hi landing
ich werde nachdenklich unter 370 USD (= Break sek. uptrend/Horizontalsupport) und rechne dann mit 340 USD (= test primärer uptrend)
Baisse: unter 340 USD
wie du weisst verfolge ich den `inflationsgedanken` mit akribie und ich lass mich da nicht von den offiziellen `gefönten` und `massierten` und `hedonisierten` zahlen blenden. schau dir das ratio aus rohstoffpreisen und Bondpreisen an (Zinsen!). es zeigt die ganze geschichte. volcker hat der inflation den garaus gemacht und das fallende ratio seit beginn der 80 er(disinflation) hat den 20 jahre währenden mega-bullmarkt hervorgebracht. mit der bodenbildung im CRB und der topbildung bei den bonds sind die equity-märkte in trouble. warum?
inflation!!!!!!!
in diesem umfeld muss gold unter den `winnern` sein. may be ich bin noch etwas zu früh dran, aber die golddukaten die ich unter der matratze habe (metapher...
) bereiten mir keinerlei schlaflosen nächte.
hier noch ein interessanter chart von contrary investor zu dem selben thema. der spx während der 70 er jahre . rot die nominalen spx-earnings:
Keepin` It Real...We suggest that the time has arrived for investors to begin seriously addressing, or at worst at least beginning to think about, nominal versus real corporate revenue and earnings growth. But, unfortunately, there`s a bit of a minor problem at the moment. Maybe it`s a bit more than just minor. Historically, the financial markets have done a very good job discounting real, or inflation adjusted, corporate earnings growth. Of course the quintessential model for this type of market discounting behavior is the entire period of the 1970`s. As you`ll see in the chart above, nominal corporate earnings (S&P 500 nominal monthly earnings) growth from 1970 through 1979 was absolutely fantastic. Yet the equity market itself, as characterized by the S&P 500, went absolutely nowhere in terms of price. The above graph tells the story better than words.
In hindsight, it is crystal clear that equity markets were discounting the influence of inflation in both corporate pricing power and reported nominal corporate earnings growth during the decade of the 1970`s.
It`s pretty clear that the 1990`s were quite the flipside experience of the 1970`s. But here we stand today at what appears to be a secular crossroads for both inflationary pressures and interest rates. Although the final verdict in terms of the tension between macro global inflationary and deflationary forces is far from having been delivered, we feel the need to start attempting to discount the influence of input pricing pressures in the ability of corporations to pass through these higher input costs in final pricing. When we look at expanding nominal corporate revenue and earnings streams, as with the case of the Dow Transports, just how much of this revenue and earnings expansion is simply recouping higher input costs? And just how much is related to margin expansion, or core profitability leverage? Now, here comes the problem. If we accept the fact that, like with the transports, companies are passing through higher input costs in their newfound pricing power, just how do we benchmark this? In our minds, the current manipulation and massaging of inflation gauge statistics such as the CPI and PPI make it extremely difficult for investors to get a sense for "real" corporate earnings growth. In essence, CPI and PPI numbers that do not reflect the true reality of inflationary pressures on both producers and consumers act to distort market efficiency in terms of investors` ability to discount real earnings growth. When oil is up almost 10% year over year, but the headline CPI reading is up only 2%, just what are equity investors to use in discounting that portion of energy prices that are driving the perception of nominal revenue growth?
Moreover, we have a whole crowd of younger institutional portfolio managers, Street strategists, etc. that have lived their entire careers so far on a one way street - disinflation street. Are they thinking about real versus nominal corporate earnings growth when making investments or recommendations for their clients? Are they distinguishing between nominal and real revenue and earnings growth in present analysis? Or has everyone become so conditioned over the last few decades to deal with nominal numbers that inflation adjustments aren`t yet given much thought when it comes to looking at absolute dollar reported corporate results? After all, it`s just as tough for younger institutional investors as it is for anyone else to use headline inflation benchmarks effectively. Of course a good part of this problem is directly related to the use of hedonics in massaging the CPI numbers. It`s also a structural result of the Boskin commission reworking the CPI a good while back. During the 1970`s, inflation was right out in the open in the CPI numbers. Not so today. Not so at all.
gruss w.