Deutschlands (und nicht etwa Ackermanns) Mannesmann Affaere - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[PresAbeL]

... so kann man die Sache naemlich auch sehen! In London und New York schuettelt man jedenfalls fassungslos die Koepfe:

Germany`s Mannesmann affair

The trials of Josef A
Jan 5th 2006
From The Economist print edition

A new trial for the head of Germany`s biggest bank should unsettle investors as well as bosses

ReutersEVERY now and again, a rumour does the rounds in Frankfurt that Deutsche Bank is planning to move its headquarters from Germany`s financial capital to London or New York. Germany`s biggest bank ritually restates its loyalty and the story dies down. However, such are the occasional frictions between Deutsche Bank`s ways and the corporate traditions of its homeland that its bosses must sometimes be tempted to unscrew their nameplate and go. They could be forgiven for feeling that way now, following the ruling just before Christmas by Germany`s federal appeal court that the bank`s chief executive, Josef Ackermann, and five other men must stand trial for a second time.

Mr Ackermann`s troubles have nothing to do with his tenure at Deutsche Bank, where he has been a successful though far from flawless leader (see article). They stem instead from the hostile takeover in early 2000 by Britain`s Vodafone of Mannesmann, a German telecommunications company on whose supervisory board Mr Ackermann sat. Mannesmann`s management resisted Vodafone`s bid stoutly, extracting much more generous terms from the British that were worth many billions to their shareholders. The result looked to many like a German embrace, for better or worse, of Anglo-Saxon capitalism: a successful, but fiercely fought, hostile bid, in which the views of institutional shareholders were in the end decisive. The rewards paid to Mannesmann`s bosses after the dust settled (approved by Mr Ackermann and the supervisory board), had an Anglo-Saxon ring to them too: €57m ($55m) in all—a lot of money to be sure, but a small fraction of the extra shareholders gained from Vodafone`s successful higher offer.

In America or Britain, these bonuses might have raised a few eyebrows and caused a whistle or two. In Germany, said prosecutors, they were illegal: Mr Ackermann and his colleagues had no business to approve them. The company was not contractually obliged to pay its executives so handsomely and, since they were leaving, the payments could not be construed as incentives. A trial ensued. In July 2004, a court found that securities law had been breached, but not seriously enough to warrant conviction, and the men were acquitted. The prosecutors, though, appealed and have now won a fresh trial. Although the prosecutors still have to prove their guilt, the appeal court`s presiding judge hardly sounded sympathetic to Mr Ackermann and the rest, calling the payments “an irresponsible waste of company money”.

Sorry, I`m out of the office
All this, of course, is unsettling for Mr Ackermann and his bank. Although he is determined to keep his job, the prospect of a time-consuming second trial is an unwelcome distraction at best. And a guilty verdict, even if it did not mean a prison sentence, would surely make his position untenable.

However, the legal to and fro ought to be as disturbing for investors in German companies as it is for their bosses. After Vodafone bought Mannesmann, they might have assumed that the market for corporate control in Germany was starting to work much as it does in America or Britain. Now they cannot be so certain. At the very least, members of German boards would do well to be much better briefed and prepared when dealing with takeovers than Mr Ackermann and his colleagues appear to have been.

But there is a lesson for German policymakers too. At the end of this case, they should make sure that investors and managers know where they stand. If after-the-fact rewards for extracting high prices from bidders are illegal, or if clear limits on them are to be set, so be it. But this could hurt the very interests that prosecutors are supposed to be protecting. If managers of listed companies see little gain in fighting a hostile bid, no one should be surprised if they choose a quiet life. Friendly mergers and alliances are much less bother, especially if less heed can be paid to shareholders (including small ones).

Some German politicians may take comfort from the potential buttressing of a traditional German form of capitalism. Maybe they shouldn`t. Corporate control, like anything that can be bought and sold, has a habit of ending up with those who value it most. If shareholders in listed companies decide that juicy takeover battles are less likely than they were, they may be more willing to sell. That could be good news for the foreign private-equity firms now running the rule over much of German business—ironically the very groups that ignited a row last year when they were accused of being predatory “locusts”. Much more than Mr Ackermann`s job is at stake.

[derdieschnautzelangsamvollhat]

PresAbel,

nach dem Artikel wurde der Schwanz eingezogen und nun soll das Verfahren gegen Bussgeld eingestellt werden..

Eine Reform der Kapitalmarktgesetze ist trotzdem überfällig. Und zwar so transparent, dass auch kleine Investoren durchblicken ohne drei Anwälte bezahlen zu müssen.

[PresAbeL]

[posting]19.744.615 von derdieschnautzelangsamvollhat am 17.01.06 00:36:57[/posting]@Schnautze, das Posting von Dir liest sich ja mal richtig gut. Jetzt bin ich gespannt, wann denn aus Deutschland so starke Kolumnen (es geht mir jetzt ganz ungeheuchelt um Qualitaet, gar nicht um Richtung) zu lesen sind. Ich hoffe, Du haeltst mich diesbezueglich auf dem laufenden.