Auf zu neuen Höhen! -- Chaparral Resources Inc. -- - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[benefactor [KommA]]

[benefactor [KommA]]

Mission Statement

The strategy of Chaparral Resources, Inc. is to acquire and develop foreign oil and gas projects in emerging markets, specifically targeting fields with previously discovered reserves, which have never been commercially produced or could be materially enhanced by Chaparral`s management team and technical expertise.


Company Profile

Founded in 1972 and taken public in 1978, Chaparral Resources, Inc. (OTCBB:CHAR) is an independent oil and gas exploration and production company headquartered in White Plains, NY. Chaparral`s focus areas include the Republic of Kazakhstan and other independent countries within the former Soviet Union.

The Company`s only operating asset is its participation in the development of the Karakuduk Field, in the Republic of Kazakhstan, through KKM, which is the operating company. The Company has directly and indirectly a 60% ownership interest in KKM with the other 40% ownership interest being held by Caspian (Lukoil) which holds a majority interest in Chaparral and operates several other producing oil fields in Kazakhstan.

[benefactor [KommA]]

Umsätze und Gewinne

2004

Revenues ($)
Q1: 15,609 M.
Q2: 17,471 M.
Q3: 22,078 M.
Q4: 23,293 M.

Diluted earnings per share ($)
Q1: 0.02
Q2: 0.03
Q3: 0.09
Q4: 0.08


2005

Revenues ($)
Q1: 24,327 M.
Q2: 33,160 M.
Q3: 50,437 M.
Q4: Feb./März 2006

Diluted earnings per share ($)
Q1: 0.10
Q2: 0.17
Q3: 0.33
Q4: Feb./März 2006

[benefactor [KommA]]

Key Statistics

Weighted average number of shares outstanding (diluted): 40,475,014
Market Cap. (diluted): 218,56 M.
Total assets: 154,136 M.
Total Stockholders` equity: 78,444 M.

[benefactor [KommA]]

Liquidity and Capital Resources

We are presently engaged in the development of the Karakuduk Field, which requires substantial cash expenditures for drilling, well completions, workovers, oil storage and processing facilities, pipelines, gathering systems, water injection facilities, plant and equipment (pumps, transformer sub-stations etc.), a rail loading facility and gas utilization. We have invested approximately $177 million in the development of the Karakuduk Field and have drilled 63 new wells and re-completed 13 of the pre-existing wells at the field by September 30, 2005. Total capital expenditures for the nine months to September 30, 2005 were approximately $22 million. Capital expenditures are estimated to be at least $140 million from 2005 through 2009, including the drilling of up to 110 more wells over this period. This is higher than previously stated since in 2005 the Company has commissioned and received a new field development project that was prepared after the state reserves committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan approved a higher than previously reported reserves estimate for the Karakuduk field. We anticipate 2005 capital expenditures of approximately $35 million.

We expect to finance the continued development of the Karakuduk Field primarily through cash flows from the sale of crude oil. During the third quarter of 2005, KKM sold approximately 984,000 barrels of crude oil for $50 million, compared to 794,000 barrels for $33 million in the second quarter of 2005. As mentioned above, KKM has recently secured $40 million of new funding with which it has re-financed the loans provided by Kazkommertsbank. Current daily oil production is in excess of 12,450 barrels per day. This is 40% higher than at the same time last year.

During the remainder of 2005, KKM expects to further increase production by drilling 3 more new wells, converting at least 6 more wells to artificial lift and converting 2 more wells to water injection wells. Work on the utilization of associated gas has resulted in the gas pipeline from the field to the export point at Station 6 having been completed. In the final quarter of the year the Company will add the necessary condensate traps to this line and source two high capacity gas driven gas compressors from the United States. Construction of the rail loading facility at station 6 commenced in late September and is anticipated to be operational by August 2006.

In addition, our short and long-term liquidity is impacted by local oil sales obligations imposed on oil and gas producers within Kazakhstan to supply local energy needs, and our ability to obtain export quota necessary to sell our crude oil production on the international market. Under the terms of the Agreement, we have a right to export, and receive export quota for, 100% of the production from the Karakuduk Field. The domestic market does not permit world market prices to be obtained, resulting in, on average, $29 lower cash flow per barrel sold into the local market in the nine months to September 30, 2005. Furthermore, the Government has not allocated sufficient export quota to allow us to sell all of our available crude oil production on the world market. We are taking steps to reduce our local market obligations and to obtain an export quota that will enable us to sell all of our crude oil production on the export market. The Company has determined that it is no longer in its the best interests to pursue arbitration proceedings in Switzerland for the breach of the Agreement by the Government of Kazakhstan, instead we intend to seek an amicable resolution of this matter. If the matter cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner, we have, however, reserved our right to commence formal arbitration proceedings pursuant to our contractual arrangements with the Government.

No assurances can be provided, however, that an amicable resolution will be reached, or that if arbitration is instituted, it will be successful or that if successful, Chaparral will be able to enforce the award in Kazakhstan, or that we will be able to export 100% or a significant portion of production or that we will be able to obtain additional cash flow from operations to meet working capital requirements in the future.

During the nine months to September 30, 2005 the Company continued with the development of the Karakuduk Field. As of September 30, 2005 the total field well count had risen to 76 compared to 66 on December 31, 2004. The producing well count at the field as of September 30, 2005 was 58 wells compared to 45 at the end of 2004. One producing well was converted to an injection well.

Production for the nine months to September 30, 2005 was 2.75 million barrels, equivalent to 10,075 barrels of oil per day ("bopd"), compared to 2.19 million barrels, or 7,993 bopd, for the nine months to September 30, 2004, an increase of 26%. The Company sold 307,641 tonnes to export markets (93% of total sales) and 22,000 tonnes locally during the nine months to September 30, 2005, compared with 240,000 tonnes exported (91% of total sales) and 25,000 tonnes to the local market in the nine months to September 30, 2004.

Drilling activity continued in the third quarter. The Company drilled 3 wells (9,609 m) in the third quarter of 2005 compared to 3.6 wells (11,409m) in the second quarter of the year. The reduction in meterage was due to the fact that about 20 days were lost as the rig required essential maintenance and a scheduled load test of the derrick.

During October our average production exceeded 12,000 bopd, and we expect that this level of production will be maintained for the remainder of the year.

The Company will continue with the development of the Karakuduk Field throughout the remainder of 2005. One drilling rig and two workover rigs will operate at the field. At the beginning of the year, the Company forecasted that up to 13 wells would be drilled for the whole year, including one horizontal well, the first such well to be drilled at Karakuduk. We will complete this programme as we expect to drill a further 3 wells during this quarter and commence drilling the horizontal well before the year end.

10-Q 9/30/2005

[benefactor [KommA]]

Reserves

As of December 31, 2004, the Karakuduk Field has total estimated proved reserves of approximately 40.59 million barrels (compared with 25.62 million barrels for prior year), net of government royalty, of which our proportional interest is approximately 24.35 million barrels, based upon our 60% interest in KKM. The reserve disclosure is based on a reserve study of the Karakuduk Field conducted by McDaniel and Associates Consultants Limited ("McDaniel"), including data available subsequent to December 31, 2004, in which total estimated proved reseves were calculated in accordance with SEC Regulation SX Rule 4-10.

KKM was obliged to submit a new reserves estimate to the State Reserves Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2004. NIPINeftegas, a research institute based in Aktau, Kazakhstan, prepared a report that was received by KKM in December. This reserves report determines the ultimate recoverable reserves of the field (i.e. those thought by the institute to be obtainable from the field regardless of any economic or licence timing constraints). The in-place reserves attributed to the Karakuduk Field in this report are almost exactly the same as those of KKM`s own internal reserves report prepared by McDaniel.


Die neuen Angaben über die Reserven erscheinen im nächsten 10-K Bericht (31.03.2006).

[benefactor [KommA]]

http://www.russia4u.de

[Albatossa]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[benefactor [KommA]]

Schöner Wochenauftakt, so kann es weiter gehen.

[benefactor [KommA]]

Four Energy Essentials
Ken Kam, Marketocracy Marketscope, 01.19.06, 12:30 PM ET

SAN FRANCISCO - Our energy investments are beginning to perform again, as the market is beginning to realize how tight the supply and demand for oil truly is right now. The economy is booming, so the upward pressure on crude oil and natural gas is not going away.

The illusion that the energy problem is under control is driven by three factors: all-out OPEC production, the International Energy Agency’s release of 60 million barrels of oil last quarter, and a mild winter in the U.S. But things can change quickly: OPEC is talking about cutting back production, the IEA stopped releasing oil from its reserves in late December, and there may still be some cold days ahead before winter is over. Gasoline prices are already going back up all over the country.

High oil prices did not derail the economy in 2005 and won’t in 2006. I don’t see a recession on the horizon unless the Fed makes a mistake and pushes interest rates up too far. Barring that, I think the price-to-earnings ratios on lots of energy stocks could increase to something closer to the market average. The S&P 500’s P/E is about 16, so Valero (nyse: VLO - news - people ) and Tesoro (nyse: TSO - news - people ) would have to appreciate by 45% just to get to a market average P/E assuming no further growth in earnings. That kind of upside justifies keeping our energy positions open.

Refiners

Last year, we recommended three refining stocks--Valero, Premcor (nyse: PCO - news - people ) and Tes­oro--and all three just about doubled. Premcor was taken over by Valero, but we continue to recommend Valero and Tesoro. Earnings at these two companies are booming, but the stocks continue to trade at P/E ratios well below aver­age. The main reason stocks like Valero trade at 11 times earnings is that Wall Street doesn’t believe the earnings are sustainable because refining has his­torically not been an attractive industry.

Oil Producers

We recommended PetroKazakhstan (nyse: PKZ - news - people ) in July 2005 at $37. It promptly jumped after only a few weeks when the Chinese National Oil Corp.’s $55 offer was accepted in a fierce competition that included the Oil and Natural Gas Corp., the Indian energy company and Russian rival, Lukoil (other-otc: LUKOF - news - people ).

Many of the things we found attractive about PetroKazakjstan we also see in Chaparral (nasdaq: CHAR - news - people ). Like PetroKazakjstan, Chaparral’s oil reserves in Kazakhstan are desirable because they are outside of the volatile Middle East and close to pipelines that can carry the crude to Russia, China or India.

Drillers & Suppliers

At today’s oil prices, a lot of exhausted oil fields are economical again, but it takes a lot of work to make these old oil fields productive. We recom­mended Lufkin Industries (nasdaq: LUFK - news - people ) in De­cember because they provide the pumps (which are the “picks and shovels”) needed to turn these fields around.

Previous boom/bust cycles in the industry have left only two U.S. competitors and Lufkin in the only publicly traded one. Now that the industry cycle is on the upswing, Lufkin is perfectly positioned to make money on the sale of new units, spare parts and the servicing of its large installed base.

Ken Kam is founder and chief executive of Marketocracy and portfolio manager of the Marketocracy Masters 100 Fund. Click here for more of Ken Kam’s analysis and picks in Marketocracy Marketscope.
http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/19/tesoro-valero-marketocracy-…

[waxweazle]

Chart weekly




Chart daily

[benefactor [KommA]]

Chaparral Resources announces new Chief Executive Officer and temporary suspension of drilling activity
Tuesday January 24, 10:42 am ET

WHITE PLAINS, NY, Jan. 24 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ - Chaparral Resources, Inc. (OTCBB: CHAR - News; the "Company") today announced that the Board of Directors of the Company has elected Boris S. Zilbermints, a current Director of the Company, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company to replace Simon Gill who resigned following the merger of the Company`s former majority shareholder, Nelson Resources Limited ("Nelson"), with and into Caspian Investments Resources Ltd. ("Caspian"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of LUKOIL Overseas Holding Ltd. ("Lukoil"). Mr. Zilbermints is Lukoil`s Regional Director for Kazakhstan.

The Company also announced today that its operating subsidiary in Kazakhstan, JSC Karakudukmunay ("KKM"), has temporarily suspended the drilling of new wells in the Karakuduk Field. This temporary suspension is the result of the unexpected decision by Oil and Gas Drilling and Exploration of Krakow ("OGEC") not to renew its current drilling contract with KKM which had expired on December 31, 2005. OGEC is now in the process of finishing demobilizing the rig from the Karakuduk Field. The Company is using its best efforts to secure another rig to replace the OGEC rig as quickly as possible and plans to resume its drilling program as soon as a new rig can be secured. However, it is uncertain at this time when the Company will be able to resume its 2006 drilling program. The drilling campaign delay could potentially lead to lower than anticipated 2006 production levels. In the meantime, the Company will continue with its current workover operations and other field development and production activities.

Mr. Zilbermints, the Company`s CEO, stated that "The temporary suspension of drilling activities will permit KKM to conduct a detailed analysis of the geological data from its recently drilled wells and will also enable KKM`s ongoing facilities development program to keep pace with current and future productive capacity."


Jetzt geht es erstmal wieder abwärts die nächsten Wochen(Monate?).

[waxweazle]

Bodenbildung abwarten!!!
Unterstüzungen siehe oben chart!

[Steigerwälder]

Servus Benefaktor,


hast dich ja schon im Vaalco Thread durch fundierte Aussagen hervorgetan. Bei EGY bin ich damals in einer ähnlichen Situation (ebenfalls -20% an einem Tag) eingestiegen. Sieht fast so aus als braut sich hier auch so eine Gelegenheit zusammen.

Was hälst du davon? Ist die Situation vergleichbar? So wie´s aussieht wird ja lediglich kurzfristig etwas weniger gefördert...

[Moneymaker_4]

oh oh, das sieht mir aber gar nicht gut aus

und ob das so kurzfristig ist...

Gewinne sichern kann nie schaden!

Viel Erfolg!

[Vinyard]

Ich werd se wohl auch nimma anrühren.

Wo Lukoil seine Finger drin hat, da lass ich meine draußen.

Meine These:

Lukoil verbreitet ein paar schlechte Nachrichten und will den Rest des Ladens billig übernehmen. Welches Interesse sollte sie an einem höhen Börsenwert haben. Sie wollen die Char ja nicht veräußern sondern günstig eingliedern.

Warum läuft die Akie trotz der groteskten Unterbewertung seit der Nelson-Übernahme nicht mehr richtig?

[benefactor [KommA]]

[posting]19.861.764 von Steigerwälder am 24.01.06 22:16:14[/posting]Also erstmal habe ich sofort nach Erscheinen der Nachricht verkauft(hohe 5er Kurse). Diese kurzfristige Reaktion war vorauszusehen.

Die Nachricht an sich ist nicht schlimm. Die aktuellen Bohrungen werden auf Eis gelegt, bis KKM (CHAR) einen neuen Ersatz findet. Die Produktion läuft aktuell auf über 12000 BOPD. Somit kann CHAR trotzdem, je nach Ölpreis zwischen 0.20$ bis 0.40$ (diluted) pro Quartal einnehmen. Die Produktionssteigerung verzögert sich eben etwas.

Größter Risikofaktor: komplette Übernahme durch Lukoil

Ich werde in den nächsten Tagen(Wochen) wieder einsteigen. Um so günstiger ich reinkomme, um so besser.

[Albatossa]

[posting]19.870.237 von benefactor am 25.01.06 12:45:26[/posting]Ich nehme an das Zeitfenster wird nicht allzu groß sein um wieder einzusteigen!

[benefactor [KommA]]

Jetzt sollte man so langsam wieder in die Vollen gehen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass es noch mal viel billiger wird, ist gering.

[Albatossa]

[posting]20.108.251 von benefactor am 08.02.06 22:32:02[/posting]Wenn ich nur an das kommende KGV von geschäftsjahr 2005 denke und welcher Gewinn hier eingefahren wird und mir die Börsemkapitalisierung anschaue zu Firmen die nicht annährend da gleiche bieten, dann ist diese Aktie hoffnungslos unterbewertet!

[Bulle Benny]

Hallo Albatossa, u. Ko. (viele seit ihr ja eh nicht)...


bin zufällig im Internet auf die Aktie fündig geworden! Die Story stimmt, die Aussichten eben auch, nur die Firma wird kaum noch gehandelt! In Deutschland "null" u. der Rest der Stücke die noch vorhanden sind, sind der Massen knapp, das es schwierig wird eine normalen Kurs zu bekommen!

Wie habt ihr euere Aktien bekommen?

Was haltet ihr eigentlich von Max Petroleum???

Würd gerne nee Antwort bekommen! Die Aktie ist zwar besser wie Max Pe.. nur was nützt es mir, wenn zu wenig Aktien im Umlauf sind u. wenn Lukoil mehr als 60% im Peto hat!

Oder habt ihr andere tolle ÖL-Aktien im Auge! Würde mich
um Antwort freuen!

Gruß Benny

[Albatossa]

[posting]20.425.461 von Bulle Benny am 28.02.06 16:29:22[/posting]Am besten ist wenn man in Amerika kauft/verkauft oder man wartet solange bis Amerika die Börse aufmachtm, weil dann der Handel in Frankfurt sich am Kurs von Amerika orientiert und damit wird der Spread kleiner! Über Max Petroleum will ich nichts sagen weil dies von einer ganz gewissen Schiene empfohlen wird und ich deren Rat niemals folge, weil ich keine Lust habe mich wie ein Lemming abzocken zu lassen!

Gruß Albatossa

[benefactor [KommA]]

Chaparral Resources and Lukoil enter into a definitive agreement to merge
Monday March 13, 8:03 am ET

WHITE PLAINS, NY, March 13 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ - Chaparral Resources, Inc. (OTCBB: CHAR - News), an exploration and development company operating in Kazakhstan, today announced that it has entered into a definitive agreement with LUKOIL Overseas Holding Ltd. ("Lukoil") dated March 13, 2006 to effect a merger into a wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil. On the effective date of this merger, all issued and outstanding common stock of Chaparral will be exchanged for $5.80 per share in cash, resulting in a payment to minority shareholders of approximately $88.646 million.

The transaction is subject to the approval of a meeting of stockholders expected to be held in May 2006. At this meeting the approval of 50% of the outstanding shares will be required to vote in favour of the merger for it to become effective. Closing is subject to certain other conditions including the receipt of all regulatory approvals and consents.

The merger agreement contains customary provisions prohibiting Chaparral from soliciting any other acquisition proposals but allows the Board of Directors to recommend a superior proposal if it is required to do so to avoid breaching its fiduciary duties and upon payment of a termination fee of $2.5 million plus costs, subject to a maximum amount of $3 million.

A Special Committee of the Board of Directors has negotiated the terms of the agreement with Lukoil. The Special Committee has retained independent counsel and received a fairness opinion from its independent financial advisor, Petrie Parkman & Co., Inc. The financial advisor to the Special Committee has advised that the offer to shareholders of Chaparral is fair, from a financial point of view.

Subject to stockholder approval and satisfaction of conditions precedent to the merger agreement, the proposed transaction is expected to complete in May 2006.
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/060313/to071.html?.v=26

[best_choice]

Der Preis ist ein Witz (ein schlechter), erst recht, wenn man die Ergebnisse 2005 sieht.
Ich werde abwarten. Kein vernünftiger Aktionär würde das annehmen.
Welche Chancen aber darüber hinaus bestehen, vermag ich nicht zu sagen.

Eure Meinungen ?

[fireball69]

Ich werde abwarten. Dieser Abschlag zu den Kursen in 2005 ist nicht zu akzeptieren. Oder? Was meint ihr?

[Albatossa]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 21.002.476 von fireball69 am 30.03.06 00:19:13

Wenn ich mir die Zahlen so anschaue die vorgestern herausgekommen sind
und den Jahresgewinn dann ist das Angebot von Lukoil ein Witz! Ich für meine Person verschenke meine Aktien nicht, wenn aber andere ihre Aktien so einfach wegwerfen dann kann ich es auch nicht halten!

[Albatossa]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 21.037.030 von Albatossa am 31.03.06 22:06:27

Noch jemand da?

[benefactor [KommA]]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 22.458.459 von Albatossa am 07.07.06 20:44:04

Chaparral Resources Buyout Highlights Lukoil's Questionable Tactics
Monday September 18, 11:27 am ET

Thomas Kirchner submits: Russian oil giant Lukoil's attempt to buy out the minority shareholders of Chaparral Resources, Inc. raises serious concerns about shareholder rights and the treatment of outside investors by the first Russian company to list on the London Stock Exchange -- one that claims to be a model for openness and transparency.

Over the last few years, Lukoil, described by many observers as an extended arm of the Kremlin, has tried repeatedly to expand its operations in Kazakhstan, which it views as strategically important for its vast oil reserves. Last year, it lost the $4.2 billion takeover battle of Canadian PetroKazakhstan to the Chinese National Petroleum Company. In the heat of that fight, it bought another player in Kazakhstan's oil industry, Nelson Resources, and thereby acquired a stake in CHAR, which it eventually raised to a 60% majority. Following its defeat in the PetroKazakhstan saga, Lukoil has taken on an easier target: the minority shareholders of CHAR.

While it is not surprising that Lukoil seeks to consolidate its presence in Kazakhstan, it is the tactics it employs that raise eyebrows among U.S. investors. Minority shareholders have a tough stance anywhere in the world, but when U.S. minority shareholders and a Russian company are involved, two extremes come together. Shareholders would not even know the whole story, had it not come to light through a class action lawsuit against the buyout. Lukoil's managers seem to have been unaware of the remarkable powers enjoyed by plaintiffs in the U.S. to compel the release of internal documents during discovery, as they left an extensive paper trail. Frank Quattrone's infamous e-mail instructing employees to 'clean up' their files sounds harmless and innocent compared to the unambiguous and direct language in documents released through Chaparral's proxy materials.

During the preparation of the 10-K in early 2006, a Lukoil executive instructed Chaparral in internal e-mails to “add something a little negative to the report” and complained that it conveyed a “positive impression” and used “positive words.” To make sure that investors got a negative impression, he also suggested the deletion from a press release of production data that showed growth. In fact, production had been a major drag on CHAR's stock price for a few months, because drilling of new wells had been suspended at the end of 2005 when the lease on the CHAR's only drilling rig on the Karakuduk oil field expired. The field is operated jointly by Lukoil and CHAR. However, the expiration of that lease was caused deliberately by Lukoil, which refused to renew the lease contract, even though the rig's owner kept urging a renewal. The suspension of drilling had the desired effect: CHAR's stock price dropped by more than 23%. Investors were told neither that two new rigs had already been lined up, nor that drilling and production would be accelerated later in the year.

With the stock price depressed artificially, Lukoil made a lowball offer for the shares of CHAR's minority shareholders. Lukoil's initial bid of $5.50 per share was soon raised to the final price of $5.80 when it became clear that this was a level at which one institutional holder was willing to sell. While CHAR and Lukoil were debating whether $5.50 or 5.80 was the right price, CHAR's financial adviser indicated that the value of the firm in the $8-$11 range.

Even though it exploited the Karakuduk field jointly with CHAR, Lukoil executives regarded it
as theirs. In an email, the CFO of CHAR talks of Lukoil's regional director for Kazakhstan, Boris Zilbermints, making “noises” about payments from the oil field to CHAR, which “is letting the minority shareholders receive funds.” Presumably, this is an example of what a CHAR director describes in another email as “the Russian way of doing business.” So are some of the other scare tactics used by Lukoil. It threatened to shut-in the Karakuduk field if no deal were reached, or to cease development or fire the board of directors.

This is not to say that firing the board of directors would have been a bad outcome. A committee of two independent directors had been created to lead the negotiations with Lukoil, as is standard practice in mergers, with a mandate to represent shareholder interests. At least one of the two directors on the committee, however, appears to have had more concern for Lukoil’s interests than for those of shareholders. He leaked the valuation range that CHAR's financial adviser had calculated to Lukoil, so that CHAR was negotiating with a buyer who knew the price range of the seller. The two directors appear to have been well aware of the problematic nature of the buyout, as they negotiated a highly unusual clause in their indemnification agreement: if there is a lawsuit in connection with the merger, they will be paid $300 per hour for time spent defending themselves. In other words, the less they represent shareholders, the longer the lawsuits will be, and the more they get paid.

The big question is: why does Lukoil bother going to such great lengths to strongarm minority shareholders? Chaparral is a $200 million company of which Lukoil owns 60%, so that the buyout is costing a mere $80 million. This is small change for the world's second largest oil company by reserves, which posted net
profits of approximately $1.7 billion in the first quarter alone. Clearly, it could afford to pay fair value if it wanted, without the need to squeeze outside shareholders to the bone.

Lukoil's actions can only be explained by culture. As in many other emerging markets, Russian companies have an appalling record of treating minority shareholders, and Lukoil is exporting this standard to the U.S. market. Add to this a few ambitious regional and divisional managers seeking to impress their superiors with clever financial maneuvering. In a 2003 presentation posted on Lukoil's website, Lukoil's regional management for Kazakhstan boasts of its skill at buying assets low and selling high - they are sure to get top grades in that subject due to their Chaparral dealings.

For any large corporation, it is easy for top executives to tout their firm as a modern, shareholder-friendly company with good governance. But it is much harder to get B and C-level executives to act in that spirit. In Lukoil's case, middle management actively torpedoes the tone set at the top, and sooner or later it will lose any credibility with investors. And it is a mystery how exactly Lukoil intends to build a brand name for its gas stations in the Mid-Atlantic while establishing a reputation of abusing shareholders. What money they save on the CHAR purchase today will not be enough to fix their reputation in the future.

With Lukoil guaranteed to vote its 60% stake at the September 29th shareholder meeting in favor of selling CHAR to itself, the fate of Chaparral's minority shareholders is now in the hands of the Delaware courts. Class action lawsuits are often vilified, but if you are a holder of Chaparral, it is your only shot at getting a fair price for your shares.

Thomas Kirchner manages the Pennsylvania Avenue Event-Driven Fund [PAEDX], which holds shares in Chaparral Resources, Inc.