Virtu Financial - 500 Beiträge pro Seite
eröffnet am 18.01.19 16:14:35 von
neuester Beitrag 06.09.19 08:38:19 von
neuester Beitrag 06.09.19 08:38:19 von
Beiträge: 5
ID: 1.296.422
ID: 1.296.422
Aufrufe heute: 0
Gesamt: 450
Gesamt: 450
Aktive User: 0
ISIN: US9282541013 · WKN: A14RHF · Symbol: 0VF
19,500
EUR
+0,52 %
+0,100 EUR
Letzter Kurs 15.04.24 Tradegate
Neuigkeiten
27.03.24 · globenewswire  |
26.03.24 · globenewswire |
27.02.24 · globenewswire |
25.01.24 · globenewswire |
10.01.24 · globenewswire |
Werte aus der Branche Finanzdienstleistungen
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 1,2900 | +36,33 | |
| 5,7617 | +13,42 | |
| 0,5200 | +11,83 | |
| 0,5400 | +10,20 | |
| 69,00 | +8,66 |
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 0,8800 | -9,74 | |
| 0,7200 | -10,00 | |
| 2,4200 | -10,37 | |
| 5,2200 | -11,07 | |
| 1,2500 | -35,90 |
Feedback
...ist ein HFT/Market-maker;
vor Jahren mal gesehen und irgendwie den Begriff "legaler Betrug" abgespeichert.
Trotzdem mal ein paar Ansichtsstücke geholt.
vor Jahren mal gesehen und irgendwie den Begriff "legaler Betrug" abgespeichert.
Trotzdem mal ein paar Ansichtsstücke geholt.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 59.663.153 von R-BgO am 18.01.19 16:14:35
"Virtu Financial21: Building a bigger, better money machine
We have held an exposure to Virtu Financial (VIRT) since January 2017, when we started acquiring at around $17.65; the current price is $25.76 providing for an equity market capitalisation of $4.9billion. We have traded around gains in the shares, selling a few in the low $30’s in early 2018. However, what we now hold is a superior business to that of two years ago.
How does Virtu make money?
Those of you reading our AGM presentation will have picked up the fact that the companies involved in the financial services supply chain who have tended to benefit the most over five years have been the stock exchanges themselves, rather than funds managers or investment banks. So whilst the value of the “house” (the exchange) has increased significantly over this period, one of the most essential components – the plumbing – has increased in price to a far lesser extent. In a stock exchange, the “plumbing” is the technology and expertise which provides liquidity to investors (and speculators) by market making, algorithmic trading or other execution services like dark pools and off exchange transactions.
As a guide, over the past five years on US equity markets, roughly 6.8billion shares a day trade at a most recent average price of ~ US$49, for around $330billon of daily turnover. Virtu processes around one in four retail orders in US equities. Like any other market maker, Virtu’s net trading income is advantaged by four key influences, namely:
• Increasing prevalence of electronic trading, especially with growth in exchange traded funds;
• A larger number of exchange venues in which to operate across foreign exchange, commodities, equities and fixed interest;
• Its own capability to grab higher market shares and “capture” – the latter being a higher return per dollar traded; and
• Volatility; in general, the more volatile the market, the greater the opportunity for profit.
These four facets were laid out in early Virtu presentations, together with a fifth driver of overall profitability: the ability to utilise a common platform to reduce costs and improve margins. It is this latter feature which is now starting to take centre stage and which we will discuss later.
Virtu deploys around $1.3billion of net trading capital, which is “geared” around 4.4:1; the asset side is broadly comprised of cash, shares borrowed, shares held, and amounts owed by broker- dealers.
Liabilities are represented by amounts payable, shares sold (under repurchase agreements or otherwise), and stocks loaned out. This net trading capital increased substantially after the purchase of Knight Capital Group in early/mid 2017 from under $400m to a high of over $1.8billion. In LTM through Q3 2018, Virtu earned net trading income of ~ $960m – a 69% return on average net trading capital – of which 61% came from Americas equities.
The benefit from volatility is clear: Q2 2018’s market making income of $314m in a high volatility environment was nearly double Q3 2018’s $159m in a less wild quarter. Around the time of the public listing, with a significantly lower level of trading capital, Virtu regularly recorded quarters with annualized return of well over 100%pa net trading income to capital.
An important aspect of volatility is that Virtu benefits from realised volatility, not the volatility implied in the pricing of options contracts, measured by indices such as CBOE’s VIX. In calendar 2017, the VIX implied volatility of 11%pa – very low already – saw realised volatility averaging 6.7% - 61% of that “predicted”. This type of absurdly low volatility environment, consistent with market complacency, was why we took a large short position in US equities in late 2017 and early 2018.
History and the Knight Capital acquisition
Virtu was founded in 2008 by Vincent Viola and Doug Cifu, both of whom remain with the firm. In 2014, Virtu moved to enact an IPO, and submitted an S-1 filing on 10 March 2014 – a document which created no little comment, notably in respect of a famous chart on page 3 showing that of 1,238 days between 2009-2013, the firm had lost money trading on only one.
The advent of two books – Scott Patterson’s “Dark Pools” in July 2012 but specifically the more widely read and marketed “Flash Boys” by Michael Lewis (March 2014) caused a degree of controversy, leading to the original IPO to be postponed.
The public offering was regenerated in April 2015 with a float at $19/share (pre costs) of just under 14% of the capital, raising $360m. The shares generally traded in the mid $20s for most of the first year, before commencing a downward trend in the latter part of 2016, reaching a low of ~$13.25 in October 2016. This decline in the share price broadly corresponded with the commencement of a period of extremely low realised volatility in US equity markets, despite the fact that for a few quarters, VIRT’s net trading income as a percentage of net trading capital held up very well.
This share price decline presaged a tumultuous calendar 2017 for market makers, with the afore mentioned extraordinarily low volatility measures. As a response to these conditions, in April 2017, VIRT acquired the publicly listed Knight Capital Group (KCG) for ~$1.4billion, funded by a new debt issue and $750m stock placement to selected parties.
KCG had been publicly listed since early 1999, with a split adjusted IPO price of $17.50 reaching heights of $60 in early 2000. The company morphed through various different eras of market making, and the growth of hedge funds, with the shares generally being moribund, reflecting the significant decline in profitability of the company from its calendar year 2000 peak pre-tax income of over $400million. Profitability did start to improve in the mid 2000’s until a fateful day on 1 August 2012.
That day, KCG’s automated order routing system experienced a significant failure, effectively stemming from a failed new software deployment; the firm lost $440million in a single day and the shares fell from $10.25 to $2.58 over two days. KCG was rescued by an effective consortium of Jefferies Financial24, Blackstone and GETCO five days later with the use of preferred stock.
The aftermath of Virtu’s KCG purchase is a near master-class in cost and capital management within the financial sector. Estimated cost synergies at the time of purchase of $208million have been vastly exceeded25, with the saving run-rate now estimated at $340million annualized; moreover, VIRT has freed up significant portions of trading capital between the merged VIRT/KCG entity as follows, as well as paying down long term debt, through capital release and the sale of a major subsidiary, Bondpoint.
A potential re-run: acquisition of Integrated Technology Group (ITG)
The acquisition of KCG made Virtu a slightly greater hostage to market volatility than management felt was desirable; the degree to which this is the case can be seen the following chart:
...
The sharp dip in Q3 2017 reflects the increased capital arising from the acquisition of KCG; however, there is a clear decline in the returns available on capital from a given level of implied VIX volatility, partly as a result of competitive pressures.
In its own words: “ITG is a global financial technology company that ...empowers traders to reduce the end-to-end cost of implementing investments via liquidity, execution, analytics and workflow technology solutions.” On VIRT’s analysis, ITG will increase the level of execution services as a percentage of net trading income from ~ 10% currently to around 37% on a pro- forma basis.
As was the case with KCG, there are significant personnel and rental cost synergies to be gleaned in the first year of the acquisition – some $123million, primarily composed of personnel and occupancy savings, along with data processing and IT savings; all up, VIRT see the acquisition being after tax earnings accretive (after funding costs) by some $127million in full year 2020 – equivalent to $0.67 per VIRT share.
Strong outcome in Q4 ahead of ITG acquisition
Q4 2018 will represent the highest VIX reading by quarter since Q1 2016; more pointedly, realised volatility has broadly mirrored the CBOE VIX contracts, and US equity volumes have picked up suggesting a very strong Q4, with potential annualised return on trading capital at ~100%.
Imputing this into the first three quarters of CY2018, we conservatively think VIRT will earn net income (excluding the gain on BondPoint) of $265million ($1.41per share) in the 2018 calendar year; adjusting for other non-recurring items (including significant lease termination costs) and adding back share-based compensation, adjusted EPS (as defined by VIRT) should come in above $1.94 for the 2018 year, leaving the shares on a LTM P/E around 13x. This is in a year with two strong quarters of realised volatility, together with two more mundane periods.
Looking forward, properly executed, the ITG acquisition should not only be very highly earnings accretive, but the strong cash flows generated by Virtu will hopefully serve to pay down debt relatively quickly. VIRT charges off around $64m pa in amortisation, whilst investing approximately $50million in capitalised software and equipment capex; additionally, share based payments should save a further $25m pa in cash outflow.
Hence, in a reasonable (not high) volatility environment in 2020, VIRT should be capable of earning an adjusted $2.30 - $2.60 per share, paying out $0.94 in dividends ($0.24 per quarter) and leaving over $300million for debt repayment or share repurchase.
In our view, Virtu is an extremely well run, near unique listed entity. The company is at the forefront of equity (and other market technologies), has a strong insider shareholder base, and has proven very capable at acquisition integration and capital release. In an equity market still likely to provide bursts of volatility, VIRT represents a cheap – if variable earnings stream – with significant optionality. Even in the short term, with the shares up $4 or so since the 7 November 2018 announcement of the ITG deal, along with wild volatility for two months thereafter, it would be surprising not to see further upward re-rating of VIRT shares, early in 2019.
Conclusion
We have significantly increased our equity exposure over the past four months. We may have moved a little early in some areas, but feel there has been genuine panic in certain sectors. This is notably the case in financials where we can buy numerous banks on single digit P/E’s (and discounts to book) as their credit improves; none of these are based in Australia. That we can also buy Goldman Sachs at below tangible book value ($191.71) and KKR (on 31 December 2018) at an 18% premium to book ($16.68) with an implied value of 1.76% of fee paying assets under management, suggests Raoul Pal’s machines may have run a bit too hot in December.
über den jüngsten East72-letter wieder dran erinnert;
sie schreiben:"Virtu Financial21: Building a bigger, better money machine
We have held an exposure to Virtu Financial (VIRT) since January 2017, when we started acquiring at around $17.65; the current price is $25.76 providing for an equity market capitalisation of $4.9billion. We have traded around gains in the shares, selling a few in the low $30’s in early 2018. However, what we now hold is a superior business to that of two years ago.
How does Virtu make money?
Those of you reading our AGM presentation will have picked up the fact that the companies involved in the financial services supply chain who have tended to benefit the most over five years have been the stock exchanges themselves, rather than funds managers or investment banks. So whilst the value of the “house” (the exchange) has increased significantly over this period, one of the most essential components – the plumbing – has increased in price to a far lesser extent. In a stock exchange, the “plumbing” is the technology and expertise which provides liquidity to investors (and speculators) by market making, algorithmic trading or other execution services like dark pools and off exchange transactions.
As a guide, over the past five years on US equity markets, roughly 6.8billion shares a day trade at a most recent average price of ~ US$49, for around $330billon of daily turnover. Virtu processes around one in four retail orders in US equities. Like any other market maker, Virtu’s net trading income is advantaged by four key influences, namely:
• Increasing prevalence of electronic trading, especially with growth in exchange traded funds;
• A larger number of exchange venues in which to operate across foreign exchange, commodities, equities and fixed interest;
• Its own capability to grab higher market shares and “capture” – the latter being a higher return per dollar traded; and
• Volatility; in general, the more volatile the market, the greater the opportunity for profit.
These four facets were laid out in early Virtu presentations, together with a fifth driver of overall profitability: the ability to utilise a common platform to reduce costs and improve margins. It is this latter feature which is now starting to take centre stage and which we will discuss later.
Virtu deploys around $1.3billion of net trading capital, which is “geared” around 4.4:1; the asset side is broadly comprised of cash, shares borrowed, shares held, and amounts owed by broker- dealers.
Liabilities are represented by amounts payable, shares sold (under repurchase agreements or otherwise), and stocks loaned out. This net trading capital increased substantially after the purchase of Knight Capital Group in early/mid 2017 from under $400m to a high of over $1.8billion. In LTM through Q3 2018, Virtu earned net trading income of ~ $960m – a 69% return on average net trading capital – of which 61% came from Americas equities.
The benefit from volatility is clear: Q2 2018’s market making income of $314m in a high volatility environment was nearly double Q3 2018’s $159m in a less wild quarter. Around the time of the public listing, with a significantly lower level of trading capital, Virtu regularly recorded quarters with annualized return of well over 100%pa net trading income to capital.
An important aspect of volatility is that Virtu benefits from realised volatility, not the volatility implied in the pricing of options contracts, measured by indices such as CBOE’s VIX. In calendar 2017, the VIX implied volatility of 11%pa – very low already – saw realised volatility averaging 6.7% - 61% of that “predicted”. This type of absurdly low volatility environment, consistent with market complacency, was why we took a large short position in US equities in late 2017 and early 2018.
History and the Knight Capital acquisition
Virtu was founded in 2008 by Vincent Viola and Doug Cifu, both of whom remain with the firm. In 2014, Virtu moved to enact an IPO, and submitted an S-1 filing on 10 March 2014 – a document which created no little comment, notably in respect of a famous chart on page 3 showing that of 1,238 days between 2009-2013, the firm had lost money trading on only one.
The advent of two books – Scott Patterson’s “Dark Pools” in July 2012 but specifically the more widely read and marketed “Flash Boys” by Michael Lewis (March 2014) caused a degree of controversy, leading to the original IPO to be postponed.
The public offering was regenerated in April 2015 with a float at $19/share (pre costs) of just under 14% of the capital, raising $360m. The shares generally traded in the mid $20s for most of the first year, before commencing a downward trend in the latter part of 2016, reaching a low of ~$13.25 in October 2016. This decline in the share price broadly corresponded with the commencement of a period of extremely low realised volatility in US equity markets, despite the fact that for a few quarters, VIRT’s net trading income as a percentage of net trading capital held up very well.
This share price decline presaged a tumultuous calendar 2017 for market makers, with the afore mentioned extraordinarily low volatility measures. As a response to these conditions, in April 2017, VIRT acquired the publicly listed Knight Capital Group (KCG) for ~$1.4billion, funded by a new debt issue and $750m stock placement to selected parties.
KCG had been publicly listed since early 1999, with a split adjusted IPO price of $17.50 reaching heights of $60 in early 2000. The company morphed through various different eras of market making, and the growth of hedge funds, with the shares generally being moribund, reflecting the significant decline in profitability of the company from its calendar year 2000 peak pre-tax income of over $400million. Profitability did start to improve in the mid 2000’s until a fateful day on 1 August 2012.
That day, KCG’s automated order routing system experienced a significant failure, effectively stemming from a failed new software deployment; the firm lost $440million in a single day and the shares fell from $10.25 to $2.58 over two days. KCG was rescued by an effective consortium of Jefferies Financial24, Blackstone and GETCO five days later with the use of preferred stock.
The aftermath of Virtu’s KCG purchase is a near master-class in cost and capital management within the financial sector. Estimated cost synergies at the time of purchase of $208million have been vastly exceeded25, with the saving run-rate now estimated at $340million annualized; moreover, VIRT has freed up significant portions of trading capital between the merged VIRT/KCG entity as follows, as well as paying down long term debt, through capital release and the sale of a major subsidiary, Bondpoint.
A potential re-run: acquisition of Integrated Technology Group (ITG)
The acquisition of KCG made Virtu a slightly greater hostage to market volatility than management felt was desirable; the degree to which this is the case can be seen the following chart:
...
The sharp dip in Q3 2017 reflects the increased capital arising from the acquisition of KCG; however, there is a clear decline in the returns available on capital from a given level of implied VIX volatility, partly as a result of competitive pressures.
In its own words: “ITG is a global financial technology company that ...empowers traders to reduce the end-to-end cost of implementing investments via liquidity, execution, analytics and workflow technology solutions.” On VIRT’s analysis, ITG will increase the level of execution services as a percentage of net trading income from ~ 10% currently to around 37% on a pro- forma basis.
As was the case with KCG, there are significant personnel and rental cost synergies to be gleaned in the first year of the acquisition – some $123million, primarily composed of personnel and occupancy savings, along with data processing and IT savings; all up, VIRT see the acquisition being after tax earnings accretive (after funding costs) by some $127million in full year 2020 – equivalent to $0.67 per VIRT share.
Strong outcome in Q4 ahead of ITG acquisition
Q4 2018 will represent the highest VIX reading by quarter since Q1 2016; more pointedly, realised volatility has broadly mirrored the CBOE VIX contracts, and US equity volumes have picked up suggesting a very strong Q4, with potential annualised return on trading capital at ~100%.
Imputing this into the first three quarters of CY2018, we conservatively think VIRT will earn net income (excluding the gain on BondPoint) of $265million ($1.41per share) in the 2018 calendar year; adjusting for other non-recurring items (including significant lease termination costs) and adding back share-based compensation, adjusted EPS (as defined by VIRT) should come in above $1.94 for the 2018 year, leaving the shares on a LTM P/E around 13x. This is in a year with two strong quarters of realised volatility, together with two more mundane periods.
Looking forward, properly executed, the ITG acquisition should not only be very highly earnings accretive, but the strong cash flows generated by Virtu will hopefully serve to pay down debt relatively quickly. VIRT charges off around $64m pa in amortisation, whilst investing approximately $50million in capitalised software and equipment capex; additionally, share based payments should save a further $25m pa in cash outflow.
Hence, in a reasonable (not high) volatility environment in 2020, VIRT should be capable of earning an adjusted $2.30 - $2.60 per share, paying out $0.94 in dividends ($0.24 per quarter) and leaving over $300million for debt repayment or share repurchase.
In our view, Virtu is an extremely well run, near unique listed entity. The company is at the forefront of equity (and other market technologies), has a strong insider shareholder base, and has proven very capable at acquisition integration and capital release. In an equity market still likely to provide bursts of volatility, VIRT represents a cheap – if variable earnings stream – with significant optionality. Even in the short term, with the shares up $4 or so since the 7 November 2018 announcement of the ITG deal, along with wild volatility for two months thereafter, it would be surprising not to see further upward re-rating of VIRT shares, early in 2019.
Conclusion
We have significantly increased our equity exposure over the past four months. We may have moved a little early in some areas, but feel there has been genuine panic in certain sectors. This is notably the case in financials where we can buy numerous banks on single digit P/E’s (and discounts to book) as their credit improves; none of these are based in Australia. That we can also buy Goldman Sachs at below tangible book value ($191.71) and KKR (on 31 December 2018) at an 18% premium to book ($16.68) with an implied value of 1.76% of fee paying assets under management, suggests Raoul Pal’s machines may have run a bit too hot in December.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 59.663.153 von R-BgO am 18.01.19 16:14:35"... irgendwie den Begriff "legaler Betrug" abgespeichert" - Hm..? Ist oftmals Auslegungssache! 
Wikipedia dazu (u.a.):
Untersuchungen
Im April 2014 sandte der New Yorker Generalstaatsanwalt Eric Schneiderman einen Brief an Virtu, in dem er Informationen über seine HFT-Praktiken abfragte und nach Sondervereinbarungen mit dunklen Pools und Börsen, den Handelsstrategien des Unternehmens und der Frage, ob Virtu Latenz-Arbitrage betreibt, befragt, was als hochfrequent angesehen wird Frontlauf [28]
Im Juli 2014 suchte die Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) im Rahmen einer laufenden Untersuchung über räuberische Handelsstrategien nach Informationen zu zehn HFT-Unternehmen mit Broker-Dealer-Lizenzen, einschließlich Virtu Financial. [29] Die Untersuchung der SEC konzentriert sich auf den Missbrauch von Orderarten und missbräuchlichen Handel wie Schicht- oder Spoofing, eine Taktik, die Anleger dazu verleitet, Aktien zu ungünstigen Preisen zu kaufen oder zu verkaufen. [29] Ein Vergleich wurde 2017 angekündigt. [30]
John McCrank von Reuters stellte fest, dass die Überprüfung des Hochfrequenzhandels nach der Veröffentlichung von Michael Lewis 'Bestseller " Flash Boys: Ein Wall Street Revolt" im März 2014 intensiviert wurde.
Des und was die sonst allgem. so machen:
Virtu Financial
Aus Wikipedia, der freien Enzyklopädie
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=en&u=https:/…
Michael Lewis 'Bestseller " Flash Boys: Ein Wall Street Revolt" sollte man jedenfalls mal gelesen haben, wenn einen das Thema interessiert! (Ist bei den ganzen kleinen Antiquariaten via Amazon-Plattform inzw. für ca. nen Fünfer zu haben!)
Wikipedia dazu (u.a.):
Untersuchungen
Im April 2014 sandte der New Yorker Generalstaatsanwalt Eric Schneiderman einen Brief an Virtu, in dem er Informationen über seine HFT-Praktiken abfragte und nach Sondervereinbarungen mit dunklen Pools und Börsen, den Handelsstrategien des Unternehmens und der Frage, ob Virtu Latenz-Arbitrage betreibt, befragt, was als hochfrequent angesehen wird Frontlauf [28]
Im Juli 2014 suchte die Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) im Rahmen einer laufenden Untersuchung über räuberische Handelsstrategien nach Informationen zu zehn HFT-Unternehmen mit Broker-Dealer-Lizenzen, einschließlich Virtu Financial. [29] Die Untersuchung der SEC konzentriert sich auf den Missbrauch von Orderarten und missbräuchlichen Handel wie Schicht- oder Spoofing, eine Taktik, die Anleger dazu verleitet, Aktien zu ungünstigen Preisen zu kaufen oder zu verkaufen. [29] Ein Vergleich wurde 2017 angekündigt. [30]
John McCrank von Reuters stellte fest, dass die Überprüfung des Hochfrequenzhandels nach der Veröffentlichung von Michael Lewis 'Bestseller " Flash Boys: Ein Wall Street Revolt" im März 2014 intensiviert wurde.
Des und was die sonst allgem. so machen:
Virtu Financial
Aus Wikipedia, der freien Enzyklopädie
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=en&u=https:/…
Michael Lewis 'Bestseller " Flash Boys: Ein Wall Street Revolt" sollte man jedenfalls mal gelesen haben, wenn einen das Thema interessiert! (Ist bei den ganzen kleinen Antiquariaten via Amazon-Plattform inzw. für ca. nen Fünfer zu haben!)
krasse Skaleneffekt: von 3 MUSD auf 289 MUSD Gewinn für 2018
Position durch Andienung von short-put Stücken verdoppelt
DurchsuchenBeitrag zu dieser Diskussion schreiben
Zu dieser Diskussion können keine Beiträge mehr verfasst werden, da der letzte Beitrag vor mehr als zwei Jahren verfasst wurde und die Diskussion daraufhin archiviert wurde.
Bitte wenden Sie sich an feedback@wallstreet-online.de und erfragen Sie die Reaktivierung der Diskussion oder starten Sie eine neue Diskussion.
Investoren beobachten auch:
| Wertpapier | Perf. % |
|---|---|
| -2,14 | |
| -2,44 | |
| -0,52 | |
| -0,06 | |
| +1,60 | |
| +0,85 | |
| -1,03 | |
| -0,78 | |
| -5,23 | |
| -2,12 |
Meistdiskutiert
| Wertpapier | Beiträge | |
|---|---|---|
| 224 | ||
| 102 | ||
| 92 | ||
| 62 | ||
| 57 | ||
| 42 | ||
| 38 | ||
| 35 | ||
| 32 | ||
| 31 |
Virtu Financial
