LYNAS - auf dem Weg zu einem Rohstoffproduzent von Hightech-Rohstoffen (Seite 5218)

[spro]

Hi all

Habe von meiner Bank heute auf Anfrage erfahren, dass die Aktien bei ihnen am 03.11. "geliefert" werden und mir an dem Tag, rückwirkend mit Valuta 23.10., ins Depot eingebucht werden.

Aha.. , so geht das also bei meiner CH-Bank

Zum Glück gedenke ich diese Papierchen seeeehr lange zu halten

Beste Grüsse an alle Lynas Fans

[schlumpftrader]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.271.072 von auro am 28.10.09 15:22:09

gute gemacht!

das wäre auch mein plan gewesen, aber leider bin ich nicht zeichnungsberechtigt.
zum glück habe ich aber noch einige "alte" shares.

[auro]

hallo,

als mir meine bank die anrechte zum zeichnen (a 0.28 €/ 0.45 AUD) eingebucht hat, habe ich einen grossen teil meiner bestehenden lynasaktien zu € 0.40/0.37 verkaufet.
Ich wusste ja, dass ich sie in kürze wieder bekomme zu € 0.28.
Hat funktioniert und war ein gutes geschäft!

gruss
auro

[privateer]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.960 von schlumpftrader am 28.10.09 13:38:30

das "stark überzeichnet" war nur auf die für die Institutionellen vorgesehenen Sparten bezogen. Die dazugehörende News ist vom 01.10., wie oben von mir gepostet.

Die 77% beziehen sich rein auf die Privatanleger. Wobei ich aber davon ausgehe, dass US-Bürger NICHT in den 23% beinhaltet sind, da ja nur von "eligible shareholders" gesprochen wurde. US-Anleger waren also von vornerein "ineligible".

Und da halte ich 77% für einen sehr guten Schnitt in Abetracht der Zeichnungsumstände, denn wer hat schon, wie bereits erwähnt, bei einer Investition von beispielsweise € 5000,- nochmals den gleichen Betrag für das gleiche Investment locker...

[impyer]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.960 von schlumpftrader am 28.10.09 13:38:30

es war ein zeichnen, der 23% nicht möglich, da sich JPM das Recht auf die nicht ausgeführten Zeichnungen gesichert hatte.

die 23% sind US Bürger und alle, welche nicht teilnehmen konnten oder wollten, es stellt aber nicht die Nachfrage nach dem Sortfall dar. Diese ist nur mit den Worten "stark überzeichnet" beschrieben.

[privateer]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.393 von Nebiim am 28.10.09 12:36:22

hi nebiim,

für den Fall, dass Dein Posting eine gewisse Portion Ironie beinhaltet:

Ich habe an der KV teilgenommen, doch dies konnte ich nur, weil ich hierfür Aktien eines anderen Unternehmens verkauft habe.

Nicht jeder hat eben den Betrag, den er schon vor der KE in Lynas gesteckt hat nochmal flüssig...

[schlumpftrader]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.583 von impyer am 28.10.09 12:56:15

wieso "stark überzeichnet"?
77 % sind es und nicht 100 % +, was das private placement anbelangt, oder verstehe ich das falsch?

[schlumpftrader]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.268.062 von privateer am 28.10.09 10:45:30

verstehe. danke für die erklärung.

[JoJo49]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.393 von Nebiim am 28.10.09 12:36:22

Besser hätte die KE IHMO nach nicht laufen können.
Die Kursentwicklung hab ich allerdings ein wenig konstanter bis zum Ablauf der KE erwartet, ist aber m.e. auf die weiterhin herrschende Verunsicherung auf den Weltmärkten zurückzuführen.

Bin aber sehr zuversichtlich das sich bei einer schnellen positiven Entwicklung bezogen auf das REO-Projekt es zu einer schnellen konstanten Kurserholung kommen und die sich weiter nach Produktionsbeginn fortsetzen wird.

Dazu paßt der Neue Lifton Bericht über REE!
http://www.stockhouse.com/Bullboards/MessageDetail.aspx?s=RE…
• www.jackliftonreport.com • October 2009 •

JACK LIFTON REPORT

S P E C I A L E D I T I O N
The Rare Earth Crisis of 2009
By Jack Lifton - Founding Editor, The Jack Li!on Report

DETROIT, Oct 15, 2009 – The recent rare earth investment mania has exposed a standard contradiction in the rare earth segment of the rare element mining investment space. The market prices of the shares of the publicly listed existing rare earth mining opportunities have, for the two existing Canadian companies, gone up dramatically. So have the share prices of the two listed Australian rare earth mining companies, since the beginning of August 2009. Additionally, the run up in share price of listed rare earth mining ventures, has now also raised the share prices of many, if not all, of the existing rare earth wannabes, and spawned a new wave of the same, most of which have either no understanding of the rare earths or their potential future uses and market, or no defined way to extract, refine, and process their ores to recover contained rare earth values. I might also mention that among the wannabes there were a few listed so-called rare earth opportunities, actually selling fantasies of high grade high volume ore bodies on the analyses of a few carefully selected drill cores. Most of these analyses had been previously sold as evidence of other “deposits’ of metals, not the rare earths, desired at previous times by a volatile and fickle commodities market.



Institutional investors, public and private equity funds and banks, often buy and sell shares of specialty metal companies based on the same factors that small private investors do, in order to make short term gains. Thus, stock pickers go orgasmic when they find out that an institutional investor has “taken a position” in one of their holdings of a bulletin board, pink sheet, or even NASDAQ listed junior (exploration) mining company. What the stock pickers call evidence of interest is almost always evidence of wanting to get into and out of a good thing while it lasts.

The institutional investors, however, are traditionally very hard on (conservative with respect to) actual mining development. The rare earth mania has so far been no exception to the banker’s rule of avoiding high risk long term investments. Such investments offer a low probability of any return on investment, in a reasonable time that exceeds the return the institutional investor would get from merely putting its money in a “quality” investment, such as, traditionally, US Treasury long-term securities. Note well that even today, when such quality investments are paying all time low returns, institutional investors are not placing long term bets on rare earth mining with their capital. So far my analysis is not unusual. There is rarely any direct connection between a share price run up and the probability of a long term investment in a mining venture, so why worry? I think that the market share - price lifting “crisis” in security of supply of the rare earths, caused by the promulgation of mostly hearsay evidence that China, the present monopoly producer, is (further) restricting exports of the rare earths and may even halt the export entirely of selected rare earths, is “The run up in share prices has spawned a new wave of rare earth wannabes.” evidence of two things that are being masked by the now increasingly obsolete approach of western procurement officers, both public and private, to long term planning. These procurement officers have been taught in western business schools and are convinced that price is the critical driver of their ability to buy anything, and that increased demand always increases supply.



The two things being masked by this belief are that:

· The selling prices of the rare earths outside of China are being artificially depressed; they are too low, and

· China is moving towards or preparing for the re-pricing of commodities, such as the rare earths, in the production and use of which it is world dominant, out of US dollars.


Interestingly enough although the first factor above clearly explains why institutional investors are not making long term investments in rare earth mining - the selling prices are too low to give any, much less an adequate, return on investment - the second factor is a reason to make such investments. American production costs won’t go up if the dollar declines, because most of the costs are independent of the relative value of the US dollar. However, margins will skyrocket when and if the goods are exported to those consumers who will be buying many more dollars with their local currency, and so are unlikely to reduce their demand solely because of a price increase in US dollars. Did I mention that I believe that Chinese production and refining of rare earth metals cannot keep up with Chinese domestic demand for much longer? I have always believed that perspective is the key to objectivity, and although the mainstream media (MSM) are now noticing that hard asset prices are increasing for commodities besides gold, and that such price increases may in fact reflect the decrease of the value of the dollar rather than any increase in the value of the commodity, the MSM has not noticed that some commodities, for which the demand is in fact increasing are nonetheless not increasing in price as rapidly as others. The MSM does not discuss this anomaly, because its perspective is too limited. I’ve been watching the current stock market small investor interest boom let in the rare earth elements (REEs) since it began late this past summer of 2009. For small investors I think that the “rare earth publicly traded share price rush” was triggered by an article by James Dines in his popular subscription newsletter. In this article he predicted that, due to rapidly rising public awareness of their strategic and critical nature, a rare earth investing rush, such as the one he correctly predicted many years ago for uranium mining, under similar circumstances of rising public awareness, was about to get underway.

It didn’t hurt the octogenarian Dines prediction thesis at all when the news media, shortly thereafter, caught wind of a supposed Chinese pronouncement that would impact the future security of the supply of rare earths. This pronouncement, said to be an internal memo solicited by China’s Ruling State Council on the future supply and demand of rare earths in and by Chinese industry during the next “five year plan” cycle, 2010-2015, had first actually been noted in April 2009. The Chinese, it was said, in a press release by the Australian miner, Arafura Resources, were officially considering a continuation of the reduction in their export allocations of rare earths (the reduction of which they have been practicing for the last 5 years), and (drum roll, please) it was said that they were contemplating an “immediate” cessation of the export of the so-called heavy rare earths (first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, please!).

Although there are no “official” comparative production statistics for the rare earths, which are not traded on any exchange, it is believed by everyone who comments on this topic that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today produces more than 95% of the entire world’s annual new supply of the rare earths; it is certain that the PRC today produces 100% of the world’s annual production of the very rare so-called “heavy” rare earths, dysprosium, terbium, and europium. These high atomic numbered rare earth elements - referred to as the “heavies” - are critical either for raising the operating temperature at which rare earth based magnets can perform efficiently, or for producing a red cathodoluminescent phosphor for color displays. “Critical” here means that, without these rarest of the rare earths, the functions they create cannot be performed. There are no substitutes for them.

There is, and has been continuously, since the mid-twentieth century, some mining of rare earths in Russia, India, and, perhaps, Malaysia, and there has been, since 2007, a small amount of large scale processing of previously produced REE concentrates (70%) in Mountain Pass, California by Molycorp. As of this writing, production at Mountain Pass is 6 tons per day, apportioned between lanthanum (oxide) at 4 tons per day, and didymium (80% neodymium mixed with 20% praseodymium) oxide at 2 tons per day. Although Molycorp is a producer of rare earth oxides (REOs), it is not currently mining or concentrating ore at Mountain Pass; it is working off concentrates last produced in 2002. I am using the convoluted term “small amount of large scale processing,” because I am certain that no one else outside of China is producing anywhere near the volume of REOs, daily, that Mountain Pass is. Molycorp is most likely producing between 40% and 67% of all of the REOs produced outside of China in a vertically integrated operation.

It is important here to note that during the 1980s, the Mountain Pass ore body was the site of the largest individual rare earth production level ever achieved in one mine. The open pit operation reached a level of 20,000 tons a year of REEs. The ore body that was mined at Mountain Pass is immense; it is an indicated (verified) resource of, at least, 30,000,000 tons of 9.6% average grade, with a cutoff grade of 7.6%, bastnaesite. The reason that Mountain Pass was put on care and maintenance (i.e., shut down) in 2002 was not due to the exhaustion of high grade ore or the loss of access to such ore; the reason was simply that Chinese production out of the Bayanobo region of Inner Mongolia had by 2002 become priced much lower than that at Mountain Pass. This meant that Molycorp could only continue mining by subsidizing the cost, which it chose not to do since the trend was clearly for even higher Chinese production and lower pricing. It was not then, and it is not now clear, whether or not Chinese production costs could justify the selling prices of Chinese REEs. But there may well be subsidies available to Chinese miners from the state in order to maintain employment in Inner Mongolia, which are not solely based on the world market prices for the products of the mines, as they would be in the free market oriented West.



Whether the current Chinese monopoly in rare earth production was planned as a strategy fueled by predatory (lowball) pricing, or simply happened as a consequence of adhering to a larger national plan to create employment and drive manufacturing dependent on a secure supply of the rare earths to China, is only an important consideration outside of China. As of this moment, China is still exporting enough refined rare earths to keep the world market for these products going.

The problem that has been exposed by the “discovery” of the memorandum on rare earth export allocations is that it proves the conjecture highlighted by well-known Australian rare earth specialist, Dudley Kingsnorth, that Chinese domestic demand for rare earths is rapidly catching up to Chinese supply output. Mr. Kingsnorth has predicted that before the expiration of China’s next five year plan in 2015 Chinese domestic demand will exceed its domestic production.

Assuming Mr. Kingsnorth’s prediction to be correct, and I do, this means that at some point in the next five years it will not be possible to manufacture rare earth based products outside of China unless and until

1. There are rare earths produced outside of China;

2. Those rare earths can be refined and processed into useful forms outside of China, and

3. Chinese domestic consumers have not preemptively gained control over the non-Chinese production of the rare earths in order to secure their own supplies for domestic manufacturing and marketing within China. What the recent hubbub over Chinese rare earth export allocations has exposed, is that a deadline is rapidly approaching after which the production and use of the rare earths will pass by default to the absolute control of the PRC.



I and others have written extensively over the past few years about the importance, indeed the critical importance, of the rare earth metals in today’s age of technology. This importance seems now to have been noticed first by the market and finally by the US military establishment. The latter finds itself in the unenviable yet perfectly foreseeable position of becoming dependent on a foreign power, the PRC. If not a military adversary of the US, the PRC is already a direct economic competitor of the US and the rest of the world for the raw materials, the rare earths, without which the US military cannot build its smartest and most effective weapons. To some it seems irresponsible in the extreme and, perhaps, ominous, that the US has allowed itself to become dependent on the PRC for any critical raw materials, much less such materials as the rare earths which the US has in abundance and of which the US was very recently the world’s largest producer. It must also be noted that, even without the military hardware consideration, there are very few green technologies that do not need REEs for critical aspects of their performance.



“Before the expiration of China’s next five year plan in 2015, Chinese domestic demand will exceed it’s domestic production.”



An excellent example of spin control - excuse the pun - has been projected by the “wind turbine generator” industry in the US and Europe. In the Spring of 2009 the PRC announced that over the course of the next two five-year plans (2010-2020), China would quadruple its previous commitment to building wind generators from a previously announced 33 gigawatts (GW) to a new total of 120 GW of capacity. The western “wind” industry acclaimed this announcement whenever it was brought up, as a vindication of their industry and as proof of China’s commitment to alternate energy production, in order to reduce the PRC’s dependence of fossil fuels for energy generation. In fact the Chinese plan may throw the rest of the world’s attempt to build wind generating capacity into chaos. Some of the most efficient types of wind turbines are based on the use of a permanent magnet type generator, which is most effectively made using neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets. Each MW of electricity produced by such a wind turbine type requires between 0.7 and 1 ton of neodymiumiron-boron. The construction by China of 120 GW of such capacity, could take therefore as much as 120,000 tons of neodymium-iron-boron magnet alloy. This alloy would necessarily have to be produced with newly mined materials, since it replaces nothing now using neodymium, and it can be estimated that it would require 250,000 tons of new production of rare earths over the next 10 years just to provide sufficient neodymium for the job. The only nation that could possibly produce enough new neodymium in the next ten years to undertake the completion of such a project would be the PRC, and it could do this only by eliminating the export of neodymium or maintaining it, at best, at 2008 levels. Whenever I mention this to anyone associated with the wind industry, I am accused of ignorance of alternatives to rare earth based permanent magnets, for wind turbine generators and of ignorance of other types of generators. Yet no one will tell me what would happen to the western wind turbine energy industry, if it were now completely cut off from PRC material. It is clear to me that public companies that depend on subsidies to be competitive, do not wish to discuss what the effect of delays, re-engineering, and lessened efficiency will do to their business models.

The most progressive of the world’s car companies in the electrification of the motor car, Toyota, has sold more than 1 million of its full hybrid Prius vehicle since 1997. The current third generation model Prius uses a 1.5 kWh nickel metal hydride (NiMH) storage battery, based on the rare earth metal lanthanum, in conjunction with a gasoline fueled internal combustion engine (ICE) to achieve a 50+ mpg fuel efficiency. Toyota has made it clear recently that based on its own three year study of currently available lithium-ion storage batteries, it has decided to indefinitely continue the production of the Prius with its current NiMH battery and to ramp that production up to 1 million units per annum by 2011. Toyota makes its own NiMH batteries, from its own in house design, so that it feels directly any Chinese export reductions or eliminations. Although Toyota does not disclose the amount of lanthanum and other REEs that it uses in the construction of the Prius type power train, I can safely estimate that Toyota annually uses at least 7,500 tons of lanthanum and 1,000 tons of neodymium. I don’t know how much praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium Toyota uses annually, but I would guess that Toyota is the world’s largest single user of all of the REEs named. Toyota thus has good reason to be concerned over the security of its supply of Chinese REEs, and this gives it good cause to be proactive in seeking out alternate sources of REEs globally. In fact Toyota has done that, and it is in the process of doing more. That story however is for another article.

I have now come to the topic that I wish to discuss. The need for the REEs in strategic and critical civilian and military manufacturing is growing, and China is cutting back on its exports of REEs to secure its own supplies of these strategic and critical metals. So with this in mind - why are private capital and the Federal government state not placing a priority on reviving rare earth production and processing in the USA, even as they throw hundreds of billions of dollars at green technologies which will not be efficient, or even, in some cases, functional without rare earth based components? Why doesn’t the US military seem concerned with its dependence on a competitive power for the critical and strategic materials required for so many of its highest tech weapons and weapons’ platforms?

There is no explanation other than sheer lethargy for the lack of state action; if it’s not really broke, why fix it seems to be the rationale for non-action. Military procurement officers will tell you that so far there has been no problem sourcing the relatively small amounts of REEs needed for military production, so, they say, why “create an issue where there has been no problem?’ It is not just the American military that ignores long term strategic planning for even critical materials; short term thinking is, in fact, the norm in American private industry.

But there is an even better reason than short term thinking, to explain why private capital is not being directed to the development of non-Chinese sources of the REEs.

To be concise, it is because at current rare earth prices, there is no chance of any return on investment from any rare earth mining ventures, public or private, that do not contain the heavy rare earths in significant quantity. Even then, for such a venture to be profitable it will need to have not only the heavy rare earths but also either light rare earths or be combined with a venture that does.

Additionally there is no point to developing a rare earth mining venture unless it is accompanied not just by a refining operation to separate the individual REEs from one another, but also to produce the pure rare earth metals and the necessary alloys and compounds required to manufacture products critically dependent on the REEs In other words any investment must also be over the entire supply chain or have access to such a supply chain.

To understand the dilemma, look at the declining copper mining industry in the USA for example and contrast it with the rare earth mining industry.

America has not only copper mines, but also copper refineries , fabricators , and copper end product manufacturers. Copper mined in Utah, for example, can be smelted in impure “blister” copper and then refined into high purity copper cathode in Utah. Then the cathode can be drawn into wire in a place like St. Louis; the wire can be used to make OEM automotive wiring harnesses in Ohio, and the wiring harnesses can be installed in cars being made in Indiana. America, through its fascination with globalization, does not today mine enough copper to feed its domestic demand, so it must import copper cathodes from abroad. America could however produce enough copper to satisfy its own demand and it is still self sufficient in the value chain for copper containing products such as electric wire and electric motors. Even if the copper cathode is imported, most of the value added by forming it into electric motors can be done in America by American workers. Keep in mind that when value is added to a natural resource, it creates jobs and wealth. This is not true of the value added to products by the use of rare earth components. Rare earth magnets are, for example, only manufactured in one form, in small quantities, by one American company, which imports the magnet alloy material from China, because no one in the USA today produces rare earth metals or alloys even from the REEs produced by Molycorp in California.



So the only wealth creation possible today in North America from the rare earths, after they are mined and concentrated, and, in the sole case of Molycorp, separated into their crude oxides, is the added value of those rare earths to Chinese rare earth refiners and fabricators of the industrially useful forms of rare earth metals and alloys. Most of that material is further processed into magnets, batteries, lasers, motors, generators, and displays within Asia, predominantly China. So the added value to any rare earths based products that would be produced today anywhere in the world outside of China, would be added mainly in China and to a lesser extent in Japan and Korea. One of the reasons that Australia rebuffed the recent attempt by China Non Ferrous Metals Company to acquire Lynas Corp’s Mt Weld mine was that the investment would have created only 90 jobs in Australia, while insuring the creation of 400 jobs in a Malaysian refinery and untold numbers of jobs in China, where final reduction of the refined oxides to metals and alloys, as well as the fabrication of those metals and alloys into end use products, would have occurred. Australia’s government is now questioning the business model of Lynas and asking why the refining, metal production, and component and end-use product manufacturing supply chain cannot be erected entirely within Australia creating new wealth and jobs from what up until now, was considered merely a natural resource. China clearly has already recognized and adopted the closed loop model for creating wealth and jobs from a natural resource in which it is dominant. Australia is on the verge of catching on to the Chinese model. Canada and the United States are both in the process of waking up to the success of the Chinese business model for maximum wealth creation from natural resources.

But China operates by state action, whereas all of its present direct competitors use some form of free enterprise. China’s competitors are and can only be industrialized nations that are blessed with natural resources and high technology industries. In the case of the abundant natural resources free market capitalism triumphed first, but in the case of rare metals where individual production or manufacturing may be uneconomical, only collaborative action, such as Chinese state action, can work, unless prices get so high, such as in the case of the industrially useless rare metal gold , that even though enormous investments must be made in order to produce small amounts such investments can be profitable.

Some examples of why China is considering totally restricting the export of critical and strategic rare earth metals will tell the whole story. The application of indium-tin-oxide (ITO) coatings for LCD & touch panel displays and other important applications, is not an area where the Chinese are known to have high expertise, but they may soon have a cost advantage anyway. The sputtering systems used to apply these coatings use magnetrons - permanent magnet assemblies that are made to operate at the highest possible temperatures. It can be a significant challenge to cool these magnetrons during operation. The best permanent magnets for such magnetrons are those made from the alloy neodymium-iron-boron. The alloy itself must have additions of dysprosium and terbium, which are today only and solely available from the PRC and are very rare, in order to be able to operate at the highest operational temperatures. It must be obvious to the world’s display companies that shortly they will be unable to buy or have made magnetrons for sputtering production lines other than in China. It must also be obvious to them that if Chinese display companies place orders for the same magnetrons, they will ultimately simply be unavailable to non Chinese display companies I should also point out that the sole American domestic producer maker of rare earth permanent magnets, Electron Energy, has produced some remarkable high temperature samarium-cobalt alloys for permanent magnets in a range of applications, using the mid-atomic-number range rare earth element gadolinium as an additive. There is today no North American production of either gadolinium or samarium, although Molycorp have told me that they hope to produce both, as oxides, from their above ground concentrates in California within a year. In the meantime, Electron Energy will remain totally dependent on the PRC for the critical rare earth metals it needs to make its high temperature operating permanent magnets, for which it is a principal supplier to the US Department of Defense.

Yet even if a display company or a company like Toyota were to agree to pay for the development, for example, to bring Avalon Rare Metals or Great Western Mineral Group’s mining ventures into production, there would still be a need for the rest of the supply chain to be built simultaneously else China will still be in control due to its absolute dominance of the value chain for REEs. No one in the world of institutional investment seems to care about rare earths, because the total market size for the current global production of rare earths at the mine is less than two billion dollars.

The only hope for the further availability of the rare earths outside of China after 2015 is a collaborative effort by the rare earth mining, refining, metal and alloy production and fabrication, and end use product manufacturing industries to build a complete rare earth supply chain. This includes, by the way, a recycling industry targeted at recovering the rare earths from civilian and industrial products and processes, in one country, such as Australia, Canada, or the USA, or, at least, on one continent, North America.

This and this alone can create enough value to justify the total investment required. It makes no sense at all just to invest in mining either the light or the heavy rare earths. At today’s selling prices and even at the prices projected over the next ten years, there is little or no hope of any return on such investment and therefore no private investors will undertake such a venture, other than to make money by the increased value of their public share holdings.

The public, without any analysis, is hypnotized by the hype. In the stock market holders of shares are betting with each other on the company’s future; they are not analyzing the company’s future nor understanding fundamental issues such as the current monopoly held by China and the value to China’s domestic economy of the rare earths. Chinese companies owned by the state do not fail if they are unprofitable; they fail only if they are not needed by the next five year plan.

The Chinese rare earth mines are critical to not only the growth of the Chinese domestic technology culture but to its very existence. Balance sheets don’t matter. As soon as Chinese industry needs raw materials it is directed from the heavily indebted to the government mines to where it is needed. Foreign buyers are simply told that the desired material is sold out. This is exactly what American short term thinking has done to our heavy industry and is now doing to our high tech industry. The rare earth supply crisis is a symptom of a greater dilemma. It is time for collaborative action right now, before it is too late.

About the Author: Jack Li!on is an independent consultant, prolific author and popular speaker who specializes on the market fundamentals and end use trends of rare metals. His work covers exploration and mining, separation and refining, and recovery of rare metal values by the recycling of not only rare metals and their a%oys but also of metal-based chemicals used as raw materials for component manufacturing.

Mr. Lifton has more than 45 years of experience in the global OEM

automotive, heavy equipment, electrical & electronic, mining,

smelting & refining industries. Today he primarily consults to

institutional investors doing due diligence on metals related

opportunities. He can be emailed via jack@jackli!onreport.com.

http://translate.google.com/translate?js=y&prev=_t&hl=de&ie=…


Grüsse JoJo

[impyer]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.269.393 von Nebiim am 28.10.09 12:36:22

viel wichtiger: stark Überzeichnet