Dividenden Strategie (Seite 68)

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.630.166 von cimar am 22.01.12 20:51:20

$10 TRILLION Liquidity Injection Coming? Credit Suisse Hunkers Down Ahead Of The European Endgame

When yesterday we presented the view from CLSA's Chris Wood that the February 29 LTRO could be €1 Trillion (compared to under €500 billion for the December 21 iteration), we snickered, although we knew quite well that the market response, in stocks and gold, today would be precisely as has transpired. However, after reading the report by Credit Suisse's William Porter, we no longer assign a trivial probability to some ridiculous amount hitting the headlines early in the morning on February 29. Why? Because from this moment on, the market will no longer be preoccupied with a €1 trillion LTRO number as the potential headline, one which in itself would be sufficient to send the Euro tumbling, the USD surging, and provoking an immediate in kind response from the Fed. Instead, the new 'possible' number is just a "little" higher, which intuitively would make sense. After all both S&P and now Fitch expect Greece to default on March 20 (just to have the event somewhat "priced in"). Which means that in an attempt to front-run the unprecedented liquidity scramble that will certainly result as nobody has any idea what would happen should Greece default in an orderly fashion, let alone disorderly, the only buffer is having cash. Lots of it. A shock and awe liquidity firewall that will leave everyone stunned. How much. According to Credit Suisse the new LTRO number could be up to a gargantuan, and unprecedented, €10 TRILLION!

Here is how the strawman is now put in place for what may the biggest liquidity injection in modern history in just under two months.

.....

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/10-trillion-ltro-coming-credit…

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.629.608 von cimar am 22.01.12 17:23:47

Greek bondholders draw line in the sand

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3060a200-4522-11e1-a719-00144…


High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Email [e-mail] to buy additional rights. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3060a200-4522-11e1-a719-00144feabd…

Private owners of Greek debt have made their “maximum” offer for the losses they are willing to accept, the bondholders’ lead negotiator has said, implying that any further demands could kill off a “voluntary” deal and trigger a default.

Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, said in an interview that he remained “hopeful and quite confident” the two sides could reach a deal that would prevent a full-scale Greek default when a €14.4bn bond comes due on March 20.

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But the mood in Athens was tense on Sunday night after it became clear that an outline agreement on cutting Greece’s debt by €100bn could not be reached ahead of Monday’s meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Brussels.

One banker said Friday’s demand by official creditors, led by the International Monetary Fund, for a further interest rate cut of 50 basis points on new long-term bonds to be swapped for existing Greek debt “may have put a voluntary deal out of reach”.

Mr Dallara said the IIF’s position tabled with Greek authorities on Friday night – believed to include a loss of 65-70 per cent on current Greek bonds’ long-term value – was as far as his side was likely to go.

“I think its clear we are at the limits of a voluntary deal,” Mr Dallara said, recalling that eurozone heads of state had committed to keeping the restructuring voluntary at a high-stakes EU summit in October. “It is clear to me we are at a crossroads.”

High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Email [e-mail] to buy additional rights. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3060a200-4522-11e1-a719-00144feabd…

While he has been in touch with Lucas Papademos, the Greek prime minister, by phone over the weekend, Mr Dallara declined to say whether he planned another trip to Athens or would come to Brussels for today’s meeting of finance ministers.

“I am hopeful. We made a lot of progress in Athens over the last few days,” Mr Dallara said.

Greek officials said that despite Friday’s setback they were still optimistic a voluntary deal could be achieved ahead of a European leaders’ summit on January 30.

Greece is due to agree terms of an updated “medium-term” fiscal programme this week with visiting monitors from the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund. Discussions will be tough as successive governments have missed budget deficit targets while failing to implement structural reforms.

Athens will have to take additional measures this year to achieve deficit reduction of €7bn this year, after achieving only €2bn of cuts in 2011, according to the Greek budget for 2012. This will entail further wage cuts in the public and private sectors, pension reductions and faster cuts in healthcare spending.

“Nothing substantive has been achieved on structural reform in the 18 months since Greece sought help from the European Union and IMF,” said Yannis Stournaras, head of the Athens thinktank IOVE.

Both the debt swap and the new fiscal programme must be in place before Greece will be allocated funding from a second €130bn rescue package.

Mr Dallara declined to characterise the positions of European and IMF negotiators, but reiterated his belief that a voluntary deal between international lenders and Greek bondholders was essential to prevent the market turmoil that could accompany a full-scale Greek default.

“Europe had a very good week last week,” Mr Dallara said, referring to better-than-expected bond auctions for several eurozone countries. “We need to build on that market momentum.”

Official creditors are concerned that without harsher terms for private bondholders, Greece’s debt may exceed the 120 debt to gross domestic product ratio in 2020 that the IMF deems sustainable.

The Greek economy is in free fall after shrinking by more than 6 per cent last year compared with official forecasts of 3.8-4.5 per cent.

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.628.334 von cimar am 22.01.12 00:13:55

Sehr interessanter Artikel über die Folgen einer "erzwungenen" Einbindung privater Gläubiger der unter UK-Gesetz ausgegenen Griechenland Anleihen.


http://www.zerohedge.com/news/subordination-101-walkthru-sov…

Subordination 101: A Walk Thru For Sovereign Bond Markets In A Post-Greek Default World


...
"Furthermore, since the Greek "case study" will have dramatic implications for not only other instances of sovereign default, many of which are already lining up especially in Europe, but for the sovereign bond market in general, this may be a good time to explain why not only does Greece not have the upper hand, but why an adverse outcome from the 11th hour discussions between the IIF, the ad hoc creditors, Greece, and the Troika, would have monumental consequences for the entire bond market in general."...

...
"Yet where the process falls squarely on its face, is the fact that Greece also has issued a modest amount, somewhere over €25 billion face, in bonds issued under UK-law. These are bonds which already have Collective Action Clauses and which as Stephen J. Choi and Mitu Gulati explain, come in two flavors: "Those that were issued prior to 2004 contained CACs that allow holders of 66% or more of an issue to modify payment terms in a manner that would bind all other holders. The bonds issued after 2004 require the consent of holders of 75% or more of an issue." Incidentally, this is where the Greece has the upper hand argument fails because while Greece can force local-law bondholders to do pretty much anything, it has no chance of doing that if a given hedge fund cartel has already built up a blocking stake in the UK-bonds. Choi and Gulati go on to state the obvious: "Obtaining approvals from between 66% and 75% of the bonds is likely to be difficult." And this is where the game gets interesting, because while the bulk of the bonds, or what is now becoming obvious is the junior class, can be impaired with impunity (pardon the pun), it is the UK-law, or the non-domestic indenture, bonds, which are the de facto fulcrum security. And since the notional outstanding here is tiny, it is quite easy to build up a blocking stake in the bonds and to obtain full control of the process, especially since the ECB appears to have been building up its own stake in local-law bonds.
Blocking Stake
As anyone who has ever overseen or participated in a bankruptcy process, the biggest trump card one can attain is to build up a blocking stake in a fulcrum security (just ask Carl Icahn) . Because it does not matter who has a majority. What matters is who has 33% + 1 of the vote to block any consensual deal. This is what is also known as "nuisance value" because in exchange for their votes, those blocking stake holders can demand anything, and be virtually assured of getting it, in order to allow the restructuring process to continue. This is precisely what the hedge fund hold outs, who started accumulating a block stake in the UK bonds some time in October, figured out in mid- to late-2011. And the fact that the ECB did not, back in 2010 when it was actively buying Greek bonds did not, only made it easier."....

...
"It may not be trivial, but it certainly is not sufficient. Because when one thinks that of the €25 billion in calculated face non-local bonds out there (of which some are non-UK law), the hold outs have to merely control a third plus one or just under €9 billion. At recent prices this is about €3 billion. A €3 billion investment to control the restructuring of a €240 billion (excluding the Troika's DIP loan) balance sheet? Not bad at all."...

...
"Litigation Arbitrage

It appears that for many hedge funds, buying Greek debt (and ostensibly Portuguese, Irish, and so forth), at absolutely firesale prices, is one of two things: i) an attempt to build a blocking stake as discussed above, or ii) a means to generate an actionable adverse claim in international litigation (following a cram down or any other disputed subversion of creditor rights), which as shown previously, is on an annualized basis arguably the most profitable type of transaction ever. These are hedge funds, who are staffed to the brim with the highest caliber of international law and bankruptcy experts (many of whom have worked side by side with the likes of Buccheit), and who are versed in every nuance of all previous international bankruptcy case studies. In other words, in addition to litigation potential in case of a forced cram down, there are avenues open to litigation in the event of a 'simple' sovereign default.To wit, from Singh:"...

....
"The bold-underlined sentence should put any concerns as to whether hedge funds will or will not sue Greece, Europe, the ECB and everyone else in the case of a cramdown and/or default to rest. And if the name Elliott appears among the list of Greek bondholders, consider it a done deal.

And speaking of suing the ECB, here our German readers may be delighted to know that in taking a gambit with hedge funds' litigation trigger finger, Greece is in fact exposing none other than the Bundesbank to litigation risk! Singh explains."...
....
"Sovereign Debt Subordination

What we present below is not our prediction of what will happen in the market. It is our view on how the market would react if Greece does in fact proceed with cramming down either the weak and the strong indenture, or just the former.

Potentially far more troubling than the consequences of a drawn out litigation in bankruptcy court, would be the market response of an implicit "foreign law" bond subordination, or the split of the bond tranche into senior and junior components. This is because according to a Bloomberg-sourced analysis run by Zero Hedge, while the local (weak) - non-local (strong) law analysis is relevant to Greece, if in asymmetric terms (with ~90% of all bond issued under Greek law), when one factors in the rest of the PIIGS, it suddenly becomes a very non-trivial bifurcation.

Based on Bloomberg data (using the GOVERNING_LAW mnemonic) in which clearly defined local law bonds are segregated from NA or non-local ones, the sovereign debt universe of the PIIGS, which amounts to €2.1 trillion, consists of €1.3 trillion in non-local law bonds, and a whopping €800 billion in local law bonds!"..

...
"While not disclosing them here publicly, Zero Hedge is happy to discuss with its readers the CUSIP list of these two distinct bond sets. Because while quite a bit, if not nearly enough, has been said in the media about the two bond indenture classes in Greek bonds, absolutely nothing has been discussed about how this problem extends into the general periphery. Here, for the first time, we present it visually, by showing a matrix of bond price vs years to maturity for all five PIIGS. As expected, and as confirmed by the Choi and Gulati analysis, bonds with stronger protection (i.e. issued under non-local law) trade broadly richer than those without protection."...

....
"The kicker: if and when Greece proceeds with making a "mockery of the quaint notion of bondholder contract law", as Michael Cembalest so aptly put it, the spread between these two regression lines for every country, not just the PIIGS with their €2.1 trillion in debt, but every other one as well which offers creditors the option of dumping all weak protection bonds and jumping to the "strong" ones, will surge, as the realization that a very distinct class of sovereign debt has now been subordinated and that a senior and junior class of sovereign debt has emerged.

And since any incremental capital will further prime these bonds (good luck with that negative pledge covenant on the local law bonds) thereby acting as a DIP loan, in essence the sovereign debt structure is about to be trifurcated into secured, senior subordinated and junior subordinated bonds. Very soon nobody will trade corporates anymore as all legacy fixed incomes investors start doing "capital structure arbitrage" with the balance sheets of the likes of Italy.

How this will impact the sovereign bond market in the long run is anyone's guess, but it will hardly be positive. Especially when one considers that going forward even bonds issued under UK-law, should Greece attempt to strip these, will be percevied as insufficiently secure. Which means that the bond market going forward will no longer look at new sovereign bond issuance with the view that all bonds are created equal and have a pari passu standing, but that at any given moment one may be primed arbitrarily, or see any and all covenant protection stripped.

Before we proceed we would like to also point out one very curious Catch 22, in that if indeed Greece succeeds with its own exchange offer with the world not imploding, the natural next step would be for the other PIIGS to proceed with just such an exercise in order to cut their own debt load by up to 70%. Because while Greece may have the advantage, the question now become who will be second. Paradoxically, the more success this global strategy has, the deeper it sows the seeds of Europe's destruction, as more and more bondholders will actively shy away from all weak bonds first in the PIIGS, then in Europe, then in the world. Until at the end, there is no end-market demand, and the only buyer remains the central bank.

Finally, while we have no prediction of whether or not any of the above happens, one thing we are sure of: if the runaway central planners of the world believe they can legislate their way into an 'upper hand' over the bond market, in ever more desperate attempts to avoid the day of reckoning, they will fail without any shadow of a doubt. Because demand for risk comes first and foremost from a sense of stability, of fair and efficient markets, and equitability: something which has long been missing in the stock market, and which may very soon be taken away, by force, from the bond market as well.

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.623.238 von cimar am 20.01.12 14:25:14

http://www.athensnews.gr/issue/13479/52479
PSI talks near final deal
THE GOVERNMENT resumed its talks with representatives of private bondholders on January 18 in a race against time to clinch a deal for the writedown of the country’s debt by 100bn euros before the next EU summit at the end of the month.

Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos met with Charles Dallara, the head of the Washington-based bankers’ lobby, for a new round of negotiations on private sector involvement (PSI), which had broken down on January 13.

The International Institute of Finance (IIF) chief walked out of the talks last week in disagreement over the future interest rate on the new bonds which bondholders would receive after writing 50 percent off the face value of their old ones.

The difference over the new bonds’ coupon rate may not have been overcome yet, but Dallara’s return to Athens indicates that the EU and the IMF have given way to IIF pressure for higher coupon rates than the ones which led to the breakdown of the talks on January 13.

The 2.5-3.0 percent rates which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had deemed appropriate for the sustainability of Greek debt in early January have now been abandoned in favour of a compromise offer of “at least 4 percent” which the IIF equates to a haircut of 65-68 percent on the net present value of the old bonds.

Fine print

The Financial Times reported that the interest rate on the new bonds was proposed to start at 3 percent for the first five years and increase to around 4 percent as the bonds near maturity in their 20- to 30-year lifespan, allowing for an average rate closer to the demands of the private bondholders.

“They [Dallara] went to Athens and didn’t pick up where they left last Friday. They’re proposing new things ... a yield well below 4 percent that will increase biannually,” an EU official told Dow Jones Newswires on January 19.

This was later confirmed by a Greek government official. “We are discussing a proposal for a coupon starting at around 3.6-3.7 percent, which will progressively increase over time. Dallara will put this proposal to the banks and will come back with their responses tonight,” the official said.

Dallara has reportedly shrugged off a Greek offer of coupons “marginally above 3.5 percent” at his earlier meeting with Papademos and Venizelos after the IIF chief returned to Athens on January 18.

The partial debt writedown is an essential component of a second, 130bn euro EU-IMF bailout package agreed at the EU summit on October 27 to cover the country’s financing needs through 2015.

But some 70bn euros of this new loan pact is earmarked to sweeten the PSI pill for the Greek and foreign banks who will volunteer for the haircut, while another 15bn euros will go towards the redemption of the bond issue that matures on March 20.


Greek public debt structure (euros)

EU-IMF loans 73bn
Other debt 37bn
ECB bond purchases 60bn
Private sector bonds 205bn
Total debt (Dec 2011) 375bn


Private sector holdings (euros)

Foreign banks/funds 40bn
Greek banks/funds 75bn
Hedge funds/persons 80bn
Sovereign funds (China) 10bn
Potential PSI bonds total 205bn
- Under Greek jurisdiction 190bn


PSI/bailout funds (euros)

Private sector writeoff 100bn
EU-IMF contribution 70bn
Total EU-IMF bailout loan: 130bn
- Cash to PSI participants 30bn
- Greek bank recapitalisation 40bn
- Net Greek deficit financing 60bn


PSI bond swap proposal (Jan 19)


For each 100 euros of old bonds, investors will receive:

- 15 euros in cash
- 35 euros in new bonds

New coupon rate: 3.5-4.5%
Maturity: 30 years
GDP bonus: 10 basis points per 1% of Greek growth

Face value loss 50%
Net present value loss 68%
Average annual coupon 4%
Discount rate 9%

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.623.164 von cimar am 20.01.12 14:13:41

Div% Port%
Gesamt Port.: 4,81% 100,00%
Aktien & Bonds invested: 5,51% 87,25%
Nur Aktien invest.: 4,78% 78,37%
Nur Bonds invest.: 7,99% 8,70%
Cash invested: xxxx 12,75%
Nur in Div&Coup. payiny Securities invested: 5,71% 84,26%
Divi Net of Tax Ratio: 78,14%

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.623.101 von cimar am 20.01.12 14:04:36

Portfolio Eigenschaften
Aktien 78,37%
Anleihen 8,70%
Liquidität 12,75%

Investierter Betrag (PortfolioExLiquidität)
Zykliker 26,34%
Blend 37,63%
Defensive 35,81%

EURO 62,02%
USD 21,06%
GBP 4,60%
CHF 9,10%
Other 1,98%

Financials (Banks/Insurance) 8,28%
Real Estate 3,05%
Telcos 13,90%
Utilities 2,75%
Energy 8,27%
Industrials 4,06%
Materials 10,35%
Consumer defensive 19,11%
Consumer cyclical 7,18%
Health Care 8,61%
Technology 4,25%


Giant 62,27% (Above 24 Mrd Euro)
LargeCap 7,03% (6-24Mrd Euro
MidCap 6,99% (1-7 Mrd Euro)
Nebenwerte 9,15% (Below 1 Mrd Euro)
SmallCap 6,67% (250 Mio - 1 Mrd Euro)
MicroCap 1,63% (below 250 Mio Euro)


Dividenden Eigenschaften
Div in EUR 70,82%
Div in USD 17,02%
Div in GBP 3,62%
Div in CHF 6,08%
Div in other 2,45%

Div characteristics
Growth 23,81%
Stable 41,99%
Cyclical 27,16%
Shrinking 7,04%

[cimar]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.621.175 von cimar am 20.01.12 09:22:42

Aktie %Port %DivRe
BASF 7,95% 3,73%
Nestle 6,22% 3,44%
RoyalDutchShell 5,14% 4,73%
Dt. Telekom 4,05% 7,81%
Deutsche Post 3,81% 5,11%
Johnson&Johnson 3,60% 3,50%
Allianz 3,58% 5,41%
Telefonica 3,35% 9,72%
Freenet 3,27% 7,53%
Philip Morris 3,23% 3,45%
Dt. Euroshop 2,66% 4,38%
Siemens 2,66% 3,84%
Cewe Color 2,63% 3,91%
DBTier1 2015 9,5% 2,56% 9,13%
Daimler 2,45% 4,46%
GlaxoSmithKline 2,18% 4,45%
Seadrill 2,07% 7,47%
MünchnerRück 1,94% 6,36%
Intel 1,86% 2,83%
ImperialTobacco 1,83% 3,90%
Roche 1,73% 4,00%
Freenet 2016 7,125% 1,71% 6,85%
Comdirect 1,70% 5,24%
KTGAgrar 2017 7,125% 1,63% 7,19%
Raiffeisen EuroHighYield Fund 1,52% 6,26%
FranceTelecom 1,46% 12,02%
Exelon 1,38% 5,31%
Aareal Pref 1,16% 10,13%
Microsoft 1,08% 2,82%
Philip MorrisCR 1,08% 10,60%
Eon 1,02% 6,12%
MetroVZ 0,85% 6,00%
Unilever 0,84% 3,54%
Euromicron 0,77% 6,18%
SKW Stahl 0,43% 4,47%
Divi-Portf. 85,41%

Aktie Port Anteil
Greece 4,3% 20/3/12 0,12%
Prophecy Ressources 0,57%
Gippsland 0,08%
BundFutureShortx15 0,12%
10YTreasury Shortx15 0,07%
Schuler 0,88%
Takt. Portf. 1,85%
Liquidität 12,75%
Gesamt Portfolio 100,00%

[cimar]

Zitat von everyday1000: interessanter thread.
Was passiert wohl mit Griechenland und kann man es riskieren die jetzt aufgelaufenen Gewinne mit Bankaktien weiterlaufen zu lassen. Ich bin hin- und hergerissen.

Das würd ich von dein einzelnen Banken, Gewicht, Gewinne, deine steuerlichen Aspekte und evtl. technisches Bild abhängig machen. Ich bin im vergangenen Jahr gut damit gefahren, die Gewinne bei DB, Coba und Aareal eher kurzfristig zu realisieren. Ich weiß nicht, ob die Zeit schon da ist die Banken wieder langfristig zu halten. Wohl eher nicht...

[everyday1000]

interessanter thread.
Was passiert wohl mit Griechenland und kann man es riskieren die jetzt aufgelaufenen Gewinne mit Bankaktien weiterlaufen zu lassen. Ich bin hin- und hergerissen.

[cimar]

http://seekingalpha.com/article/320751-intel-reports-record-…

Intel Reports Record Year

After the bell on Thursday, chip giant Intel (INTC) reported a record year in terms of revenues. The company posted decent revenue numbers in the fourth quarter, and they beat the midpoint of their lowered guidance when the company warned a few weeks ago. Shares were up about 1.3% after reporting numbers.

Here's how the numbers looked for the fourth quarter:

Revenues of $13.89 billion, beating midpoint of lowered guidance ($13.7 billion). Analysts called for $13.72 billion.
EPS of 64 cents (GAAP), beating analysts' call for $0.61.
Gross margins (non-GAAP) of 65.5% and GAAP of 64.5%. Both numbers met revised guidance from company.

For the full year:

Revenues of $54 billion (GAAP), beating analyst expectations of $53.84 billion.
EPS of $2.39, beating analyst expectations of $2.37.

For the first quarter of 2012, Intel provided revenue guidance of $12.8 billion, plus or minus $500 million. That is exactly where analysts had the company pegged, at $12.8 billion.

So how do the fourth quarter numbers look? Well, they are up in dollar terms, but financial performance was down slightly. Here's some key financials over the past few years, for the fourth quarter.


While the numbers were up, so were the costs, which led to lower overall margins in this year's period.

The numbers are still much better than those of 2008 and 2009, but I think Intel would have liked to have done a little better. Now let's look at the full year numbers.

So where does Intel go from here? Good question.

Intel is doing much better than Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) right now, but it is facing some decent competition from ARM Holdings (ARMH). Intel is doing much better than AMD in terms of margins, both in gross and operating. When looking at Arm, Intel trails in gross margins, but is doing a bit better in terms of operating margins.

Now, Intel is buying back plenty of stock, and has a decent dividend to offer, something that the other two lack. AMD does not offer a dividend, while ARM Holdings pays slightly less than half of 1%. Intel pays almost 3.5% currently. Intel paid out over $4 billion in dividends in 2011, but also bought back over $14 billion in stock, and that buyback will continue.

Intel is currently trading at 10.8 times 2012 earnings, while AMD trades at 10.4 times, and Arm Holdings is at 45.6 times. However, Arm has much better growth potential ahead of it, which is why it is so expensive. Intel is cheapest when looking at the price to expected growth ratio over the next five years.

So what's my overall view? Well, we knew weeks ago that the quarter wouldn't be great, but it was decent, and slightly better than we were expecting. Intel has a great dividend and is buying back plenty of stock, which makes it a great value play.

The question for Intel is are they late to the party in terms of chips for mobile units? They may be. The future of chips appears to be in the mobile segment and possible ultrabooks, and ARM seems to have the edge there. However, Intel is the giant in the room, and I think that they are set up to do well going forward. I liked the report, but with the stock trading near 52-week highs, I would wait for a pullback before entering. I like the name but you can get it cheaper.