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    Billiger wird Bank Bali (885816) nicht mehr! - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

    eröffnet am 29.03.00 15:50:48 von
    neuester Beitrag 12.07.01 12:28:07 von
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     Ja Nein
      Avatar
      schrieb am 29.03.00 15:50:48
      Beitrag Nr. 1 ()
      Hi Leute!

      Bank Bali ist so billig wie noch nie.Kaufen!!!!

      Gibt es hier noch mehr Leute die die Aktie haben?
      Avatar
      schrieb am 25.06.00 23:12:51
      Beitrag Nr. 2 ()
      Ich habe Bank Bali bei 0.05 gekauft.Glaube an Gute Zeiten.
      Kaufen wenn alles im Keller liegt.Halten und nicht nervös
      werden,wenn der Kurs mal anzieht.Warten bis 5000% Gewinn
      drin sind.Habe 100000 Anteile.
      Mfg.:Willi
      Avatar
      schrieb am 26.06.00 00:06:11
      Beitrag Nr. 3 ()
      Werde voraussichtlich per nächste Woche weitere
      200000 Anteile ordern.Bin Optimist,trotz Krise
      bei Bank Bali.
      Avatar
      schrieb am 26.06.00 11:32:41
      Beitrag Nr. 4 ()
      Bank Bali to offer 66.5bn new shares
      JAKARTA (IF) -- Bank Bali is planning to offer 66.528.577.467 new shares of `Class B` through its third rights issue. The management will ask approval from its shareholders in forthcoming meeting of shareholders, scheduled on June 30, 2000.
      In a letter sent to the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) dated on June 22, 2000, Bank Bali said that the nominal value of the new share will be of Rp5. It would be offered to the public at Rp72.86 per share through a 1 on 99 ratio. IBRA will act as a stand-by buyer. The new shares would be listed at JSX and SSX.
      Bank Bali`s management team elaborates in its letter to the JSX that capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of Bank Bali reached 84.10% as of March 2000 or lower than its level of 84.48% a year earlier.
      The government has approved to provide the bank with Rp4.8tr recapitalization fund.

      so`n mist kauft doch keiner! zum geld verschenken geht man besser ins casino....
      Avatar
      schrieb am 26.06.00 12:34:32
      Beitrag Nr. 5 ()
      Gehört dieses Thema nicht ins ASIEN-Board?

      Trading Spotlight

      Anzeige
      Rallye II. – Neuer Anstoß, News und was die Börsencommunity jetzt nicht verpassen will…mehr zur Aktie »
      Avatar
      schrieb am 10.04.01 20:45:17
      Beitrag Nr. 6 ()
      Gibt es neue Infos? Oder bleibt der Kurs wo er ist, die nächsten 2 Jahre?
      Avatar
      schrieb am 17.05.01 18:20:00
      Beitrag Nr. 7 ()
      Heute seit langem wieder auf die 50 Ruphia hoch !
      Avatar
      schrieb am 20.05.01 10:13:51
      Beitrag Nr. 8 ()
      habe bank indonesia gekauft
      für 0,002. da kommt bank bali
      auch noch hin
      grus lupos
      Avatar
      schrieb am 21.05.01 00:12:09
      Beitrag Nr. 9 ()
      Klar, 5000 % mit Bank Bali :laugh: Träumt weiter - ihr habt doch BB mal auf irgendeinem Kurszettel gelesen, gedacht"Gott sind die billig" und blind gekauft :D

      Diese Performance ist vielleicht bei einem Technowert möglich - bei einer Bank bist Du dann schon lange in der Kiste :D
      Avatar
      schrieb am 21.05.01 01:15:00
      Beitrag Nr. 10 ()
      seit wann sind die denn im SDAX?
      Avatar
      schrieb am 04.06.01 00:52:47
      Beitrag Nr. 11 ()
      Ich kann Euch die Kontonummer einer Bank auf Vanuatu geben. Dann ist das Geld wenigstens gleich weg und ihr müßt nicht noch lange angestrengt einen Kurs verfolgen.
      Alternativ: Gleich für die Entwicklungshilfe Bali spenden!
      Avatar
      schrieb am 06.07.01 17:11:35
      Beitrag Nr. 12 ()
      Hier eine kleine Story zur Bank Bali:

      CHRONOLOGY OF THE GOVERNMENT`S INTERVENTION IN
      BANK INDONESIA

      This is a translated transcript of a report submitted to the House of Representatives by Bank Indonesia Governor Sjahril Sabirin on June 7, 2000.

      Jakarta, Wednesday, Dec. 29, 1999

      Abdurrahman Wahid requested my presence at Bina Graha presidential office together with Minister of Finance Bambang Sudibyo, Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) deputy chairman Cacuk Sudaryanto and Hariadi Ahmad (a legislator from Commission IX for banking and finance).

      I guessed that we would discuss the Texmaco issue. However, the topic under discussion was not what I expected, although it did not surprise me. The President said: "The governor of Bank Indonesia will be replaced, and his replacement will be Mr. Dono Iskandar." I think I was quite calm in responding to it by saying:

      "I have personally no problem if I have to resign from Bank Indonesia; I am ready to resign at any time. After all, they (the government of former president Soeharto) requested me to return to Bank Indonesia, it was not my own desire. But the new law of Bank Indonesia stipulates that the governor of Bank Indonesia cannot be dismissed before the expiration of his term of office, except under three circumstances: in the case that he resigns, is incapacitated or is convicted of a criminal offense. I cannot yet resign because I still have work to accomplish and if I resign because I am forced to do so, I would be violating the law".

      The President responded that he would assign the minister of finance to propose a bill (to the House of Representatives) to amend the law on Bank Indonesia. The President also said that if necessary, he would issue a presidential decree (he meant a government regulation in lieu of a law). I did not respond to his statement. However, I did not know what Messrs. Bambang Sudibyo, Cacuk Sudaryanto, Hariadi were thinking. After exiting the President`s room, I, Bambang Sudibyo, Cacuk Sudaryanto, Hariadi Ahmad assembled for a moment in the room of the presidential secretary (Ratih) and we asked each other why the President had revealed at the meeting that the governor of Bank Indonesia was to be replaced.

      Jakarta, Tuesday, Feb. 29, 2000

      That night, Mr. Subarjo called me and said that he got a message from the assistant to the attorney general that the attorney general (Marzuki Darusman) wished to see me at the Grand Hyatt hotel, on the 24th floor at 9 a.m. the following day, together with Mr. Subarjo. I asked him if he was sure that it was the assistant to Marzuki that had called him. After some time Mr. Subarjo called again and said that the assistant to Marzuki had called him again and gave him the cellular phone number of Marzuki in the event that I wished to check it with him directly. I did not, but asked my secretary to do so the following morning.

      Jakarta, Wednesday, March 1, 2000

      On that morning my secretary called the assistant to Marzuki, and the instruction for me to be at the Grand Hyatt hotel in the morning was correct. I asked my secretary to tell Mr. Subarjo that the request for a meeting from Mr. Marzuki was correct. That afternoon Mr. Subarjo left for Mecca to go on the pilgrimage.

      At 9:05 a.m. I arrived at the Grand Hyatt and someone who I presumed was in charge of arranging the meeting room was waiting for me. Mr. Subarjo was also waiting for me in the hotel lobby. We went to the 24th floor to have breakfast.

      There we inadvertently met the IMF`s (International Monetary Fund) Anoop Singh (who was on a mission in Jakarta) and John Dodsworth (IMF`s chief in Jakarta) who were having breakfast. There is no closed rooms there, and we were waiting while drinking coffee in a corner of the breakfast room that morning.

      A Grand Hyatt staffer left us, possibly to check on whether or not Mr. Marzuki had arrived and to look for a better (closed) room. Some time later, as Mr. Marzuki had arrived we were escorted to a (closed) room on an upper floor. Mr. Marzuki was waiting alone for us there (his assistant waited for him outside the room).

      First, Mr. Marzuki asked Mr. Subarjo whether or not he had told me, at which Mr. Subarjo replied he had not and that he preferred him to do so personally. Mr. Marzuki put forward the case of Bank Bali, and said that he had some information which the public prosecutors did not have and that even if I had attended the "meeting" at Hotel Mulia on Feb. 11, 1999, I still might not have been involved in any discussion leading to an "agreement" in the case of Bank Bali. He said he believed I was not involved, but said that the testimony of other parties might make me a suspect.

      Then Mr. Marzuki put forward the President`s request for my resignation as the governor of Bank Indonesia. In brief, he told me that the President was giving me two options: resign and not be named a suspect or stay in my position and risk being named a suspect. In other words if I did not resign, I would be named a suspect in the Bank Bali case. He also said that, to make it look "elegant", he had discussed with the minister of foreign affairs the possibility of making me an ambassador, or possibly a member of the Supreme Advisory Council.

      I told him that I had not played any role and that I am innocent of any involvement in the Bank Bali case. I also said that I would basically stand by my decision, that is not to resign from Bank Indonesia, because if I did resign it would harm the system already established by virtue of the new law on Bank Indonesia. He gave me a day or two to give a definite answer. However, he highly expected to receive my answer on that very day as he had to meet the President then.

      Before returning to my office, Mr. Subarjo and I had a talk while drinking orange juice at the coffee shop on the mezzanine. He told me that the night before he talked to Mr. Marzuki by phone, and that Mr. Marzuki mentioned the choices explicitly: resign or be named a suspect; and he requested that Mr. Subarjo tell me.

      At noon, Mr. Marzuki tried to contact me two or three times (through my secretary), and I believe he would have asked for my answer. I could only contact him in the afternoon, but he was having a meeting with the President at the palace. He was already out of the President`s room when my secretary put me through to him on his cellular phone. I asked him to give me until the following day to answer. He did not say much, but he agreed.

      Jakarta, Thursday, March 2, 2000

      That morning, I gave a keynote speech on Bank Indonesia`s current position at a seminar organized by an institution led by Mr. Fachry Ali. The seminar started about 40 minutes late. Then at 10:30 a.m. I accepted the deputy prime minister and the Netherlands` minister of the economy, Mrs. Joritsma, at Bank Indonesia`s office, and continued with a round-table conference on the third floor of B building with more than 40 businessmen and bankers from the Netherlands, with presentations from Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and the Capital Market Supervisory Board (Bappepam).

      At 12 p.m. I accepted Mr. Todung Mulya Lubis, and Mr. Kemus Amir Syarifudin and Ms. Tituk (Kusumaningtuti). T. Mulya Lubis is a lawyer who assists Bank Indonesia, and me, in the case of Bank Bali. Amir recommended (and Mulya agreed) that I try to postpone giving an answer to Mr. Marzuki until Monday in order to have more time to think.

      That noon, Mr. Marzuki also tried to contact me. It was only in the afternoon that I could talk to Mr. Marzuki, who was in his office, by phone. My secretary contacted him on his cellular phone. I told him that the choices were very hard: resign from Bank Indonesia or be named a suspect in the Bank Bali case.

      Many officials and officers of Bank Indonesia have been summoned by the public prosecutor to appear as witnesses, which has greatly disturbed them both physically and mentally. I find this difficult, and it possibly has something to do with my unwillingness to resign from Bank Indonesia.

      On the other hand, I would feel guilty if I resigned because it would implicitly make the independence of Bank Indonesia -- which the legislature, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance have long fought for by formulating Law No. 23/1999 -- ineffective. In addition, the "market" would consider my resignation an absence of rationality of law because (it would mean) the President could tamper with the law and thereby disrupt economic stability.

      Mr. Marzuki tried to direct me to resign from Bank Indonesia by saying that my resignation followed by a posting as an ambassador would not demonstrate any intervention from the President. In the mean time, I asked him whether or not there was another alternative, for example by letting Bank Indonesia work without any intervention, until people forgot about the request for my resignation. Then, in due time after completing my major tasks, I would resign voluntarily.

      I requested Mr. Marzuki give me more time to think about it and that I would give a definite answer on Monday, March 6. Mr. Marzuki agreed and said that as he would be out of town on Monday, I could give him my answer on Tuesday.

      Monday, March 6, 2000

      At noon, my secretary received a phone call from the assistant to Mr. Marzuki who said that Mr. Try Sutrisno was inviting me to his home to have a dinner on the following day, together with Mr. Marzuki and Mr. Rachmat Saleh, and that I would be asked about my answer to the choices (resign or be named a suspect).

      I was becoming more confused, especially about the role of Mr. Try, who had no official position then; is he close to the President? I discussed it with Mr. Rachmat Saleh, and he considered it inappropriate for me to attend, as people would consider it an effort on my part to find a political alliance, etc. Then I requested my secretary to inform him that I could not attend because of the above mentioned reason, and I suggested a private meeting with only Mr. Marzuki at Bank Indonesia`s office or the Attorney General`s Office.

      Tuesday, March 7, 2000

      According to my secretary, on that morning she received several calls from the secretary to Marzuki, with the same message, namely asking me to accept the invitation to go to Mr. Try`s house.

      I was finally informed that Mr. Marzuki had proposed a meeting at the Attorney General`s Office at 7 p.m. Since the day before, Mr. K. Amir Syarifuddin had prepared a letter for me to give to Mr. Marzuki. It was a written response to the President`s request.

      At first I considered it inappropriate to write such a letter, because I was afraid it would be considered that I was trying to corner Mr. Marzuki. But Mr. Amir later convinced me that it was legally necessary, and after softening its substance I signed the letter to give to Mr. Marzuki.

      After finishing the monthly and weekly meeting of the board of governors, I went to the Attorney General`s Office, and upon arrival at 8 p.m. there was a demonstration of the Students Action Front for Reform and Democracy (Famred) demanding that corruptors be put on trial. They forced Mr. Marzuki to talk to them, thereby causing the meeting to be postponed until almost 10 p.m.

      I entered Mr. Marzuki`s office through another door so as to avoid reporters, who were there with the students.

      I told him my reasons for not resigning, and the history of my return to Bank Indonesia and that Mr. Harto (former president Soeharto) had not known me (previous to being first appointed), etc. I also gave him the letter I had prepared. Mr. Marzuki looked disappointed because he apparently thought I would submit my resignation.

      It seems that he had hinted to the President that I would resign. In response to my suggestion to consider another alternative, in the interest of the economy and other reasons, (namely, let me and Bank Indonesia operate free from intervention for some time until people forgot about the request for my resignation, and in due time and after accomplishing my major tasks I would resign of my own free will) Mr. Marzuki asked me how much time I would need, whether if one year was enough and if so he would discuss it with the President. I told him that it could be two years. The meeting lasted for approximately 20 minutes, and I got the impression that he would discuss it with the President.

      Monday, March 27, 2000

      On that day Mr. Subarjo, who had just returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca, came to meet me. He brought a message from Mr. Marzuki in the event that I had changed my mind. He also told me that Mr. Marzuki had not yet discussed the substance of my previous letter with the President (of which I am not convinced). I told him that I would stand by my decision not to resign.

      Chiang Mai, Monday, May 8, 2000

      My wife and I, as well as Mr. Achjar Iljas, Mr. Didi, Mr. Hartadi Sarwono, Mr. Nana Supriana, had been in Chiang Mai since Thursday to attend an Asian Development Bank meeting and to give presentations in front of bankers and investors together with Minister of Finance Bambang Sudibyo. At noon, my secretary called and told me that there was a summons to appear before the South Jakarta District Court on Thursday, May 11 to testify in the case of Djoko Chandra. Considering that it was too close to when I would return to Jakarta, I, through an official of the legal department of Bank Indonesia, Mr. Ivo, requested that public prosecutor Ridwan Mukiat postpone my testimony until Monday, May 15, and he agreed.

      Jakarta, Tuesday, May 16, 2000

      Mr. Aris Junaidi, who is close to the President, and his colleague Mr. Ridho Hakim contacted me and told me that the President wished to see me to have an informal talk. Therefore at approximately 8:30 p.m., accompanied by Mr. Difi, I went to Merdeka Palace to meet the President.

      Mr. Aris and Mr. Ridho were waiting for us at the State Guest House, and the four of us went to Merdeka Palace by foot to meet the President. The President asked me about the issue of Mr. Prijadi, who had failed Bank Indonesia`s fit and proper test. I told him that my colleagues in Bank Indonesia had done their best and had exercised fair judgment and that the result had been told to him.

      Mr. President said Prijadi was the person who developed the rural credit scheme at BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia), and without whom BRI would collapse. I explained to him that to the best of my knowledge it was the late Sugiyanto who had developed the scheme, that the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) named BRI`s KUPEDES rural credit program "the Sugiyanto scheme".

      The President said Prijadi played a large role in BRI. I said Bank Indonesia could summon Prijadi, and if there was any new information, BI would study it. If the new information could improve his fit and proper test result, BI would certainly revise the result.

      In addition, I also told him that the revision of the fit and proper test result would draw skepticism from the international community. The President said that the main point was the result.

      Then he said that BI could possibly be dissolved in August, and he had discussed it with Mr. Akbar (possibly he meant Mr. Akbar Tandjung). According to the President, after the dissolution, the government would establish a new central bank, such as that in the Philippines, and the government would select good persons from BI.

      Jakarta, Saturday, May 20, 2000

      Again Mr. Aris and Mr. Ridho contacted me and said the President would see me again to talk informally. I was asked to be at Merdeka Palace at around 6:30 pm so that he could talk to me before he left for the legislative building to watch a wayang (shadow puppet) performance (I also received an invitation from the legislature to attend it, but I had notified them that I could not attend).

      After waiting for a long time in the waiting room, they invited me into the President`s study at around 8 p.m. Mr. Difi, Mr. Aris and Mr. Ridho accompanied me.

      Jakarta and Bukittinggi, May 25 through May 28, 2000

      On Thursday, May 25, we and Mr. Dudung Syarifuddin left on a Garuda flight for Padang, from where we continued on to Bukittinggi to handle Y2K issues. Not long after arriving at Pusaka hotel, before I even had a chance to enter my room, Mr. Aris Junaidi called me and told me that the President wished to see me urgently.

      As the President could not wait for me to return to Jakarta on Saturday, May 27, I immediately returned to Padang to take the last Garuda flight to Jakarta (which according to the schedule should leave Padang at 4 p.m.). Luckily, the flight was 30 minutes late, and I caught the Garuda flight to Jakarta from Tabing Airport. I was asked to meet the President at Merdeka Palace.

      I dropped in for a moment at Bank Indonesia to perform the maghrib evening prayer as the time for maghrib had passed. I asked Mr. Difi to accompany me to meet Mr. President.

      Arriving at the palace, Mr. Difi was not allowed to enter. I saw Mr. Marsilam Simanjuntak and several persons sitting in the middle of the room. Then they called me to enter to the President`s study together with Mr. Marsilam.

      The President handed me a report on a "The Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia" letterhead. The unsigned sheet of typed paper was titled "Subject: Governor of Bank Indonesia, Syahril Sabirin, and the Bank Bali Case; Report to President of the Republic of Indonesia".

      The report basically explained that my testimony under oath before the court contradicted that of Mr. Firman Soetjahja and Mr. Rudy Ramli, as well as data obtained from the intelligence operation of the Attorney General`s Office, therefore they could sue me for perjury, which carries a maximum imprisonment of seven years.

      Then the President explained in brief the substance of the said report, as well as saying that if I resigned as governor of Bank Indonesia, the legal action against me would be dropped. The President also said "we will do GTM", namely the government would not reveal the offer to anybody else whomsoever, and he offered me a position at the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), or an ambassadorial or some other post.

      But, I was told, that if I did not resign from my position as the governor of Bank Indonesia, the attorney general would continue the investigation and legal process. The President said that he had already discussed it with Mr. Akbar Tandjung. Then he gave me time to think before giving an answer to the given alternatives: resign or be named a suspect.

      That night I requested that the officials from the Directorate of Legal Affairs at Bank Indonesia come to the office to discuss the latest development. They were, among others, Mr. Sis Abadi, Mr. Ali Tarmizi and Ms. Tituk (Kusumaningtuti). There I told them what had happened, and I added that I did not want consider the alternatives offered by the President, namely a position in the Supreme Supervisory Council (DPA) or an ambassadorial position overseas, because it would be better for me to find a job on my own, if necessary.

      Friday, May 26, 2000

      That night I called Mr. Marsilam from my office to ask what he understood from what the President had said the night before, particularly on the time given to me to answer. Mr. Marsilam said that he did not know about it either, but he would ask the President about it. I also told him that I did not do anything wrong in relation to the Bank Bali scandal.
      Avatar
      schrieb am 11.07.01 09:51:54
      Beitrag Nr. 13 ()
      Gibt es einige Neuigkeiten bezüglich Bank Bali??
      Avatar
      schrieb am 11.07.01 13:27:24
      Beitrag Nr. 14 ()
      BNLI
      Bank Bali Tbk
      Af :
      Sector Code : 81
      Sector Name : BANK

      (In thousand rupiah except Par Value, Closing Price and Ratios)

      Financial Statement Date : 31-Mar-2001
      Fiscal Year Ends : Dec
      Months Covered in Income St : 3

      Summary of Balance Sheet
      Receivables : 0.00
      Inventories : 0.00
      Current Assets : 0.00
      Fixed Assets : 628,300,016.82
      Other Asstes : 730,259,026.79
      Total Assets : 11,354,720,973.91
      Current Liabilities : 0.00
      Longterm Liabiities : 0.00
      Total Liabilities : 10,867,951,090.38
      Authorized : 93,471,422.53
      Paid-up Capital : 668,645,803.84
      Par Value : 500 & 5
      Paid-up Capital Shares : 67,200,583.30
      Retained Earnings : -5,438,612,906.41
      Total Equity : 453,705,696.27
      Minority Interest : 33,064,187.26

      Summary of Income Statement
      Total Sales : 345,217,357.41
      Cost of Good Sold : 367,127,500.37
      Gross Profit : -21,910,142.95
      Operating Profit : -21,910,142.95
      Other Income : 8,965,190.62
      Eearning Before Tax : -12,944,952.34
      Tax : 1,951,981.12
      Net Income : -18,349,907.01
      Closing Price : 50.00

      Per Share Data (Rp)
      Eps : -1.09
      Book Value : 6.75

      Financial Ratios
      Debt Equity Ratio (X) : 23.95
      Roa (%) : -.65
      Roe (%) : -16.18
      Npm (%) : -5.32
      Opm (%) : -6.35

      Cash Flow
      CF from Operating Activities: 318,196,830.12
      CF from Investing Activities: -2,519,718.41
      CF from Financing Activities: -573,397,427.28
      Net Increase in Cash & Cash Equivalent: -257,720,315.57
      Cash & Cash Equivalent at The Beginning of The Year: 1,011,336,963.70
      Cash & Cash Equivalent at The End of The Year: 753,616,648.13

      Quelle:

      http://www.indoexchange.com/jsx/bali/financial/1qtr01.htm
      Avatar
      schrieb am 12.07.01 12:28:07
      Beitrag Nr. 15 ()
      @ 7raven

      danke für die infos...

      gibt es irgendwann wieder mal eine kursreaktion
      zu befürchten??

      Gibt es rein objektiv Hoffnung darauf dass der Kurs mal wieder ansteigt??


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