Antrag auf Aussetzung des Verkaufs der Core Assets an Barclays durch Anteilseigner - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[flyingkremlin]

Hochinteressantes Anwaltschreiben.

Die ganze Lehmannummer ist suspekt. Der Kurs wurde beispiellos an die Wand gefahren. Und die vorausgegangene Seifenoper unter Beteiligung von Fed, Barclays, BoA und Merill lässt nur wenige an Zufall der Ereignisse glauben.

Die Koreaner wurden vor 2 Wochen noch nach Hause geschickt -um dann nach Sonntag "kampflos die Waffen zu strecken"? Irgendwie ein Bruch im Schauspiel.

Das die Amerikaner Lehman nicht an Asiaten verschenken wollen finde ich an sich gar nicht so ungewöhnlich -der grobe Nachgang allerdings hat eher einen östlichen Touch. Vielleicht muss man doch noch etwas filigraner "nacharbeiten"?

Bisher mutet die Attacke auf Lehman jedenfalls irgendwie wie das westliche Gegenstück zu Yukos an. Die Verschiebung der Yukostochter Yuganskneft war auch millardenschwer. Und der Profiteur damals hiess "Baikal Finanz". Wie ists hier? Wo landen die Assets?

Aber sei es drum - der Staatsfonds für die notleidenden Immokredite müsste eigentlich den Notverkauf an Barclays unnötig machen... Die Lage hat sich nach Donnerstag ja grundlegend geändert.

Was ist, wenn die Presse und amerikanische Politiker auf diese Argumentation aufspringten? Was immer jetzt bei Lehman passiert, ist ist noch nie da gewesen. Barfuss oder Lackschuh



L. Matt Wilson
GA Bar No: 768801
THE WILSON LAW FIRM, PC
950 East Paces Ferry Road
Suite 3250 - Atlanta Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN RE: ))
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. ) Case No. 08-13555-jmp
)
Debtor. ) Chapter 11
)
)
OBJECTION TO SALE MOTION
Comes now Greg Georgas, shareholder of the Debtor, by and through his undersigned
counsel, who files this his OBJECTION TO SALE MOTION, as follows:
1.
The Asset Purchase Agreement (“Purchase Agreement”) was dated on September 16,
2008, a day when the public markets were under tremendous turmoil with so-called “naked short
sellers” specifically targeting the Debtor’s stock, causing widespread public market “panic”
which evidently lead to panic among the Debtor’s Senior Management and its Board of
Directors.
2.
The Assets subject to the Purchase Agreement are very well-established, valuable
operating assets, including the Debtor’s core business divisions which have consistently been
operated profitably for many years. The price for these core business divisions is only
$250,000,000, with additional amounts being paid for certain real estate, and with a price
adjustment at the end of the first year that can not exceed an additional $750,000,000. These
amounts are not fair and adequate in consideration of the net income which has historically been
produced, and may reasonably be expected to be produced in the future, by the subject Assets.
3.
The Debtor’s September 10, 2008 Press Release announced Preliminary Third Quarter,
2008, financial results, further indicated that absent Gross Mark-to-Market Adjustments of $5.3
Billion on Residential Mortgage-Related Positions, the Debtor would have reported $1.4 Billion
in Net Income. A substantial portion of this Net Income would be have been attributed to the
Assets subject to the Purchase Agreement.
4.
The Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury and various member of the US Congress have
announced an intention to create a bailout designed to stem further losses in the Residential
Mortgage-Related Markets. There is every indication that the Debtor could and will be able to
participate in this bailout fund, thereby providing further protections from losses related to
Residential Mortgage-Related Investments, such that the Debtor’s best course of action may be to
petition this Court to dismiss its Bankruptcy.
5.
The Debtor’s September 10, 2008 Press Release announced Preliminary Third Quarter,
2008, financial results, further indicated that the Debtor had “Estimated Liquidity Pool of $42
Billion.”
6.
The Debtor’s September 10, 2008 Press Release announced Preliminary Third Quarter,
2008, financial results, indicating that “Total Shareholder’s Equity of $28.4 Billion, Up from
$26.3 Billion.” There has been no examination, explanation, or analysis as to the impact of the
proposed Asset Sale on this very significant positive Shareholder’s Equity, which can not be
adequately protected by Creditors acting in their own interests.
7.
More importantly, the market conditions in the real world have substantially improved,
because of various events of government intervention, such as the SEC’s barring of “naked
short” selling; the Federal Reserve’s extension of loans to AIG Insurance Company, and the
Federal Reserve’s extension of approximately $200 Billion into the banking system, all of which
provide for changed market conditions, such that the Debtor’s Senior Management, and its Board
of Directors, and this Honorable Court, should not proceed with any undue haste to approve the
subject Asset Sale.
8.
Therefore, at this time, contrary to Paragraph B of this Court’s September 17, 2008 Order,
the Purchase Agreement does not appear to be in the best interest of the Debtor, and certainly not
in the best interests of the Debtor’s shareholders. At best, there is no evidence to support this
conclusion, or the evidence in regard to this conclusion would have potentially changed, such
that the Court should reconsider this issue, and require that the Debtor and its Creditors to satisfy
the Court with record evidence in this regard. The hand-wringing of panicked executives should
not be accepted as evidence of best interests.
9.
Similarly, at this time, contrary to Paragraph D of this Court’s September 17, 2008
Order, there no longer appears to be any threat of immediate or irreparable harm if the approval
of the Sale is postponed to permit a more through, appropriate, and in-debt consideration of the
sale and/or a public market auction of these assets, in a more calm manner free from panic.
10.
Similarly, at this time, contrary to Paragraph E of this Court’s September 17, 2008 Order,
the Purchased Assets no longer appear to be wasting, and the exigent circumstances have waned,
such that it appears appropriate for the approval to be addressed in a more thoughtful and
deliberate manner.
For all of these reasons, the undersigned, on behalf of shareholder Greg Georgas, hereby
objects to the said sale, and particularly to the consideration of the sale on an emergency,
expedite, or panicked basis.
Respectfully submitted, this 19th day of September, 2008.
THE WILSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
/s/ L. Matt Wilson
L. Matt Wilson
Georgia Bar No. 768801
THE WILSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
950 East Paces Ferry Road
Suite 3250 - Atlanta Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Z:\\WP\\830\\01\\Objection to Sale.pld.wpd

Quelle:

http://webmail.gatorapple.com/wm/mail/genimage/Objection%20t…

http://webmail.gatorapple.com/wm/mail/genimage/Motion%20for%…

[flyingkremlin]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122184864327757571.html?mod=…

[gerdass]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.476 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 00:34:10

Sehr mutig, dennoch ist es genau die Lage.Eigentlich sollte man glauben, alle oder keine.Schauen wir, wie es kommt.Diese Immo-Blase war schon vor Jahren allen bekannt.Warum sind dann auch noch deutsche Banken drauf rein gefallen.
Vor jahren haben sie schon im TV vor der Immo- Blase gewarnt.
Ein Vorteil
Je nach Geldbeutel, kann der Anleger zu genau dieser Zeit spielend abkassieren.Das ist Börse, gut das es sie gibt

[flyingkremlin]

SEPTEMBER 20, 2008

Lehman Moved Cash Fast
Some $8 Billion Went From London Before Bankruptcy

Clients and accountants are probing how Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. moved billions of dollars from its London operations to New York just ahead of its bankruptcy filing this past week.

At issue: whether transferring $8 billion to New York was an effort to shore up the unit there so it could be sold at the expense of the London office, a person familiar with the matter said.

On Friday, in federal bankruptcy court in New York, Lehman sought approval to sell off much of its North American operations to the U.K.'s Barclays PLC for $1.75 billion.

The money transfer to New York is raising questions about the speed and haste of Lehman's efforts to file for bankruptcy and complete a sale to Barclays.

Lawyers for Lehman argued in court Friday there was no time to wait for the bankruptcy filing.

They argued that the firm's broker-dealer customers and its employees, mostly in its investment bank, are in danger of rapidly disappearing with each passing day.

Lehman's holding-company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Monday, but the firm's U.S. broker-dealer stayed in business long enough for Barclays to arrange the purchase of assets including Lehman's brand name, technology, 10,000 employees, midtown Manhattan offices and two New Jersey sites.

As the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, the Lehman case is marked by an unusual rush and lack of public disclosure about what specifically was being sold to Barclays. Lawyers representing the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, SEC and U.S. Trustee's office all stood up in court to urge the judge to authorize the sale, arguing the global financial markets would be harmed by a delay.

On Friday, a slew of angry creditors pushed and shoved to get into Judge James M. Peck's courthouse. On several occasions a security guard yelled at the well-suited crowd. Harvey Miller, lead counsel for Lehman on the country's largest bankruptcy, needed someone to clear a path for him and his team to get in the room and to the front of the court.

Judge Peck was expected to approve the sale to Barclays, despite objections raised in court documents by companies such as Verizon Communications Inc., Occidental Energy Marketing Inc. and hedge-fund firm Harbinger Capital Partners. One creditor made a motion to the court pleading for a delay. "Here there has been hardly a moment to breathe," the court filing said.
Terms of Sale

Also Friday, there were a number of changes to the terms of the sale to Barclays. The British bank will take on $47.4 billion in assets and $45.5 billion in liabilities, instead of $72 billion in assets and $68 billion in liabilities. Barclays will get a license on Lehman's name for two years, instead of permanently. It wasn't clear why the terms changed from the agreement unveiled earlier in the week.

Meanwhile, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, the insolvency administrator for Lehman's London-based units, sent a letter recently to Lehman in the U.S. requesting that $8 billion be paid back, a person familiar with the matter said. PricewaterhouseCoopers has said it is reviewing all transactions.

Lehman's lawyers said at Friday's hearing that Barclays also has agreed to purchase Lehman's private-investment-management business. Private-equity firms Bain Capital LLC and Hellman & Friedman LLC are expected to reach an agreement in the coming days to acquire most of Lehman's asset-management business, which includes money manager Neuberger Berman.

A New York investment fund and Lehman client, Amber Capital Investment Management, made a filing Friday afternoon raising concerns that some $8 billion was "misappropriated" from Lehman Brothers International (Europe) to Lehman in the U.S. just before the filing. Amber asked the judge to set aside the proceeds from the Barclays' sale while the $8 billion transfer is investigated.
Cash Sweep

According to PricewaterhouseCoopers and Lehman executives, monies residing in Lehman units based in Europe or Asia typically were swept up each day and transferred to Lehman's group treasury in New York. The money was later dispatched back out to the units.

Tony Lomas, a PricewaterhouseCoopers partner working on the Lehman insolvency in London, said this week during a London news conference, "Every subsidiary, here and elsewhere in the world, was dependent upon the flow of cash back from New York each morning to meet its obligations."

But when Mr. Lomas arrived at Lehman, in a skyscraper in London's Canary Wharf on Monday, he said he found no funds. Employees' paychecks have been delayed, vending machines are running dry, and many of the firm's London employees are looking for new jobs. The London office took out a loan to pay employees, a person familiar with the matter said.

"Any time you are on the eve of bankruptcy and have big transfer of money like that, it will be the subject of review or some sort of investigation," said Don Workman, head of the bankruptcy and restructuring practice at the law firm of Baker & Hostetler LP in Washington D.C. whose firm is following the case for clients who did derivatives trading with Lehman. "The British may say 'that's our $8 billion.'"

Write to Carrick Mollenkamp at [e-mail] and Jeffrey McCracken at [e-mail]

[gerdass]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.598 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 02:38:46

Für den deutschsprachigen Raum.Nur 8% der deutschen können englisch halbwegs leseen



20. SEPTEMBER 2008 Lehman verschob Bargeld schnell Ca. $8 Milliarde gingen von London vor Bankrott Klienten und Buchhalter sind prüfend, wie Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Milliarden Dollar von seinen London-Betrieben nach New York gerade vor seinem Antrag auf Eröffnung des Konkursverfahrens diese letzte Woche übersiedelte. An der Ausgabe: ob, $8 Milliarde nach New York zu bringen eine Bemühung war, die Maßeinheit dort abzustützen, also es auf Kosten von dem London-Büro verkauft werden könnte, sagte ein Personenvertrautes mit der Angelegenheit. Am Freitag im Bundeskonkursgericht in New York, suchte Lehman Zustimmung, um viel seiner nordamerikanischen Betriebe an das U.K.' auszuverkaufen; s Barclays PLC für $1.75 Milliarde. Die Geldüberweisung nach New York wirft Fragen über die Geschwindigkeit und die Eile von Lehman' auf; s-Bemühungen, für Bankrott zu archivieren und einen Verkauf zu Barclays abzuschließen. Rechtsanwälte für Lehman argumentierten bei Gericht Freitag dort waren keine Zeit, den Antrag auf Eröffnung des Konkursverfahrens zu warten. Sie argumentierten dass das firm' sbroker-dealerkunden und seine Angestellten, meistens in seiner Emissionsbank, sind in der Gefahr von mit jedem verstreichentag schnell verschwinden. Lehman' s Holdingfirma archivierte für Bankrottschutz des Kapitels 11 am Montag, aber das firm' sus Broker-dealer blieb im Geschäft lang genug, damit Barclays den Kauf der Anlagegüter einschließlich Lehman' ordnet; s-Markenname, Technologie, 10.000 Angestellte, Stadtmitte Manhattan-Büros und zwei Jersey-Aufstellungsorte. Als der größte Antrag auf Eröffnung des Konkursverfahrens in der US-Geschichte, wird der Lehman Fall durch einen ungewöhnlichen Ansturm und einen Mangel an allgemeiner Freigabe markiert über, was spezifisch an Barclays verkauft wurde. Rechtsanwälte, welche die Zentralbank, das Finanzministerium, die sek und die US Trustee' darstellen; s-Büro stand ganz oben bei Gericht, um den Richter zu drängen, den Verkauf zu autorisieren und argumentierte die globalen Geldmärkte, würde geschädigt durch eine Verzögerung. Am Freitag ein Durchlauf verärgerte Gläubiger gedrückt und geschoben, um in Richter James M. Peck' zu kommen; s-Gericht. Mehrmals kreischte ein Sicherheitsbeamte an der gut angepassten Masse. Harvey Miller, Bleiberater für Lehman auf dem country' s-größter Bankrott, benötigt jemand, zum eines Weges zu löschen, damit ihn und seine Mannschaft in den Raum und an die Frontseite des Gerichtes gelangt. RichterPeck wurde erwartet, um den Verkauf zu Barclays, trotz der Einwände angehobenen Dokumente bei Gericht zu genehmigen von den Firmen wie Verizon Communications Inc., Occidental Energy Marketing Inc. und feste Vorbote-Kapital-Partner Hecke-finanziert. Ein Gläubiger bildete eine Bewegung zum Gericht plädierend für eine Verzögerung. " Hier hat es kaum einen Moment gegeben, zum zu atmen, " die Gerichtsarchivierung sagte. Verkaufsbedingungen Auch Freitag, gab es einige Änderungen an den Ausdrücken des Verkaufs zu Barclays. Die britische Bank nimmt auf $47.4 Milliarde in den Anlagegütern und $45.5 Milliarde in den Verbindlichkeiten, anstelle $72 anstelle Milliarde in den Anlagegütern und $68 von Milliarde in den Verbindlichkeiten. Barclays erhält eine Lizenz auf Lehman' s-Name für zwei Jahre, anstelle von dauerhaft. Es wasn' t-freier Raum, warum die Ausdrücke von der Vereinbarung änderten, die früh in der Woche vorgestellt wurde. Unterdessen PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, der Insolvenzverwalter für Lehman' die s London-gegründeten Maßeinheiten, vor kurzem geschickt einen Buchstaben zu Lehman in den US, die fordern, dass $8 Milliarde zurück gezahlt werden, ein Personenvertrautes mit der Angelegenheit sagten. PricewaterhouseCoopers hat gesagt, dass es alle Verhandlungen wiederholt. Lehman' s-Rechtsanwälte sagten an Friday' s-Hörfähigkeit, dass Barclays auch damit einverstanden ist, Lehman' zu kaufen hat; s Privat-Investitionmanagement Geschäft. Privat-Billigkeit macht Bain Haupt-LLC und Hellman & fest; Friedman LLC werden erwartet, um eine Vereinbarung an den kommenden Tagen zu erreichen, die meisten von Lehman' zu erwerben; s Anlagegutmanagement Geschäft, das Geldverwalter Neuberger Berman umfaßt. New- YorkInvestmentfonds und ein Lehman Klient, bernsteinfarbiges Investitions-Management, bildeten einen Archivierung Freitag-Nachmittag, der Bedenken äußert, dass ca. $8 Milliarde " war; misappropriated" vom Lehman BrothersInternational (Europa) zu Lehman in den US kurz vor der Archivierung. Bernstein bat den Richter, die Erträge vom Barclays' beiseite zu setzen; Verkauf, während die Übertragung $8 Milliarde nachgeforscht wird. Bargeld-Schleife Entsprechend PricewaterhouseCoopers und Lehman Hauptleitern wurden die Gelder, die in den Lehman Maßeinheiten angesiedelt wurden in Europa liegen oder Asien gewöhnlich herauf jeden Tag gefegt und gebracht auf Lehman' s-Gruppenfiskus in New York. Das Geld wurde später ausweichen zu den Maßeinheiten geschickt. Tony Lomas, ein PricewaterhouseCoopers Partner, der an der Lehman Insolvenz in London arbeitet, sagte diese Woche während einer London-Pressekonferenz, " Jede Tochtergesellschaft, hier und anderwohin in der Welt, war nach dem Fluss des Bargeldes zurück von New York jeder Morgen abhängig, zum seines obligations." zu treffen; Aber, als Herr Lomas bei Lehman ankam, in einem Wolkenkratzer in London' s-zitronengelber Kai am Montag, sagte er, dass er keine Kapital fand. Employees' Gehaltsscheck sind verzögert worden, sind Verkaufäutomaten das Laufen trocken und viele des firm' Angestellte s-London suchen nach neuen Jobs. Das London-Büro nahm den Lohnangestellten ein Darlehen heraus, sagte ein Personenvertrautes mit der Angelegenheit. " Immer wenn Sie auf dem Vorabend des Bankrotts sind und große Übertragung des Geldes haben, wie die, es das Thema des Berichts oder irgendeine Art der Untersuchung ist, " besagter Don-Arbeiter, Kopf des Bankrotts und Umstrukturierung üben an der Sozietät von Bäcker & Hostetler Langspielplatte in Washington DC, dessen Unternehmen dem Fall für Klienten folgt, die die Ableitungen taten, die mit Lehman handeln. " Die Briten können ' sagen; that' s unsere $8 billion.' " Schreiben Sie Carrick Mollenkamp an [e-mail] und Jeffrey McCracken an [e-mail]

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.599 von gerdass am 20.09.08 02:43:50

mir fallen jetzt auch die Augen zu ; )

kurz -nachdem PWC darauf aufmerksam machte, dass die 8 Mrd. doch zurück nach GB gehören, wurde bekannt, dass Barclays nun auch das European Business kaufen möchte...

[gerdass]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.600 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 02:49:38

Mir allerdings auch
Es wird allemal sehr spannend, was an einem Wochenende so geschehen kann.Hoffentlich zum Wohle der jetzigen Aktionäre.

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.602 von gerdass am 20.09.08 02:53:02

also die Papiere sind doch sehr gestreut. Kein gutes Zeichen. Aber wenn man wirklich ein Szenario aufdecken würde, dass diese Insolvenz so vielleicht nicht notwendig -oder vielleicht sogar geplant war, dann könnte man vielleicht den Rückwärtsgang einlegen müssen...


Und das wäre dann sicher ein beispielloser Spaß. Es ist Roulette geworden, keine Frage -aber die Kugel rollt. Nacht!

[gerdass]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.604 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 02:58:17

Genau so schaut es aus.#
Unter normalen Umständen sollten wir gewinnen können.

[big_mac]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.613 von gerdass am 20.09.08 03:19:08

immerhin gehört LEHQ jetzt zu den unberührbaren 799.

[niemwolf]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.599 von gerdass am 20.09.08 02:43:50

"Für den deutschsprachigen Raum.Nur 8% der deutschen können englisch halbwegs leseen"

Und, kann mal jemand das deutschsprachige übersetzen?

[Dorfrichter]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.598 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 02:38:46

Hab Dank, Du wertvoller User.

[mfierke]

guter Thread, weiter so, alle news hier rein stellen, denn hier ist es übersichtlicher

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.476 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 00:34:10

Gericht erteilt Erlaubnis für den "Barclays Deal". Na dann bin ich mal gespannt, wie jetzt und in Zukunft damit umgegangen würde, wenn Lehman der einzige Totalausfall in diesem Spiel wäre.

Aber vielleicht gibts ja noch Bonbons.

Lehman Wins U.S. Court Approval for Sale to Barclays (Update1)

By Christopher Scinta and Erik Larson

Sept. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the U.S. investment bank that filed the largest bankruptcy in history, won federal court approval to sell its North American business to London-based Barclays Plc for $1.75 billion.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck in Manhattan overruled objections from Lehman creditors who said the sale was moving too quickly, setting the stage for Barclays, the U.K.'s third- biggest bank, to close the deal over the weekend. Peck said it was clear no other purchaser would emerge if he delayed the sale, and that the deal would help stabilize global financial markets.

``I need to approve this transaction, because it's the only available transaction,'' Peck said. ``Lehman Brothers became a victim -- in effect the only true icon -- to fall in the tsunami that has befallen the credit markets, and it saddens me.''

Barclays President Robert Diamond called it the deal of a ``lifetime'' when the bank acquired Lehman's North American investment banking arm on Sept. 17, two days after Lehman collapsed. Barclays may add other parts of the failed investment bank to help it boost equity and advisory units in Europe and Asia, Diamond told analysts at the time.

The courtroom broke into applause when the hearing closed at 12:41 a.m. New York time.

``This week, more than any other week, I have felt the awesome power of this job,'' Peck said. ``This is the most momentous bankruptcy hearing I've ever sat through -- either as a lawyer or a judge.''

Lehman attorney Harvey Miller of Weil Gotshal & Manges said a rejection of the deal would have caused a ``major shock to the financial system.'' Miller previously said there were accounts with a total value of about $138 billion dependent on the sale.

Asset Sales

Lehman is selling off pieces that weren't included in the New York-based holding company's bankruptcy filing. The Securities Investor Protection Corp. began a liquidation proceeding for the brokerage and appointed a trustee who must also approve the sale. The SIPC is an insurance fund created under federal law and financed by brokerages.

Hedge fund Harbinger Capital Partners had asked the judge to block the sale unless Lehman immediately disclosed cash transfers it made just prior to its bankruptcy, including an alleged $5 billion transfer of cash from Lehman's London office. Another two hedge funds, Bay Harbour Management LC and Amber Capital, filed papers alleging $8 billion was moved.

Regulators including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York favored the deal. Some creditors argued the sale should have been delayed to seek a better deal for Lehman's assets amid a government plan to purge banks of bad assets and crack down on speculators who drove down shares of financial companies.

`Extraordinary Example'

``This is Friday; the case was filed on Monday. What we're doing is unheard of,'' Peck said when approving the sale. ``It's an extraordinary example of the flexibility that bankruptcy affords.''

The deal involves the sale of Lehman's investment-banking, fixed-income and equities sales, trading and research divisions. The price values Lehman's headquarters building in New York and two data centers in New Jersey at a total of $1.29 billion -- a reduction of as much as $200 million from an earlier estimate. Barclays will also assume as much as $2.5 billion in liabilities related to Lehman workers and about $1.5 billion in costs for altering contracts, according to court papers. Some 10,000 Lehman workers will move to Barclays as part of the sale.

Lehman's broker dealer unit now has only $47.4 billion of securities and $45.5 billion of liabilities to be assumed by Barclays, or a net value of $1.9 billion -- a change from the earlier $72 billion in securities and $68 billion of liabilities, or a net value of $4 billion, Miller said.

Integration

Barclays's asset management and investment banking chief operating officer Rich Ricci will be chief executive officer of the Lehman U.S. unit for about three months, to oversee its integration.

Diamond, who abandoned talks to buy all of Lehman less than 24 hours before it collapsed, has said he wants Barclays to take market share from Wall Street firms weakened by the credit crunch and break into the ``top tier'' of U.S. securities firms. Less than 5 percent of the U.S. assets Barclays bought are mortgage-related, he said.

Barclays declined to bid for all of Lehman after three days of emergency negotiations involving the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve. Barclays couldn't get guarantees from the government to mitigate what it called Lehman's ``open-ended'' trading obligations, it said Sept. 14.

Collapsed Talks

New York-based Lehman, a holding company, filed for Chapter 11 protection on Sept. 15, stating it had debt of $613 billion and assets of $639 billion after talks to sell the entire company collapsed. Barclays is providing a $450 million loan for Lehman to use during the bankruptcy that is tied to the buyout. The loan is secured by Lehman's interest in its fund manager unit Neuberger Berman LLC.

Lehman is also in discussions to sell its investment- management unit to private-equity bidders Bain Capital LLC and Hellman & Friedman LLC, people familiar with the negotiations said this week.

Barclays is adding Lehman units to areas where Barclays own securities unit has the ``weakest positions,'' Diamond said Sept. 17. Lehman ranked seventh in advising on mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. companies this year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Barclays ranks 35th in that market.

Japan Unit

Lehman's Japan unit is trying to sell assets including its equity, investment banking and real-estate businesses to potential buyers including Barclays and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc., two people familiar with the matter said. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc. may also buy assets, the people said.

Lehman's European corporate finance and asset management units are close to finding a buyer, said Lehman's European administrator, PricewaterhouseCoopers. Barclays and Nomura Holdings Inc., Japan's biggest securities firm, are among potential buyers of assets at the subsidiaries, which employ about 4,500 people at headquarters in London's Canary Wharf.

Lehman placed four of its European units in administration on Sept. 15.

The committee includes Wilmington Trust Co., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Shinsei Bank Ltd., Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd., Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, MetLife Inc. and R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.

An attorney for some Lehman bondholders, Daniel Golden of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, said at a Sept. 17 court hearing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan that Lehman should give more information to creditors about the sale negotiations that took place before the company sought court protection.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

To contact the reporter on this story: Christopher Scinta in New York bankruptcy court at [e-mail]; Erik Larson in New York bankruptcy court at [e-mail].
Last Updated: September 20, 2008 01:22 EDT

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aU2fVYAI…

[flyingkremlin]

http://dailybriefing.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/09/16/will-m…

[Leele]

Samstag, 20. September 2008
Hunderte Mrd. Dollar
Amerikas Megaprogramm

Das von der US-Regierung geplante Programm zur Übernahme fauler Kredite soll ein Volumen von 500 bis 800 Mrd. Dollar haben. Das verlautete aus amerikanischen Bankenkreisen. Die Regierung werde damit Hypotheken für Wohn- und Geschäftsimmobilien erwerben sowie mit Hypotheken besicherte Wertpapiere. Das Programm muss noch vom Kongress gebilligt werden. Das Finanzministerium äußerte sich nicht zu diesen Informationen.

Die demokratische Mehrheitsführerin im Repräsentantenhaus, Nancy Pelosi sagte ein schnelles und parteiübergreifendes Vorgehen der Abgeordneten zu. Eine Entscheidung solle in der kommenden Woche fallen. Finanzminister Henry Paulson hatte zuvor gesagt, er werde Gesetzespläne vorstellen und mit dem Kongress arbeiten, damit dessen Mitglieder übers Wochenende Details ergänzen könnten. Kommende Woche solle es an die Gesetzgebung gehen. US-Präsident George W. Bush hatte die amerikanischen Steuerzahler auf hohe Kosten für die Bankenrettung eingestimmt.

Finanzminister Henry Paulson hatte erklärt, das Rettungspaket sei nötig, um die Krisenpapiere vor allem aus dem kollabierten Hypothekenmarkt zu beseitigen, die auf den Finanzinstituten und der Wirtschaft lasteten. Das Programm müsse groß genug sein, um einen deutlichen Erfolg zu zeigen "und die Probleme an der Wurzel zu packen". Zugleich müssten die Steuerzahler so weit wie möglich geschützt werden.


240 Mrd. Dollar in einer Woche

Der demokratische Präsidentschaftskandidat Barack Obama sprach dem Programm der Regierung seine "vollkommene Unterstützung" aus. Es dürfe jedoch nicht nur ein Plan für die Unternehmen geben, auch der Bevölkerung müsse geholfen werden.

Die US-Notenbank Fed hatte am Freitag weitere 20 Mrd. Dollar in das notleidende Bankensystem gepumpt. Die strauchelnden Geldinstitute hatten nach Angaben der Fed sogar um mehr als 55 Mrd. Dollar an frischem Geld gebeten. Insgesamt stellte die US-Notenbank in der abgelaufenen Woche bereits 240 Mrd. Dollar zur Verfügung.


Weitere Bankenpleite

Unterdessen hat die Finanz- und Immobilienkrise die zwölfte US-Bank in diesem Jahr in die Pleite gerissen. Die Ameribank im US-Bundesstaat West Virginia wurde nach Angaben des staatlichen Einlagensicherungsfonds der US-Banken (FDIC) geschlossen.

Die Ameribank verfügte den Angaben zufolge über Aktiva in Höhe von 115 Mio. Dollar und Depot-Einlagen über 102 Mio. Dollar. Laut FDIC sollen die Pioneer Community Bank und die Citizens Savings Bank die Einlagen der Ameribank und damit auch deren Kunden übernehmen.
@n-tv

[flyingkremlin]

http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/attention-to-tu…" target="_blank" rel="nofollow ugc noopener">http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/attention-to-tu…


"Dick Fuld lost the war. Like a lousy and drunken poker player, he bet a wonderful bank and lost. "

Filmreif! "Lehman" müsste doch zu drehen sein. Wann schlägt Oliver Stone zu?

[big_mac]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.195.925 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 13:55:09

Wall Street 2 ?

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.194.476 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 00:34:10

Aus der New York Times Online-Ausgabe: Ist Lehman der größte Bankraub aller Zeiten?

Death and Near-Death Experiences on Wall St.

EARLY last Monday morning, Richard S. Fuld Jr., the longtime chief executive of Lehman Brothers, put his 158-year-old firm into bankruptcy, burying a company where he had spent his entire career.

Two men left the offices of Lehman Brothers in New York last week. The government refused to bail out the brokerage firm, leading it to file for bankruptcy.

Several hours later, John A. Thain, the chief executive of Merrill Lynch, climbed a stage in Manhattan and told his employees, most of whom he had barely gotten to know during his brief tenure, that he was selling the troubled firm to the Bank of America Corporation.

Although both men played starring roles in a cataclysm that has threatened to break the economic backbone of the United States and has rearranged the financial landscape, their firms are hardly the only ones wounded in the crisis. And what began with falling house prices has escalated into staggering bank and stock-market losses, unleashing deep-rooted uncertainty about the resilience of the economy.

Over the last six months alone, the federal government has ponied up hundreds of billions in taxpayer funds to try to blunt the impact of outsize financial blunders on Wall Street and at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the American International Group. On Friday, the government took extraordinary and historic steps to save some firms and restore investor confidence by proposing to buy hundreds of billions of dollars in distressed assets.

Lehman had pleaded with regulators for months to use similar tactics to rescue it, but to no avail. Merrill, on the other hand, was able to stay in the game just long enough to find a suitor and benefit from the federal bailout announced on Friday.

Mr. Thain and Mr. Fuld made different strategic decisions over the last year that shaped radically diverse outcomes for their employees and shareholders. But the chaotic backdrop also spelled death for some companies and unlikely survival for others. Indeed, had last week’s government bailout arrived sooner, Lehman, like Merrill, might still exist.

A reserved and almost robotic executive, Mr. Thain approached Merrill’s fate like a technocrat, coolly assessing his options and selling the company before the pain got worse. Mr. Fuld, a passionate, dedicated and combative leader, kept struggling to survive until his firm finally ran into the ground.

“We are all prisoners of where we have been. The longer you are attached to a place, the harder it is to see it without rose-colored glasses,” says James D. Cox, a professor at the Duke University School of Law. “When Mr. Thain got to Merrill, he started moving quickly to put the problems behind him.”

“But Mr. Fuld helped build Lehman,” he adds. “He had spent his entire career there and helped build some of the assets that ended up causing so many problems. It’s almost impossible to force yourself to completely reconceptualize your career and your life, and undo the company you built.”

Other than being in the same business, Mr. Thain, 53, and Mr. Fuld, 62, appear to have little in common. Mr. Fuld is a classic Wall Street trader — taking big risks, reaping huge rewards, exuding intensity and demanding loyalty. A University of Colorado graduate, he stumbled into the industry and through sheer determination rose from a trading floor to the highest ranks of his profession.

Mr. Thain, a dead ringer for Clark Kent, is cautiously amiable and seemed to act out, rather than inhabit, the role of C.E.O. A graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he spent his career at Goldman Sachs and the New York Stock Exchange before Merrill’s board asked him to calm a firm rife with palace politics and glaringly lax risk management.

In the end, the technocrat brought Merrill a measure of safety, though only by the narrowest of margins.

And the defiance and independence that marked Mr. Fuld’s tenure and made him one of Wall Street’s most admired chief executives served him poorly when — like many — he misjudged the severity of the financial upheaval.

“Everyone on Wall Street is navigating uncharted waters right now,” said Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, a professor at the Yale School of Management. “No one could have dreamed it would have gotten this bad, and now that it is, no one is completely certain which choices were right and which were wrong.”

LAST October, E. Stanley O’Neal, Merrill’s ambitious chief executive, was forced to resign after reporting a $2.3 billion loss and making a desperate and unapproved attempt to find a merger partner. About two weeks later, the board announced that it had hired Mr. Thain.

At the time, Mr. Thain said he took the job because Merrill had the best wealth management business in the world and a premier investment banking franchise. Privately, he told friends that he wanted to resurrect the “MGM” days when Merrill, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley dominated investment banking.

But his immediate needs were more prosaic: raising money to fill the firm’s dwindling coffers. Even before Mr. Thain arrived, Merrill executives concluded that they needed to raise money in order to survive.

Mr. Thain argued to investors that he hadn’t created the debacle enveloping Merrill and that he came to the firm to fix its problems. On Christmas Eve, he announced that he had raised $6.2 billion; a few weeks later, he announced an additional $6.6 billion.

Just as important, he began an internal charm offensive. In January, a day before Merrill announced its annual earnings, Mr. Thain traveled to Arizona to meet with 800 of the firm’s wealth managers. He warned them that the firm’s results would be bad. But he promised that the company was on the right track. As he exited the stage, he was followed by Money, a live bull who was a flesh-and-blood embodiment of Merrill’s ubiquitous corporate logo.

The next day Merrill announced a huge hit: $9.8 billion in losses and $16.7 billion in write-downs. Speaking to investors, Mr. Thain said he was “confident that we have the capital base we need to go forward with 2008.” A few weeks later in a private meeting with a group of investors at the company’s headquarters in New York, Mr. Thain reassured them that he would take a tough-love approach.
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Virginia Mayo/Associated Press

Lehman Brothers’ C.E.O., Richard Fuld Jr., started as a intern 42 years ago and ran the firm for the last 14 years.

The news was a photo op for tourists in New York on Monday. Lehman Brothers sought bankruptcy protection, and Merrill Lynch announced a buyout deal.

“We’ve got fresh eyes on these problems, and we’re not wedded to believing this company has done everything right for years,” he said, according to two participants in that meeting, who requested anonymity because the talks were confidential.

“Look at Citi,” he said, referring to Citigroup, the banking giant. “If the 800-pound gorilla has to raise money, then everyone should be asking if it isn’t time to do the same.”

As Merrill wrestled with its financial demons, Lehman seemed in better shape.

Earlier this year, Mr. Fuld, who started as a Lehman intern 42 years ago and had run the firm since 1994, was basking in two quarters of surprisingly good results. Investors were hammering his stock, but he saw those downturns as opportunities to dole out more shares to employees he believed would benefit when the storm passed.

After all, he was fond of noting, life on Wall Street was war.

“Every day is a grind, every day we’re in it, really trying to trudge through the stuff, and don’t think this is a walk through the park,” he said in an interview last fall. “Every day is a battle: think about the firm, do the right thing, protect your client, protect the firm, be in it, be a good team member.”

Lehman executives took comfort in the fact that their balance sheet was heavily weighted with commercial real estate — which they felt was immune to the mess in residential housing. Moreover, Lehman didn’t hold the same type of bundled mortgages, known as collateralized debt obligations, that had hamstrung Merrill.

Earlier this year, when Lehman’s chief financial officer, Erin Callan, met with some investors at the company’s headquarters in Midtown Manhattan, she exuded confidence.

During the meeting an investor challenged Ms. Callan, according to two participants who requested anonymity because they did not want to jeopardize their relationships with senior executives. With firms like Citigroup and Merrill raising capital, the investor asked, why wasn’t Lehman following suit?

Ms. Callan was brusque, the two participants recalled. Glaring at her questioner, she said that Lehman didn’t need more money at the time — after all, it had yet to post a loss during the credit crisis. The company had industry veterans in the executive suite who had perfected the science of risk management, she said.

According to both investors, she said Lehman’s real estate investments were top-notch. “This company’s leadership has been here so long that they know the strengths and weaknesses,” participants recalled her saying. “We know when we need to be worried, and when we don’t.”

In an interview, Ms. Callan challenged that version of events and said that she was never defensive with investors. While conceding that she may have said those things, she thinks that investors who met with her took her comments out of context.

Lehman had been searching for a strategic partner for almost two years to buy a 10 percent or 15 percent stake in it — a move that would have made its stock less volatile and expand its business — according to people briefed on the discussions.

In 2006, it had unsuccessfully tried to team up with American International Group, the insurance behemoth. A year later it considered links with state investment agencies in Kuwait and China. Mr. Fuld and other Lehman executives also held discussions with Mizuho Corporate Bank of Japan, these people said.

But those deals hadn’t panned out. And as the credit crisis grew, investors were increasingly wary of the firm.

After federal regulators intervened to stop a collapse of Bear Stearns in March, Lehman’s stock fell 45 percent in two days. Shortly after, it reported meager profits of $489 million and write-downs of $1.8 billion — and soon after, it raised $4 billion in new capital.
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Shannon Stapleton/Reuters

John Thain, left, called Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America to offer a stake in Merrill. Mr. Lewis suggested a buyout.

With Bear gone, Lehman became the smallest investment bank on Wall Street. A chorus of whispers began: Lehman is next. Critics began opining that a world of woe lurked on its balance sheet. In May, David Einhorn, a well-regarded hedge fund manager, began publicly questioning the company’s accounting and mocking Ms. Callan’s self-assurance.

As the stock declined, Mr. Fuld authorized his executives to seek a minority investment from a deep-pocketed investor, which would give the market confidence, according to people briefed on the discussions. Potential investors were said to include General Electric, HSBC and Barclays.

Top executives still believed Lehman could remain independent. The market, however, disagreed.

As Lehman tried to make a case with the media and regulators that investors betting against its stock were unfairly going after the firm, top executives increasingly realized that their strategy was failing and assets were withering.

In June, Lehman was forced to unveil its second-quarter earnings early — an unexpected loss of $2.8 billion. Mr. Fuld replaced the president, Joseph Gregory, his closest friend at the company, and demoted Ms. Callan, who later left.

Lehman raised $6 billion more in capital and explored selling parts of its business. But neither management shake-ups nor promises that a dramatic turnaround was forthcoming stopped the stock from dropping.

AS Lehman publicly struggled, Merrill was quietly trying to right its ship.

In spite of Mr. Thain’s assurances in January that Merrill wouldn’t need new capital, the plummeting value of its mortgage securities soon made it apparent to its executives that they needed more funds.

Inside Merrill, Mr. Thain had drawn criticism for being aloof and for surrounding himself with a small cadre of colleagues from his previous jobs.

By July, when the stocks of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began spiraling downward, it was clear to investors everywhere that problems within the housing market were getting out of control.

Most consumers could see the reality of collapsing home prices for themselves. Within banks like Merrill, other hidden dangers existed: a dizzying array of complex products, known as derivatives, that tied mortgage-related securities, other assets and debts to companies here and overseas — a daisy chain that amplified the downturn.

Knowing he was caught in this web, Mr. Thain announced in July that he would sell some assets, including the firm’s stake in Bloomberg, the financial data and media company, for $4.4 billion. Merrill also raised $8.5 billion in a deal that severely diluted Merrill’s shareholders. It reported a second-quarter loss of $4.6 billion and $9.7 billion in write-downs.

A few weeks later, Mr. Thain announced a deal that stunned the markets: he offloaded $31 billion of toxic mortgage assets to Lone Star, a small investment company, for 22 cents on the dollar. Merrill had to finance 75 percent of the sale. Analysts uniformly agreed that Lone Star got a sweet deal.

“We have over 60,000 people working every day,” Mr. Thain said in an interview at the time, responding to criticism that he had sold the assets for a song. “All the efforts of these people were overwhelmed by the write-downs in the mortgage-related assets.”

Within months it would become clear that the Lone Star deal had, in fact, helped give Merrill extra time by untethering it from a block of ugly assets that might have stood in the way of a merger.

As the crisis escalated in July and August, Lehman was also racing to shore up its weaknesses. But investors had been burned by earlier investments in struggling financial service companies and were tapped out.

Still, Lehman executives held out hope that they would be able to save themselves by selling a stake to the Korea Development Bank, a state bank. But when Mr. Fuld, ever the tough negotiator, pushed the bank to take over some underperforming loans, the Koreans balked.

By Labor Day, a tidal wave was crashing down on the entire economy and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had become the centers of concern. Hoping to prevent companies of all sizes from toppling into one another like dominos, the government bailed out the two mortgage giants for about $200 billion.

While most banks and brokerage stocks soared on the news, including Merrill’s, Lehman’s stock dropped more than 50 percent in the two days following the bailout.

As government officials quietly said they were done rescuing financial firms, Lehman scrambled to find a solution. It was waiting for bids on its investment management division, a deal it hoped might secure $5 billion to $6 billion. It also floated the idea of splitting itself in two to create a separate company to house its troubled assets.
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Then, just over a week ago, Lehman announced a $4 billion loss and a $5.6 billion write-down. It also said it would spin out $30 billion of troubled assets into a separate company.

“We’ve been through adversity before, and we always come out a lot stronger,” Mr. Fuld said in a conference call on Sept. 10, sounding unusually resigned and utterly exhausted.

The markets didn’t buy it. Clients pulled money from Lehman, other firms wanted trading guarantees and Lehman finally ran out of cash. After surviving more than a century, Lehman would be dead within days unless someone stepped in.

ON a rainy afternoon nine days ago, with just an hour’s notice, Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, summoned Wall Street’s leading chief executives to a meeting at the Fed’s cavernous downtown offices. Many were getting ready to leave for the weekend, and all of them were worn out after a treacherous week.

Notably absent from the meeting was Mr. Fuld, who was scrambling to strike a deal with Bank of America, said people briefed on the negotiations. Mr. Geithner, who declined interview requests, told the gathering the government wouldn’t rescue Lehman, according to various participants. It was up to the industry to find a solution, he said.

Although Lehman’s woes were in the headlines, some participants wondered if they shouldn’t be talking about other troubled firms as well. Weren’t A.I.G.’s problems just as big, if not bigger? James Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, said A.I.G. had hired his bank, which was trying to find a solution.

Others in the room focused on Merrill’s sagging stock and huge debt burden. If Lehman collapsed, participants wondered to themselves, was Merrill next? Some banks were so concerned that they considered stopping trading with Merrill if Lehman went under.

When the meeting broke up at 8:30 p.m., Mr. Geithner asked the executives to return at 9 the next morning and to count on spending most of the weekend trying to build a bulwark against the biggest economic firestorm since the Great Depression.

On Saturday morning, when Mr. Thain arrived at the Fed, Lehman had returned to the center of discussion. Various scenarios, including the impact of a Lehman bankruptcy, were considered; everyone knew that Bank of America and Barclays were considering buying Lehman but had wanted government backing. Regulators made it clear that that wasn’t going to happen.

During the morning session, Mr. Thain sat across the table from Herbert H. McDade III, Lehman’s president. “I don’t want to be in his seat,” Mr. Thain thought to himself, according to a person familiar with his thinking.

And to make sure he didn’t wind up in that seat within days, Mr. Thain decided Merrill had to do something bold by Monday. His hope was to sell about a 10 percent stake to a cash-rich partner.

His first call was to Kenneth D. Lewis, Bank of America’s chief executive, who had long coveted Merrill. Mr. Thain got Mr. Lewis’s phone number from Gregory J. Fleming, Merrill’s president, who wanted a tie-up between the two. Mr. Fleming was worried that if Bank of America purchased Lehman first, the bank wouldn’t cut a deal with Merrill.

Mr. Lewis raised the ante: he said he wasn’t interested in buying just a stake in Merrill. He wanted the whole company. Mr. Lewis flew to New York from the bank’s headquarters in Charlotte, N.C., to meet with Mr. Thain on Saturday afternoon in a corporate apartment.

Those conversations went well. But then Mr. Thain trekked back to the Fed, where another surprise awaited. Peter Kraus, his head of strategy, told him that Goldman Sachs was interested in buying a 9.9 percent stake and extending a $10 billion credit line, according to people briefed on the discussions.

And Goldman wasn’t the only other interested suitor. John J. Mack, chief executive of Morgan Stanley, told Mr. Thain that “we should talk,” according to people familiar with the discussions. A two-hour meeting was held that afternoon on the Upper East Side with the C.E.O.’s and their advisers.

But by Saturday afternoon, Mr. Fleming was already leading Merrill’s bankers and lawyers through a quick scouring of Bank of America and its proposal, giving the North Carolina bank a leg up.

Around 9 on Sunday morning, Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary, told the Fed group that Lehman hadn’t found a buyer and that they should brace for its bankruptcy.

ATTENTION immediately shifted to Merrill Lynch, which many were certain would be the next to topple. Bankers started discussing the possibility of creating a vast liquidity pool that the next troubled institution could tap into.
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Meanwhile, Mr. Thain set a noon conference call with his board. He said he expected a bid from Bank of America and had held discussions with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, according to people briefed on the discussions. He concluded that Mr. Lewis’s bid — a takeover of the entire company at a premium price — was the best offer.

At a 6 p.m. meeting with his board at the St. Regis hotel, Mr. Thain recommended to his board that it accept. The deal was unanimously approved.

For Lehman, the weekend shaped up very differently.

On Friday night, Lehman executives believed a deal with Bank of America was possible, according to people briefed on the negotiations. But by Saturday, they couldn’t get Bank of America to return their calls.

Mr. Fuld stayed in his office from 7 a.m. until after midnight on Saturday and on Sunday, calling regulators, potential buyers and his own team. But his options were fading. Even promising talks with Barclays, a British bank, were running aground.

Late in the day on Sunday, Mr. Fuld learned that the Fed would expand its lending by allowing banks to post a wider variety of collateral, and that the banking industry had cobbled together a $70 billion lending pool.

According to people briefed on the conversations, Mr. Fuld implored the regulators to let Lehman have access to those new funds — a move that he believed would have saved the firm. No, he was told: these measures are to stabilize the market in the aftermath of a Lehman liquidation, not to prevent it.

In fact, the pool was intended to help Merrill, industry participants said. Ironically, though, Merrill wouldn’t need that capital because it was completing its deal with Bank of America.

Regulators and bankers tried to wait for Lehman’s bankruptcy filing before announcing the two new lending options. But by 10 Sunday night, Lehman still hadn’t filed, because Mr. Fuld was still trying to do a deal with Barclays.

After Barclays fell through, Mr. Fuld directed his lawyers at 12:30 a.m. Monday to file for bankruptcy. Within hours, Mr. Thain announced his deal.

On Wednesday, Barclays offered the bankruptcy court $1.75 billion — far less than Lehman wanted for that firm’s core capital markets and investment banking business, its headquarters and two data centers.

And with each day the drama continues. On Friday, the rumor mill was speculating that a huge market rebound sparked by the federal bailout of Wall Street might mean that Merrill wouldn’t need to sell itself to Bank of America.

Both companies insist the deal is still on.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21exec.html?pagew…

[RoyalFlasch70]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.201.504 von flyingkremlin am 21.09.08 03:16:56

Übersetzt!

Ich denke hier wird profit an den Szenario gemacht am Ende aus Insolvenz!

Tod und Near-Death Erfahrungen an der Wall St.

Anfang letzten Montag morgen, Richard S. Fuld Jr., der langjährige Geschäftsführer von Lehman Brothers, seine 158-jährige Unternehmen in den Bankrott, Vergraben eines Unternehmens, wo er verbrachte seine gesamte Karriere.

Zwei Männer aus dem Büro von Lehman Brothers in New York letzte Woche. Die Regierung weigerte sich, Bail-out der Brokerage-Unternehmen, führende es Insolvenz anmelden.

Mehrere Stunden später, John A. Thain, der Chief Executive von Merrill Lynch, um eine Etappe in Manhattan und sagte seinen Mitarbeitern, von denen die meisten hatte er kaum bekommen zu wissen, während seiner kurzen Amtszeit, dass er den Verkauf der krisengeschüttelten Unternehmen an die Bank of America Corporation.

Obwohl beide Männer Mit spielte Rollen in einer Katastrophe, die bedroht, um die wirtschaftliche Rückgrat der Vereinigten Staaten und hat neu die finanzielle Landschaft, ihre Unternehmen sind kaum die einzigen, verwundet in der Krise. Und was begann mit dem Rückgang der Immobilienpreise hat eskalierte in der Staffelung Bank-und Börsen-Verluste, Entfesselung tief verwurzelte Unsicherheit über die Widerstandsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft.

Im Laufe der letzten sechs Monate allein, hat die Bundesregierung ponied bis Hunderte von Milliarden in Steuerzahler Mittel zu versuchen, stumpfe die Auswirkungen der finanziellen Großdatum Fehler an der Wall Street und bei Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac und die American International Group. Am Freitag, die Regierung hat außerordentliche und historische Schritte, um die Unternehmen und das Vertrauen der Anleger wiederherzustellen, indem sie zu kaufen Hunderte von Milliarden Dollar in notleidende Aktiven.

Lehman hatte plädierte mit Regulierungsbehörden für Monat zu benutzen ähnliche Taktiken zu retten, aber ohne Erfolg. Merrill, auf der anderen Seite, konnte im Spiel bleiben nur lange genug zu finden, ein Freier und profitieren Sie von der Bundes-Rettungsaktion am Freitag mitteilte.

Herr Thain und Herr Fuld aus verschiedenen strategischen Entscheidungen im Laufe des letzten Jahres, dass die Form radikal unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse für ihre Mitarbeiter und Aktionäre. Aber die chaotischen Hintergrund auch Schreibweise Tod für einige Unternehmen und Überleben unwahrscheinlich, für die anderen. Tatsächlich, hatte letzte Woche die Regierung Rettungsaktion kam früher, Lehman, wie Merrill, könnte noch existieren.

Ein reserviert und fast Robot-Exekutive, Herr Thain an Merrill das Schicksal wie ein Technokrat, kühl Beurteilung ihrer Möglichkeiten und Verkauf des Unternehmens vor dem Schmerz haben Schlechten. Herr Fuld, eine leidenschaftliche, engagierte und kämpferische Anführer, gehalten kämpfen, um zu überleben, bis seine Firma schließlich lief in den Boden.

"Wir sind alle Gefangenen, wo wir gewesen sind. Je länger Sie sind an einem Ort, desto schwieriger ist es, um es zu sehen, ohne Rose-farbigen Gläser ", sagt James D. Cox, Professor an der Duke University School of Law. "Wenn Herr Thain habe Merrill, begann er schnell bewegen, um die Probleme hinter ihm."

"Aber Herr Fuld geholfen Lehman bauen", fügt er hinzu. "Er hatte verbrachte seine gesamte Karriere und dort geholfen, einige der Vermögenswerte, endete verursacht so viele Probleme. Es ist fast unmöglich zu zwingen Sie sich völlig reconceptualize Ihre Karriere und Ihr Leben, und das Unternehmen wieder rückgängig Sie gebaut. "

Andere als die im gleichen Geschäft, Herr Thain, 53, und Herr Fuld, 62, offenbar haben wenig gemeinsam. Herr Fuld ist ein klassisches Wall-Street-Händler - die großen Risiken, erntet große Belohnungen, ausschwitzende Intensität und anspruchsvolle Loyalität. A University of Colorado Absolvent, stolperte er in die Industrie und durch schiere Entschlossenheit stieg von einer Parkett auf den höchsten Ränge der seinen Beruf.

Herr Thain, ein Dead Ringer für Clark Kent, ist liebenswürdig und vorsichtig zu handeln schien aus, anstatt bewohnen, die Rolle des CEO Als Absolvent des Massachusetts Institute of Technology, verbrachte er seine Karriere bei Goldman Sachs und der New York Stock Exchange vor dem Merrill-Vorstand bat ihn zu beruhigen ein Unternehmen grassiert Palast mit Politik und grell Lax Risikomanagement.

Am Ende, der Technokrat gebracht Merrill ein gewisses Maß an Sicherheit, wenn auch nur durch die schmalen der Margen.

Und die Herausforderung und die Unabhängigkeit markiert, dass Herr Fuld Amtszeit und machte ihn zu einem der Wall Street die am meisten bewunderte Chief Executives serviert ihn schlecht, wenn - wie viele - er falsch die Schwere der finanziellen Umwälzungen.

"Jeder an der Wall Street ist die Navigation unbekannte Gewässer im Moment", sagte Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, ein Professor an der Yale School of Management. "Niemand hätte davon geträumt, es hätte diese schlecht geworden, und nun, da es, niemand ist vollkommen, die bestimmte Entscheidungen waren richtig und was falsch waren."

LAST Oktober, E. Stanley O'Neal, Merrill das ehrgeizige Chief Executive, zum Rücktritt gezwungen wurde nach der Meldung ein 2,3 Milliarden Dollar Verlust und einen verzweifelten und nicht genehmigten Versuch, eine Fusion Partner. Über zwei Wochen später, der Vorstand angekündigt, dass sie gemietet hatte Herr Thain.

Zu der Zeit, Herr Thain sagte, er habe den Job, weil Merrill hatte die beste Wealth-Management-Geschäfts in der Welt und ein Privat-Investment-Banking-Franchise. Privat, sagte er Freunden, dass er wollte wieder die "MGM" Tage, an denen Merrill, Goldman Sachs und Morgan Stanley beherrscht Investment Banking.

Aber seine unmittelbaren Bedürfnisse wurden mehr prosaisch: Geld zu füllen des Unternehmens schwindenden Kassen. Noch bevor Herr Thain angekommen, Merrill Führungskräfte der Schluss gezogen, dass sie erforderlich, um Geld, um zu überleben.

Herr Thain geltend gemacht, für die Anleger, dass er nicht das Debakel Merrill Kuvertierung und dass er kam zu dem Unternehmen zur Behebung ihrer Probleme. Am Heiligabend, kündigte er an, dass er die 6,2 Milliarden Dollar; ein paar Wochen später, kündigte er an, eine zusätzliche 6,6 Milliarden Dollar.

Ebenso wichtig, begann er eine interne Charme-Offensive. Im Januar, einen Tag vor der Bekanntgabe seiner Merrill Jahresverdienst, Herr Thain reiste nach Arizona, um mit 800 der Firma Vermögensverwalter. Er warnte sie, dass das Unternehmen die Ergebnisse wäre schlecht. Aber er versprach, dass das Unternehmen war auf dem richtigen Weg. Als er die Bühne verlassen, wurde er gefolgt von Geld, eine Live-Stier, der war ein aus Fleisch und Blut Verkörperung von Merrill's allgegenwärtigen Firmenlogo.

Am nächsten Tag Merrill kündigte ein grosser Erfolg: 9,8 Milliarden Dollar in Verluste und 16,7 Mrd. Dollar in Abschreibungen. Im Gespräch mit Investoren, Herr Thain sagte, er sei "zuversichtlich, dass wir die Kapitalbasis müssen wir nach vorne mit 2008." Ein paar Wochen später in einem privaten Treffen mit einer Gruppe von Investoren an der Firmensitz des Unternehmens in New York, Herr Thain versicherte ihnen, er würde eine harte Liebe-Ansatz.
Direkt zum nächsten Absatz
Dieses Bild vergrößern
Virginia Mayo / Associated Press

Lehman Brothers' CEO, Richard Fuld Jr., begann als Praktikant 42 Jahren und lief die Firma für die letzten 14 Jahre.

Die Nachricht war ein Foto op für Touristen in New York am Montag. Lehman Brothers gesucht Konkurs Schutz, und Merrill Lynch angekündigt, ein Buyout sich.

"Wir haben frische Augen auf diese Probleme, und wir sind nicht fest auf der Annahme dieses Unternehmen hat alles richtig gemacht für die Jahre", sagte er, nach zwei Teilnehmer in dieser Sitzung, der beantragt Anonymität, weil die Gespräche wurden vertraulich.

"Sehen Sie sich Citi", sagte er unter Bezugnahme auf die Citigroup, die Bank-Riese. "Wenn die 800-Pfund Gorilla hat, um Geld, dann sollte jeder gefragt, ob es nicht an der Zeit, das Gleiche zu tun."

Wie Merrill rang mit ihrer finanziellen Dämonen, Lehman schien besser in Form.

Anfang dieses Jahres, Herr Fuld, die begann als Lehman intern 42 Jahren und hatte das Unternehmen seit 1994, wurde Riesenhai in zwei Quartalen überraschend gute Ergebnisse. Investoren wurden Hämmern seinem Lager, aber er sah die Abschwung als Möglichkeiten zur Dole mehr Aktien an Mitarbeiter glaubten, er würde profitieren, wenn der Sturm vorbei.

Denn er war gerne der Feststellung, das Leben an der Wall Street war Krieg.

"Jeden Tag ist ein schleifen, jeden Tag sind wir in ihm, wirklich versuchen, trudge durch das Zeug, und glaube nicht, dass es sich hierbei um ein Spaziergang durch den Park", sagte er in einem Interview im vergangenen Herbst. "Jeden Tag ist ein Kampf: Denken Sie über die Firma, das Richtige tun, schützen Sie Ihre Kunden, zum Schutz des Unternehmens, werden in ihm, ein guter Team-Mitglied."

Lehman Führungskräfte nahmen Komfort in der Tatsache, dass ihre Bilanz war stark gewichtet mit gewerblichen Immobilien -, die sie fühlte war immun gegen die Unordnung in den Wohnungsbau. Darüber hinaus Lehman nicht die gleiche Art von gebündelten Hypotheken, bekannt als besicherte Schuldverschreibungen, dass Merrill gelähmt hatte.

Anfang dieses Jahres, wenn Lehman's Chief Financial Officer, Erin Callan, traf sich mit einigen Investoren am Firmensitz des Unternehmens in Midtown Manhattan, sie exuded Vertrauen.

Während des Treffens ein Investor in Frage gestellt Frau Callan, nach zwei Teilnehmer, die geforderten Anonymität, weil sie nicht wollen, gefährden ihre Beziehungen mit Führungskräften. Mit Unternehmen wie Citigroup und Merrill Kapitalbeschaffung, der Investor gefragt, warum wurde nicht Lehman folgenden Anzug?

Frau Callan wurde brüsk, die zwei Teilnehmer daran erinnert. Eklatanten auf ihre Fragesteller, sagte sie, dass Lehman nicht brauchen mehr Geld, die zum Zeitpunkt - nach allem, sie habe noch nach einem Verlust während der Kredit-Krise. Das Unternehmen hatte die Industrie-Veteranen in der Executive-Suite, die perfektioniert die Wissenschaft des Risiko-Managements, sagte sie.

Nach den beiden Investoren, sagte sie Lehman's Immobilienanlagen wurden Top-Notch. "Dieses Unternehmen Führung wurde hier so lange, dass sie wissen, die Stärken und Schwächen," die Teilnehmer daran erinnert, ihr sagen. "Wir wissen, wann müssen wir uns besorgt, und wenn wir dies nicht tun."

In einem Interview, Frau Callan herausgefordert diese Version der Ereignisse und sagte, sie sei nie mit defensive Anleger. Während conceding Mai, dass sie gesagt haben, diese Dinge, sie ist der Auffassung, dass Investoren, die mit ihr nahm ihre Kommentare aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen.

Lehman hatte der Suche nach einem strategischen Partner für fast zwei Jahre den Kauf eines 10 Prozent oder 15 Prozent der Anteile an der IT - ein Schritt, hätte seine Aktien weniger volatil und erweitern ihr Geschäft - nach Menschen, über die Diskussionen.

In 2006, sie habe vergeblich versucht, sich mit American International Group, die Versicherungs-Behemoth. Ein Jahr später hält sie es für Verbindungen mit staatlichen Investitionen Agenturen in Kuwait und China. Herr Fuld und andere Führungskräfte Lehman auch Gespräche mit Mizuho Corporate Bank of Japan, diese Leute gesagt.

Aber diese Angebote noch nicht Balance aus. Und da die Kredit-Krise wuchs, waren Investoren zunehmend misstrauisch des Unternehmens.

Nach dem Bundes-Regulierungsbehörden intervenierte, um Stopp ein Zusammenbruch von Bear Stearns im März, Lehman-Aktie fiel 45 Prozent in zwei Tagen. Kurz nach, so berichtet dürftige Gewinne von 489 Millionen Dollar und Abschreibungen von 1,8 Milliarden Dollar - und bald nach, es hat 4 Milliarden Dollar in neue Hauptstadt.
Direkt zum nächsten Absatz
Dieses Bild vergrößern
Shannon Stapleton / Reuters

John Thain, links, namens Kenneth Lewis von Bank of America, eine Beteiligung an der Merrill. Herr Lewis vorgeschlagen, ein Buyout.

Mit Bär weg, Lehman wurde die kleinste Investmentbank an der Wall Street. Ein Chor von flüstert begann: Lehman nächsten ist. Kritiker begann opining, dass eine Welt der WOE lauerte auf seine Bilanz. Im Mai, David Einhorn, ein gut, die Hedge-Fonds-Manager, öffentlich in Frage zu stellen begann das Unternehmen über die Rechnungslegung und spöttisch Frau Callan's Selbstbewusstsein.

Da die Lager gingen, Herr Fuld ermächtigt seine Führungskräfte, um eine Minderheit Investitionen aus einer Tiefsee-pocketed Investor, nach dem Vertrauen des Marktes, nach Menschen, über die Diskussionen. Potenzielle Investoren wurden, sagte auch General Electric, HSBC und Barclays.

Top-Führungskräfte nach wie vor der Ansicht, Lehman könnte unabhängig bleiben. Der Markt, jedoch nicht einverstanden.

Wie Lehman versucht, ein Fall mit den Medien und den Regulierungsbehörden, dass die Anleger Wetten gegen seine Lager wurden zu Unrecht wird, nachdem das Unternehmen, Top-Führungskräfte zunehmend erkannt, dass ihre Strategie war nicht und Vermögenswerte wurden Welke.

Im Juni, Lehman war gezwungen, enthüllen seine zweite Quartal Ergebnis Anfang - ein unerwarteter Verlust von 2,8 Milliarden Dollar. Herr Fuld ersetzt den Präsidenten, Joseph Gregory, seinem engsten Freund in der Firma, und degradiert Frau Callan, der später nach links.

Lehman erhöht 6 Milliarden Dollar mehr in die Hauptstadt erkundet und Verkauf von Teilen ihres Geschäfts. Aber weder Management schütteln-ups noch verspricht, dass eine dramatische Wende war die bevorstehende gestoppt Bestands ab dem Drop.

AS Lehman öffentlich zu kämpfen, Merrill war ruhig versuchen, Recht seine Schiff.

Trotz der Herr Thain's Zusicherungen im Januar, dass Merrill würde nicht brauchen neue Hauptstadt, die Talfahrt Wert ihrer Hypothek Wertpapiere bald wurde es offensichtlich auf seine Führungskräfte, dass sie mehr Mittel erforderlich.

Inside Merrill, Herr Thain hatte die Kritik als zurückhaltend und Umgebung für sich selbst mit einem kleinen Kader von Kollegen aus seiner früheren Beschäftigung.

Mit Juli, wenn die Bestände der Hypothek Riesen Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac begann spiraling nach unten, es war klar, Investoren überall, dass Probleme innerhalb der Wohnungsmarkt waren immer außer Kontrolle.

Die meisten Verbraucher konnte sehen, die Realität des zusammenbrechenden home Preise für sich. Innerhalb von Banken wie Merrill, andere versteckten Gefahren existierten: eine schwindelerregende Vielzahl von komplexen Produkten, bekannt als Derivate, dass vertraglich gebundene Hypotheken-Wertpapieren, sonstige Vermögensgegenstände und Schulden an Unternehmen, hier und in Übersee - ein Daisy-Chain verstärkt, dass der Abschwung.

Zu wissen, er war gefangen in diesem Web, Herr Thain der Bekanntgabe im Juli, dass er verkaufen einige Vermögenswerte, einschließlich des Unternehmens-Beteiligung an Bloomberg, die finanziellen Daten und Medien-Unternehmen, für 4,4 Milliarden Dollar. Merrill ebenfalls 8,5 Milliarden Dollar in ein Geschäft, dass stark verdünnten Merrill-Aktionäre. Er berichtete über eine zweite Quartal Verlust von $ 4,6 Milliarden und 9,7 Milliarden Dollar in Abschreibungen.

Ein paar Wochen später, Herr Thain kündigte eine betäubt, dass sich die Märkte: er entladen 31 Milliarden Dollar von giftigen Hypotheken-Vermögenswerten zu Lone Star, eine kleine Investmentgesellschaft, für 22 Cent auf den Dollar. Merrill hatte zur Finanzierung von 75 Prozent des Verkaufs. Analysten einig, dass eine einheitliche Lone Star hat eine süße Sache.

"Wir haben mehr als 60.000 Menschen arbeiten jeden Tag," Mr. Thain sagte in einem Interview zu dem Zeitpunkt, als Antwort auf Kritik, dass er verkauft die Vermögenswerte für einen Song. "Alle Bemühungen dieser Menschen waren überwältigt von der Abschreibungen in der Hypotheken-bezogenen Vermögenswerte."

Innerhalb weniger Monate wäre es klar geworden, dass die Lone Star hatte sich in der Tat dazu beigetragen, geben Merrill zusätzliche Zeit von untethering es aus einem Block von hässlich, dass Vermögenswerte haben könnten stand in der Form einer Fusion.

Wie die Krise eskalierte im Juli und August, Lehman war auch Renn-Ufer auf ihre Schwächen. Aber Investoren wurden verbrannt durch frühere Investitionen in kämpfen Finanzdienstleister und Unternehmen wurden erschlossen werden.

Still, Lehman Führungskräfte bis zum Anschlag herausgezogen gehalten hoffe, dass sie der Lage wäre, sich selbst zu retten durch den Verkauf einer Beteiligung an der Korea Development Bank, einem Staat, Bank. Aber wenn Herr Fuld, immer die harten Verhandlungspartner, drängte die Bank zu übernehmen, einige unterdurchschnittlich Darlehen, die Koreaner balked.

Mit dem Tag der Arbeit, eine Flutwelle stürzte sich auf die gesamte Wirtschaft und Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac hatte sich die Zentren zur Sorge. Der Hoffnung, um zu verhindern, dass Unternehmen aller Größen aus Sturz in einem anderen wie ein Domino, die Regierung bailed die zwei Riesen Hypothek für über 200 Milliarden Dollar.

Während die meisten Banken und Brokerage-Aktien stieg in den Nachrichten, einschließlich Merrill's, Lehman-Aktie fiel mehr als 50 Prozent in den zwei Tagen nach der Rettungsaktion.

Wie Regierungsbeamte sagte sie leise wurden finanzielle Rettung von Unternehmen, Lehman verschlüsselt, eine Lösung zu finden. Es wurde erwartet Gebote für seine Investment-Management-Abteilung, eine Einigung gehofft, es könnte sicher 5 Milliarden Dollar auf 6 Milliarden Dollar. Darüber hinaus schwebte die Idee der Teilung selbst in zwei, um eine eigene Gesellschaft für Haus seiner unruhigen Vermögenswerte.
Direkt zum nächsten Absatz

Dann, vor gut einer Woche, Lehman kündigte eine 4 Milliarden Dollar Verlust und ein 5,6 Milliarden Dollar Abschreibung. Sie sagten auch, es würde Spin-out 30 Milliarden Dollar der unruhigen Vermögenswerte in eine separate Firma.

"Wir haben durch Widrigkeiten vor, und wir kommen immer eine viel stärkere," Herr Fuld sagte in einer Telefonkonferenz am 10. September, klingt ungewöhnlich zurückgetreten und völlig erschöpft.

Die Märkte nicht kaufen. Kunden gezogen Geld von Lehman, andere Unternehmen wollte Handel Garantien und Lehman schließlich lief von Bargeld. Nach der überlebende mehr als einem Jahrhundert, Lehman wäre Toten innerhalb weniger Tage, es sei denn, jemand verstärkt in.

An einem regnerischen Nachmittag neun Tage, mit nur einer Stunde Hinweis, Timothy F. Geithner, Präsident der Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Ladung Wall Street zu den führenden Chief Executives zu einem Treffen auf die Fed die Gänge der Innenstadt Büros . Viele waren immer bereit zu verlassen für das Wochenende, und alle von ihnen getragen wurden dann nach einer tückischen Woche.

Vor allem fehlt der Sitzung wurde Herr Fuld, der Verschlüsselungs-, ein Deal mit der Bank of America, sagte Menschen informiert über den Stand der Verhandlungen. Herr Geithner, der ging Interviewanfragen, sagte die Sammlung der Regierung würde nicht Rettungs-Lehman, nach verschiedenen Teilnehmern. Es war bis zu der Branche, eine Lösung zu finden, sagte er.

Obwohl Lehman die Leiden waren in den Schlagzeilen, einige Teilnehmer gefragt, wenn sie nicht zu sprechen von anderen Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten als gut. AIG wurden nicht nur die Probleme so groß, wenn nicht sogar größer? James Dimon, JPMorgan's Chief Executive, sagte AIG hatte seine Bank, die versuchen, eine Lösung zu finden.

Andere im Raum konzentrierte sich auf Merrill's Hängebrüsten Lager und riesige Schuldenlast. Wenn Lehman zusammengebrochen, die Teilnehmer gefragt, sich selbst, war Merrill nächsten? Einige Banken waren so besorgt, dass sie als Anhalten Handel mit Merrill, wenn Lehman ging unter.

Bei der Sitzung brach bis auf 8:30 Uhr, Herr Geithner forderte die Führungskräfte, um zurück zu gehen um 9 am nächsten Morgen und die Tage zählen Ausgaben für die meisten am Wochenende versuchen, ein Bollwerk gegen die größten wirtschaftlichen Feuersturm seit der Großen Depression.

Am Samstag Morgen, wenn Herr Thain angekommen an der Fed, Lehman hatte wieder in den Mittelpunkt der Diskussion. Verschiedene Szenarien, einschließlich der Auswirkungen eines Konkurses Lehman, wurden geprüft; alle wussten, dass die Bank of America und Barclays waren erwägt Kauf von Lehman aber wollte Regierung Rückendeckung. Die Regulierungsbehörden deutlich gemacht, dass das war nicht passieren.

Während der Vormittagssitzung, Herr Thain Samstag über den Tisch von Herbert H. McDade III, Lehman Präsident. "Ich möchte nicht in seinem Sitz," Mr. Thain Gedanken zu sich selbst, nach einer Person mit seinem Denken.

Und, um sicherzustellen, dass er nicht Wind-up in diesem Sitz innerhalb weniger Tage, Mr. Thain Merrill beschlossen hatte, etwas zu tun fett bis Montag. Seine Hoffnung war zu verkaufen über einen 10-Prozent-Beteiligung an einem Cash-reich Partner.

Seine erste Ausschreibung war es, Kenneth D. Lewis, Bank of America's Chief Executive, hatte lange begehrten Merrill. Herr Thain hat Herr Lewis die Telefonnummer von Gregory J. Fleming, Merrill Präsident, der wollte eine Krawatte-up zwischen den beiden. Herr Fleming war besorgt, dass, wenn Bank of America gekauft Lehman ersten, die Bank würde nicht geschnitten einen Deal mit Merrill.

Herr Lewis, die die ante: Er sagte, er sei nicht interessiert am Kauf nur einen Anteil an Merrill. Er wollte das ganze Unternehmen. Herr Lewis flog nach New York von der Bank Hauptsitz in Charlotte, NC, um mit Herrn Thain am Samstag Nachmittag in einem Corporate-Wohnung.

Diese Gespräche gut gegangen ist. Aber dann Herr Thain trekked zurück auf die Fed, wo eine andere Überraschung erwartete. Peter Kraus, den Kopf der Strategie, teilte ihm mit, dass Goldman Sachs war interessiert am Kauf eines 9,9-Prozent-Anteil und die Ausweitung des 10 Milliarden Dollar Kreditlinie, nach Menschen, über die Diskussionen.

Und Goldman war nicht der einzige andere interessierte Freier. John J. Mack, Chief Executive von Morgan Stanley, sagte Herr Thain, dass "wir sollten reden", so die Menschen mit den Diskussionen. Ein zwei-Stunden-Sitzung wurde festgestellt, dass Nachmittag auf der Upper East Side mit den CEO's und deren Berater.

Aber von Samstag Nachmittag, Herr Fleming wurde bereits führende Merrill's Banker und Anwälte durch einen schnellen Reinigen der Bank of America und ihren Vorschlag, den die Bank North Carolina ein Bein auf.

Rund 9 am Sonntag Morgen, Henry M. Paulson Jr., der Treasury Secretary, sagte der Fed-Gruppe, dass Lehman hatte nicht ein Käufer gefunden und dass sie Stütze für seine Konkurs.

ACHTUNG sofort verschoben zu Merrill Lynch, die viele von ihnen wurden bestimmte wäre die nächste zu stürzen. Bankers begann der Erörterung der Möglichkeit der Schaffung eines riesigen Pool Liquidität, dass die nächste unruhigen Institution könnte erschließen.
Direkt zum nächsten Absatz

Inzwischen, Herr Thain eine Uhr Telefonkonferenz mit seinem Bord. Er sagte, er erwarte ein Angebot von Bank of America und hatte Gespräche mit Goldman Sachs und Morgan Stanley, nach Menschen, über die Diskussionen. Er Schluss gezogen, dass Herr Lewis, das Angebot - eine Übernahme des gesamten Unternehmens auf einen Premium-Preis - war das beste Angebot.

Auf einer 6 Uhr Treffen mit seinem Board auf dem St. Regis Hotel, Herr Thain empfohlen, seine Bord, dass es akzeptieren. Das Vorhaben wurde einstimmig genehmigt.

Für Lehman, das Wochenende geprägt bis sehr unterschiedlich.

Am Freitag Nacht, Lehman Führungskräfte der Ansicht, eine Einigung mit Bank of America möglich war, nach Menschen, über die Verhandlungen. Aber von Samstag, könnten sie nicht bekommen Bank of America, um wieder ihre Anrufe.

Herr Fuld blieb in seinem Büro von 7 Uhr bis nach Mitternacht am Samstag und am Sonntag, den Regulierungsbehörden fordern, potentiellen Käufern und seine eigene Mannschaft. Aber seine Optionen wurden Fading. Selbst viel versprechende Gespräche mit Barclays, eine britische Bank, liefen gestrandet.

Spät in den Tag am Sonntag, den Herr Fuld gelernt, dass die Fed würden ihre Kreditvergabe durch die Banken, um eine breitere Palette von Sicherheiten, und dass die Kreditwirtschaft hatte gepflasterten zusammen ein 70 Milliarden Dollar-Darlehen Pool.

Nach Menschen, über die Gespräche, Herr Fuld implored die Aufsichtsbehörden zu lassen Lehman haben Zugang zu diesen neuen Fonds - ein Schritt, dass er geglaubt hätte das Unternehmen gespeichert. Nein, er sagte: diese Maßnahmen zur Stabilisierung der Markt im Anschluss an ein Lehman Liquidation, nicht, um dies zu verhindern.

In der Tat, der Pool war, die dazu bestimmt Merrill, Industrie Teilnehmer sagte. Ironischerweise, wenn, Merrill wäre nicht notwendig, dass die Hauptstadt, denn es war die Vollendung seiner befassen sich mit der Bank of America.

Regulierungsbehörden und Bankiers versucht zu warten, für die Lehman Konkurs Einreichung vor der Bekanntgabe der beiden neuen Darlehen Optionen. Aber um 10 Sonntag Nacht, Lehman noch nicht eingereicht, weil Herr Fuld war immer noch versuchen, eine Einigung mit Barclays.

Nach Barclays fiel durch, Herr Fuld richtet sich seine Anwälte um 12:30 Uhr Montag bis Konkurs anmelden. Innerhalb von Stunden, Herr Thain gibt bekannt, dass er sich.

Am Mittwoch, Barclays bietet den Konkurs Gericht 1,75 Milliarden Dollar - weit weniger als Lehman wollte, dass für das Kerngeschäft Wertpapierfirma Kapitalmarkt-und Investment-Banking-Geschäft, seinen Sitz und zwei Rechenzentren.

Und mit jedem Tag das Drama geht weiter. Am Freitag, dem Gerücht Mühle wurde spekuliert, dass ein riesiger Markt Rebound löste durch die Bundes-Rettungsaktion der Wall Street könnte bedeuten, dass Merrill würde nicht zu verkaufen, selbst zu Bank of America.

Beide Unternehmen darauf bestehen, die sich immer noch auf.

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.195.925 von flyingkremlin am 20.09.08 13:55:09

Wer als Flieger seinem Vorsetzten für die Verspottung eines anderen in die Fresse haut, der lässt sich nicht sang und klanglos seine Firma, seine Kohle und seine Reputation nehmen.

Vermutlich nicht von tonangebenden Personen bei GS,JPM, Fed und Co. mit denen er wahrscheinlich im Geiste soviel gemein hat, wie mit dem Offizier dem in jungen Jahren eine gescheppert hat.

Vielleicht sollte Herr Fuld (und damit Lehman) einfach seinen Platz in der Neuordnung der amerikanischen Bankenlandschaft verlieen, weil Personen wie er für den aktuellen Standardmanager, dem technokratischen Bückling, eine unkalkulierbare Gefahr darstellen, die nicht konrollierbar ist.

Ich bin gespannt was Fuld zu sagen hat. Er scheint jedenfalls wirklich ein crazy Typ zu sein.

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sect…

[flyingkremlin]

http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=O_mcdAIWJWQ&feature=related" target="_blank" rel="nofollow ugc noopener">http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=O_mcdAIWJWQ&feature=related
http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=rtrQYhr_oQU&feature=related

[sholong]

Hi all,
schreibe normalerweise in einem anderen thread , doch dieser ist momentan aktueller.
Habe etliche englische Presse durchgelesen und es scheint der Fall zu sein , dass Mr. Fuld mit ein Teil des ganzen LEH Problemes ist.
Durch seinen charismatischen und teilweise groben Stil ist er ein Dorn im Auge der sonst so smarten Wallstreet Jungs und möglicherweise auch von Politikern ( vergessen wir nicht , dass
das "Finanzgenie" Hank Paulsen ex G&S CEO war und im Wettbewerb mit einem quasi rücksichtslosen L&H CEO Mr. Fuld stand ).
Was ich damit sagen will, vielleicht wäre es besser wenn Mr.Fuld zurücktritt , damit LEH leichter an die Fresstöpfe der Regierung
kommt.

Cheers

[gerdass]

http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwzNBuUJuyA&feature=related

[Plusquamperfekt]

Hat Mr. Marsal evt. gute Beziehungen zu den Fressnäpfen der Regierung ?

[Plusquamperfekt]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.235.090 von Plusquamperfekt am 23.09.08 15:16:31

Nach Börsenschluss wurde ein gewisser Mr. Marsal zur Restrukturierung des Unternehmens ernannt.
Dieser hat schon Healthsouth aus Chapter 11 geholt und zwar ohne Schaden für die Alt-Aktionäre.
Warum sollte er das hier nicht auch schaffen ? Lehman ist nicht irgendeine Klitsche, ausserdem ist Wahlkampf,
, Geld vom Staat ?, Juden helfen sich sehr oft gegenseitig aus der Patsche, Gegenreaktion läuft usw.
Alles Gründe für mich persönlich hier drin zu bleiben und auf Kurse über 0,50 Euro zu warten !

[Plusquamperfekt]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.235.113 von Plusquamperfekt am 23.09.08 15:18:00

Sind natürlich nur optimistische Mutmaßungen, die aber auch nicht schlechter als die Schwarzmalerei der basher hier ist

[flyingkremlin]

klingt schon ein bisschen nach Aktionismus -und das Goldman da auftaucht... naja...

US: SEC Presses Hedge Funds

by Kara Scarnell, Wall Street Journal
September 25th, 2008

The Securities and Exchange Commission ordered more than two dozen hedge funds to turn over trading information as it ramps up its investigation into whether traders were spreading rumors to manipulate shares, according to people familiar with the matter.

The order, dated Sept. 22, identifies six financial institutions the SEC believes may have been subject to such manipulation. The order is akin to a subpoena and requires information to be handed over with a sworn statement attesting to its accuracy. It seeks a wide range of trading data and email communications over a period of three weeks involving American International Group Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co., according to the order, which has been viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

The broad investigation, which was announced Friday, is part of an effort to crack down on rumor mongering and abusive short selling, which some believe contributed to the collapse of Bear Stearns.

Earlier this year, the SEC sent subpoenas to more than 50 hedge funds looking at whether they were spreading rumors about Lehman Brothers, including apparently false information about takeover talks and the possibility of government financing.

In a regular short sale, a trader sells borrowed stock in hopes that it drops and can be bought at a lower price. Under SEC rules, a trader needs to locate stock to borrow ahead of a short sale, and the stock needs to be delivered within three trading days.

Concerns about abusive short sales increased leading up to Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing and moves by other financial companies to seek cash infusions or merger partners. The SEC took the extraordinary step last week of temporarily banning short selling in stocks of financial companies. About the same time, it announced an investigation into credit-default swaps, complex instruments akin to insurance contracts.

The order requested detailed and extensive information about transactions conducted between Sept. 1 and Sept. 19, when certain financial markets came close to freezing up, threatening the broader economy. The requests include details of funds' positions in stocks, derivatives, swaps and other financial instruments, as well as when trades were initiated and settled and whom they involved.

The SEC is trying to determine whether any traders were involved in abusive short selling, in which numerous short positions were placed at once and the stock was never borrowed and the position never covered. That method can have the effect of putting extra selling pressure on stock prices. The subpoenas are seeking proof that firms located and borrowed shares ahead of the short sales.

The SEC also is seeking detailed information about rumors or other information received by the funds and how it was communicated. Hedge funds also have to turn over information if they forwarded a message to anyone.

http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15186

[flyingkremlin]

es geht weiter. JPM schnappt sich WaMu...

WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan,
In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History

By ROBIN SIDEL, DAVID ENRICH and DAN FITZPATRICK

In what is by far the largest bank failure in U.S. history, federal regulators seized Washington Mutual Inc. and struck a deal to sell the bulk of its operations to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
[JP Morgan to take over Wamu] Associated Press

Pedestrians walk past a Washington Mutual branch in downtown Seattle.

The collapse of the Seattle thrift, which was triggered by a wave of deposit withdrawals, marks a new low point in the country's financial crisis. But the deal, as constructed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., could hold some glimmers of hope for the beleaguered banking system because it averts any hit to the bank-insurance fund.

Instead, J.P. Morgan agreed to pay $1.9 billion to the government for WaMu's banking operations and will assume the loan portfolio of the thrift, which has $307 billion in assets. The full cost to J.P. Morgan will be much higher, because it plans to write down about $31 billion of the bad loans and raise $8 billion in new capital. All WaMu depositors will have access to their cash, but holders of more than $30 billion in debt and preferred stock will likely see little if any recovery.
WaMu's Collapse

* The Deal: Regulators seize Washington Mutual, in largest U.S. banking failure.
* The Buyer: J.P. Morgan agreed to buy the company's banking operations, preserving depositors' money.
* Downside: WaMu shareholders and other creditors likely get wiped out.

The deal will vault J.P. Morgan into first place in nationwide deposits and greatly expand its franchise.

The seizure was another watershed event in a frenetic period for the U.S. banking system, and came while members of Congress wrangled over the Bush administration's proposed $700 billion bailout package. The tally of U.S. financial giants that have either been seized by the government or sold themselves off to stronger firms in recent weeks includes mortgage titans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, insurer American International Group Inc., and Wall Street firms Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co.

The failure of WaMu eclipsed what had long been America's largest bank bust on record, the 1984 collapse of Continental Illinois, which had $40 billion in assets.

The fact that no bank was willing to buy WaMu until it failed shows how badly confidence has eroded in a banking system awash with record profits just a few years ago. Faced with deepening losses on mortgages, credit cards and other loans, big and small banks across the country are struggling with what many bank executives say is a crisis far deeper than the savings-and-loan debacle.

The seizure of Washington Mutual is likely to send tremors through the thrift industry. Many of WaMu's smaller brethren are also struggling with a wave of bad loans and some have already been ordered by regulators to raise capital and stop growing. Many community and regional financial institutions are also slashing dividends, selling branches and reining in lending in order to preserve capital.

WaMu has suffered huge losses but still boasts a strong deposit base and a network of 2,239 branches that bigger banks would have paid dearly for when times were good. In March, with the credit crisis in full bloom, J.P. Morgan offered to acquire WaMu but was spurned in favor of a $7 billion infusion led by the private-equity firm TPG, considered one of the savviest buyout firms. TPG, led by investor David Bonderman, said it will lose $1.35 billion, wiping out its investment.
[WaMu Rescue]

This is the second time that J.P. Morgan, the second-largest U.S. bank in stock-market value, has been a buyer of last resort. In March, the New York company agreed to purchase Bear Stearns Cos., getting a $29 billion backstop from the federal government.

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said that WaMu's downward spiral "could have posed significant challenges without a ready buyer." Referring to J.P. Morgan's willingness to buy WaMu and absorb its shaky loans amid continuing debate over the $700 billion bailout package, she added: "Some are coming to Washington for help, others are coming to Washington to help."

While WaMu has been struggling since last year, its demise occurred with breathtaking speed.

Starting Sept. 15, the day that Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, WaMu's customers began heading for the exits. Over the next 10 days, they yanked a total of $16.7 billion in deposits, according to the Office of Thrift Supervision. That was about 9% of the thrift's deposits as of June 30. WaMu declined to comment.

Melody Williams, 50 years old, said in the past 30 days she has moved about $25,000 out of Washington Mutual, spreading it to other financial institutions she thought were stronger, including Wells Fargo & Co. Ms. Williams, the controller for an architecture firm, said she thought that Washington Mutual had gotten "too big for their britches" with too many deals over the years.
Accelerated Shutdown

Regulators also hustled to shut down WaMu faster than they have with other failing banks this year. Normally, when the FDIC and another regulatory agency are preparing to take over a bank, the FDIC will solicit bids for the bank on Tuesday or Wednesday and then seize it on Friday evening, after the bank's branches have closed for the weekend. Sometimes the FDIC will even wait another week to step in. Every bank to fail this year has been shut down on a Friday. The FDIC steps in on Fridays to ensure a smooth transition so that customers hardly notice the handover.

In WaMu's case, the FDIC set a Wednesday evening deadline for interested parties to submit their offers for various parts of WaMu. Twenty-four hours later, they were already preparing to seize the bank. Earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson made it clear to WaMu that the company should have accepted the takeover deal J.P. Morgan had offered earlier this year, according to a person close to WaMu.

As pressure mounted on WaMu over the past two and a half weeks, regulators sparred over how to handle the situation, according to people familiar with the matter. Last week WaMu met in Washington, D.C., with the FDIC and OTS, WaMu's chief regulator. WaMu, according to a person familiar with the situation, asked for the meeting because it had received conflicting information from the two agencies. The tension between the two groups was palpable, this person said. The FDIC, this person said, was more aggressive in describing the information it wanted from the thrift.

Federal regulators said the exodus of deposits left WaMu "with insufficient liquidity to meet its obligations." As a result, WaMu was in "an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business," according to the OTS.

The OTS closed WaMu on Thursday and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC ran the bidding process that resulted in the decision to sell WaMu's banking operations to J.P. Morgan.

The change, according to OTS, "will have no impact on the bank's depositors or other customers." WaMu's bank branches will open on Friday morning as usual and business will "proceed uninterrupted."

As of June 30, WaMu had more than 43,000 employees, more than 2,200 branch offices in 15 states and $188.3 billion in deposits, according to the OTS.

"The housing market downturn had a significant impact on the performance of WaMu's mortgage portfolio," said OTS director John Reich.

With mortgage losses mounting and its stock price plunging, WaMu has been scrambling over the past month to find a solution. Last week, it put itself on the auction block. A number of banks -- including Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo and Banco Santander SA -- pored over WaMu's books, but the bank didn't receive any offers. This week, WaMu's outside bankers approached a group of private-equity funds to gauge their interest in a deal. Those talks were viewed as a last-ditch effort.

Also this week, the FDIC took the step of reaching out to banks, asking them to express interest in taking over some or all of WaMu, according to people familiar with the matter. Those bids were due at 6 p.m. Wednesday.

J.P. Morgan's takeover of WaMu's deposits represents a huge blow for private-equity firm TPG, which led a deal to inject $7 billion into the thrift this spring.

"Obviously, we are dissatisfied with the loss to our partners from our investment in Washington Mutual," said a TPG spokesman. "The unprecedented turmoil in global financial markets and resulting macro crisis of confidence has radically changed the dynamics for all financial institutions, and led to widespread losses among investors throughout the sector." TPG said its losses are about $1.35 billion, wiping out its investment.

Before the deal, J.P. Morgan ranked as the fourth-largest bank as measured by branches, ranking below Bank of America Corp., Wachovia Corp. and Wells Fargo. Its network of more than 3,100 branches stretches across 17 states with deep penetration in New York, Illinois, Texas, Michigan and Ohio.
Instant Presence

The deal will expand J.P. Morgan's footprint westward and into the South. Most importantly, it will give J.P. Morgan an instant presence in two states where it is now virtually non-existent: California and Florida. Although both states have been battered by the housing market collapse, they still offer significant potential for J.P. Morgan, which can pitch a slew of financial services that weren't big business for WaMu, such as wealth management and commercial banking. WaMu has nearly 700 branches in California and operates more than 250 branches in Florida.
[James Dimon]

James Dimon

James Dimon, J.P. Morgan's chairman and chief executive, has long coveted Florida -- as have his customers. Although WaMu is dominated in Florida by Bank of America and Wachovia, J.P. Morgan is likely to boost WaMu's 3% market share in the state by tapping into its base of New York customers who spend the winter months in Florida.

Last year, one of those New York customers expressed frustration at J.P. Morgan's annual meeting, telling Mr. Dimon "it galls me" that the bank didn't have a presence there.

"It p- me off too," Mr. Dimon said, drawing laughter from the audience. "Believe me, we would love to be much bigger in Florida and we'll find some way to do it. You will see us there."

The job of integrating WaMu's branches into J.P. Morgan's vast network will fall to Charles Scharf, a longtime ally of Mr. Dimon who followed him from Citigroup to Bank One Corp. in 2000. Mr. Scharf, 43, now runs J.P. Morgan's retail operations, which include branch-banking, mortgages and home-equity loans.

Over the past few years, Mr. Scharf has overseen the overhaul of J.P. Morgan's hodgepodge of retail branches that had fallen into disrepair after a slew of big mergers. J.P. Morgan has poured millions of dollars into its tired branches that sometimes featured outdated logos and chipped wood paneling.

Taking a cue, in part, from the fresh looks flaunted by rivals like WaMu, Commerce Bancorp., and Bank of America, J.P. Morgan added brighter lights and carpeting. The bank also hired Lands End to design outfits for branch employees so they had an easily recognizable and uniform appearance.

Along with the new looks, J.P. Morgan launched a technology overhaul of its branch network so that customers who open an account in Texas could make deposits from a branch in New York. That type of integration has been missing from many banks that went through big mergers over the past decade.

J.P. Morgan's branch strategy got another push in 2006, when the bank solidified its hold on New York by acquiring 300 branches from Bank of New York Corp.

The deal is a bold move for Mr. Dimon, 52, who has emerged as one of the banking industry's most powerful executives during the current credit crisis. Just six months ago, J.P. Morgan swept in to acquire Bear Stearns as the brokerage firm was collapsing and heading for bankruptcy. Although J.P. Morgan has also been hurt by the credit crisis, it has one of the strongest balance sheets in the industry despite exposure to many of the banking businesses that are feeling pain.

Since taking the reins of J.P. Morgan nearly three years ago, Mr. Dimon has transformed the bank. Much of those efforts came during a period of prosperity for the banking industry, giving him time to upend the bank's culture and computer systems. Along the way, he has emphasized the need to create a "fortress balance sheet" that can withstand a weak economy.

Still, J.P. Morgan isn't immune to the troubles afflicting thousands of other banks. Its investment-bank unit is expected to take a big hit in the third quarter due to the widespread turmoil in capital markets. The bank has been hit badly by home-equity losses and its massive credit-card business is being hurt by rising delinquencies and defaults.

A former protégé of Citigroup's Sanford Weill, Mr. Dimon was once viewed as his heir-apparent at Citigroup. But the two had a falling out in 1998 that led to Mr. Dimon's ouster. In a move that startled the New York banking industry, Mr. Dimon headed west to take the top job at Bank One, a regional Chicago bank that had stumbled after a string of acquisitions.

Mr. Dimon's return to New York came in 2004, when J.P. Morgan acquired Bank One for $58 billion. That deal put Mr. Dimon into the upper ranks of J.P. Morgan's management and paved the way for him to take over as chairman and chief executive officer.
String of Mergers

WaMu, founded in 1889, became a national mortgage- and consumer-lending giant via a string of mergers in the 1990s led by Chief Executive Officer Kerry Killinger. But Mr. Killinger made several missteps. He pursued an aggressive retail expansion marred by poor locations in too many markets. He steered WaMu into subprime mortgages, only to discover too late that the thrift was lending to many unqualified borrowers.
[Kerry Killinger]

Kerry Killinger

This year the company laid off employees, closed mortgage centers and cut its dividend.

But it still posted a $3.3 billion second-quarter loss and said it expected to lose $19 billion on its mortgage portfolio over the next two and a half years. WaMu's biggest predicament was that it held large amounts of mortgages made in U.S. regions where housing prices have fallen sharply, such as California. WaMu has $53 billion in option adjustable-rate mortgages, a type of loan particularly vulnerable to default, as well as $16.1 billion in loans made to subprime borrowers.

The board, responding to investor discontent, stripped Mr. Killinger of his chairman's title and then ousted him Sept. 7, installing Brooklyn banker Alan Fishman in his place. Messrs. Killinger and Fishman couldn't be reached for comment Thursday night.
Short Tenure

Upon taking WaMu's helm, Mr. Fishman, who had run Independence Community Bank in Brooklyn, N.Y., before selling it to Sovereign Bancorp Inc. in 2005, declared his intention to keep WaMu independent. As rumors swirled about the company's financial troubles, he tried to reassure investors and depositors by releasing more details about the company's financial health.

But Mr. Fishman seemed to realize that WaMu's problems were intractable. Last week, he asked Goldman Sachs Group Inc. investment bankers, hired by WaMu earlier in the year as it sought additional capital, to put the thrift up for sale.

In a year in which a number of financial-services CEOs have had remarkably short tenures -- notably Merrill Lynch's John Thain and AIG's Robert Willumstad -- Mr. Fishman stands out. While it's not clear what role, if any, he will play following the J.P. Morgan transaction, he has been on the job for a mere 16 days.

WaMu's deal team, including Mr. Fishman, left New York on Thursday night and caught a plane back to Seattle, not knowing that the company was about to be taken over by the OTS and sold to J.P. Morgan.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586" target="_blank" rel="nofollow ugc noopener">http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html[/green]

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.286.437 von flyingkremlin am 26.09.08 09:09:13

Lehman hat nur noch Silber:

I'm In Re: Class Action Lawsuit 26-Sep-08 02:03 am
Biggest Bank Heist in US History.
The FDIC working with Govt., has Stolen WAMU from it's rightful owners, the Shareholders, and gave it to JP Morgan Chase. The entire transaction smells of major corruption and should be investigated now! WAMU was in full compliance, was not going bankrupt and had enough working capital. Basically they stole a good bank and gave it too their friends and sacrificed the voters and taxpayers.
If WAMU was so bad then why does JP want it? Now they decided to screw over the taxpayers and owners of WM, which are the shareholders. Are we living in Red China, Russia, Uganda or zimbabwe?

(aus dem US Yahoo-Board)


http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

2nd Email sent to FDIC/Pres/V.P...... 27-Sep-08 01:31 pm
Encourage all to also send...and to their Congressman.


To: [e-mail], [e-mail], [e-mail]
CC: [e-mail], [e-mail], [e-mail]
Sent: 9/27/2008 1:19:20 P.M. Eastern Standard Time
Subj: Second part to FDIC Ref WaMu


Dear Chairman S. Bair



Subsequent to my earlier EMail in regards to Washington Mutual (WM) I also wanted to further go into detail on just how corrupt and dishonest this undertaking by your agency on Sep 25, 2008.



We all are aware that Sec.Treas. Paulson's proposed Mortgage Resolution Trust (MRT) Act currently being bickered about in Congress would have been able to maintain and keep WaMu as a going concern without the damage that has been created by your illicit action which by design has taken by a scheme of theft monetary compensation duly owed to WaMu's shareholders as equity owners in this institution. And most incomprehensible is that this action by FDIC was perpetrated by the continued negative media press causing panic and fear to customers of WaMu.



If the government was so concerned about the claimed $16/$17billion of withdrawn deposits in the last week before the demise created to WaMu leading to the “secret auction”, then the government could have offered a temporary bridge loan until Congress was able to pass the MRT Act and thereby save this historical institution of over one century of service to this country and U.S. citizens. There was no need to purposely destroy this enterprise and wipe out its shareholders.



It is suspect that the OTS/FDIC took this position on this past Thursday eve Sep 25, 2008 when all other action by the FDIC on failing banks were taken after the market closed on the end of the week on a Friday evening. I allege that your action was promulgated under pressure from the current White House administration to act as a political pressuring mechanism to force Congress into rapidly take action on the MRT Act which seemed to have come to a stall on Thursday Sep 25, 2008. This will require further and intense investigation and I will be requesting same through the proper agency in the near future as legal recourse is considered for lawful remedy on behalf of all shareholders which have been deprived of their legal compensation of ownership value that was with intent taken from them through criminal theft.



Again I wish to have your response at the soonest opportunity.

Thank you in advance for your time.

Sincerely

Lawrence Meany

Waltham, MA 02453

[e-mail]

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

Ich vermute, sie wird sprachlos sein, "die Kleine"....

http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/board.html

[flyingkremlin]

Ich glaube Putin und Co. haben mit ihren hunderten Hausdurchsuchungen und der Verhaftung von Angestellten bei Yukos, sowie den "Sondersteuern" eine filigranere Enteignung durchgeführt als nun JPM unter Mithilfe der FDIC... WaMu ist der größte Bankraub aller Zeiten... und die Täter sind bekannt.

LETTER TO MY CONGRESSMAN 26-Sep-08 12:59 pm
Dear Congressman Garrett,

I am extremely confused about the FDIC's action to seize the deposits of Washington Mutual just days before the bailout is announced. I understand that the process of meeting the minimums for well capitalized banks, but don't understand how this happened.

The CEO, Alan Fishman, repeatedly stated as of Monday, the 22, in a letter to shareholders that the companys liquidity was above the minimum for well capitalized banks, and he was excited about the future of Washington Mutual. I base all my investments on thorough analytical research, and this company had $380 B in assets, $143 B in deposits and earned $2 B per quarter on interest income. Plus, Fishman said the company had access to $50 B in cash if necessary. Fishman said the company was in better shape than being reported numerous times, and also said Wamu could sustain operations thru 2010.

If Alan Fishman was telling the truth,
why would the FDIC mamagement decide they are going to wipe out shareholders without any prior notice. Nothing was said publically like you have 5 days to comply, at least that would have given all of us time to exit and recoup some of our investment back. Plus, the company was sold for $1.9 B not including the $31 B in debt JP Morgan will assume. But what I don't understand is the bailout will cover that debt making this purchase a sweetheart deal for $1.9 B.

Something here doesn't sit right with many. I respect the action the FDIC must take to protect the reserves, but not giving public notice or making the public aware of an ongoing investigation of insufficient funds was wrong. This failure has cost longs their entire investment, and my investment was substantial. I don't speculate, I carefully pick stocks based on sound fundamentals. In this case, I read every story, the pre 3Q earnings report, and listened to what the CEO was saying.

The FBI and SEC are working together to protect us from this fraud, and everything Alan Fishman said was misleading, and incredibly damaging to many. The FDIC should not go by unchecked either, for not giving shareholders a countdown sign was in my view unlawful. The FDIC did not communicate to us the severity and timing of their ongoing case. This in turn has caused extensive damage to million of American families and more importantly it will further erode trust in our government at at time when that is already a deeply sensitive issue.

Please in the very least, pass this complaint along to your colleagues, and discuss. Please also encourage the SEC and FBI to examine this case and the lies and deception of Alan Fishman.

Very best regards

Steve Germano

_____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________


I sent this letter over to my congressman, and I encourage all of you to do the same, this is bull#$@$, the FDIC should have given public notice of default. I realize now that this must have been going on for 2 weeks, and Alan Fishman said nothing to us. Notice was only given to WAMU. This is really wrong, Wamu is wrong for lying, and the FDIC is wrong for not making us aware of serious default.

I am pissed and want action..

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

While the markets were closed, and the Chairman of Washington Mutual was on a flight from New York to Seattle, the largest theft in US history took place. Although there has been negative news about the financial stocks for the past few months, including Washington Mutual,the FDIC and Washington Mutual repeated assurances that the bank was in good shape through 2010 over and over and the fact that WaMu met it's daily requirements. If that is the case, the seizure and immediate for profit sale of WAMU to JP Morgan Chase raises many questions.


This isn't so much about the failure of WAMU, as that may have happened eventually anyway, but suddenly the FDIC has become a for profit institution taking over and selling off a company for 1.9 Billion dollars. This is unprecedented in many ways, and in many ways probably illegal. The shareholders own WAMU, not the FDIC. Yes, the FDIC regulates banking, however shareholders own the company. WAMU could have literally gone bankrupt and sold off chairs, computers, land etc and shareholders would have received some portion of compensation. In this seizure, Chase gets the assets and deposits at a bargain, the FDIC gets 1.9 Billion dollars and shareholders get nothing. It is literally something you might think would happen in Nazi Germany, not the United States.


It seems as if these failures are following a pattern that we are seeing over and over. First, short sellers work to smear the bank's reputation. Major media outlets join the fray. Analysts downgrade. Ratings agencies follow with downgrades. Cost of insurance skyrockets creating self-fulfilling prophecy. The Bank forced to come up with reserve capital to please ratings agencies. Dilution of shareholder equity at sale prices. Share price falls further triggering more downgrades from above-mentioned entities. The Media really starts to salivate now and creates all kinds of instability with doom and gloom, and seem outright gleeful about it. Then institutions and high net worth individuals begin pulling deposits out of the targeted bank. Further ratings agencies downgrades. The media then creates a self fulfilling prophesy with constant reporting of doom and gloom and individuals also pull their money out of the targeted bank. Then the FDIC having all the ammunition it needs steps in and seizes the bank assets and sells them to whoever they are in bed with that week.


Basically the government decided that they liked JP Morgan Chase so much as an institution that they would gift them this company.


It's worse than that though, last week Goldman Sachs upgraded WM to hold knowing all of this was going on. Serious misrepresentation of the facts. The story told to the public was that Goldman was supposed to be brokering a sale. This at the expense of average Americans. Sure there are a lot of institutions that owned shares in WAMU, but there are an incredible amount of average Americans who had large portions of their retirements tied up in WAMU stock. Without that upgrade, many may not have kept the stock through this trouble. Some are now threatening suicide. Families are breaking up. People have lost everything. How can the American public not be safe investing in an American Bank. A bank that owns assets, that had a large deposit base and that stated it could sustain life until 2010.

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

The Second Part


That doesn't even begin to mention that by next week the whole dynamics of WM could change for the better with the government bailout coming. Stock could have increased in value once the toxic paper was taken from WM. More liquidity would have been available. The 2010 deadline would be extended to many more years once the toxic paper was removed. This was not a bank in trouble in any of the standards that have been repeated over the last eighty years.


You really want to get upset about it, take a look at the aftermarket trading volume. Before any of this was announced, there were three very large trades in the early aftermarket, in a three minute period totaling almost 13 million shares. The FDIC and the markets allowed someone to get inside and make away with some 12 million dollars. nasdaq screenshot There is no way that trading should not have been suspended before this was allowed to happen, just another case of corruption and manipulation by the government and large institutions.


Possibly the most damaging could be what this could do to the American psyche as a whole. The corruption in the system has just killed the morale and spirit of many people. They have no trust in Wall Street, the financial system, politics and the future of America! Corruption, short selling, manipulation of stock, and abusive ratings downgrades are all responsible for bringing this company down to the point that this could happen, and then a corrupt government agency cherry picked a bargain for their buddies at JPMorgan who get a huge upside. The FDIC facilitated a transaction that was so corrupt and damaging words cannot properly describe it.


In the end, it is the system as a whole that will lose, as the average American can no longer trust not only it's banking industry, or Wall Street, but apparently it's government anymore.

BY jojo_oswego

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

Im Yahoo-Board in den Staaten herrscht leichte Unzufriedenheit im Volke bezüglich der vermutlich größten Börsenschweinerei aller Zeiten. Beteiligt beim WaMu-Bankraub sind sind Medien, Poltiker, Regierung, Hedgefonds, Shortspekulanten -und die schon "alt bekannten" Jungs von JPM.

Don't get mad - Boycott JPMorgan 26-Sep-08 08:41 pm
It's pretty clear what happened here. You were defrauded by managemnt - past and present. You were played by hedge funds and their willing enablers at the SEC. They didn't just naked short the stock. They played it up and down the charts for months - mostly down.

Why did Killinger jump ship three weeks ago? Can you imagine him leaving with his multi- million dollar parachute now? Fishman was paid to do the honors. That's just how it works. You look at almost any company that goes into bankruptcy, an interim management moves in first to take fall on the golden sword.

The run on the bank deposits was sort of insane - considering that most of it was FDIC insured. But the rumors were there. I had a dozen people ask me if they should take their money out and I said "no - even if it's taken over - you'll have access to your funds." But I've talked to a number of people - many of them senior citizens - who got spooked by the rumors.

Maybe it was just a matter of time before it went under - but when you bleed 10% of your deposits in as many days - that's curtains for most banks. A little time might have found a paying customer. JPMOrgan itself offered $8/share just a few short months ago.

I wasn't in this stock when it went under. But I was looking at it and it looked like it might have a chance to make it - bailout or no bailout. Based on available information, if I had liquidity, I would have purchased a few thousand shares.

So, don't hit yourself over the head. Wamu's demise was not ineveitable.

Wisen up folks. Don't bang your heads against the wall. You got swindled by the sharpest operators on Wall Street. These days will be remembered as hedge fund heaven. And Jamie Daimon of JP Morgan is a brass knuckle operator.

There is a lot of money to be made on the short side. I wouldn't be surprised if JP Morgan was shorting the stock all the way down.

In any case, there are ways to pay JPMOrgan for the favor. Just say no to banking with them. Now is the proper time for a run on this bank. Take your money out and deposit it with a local bank that is operated and managed by neighbours who live in your community. Bank with a Credit Union. Keep away from the Bank of America, Citi crowd. If you must, consider a regional bank like Wells Fargo.

First, spend a little time to understand what happened here. Then tell your neighbors and your family and your friends that there are ways to resist this kind of wholesale robbery by the barrons of Wall Street.

Now, I'm only asking you to move your deposits and your CDs out. If you have a credit card or line of credit or mortgage - keep it to deprive them of liquidity. Just close your savings and checking accounts and transfer your IRA's and CDs to more reputable community friendly banks in your city.

Banking locally is the sweetest revenge. If you know family or relatives who already bank
at CHASE - give them a call or send them an email. Tell them to act in solidarity.

Let's start a movement. Boycott JPMorgan and Wall Street and hell no to the bailout.
http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

dem kann ich mich nur anschliessen:

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_W/t…

[flyingkremlin]

US Rep Waxman Demands Documents From Lehman CEO Fuld


(Updates with statement from spokesman for Fuld)

By Sarah N. Lynch
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES


WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., sent an angry letter Friday to Lehman Brothers (LEHMQ) CEO Richard Fuld demanding to know why his lawyers have failed to turn over company documents requested by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Last week, the committee asked Lehman to voluntarily provide documents relating to the company's bankruptcy in preparation for an upcoming hearing Oct. 6. Of particular interest are any e-mails, internal memos or other correspondence over the past six months between Fuld and other senior staffers at Lehman.

"It is difficult to understand how Lehman Brothers is unable to produce a single internal document that went to or from the CEO's office over the past six months," wrote Waxman, who is chair of the oversight committee.

According to the letter, Waxman said that company lawyers claim many hard copies of the documents in the CEO's office did exist, but that many of them have since been discarded.

When the committee pressed the attorneys to trace the documents back to the original sources, however, it could not get a straight response, he claims.

"Committee staff asked your counsel and his team if they had consulted with the likely sources of these hard copy documents, such as top company officials, but your counsel was unable to identify a group of senior company officials who regularly provide documents to you," Waxman wrote to Fuld.

In addition, the letter says Lehman lawyers are skeptical they will find many e-mails to provide because Fuld rarely communicated via e-mail.

Waxman told Fuld he is giving the company until the end of the day Friday to let the committee know if he will agree to expand his search for the documents.

If he does not make a commitment, then Waxman said he will force the company to hand over the documents.

"Mr. Fuld previously agreed to testify on October 6, and his lawyers are working with the Committee to get them the additional documents they want to see," a spokesman for Fuld said late Friday.

-By Sarah N. Lynch, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-6634; sarah.lynch@ dowjones.com

(END) Dow Jones Newswires
09-26-082055ET
Copyright (c) 2008 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/NewsStory.aspx?cpath=20080…

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http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/virgin/381074_virgin30.html

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Fox News about JPM,WaMu and Fishman sollte man gesehen haben:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCyGxV0_viE

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Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.374.359 von flyingkremlin am 02.10.08 01:58:44

O`Reilly: "I have nothing against JP Morgan Chase, but I will tell you, if you give this man 15 Millions Dollars you got a problem with me, a big big problem, and we know where you live."

(an JPM gerichtet, bezüglich der Millionenabfindung an Fishman)

Wenn über die Umstände des WaMu-Schnappers eine öffentliche Debatte entsteht -und JPM, FDIC, Killinger, Fishman und alle diejenigen, die sich die "WaMu-Nummer" ausgedacht haben (wer weiss wer daran beteiligt ist) Gefahr laufen beschädigt zu werden, dann könnten ggf. Absprachen zerbrechen.

"The OReillyFactor" ist übrigens kein Hinterhoffernsehen.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fox_News_Channel

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O´Reily ist jedenfalls kein Beckmann oder Kerner...

http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=H7Nt8MQaKko&feature=related

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WaMued - The Story

© by Daniel Wood/aka testorx, testorx2

Copyrighted, but permission is given to reproduce for now, as long as the copyright is acknowledged and credit is given to the author.

For example “WaMued - The Story © by Daniel Wood, reproduced with permission”. I reserve the right to withdraw permission to reproduce this in the future.
First Draft, 09/30/08. I expect many revisions.


On Thursday Sept 25th 2008, Washington Mutual - WaMu (WM) shares opened at $2.62, rose to $2.69, and fell for the rest of the day closing at $1.69. In after hours trading it fell to $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it fell 93.89%. Excluding the pre-market trading data which I do not have.

Clearly anyone who held through the day experienced a financial wipeout in their position. For some people, WaMu was their only position, and if fully invested the wipeout for them was 100%, a total wipeout. Some people may have done all of that and also used margin, they were more than 100% wiped out, they are in the hole.

What caused this wipeout? In a statement issued on September 25th the OTS said “An outflow of deposits began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With insufficient liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business.

The OTS closed the institution and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.”

OTS is Office of Thrift Supervision, and the quote is from their website. WaMu suffered a run on the bank. The accounts that ran were large retail accounts over $100,000 which is the FDIC insurance maximum. The running was done by electronic banking over the internet.

It was a silent run, it was not in the news, people were not lined up outside the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift in the nation, and large enough that the Federal Reserve assigned it onsite full time bank inspectors to monitor liquidity levels among other things. The Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the run.

Runs on banks was a major cause of the great depression of 1929. Customers wanted their cash in their hand, because once the bank dies and locks its doors, they knew they would never see it again. In WaMu’s case the retailers transferred the money to other banks online.

Runs on banks dominoed in 1929. After the first bank closed everyone got scared ran to their bank pulled their cash, when the bank ran out of cash it locked its doors etc That then caused even more people to decide to run to their bank to get their cash etc. With no banks to transact business the economy declined into depression.

In response to the runs on the banks of 1929, in 1933 the government created the FDIC. FDIC is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It is government insurance on bank deposits up to $100,000.

The banks pay the insurance premiums. So even if a bank locks its doors, your deposits are covered up to $100,000. The idea was this would prevent people from doing runs on the banks.

The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. The Federal Reserve is a private corporation composed of the biggest banks in the country. The Government does appoint a minority membership of its board of governors and it requires congressional approval for the appointment of the head of the Federal Reserve.

Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the Federal Reserve Corporation. All banks in America are members of the Federal Reserve system and all paper money is printed by the Treasury per the amounts ordered by the Federal Reserve. All electronic money, wires, credit cards, debit cards etc and all check book money, is also under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve controls how much money, (cash, electronic, check book,) banks have on hand through a number of regulations and mechanisms.

The Federal Reserve also has the power to change its banking regulations and money control mechanisms as it sees fit to meet banking demands. It maintains this flexibility so that it may meet the liquidity demands of banks.

WaMu of course was also part of the Federal Reserve system. WaMu had a lot of no pay and slow pay mortgage loans, as do many banks today in America. After the Dot Com bubble busted the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to make borrowing more attractive to stimulate the economy out of the crashing caused by Dot Com companies going out of business.

Home loans became a primary source of lending customers. Competition was high and banks lowered requirements to receive loans to make business and get as big a share of the business as they could. The least stringent home loans were known as subprime loans, as they were to other than prime customers. Over the years some subprime customers lost their ability to make their payments on time.

Often the loans were structured with low payments up front, and higher payments in the later years. As payments rose some borrows could not pay.

In banking a bank’s assets are its loans, because loans are where people owe you money plus interest, an income stream. Deposits are a liability, because the bank owes the depositor the money, plus interest, and is liable for its payment on demand.

Bankruptcy is when a person or company can not meet the current obligations or payments on its debts. WaMu borrowed money from citizens like all banks in many forms, Cds, bonds, secured bonds, unsecured bonds, subordinate secured bonds etc. to get money to do its business.

WaMu was perfectly able to make the interest payments and redemption payments on its debts. This is what they said when they said they had cash reserves to make it to 2010. WaMu was not a bankrupt bank.

Liquidity is when your current income stream is able to meet or beat your current debt service requirements, without having to use other assets, like cash reserves. As subprime loans fail to pay, a bank is losing its income stream, it is losing liquidity as the monthly checks are not showing up. Less money coming in means less is available to pay on monthly interest to bond holders, Cds, savings deposits etc.

WaMu’s liquidity was shrinking due to its subprime loan failures. WaMu had decided it should seek a buyer from a bank with better liquidity so the merged bank had adequate liquidity. WaMu was for sale.

As news spread WaMu was for sale, other banks were in similar situation. Congress under pressure from both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury was being urged to authorize government funds to bailout the banks with subprime loan failures and thus increasing liquidity problems.

The idea was the government would create new government obligations, bonds of various term lengths, and trade these for the banks’ subprime loans. As the government has the ability to control tax revenue by increasing taxes, its ability to pay its debt obligations is the highest you could have, because it can and does enforce the payment of taxes. If it needs money to pay a debt it increases taxes.

The government would put itself in charge of collecting the subprime debts as well, and defaults are more easily absorbed by them as they are also offset by its tax collecting abilities.

Thus the bailout swap would insure banks current income streams would increase as all payments would be made, and also be quite certain going forward as the government is not likely to go out of business. This plan is essentially the 700 billion dollar bailout plan that is currently still being worked on as I type this.

This plan would strengthen WaMu considerably, and even to the point where some were speculating WaMu would not have to sell and could continue on as an independent bank. It also made WaMu a much more attractive buyout candidate as much more of its loans and income stream would be certain, and thus WaMu would have better liquidity. WaMu’s average account was only $5,200.00, well within the FDIC insurance range. In aggregate these FDIC insured accounts were much more in dollars then the FDIC had in cash to pay insured depositors.

Since it was unable to make good on its insurance plan the FDIC it was thought would instaed help to broker a deal for a buyout as soon as the price being received for the subprime loans in the bailout was known. With the bailout details known the banks could then establish a value and price for the bailed out WaMu.

The White House and congressional finance committee members began discussing the bailout together from my memory on Wednesday September 17th and actual congressional hearings were started the next day, and have been held everyday thereafter, and are still being held, though congress is set to adjourn this Friday September 26th. Initially they were anticipated to close Monday, September 22nd. A week was added on and they were supposed to end Monday September 29th.

Just previous to the initiation of the bailout proceedings, due to falling stock prices in financial issues, and most of the banks, for the entire year, bans on short selling were introduced. The first one was on only 19 finance stocks for 10 days, but the second one, begun Friday September 19th was for 799 stocks and good until October 2nd.

WaMu was on that list. Naked shorts had to cover in three days, and thus be covered by Wednesday September 24th. Shorts sell stocks at high prices and buy them at low prices and profit the difference. It works best in downtrends, which defined bank stocks for the year.

As this short selling ban relived some of the selling supply at high prices, it was hoped with less supply there would be dearer demand and prices would rise. There is though the other angle to this which is when stocks drop, shorts buy, creating demand at low levels and slowing and reversing descents.

Thus going into the week of Thursday September 25th for WaMu there was expectations of large short positions covering and a positive outcome to the bailout meetings. The total amount of outstanding shares short was 26% of the float. Who were these shorts. Many people believe it was JPMorgan Chase.

One factor the bailout meetings concerned was the price at which the government would pay for the bad subprime loans. Should it be the hold-to-maturity value, ie the full anticipated value when issued or some reduced or discounted value, particularly the current market value as determined in their distressed current condition and its effect on their current trading levels.

Both Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr., were quite clear and stressful when speaking publicly about this that the subprime debt should be purchased at hold-to-maturity or full value to adequately capitalize the income streams and liquidity to the receiving banks so that they would be in a strong position to generate business at the local levels and keep the economy from slipping into a recession. They also stressed for similar reasons that the bailout should insure that no large banks fail, and that numerous small bank failures would be unacceptable as well.

WaMu being the largest thrift in the nation was obviously being primed as a candidate to succeed from the bailout, though everyone was pretty certain that they would chose to be bought out afterwards, so as to never risk being in their current position again.

In general bank share prices fell as the bailout meetings got underway. There was bickering, Pres. Bush invited both Senators McCain and Obama to a White House meeting that ended chaotically. I personally was unable to watch the hearings on TV, but those who did, did not seem inspired. The expected short squeeze in WaMu had not materialized.

It should have taken seven days at recent typical daily volume levels for the number of known shorts to cover. Volume levels for the 22nd, 23rd and 24th do not show this short covering. If JPMorgan Chase was a major shorter of WaMu they had not covered. Wednesday evening September 24th President Bush gave a televised speech to the nation on the economic problems and the bailout. One remarkable statement he made was that the subprime debt would be purchased at current market, very depressed, prices.

This was the exact opposite of what the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had been saying. It also seemed to contradict the idea of doing a bailout. I myself thought he was just saying this to placate the public. Thursday September 25th was a day like the day before, bank shares fell, and the hearings produced no results. WaMu drifted down almost a whole dollar and 35% for the day. Obviously it seemed people were losing faith in the bailout plan. Myself and others watched and although understanding the sellers concern believed that the government would prevail.

As by now all shorts had to be covered and out of the market, the steep fall in price was partially understood because the normal breaking mechanism to the market had been removed. When the market closed I looked at an early after hours quote and it was a few pennies from the regular market close. I surfed onto nonfinance things.

To me it was less than an hour when I checked again and the quote was $0.52. I went to the Yahoo WM message board and began looking at posts. Some people were up in arms, some people said it was oversold panic selling etc. I stayed and watched the posting and began reading news sites for news. First there were posts on WaMu closing. This made no sense. I saw a post where the word seized was used. It only had one news source anyone could find backing it.

WaMu’s price by now was at about $0.16 where it would close, though it did go as low as $0.09 from my memory. It was discussed what they meant by seize. At about this time afterhours trading ended, WaMu was at $0.16. Over the next hour we learned the following. Most investors understood that Washington Mutual Inc was a holding company trading under the symbol WM and that they were the owners of the Washington Mutual Bank. The shares were shares of the holding company, not the bank.

The OTS and FDIC recognized this as well and chose to exploit this corporate structure. Without a public word they realized that the WaMu bank could be seized under some pretense and that the shareholders and debt holders of Washington Mutual Inc. would lose the primary asset of their company but that their litigation would not be directed at them for the seizure as claims would be directed at the holding co. Had everything been exactly the same for the WaMu Bank, but that the shares and debts been in the bank’s name and not the holding companies, it is likely the bank would not have been seized.

That the corporate structure allowed a loophole to screw the shareholders is really the only reason the WaMu bank was seized. JP Morgan Chase is one of the primary stockholders of the Federal Reserve Corporation. JPMorgan Chase owns a large piece of the Federal Reserve Corporation. It is the Federal Reserves job to insure that its member banks have the liquidity to transact business. The member banks borrow and lend among themselves electronically every night to keep each other liquid. If need be they can borrow directly from the Federal Reserve.

The FDIC was in a jam in that if WaMu was deprived of funds from the Federal Reserve and a bank run insued the FDIC would not be able to cover the insured deposits. JPMorgan Chase could tell the Fed Reserve to starve WaMu of liquidity and the FDIC would be bankrupt. JPMorgan Chase had tried to buy WaMu months earlier and had been rebuffed. They now had a way to steal WaMu.

They carried out the plan. The words Toxic Paper and Toxic Debt suddenly were all over the newspapers and the internet. Fear mongering was in the works. The fact that the FDIC could not make good on its insurance liabilities was well advertised. Though Congress may authorize funds at some point to make the FDIC solvent, accounts over $100,000 would lose everything above $100,000.

These accounts read the writing on the wall and began silently electronically removing their funds. As mentioned the Federal Reserve inspectors would be on hand to witness this day by day. WaMu’s liquidity was being drawn down. Did the Federal Reserve step in and loan them this liquidity as the system is set up to do for just these such type of incidents. No they did not. This all occurred as the congressional bailout meetings were beginning. Once the bailout was completed, WaMu’s bad subprime loans would be swapped out for good government paper, maybe at 100%, maybe at a discounted level, maybe at market level. WaMu’s improved condition would make it much more expensive to purchase in any case after the bailout then before.

JPMorgan Chase played its hand. It influenced the Federal Reserve, which it owns a major piece of, to not provide liquidity to WaMu. There was a lot of hype about the FDIC’s inability to pay depositors in event of WaMu’s failure. If they couldn’t pay WaMu depositors, the FDIC couldn’t pay anyone and a 1929 bank panic could ensue. The Federal Reserve watched as the money ran down in WaMu and then did secret backroom sweetheart deals with the FDIC wherein it was decided the OTS would seize WaMu for lack of liquidity give it to the FDIC who would sell it cheap to them.

The FDIC would be saved from all its insurance claims. JPMorgan Chase would get the WaMu bank it wanted so badly, and WaMu’s parent company Washington Mutual Inc shareholders and debt holders would have to eat a total loss. If JPMorgan Chase had major short positions it had not covered, when the stock collapsed, it could cover or it may just have been able to hide the fact.

As congress discussed the bailout on September 25th, and after regular market hours, the OTS seized control of WaMu, and sold it to JP Morgan Chase. Now devoid of assets Washington Mutual Inc the holding company filed for bankruptcy the next day Friday September 26th.

http://www.geocities.com/testorx/page_two.html

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7d_9z0oh3I&feature=related

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Maria Cantwall, Senatorin des Bundesstaates Washington vor dem U.S. Senat über den Rettungsplan und die faktische Enteignung der WaMU Aktionäre zugunsten von JP Morgan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3J2R9HKXRVw

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http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/081003/lehman_brothers_bankruptcy.ht…

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John Paul über den Rettungsplan und die Federal Reserve.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBVB1Uc0nko&feature=related

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!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

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Lehman's Fuld to Testify; JPMorgan Faces Lawsuit

By Charlie Gasparino, On-Air Editor | 06 Oct 2008 | 04:57 AM ET


Disgraced CEO Richard Fuld, who oversaw the demise of venerable Lehman Brothers Holdings that helped tip the credit crunch into a full-blown crisis, will testify at a congressional hearing this week.

Wall Street In Crisis - A CNBC Special Report

In related news, JPMorgan Chase [JPM 45.90 -3.95 (-7.92%) ] stands accused of allegedly precipitating the collapse Lehman Brothers by freezing Lehman assets days before it filed for bankruptcy protection.

Lehman creditors have accused JPMorgan of freezing $17 billion in cash and securities on Friday, Sept. 12, according to a published report. Lehman filed for bankruptcy the following Monday.

For months while Lehman's fortunes continued to sour, it continued to assure the investing
public it could survive. Dick Fuld held numerous conversations with JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon during this time.

Dimon's capital markets chief Steve Black met with Fuld days before the firm's bankruptcy. Its
unclear what Fuld told these insiders, but it is clear they were increasingly worried about the Lehman's future.

Rep. Henry Waxman, the Democratic chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, has called Fuld and former chief executives of insurer American International Group [AIG 3.86 -0.14 (-3.5%) ] to appear at hearings into the financial excesses that led to the collapse of the companies.

Here is a brief timeline of what happened to Lehman Brothers:

* Early summer: JPMorgan is the clearing bank on behalf of clients who have exposure to Lehman trade. These are money market fund and pension funds. JPMorgan also makes intra day loans to Lehman
* July: The head of JPMorgan's risk department begins asking for collateral from Lehman as it becomes clear that Lehman's problems aren't going away and clients are getting nervous
* JPMorgan asks for $5 billion in July, but does not receive it until August. And it receives structured securities, which JPMorgan considers difficult to value. When valued, JPMorgan feels they're worth significantly less than $5 billion. It is unclear why JPMorgan accepts these securities. But it should be noted that Lehman has publicly stated at this time that it is looking for capital and that it wants to sell its investment management business.
* Early September: Lehman still has not raised capital. It has approached several banks about possible mergers. Nothing happens. It sets a course to sell its investment management division to raise capital. But the firm's prospects begin to dim considerably; counterparties getting anxious; credit default swaps spiking.
* September 4: Lehman is really teetering. This time, JPMorgan asks for another $5 billion in collateral in cash. JPMorgan's internal analysis shows that the initial $5 billion tranche deteriorated significantly -- worth around $1 billion. JPMorgan demands the money on behalf of money market fund clients who are demanding collateral on trades with Lehman. The money doesn't come in.
* September 9: Steve Black, head of capital markets, knowing that Lehman has not paid the $5 billion from the week before, asks for another $5 billion in cash. He personally reaches out to Lehman CEO Dick Fuld. Fuld obliges with $3 billion. Black agrees, but JPMorgan is getting increasingly nervous: It is worried that Lehman will go bankrupt if it doesn't raise money. That same day JPMorgan also finds out Lehman is going to preannounce its losses and plans to raise capital.
* JPMorgan and Citigroup [C 18.35 -4.15 (-18.44%) ] both call a meeting with Lehman's head of capital markets. Both ask Lehman not to go ahead with the announcement. It will spook markets unless it raises significant capital -- the sale of the investment management division would not be enough. Lehman said it was worth $8 billion but Street estimates were less than $3 billion. The firm needed around $4 billion in capital. However, nothing happens.
* September 10: Lehman does the pre-announcement and conference call to analysts. They assure investors the firm is healthy despite all the problems the firm had delivering capital to JPMorgan. Deutsche Bank analyst Mike Mayo asks the question about the need to raise $4 billion in capital. Lehman's CFO says it doesn't need that much.
* September 11-12: JPMorgan discovers that its initial $5 billion wasn't paid. It demands $8 billion immediately. Over those two days Lehman delivers the money.
* September 12: CNBC breaks the story that Lehman is selling itself
* September 13/14: The Fed tries to save Lehman through a private sector bailout, but this fails
* September 15: Lehman files for bankruptcy

Fuld is scheduled to appear before the committee on Monday in what would be his first public appearance since Lehman filed for bankruptcy. On Tuesday, the committee will take on former AIG CEOs Robert Willumstad, Martin Sullivan and Maurice "Hank" Greenberg.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/27040603

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Financial services major JPMorgan, which rescued two troubled banks within a span of seven months, has now been accused of putting the final nail on Lehman Brothers, says a media report.

"JP Morgan has been accused by its Wall Street rivals of dealing the final hammer blow that forced Lehman Brothers into collapse in a sensational claim that threatens to spark a colossal legal battle," the Sunday Times reported.

The giant American bank is alleged to have frozen USD 17 billion (9.6 billion) of cash and securities belonging to Lehman on the Friday night before its failure, the daily added.

Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy two days later on Monday, triggering a series of collapse of financial institutions in US and Europe.

The allegations were raised in a filing at the bankruptcy court in New York, lodged late last week, the newspaper said.

"The creditors committee understands that LBHI [Lehman Brothers Holding Inc] had at least $17 billion in excess assets which were held at JPMC [JP Morgan Chase] on the Friday going into the weekend before its bankruptcy filing," Sunday Times said quoting documents.

"The creditors committee further understands that, on September 12, 2008, JPMC refused to allow LBHI access to its excess assets and instead 'froze' LBHIs account. In freezing LBHIs assets, JPMC was purportedly holding all of LBHIs assets as a potential offset against any claims JPMC may have had against LBHI," the documents said.

Before Lehman's bankruptcy JPMorgan had agreed to buy investment bank Bear Sterns and had paid USD 2.3 billion. Later in September it also agreed to purchage Washington Mutual's banking assets for 1.9 billion dollars.

Quoting Lehmans biggest creditors, the Sunday Times said freezing of Lehman assets precipitated the liquidity crisis that embroiled the latter, forcing it into Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Lehmans biggest creditors include almost every big firm on Wall Street, most of Europes heavyweight banks and insurance companies as well as a slew of Japanese and Chinese institutions that are owed several hundred billion dollars, the daily said.

It said Lehman creditors are now demanding that JP Morgan open up its books to the bankruptcy court to allow the transactions to be assessed.

The filing goes on to claim that "as a result of JPMorgan Chases actions, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc (LBHI) suffered an immediate liquidity crisis that could have been averted by any number of events, none of which transpired," the newspaper reported.

Quoting JP Morgan the daily said: "These assertions raised by the creditors panel are unfounded conjecture. We will address them at the appropriate time in bankruptcy court." Previous court documents have suggested that JP Morgan was owed $23 billion by Lehman in secured loans, the Sunday Times added.


http://research.scottrade.com/public/markets/news/news.asp?s…

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JPM on u-tube.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3xnxyfYSJw

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Wer Lehmanpapiere hält oder hielt muss das sehen: Fulds erster öffentlicher Auftritt nach Insolvenzanmeldung

http://www.youtube.com/watch?aq=f&emb=0&eurl=http%3A%2F%2Fvi…

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 35.446.877 von flyingkremlin am 07.10.08 01:00:39

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0nilm6XqjI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_pmgklHGl6s
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Qx00XFtO1g&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xR79SUKi7PM

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5EzPZt7CJw&feature=related

[flyingkremlin]

der letzte Anrufer kann zwar nicht ordentlich sprechen -aber er hats kapiert glaube ich:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANWGSR31ZPU

[flyingkremlin]

http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/10/did-jpm-cash-…

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10/6 Angry Americans Speak out Lehman Hearing
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvOd2fLD_O8&feature=related

10/6 Not my fault (Fuld) SEC/regulation failed!
http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=H-Jm2ILQxTE&NR=1

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Collateral Call für Lehman and Merrill - JP Morgan ist aller Wahrscheinlihchkeit nach der Auslöser der Lehman Insolvenz -und somit für das nachfolgende Desaster.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=880985244&play=1

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I stole every pen from chase branch near my house
If everyone does this we can send a message that we are mad and they won't get away with it.

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/Stocks_J/t…

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September 29, 2008, 9:03 am
How J.P. Morgan Raised $11.5 Billion in 24 Hours
Posted by Heidi N. Moore

The fall of Washington Mutual wasn’t a surprise to the government. Nor was it a surprise to J.P. Morgan.

Three weeks before J.P. Morgan bought WaMu’s deposits for $1.9 billion, officials at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had called J.P. Morgan to say that the FDIC was carefully monitoring WaMu and that a seizure of its assets was likely. The FDIC said it would want to immediately auction off WaMu’s assets if a seizure was necessary, people familiar with the situation told Deal Journal.
[go]
Associated Press

J.P. Morgan was well-prepared, then, when the FDIC asked for bids on Tuesday, Sept. 23. On Wednesday night, the regulators told J.P. Morgan that the bank had won the bidding, one person close to the situation said. The Wall Street Journal reported the sale at around 7 p.m. on Thursday, and J.P. Morgan hurriedly called a conference call in two hours to discuss the sale.

But that was just the first step. J.P. Morgan had known for three weeks that if WaMu was seized, and J.P. Morgan won the assets, the big bank would want to raise enough capital to keep its Tier 1 capital at at least 8%. Tier 1 capital is the gauge of a bank’s health watched by regulators, and it measures whether a bank has sufficient capital to cushion future losses. The federal government requires a minimum Tier 1 ratio of 4%, and 8% is typically thought to be robust. J.P. Morgan’s plan was to gather $8 billion in one big capital-raising, which would put its Tier 1 ratio between 8% and 8.5%

It is not, however, easy to raise $8 billion of capital without revealing why. J.P. Morgan could not risk revealing anything about WaMu’s potential seizure, or face the FDIC’s wrath and a major market disruption. So the bank chose a strategy that has become increasingly popular in these times of crisis: “wall-crossing.”

Here’s how it worked. J.P. Morgan picked 10 major financial firms that could help the bank raise money. None were sovereign wealth funds or private equity firms, according to people familiar with the situation; all 10 were U.S. asset managers, and several were already among the list of the biggest J.P. Morgan shareholders. Some of the firms — who remain unnamed — also helped Goldman Sachs raise billions of dollars last week.

J.P. Morgan’s bankers called the 10 chosen firms and posed a question: the bankers were advising a U.S. bank that was contemplating a strategic acquisition of a retail bank, and a capital-raising could be connected. The bankers could not reveal their client until the bidding was done. Did the investors want to hear more? If they said yes, they would get details; if they said no, they would be left out in the cold on a deal that could potentially move the markets.

Nine of the 10 investors that J.P. Morgan invited said they were interested in hearing more. As soon as they agreed, they were asked to sign confidentiality agreements that would make them official J.P. Morgan insiders, which would mean that they could not trade in the bank’s stock. J.P. Morgan’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, along with CFO Mike Cavanagh and retail chief Charlie Scharf triple-teamed to speak with the investors in half-hour conference calls that extended throughout the day on Thursday. The investors were told that the U.S. bank in question was J.P. Morgan itself. Some of the investors independently guessed that the takeover candidate was WaMu, but none knew that a potential seizure of WaMu’s assets was in the works, nor did J.P. Morgan tell them.

By the end of the day, J.P. Morgan had raised $7 billion from the nine investors. By 9:15 p.m., when J.P. Morgan held its public conference call to announce the deal, all seven investors were taken off the “insiders” list and no longer had any access to material non-public information about the bank. J.P. Morgan also planned to raise another $1 billion in the capital markets on Friday by opening the offering to anyone who wanted to participate. Meanwhile, Dimon repeatedly touted the effort as an “offensive” one, painting the capital-raising as an effort to get ahead while other banks, he indicated, were just trying to keep up.

Between 7 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on Friday, before the markets opened, J.P. Morgan pitched the offering to new investors, who clamored for enough shares to double the amount J.P. Morgan had expected to raise in the open market to $2 billion. A “greenshoe,” or overallotment, added another $1.5 billion. The bank had gathered $11.5 billion, enough to take its regulatory capital ratio very close to 9%, a full 100 basis points above what it had expected just a day before.

J.P. Morgan had sold its open-market shares at their Wednesday closing price of $40.50, a 6.8% discount to the Thursday close of $43.46. Investors expected a thick discount because the offering itself was so large. In addition, nvestors wanted the benefit of a lower price where they would not be paying for Thursday’s one-day rally in a volatile market.

In an internal memo, J.P. Morgan executives Steve Black and Bill Winters warned employees, “the dislocation and volatility in the markets are far from over.” Many investors, including J. Christopher Flowers and his old shop Goldman Sachs, are gearing up to bid for the masses of distressed bank assets that are expected to flood the markets in coming months.

Will J.P. Morgan be a buyer again?

http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&lang=de&searchLoc=0&cmpType…

[flyingkremlin]

falscher Quellenlink -dieser ist richtig:

http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:NBpKm42cM48J:blogs.wsj.…

[flyingkremlin]

Video zur Übernahme von Washington Mutual durch die FDIC und J.P.Morgan, den Freunden, die den "Kollateral Call" mit bekannten Folgen bei Lehman ausgeführt haben.

Wer bei Lehman oder WaMu Anteile hat oder hatte muss das gesehen haben. Möge jeder werten wie er will.

http://www.studentenregister.de/videos/video-27.html

[flyingkremlin]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 36.322.395 von flyingkremlin am 07.01.09 11:32:41

http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE52O3IB20090325

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122290904270000000…