Indonesion vor der Trendwende? - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[zinnbude]

Als absoluter Turnaround-Investor halte ich Indonesien jetzt für sehr erfolgreich.

Grund alle Indikatoren sind so negativ, da kann es nur noch besser werden.

1. Plitische Unsicherheiten in den Kursen (Aktie,FX) eingepreist. Politisch scheint die Wende aber erreicht zu sein.

2. Psychologie: Keiner spricht von Indonesien, keiner empfiehlt Indonesien, alle haben sich bei BNII und Co. die Finger verbrannt. Es kann nur noch besser werden.

3. Kurse auf jetzigem Niveau extrem billig, z.B.
BNII (25 IDR): KGV 2001 5,0
TINS (1500 IDR):KGV 2001 2,5

Ich kann mir sehr gut vorstellen, dass ein Kauf in der jetzigen Situation auf 1 bis 2 Jahre deutlich belohnt wird.

Was mein Ihr.

Gruss

Zinnbude alias hang seng (consors)

[oppaduska]

wo kann ich diese titel kaufen?

wo sind die handelsplätze?

welche würdest du als spezialist für die ecke erwerben?

[zinnbude]

Ich schwöre auf Timah (TINS). Indonesischer Zinnproduzent mit fantastischem KGV (2,5). Gute Dividendenrenite (240 IDR). Kauf wird aufgrund der Marktenge nur in Indonesien empfohlen (über direktbroker, sinarmas sekuritas, siehe auch Hompage von BNII: www.bii.co.id). Geht einfacher als man denkt. Setup etwas umständlich. Gebühren aber äusserst günstig. (0,2 bzw 0,3 %).

Problem bei TINS: Politisch wie bei allen Indo-werten. Hier speziell Linzenzvergabe für Schürfrechte und Abgaben von Provinzregierungen.

Problem allg: Steuerproblematik DBStA

Quartalberichte s: www.jsx.co.id

[zinnbude]

übrigens für alle die Fundamentals lieben.

Quartalbericht für Indonesien:

www.jsx.co.id

heute allerdings nicht erreichbar

[gholzbauer]

Hallo zinnbude,
als ich Deinen User-Namen in Zusammenhang mit der Thread-Überschrift las, mußte ich sofort an Timah denken, und tatsächlich ...
Ich habe auch noch ein paar von den Dingern, gekauft Ende 98 zu Ausverkaufskursen und dummerweise 1999 nicht verkauft, so daß ich mittlerweile sogar im Verlust bin.
Die Dividenden sind bisher nicht schlecht gewesen, evtl. würde ich z.Z. nachkaufen, wenn Handel in Dtl. zustandekäme. Für Indonesienhandel möchte ich nicht extra ein neues Konto eröffnen.
Interessant an Timah ist, daß sie von Abwertungen der indones. Währung profitieren, so daß die Unternehmensfundamentals durch weitere indon. Währungskrisen sogar besser würden.
MfG

[zinnbude]

Hallo gholzbauer,

gabs in 2000 240 IDR pro Aktie Dividende? Die unterschiedlichen Informationsdienste haben hier recht verschiedene Ansichten.

Ich persönlich glaube an Indonesien. Gemäss meiner Strategie kaufe ich dort wo die Kanonen donnern. Nach meinen vergangenen Investments in Asien, Russland und Brasilien glaube ich fest an eine Turn-Around in Indonesien.
Werde übrigens morgen mal wieder ein paar EUR nach Jakarta transferieren und mir noch ein paar Timah zulegen.

Das KGV und die Dividenrenite ist einfach unschlagbar. Für den Langfristanleger ein muss.

Übrigens: Im März wird die Aktie auf nennwertlose Aktie umgestellt.

[gholzbauer]

Es waren um die 240 IDR. Ich habe zwar die Kontoauszüge nicht hier, da die Timah im Depot meiner Eltern sind. Aber ich kann mich noch erinnern, daß zum Zahlungszeitpunkt die Div.-Rendite bei einem Kurs von 30 Cent knapp 10% war. Dies würde den 240 IDR entsprechen. 10% oder 15% Quellensteuer wurden vom Dividendenbetrag abgezogen.
MfG

[zinnbude]

Timah soll Indocoal kaufen. Wenn das mal gut geht. Sämtlicher Cash gegen einen Kohleporduzent.

Auweia.

[Ken_meyer]

@Zinnbude

na Du traust Dich was. Meinst Du ernsthaft
dass ein korruptes ,schwaches und nicht funktionierendes demokratisches Regime ökonomisch eine bessere Voraussetzung
ist als eine halbwegs funktionierende korrupte
Diktatur, mit einem Ausbeuterclan an der Spitze?? Die Lage ist sowas von labil.
Also, ich würde in Indonesien nur investieren, wenn
ich Einzelhändler UND Chinese wäre oder aber Mobius hiesse
und den Laden ein paar Monate vor Ort inspiziert hätte.

Netter Urlaub auf Bali bringt ungleich mehr ROI.

[zinnbude]

Ken_meyer

Dein Artikel erfreut micht als antizyklischer Anleger aufs Äusserste. Wenn alle nur noch rot sehen, dann ist doch das meiste schon in den Kursen drin.

M.E. haben wir den Boden erreicht, bei der kleinsten positiven Meldung dürfte es speziell bei Timah richtig abgehen.

zinnbude

[zinnbude]

IDR/EUR 8.870,--
TIMAH 1.500,--
BNII 20-25,--

Alles Kaufkurse

[zinnbude]

IDR/EUR 8.700
TIMAH 1.525
BNII 25

Der Take-Off beginnt.

[Darmspuelung]

shit ich glaube das dreht wirklich. die leute die negativ schreiben bzw posten sind nicht drin oder sind drin und haben schon aufgegeben. habe lippo bank in jakarta zu 55 irp geordert. ich hoffe ich habe recht !!!

[SKberlin]

An Darmspuelung!!

Mich würde es interessieren mit welchem Broker Du noch in Indonesien direkt ordren kannst. Han früher selbst Arbitrage betrieben, bis meine Hausbank diese Art von Geschäften in Indonesien einstellte!!

Gruß

PS: Hab beträchtlich viele Lippo Bank!!!

[Tradeinvestor]

@ zinnbude,

die Kurse sind wirklich verlockend und die Stimmung ist am Ende!

Allerdings soll doch in D die dritte Stelle nach dem Komma eingeführt werden. Ich glaube, dann kann man sich hierzulande noch rechtzeitig zu diesen Preisen mit Germanshares eindecken.


@ SKberlin,

kannst Du doch direkt über Deine Hausbank erledigen. Z.B. über Commerzbank Online. Die haben direkten Zugang nach Jakarta.

Allerdings habe ich selbst noch nicht in Jakarta gehandelt, da ich bislang alle indonesichen Aktien hierzulande zum fairen Preis bekam. Bei BNII und LPBN ginge das derzeit ja nicht mehr, wie wir alle wissen.

TI

[zinnbude]

@SKBerlin

Ich kaufe nicht in Deutschland! Deutlich zu wenig Umsatz und schlechte Kurse.

Habe ein ein Superpundi Konto bei BNII www.bii.co.id eröffnet und ein Traderkonto bei Sinarmas Sekuritas (Tochter von BNII).

Die Preise von Sinarmas sind günstig. 0,2 % bei An- und 0,3 % bei Verkauf.

Der Set-up ist auch nich besonders kompliziert. Antrag mit Kopie des Reisepasses an BNII und Sinarmas.

@Tradeinvestor

Schlimmer kann es m.E. nicht mehr kommen. Vieles ist eingepreist. Für mich als Anitzykliker (1998: Hong Kong, 1999 Russland und Brasilien) die besten Einstiegskurse.

Mfg

zinnbude

[Watcher100]

@ zinnbude

Da hast du dir ja einen originellen Namen ausgedacht.
Spaß beiseite.
Bin auch ein Indonesien- Investor: Bank Bali, Bank Lippo.
Bank Indonesia, Telecom Indonesia.
An den Werten kannst Du Dir schon vorstellen, wie geprügelt die sind. auf den Punkt gebracht.
Ich würde kein weiteres Geld in Indonesien stecken.
Gutes Geld wirft man schlechtem Geld nicht hinterher.
Wahid ist zu schwach, um dieses Land zu regieren.
Daraus folgt eine Unsicherheit für ausländische Investoren.
Thailand ist z.Z. durch den Wahlausgang klar vorzuziehen.
Also, warum jetzt das Geld nach Indonesien bringen ?
Wann sind dort die nächsten Wahlen???

So long

WATCHER

[zinnbude]

Nochmals an alle die diesen Beitrag hier lesen. Die Trendwende kommt meistens, wenn keiner mehr dran glaubt. Wie Ihr den o.a. Beiträgen entnehmen könnt, haben sogar die ganz harten Zocker die Finger verbrannt.

Für mich heisst das: Es kann nicht mehr schlimmer werden. Deshalb: Einsteigen!

BNII 40 IDR
TINS 1500 IDR
IDR/EUR 8690

Meine Empfehlungskures s.o.

[Tradeinvestor]

Heute war der Kursanstieg bei BII mit rießigen Umsätzen begleitet. Sollte ein gutes Zeichen für eine Trendumkehr dieser Aktie sein.

In Germany im Tief bei € 0,002 um dann auf € 0,005 zu schließen!

TI

[zinnbude]

BNII dürfte bis rd. 60-70 IDR laufen. Dann wird die Luft eng.

Bei diesen Kursen würde das KBV 2001 bei 2,5 und das KGV bei rd. 11 liegen. Dies wäre dann ein stolzer Preis für so viel Unsicherheit. Nach rd. 150 % Kursgewinn wären das Kurse zum Glatstellen der Positionen.

Anders bei Timah. KBV 20001 0,5, KGV 2, DIV-Rend. rd. 14 % nach Steuern. Ein paar gute Narichten reichen bei diesem ausgebomten Wert zu einer Kursexplosion von mind. 100 %.

Auf Bald

zinnbude

[Darmspuelung]

@ sk berlin

also ich habe lippo bank ueber die commerzbank geordert.ueber die gebuehren kann ich dir noch nichts sagen, da ich die abrechnung noch nicht erhalten habe und es war auch mein erster trade direkt in jakarta.

ich habe aber jetzt meine kontoeroeffnungsunterlagen zu boom securities geschickt (boom.com). das ist ein internetbroker der den ganzen suedostasiatischen raum abdeckt (thailand, taiwan, indonesien usw) die anz bank haengt da mit 20% drin und es sieht ganz serioes aus soweit.
in indonesien direkt zu einem broker zu gehen halte ich fuer zu riski, wenn da eine bude dicht macht hast du nur aerger. boom sitzt in hongkong und macht einen guten eindruck.

[zinnbude]

@ darmspülung

Dein Beitrag ist ein Widerspruch in sich. Lippo Bank gekauft, aber nicht mal der Broker Tochter von Lippo Bank vertrauen. Das passt nicht.

Akt. Kurse:
BNII 30 IDR
IDR/EUR 8.950
TINS 1.675

Und los gehts. IDR/EUR wird wohl ne M-Formation geben.

[gholzbauer]

Für TINS wäre ein niedriger Kurs der IDR zum Dollar/Euro besser, da die Kosten zum großen Teil in IDR anfallen, Erlöse dagegen in Dollar.

[SunInvestor]

Schaut euch mal die Prognosen für BII an! Wenn da dran auch
nur ein Fünkchen Wahrheit ist, halte ich die Teile noch 2 Jahre
und werde vielleicht doch noch reich damit...

http://www.indoexchange.com/index/menu/redirect.html?/market…

SunInvestor

[zinnbude]

Ob das wohl der take off ist:

BNII 40 IDR
IDR/EUR 8.925
TINS 1.850

@ gholzbauer: exakt. IDR ist aber aktuell sehr schwach. Bei FX 7.200 haben die aber auch schon ganz gut verdient.

So könnt es hier noch äusserst positive Überraschungen geben

zinnbude

[lupos1]

bank indonesia
habe 100000 für 0.002 bekommen
gewinn +150%
GRUSS
lupos1

[broker*709]

Und das Spiel geht von vorne los ....... :-(


Freitag 2. Februar 2001, 14:45 Uhr


Indonesiens Präsident lehnt Rücktritt ab


Jakarta (Reuters) - Indonesiens Präsident Abdurrahman Wahid hält trotz einer Rüge des Parlaments und eines drohenden Amtsenthebungsverfahrens an seinem Posten fest. Er werde nicht vor Ende seiner Amtszeit 2004 zurücktreten, sagte Wahid am Freitag vor moslemischen Gläubigen in einer Moschee der Hauptstadt Jakarta. Das Parlament hatte den Präsidenten am Vortag wegen seiner Verwicklung in zwei Finanzaffären formell gerügt. Durch die mit großer Mehrheit getroffene Entscheidung wurde zugleich der Weg für ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren frei. Justizminister Yusril Ihza Mahendra befürwortete strafrechtliche Ermittlungen gegen Wahid wegen der Vorwürfe. In Jakarta forderten rund 2000 Demonstranten den Rücktritt Wahids.


Wahid wird in einem vom Parlament bestätigten Untersuchungsbericht vorgeworfen, an offiziellen Stellen vorbei eine Spende des Sultans von Brunei in Höhe von zwei Millionen Dollar (etwa 4,2 Millionen Mark) für die Provinz Aceh entgegengenommen zu haben. Zudem sollen Vertraute Wahids in dessen Auftrag bei der nationalen Lebensmittelbehörde rund vier Millionen Dollar (etwa 8,3 Millionen Mark) abgezweigt haben. Wahid bestreitet die Vorwürfe.


Das Parlament hatte zudem beschlossen, die Fälle an die Justiz zu übergeben. Die Ermittlungen sollten umgehend beginnen, zitierte die Nachrichtenagentur Antara Justizminister Mahendra am Freitag. Parlamentspräsident Akbar Tandjung forderte Wahid auf, während der Ermittlungen sein Amt ruhen zu lassen.


Mahendra hatte am Donnerstag gewarnt, die politischen Spannungen könnten zu einem Volksaufstand wie 1998 führen. Damals war nach 32 Jahren Regierungszeit der Machthaber Suharto gestürzt worden. Wahid wurde als dessen Nachfolger gewählt und ist seit 15 Monaten im Amt.


Der Chef der Beratenden Volksversammlung, Amien Rais, forderte nach Medienberichten eine umgehende Sondersitzung, um über eine Absetzung Wahids zu beraten. Der normalerweise sehr langwierige Prozess zur Einberufung einer Sondersitzung solle umgangen werden, um politische Instablität im Land zu verhindern. Rais, ein früherer Anhänger Wahids, wird mit den Worten zitiert: "Die Blutung muss gestoppt werden, sonst wird es nur schlimmer." Wahids Vertrauenswürdigkeit sei gleich null.


In Jakarta blockierten unterdessen aus Protest gegen Wahid rund 2000 Studenten eine Straßenkreuzung. Die Demonstration verlief friedlich. Die Börsenkurse in Jakarta stiegen am Freitag wegen der Rücktrittsspekulationen um fünf Prozent und erreichten den höchsten Wert seit September. Sollte Wahid sein Amt aufgeben, würde Vizepräsidentin Megawati Sukarnoputri seine Nachfolgerin werden. Sie führt die größte Partei des Landes, die Demokratische Partei (PDI-P), und hat sich bislang mit Äußerungen über Wahid zurückgehalten. Megawati gilt als Symbolfigur der Demokratie und hatte Wahid unterstützt. Ihre Partei schloss sich der Rüge des Parlaments an, wohl aber um eine härtere Sanktion zu verhindern. Ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren würde mehrere Monate dauern.

[broker*709]

Entschuldigung für das schlechte Übersetzung von Alta Vista, geht dafür aber schnell ;-)

Wahid übt kriminelle Prozesse aus

Von AP
04feb01

INDONESIENS embattled Präsidenten Abdurrahman Wahid vorbereitet Rechtsverfahren gegen Parliamentarians, die ihn vor kurzem über seiner angeblichen Rolle in zwei Transplantationskandalen kritisierten, einen Nachrichtenreport, der heute gesagt wurde.

Der Report in der Mediaindonesienzeitung wirft die Temperatur in einer mudslinging Übereinstimmung zwischen den Präsidenten und die Gesetzgebung auf, die auch bedroht hat, Beweis der Wahid behaupteten Strafprozesser zu überreichen, um Verfolger anzugeben.

" in naher Zukunft archivieren wir kriminelle Ladungen gegen Bauteile und Führer des Parlaments, ", sagte Indra Sahnun Lubis, der Kopf des zugelassenen Teams Wahid, wie durch die Tageszeitung veranschlagen.

Lubis stellte Details nicht auf den möglichen Ladungen zur Verfügung. Solch eine Bewegung würde die Legalität der Tätigkeit des Parlaments gegen Wahid untergraben, das Lubis beschrieb, wie " slanderous ".

Keine der amtlichen Wortführer des Präsidenten waren für Kommentar vorhanden.

Am Donnerstag indossierte eine überwältigende Majorität Bauteile den Report einer parlamentarischen Anfrage, die Wahid hatte irregeführt Forscher über seine Miteinbeziehung in den zwei Transplantationfällen fand.

Das Dokument behauptete Wahid auskannte in der ungültigen Übertragung von $$US4 Million ($$A7.33 Million) von den Coffers der Zustandnahrungsmittelagentur, Bulog, durch einen ehemaligen Geschäftspartner. Es schlug ihn auch zu, damit das Nicht können Million $$US2 (Million $$A3.67) Hilfsmittelabgabe von Sultan Hasanal Bolkiah, das Tabellierprogramm von benachbartem Öl-reichem Brunei erklärt.

Jedoch enthielt der Report keinen schlüssigen Beweis, den Wahid von jedem Entwurf profitiert hatte.

Wahid hat durchweg irgendwie wrongdoing verweigert und gesagt dem Geld wurde auf Entlastung Hilfsmittel für Provinz Aceh aufgewendet, in der ein Kampf für Unabhängigkeit Tausenden Leben behauptet hat.

Wenn Wahid zufriedenstellend nicht auf den Verweis des Parlaments innerhalb 90 Tage reagiert, kann die Gesetzgebung ihn wieder kritisieren. Ein Monat nachher, daß es Anklageverfahren öffnen kann.

Analytiker fürchten, daß Wahid das Haus ignoriert, das er einmal zu einem Kindergarten verglich und starten eine Verfassungskrise.

" es gibt eine Systemblockade zwischen dem zugelassenen und den politischen Aspekten dieses Falles, " sagte Dede Oetomo. Die Regierung schien, hinter dem Präsidenten fest zu sein.

Vor einer Notschranksitzung heute, verweigerte Gerechtigkeitminister Yusril Ihza Mahendra Betrachtung, die er plante abzufinden.

" das Abfinden bedeutet innen geben, " er erklärte Journalisten. " wenn ich in bin (der Schrank) bedeutet es, daß ich meine Meinungen vorbringen kann. ",

Mit der beträchtlichen Majorität des Parlaments gegen ihn, lagert politisches Überleben Wahid groß auf dem fortfahrenden Support seines Abgeordneten, Megawati Sukarnoputri schwenkbar.

Sie hat, schon zu kommentieren, aber ihr Beteiligtes - das größte im Parlament - führte die Ladung gegen ihn zusammen mit dem Beteiligten Golkar des ehemaligen Diktators Suharto.

Ironisch sind Golkar und indonesische demokratische Partei Megawati des Kampfes von der Miteinbeziehung in der Korruption beschuldigt worden.

Als das Anordnenbeteiligte während Suharto war eine 32-Jahr-Diktatur, Golkar der Hauptpfosten eines Regimes, das als eins von den die meisten angesehen wurde, die in der Welt verdorben sind.

Megawati - dessen, Ehemann zu besitzen von den unsachgemäßen Geschäftsverfahren beschuldigt worden ist - vor kurzem wurde erzwungen, 13 Beteiligtbeamte wegen der schattigen finanziellen Umgang abzufeuern.

[Darmspuelung]

@ zinnbude

ich sehe meine aussage nicht als widerspruch.
ich habe mein lippo investment getaetigt unter der annahme das ich mit einen totalverlust hinnehmen muss oder (was ich hoffe) mit 2000% nach hause gehe.

warum soll ich ueber einen broker handeln dem es finaziel nicht so gut geht wenn ich die moeglichkeit habe ueber einen vermeidlich sicheren brober zu handeln, der zudem asien komplett abdeckt.
ich sehe ueberhaupt keinen bedarf dieses risiko einzugehen. ausserdem habe ich keine ahnung wie in indonesien bestaende gesichert sind. in hongkong ist die rechtliche situation doch besser zu durchschauen.

[zinnbude]

Heute habe ich zufällig im Handelsblatt den Bericht über den etwas ausgefallenen Börsenpropheten Faber gelesen.

Ich habe geglaubt mich zu erkennen. Er ist wie ich völliger Antizykliker. Er kauft dort, wo niemand kaufen möchte und verkauft Märkte von denen allen sprechen.

Raus aus USA und Europa. Rein in Thailand, Korea und Indonesien und Goldaktien. Oder auch kurz, wer hätt vor zwei Jahren Öl-Aktien gekauft.

Ich hatte vor knapp 2 Jahren Lukoil gekauft und nach einer Verfünffachung abgestossen. Bei Timah bin ich mit einer Verdreifachung zufrieden.

Gruss

Zinnbude

[broker*709]

Ich meine, daß nun das Problem mit den Bankverkäufen der IBRA nun endgültig richtig angepackt wird.
Wenn die von der IBRA gehaltenen Mehrheitsanteile der Banken verkauft sind (einiges wird da an ausländische Banken gehen), werden die Kurse deutlich höher stehen.
Das alles dürfte bis Ende 2001 passiert sein.

Audit on IBRA will be completed this month

JAKARTA (IO) — The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has said the audit on the
powerful Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) will be completed by
the end of February.

“We hope the audit on IBRA will be finished this month,” BPK member
Bambang Wahyudi told reporters here.

He said the BPK team was now at the IBRA office and had started to
investigate each of the banks receiving credit under the Bank Indonesia
Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) program.

BPK is currently investigating whether or not the Rp144 trillion in BLB
assistance was distributed during the economic crisis.

So far 48 banks had been audited, he said, adding that another 16
liquidated banks are set to be investigated by the liquidation team.

BPK is unable to announce the results of the audit because additional
analysis of the data is needed.

“We will report the audit to the House, but the important thing is that
our team is currently investigating IBRA now,” he said.

BPK chairman Satrio Budiharjo Joedono said the BPK is ready to provide a
more detailed explanation to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO).

“Officials from the AGO have already contacted us (BPK) to share their
experiences with the prosecutors assigned to handle the banks,” he said.

Wahyudi said the BPK has met AGO officials on several occasions

[broker*709]

Schritt für Schritt geht es vorwärts.

Monday February 12, 2:17 PM

Indonesia Signs $9 Bln Deal To Supply Gas To Singapore
JAKARTA (AP)--In its biggest business deal since the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia on Monday signed a $9 billion agreement with Singapore to supply natural gas to the island state for the next 20 years.
Singapore`s Trade Minister George Yeo said the agreement represented a positive step forward in relations between the two countries which were strained recently after Indonesia`s President Abdurrahman Wahid threatened to shut off the city-state`s water supply.

"The social, political and economic links that bind Singapore and Indonesia together are long-standing," the visiting said.

Yeo said the agreement "marked an important milestone in the long-term economic relationship between Indonesia and Singapore."

Indonesia`s energy minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said the deal would contribute significantly to economy as it struggles to recover from its worst downturn in a generation. In 1998, Indonesia`s economy contracted by more than 14%.

The deal, signed by Singapore Power and Indonesia`s Pertamina (P.PTM) oil and gas company, will see natural gas from the Asmara gas fields on Sumatra island delivered to Singapore, along a new 500-kilometer pipeline costing $1.2 billion.

The supply of gas will start from July 2003 after construction of the high-pressure pipeline is complete.

Last month, a 640-kilometer underwater pipeline linking Singapore with the Indonesia`s Natuna Sea natural gas fields was inaugurated.

Resource-rich Indonesia is the world`s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, which is shipped to Japan, South Korea and other Asian markets.

Relations between Singapore and Indonesia were strained late last year when Wahid berated Singapore after a summit of Southeast Asian leaders in Singapore.

Wahid accused Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of currying favor with China at the expense of Indonesia and other less-developed Southeast Asian countries.

Wahid also suggested that Indonesia and nearby Malaysia jointly gain control of Singapore`s water supply - much of which currently comes from Malaysia - to teach tiny, prosperous Singapore "a lesson."

[zinnbude]

PT TIMAH (RIC: TINS):

Zinnkonzern deutlich auf Expansionskurs:
Zinnprojekte in Myanmar kurz vor dem Abschluss.
Übernahme von Indocoal Ende März.
Ergebniszahlen Ende Februar.
Dividende für 2000 avisiert (1999: 240 IDR)

IDR/EUR: 8,640
TIMAH: 1,750

[broker*709]

Indonesien ist noch nicht vergessen!

Friday February 16, 3:56 PM

Indonesia`s Ramli to meet IMF`s Fischer next week
JAKARTA (Reuters) - Indonesia`s chief economics minister, who has complained the International Monetary Fund was pushing Jakarta too hard on some reforms, said on Friday he would meet the IMF`s first deputy managing director next week.

Rizal Ramli played down the significance of the meeting with Stanley Fischer, planned for early next week in Washington, but it follows a cooling of relations between the embattled government and the IMF.

The IMF, Indonesia`s lifeline to the foreign donor community, has refused to hand over more money until Jakarta settles questions of regional government borrowing, attempts to change the central bank law and sells stakes in two major retail banks.

"I will go to Washington next week to meet Stanley Fischer and the new U.S. Treasury Secretary (Paul O`Neill)," Ramli told reporters.

Asked why he was going to meet Fischer, Ramli said: "Because we haven`t met for a while." He gave no more details.

Ramli on Thursday complained the IMF was pressing too hard, saying it was difficult to implement every reform while the country was going through its unruly transition to democracy.

"We got that feeling," Ramli told foreign reporters, when asked if he believed the IMF was being too pushy. He added he had already raised the point with the Fund.

The two sides have been deadlocked since late last year because of what the IMF sees as the government`s repeated failure to move quickly enough to reform its damaged economy.

The Fund has held up its latest loan of $400 million, part of a $5 billion facility agreed in January 2000.

Without IMF backing, Indonesia will be unable to secure debt rescheduling from its key donors and what little confidence is left in its chances of recovery will be further eroded.

[broker*709]

!

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[broker*709]

World Bank program for Indonesia
New 3-year effort proposes annual loans of $400 mln


By Bill Clifford, CBS.MarketWatch.com
Last Update: 5:46 AM ET Feb 23, 2001

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JAKARTA (CBS.MW) - The World Bank Group unveiled a new assistance program for Indonesia on Friday that will guide the organization`s lending over the next three years toward eradicating poverty and promoting broad-based economic growth in the world`s fourth most populous country.
The World Bank`s "country assistance strategy" sets forth a lending program of up to $400 million a year for Indonesia.

That proposed "base case" is lower than its lending program during the 1990s, but it "will enable Indonesia to borrow money for poverty programs on much softer terms and avoid adding to its large external debt," the World Bank said in a statement.

About a third of the annual lending amount would be interest-free credits from the International Development Association that are repayable over 35 years.

The assistance strategy for Indonesia, reviewed by the World Bank`s board of directors in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 30, "leaves the way open for increased lending of up to $1 billion a year, with a corresponding increase in IDA resources," the Bank said. This scenario depends upon Jakarta`s improved policy performance, as well as institutional reforms to protect public funds from misuse and to ensure they are channeled effectively to the poor.

Last month, Indonesia`s parliament voted overwhelmingly to censure President Abdurrahman Wahid after he was implicated in two financial scandals. In one of the cases, Wahid has yet to give his full explanation about an alleged embezzlement of $4 million from the state food-distribution agency, Bulog, by a group led by his masseur and business partner.

The World Bank`s board indicated it wants the lending program to lay the foundations for sustainable economic recovery. It aims also to support the building of national institutions for accountable government and deliver better public services to Indonesia`s poor.

"We have tried to reflect many of the concerns expressed by Indonesians in our program for the next three years," said Mark Baird, World Bank country director for Indonesia. "The approach adopted is not just that of the World Bank; it is consistent with the views of the government."

[zinnbude]

Hi broker*709!

Hast Du überhaupt irgendwelche indonesische Aktien.

Ich schwöre nach wie vor auf PT Timah.

Kurs: 1.800 IDR
IDR/EUR 7.700

[broker*709]

Ja ja,

ich will auch z. Zt. an die PT Timah und habe schon seit längerem eine Order über 30.000 Stück Limit 0,19 liegen.

Bekomme aber keine :-(


Sonst habe ich noch:

600.000 BNII
380.000 Bank Bali
400.000 Niaga
400.000 Lippo
3.000 Indosat

[broker*709]

Friday February 23, 11:55 PM

IMF Belatedly Says Talks With Indonesia Were `Productive`
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--The International Monetary Fund sought Friday to reassure financial markets that it wasn`t turning away from engagement with Indonesia, following speculation in Indonesia that a meeting this week between Fund officials and Economy Minister Rizal Ramli damaged relations further.
Rizal met with IMF First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer Wednesday, but after two hours the IMF would only confirm that the two met, demurring from providing any further details.

Indonesian officials told reporters the meeting was positive and that they were nearing an agreement with the IMF on the payment of a stalled $400-million loan installment, but Indonesian press reports pointed to the silence at the IMF as a sign negotiations had gone poorly.

An IMF spokesman said Friday that, because of the intense media speculation in Indonesia, the IMF wanted to issue a statement on the meeting between Rizal and Fischer.

"They discussed issues relevant to the IMF-supported program in Indonesia," the spokesman said. "The meeting was productive and the two sides agreed to intensify discussions and remain in touch in the coming days."

There is still no hint as yet as to when an IMF staff mission might travel to Jakarta to conclude negotiations with the government on the delayed loan installment, which was to have been paid by the IMF last December.

However, the money has been held back by IMF concerns that the government is about to implement a law weakening the independence of the Indonesian central bank. The Fund also wants the government to curb the borrowing powers of the provincial governments to ensure fiscal discipline is maintained throughout the loan program.

[broker*709]

To many people, making to many problems ?


Freitag 23. Februar 2001, 06:32 Uhr

Inzwischen mehr als 140 Tote bei Unruhen auf Borneo
Palangkaraya/Indonesien (AP) Die neu aufgeflammten Unruhen in Sampit auf der indonesischen Insel Borneo haben bereits mehr als 140 Tote gefordert. Wie die Polizei am Freitag mitteilte, wurden 142 zum Teil stark verstümmelte Opfer ins Leichenschauhaus eingeliefert. Weitere Tote lägen noch auf den Straßen, hieß es. Ein bereits am Wochenende Ausgehverbot werde nicht befolgt.
Die Zusammenstöße zwischen dem Volk der Dayak und Zuwanderern hatten am Sonntag begonnen und waren Mitte der Woche eskaliert. Augenzeugen berichteten, dass Dayak-Männer mit Schaufeln und Macheten bewaffnet durch die Stadt zögen. Häuser von Zuwanderern, die vo rallem von der Insel Madura kommen, würden niedergebrannt.

Viele Menschen haben die Stadt verlassen und sich in die Hauptstadt der Provinz Kalimantan, Palangkaraya, geflüchtet. Für sie wurden Notunterkünfte, zum Teil in Polizeiwachen, eingerichtet.

Kämpfe zwischen den Dayak und den Einwanderern gibt es seit Jahren. Hunderte Menschen starben bereits dabei. Die Ansiedlung der Einwanderer geht zumeist auf Initiativen der Regierung zurück, die damit überbevölkerte Gebiete entlasten wollte.

[broker*709]

An Nachrichten mangelt es nicht, wenn es nur aufwärts gehen würde!




February. 24, 2001 15:18:10 WIB
WB SAYS INDONESIAN ECONOMY MAY COLLAPSE
JAKARTA (WEBS88) — World Bank representative in Indonesia, Mark Baird, yesterday warned that Indonesia’s battered economy may collapse if leaders of the populous country fail to overcome the current political turmoil and social unrest.“There is a significant possibility of another crisis. … In the event of another macroeconomic shock, the bank may be asked to contribute to an international rescue effort,” Baird said, reading from a World Bank report. The World Bank report said Indonesia`s fragile economy could collapse if the International Monetary Fund-sponsored economic reform program failed to be implemented, and if the political instability and social unrest in the country persisted. Baird also said that his office was currently drawing up contingency plans as to how it would deal with a new crisis in the country.Baird cited the slow pace of asset sales and urged the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to speed up its asset sales, even if it means selling some at a discount.“We would like to see more rapid progress on cash recovery and that requires willingness to sell some assets at a discount,” he said.

Indonesia lacking leadership and `infected` by corruption
The release of this report coincides with a damaging standoff between the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which accuses the government of being inconsistent in implementing its economic reforms. Indonesia’s economy collapsed in 1997 and 1998 during the Asian financial crisis. Since then, the World Bank and other international financial institutions have pumped at least US$20 billion into the country in an effort to help the Indonesian economy recover.However, analysts say little progress has been achieved, and blame the continuing political crisis for a lack of firm leadership. Public and private debt levels are at unmanageably high levels.The report says half of Indonesia’s 210-million people remain vulnerable to poverty.It also says that corruption is still rampant and infects the very institutions - the police and the judiciary - that are supposed to tackle it. On Thursday, the State Audit Body announced that state losses reached over Rp8 trillion (US$838 million) last year

World Bank not impressed
The World Bank report said Indonesia was striving to emerge from a severe economic crisis, complete its transition to a democratic society and embark on an ambitious program of decentralization. "Together, they constitute a highly complex agenda for Indonesia ... the stakes are high -- not just for Indonesia but also for the international community," the report said. The bank said the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid inherited an economy with deep structural flaws, weak institutions and an entrenched bureaucracy. The economy contracted by more than 13 percent in 1998 following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and remained flat in 1999. Although growth was around 4.8 percent last year, helped by strong exports and private consumption, Baird said the rate is well below optimal levels. .Baird said that if Indonesia manages to resolve its political crisis and put an end to social unrest in the provinces, economic growth will easily exceed 4% annually.The World Bank recently approved a new loan package for Indonesia, totaling about US$400 million per year over the next three years. Much of the money will be directed to projects for poverty alleviation and will be interest-free and have repayment terms of up to 40 years.

IMF response crucial
In another part of the report, the bank warns that a breakdown in the government’s arrangement with the IMF as a result of a major policy slippage would lead to a rapid erosion of market confidence and cause
economic conditions to deteriorate rapidly.That has prompted the IMF to delay its latest loan to the country.The warning came amid deteriorating relations between the government and the IMF, and continued unrest in the country, including a wave of ethnic clashes in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, which have thus far have left more than 140 people dead. .“Regional unrest and political and ethnic tensions threaten national unity and continue to preoccupy the government,” the report said. Baird did not say whether the IMF will delay or release the US$400 million loan which was initially scheduled for December.“Clearly we have high expectations. We expect the government to reach an agreement with the IMF... this is a pre-condition for restoring investor confidence which is absolutely essential if Indonesia is to get the degree of financing it needs,” Baird said.

“I want to stress that many of the issues of concern to the IMF are also of concern to us,” Baird added."A breakdown in the government`s extended arrangement with the IMF as a result of major policy slippage, including inadequate progress on bank and corporate restructuring, could lead to a rapid erosion of market confidence and deterioration in economic conditions," the report said. "A similar outcome could result from political instability or a widespread deterioration in law and order. In such adverse situations, the bank would cease all new lending until base case conditions have been restored." The World Bank said it would help prepare contingency plans in the event of another macroeconomic tumble in the country.

Lending program goes ahead as Ramli talks to the men in suits
In Washington, the International Monetary Fund said on Friday that talks with Coordinating Minister for the Economy Rizal Ramli were still continuing in an effort to try to resolve their differences. Describing Wednesday`s meeting between Rizal and IMF first deputy managing director Stanley Fischer as "productive". IMF spokesman Vasuki Shastri was quoted as saying "the two sides agreed to intensify discussion and remain in touch in the coming days." Also yesterday the World Bank launched its new loan package for Indonesia, totaling $400 million per annum over the next three years, compared to an average of $1.3 billion per year from 1990 to 1999, because of lackluster efforts to reform the economy and concerns over new regional autonomy laws, which give provinces and districts more control over their finances. The bank said about one-third of the new loan would be highly concessional credits from the International Development Association (IDA), which are repayable over 35 years, have no interest and come with an administrative fee of 0.75 percent. "The proposed amount ... will enable Indonesia to borrow money for poverty programs on much softer terms and avoid adding to its large external debt," it said.

[broker*709]

Wieder was zu lesen.

Gruß an die Indogemeinde :-)

Monday February 26, 9:19 PM

Indonesia and IMF agree on to keep central bank`s independence
Photo Gallery

Reuters Photo


JAKARTA (Reuters) - Indonesia`s chief economics minister Rizal Ramli said on Monday he had reached agreement with the International Monetary Fund on the need to maintain the central bank`s independence but stopped short of saying a long running deadlock had been broken.

"Mr Fischer and I had some very good discussions regarding the proposed amendments to the central bank law and we are in full agreement regarding the need to ensure that Bank Indonesia maintains its independence while efforts are made to make it more accountable and more professional," Ramli said in his first statement after last week`s talks with IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer in Washington.

But Ramli did not mention the fate of the IMF`s $400 million loan, delayed since December due to Indonesia`s foot dragging on a number of key economic targets and because of concerns over the proposed central bank law.

The IMF fears the proposed new law could open the central bank to political interference.

The Fund emerged from last week`s meeting only saying the talks were productive and there was agreement to "intensify" discussions.

In a bid to appease the Fund, Ramli said parliament was also considering establishing a team of international and local experts to review the proposed central bank law changes.

"We will ask the parliament`s special committee in charge of the central bank laws to allow a team of international and local experts to be formed to help review the central bank law," Ramli told reporters late on Monday.

He also said agreement had been reached on the borrowing rights of newly empowered regions -- the other key sticking point between the two groups.

"We have agreed with the IMF to issue a decree from the finance minister on a ban for regional governments to make international and domestic borrowings," he told reporters.

But the IMF has clearly stated it wants the government to instead set legal limits that would effectively block their ability to directly borrow, including offshore, and adding to Indonesia`s already mountainous debt.

It has said the finance ministry could set a limit on local government borrowing under a recent regulation.

Ramli said the government and the Fund were finalising dates for the next mission to Jakarta which would likely determine the timing of the loan`s release.

[BXB]

Hallo zusammen,

erst einmal vielen Dank an zinnbude und broker709 für Eure zahlreichen Infos und Beiträge.

Seit einer Woche sind Indonesien-Aktien auch wieder für die einmal am Tage stattfinde Xetra-Auktion zugelassen, das heisst man sie wieder über Xetra (bei Consors Börsenplatz 16) ordern, z.B.

Lippo Bank (895562)
Bank Niaga (893719)
Bank of Indonesia (889036)

soll nur eine hilfsbereite Information sein.

Euch noch eine erfolgreiche Woche.

[broker*709]

Sonst weiß ich auch nichts neues:



Tuesday, February 27 11:30 AM SGT

Indonesian Newspaper Highlights Feb 27, 2001
JAKARTA, Feb 27 Asia Pulse - Highlights of today`s newspapers :
THE JAKARTA POST

- The rupiah dropped on Monday by 2 per cent to its lowest level since October 1998 amid worsening ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan and problems with the International Monetary Fund.

- The House of Representatives threw its political weight on Monday behind an all out war on corruption, which many argue has developed into an organized crime in the crisis plagued Indonesia.

- The Indonesian chamber of commerce and industry received support on Monday from the House of Representatives for its call to delay the country`s participation in the ASEAN Free Trade scheme.

THE INDONESIAN OBSERVERS

- Indonesia said Monday it has resolved problems with the International Monetary Fund following talks between chief economics minister Rizal Ramli and the Fund`s top officials in Washington.

- Bank Indonesia`s senior deputy Governor Anwar Nasution said Monday that the central bank was intervening to help prop up the rupiah and prevent it from falling further to level of 10,000 to the US dollar.

- The powerful Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency Monday said it will divest its 97.69 per cent stake in Kerismas Witikco Makmur, the country`s largest producer of iron sheets.

BISNIS INDONESIA

- The ministry of finance, in a bid to revive the country`s sagging capital market, announced Monday foreign investors are allowed to control up to 99 per cent of shares in a security company.

- The Indonesian chamber of commerce and industry expressed opposition Monday to a govenrment`s plan to issue a regulation considered discriminating against certain sectors of the industry in fuel prices.

NERACA

- The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) will continue plan to sell oil palm plantations formerly owned by the Salim Group to Malaysia`s Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd.

- Bank Indonesia will raise the interest rate on its promissory notes if its intervention failed to prop up sagging rupiah, which has hit the lowest level at 9,900 to the US dollar in two years.

[zinnbude]

Die politische Beruhigung lässt wohl ein bischen auf sich warten broker*709. Stört mich aber nicht, da ich so oder so bis 01/2002 warten werde.

Übrigens was hälts Du von 160.000 TINS?

[Watcher100]

@ Alle

Hier ein Bericht BII von EMI ( obwohl ich vm EMI nicht soviel halte ). Es gibt Indonesieninvestierten vielleicht bißchen Hoffnung. Ist auch schon 2 Wochen alt.

13.02.2001
Bank Intern. bei IDR 20 zugreifen
Emerging Markets Investor


Am 6. Februar veröffentlichte die Bank Internasional Indonesia (WKN 889036)
einen Ausblick auf ihr Jahresergebnis 2000 und bestätigte damit den vorsichtig
inszenierten Turn-Around nachträglich noch einmal, berichten die Analysten von
„Emerging Markets Investor“.

Im Gesamtjahr seien IDR 283 Mrd. erwirtschaftet worden, was umgerechnet USD
29 Mio. entspreche. Per Ende 1999 sei noch ein Verlust von IDR 2093 Mrd.
ausgewiesen worden. Die Schätzungen für das laufende Jahr würden bei einem
Gewinn von IDR 8,9 pro Aktie liegen. D.h. das Papier werde zu aktuellen Kursen
von IDR 35 nur noch mit einem KGV von 3,9 auf Basis der Gewinn 2001
bewertet. Auf Basis der geschätzten Gewinne für das Jahr 2002 sinke diese
Bewertungsrelation gar auf 2,8.

Jedoch würden die mehr als guten Daten immer noch keine Durchschlagskraft
auf die Kurse entwickeln. Dabei habe es in den letzten Tagen noch weitere
positive Meldungen gegeben. Die Restrukturierungsbehörde IBRA, welche
mittlerweile Mehrheitseigner der Bank sei, habe die Garantie für die Ausleihungen
der Bank Internasional Indonesia an die Sinar Mas Group, die ehemalige
Muttergesellschaft der BII übernommen, was die Bilanz der BII entlaste. Der
CAR-Ratio, die Eigenkapitalunterlegung der hinausgereichten Kredite, steige
durch diese Rückendeckung der IBRA in Richtung 10%. Dies mache deutlich,
dass die IBRA eine Menge tue, um die BII für Investoren wieder salonfähig zu
machen. Allerdings würden die Altlasten der Sinar Mas Gruppe noch etwas im
Wege stehen.

Bis zum Führungswechsel habe die Sinar Mas Group die Geldschöpfung für
verschiedenste Konzerne ihres verschachtelten Imperiums mit Hilfe der BII
betrieben. Auch sei Asia Pulp & Paper ein wichtiger Baustein in einem
wahrhaften Firmenlabyrinth. Die Finanzierung des Unternehmens sei mit Hilfe von
Bonds betrieben worden, die zu erheblichen Teilen nicht einmal ein Rating,
geschweige denn „investment grade“ hätten und somit der Kategorie der Junk
Bonds zuzurechnen seien. Den in New York notierten ADRs drohe die
US-Börsenaufsicht mit dem „Aus“, da die Papiere schon seit über 30 Tagen unter
USD 1 notiert würden.

Zudem habe die Tochter TJIWI KIMIA ihre Schulden nur auf den allerletzten
Drücker bedienen können. Es werde nicht ausgeschlossen, dass TJIWI KIMIA
zum nächsten Koupon- oder Rückzahlungstermin das ganze Kartenhaus Aisa
Pulp & Paper zum Einsturz bringe. Die Analysten seien der Ansicht, dass ein
großer Teil der USD 11 Mrd. die insgesamt an Bonds am Markt ausstehen
würden, durch Umstrukturierungen innerhalb der Gruppe gerettet werden könne.
Für die BII sei aber weiterer Abschreibungsbedarf in bisher nicht zu beziffernden
Umfang nicht mit Sicherheit auszuschließen.

Dringender Handlungsbedarf, die BII-Position jetzt zu verbilligen, bestehe nicht.
Man soll abwarten, bis die Bereitschaft am Markt bestehe, die
Zukunftsperspektiven der Bank zu honorieren. Natürlich seien die Experten
erfreut darüber, dass auf Basis der neuen Zehntel-Cent Notierungen jetzt in
Deutschland wieder Umsätze in BII zustande kommen würden, die den Kursen in
Jakarta ohne nennenswertes Aufgeld entsprechen würden. Zu aktuellen Kursen
umgerechnet müsste die Aktie in Deutschland genau EUR 0,003895 kosten.
Somit beinhalte der Handel zu EUR 0,004 ein Aufgeld von lediglich 2.5%. Sollte
das Papier wegen bevorstehender Turbulenzen um die Asia Pulp & Paper-Gruppe
nochmals unter Abgabedruck geraten, und zu Kursen von IDR 20 zu bekommen
sein, dann seien dies die Kurse, zu denen man bedingungslos zugreifen könne.

So long

WATCHER

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

So wie es aussieht, sind Wahid`s Tage gezählt.

Endlich kommt Bewegung hinein !

Saturday, March 3 7:43 PM SGT

Wahid Unconcerned ABout Plots To Dump Him - Reports
JAKARTA (AP)--Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid said he was unconcerned about a meeting of leading politicians - an event the local media has dubbed an effort to dump him, an aide was quoted Saturday as saying.
"His response is the same as when students made similar demands (that Wahid resign). The president is leaving it up to the legal and constitutional process," state news agency Antara quoted presidential spokesman Adhi Massardi as saying in Saudi Arabia.

Wahid is on the last leg of a 15-day tour to North Africa and the Middle East. He will perform an Islamic pilgrimage Sunday in Islam`s holiest city of Mecca despite repeated calls for him to return home to resolve the bloody ethnic riots in Indonesia`s half of Borneo island.

Critics have called him callous for staying abroad after more than 450 Madurese settlers were killed by Dayak natives since Feb. 18.

The embattled president is also under pressure to resign after the parliament censured him in early February for alleged involvement in two multimillion dollar scandals. Wahid has denied any wrongdoing.

Leaders from six political parties met at a Jakarta mosque for prayers Friday and reportedly discussed Wahid`s ouster.

Those attending the meeting included Taufik Kiemas, the husband of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Kiemas, a member of parliament, is an influential politician in his own right. His presence at the meeting stirred speculation that Megawati might support Wahid`s ouster.

The Jakarta Post Saturday quoted Wahid`s staunchest critic, Amien Rais, as saying that Indonesians "should mentally prepare themselves to face another change of leadership." Rais heads Indonesia`s upper house of parliament which elects the president and the vice president.

However, Rais stopped short of announcing any concrete deals to oust Wahid. He said there was an "unspoken conclusion" that if a change of leadership was to take place it should be done in a prudent and constitutional manner.

[konns]

Also allein ein Rücktritt von Wahid wird dem Land keine Besserung bringen, meine ich.
Es sind zu viele Themen (Religion, Umsiedlungen unter Suharto, ..), die zu weiteren Unruhen führen werden.
Allerdings wurde Wahid auch vorgeworfen, sich nur noch um Java gekümmert zu haben. Kommende Woche will er aber nach Borneo reisen. Dies wird meines Erachtens eine Reise sein, die mit entscheidend sein wird für sein Ansehen im In- und Ausland.
Es ist schade, dass eines der wohl reichsten Länder der Erde (wenn man die Bodenschätze nimmt) von innen heraus aufgerieben wird.
In ca. 2 Wochen werde ich wieder in Jakarta sein - es wird sicher spannend, wobei ich sagen muß, es ist erstaunlich, wie viele Ausländer dort bereits aktiv sind. Dass sich das Ausland zurückhalten würde, kann man nicht sagen, wenn man dort ist.

Schönen Sonntag

[konns]

Hier das Ende eines Artikels in der FTD - ist nicht sonderlich optimistisch:Machtkampf in Jakarta


Während der Staat an seinen Rändern auseinander fliegt, geht es in Jakarta um die Macht. Präsident Wahid will seine Amt behalten und mobilisiert dafür seine Truppen - die Anhänger der größten Muslimorganisation des Landes. Oppositionsführer und Wahid-Gegner Amien Rais versucht, ihn zu stürzen, und ruft die radikalen Islamisten zur Hilfe. Megawati schart für ihre Machtübernahme die Generäle der Armee hinter sich. Und der Suharto-Clan kämpft um den Erhalt seiner massiven Wirtschaftsinteressen.


Da mag der ein oder andere Konflikt auf entfernten Inseln hilfreich sein, die eigene politische Position zu stärken. Verglichen mit dem, was auf Indonesien zukommt, wenn der politische Machtkampf auf den Straßen Jakartas ausgetragen werden sollte, dürfte das Blutbad von Borneo nur ein Vorgeplänkel sein.


"Die Indonesier wissen, dass ihr Land am Abgrund steht und dass ein Weckruf dringend nötig ist", warnte Australiens Ex-Außenminister Gareth Evans jüngst, "nicht nur intern, sondern auch von der internationalen Gemeinschaft."

[broker*709]

Wird schon:



Thursday March 8, 2:43 PM

IMF Team To Visit Indonesia If Govt Prepares Program
JAKARTA (Dow Jones)--The International Monetary Fund said Thursday that it will only send a team to Indonesia to review the country`s stalled $5 billion lending program if the government has prepared a program for the Fund`s visit.
"The IMF technical team visit to Indonesia depends on the Indonesian government`s preparation (for the visit)," IMF acting country representative Joshua Felman told reporters.

Earlier this week, Indonesian officials said an IMF delegation was scheduled to arrive in Jakarta Thursday. However, Vasuki Shastry, a spokesman for the IMF, said Wednesday that he had no information about any such visit. Indonesian officials said Wednesday that no date had been set by the IMF to send a mission to Jakarta.

The Fund has delayed a $400 million tranche of loans to Indonesia since December amid concerns the country isn`t moving fast enough on economic reforms.

The Indonesian government moved to mend relations with the IMF in the past week by making progress in several areas of concern to the IMF. In particular, it announced plans to establish a panel of experts to oversee a government effort to amend the law on the central bank`s autonomy.

[konns]

Also die Auszahlung der IMF Mittel wäre wohl der erste Schritt zur Besserung der weltweiten Stimmung in Bezug auf die wirtschaftliche Situation in Indonesien.
Was ich nicht verstehen kann sind die Regulierungen der Zentralbank in Bezug auf Zahlungsverkehr mit dem Ausland. Dass solche Eingriffe nichts bringen, hat man in vielen Volkswirtschaften gesehen. Auch erschweren diese Vorschriften den Geschäftsverkehr mit Indonesien enorm.

konns

[BXB]

* * * Indonesien-Aktien wieder über XETRA orderbar * * *



Seit 2 Wochen sind Indonesien-Aktien auch wieder für die einmal am Tage stattfinde Xetra-Auktion zugelassen, das heisst man kann sie wieder über Xetra (bei Consors Börsenplatz 16) ordern oder verkaufen, z.B.

Lippo Bank (895562)
Bank Niaga (893719)
Bank of Indonesia...

Soll nur eine hilfsbereite Information sein.

Euch noch eine erfolgreiche Woche.

[zinnbude]

Mal ehrlich: Eine Spekulation in Indonesien ist wirklich nur was für ganz harte Spekulanten, die sich ihres Risikos auch bewusst sind.

Die TINS liegen zwar nicht schlecht (IDR 1.675), der Kursgewinn wird aber leider von der Entwicklung der IDR (9.400 IDR/EUR) überkompensiert.

Aber dem wirklich härtesten Investor / Spekulant, wie ich es bin, bereitet dies noch keine schlaflosen Nächte.

Buy on bad news.

[broker*709]

Wann geht Wahid endlich ?

Monday March 12, 7:54 PM

Indonesia Rizal:Bigger Role For Megawati Will Help Rupiah

By Timothy Mapes
JAKARTA (Dow Jones)--Indonesia`s chief economics minister said Monday a plan for Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri to take a more active role in government will help the rupiah, which plunged to a 30-month low earlier in the day.

Describing the rupiah`s fall as "just a temporary blip" caused by political uncertainty, Rizal Ramli said the plan would be a "good political solution" to the country`s current political and economic problems.

"All the problems are political, so the solution should also be political," Rizal told Dow Jones Newswires.

The Indonesian rupiah ended nearly 4% down Monday at IDR10,500 per dollar, versus its close at IDR10,100 Friday. Central bank intervention and an interest rate increase helped it to rebound from a 30-month low of IDR11,500 earlier in the day.

The Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite index ended down 4.2%, or 17.495 points, at 396.611.

Dealers said the market was unnerved Monday by a large demonstration outside the Presidential Palace Monday calling for the resignation of President Abdurrahman Wahid. That followed other disturbing developments over the past few days, such as news that U.S. oil company Exxon Mobil (XOM) was curtailing production at one of the country`s main fields for natural gas exports, and a continuing standoff between the International Monetary Fund and the government over stalled loans for the country.

Despite the problems, Wahid repeated Monday that he won`t resign. But he added, without going into details, that he has asked Vice President Megawati to be "more proactive" in the day-to-day government administration - a plan that some political analysts have said would help to ease some of the political problems facing Wahid.

Rizal also downplayed the significance of a government decision Monday to delay a planned increase in fuel prices for consumers, noting that the government would still be able to cut subsidies by "close to 4 trillion rupiah" by increasing prices for industrial users on April 1.

"This is in line with the targets of the budget," he said, suggesting that it would help to satisfy the IMF`s demand that the government reduce its annual fuel subsidy bill.

[broker*709]

Das Maß ist voll !!!

Monday, March 12 7:50 PM SGT

Indonesia Ministers Can`t Leave Pres Palace Amid Protests
JAKARTA (AP)--Hours after a Cabinet meeting in Jakarta ended, ministers were unable to the leave President Abdurrahman Wahid`s palace compound because protesters blocked all exits.
Wahid rejected calls for him to quit Monday as thousands of protesters besieged the heavily guarded state palace and Indonesia`s stock market plunged. During the rally, protesters burned effigies of Wahid and shook their fists, chanting slogans.

Wahid, who came to power only 17 months ago and is now facing possible impeachment, said Indonesia, the world`s fourth most-populous nation, would break apart if he stepped down.

"I will not resign. I have to preserve the integrity of Indonesia. The moment I step down Aceh, Riau, Ambon, Maluku, Irian Jaya and ... Madura will proclaim their independence," he said, listing the country`s main troublespots.

In an apparent concession to his critics, Wahid also announced that his popular deputy, Megawati Sukarnoputri, would assume a greater role in the government.

Riot police placed barbed wire barricades around the ornate white-columned mansion as about 12,000 antigovernment protesters blocked its exits.

Earlier, the demonstrators and a smaller group of pro-Wahid supporters pelted each other with rocks.

[myanmar]

Also bei aller Liebe zu antizyklischem Investitionsverhalten, aber die politische Wende ist in Indonesien keineswegs erreicht.

[myanmar]

Noch was, wenn Megawati ans Ruder kommt, dann sieht es keineswegs besser aus. Die Dame ist nämlich höchst inkompetent und hat außer ihrem Namen nichts an politischem Profil zu bieten. Oder hat schon einer mal ein Konzept für politische oder wirtschaftliche Reformen aus ihrer Feder gelesen??

[konns]

@myanmar

Dies sehe ich genauso; es wird schwierig werden, in dieses Land eine klare Linie zu bringen. Schade, da es landschaftlich auf den meisten Inseln sehr schön ist und noch dazu viele Bodenschätze vorhanden sind.

Wir werden sehen

[findicator]

Also technisch gesehen sieht das nicht mehr gut aus.

http://findicator.trading.net ==>> World - Indices

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Der Kontraindikator fnet rät "auch" zum Einstieg in Indonesien.

An den übrigen asiatischen Börsenplätzen gab es angesichts der Katerstimmung weltweit keinen Grund zur Freude. Die größten Verlierer waren wieder einmal die Aktien in Indonesien. Die Börse in Jakarta brach um mehr als acht Prozent ein.

Hier ist immer noch alles beim Alten. Die internationalen Großinvestoren ziehen ihr mehr Kapital aus dem gebeutelten Inselreich ab. Man kann es ihnen nicht verdenken.
Die Zukunft von Präsident Wahid ist nach wie vor ungewiss, immer wieder erschüttern gewalttätige Unruhen das Land. Wahrlich kein Klima, in dem Börsenkurse gedeihen.
Der Composite ging am heutigen Freitag erneut mit einem Minus von fast zwei Prozent aus dem Handel, Schlussnotierung: 380,51 Zähler. Anleger, die insbesondere bei den indonesischen Banken auf eine Erholung setzten, werden sich auch weiterhin in Geduld üben müssen. Von Neuengagements würden wir weiterhin dringend abraten.

[broker*709]

Das wird Wahid auch nicht mehr retten.

Friday, March 16 11:26 AM SGT

Indonesia`s Wahid Fires Minister Who Supports Impeachment
JAKARTA (AP)--Indonesia`s beleaguered president, Abdurrahman Wahid, fired a member of his cabinet who supports a proposal to impeach him, an official said Friday.
Wahid dismissed Forestry Minister Nurmahmudi Ismail from his 26-member coalition cabinet late Thursday night, Defense Minister Mohammad Mahfud said.

"There were several reasons for the dismissal, including differing visions, so they can`t work together anymore," Mahfud told reporters.

The dismissal of Ismail, a member of a small Muslim party, was seen as a move by Wahid to regain control of his fractured coalition government.

In another development Thursday, two other ministers chose to stay in Wahid`s cabinet and quit from another political party that is led by of one of the president`s fiercest critics.

Last month, Wahid`s justice minister resigned after recommending that the leader step down.

Ismail is one of the founders of the Justice Party, which is supporting parliamentary efforts to impeach Wahid over his alleged role in two multimillion-dollar graft scams.

Wahid has been under intense pressure to quit since the legislature censured him over these scandals last month. A process has begun in parliament that could eventually lead to his impeachment.

Daily protests against the Wahid administration have been occurring in Indonesia lately, often matched by demonstrations by his supporters.

Wahid confirmed that he fired Ismail and told reporters at the state palace that he would name a new forestry minister when he returns from a trip to a nearby province later Friday.

[konns]

Also wenn ich so meine Geschäftspartner höre, dann rechnen die schon damit, dass Wahid weiter im Amt bleibt.

Ich glaube auch, man kann diese Entwicklung nicht so mit unseren Verhältnissen vergleichen. Einiges läuft dort wesentlich anders.

Es ist wohl egal, ob Wahid bleibt oder nicht; es muß endlich Stabilität von Staat ausgehen. Und ob die potentiellen Nachfolger etwas besseres bringen, bezweifele ich auch.

[konns]

In der EamS von heute wurde Indonesien noch keine Chance für eine Erholung der Aktienmärkte in Aussicht gestellt. Begründung war weiterhin die politische Unsicherheit.

[Watcher100]

@ Konns

Ich glaube, Wahid ist nicht stark genug, dieses zersplitterte Land regieren zu können. Deshalb werden politische Unsicherheiten weiterhin bestehen und das ist Gift für deren Börse.
Mit Wahid wird es nicht stattfinden.

So long

WATCHER

[Watcher100]

@ Konns

Das ist das Problem für Wahid. Er ist zu alt und zu schwach,
um gegen ein alt etabliertes System der alten Machthaber aufzubrechen. Und deshalb kommt kein ausländischer Innvestor

So long

WATCHER

[Jebbedaia]

Hallo,
wollte anfragen, ob jemand von euch was über Indah Kiat paper (889570) weiß, speziell hinsichtlich Auslandsschulden (Wertverfall der eigenen Währung..), Gewinnaussichten und besonders Dividendenrendite.

mfg

[konns]

@Watcher100

Ich gehöre ja mit einem Partner aus der Region zu den Investoren dort, wobei sich das eigentlich als Einbahnstr. gestaltet, da exportiert wird aus Indonesien heraus. Bisher haben wir - mit Ausnahme dieser aberwitzigen Devisenregulierungen - keine Probleme gehabt.
Unser Problem ist der Aufbau neuer Geschäfte, da wir keinerlei Finanzierungsmöglichkeit von Banken außerhalb Indonesiens finden können. Mit diesen fehlenden Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten kann und wird es auch keine weitere Entwicklung geben und keine Innovation. Also wird alles auf dem bisherigen Status blockiert bleiben.

clarus

P.S.: es wird jeder schwer zu tun haben, die alten Strukturen aufzubrechen und dieses Land zu modernisieren.

[zinnbude]

Abtauchen! Augen zu, Ohren zu und durch.
Hoffentlich nicht absaufen, heisst die Devise.

@ Kons

Was sind den das für Devisenprobleme?

Zinnbude

[konns]

@zinnbude

Die Zentralbank hat die Ausfuhr von Geld stark reglementiert. Insbesondere trifft dies Ausländer, die Gelder in Indonesien haben. So wird jede Transaktion länger als notwendig, da man Verträge, ... nachweisen muß. Und, was sicher jeder kennt, es gibt nicht zu jedem Geschäft unbedingt einen Vertrag in der Praxis. Die IDRs sollen nicht dem freien Spiel der Wechselkurse ausgesetzt werden und man versucht so die Währung zu festigen.
Mehr findest Du hier:
http://www.bi.go.id/bank_indonesia_english/main/regulations/
Für mich sieht dies aus wie damals mit der Ostmark. Solange diese im eigenen Wirtschaftsraum gehalten wurde, war sie stark; nach freier Konvertierbarkeit brach sie zusammen (und das wohl umso stärker). Wie soll man liberalen Handel betreiben, wenn die verfügbarkeit des Zahlungsmittels eingeschränkt ist?

[konns]

In der WiWo soll stehen, dass die Deutsche Bank Hotels in Indonesien kauft (schöne Gegend - Bali - und billige Softwareentwickler).

Kann jemand diesen Bericht bestätigen - wäre doch kein schlechtes Zeichen, meine ich mal.

[broker*709]

Es gibt anscheinend doch noch Instutitionen die an Indonesiens Zukunft glauben.



Tuesday, March 20 4:47 PM SGT

ADB`s New Lending Strategy for Indonesia Linked to Reforms
MANILA, March 20 Asia Pulse - The Asian Development Bank [ADB] said it is prepared to lend Indonesia between US$600 million and US$1.2 billion annually over the next three years, subject to the country improving its performance in key areas of reform such as reducing poverty and improving governance and macroeconomic stability.
ADB`s actual level of assistance will depend on Indonesia`s performance, absorptive capacity and financing needs, the Manila-based bank said in a statement.

However, ADB stressed that Indonesia will only qualify for assistance at the higher end of the lending range after it met the following conditions:

* Appropriate measures to improve macroeconomic stability;

* Progress in reducing poverty;

* Resolving difficulties of decentralization and creating real decision-making capability at local government level; and

* Improving implementation of ADB projects to ensure more efficient use of lending resources.

The lending level is part of ADB`s new Country Operational Strategy [COS] for Indonesia which focuses on the crucial need for policy reforms and identifies five key areas that will guide its assistance:

* Helping to create and strengthen institutions;

* Promoting private sector development;

* Improving regional equity through stronger geographical focus on rural and less developed areas;

* Investing in human and social development, with better social protection of vulnerable groups; and

* Strengthening environmental management

The new strategy builds on ADB`s recently completed Poverty Assessment for Indonesia.

This new report stresses the importance of sound macroeconomic management and financial sector reforms and the need for good governance and sustainable management of the country`s natural resources and environment.

"ADB would be flexible and responsive to the country`s changing political and economic conditions over the next three years and continue to support policy reforms. However, without improved governance, ADB`s programs will not have a sustainable impact on poverty," said Jan van Heeswijk, Director of ADB`s Resident Mission in Indonesia.

Indonesia is one of ADB`s major clients, borrowing some US$1.2 billion annually, before the economic crisis in 1997.

During the crisis, lending commitments increased substantially to US$1.8 billion in 1998 and US$1.5 billion in 1999, the ADB said.

To date, Indonesia has borrowed nearly US$17.7 billion to finance key development projects, it added.

[broker*709]

Ich glaube es gibt einen leisen Abgang:

President Wahid Will Step Down to a Blindfolded Megawati
March 21, 2001


Indonesian Defense Minister, Mahfud M.D.,said that Wahid would resign if he is proven to have violated the constitution. Mahfud was quoting the president.


``The president says he will not object to resigning but it must be in accordance with the constitution,`` Mahfud M.D. said a reply to a parliamentary censure memorandum.

The Indonesian media reported on Wednesday that nearly a third of parliament had signed a petition charging the ailing Muslim cleric with violating his oath of office and the constitution.

VP Megawati`s plan

An official of Vice President Megawati Soekarno Putri`s PDI-P party said if Megawati did take over, she would `empower` the military (TNI).

`She believes if we are going to solve this nation`s problems it must be with TNI,` he said. `She wants to give them a political umbrella,` the official said, speaking in anonymity.

Mega Tries to See What Wahid`s Sees

Meanwhile, Vice President Megawati Soekarno Putri blindfolded herself for 1 ½ hours to try to ascertain what President Wahid sees.

The Straits Times reported that the PDI-P Party`s official said Megawati concluded that President Wahid`s blindness was affecting his decision-making.

"Her conclusion was that his decisions just depend on the first thing that comes into his head. He just listens to the people surrounding him, and the spirits," the party official added.

The question remains, are the spirits attuned to Indonesian politics?

[gholzbauer]

Hallo,
hier ein paar Infos zu Sampoerna, Gudang Garam und Timah.
http://www.bday.net/mar29/Thailand_Daily/ad010329.pdf

[Informator]

das groesste Indonesische Finanzportal mit Realtimekursen, Backgroundinfo/Firmendaten und Artikeln ist

www.indoexchange.com

Anfragen und Vorschlaege bitte an [e-mail]
(das bin nicht ich, sondern jemand vor ort, der Deutsch spricht).

Indoexchange ist eine diversifizierte IT-Gruppe (bietet sehr guenstige Outsourcing Dienstleistungen an) and plant fuer den 9.5.01 ein IPO in Jakarta.

[Fundamentalist+]

Indoexchange ist wirklich eine sehr gutes Portal, ich frage mich nur, warum sie gerade jetzt ein IPO durchziehen wollen, wo die Marktlage nicht gut ist. So wird durch die Ausgabe der Aktien (200 Millionen zu 150 IDR) der Markt weiter belastet. Anfang 2000 hätte man durch so ein IPO den Markt nicht belastet, sondern hätte durch gute Werbung in den USA sogar mehr Kapital auf den Jarkartaer Aktienmarkt locken können.

Heute habe ich mir ein paar LPBN gekauft, die im Gegensatz zur BNII nicht so stark von Sinar-Mas abhängig sind und die Marktkapitalisierung liegt nach Angaben des Münchener Börsenbrief unter dem Eigenkapital.
Das KGV soll dieses Jahr laut FirstCall (Schätzungen auch auf Indoexchange.com) bei ca. 6 und nächstes Jahr bei ca. 3 liegen.

[Chinaboy]

meiner meinung nach ist die frage vielmehr, ob Indoexchange nicht die kommende aktie fuer den indonesischen markt ist, soll heissen der absolute ueberflieger.

die firmengeschichte ist intakt und neben dem portal werden noch viele weitere dienste angeboten.

so wird in kuerze in kooperation mit der deutschen bank online trading moeglich sein.

meiner meinung nach also unbedingt vormerken, auch fuer informationen ueber den indonesichen markt.


chinaboy

[farang777]

@fundamentalist: vergiss diese börsenbriefe, schau doch selbst mal nach, wo die zahlen herkommen. z.b.
http://202.155.2.84/financial_report/regular_report/

ich hoffe, der link ist noch aktuell, sonst leicht aufzufinden.

ich würde bei indoexchange vorsichtig sein, was das ipo betrifft. informiert euch zuvorderst, wo die stücke plaziert werden sollen.

gruß
farang

www.zeke.de/emboerse
für mehr über indonesische unternehmen (sarge`s provider streikt gerade, aber das wird schon wieder

[broker*709]

Es geht wieder weiter !



Tuesday April 3, 5:04 PM

IMF To Review Stalled Indonesia Loans After Panel Leaves
JAKARTA (Dow Jones)--The International Monetary Fund said Tuesday it will send a mission to review its stalled $5 billion lending program to Indonesia after an independent panel has finished advising Jakarta on a controversial amendment to its central bank law.
A delay in the disbursement of the latest $400 million IMF loan due December last year has hurt foreign investor confidence, and is the cause of the rupiah`s slump to 29-month lows.

The government`s plans to amend its central bank law to make it easier to fire the governor has been a major stumbling block between the IMF and Indonesia.

The fund has raised concerns the amendment could lead to political meddling in monetary policy. The IMF has pushed for an independent panel, including New Zealand Reserve Bank Governor Donald Brash, to advise the Indonesian government on the matter.

The IMF`s Jakarta representative, John Dodsworth, said Tuesday the fund would send a mission to review the possibility of restarting lending sometime after the panel completes its work Sunday.

"Certainly it will be after the panel finishes its work. Then the mission team for the review will be coming to Jakarta. But I can`t give you a date for now," Dodsworth told reporters.

Indonesia has made progress since December on other economic reforms that it promised to complete in return for the $400 million loan tranche.

Jakarta won Parliament approval earlier this year to sell two nationalized banks to foreign investors and has also drawn up rules to stop provinces from using new decentralization laws to increase borrowing.

The central bank law amendment has remained the largest sticking point to the resumption of lending, analysts say.

Indonesia needs the IMF program to draw back much-needed foreign investment. Indonesia`s rescheduling of $5.8 billion in government debt to 2002, under the Paris Club agreement last year, is also contingent on the IMF program remaining in place.

-By Tom Wright, Dow Jones Newswires; 6221 3983 1277; [e-mail]

[zinnbude]

Nach meinem Abtauchen ein kurzer Zwischenbericht:

Timah mit rd. 260 IDR Div im Mai. Mal überlegen, ob ich die beim aktuellen Kurs reinvestiere?

Performance seit Kauf:
Timah: +- 0
IDR : - 17 %

Tauch wieder ab.

[broker*709]

Dabeibleiben !!!

April. 11, 2001 13:08:35 WIB
IMF KICKS OFF WITH THE BUDGET DEFICIT

The International Monetary Fund review team had a preliminary discussion this morning with government officials here. The discussion concerned the Letter of Intent Review about to be implemented between Jakarta and the IMF Team. In this initial meeting, Chief IMF representative for Asia Pacific Anooph Singh and his Indonesian counterpart, John Dodsworth, represent the IMF team.

Government officials involved in the talks with IMF are, among others, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Rizal Ramli, Minister for Cooperative and Small to Middle Scale Business Affairs Zarkasih Noer, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Al Hilal Hamdi, Attorney General Marzuki Darusman and Senior Deputy Governor of BI Anwar Nasution.

After the meeting, Anooph Singh said that the initial meeting briefly discussed several issues concerning the implementation of the LoI although he declined to specify the issues that have been just discussed.

"This is just an initial meeting. We are going to be here for 10 days to two weeks. We are going to talk over all issues. It`s a good meeting," he said this morning at the National Planning and Development Board (Bappenas) building

Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Al Hilal Hamdi, howeverm said that the meeting discussed certain issues such as the budget deficit and monetary and IBRA matters.

"Budget deficit was the issue since certain assumptions of the State budget fall short of target as estimated , such as the rupiah exchange rate, and the increase of SBI interest rate that affects the 2001 State Budget", Al Hilal said

[broker*709]

Noch was gefunden von IMF


Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas Dawson
Director
External Relations Department
International Monetary Fund
Tuesday, April 10, 2001, 9:30 a.m.
Washington, D.C

Auszug des Interviews zum Thema Indonesien

Also, if you can update us on the hopes for the mission to Indonesia and, in particular, if you could let us know how important the central bank issue is.
MR. DAWSON: With regard to travel plans, we do always announce the travel of the Managing Director in sufficient time for you to make appropriate notifications and arrangements. But I don`t have anything for you at this point, but when we are—so that also should hint to you as to what the time frame of such a trip might be.
But once we do have it, we will, you know, have an announcement.
QUESTIONER: And Indonesia.
MR. DAWSON: Oh, Indonesia, yes. We are sending a mission to Jakarta this week, and the main objective of the mission will be first to have an overall assessment of the economic situation and then deal with the issues of central bank autonomy, IBRA , and fiscal decentralization. The central bank issue remains a very important one to the Fund, and I think you know that the authorities have established an international panel to examine the issue. And I think over the next month or so we can expect, you know, to see how that develops. But it remains an important issue.

[Informator]

@Fundamentalist, stimme zu dass www.Indoexchange.com ein gutes Portal ist, vor allem fuer asiatische Verhaeltnisse.

Wenn die das IPO bei aktueller Marktlage schaffen, dann heisst das was. Soll laut Homepage am 16.5 sein.

[broker*709]

News ...



Thursday April 12, 11:30 AM

IMF Optimistic That Discussions With Indonesia Will Run Smoothly
JAKARTA, April 12 Asia Pulse - The International Monetary Fund`s [IMF] director for the Asia-Pacific, Anoop Singh, is optimistic that the Fund`s meeting with the Indonesian government to discuss the Letter of Intent [LOI] will run smoothly.
"We have conducted good meetings," he told the press yesterday.

Singh is in Jakarta with the IMF team to review the implementation of the Indonesian government`s economic reform program, and discuss the follow-up to the LOI assessment with Indonesia`s economic team, led by Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Rizal Ramli on Wednesday.

The mission is also expected to pave the way for the disbursement of a US$400 million loan which has been suspended since last year.

The tranche is part of the US$5 billion loan pledged to the present administration, due to signs that the government`s commitment to some important economic reforms is wavering, including the delay in the sale of government-owned shares in publicly-listed Bank Central Asia [BCA] and Bank Niaga.

Also at the meeting were Finance Minister Priyadi Praptosuhardjo, Cooperatives Minister Zarkasih Nur, Manpower and Transmigration Minister Al Hilal Hamdi, and Mines and Energy Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro.

Singh said the meeting is routine, similar to those in previous reviews.

Meanwhile, according to head of Indonesia`s negotiating team, Dipo Alam, the IMF team will be here for two weeks.

He said that during the first week, the team meeting will focus on the macro-economic budget and the fiscal budget, including the monetary problems of the central bank Bank Indonesia [BI], the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency [IBRA] and the privatization of state companies.

He noted that the government has asked that the discussion focus more on the LOI`s basic agreement, which is the financial policy for economic recovery.

The state budget deficit will be discussed in detail with the Finance Ministry, he added.

On Tuesday, Priyadi said the government is optimistic that the long-awaited meeting with the IMF mission to review its economic recovery program would run smoothly.

"I do not foresee any obstacle because we have fulfilled all the requirements agreed upon in the LOI with the IMF signed September 7 last year," he said.

[broker*709]

Kleine Erfolge zeichnen sich ab:

Wednesday April 18, 7:35 PM

IMF Would Sign New Loi After Indonesia Revises Budget: Official
JAKARTA, April 18 Asia Pulse - The International Monetary Fund [IMF] will only sign the new Letter of Intent [LOI] after the Indonesian government and legislative assembly revise the 2001 state budget, an IMF official said today.
"The new LOI would only be signed after the state budget is revised, because the IMF wants clear data on the deficit of the state budget," Anoop Singh, the chief of the IMF team said.

Singh, who is the IMF deputy director for the Asia-Pacific, said the IMF could not continue its discussion with Indonesian officials if the state budget revision is unclear.

Meanwhile, legislator Abdullah Zaini said the IMF is greatly concerned about the state budget deficit, which is expected to reach more than 5 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP].

"They do not know how the government could cover the deficit. They have also urged the House to set the date for the discussion of the state budget revision with the government," Zaini said.

The 2001 state budget deficit is estimated to reach 3.7 per cent of the GDP or Rp 52.5 trillion (US$4.8 billion).

However, the recent depreciation of the rupiah has pushed the deficit to Rp77 trillion or more than 5 per cent of the GDP.

Chairman of the House` budget and finance commission, Benny Pasaribu, said the House is ready to discuss the state budget revision with the government.

"We are waiting for a proposal from the government. Whenever they want to discuss it, we are ready," Pasaribu said.

He said they could start revising the state budget before June.

"If possible, we will make some shortcuts," he said.

During the meeting with the IMF, the House had asked the organization to further consider its recommendation for the government to implement a tight monetary policy.

"If the reason is to avoid capital flight, the tight money policy will not be effective," he said.

In addition, capital flight is not only caused by economic factors, but also political factors, Pasaribu noted.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[zinnbude]

TINS zahlt Mitte Mai rd. 260 IDR Dividende pro Aktie, d.h. r.d. 18 %.

Werde die Rupien wohl in Timah oder Tempo Scan investieren. Schaun wir mal.

Das Schlimmste scheint bei der IDR wohl überstanden zu sein.

Gruss

Eure zinnbude

[Darmspuelung]

naja zumindest die rupie erholt sich wieder.welche bank aktie ist euerer meinung am aussichtreichsten (bitte mit begruendung)

[broker*709]

Hey Darmspuelung ! (Toller Name)

Nimm am besten eine dicke Portion der BANK NIAGA (z. Zt. fast in vollständiger Hand der IBRA - wird zur Jahresmitte mehrheitlich an private Investoren abgegeben - am besten an ausländische Banken.
Auch bei der BNII und BANK BALI steht ähnliches bevor. Die IBRA wartet leider immer noch auf bessere Marktverhältnisse.

Ich bin schon voll investiert :-)

[broker*709]

Das Indextief bei ca. 350 werden wir so bald nicht mehr sehen. Glücklich der, welcher jetzt schon voll investiert ist :-)

Friday, May 4 5:27 PM SGT

Indonesian Shares End +1% On Telecom, Cigarette Gains
JAKARTA (Dow Jones)--Indonesian shares ended higher Friday, extending their gains to a sixth day as cigarette and telecom stocks buoyed the market, dealers said.
The Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite index ended up 1%, or 3.619 points at 375.558. Gainers led decliners 98 to 42 with 64 stocks unchanged.

Volume was 579 million shares valued at 485 billion rupiah.

The dollar was trading at IDR10,955, compared with IDR11,100 late Thursday in Asia.

The strengthening rupiah also helped market sentiment as the local currency continued to recover after recently hitting IDR12,000 against the dollar.

Cigarette stocks were the market`s biggest gainers on expectations that the government will hike retail distribution prices by an average 10% in July. Gudang Garam shares ended up 2.6%, or IDR300, to IDR12,050, with shares in rival Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna gaining 1.9%, or IDR250, to IDR13,400.

Dealers said while there was a lack of fresh corporate leads, investors bought blue chips on expectations the political crisis will soon come to an end. However, other dealers warned that this is unlikely and that investors should remain cautious as President Abdurrahman Wahid continues to cling to power.

Shares in international call operator Indonesian Satellite gained 1.2%, or IDR100, to IDR8,750.

Shares in the world`s largest noodle maker Indofood Sukses Makmur ended up 3.1%, or IDR25, to IDR825 on positive sentiment from the stronger rupiah. The company has large dollar debts.

The market will be closed Monday for a public holiday, but is expected to be lower Tuesday as profit-taking resumes. -0- 04/05/01 09-26G

[Darmspuelung]

@broker*709

werde mir niaga mal anschauen. ich habe bis jetzt nur lippo bank (800.000 bei 55rp 600.000 bei 40rp naja und 200.000 bei 0.03 cent) mer.ly. hat eine ganz interesante analyse gebracht wenn es von intresse seien sollte kann ich sie hier mal posten.
kannst du mir sagen warum du niaga lippo vorziehen wuerdest?

[Informator]

Tagesbericht von Indoexchange
JSX index ends up on big caps buying
2001-05-04 18:49:17 GMT+7.

Jakarta (IndoExchange.com) - Investors were after blue-chip stocks until the end of market trading today. The issuance of second memorandum that did not end up with violence caused market to hope the same for the next political meeting initiated by PDI-P. The market expected the meeting next week to give peaceful political solution that could move the market.
Investors predicted that there would be political change from the meeting. At least there would be compromises regarding President Abdurrahman `Gus Dur` Wahid`s position, which predicted to weaken. The worst scenario, the meeting might support the impeachment process against Gus Dur.

Such optimism boosted Indoexchange Top-15 blue chip up by 8.66 pts, or 1.28%, to 684.85. Indoexchange-75 Average rose 4.03 pts, or 1.65%, to 247.90. Indoexchange small cap index gained 0.93 pt, or 0.79%, to 118.65.

Meanwhile, JSX composite index was up slightly by 3.619 pts, or 0.97%, to 375.558. The LQ45 index added 0.768 pt, or 1.03%, to 75.411. Volume was 636.41m shares valued at Rp442.04bn. Gainers led losers 94 to 36 with the rest 167 stocks unchanged.

[broker*709]

Hier der DEUTSCHE BANK Newsletter für 01 / 2001

http://www.germancentre.co.id/pdf-files/newsjan01.pdf

[SunInvestor]

Zumindest eine indonesische Bank bewegt sich entgegen allen
Unkenrufen zum Trotz nach Norden: Panin Bank - in den letzten
Wochen von unter 100 Rp auf jetzt 175 Rp gestiegen. Der Grund
liegt vermutlich in den Zahlen. Meines Wissens ist Panin Bank
nicht in den Händen der IBRA und hat auch keine finanziell
bedeutenden Nöte mehr.
Was ich daran bemerkenswert finde, ist: Auch bei schlechten
politischen Rahmenbedingungen, wie sie in Indonesien derzeit
herrschen - Wenn es der Bank relativ gesehen `gut` geht, steigt
der Kurs. Politik spielt zwar auch immer mit, aber nicht allein
die Politik hält die Kurse am Boden.

SunInvestor

[broker*709]

Wer Info`s zu Indonesien braucht, der wird mir der URL voll bedient !

http://asia.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/indonesia/

[broker*709]

Der alte Sack meint wohl wirklich, dass es ohne ihn nicht mehr geht!

Gus Dur ready for compromise


SLEMAN, Yogyakarta (JP): President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid expressed his readiness for a political compromise here on Friday, but insisted any deal must not lessen his authority as president.

Abdurrahman asserted that he would only agree to a compromise if it guaranteed his constitutional right and authority in defining policy guidelines and appointing high-ranking officials and Cabinet members.

"Compromise has its limitations. I do not want people meddling in my privilege to appoint high-ranking officials. People can propose any candidate, but I will have the final say," the President said after Friday prayers at the Pangandaran Islamic boarding school some 12 kilometers north of Yogyakarta.

"The rest will be under the authority of Ibu Vice President (Megawati Soekarnoputri), including the day-to-day running of the government."

Abdurrahman, who was on a one-day visit to Yogyakarta, added that talks between top political leaders to work out the arrangement would soon be held.

The President was quick to point out, however, that he would not step down, saying his removal from office would lead to the breakup of the country.

"Many people have suggested it is better for me to resign ... but I think if I quit this country will fall apart," Abdurrahman said.

The President has repeatedly claimed that Madura and the troubled provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya and Maluku would proclaim their independence if he were removed from office.

The President`s political rivals have dismissed this claim, calling it baseless and ridiculous.

"Many people do not believe me, accusing me of using the argument as a pretext to hold on to power. How can we have a dialog if they are suspicious?" the President said.

Abdurrahman also called on the nation to remain calm and exercise restraint. "In a situation such as this, I hope everybody is willing to exercise restraint. If this bickering continues, we will not be able to repair the economy and the greenback will continue to strengthen against the rupiah."

The President also said the nation was not "accustomed to democratic values" despite the existence of democratic institutions.

Abdurrahman`s statements come with his prospects for political survival looking increasingly bleak following the issuance of a second memorandum of censure by the House of Representatives on Monday.

Abdurrahman`s camp has been attempting to reach a deal with the President`s main political rivals, suggesting that yet another Cabinet reshuffle was a "viable" option.

However, leading politicians, particularly those from the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), have emphasized that a Cabinet reshuffle is not enough.

Apart from weighing the possibility of Abdurrahman`s resignation or impeachment, politicians are also looking at strengthening a presidential decree which delegates greater authority to Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

PDI Perjuangan, the party chaired by Megawati, has also stepped forward and proposed a gathering of political party leaders to discuss the current political impasse.

Abdurrahman claimed on Friday he had been "very patient and accommodating" in giving away most of his authority to Megawati.

The president also praised Megawati for maintaining a low profile, but said her silence often caused misunderstanding.

"That is why (during a breakfast meeting at Megawati`s residence) on Wednesday I encouraged her to take a more high-profile position in order not to create the impression that she has no opinions," he said.

Meanwhile in Bogor, West Java, Golkar Party chairman Akbar Tandjung insisted that Abdurrahman`s claim the country would breakup if he were to resign was "simply untrue".

"We regret the head of state makes statements which only plant seeds of division," Akbar, who is also House speaker, said while attending a gathering of farmers and fishermen on Friday afternoon.

He said Golkar had no misgivings about supporting the second censure motion because the President had violated the State Policy Guidelines, and would not hesitate to push for a special session of the Assembly if the President failed to respond satisfactorily to the censure within the next few weeks. (21/44/dja/byg)

[broker*709]

!

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[nihon]

@ an alle

Welche indonesischen Aktien
(handelbar in Deutschland mit ausreichender Liquidität)
sind bereits schon zu empfehlen?
Anlagehorizont 2 bis 5 Jahre

Danke
nihon

[broker*709]

Das Ausland hat sich noch nicht abgewendet....



Tuesday, May 8 6:56 PM SGT

Mayhill To Start Building $2B Indonesia Refinery In `02
SINGAPORE (Dow Jones)--Mayhill International Trading & Services Ltd., a U.K.-based company, will begin the construction of US$2 billion oil refinery and storage facilities early next year at Indonesia`s Sumbawa Island, a senior company official said Tuesday.
Mayhill Vice Chairman Topek Martopu Sumarinda said the 150,000-barrel-a-day refinery is scheduled to be completed in 2005. Site preparations necessary before actual construction is to begin in June this year, Sumarinda added.

The company will also construct storage tanks at Sumbawa with a total capacity of 6 million barrels. The refinery and storage facilities will be operated by the London-based firm`s unit Mayhill International Trading & Services Indonesia, or MITS Indo, he said.

The Sumbawa refinery is 100% owned by Mayhill, he added.

Sumarinda said Mayhill received a "sovereign guarantee" from the Indonesian government in late February regarding its plans to construct and operate the refinery.

"This means the project isn`t subject to nationalization or to any political changes or issues that arise," he said.

He said Mayhill has already made agreements with National Iranian Oil Co. to receive a supply of light, sour crude oil, such as Iran Light grade.

Mayhill`s Sumbawa refinery will produce gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, liquefied petroleum gas.

"We are export oriented," Sumarinda said. "We will try to export 100% of what the refinery produces."

He said the company is eyeing China as a one of its potential buyers.

[broker*709]

Megawati und Rizal (Oberkoordinator der Wirtschaft) nehmen schon mal Tuchfühlung auf.
Der Wechsel an der Spitze zeichnet sich ab.



Megawati chairs economic coordination meeting


JAKARTA (JP): Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri led an economic coordination meeting on Wednesday with several Cabinet ministers, focusing on the state budget revision, a report said.

The meeting was attended by Minister of the Economy Rizal Ramli, Minister of Trade and Industry Luhut Pandjaitan, Minister of Agriculture Bungaran Saragih and several ministers from related ministries, SCTV reported.

Earlier in the day Rizal, after a closed-door meeting with Minister of Communications Agum Gumelar, said that neither the government or the legislature could interfere with the extraordinary shareholders meeting of country`s two leading telecommunication companies, PT Telkom and PT Indosat, to be held on Thursday.

Thursday`s meeting is scheduled to discuss the cross transactions between the two companies.

"A legislature cannot interfere in any shareholders meeting anywhere in the world," Rizal told the media, adding that all parties should wait for the decisions issued by the meeting. (edt)

[zinnbude]

JAKARTA, May 9 (Reuters) - Three months ending March 31, 2001
(in billions of rupiah unless stated)
Net profit 116.4 vs 131.7
EPS (rupiah) 231 vs 262
Sales 359.3 vs 372.1
Operating profit 167.3 vs 93.0
NOTE - The financial results of the world`s largest
integrated tin miner were not audited.
((Jakarta newsroom [phone]; Fax [phone],
[e-mail]))

Das spricht für sich. Timah ist und bleibt ein klarer Kauf.

[broker*709]

Na dann frühstückt mal schön !

President breakfasts with World Bank and IMF leaders


JAKARTA (JP): President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, at a breakfast meeting with World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) country representatives, called on Thursday for better timing of the unavoidable fuel price hike so as not to burden the people.

Abdurrahman invited IMF Indonesia representative John Dodsworth and the country`s World Bank chief Mark Baird along with several Cabinet ministers to breakfast at the Presidential Palace to discuss the latest economic issues in the country.

"We wouldn`t want to repeat the bitter experience that took place in 1998," Economic Minister Rizal Ramli told media as quoted by Antara after the meeting.

High fuel and staple food price hikes in 1998 led to mass rioting in the country that had suffered from the economic crisis since 1997, and forced the former authoritarian ruler Soeharto to step down from the presidency after 32 years of power.

Rizal said the Indonesian government understands that a cut in the fuel subsidy is essential -- which means that there would be a hike of about 30 percent in fuel prices.

"But it must be done at the proper time in order to avoid mass protests which could lead to unrest," Rizal said, adding that both representatives accepted the situation.

The meeting also discussed the state budget revision.

The government recently raised fuel prices on April 1 and another hike may be imposed on Oct. 1. (edt)

[gholzbauer]

Hallo,
hier stehen ein paar Worte zu Timah drin, leider gibt BNP ein "underperform", aber die Gewinnschätzungen bleiben stabil. KGV 2,3.
http://www.bday.net/may11/Thailand_Daily/ad100501.pdf

[broker*709]

Habe auch ein paar von diesen Dingern.



Friday, May 11 7:04 PM SGT

Indonesia Timah Seeks Tin Prospects In SE Asian Countries
SINGAPORE (Dow Jones)--Declining tin reserves in Indonesia have prompted PT Tambang Timah (P.TAM) to look for tin prospects in Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand, the company`s spokesman said Friday.
"The potential to find more tin prospects in Indonesia eventually is very limited," Timah`s spokesman Prasetyo Saksono said.

Timah`s inland tin reserves will last until 2004, while offshore tin reserves 2016, according to the company`s year-end review.

"We target offshore area of Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, which we suspect we can find tin prospect with economic value," Saksono said.

In March, Timah entered a cooperation contract with Vietnam`s Marine Geology and Marine Resources Center to conduct an offshore exploration for tin in Vietnam. The project is estimated to last two years.

Indonesia`s biggest tin miner and producer is seeking to partner mining companies in Malaysia that could help Timah to seek the Malaysian government`s approval to do offshore exploration in the country.

Saksono said no partnerships have been finalized but Timah is in talks with several Malaysian companies.

Timah hasn`t decided about its partnership plans in Thailand.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[broker*709]

Vielleicht liegen wir mit unseren INDO-Investments gar nicht so falsch ?


Friday May 11, 5:51 PM

HK`s Templeton -2: Invests In Unpopular Markets
HONG KONG (Dow Jones)--Value stock picking in emerging markets worldwide will prove extremely profitable within the next two to three years, with some markets like Thailand likely to post gains of more than 900%, Templeton Emerging Markets Fund Inc. President Mark Mobius said Friday.
"Because these markets have fallen by so much, the upside potential is tremendous," Mobius said in a news briefing.


Templeton, which is part of the U.S.-based Franklin Templeton Investments, manages around US$7.5 billion in funds in emerging markets.

Templeton`s top emerging market investments are South Africa, where it invests 14% of its total emerging market portfolio, Mexico at 12%, Hong Kong at 8%, South Korea at 8%, Brazil at 7%, Thailand at 7%, China at 5%, Poland at 5%, Turkey at 4%, and Taiwan at 3%.

In terms of emerging markets with the greatest share price growth potential, Templeton has identified Thailand, which it said is likely to grow 938% within two to three years.

"Looking forward, I think Thailand offers the best gains," Mobius said.

Other emerging markets with strong upside potentials within the next two to three years are Indonesia at 884%, the Philippines at 388%, Malaysia at 233%, South Korea at 225%, the Czech Republic at 217%, Russia at 213%, Hungary at 190%, Poland at 146%, and Taiwan at 124%.

Templeton`s formula for measuring potential gains of undervalued markets and stocks is highly technical, but mainly involves past share price trends and forecasts.

Templeton`s strategy, which Templeton Asset Management Ltd. managing director Vijay Advani said has been a "tried and tested formula for the past 50 years," is investing in value stocks.

Value stocks are typically stocks that are trading below their market value, having been battered by recent or long-term sell-offs due to weak overall sentiment for the equities market or other external factors. Templeton measures valuation either in terms of price/earnings or price to book value ratios, or both.

In addition to these accounting procedures, Templeton is a major advocate of companies that exercise good corporate governance.

Good corporate governance practices are among the key reasons Templeton is heavily overweight in South Africa, Mobius said. Among the sectors represented in Templeton`s portfolio in South Africa are mining, paper, chemicals, and gaming.

"By and large, companies in South Africa are professionally run, with good shareholder relations, transparent accounting methods...Basically we`re buying first class companies at third world prices," Mobius said.

In Asia, Mobius considers Singapore and Hong Kong as the markets which exercise relatively good corporate governance. While acknowledging that many companies in Hong Kong have cross ownership, Mobius said, "at least transparency is pretty good."

Mobius said, however, that China`s determination to improve its capital markets could make it the best in transparency as long as corporate reforms remain on track.

(MORE) Dow Jones Newswires 11-05-01

0916GMT

Invests In Unpopular Markets

Mobius acknowledged that Templeton usually invests in the unpopular markets - which most fund managers and analysts avoid - and finds more opportunities amid bearish sentiment.

"We always say that high risk often means high returns," Mobius said.

Even political instability is viewed positively by Templeton, in the investment sense.

"While political instability is never good (for the countries concerned), it is an opportunity to position in a market," Mobius said, adding that Templeton is poised to increase its weighting in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in the coming months.

Templeton Asset Management`s Advani cites India as an example where "50 years of stability resulted in no growth but the past 10 years of instability led to strong growth."

Templeton also considers as a buying opportunity the reduction in weightings of some markets in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Indexes following its shift to a free float weighting methodology.

MSCI is set to announce the full list of index constituents and their inclusion factors for the MSCI Provisional Index Series May 19. The inclusion factor is the measure of a company`s free-float, or the volume of publicly held shares available to investors.

It will be the first time MSCI has taken free float into consideration in creating its indexes. The actual shift to the new system will take place in two phases on Nov. 30, 2001, and May 31, 2002.

The changes have huge implications for global fund flows. MSCI estimates US$500 billion in global funds are directly linked with its indexes and US$3 trillion in funds worldwide are benchmarked against them.

Markets whose weighting will be reduced are generally expected to experience some selling pressure.

"For value investors, these kinds of changes provide opportunities. Investors will generally rush out markets with reduced weightings, stock prices will go down, and that`s when we come in," Mobius said.

Mobius expects Hong Kong, Japan, India and Singapore to be among the emerging markets that will suffer an MSCI weighting reduction.

-By Rita Raagas De Ramos, Dow Jones Newswires; 852-2832-2331; [e-mail]

[SunInvestor]

Hehe... 884% für den Gesamtmarkt
Da muß ja BII ein Outperformer werden und das doppelte machen.
Daher würde ich sagen: Kursziel 2004 für BII: 0,06 EUR
Mein lieber Schwan... Da mach ich ja sogar noch richtig Gewinn
mit der Gurke...

SunInvestor

[gholzbauer]

Es ist doch nicht vernünftig, so starke Gesamtmarktanstiege wie für Thailand und Indonesien zu projezieren.
Ich wäre für Thaiand schon mit 100-150% in zwei Jahren hochzufrieden.
Aber gleich eine Verzehnfachung? Niemals.

[zinnbude]

@gholzbauer

BNP dürfte hier wohl nicht der adäquate Analyst sein. Indonesische Analysten sehen das etwas anders.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Nur mal so!

Megawati criticizes the implementation of autonomy law


JAKARTA (JP): Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri on Wednesday criticized the poor implementation of the Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy, citing the misunderstanding of its operation.

"We have also recorded cases of disobedience by regents or mayors against their governors," Megawati said, as quoted by Antara) while addressing the opening of a consolidation meeting for national development at the Horison Hotel in North Jakarta.

"Therefore, I support the efforts to improve regional autonomy law, if needed," she added.

The meeting was held to discuss reported cases of incongruence and dissatisfaction relating to implementation of the law.

The Vice President cited Article 3 of the law on sea management, which had invited fishermen to unilaterally acquire lots in their respective regency of origin and claim them as their own.

"I think we should maintain our seas as the uniting factor for our archipelagic country," she said.

She also cited the misapplication of Article 45 on the annual accountability speech of governors.

"In practice, the annual accountability speech has been used to topple the governor," she said.

If these practices continue, they will end up creating political instability in the regions, she added. (imn)

[broker*709]

Noch was gefunden:

May 16, 2001 Posted: 2:40 PM HKT (0640 GMT)



Wahid has rejected compromises to give more power to Megawati


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Leaders of Indonesia`s parliamentary factions are holding a meeting to discuss a possible change in leadership.

The informal meeting began Wednesday morning, a day after President Abdurrahman Wahid dropped a bombshell by saying he expected to be impeached.

Parliament chiefs will also debate the timing of any impeachment hearing against Wahid, underscoring how close the Muslim cleric is to losing his job as Indonesia`s first democratically-elected president.

The meeting should give an indication of parliament`s next move on the road to removing the erratic Wahid and replacing him with popular but untested Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

IN DEPTH
Shadows over Indonesia




Parliament has censured Wahid twice, following allegations over two financial scandals. If the cleric fails to respond to the second rebuke by May 30, legislators can call for an impeachment hearing in the supreme People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR).

A defiant Wahid on Tuesday challenged MPs to impeach him, but vowed not to leave the political stage without a fight.

Impeachment timing
"Among other things we will discuss is to decide the timing of a special session, which quite likely will be held after all," said Hery Akhmadi, a legislator in Megawati`s Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), as quoted by Reuters.

Wahid, who has denied any wrongdoing over the scandals, so far refuses to respond to the second rebuke and rejects compromises, such as giving more power to Megawati.

His attitude, according to many observers, has given momentum to calls for an impeachment hearing.

Should Wahid lose power, Megawati, his deputy and chairman of the biggest party in parliament and MPR, would automatically take over the troubled country from her old friend.

The enigmatic Megawati has said little during the political crisis but was quoted earlier this week as saying efforts to hold the impeachment hearing were unstoppable.

Although she could probably give Wahid the final push, analysts say she will not dirty her hands by overtly ousting her friend or circumventing the constitution, partly afraid of the violence it might trigger from the cleric`s supporters.

Wahid himself said he would campaign again for the presidency at the next election due in 2004.

Growing tension
In a clear sign of the cracking support for Wahid, Defense Minister Mahfud M.D. said tension had grown between Wahid and the daughter of Indonesia`s first president Sukarno.

Megawati broke her usual silence on the political impasse on Tuesday, telling supporters in Sumatra that her party believed she must be president of the fragile archipelago one day -- a comment that, while typically vague, was significant for its timing.

Despite the rumored tension between the two top leaders, Wahid and Megawati still had breakfast together Wednesday morning at the vice-president`s official house, local media reported.

[broker*709]

Dann zeitgt ihm endlich die Rote Karte !

Most House factions want Gus Dur out after special session: Akbar


JAKARTA (JP): House of Representatives (DPR) Speaker Akbar Tandjung said on Thursday the meeting between leaders of 10 House factions on Wednesday recommended that President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid`s term should end when the People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR) holds a special session, and not until 2004.

"Most faction leaders want the President impeached," Akbar said as quoted by Antara after closing a seminar held by the Institute of State Administration (LAN).

He said the faction leaders decided upon the recommendation as the President had ignored their proposed solutions to the ongoing political crisis.

"Gus Dur has yet to respond to the four options provided -- to resign from the presidency, to reshuffle the Cabinet, to delegate his daily presidential duties to the Vice President or to separate the (duties of) head of state and the head of government," Akbar said.

He said the President had announced a plan to issue a decree to dissolve the House and to campaign for the presidency again in the future.

"The faction leaders are disappointed and came to the conclusion that Gus Dur`s era should be over when the MPR convenes a special session," he said

[broker*709]

Sein Bruder ist anscheinend der Letzte, der ihn unterstützt.

Gus Dur has little chance of surviving until 2004: Brother


JAKARTA (JP): Solahuddin Wahid, a younger brother of President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, said on Thursday that the President had little chance of surviving until the end of his term in 2004 as most factions at the House of Representatives (DPR) had agreed that the People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR) should hold a special session.

It is believed that the President will be impeached if a special session is held.

"It`s nearly impossible for Gus Dur to survive as seven House factions want the MPR to hold the special session," Solahuddin said as quoted by Antara after addressing a seminar on politics, held by the Study and Action Forum for Democracy (Fosad).

He said his brother had significant weaknesses that made him desperate when dealing with his political enemies.

He cited Abdurrahman`s ignorance of the opportunity given by the MPR to lead the nation and his rigidness in upholding the 1945 Constitution as he interprets it.

Solahuddin, however, said not everything should be blamed on Gus Dur. (imn)

[broker*709]

Damit ist Gus Dur wohl auch nicht mehr zu retten !

So ein Schwachsinn !

18.05.2001 - 09.00 Uhr -Hamburg [autobild]
Magisch überfahren
Politische Anhänger des Indonessischen Präsidenten ließen sich zur Demonstration ihrer "magischen Kräfte" bewusst überfahren

Mutprobe der ungewöhnlichen Art - zur Nachahmung ausdrücklich nicht empfohlen

Politischer Fanatismus führt bisweilen zu merkwürdigen Ritualen. Um ihre Verbundenheit zu zeigen, ließen sich Anhänger des indonesischen Präsidenten bewusst von einem Jeep überfahren. Geschützt von "magischen Kräfte" sollten dabei alle unverletzt bleiben. Über etwaige Verletzungen der beteiligten Personen ist bislang nichts bekannt. Der deutsche Verkehrsminister würde ein solches Verhalten sicherlich als gesundheitsgefährdend einstufen.

[broker*709]

Was gibt es da in den nächsten 10 Tagen zu verbessern !

Die Amtsenthebung kommt so oder so.

Und das ist gut so !

President still has 10 more days: Pramono Anung


JAKARTA (JP): A legislator of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) Pramono Anung Wibowo said on Sunday that President Abdurrahman Wahid still had 10 more days to make some improvement in his performance before the House of Representatives issued a final say on his reply to its second memorandum of censure, Antara reported.

"Although it`s difficult for the president to improve his performance within a short period of time, he still has 10 more days to make some improvement," Pramono said in Malang, East Java, on the sidelines of the closing ceremony of the 28th anniversary of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), the original party`s name before it was divided into two parties --the PDI and the PDI Perjuangan -- following the 1996 PDI congress in Medan capital of North Sumatra.

He renewed his warning that if the president failed to make some improvement, the Special Session of the People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR) was unstoppable.

He dismissed the speculations that (party chairperson) Megawati Soekarnoputri, who is also the Vice President, was behind the maneuver to unseat Abdurrahman from presidency.

"The (first and second censure against the president) are the ongoing political...It`s not Mega who has attempted to topple the president," he said. (

[broker*709]

Das Militär ist für den Wechsel bereit !

Top general urges loyalty to the nation
May 20, 2001 Posted: 2:05 PM HKT (0605 GMT)



Indonesian soldiers of the Army Strategic Reverse Command (KOSTRAD) stand in line during a ceremony in Jakarta


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- A senior Indonesian military commander urged troops to remain loyal to the nation, not to any individual, after generals warned President Abdurrahman Wahid not to dissolve parliament or declare a state of emergency.

Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, who commands the 30,000-strong strategic reserve, also appealed to President Abdurrahman Wahid not to sack the army`s chief of staff, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, a vocal critic of the president.

"I stress here there will be no coup against the country or the president by the army," he told about 1,000 troops at the base.

His comments came a day after Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri held an emergency meeting with top generals to address reports that Wahid planned to replace military commanders, disband parliament, and declare martial law.

Wahid has said he has no such plans.

In recent days, there has been a flurry of meetings between Wahid`s opponents and senior military figures.

On Saturday, dozens of army leaders met privately, including former military commander Gen. Wiranto, who was sacked by Wahid last year over allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor.

The army brass has been critical of Wahid ever since he accused them of human rights violations and threatened to dismantle their lucrative business empire.

But other top military chiefs have been silent, fueling speculation about a rift within the armed forces.

Analysts say that army generals have now thrown their support behind Megawati, a nationalist who has not expressed interest in military reform.

[broker*709]

Die Spannung steigt täglich !

Was meint Ihr ?

Wird das Parlament aufgelöst, nimmt Wahid am 30 Mai einsprechend Stellung oder wird er gestürzt ?

MPR may impeach Gus Dur: Amien Rais


JAKARTA (JP): The People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR) may impeach President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid in an effort to settle the continuing conflict between the President and the House of Representatives, said Assembly Speaker Amien Rais.

"In our opinion, a special session is the best alternative to settle the political crisis since the President has given no positive response to the second memorandum of censure (issued by the House of Representatives (DPR)," Amien said on Monday aftermeeting with five House faction leaders at his residence here.

"The President must deliver his accountability speech before the Assembly. If the speech is accepted, the President will survive. Otherwise, he will step down," he added.

The five faction leaders were Arifin Panigoro of theIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), Syamsul Muarif of the Golkar Party, Alimarwan Hanan of the United Development Party (PPP), Hatta Radjasa of the Reform faction, Achmad Sumargono of the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and Achmad Sjatari of the Ummat Sovereignty Party (PDU).

Amien, who is also the chairman of the National Mandate Party(PAN), said the Assembly would make preparations in late July after the House decides whether to call a special session during its plenary meeting on May 30.

When asked to comment on the rumors of an issuance of a presidential decree to dissolve the House, Amien said the Assembly, the House and the Indonesian Military (TNI) would ignore it and hasten a special session to impeach the President.

"The President has no authority to dissolve the House. We will ignore it and directly call for a special session to impeach him," he said.

Meanwhile, Syamsul Muarif said his faction was waiting for the May 30 plenary session to decide whether it would support a special session or not. (rms)

[bum]

das mit dem ueberfahrenlassen waer doch echt ne geile idee fuer unsere mediengeilen politiker als talkshowgag.koennt ich mir recht spassig vorstellen.westerwelle,moellemann,shily,angela merkel rau oder ein zermatschter schroeder(aber bitte mit audi)fuer
kohl nimmt man besser nen off-roader wegen der bodenfreiheit.dann koennt sogar ich nochmal beim deutschen fernsehn lachen.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Und ein Regierungswechsel soll auch nichts mehr bringen.

Dann gibts hoffentlich bald wieder eine Dikatatur !

Da steigen dann auch wieder die Kurse, siehe die Zeit bis 1997.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Wahid, Du Gus Dur !

Das Militär rettet Dich auch nicht mehr!

Embattled Wahid seeks military support
May 23, 2001 Posted: 10:37 PM HKT (1437 GMT)



Wahid is running out of options, and time

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Indonesia`s embattled President Abdurrahman Wahid is making a push for support from generals in the country`s armed forces.

Wahid summoned military leaders to his palace Wednesday for a third meeting in two days as he struggles to bring his generals to heel one week before a crucial vote on his future.

With parliament taking steps towards impeaching the president when it meets next week the military has become increasingly critical of Wahid and his crippled administration.

Analysts say the military is shifting its support to popular Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who has began to publicly challenge Wahid in a bid to head the world`s fourth most populous country.

Indonesia`s legislature has already issued two censures against Wahid over alleged corruption and his handling of the nations affairs.

IN-DEPTH
Shadows over Indonesia

• Indonesia`s past and present leaders
• Interactive Map
• Timeline of the archipelago
• The military: Men in uniform and in parliament
• Messageboard



Wahid denies any wrongdoing and has questioned the legislature`s authority to move against him.

Rebuffed compromises
Parliament is widely expected to begin impeachment proceedings against Wahid, the country`s first democratically-elected leader, at a special session of the People`s Consultative Assembly on May 30.

While Wahid can`t block the vote, the ageing former cleric has so far rebuffed any political compromise, such as sharing more power with Megawati.

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Wahid`s call for military support comes as the country economy remains crippled by the political bickering and countless rumors sweep the capital.

At his latest meeting with military leaders Wahid denied widespread suggestions that he was about to sack military commander Admiral Widodo and other senior officers in a top brass reshuffle.

Presidential aides say Wahid had also previously discussed declaring a state of emergency and dissolving parliament so that he could retain power just 19 months into his five-year term.

He has since ruled out such drastic action.

Threatening democracy

Wahid has so far refuted any compromise deal with Megawati
Meanwhile, the Brussels-based think-tank the International Crisis Group has said the lingering crisis is endangering the country`s transition to democracy after 30 years of autocratic, army-backed rule under former President Suharto.

"The view that democracy has only brought disorder and chaos is growing stronger while the number looking back with favor on the enforced order of the Suharto era seems to be growing," the group said in its latest Indonesia report, released Wednesday.

As the country`s crisis deepens, Indonesia analyst Amir Santoso told Reuters Wahid is having to fight harder to hold onto power.

"Public opinion has been built up to the extent that Wahid must go," the University of Indonesia analyst said.

"Problems between parliament and Gus Dur (Wahid) go beyond the scandals -- it`s more about mismanagement."

Many Indonesians fear Wahid`s ouster could plunge the battered country back into bloodshed three years to the month after Suharto`s violent downfall.

Thousands of Wahid`s supporters and opponents are expected to rally in Jakarta during next Wednesday`s parliamentary debate, triggering fears of renewed violence on the streets of the Indonesian capital.

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Der Umsturz steht bevor !


Thursday May 24 9:54 AM ET
Indonesia Ministers to Submit Proposals on Crisis
By Achmad Sukarsono

JAKARTA (Reuters) - A team of Indonesian ministers will submit recommendations Friday to President Abdurrahman Wahid and his deputy aimed at resolving a crisis threatening to end the Muslim cleric`s 19-month rule.

Seven cabinet ministers have been seeking to strike a compromise between Wahid and increasingly assertive Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri that might placate MPs moving closer to impeaching him over two graft scandals.

``We will communicate to the president and vice president tomorrow afternoon what we have discussed,`` chief security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono told reporters after meeting the team for more than two hours Thursday evening.

He did not say if the recommendations would be final.

The ministers have had similar meetings in recent weeks as the political crisis surrounding Indonesia`s first democratically elected leader has intensified.

Parliament meets on May 30 when it is expected to ask the supreme legislature to convene an impeachment hearing against Wahid over his alleged role in the scandals, a prospect that raises the threat of violence from his fanatical supporters.

Yudhoyono did not elaborate or give details of the proposals, but Wahid has rejected previous suggestions from the ministers that he share more power with the popular daughter of founding Indonesian President Sukarno to save his rule.

Megawati has not openly attacked her long-time friend but in her own oblique way appears to have turned against Wahid.

The military has also grown increasingly critical of the erratic Wahid and shifted behind Megawati in the fight for control of the world`s fourth most populous nation.

Jakarta has been rife with rumors in the past week that Wahid was planning drastic action -- all denied by the presidential palace -- such as declaring a state of emergency, dissolving parliament and sacking top military chiefs.

Wahid has frequently tangled with parliament, which he once likened to a kindergarten. He previously apologized

for any ``inappropriate behavior`` but insisted accusations over the scandals against him were baseless.

Police have said they would impose tight security around parliament next Wednesday when it makes the expected request for a special impeachment session in the supreme People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR), likely to be held by August.

Many Indonesians fear Wahid`s ouster would plunge the battered country back into bloodshed three years to the month after former President Suharto (news - web sites)`s violent downfall.

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Die Spannung steigt !

Was meint Ihr ?

Hat Wahid in den nächsten Tagen noch was zu sagen, oder wird er komplett abgesägt.

Indonesia could split, Wahid warns
May 26, 2001 Posted: 4:22 PM HKT (0822 GMT)



Wahid leads his country deeper into crisis


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Indonesia could split apart if the impeachment process against him continues, President Abdurrahman Wahid has warned.

At least two segments of the country could break away if the special parliamentary session goes ahead next week, he told a hastily convened news conference on Saturday.

He also quoted the powerful speaker of parliament, Akbar Tandjung, as telling one of his senior officials that he did not want a special session of the top assembly, which has the power to oust the president.

Wahid said that people in the rebellious province of Aceh and his own political heartland of East Java had both asked him to become president, suggesting they would break away from Indonesia if the special session goes ahead.

`Governor rejects session`
"One must take this (threat) seriously," he said in brief comments to reporters at the palace. He left without answering questions.

"(If it goes ahead) the governor . . . will appear on television, saying East Java rejects the special session," Wahid said.

The brief statement was Wahid`s latest move to stave off his deputy and the threat of impeachment.

Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri has to decide whether to share power with her embattled president or grab it all for herself.

Wahid on Friday offered a power-sharing deal to Megawati in an effort to solve the crisis, but Megawati said she needed time to study the proposal and failed to reply.

The heightening political crisis prompted Indonesia`s military top brass to hold a crisis meeting late Friday at the armed forces headquarters.

Despite uncertainty among the public, however, the situation in the capital Jakarta remained calm on Saturday morning with daily business as usual.

Wahid had hoped that a truce with his popular vice president, now his main rival, would end his bitter feud with lawmakers, which has crippled his 18-month-old administration.

A majority of legislators now want Megawati to replace Wahid, who has largely failed to revive the plunging economy and end rising unrest across the world`s fourth most populous nation.

After a dramatic meeting on Friday, Wahid threatened to declare a state of civil emergency if parliament does not stop moves to impeach him, a spokesman for the vice president said.

But presidential spokesman Yahya Staquf denied the president would declare a state of emergency, no matter what the parliament does.

Wahid offered to delegate presidential powers in the constitution to Megawati during an emergency cabinet meeting on Friday.

The agreement would have effectively made Megawati head of government, and Wahid, head of state until the end of Wahid`s term in 2004.

Fears of violence eased
Sutjipto, secretary-general of Megawati`s party, did not say why Megawati had rejected the offer, which could have avoided an almost certain impeachment hearing against Wahid and eased fears of street violence by his supporters.

Wahid and Megawati both walked out on a Friday afternoon cabinet meeting that was meant to have resolved the country`s leadership crisis.

Reuters reported that seven cabinet ministers have been seeking to strike a compromise between Wahid and the increasingly assertive Megawati that might placate the MPs seeking to impeaching him.

Megawati has not openly attacked her long-time friend but in her own oblique way appears to have turned against Wahid.

The military has also grown increasingly critical of the erratic Wahid and shifted behind Megawati in the fight for control of the world`s fourth most populous nation.

Police in Wahid`s stronghold of East Java said on Friday they had gone on high alert to anticipate violence from his supporters ahead of Wednesday`s parliament meeting.

Many Indonesians fear Wahid`s ousting would plunge the battered country back into bloodshed three years to the month after former President Suharto`s violent downfall.

The Associated

[zinnbude]

@709

Ich wette darauf, dass Wahid in den letzten Zügen liegt.

Kein Rückhalt in der Armee, das wohl wichtigste Indiz für das alte Sprichwort "Hunde die bellen, beissen nicht"

Ich geb Wahid maximal noch eine Woche.

Es kann nur noch bergauf gehen.

Zinnbude

[Watcher100]

@ zinnbude

Die einzige Hoffnung für Indonesien ist eine Regieungsum-
bildung. Sonst geht in diesem chaotischem Land keiner mehr rein.
Ich wünschte es mir zwar selber.
Aber das muß ich erstmal für die nächste Zeit abscgreiben.

So long

WATCHER

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[zinnbude]

Schaut Euch doch mal den Chart IDR/EUR an. Die Märkte verlieren deutlich an Nervosität. Die jetzigen Meldungen hätten vor 4 Wochen noch zu deutlichen Kurseinbrüchen geführt und jetzt:

Geringfügige Entwicklung 2 % nach unten.

Die Märkte spüren, dass die Tage von Wahid gezählt sind. Die Aussagen von diesem alten Manne werden nicht mehr für ernst genommen.

Ein neuer Präsident/in wird frische Luft bringen und zwar für JSX als auch für den IDR.

Meine Favoriten: TINS, Tempscan und BNII.

Eure

zinnbude

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Einen toten hat es schon gegeben,

Die Welt ist noch nicht untergegangen, die Leute sollen blos ruhig bleiben und Wahid in den Ruhestand verabschieden:


Indonesia demands impeachment of Wahid
May 30, 2001 Posted: 11:00 PM HKT (1500 GMT)


Indonesian soldiers stand guard over barricades in East Java, where one person was killed


By staff and wire reports

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Indonesia`s parliament has overwhelmingly passed a censure motion demanding that President Abdurrahman Wahid be impeached.

The motion was passed at the end of a day marked by riots in Wahid`s political stronghold of East Java, where one person was killed, and in the capital, Jakarta, where his supporters stormed the gates of the parliament complex.

Three parties representing 342 seats in the 500-member parliament came out in favor of the measure, but Panigoro said the military chose to remain neutral.

The president`s refusal to resign in the face of probable impeachment would not prevent the body from pushing ahead with plans to unseat him, lawmaker Arifin Panigoro told CNN.

"Some of us have asked him to resign, so we don`t have to go through the special session, but he has refused," he said.

Rejection of parliament`s demands
The Associated Press quoted Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab as predicting Wahid could strike a deal with his opponents to save his presidency before the MPR convene to remove him.

A letter from Wahid answering the second memorandum of censure was read out during the Wednesday hearing.

In it, the president rejected earlier reprimands, which he said "failed to specify what pledge of office has been violated."

Parliament first censured Wahid in February for his alleged role in two graft scandals. The country`s Attorney General Marzuki Darusman has since cleared the president of any wrongdoing in both scandals.

A second memorandum was issued in April, but the censure reflected discontent over what is perceived as Wahid`s erratic rule.

Wahid is not without his supporters.

After breaking the gates of parliament protestors dispersed after a police deadline for them to leave the premises.

In Wahid`s political heartland of East Java, police fired warning shots to disperse hundreds of his supporters.

Last option
Troops were parachuted in to help keep the area under control. One protester was killed and four were wounded.

Wahid has said violence will break out if his is impeached, but that threat is seen as one of the last options he has in his bid to cling to power.

The president has threatened to declare a state of emergency if members of parliament press ahead with their challenge.

But he is unlikely to win official backing to implement emergency laws, Reuters said, because the military is expected to side with his more predictable vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Her aides say she will take over if Wahid is ousted, and she rejected an offer made last week for her to become the effective head of government.

[broker*709]

Der Überlebenskampf von Wahid scheint zu Ende sein !

Hier eine lustige Überstetzung von meinem Internettranslator:

Mittwoch, Mai 30 10:40 P.M. SGT
Indonesiens embattled outmanoeuvres Wahid selbst
Jakarta, Mai 30 (Afp) -
Präsident Abdurrahman Wahid Indonesiens, der am Mittwoch den ersten Umlauf seiner Schlacht gegen Anklage verlor, ist ein liberaler Demokrat, der Opfer zu den gleichen Taktiken fiel, er verwendete, zu überleben drei Dekaden der Diktatur.

Der respektierte moslemische Gelehrte 60-year-old, der Parlament für viel seiner kurzen 19-Monat Bezeichnung gekämpft hat, hat seine eigenen demokratischen Bescheinigungen, möglicherweise tödlich getrübt, beim Kriechen zum Stoppen des Anklageprozesses.

In den Vergangenheit Wochen, die Wahid bedroht, Notrichtlinie aufzuerlegen, Parlament auflösend Sie hat und die Politiker umworben hat er würde heftig zerreißen das Land auseinander gewarnt hatte, wenn sie übernahmen.

Er hat auch seinen Vizepräsidenten Megawati Sukarnoputri entfremdet, der steht, um ihn zu ersetzen und dessen Support entscheidend ist, sagen öffentlich würde sie von alleine anordnen unfähig sein.

Das Wahid des heutigen Tages ist, für die meisten Indonesier, eine tragische Enttäuschung und ein trauriger Abfall von einer der Tasteabbildungen, die halfen, den Fall des ehemaligen Diktators Suharto 1998 sicherzustellen.

Last-minute Kandidatur Wahid, die die zu ihn dem ersten demokratisch gewählten Präsidenten des Landes im Oktober 1999 stehend führte, wurde dann begrüßt, als er als annehmbarer Führer gesehen wurde, der das Land halten könnte vereinigt.

Aber seit dem dieses mal ist der klinisch blinde Präsident, enorme Vorteile gegenüberstellend, wenn er das Verbesserunglaufwerk lebendig und die csreformern mit ihm hielt, nicht imstande gewesen, sogar seine eigenen Verbündeten zu vereinigen.

Instead sagen Analytiker, arbeiteten die Taktiken, die ihn gut im rückseitigen Sitz dienten, nicht unter dem grellen Glanz der Werbung mit realer Energie ausgeübt zu werden.

Sein endloses Dealmaking, spielend weg von einer Gruppe gegen andere, die ihn aktiviert hatten und seine moslemische Bewegung Nahdlatul Ulama, um zu überleben die Jahre Suharto hat Freund und Feind gleich entfremdet.

Zusätzlich sein konstantes Kugel-globe-trotting unter entsetzlichen Krisen und seiner penchant für Anmerkungen Beißens, die zuerst gehalten der fractious Jakartaauslese weg von der Abgleichung, in zunehmendem Maße Fiedeln beschriftet worden ist, während Rom brennt.

Wahid schießt sich ununterbrochen im Fuß, sogar seine ardent Verfechter zustimmen.

Mit den freien Beleidigungen des Präsidenten über den politischen Beschränkungen seines alten Freunds Megawati, schien er, zu vergessen, daß viel seiner Energie auf Grass-rootspopularität Megawati stillstand und daß ihr Vermächtnis als die Tochter des nationalistischen gründenpräsidenten Sukarno des Landes entscheidend war.

Indonesische demokratische Partei Megawati des Kampfes (PDIP) gewann die Generalwahlen 1999 und hält die größte Zahl Sitzen im Parlament an.

Beteiligtes Wahid, durch Vergleich, hält nur eine Handvoll Sitze im Haus 500-seat an, das jetzt auf ousting ihn verbogen wird.

In die Flügel auch warten ist altes politisches Beteiligtes Suharto, das Golkar, das an zweiter Stelle in den Wahlen 1999 abstimmte und die Verfechter Wahid sagen, zu seinen alten Tricks aufgestanden ist, um den Präsidenten zu frustrieren.

Bittere Relationen Wahid mit Parlament haben viele seiner Verbesserungbemühungen gerannt.

" die Lebensdauern der Leute verschlechtern sich, haben die Markt- und Spenderanstalten Vertrauen verloren, verliert der Rupiah seinen Wert, erhöht Arbeitslosigkeit und setzt oben für Preis gehen fest, " sagte Wartungstafel Evita Asmalda Golkar.

Wahid lauded Bemühungen, die alten Industriemagnaten und rapacious die Kinder Suharto unten zu schneiden, um zu sortieren, holen sie zum Gericht und halten die endemische Korruption, die noch Regierung Coffers leert auf, schnell entwirrt.

Gerüchtverbreitung von Korruption im Präsidentenpalast, getankt durch eine nationale Presse gestochen durch Ereignisse der Einschüchterung und Parlament ergriffen auf möglicher Miteinbeziehung Wahid in zwei finanziellen Skandalen als Grundlage, um ihn zu kritisieren.

Seine Bemühungen, mit separatistaufrührern in den Provinzen von Aceh und von Irian Jaya zu sprechen kamen zu nichts. Das Militär ist jetzt zu Aceh zurückgekommen und ein Durchgreifen ist unterwegs in Irian.

Das Militär, das da Fall Suharto hinausgeschoben von der Politik hat, hat gekonnt, Einheit unter den relentless Angriffen wiederzugewinnen, die sie ausgehalten hatte.

Zum ersten Mal ist das Militär bis zum Präsidenten gestanden und ihn gegen das Erklären eines Ausnahmezustands gewarnt, der ihn aktivieren würde, das Parlament aufzulösen.

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Ich kann dieses Geschwafel nicht mehr ab!


Isolated Wahid unleashes cabinet reshuffle
June 1, 2001 Posted: 11:49 PM HKT (1549 GMT)



Wahid is growing increasingly desperate to hold on to power

From staff and wire reports

JAKARTA, Indonesia (CNN) -- Finding himself increasingly isolated, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid reshuffled his cabinet Friday, appointing a supporter of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri to a key post.

A presidential spokesman said overall four ministers were sacked, two changed positions and a cabinet secretary was promoted to minister in the surprise shake-up.

CNN`s Atika Schubert who is Jakarta says that while no official explanation was given for the reshuffle, the cabinet will now become a more Wahid-Megawati cabinet than it had been before.

She says that by replacing Chief Security Minister Bambang Yudhoyono with Communications Minister Agum Gumelar, Wahid also gets rid of an opponent of his desire to declare a state of civil emergency.


Growing crisis
Observers say the reshuffle is likely to deepen Indonesia`s political crisis as Wahid becomes increasingly desperate to fight off his forced removal from office.

Earlier this week opposition lawmakers voted to call a special session of the National Assembly to debate impeachment charges against him.

Wahid has refused to step down as Indonesia`s first democratically elected president and has warned that his impeachment would plunge the world`s second largest democracy into chaos.

He has warned that at least six provinces where he has support could erupt in violence if he is impeached, leading to the disintegration of Indonesia.

Attempts to impeach Wahid have sparked riots in East Java and mass demonstrations in Jakarta.

Fraud charges
Among the other ministers caught up in the shuffle are Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, who was replaced with the Justice Minister Baharuddin Lopa.

Darusman had investigated and, earlier this week, dismissed two allegations of fraud against the president.

Marsillan Simantjuntak, who was cabinet secretary, was appointed the justice minister and Budi Muliwan, who was outside the cabinet, was named cabinet secretary.

Yudhoyono, who has served as chief security minister, said the president told him he was being fired to improve relations between the president and vice president.

"His reason for replacing me is -- first, pressure from the public, and, second, Minister Agum Gumelar as chief security minister will improve the relationship between President Wahid and Vice President Megawati," Yudhoyono said.

Wahid had been attempting for weeks to win over Megawati`s PDIP party and thereby defuse efforts to impeach him. Up to now, Megawati`s party has refused all offers.


Megawati`s party members are determined to impeach Wahid
The security minister is considered Indonesia`s first minister -- the executive who effectively runs the government apparatus.

The outgoing minister, Yudhoyono, who said he was "still loyal" to the president, had repeatedly urged Wahid not to declare a state of emergency, which would allow him to disband parliament and derail the moves to impeach him

The heads of the Indonesia`s powerful armed forces have also cautioned against declaring a state of emergency.

"The decree would make Indonesia`s problems worse," armed forces spokesman Air Marshall Graito Usodo was quoted as saying. "We have told the president this and we have asked him not to declare it."

Wahid`s ultimatum
Earlier Friday Wahid was quoted as giving legislators a week to call off moves to impeach him over his alleged involvement in two multi-million dollar scandals.

"I will give them until Friday. After that we will see what happens," Wahid said after weekly prayers at a Jakarta mosque.

"The government is working hard to handle the security problem so that the political situation can be stabilized," he said.

He described attacks on him by parliament as "a clear and dirty way to kill democracy."

Country `in danger`
Wahid, who looks certain to face an impeachment hearing in two months time, said again he would not resign despite growing calls for him to step down.

"I don`t care what it is, I will take firm action if the country is in danger," Reuters quoted 60-year-old Wahid as saying.

"The challenge is the territorial integrity of the nation. Currently, many people, including officials, believe the integrity problem is a small one which can be overcome," he added.

"But I as an elected president have my own views … I will not resign if the safety of the country is at stake."

He said he still wanted a political compromise that did not violate the constitution.

Faction leaders of the supreme legislature decided on Thursday to convene on August 1 to consider impeaching the former Muslim cleric.

The date for the special session was set and announced by the Speaker of Parliament Amien Rais, one of the Wahid`s biggest critics, after a meeting with party leaders.

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Und jetzt wieder das Notstandsgefasel!

Indonesian police chief faces down president
June 4, 2001 Posted: 11:03 AM HKT (0303 GMT)



Indonesians fear Wahid will declare a state of emergency


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By John Raedler
CNN Bangkok Bureau

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Embattled Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid -- facing impeachment proceedings -- suffered a serious setback Sunday when the nation`s police force, backed by parliamentary leaders, rebuffed him.

More than 100 top police officers issued a statement Sunday backing General Surojo Bimantoro, their police chief, who was stripped of his duties by Wahid on Saturday. Among those endorsing Bimantoro: the man Wahid named to replace the chief.

Bimantoro refused to relinquish his position and claiming that only parliament could remove him. "I am still the police chief, there is no replacement," he said.

Bimantoro met Sunday with leaders of the various parliamentary factions and has the support of eight of the 10 factions.

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"The national police chief must not be replaced for political interests or any other subjective interests without agreement from parliament," the parliamentary leaders said.

A spokesman for Wahid said the president`s decision to relieve Bimantoro should be obeyed. "If not, there will be firm action," the spokesman said without elaborating.

President Wahid`s problems worsened significantly last week when the parliament voted overwhelmingly to bring impeachment proceedings against him in the nation`s highest body, the People`s Consultative Assembly. He is accused of corruption and incompetence.

Proceedings are to start August 1.

A widespread fear here is that the president might declare a state of civil emergency, which would allow him to dissolve parliament and stave off the efforts to impeach him.

Local reports say Wahid tried to sack Bimantoro because the police chief refused to support the imposition of a state of emergency. Parliamentary leaders also are concerned Wahid might try to replace leaders in Indonesia`s powerful military.

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Ach ätzt mich das an.

Bla bla bla ...

Gus Dur wann siehst Du es ein, dass Deine Zeit vorüber ist?

Megawati snubs Wahid cabinet meeting
June 7, 2001 Posted: 4:41 PM HKT (0841 GMT)



The rift at the top of Indonesia`s leadership appears to be growing deeper


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Indonesian Vice-President Megawati Sukanoputri has failed to attend the first meeting of the country`s reshuffled cabinet.

The move is being seen as a snub to President Abdurrahman Wahid who is fighting to stave off impeachment proceedings against him by opposition lawmakers.

In a surprise shake-up last Friday Wahid removed six ministers from their posts, sacking four of them from the cabinet.

The reshuffle was widely regarded as an attempt by the president to rebuild bridges with his deputy whose support he desperately needs if he is to defeat the impeachment process.

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However, Megawati, who rarely makes public announcements concerning her actions appears to have rejected his overtures.

She is reported to have attended the opening of an environment exhibition instead of taking up her usual role chairing the cabinet meeting.

Deepening rift
Among the new cabinet appointments announced last Friday was a key Megawati advisor as the country`s new security minister.

At the time of the announcements Wahid was quoted as saying he believed the new security chief would help heel the deepening rift with Megawati -- observers say that has obviously not been the case.

Senior officials in Megawati`s own party, the PDI-P, say the president`s strategy never held much chance of success because failed to consult her before making the changes.

The reshuffle was the third major cabinet shake-up since Wahid took office as Indonesia`s first democratically elected president 19 months ago.

Since Wahid`s announcement Megawati has failed to attend the swearing-in ceremonies for several new ministers.

Boycott warning

Indonesia`s political crisis has sparked growing tension on the streets of Jakarta
Wahid has been under pressure to stand down after opposition lawmakers issued two formal parliamentary censure motions accusing him of involvement in two financial scandals and of incompetence.

He has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing.

Indonesia`s top legislature is now expected to meet in less than two months to consider impeaching the president, thereby forcing his removal from office before the end of his five-year term.

Earlier this week Indonesian Defense Minister Mohammad Mahfud said the president was considering boycotting parliament if it went ahead with impeachment proceedings.

He said the president would refuse to give an obligatory accountability speech to the nation`s highest legislative body, the People`s Consultative Assembly, because hostile lawmakers have not specified exactly what violations he had committed.

[broker*709]

Vergiftet euch mal schön - euer Gus Dur wird schon richten.

Pollution and clean water shortage


The worsening water situation in Jakarta and other major cities, most noticeably affects the poor and poses a serious public health hazard, report The Jakarta Post`s Ida Indawati Khouw, Maria Endah Hulupi and Pandaya.

JAKARTA (JP): "After the heavy rain, a beautiful rainbow stretches down this road, right here, for everyone to see," said Ikin, with a cheeky grin on his face.

"Everybody in the neighborhood takes the sight for granted."

Is Ikin joking? Probably. But the blue collar worker of a garment factory was talking about a serious problem in his neighborhood of Semanan, West Jakarta, where garment factories and very crowded residential areas exist side by side.

"Rainbow" is a metaphor he uses to describe the neighborhood`s classic colors: red, green, blue, black... all the colors that run down the overflowing narrow gutter where major factories dump untreated industrial waste.

The gutter empties into River Mogot, which like any other river in the capital, is notoriously polluted. The water is thick, black and stinky because it serves as a dump for domestic and industrial waste.

Along River Mogot, which is virtually stagnant during the dry season, live thousands of impoverished families who rely on groundwater supplies for drinking, bathing, cooking.

Many Jakarta townsfolk may not be aware that by dumping waste in the river, they are poisoning each other. Although Jakarta had launched Prokasih (Clean River Program) more than 10 years ago, all of the city`s 13 rivers remain heavily polluted.

Factories, families and people in the street dump their toxic waste into the river without proper treatment, while an estimated 90 percent of shallow wells (up to 40 meters deep) in Jakarta have been polluted by domestic waste.

Seawater intrusion

Intrusion of brackish water also poses a serious problem to people living in the coastal area. Look at Marunda, a somewhat "isolated" subdistrict in Jakarta Bay. It is a typical slum area where potable water is scarce.

The swampy area by the sea, which has been jokingly, though rightly, called "Jakarta`s toilet", is devoid of potable water unless one is rich enough to afford a powerful machine capable of pumping out water from a depth of 80 meters.

Residents, mostly fishermen living in houses built on stilts, have to buy drinking water for Rp 750 per jerrycan (approximately 15 liters). In the rainy season, they save on costs by catching rain water.

When a dam in East Jakarta recently burst and disrupted water supplies from state-run water enterprise, PAM, the price of water soared to Rp 1,500 a jerrycan.

"We had to queue for hours to get water from a nearby water pump," said ibu Dedeh, a resident of Marunda Baru.

In North Jakarta, where the water crisis is most severe due to its proximity to the sea, only 50 percent of the population have access to drinking water services. The rest have to buy it from traders.

The increasingly complicated water crisis has seriously affected the low-income bracket, who have no access to clean water services. If there is any party that benefits from the crisis, it is undoubtedly the bottled water companies.

On the other extreme, many wealthy people take water for granted. It is common knowledge that many wealthy people in expensive housing complexes pump ground-water for their private swimming pools, robbing water resources from the neighborhood.

At the height of the 1997 dry season, a resident of a housing complex in Duri Kosambi, West Jakarta, was forced to dismantle his high-powered jet pump system by neighbors who believed he had drained groundwater in the neighborhood.

In industrial centers like Greater Jakarta, limited water sources are "fought for" by households and industry.

In its May edition, Warta Konsumen, a newsletter published by the Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI), reported that 30 percent of the water used in industry is groundwater, 60 percent surface water and tap water from PAM accounts for a mere 10 percent of its total use of water.

The slack enforcement of the law on the exploitation of groundwater and the inadequate tap water supply has encouraged excessive exploitation of groundwater by both industry and individuals alike.

Health hazards

The water crisis has sparked health concerns. Even tap water is not guaranteed to be free from contamination by heavy metals. For example, YLKI found in a 1990 survey that Jakarta PAM water contained 0.0024 ppm of mercury, 2.4 higher than the Health Ministry standard of 0.001.

The unchecked dumping of waste has caused widespread pollution in rivers across Indonesia. See the table below for details.

Heavy metal content in rivers in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan

(Metal, Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Health, Ministry, Standard): (Cadmium, 0.04, 0.20, 0.06, 0.005); (Chromium, 0.03, 0.02, 0.04, 0.05); (Copper, 0.14, 0.13, 0.00, --); (Iron, 9.25, 3.40, 10.55, 1.0); (Manganese, 0.48, 0.48, 0.50, 0.5); (Nickel, 0.22, 0.12, 0.00, --); (Lead, 0.43, 0.11, 0.00, 0.05); (Zinc, 0.41, 0.09, 0.08, 0.15)

Source: Kualitas Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, 1992

A toxicologist from the Jakarta Islamic Hospital Foundation, Ahmad Hidayat, said that the water supplied from PDAM comes mainly from rivers exposed to household waste. As for underground water, the quality depends on location. In coastal areas, the water is usually unpotable due to sea intrusion, while those in high density areas are contaminated with various disease-causing organisms, such as E.coli bacteria.

In crowded residential areas, septic tank and wells are usually too close to each other. The law requires that the minimum distance is 20 meters.

Good drinking water is clear, odorless, free from silt, metals or contaminating organisms -- a requirement that PAM has yet to achieve.

Long-term exposure to heavy metal pollutants, existing in the air and water are not tangible but lead to health problems affecting the nervous system, organs, creating muscle pain, reducing intelligence and triggering a chronic fatigue syndrome.

Studies on minerals show that mercury can cause mental retardation, gait and visual impairment; abnormal lead levels are associated with a lack of attention, increased impulsiveness, aggression and erratic behavior; while aluminum intoxication may contribute to hyperactivity.

Ahmad suggested that the public are advised to find a reliable filter to remove harmful substances and boil water properly to kill any hazardous living organisms.

"A good boiling pan is also necessary to avoid possible aluminum contamination from the pan," he said.

Water testing is available at the laboratory of state-owned surveyor Sucofindo on Jl. Arteri Tol Cibitung, Bekasi.

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Zum wiederaufbauen gibt es auf eine ganze Menge.

More than 55,000 homes destroyed in Indonesian unrest


JAKARTA (Agencies): More than 55,000 homes have been destroyed in the communal unrest wracking parts of Indonesia since 1999, Antara news agency said Saturday quoting government statistics.

Of 57,088 buildings razed during the violence, 448 had been houses of worship, 241 schools and 260 offices, the report said.

The Ministry of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure figures showed that the worst hit areas were the North Maluku and Maluku islands, where the dragging Muslim-Christian conflict destroyed 35,968 buildings.

Violence associated with the separatist conflict in Aceh province left 12,275 buildings destroyed while most of the others were razed in conflicts in Central and West Kalimantan and Central Sulawasi, the report said.

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In diesem Anlauf werden die 400 Mio US $ und weitere Tranchen hoffentlich ausbezahlt.

Nur noch das Problem "Gus Dur" muss gelöst werden.

New economic coordinating minister asked to restore relations with IMF


JAKARTA (JP): Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri asked on Monday newly appointed Coordinating Minister for the Economy Burhanuddin Abdullah to continue attempts to restore relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Burhanuddin told reporters after meeting Megawati at the vice presidential palace that she had stressed the importance of improving cooperation with the IMF and paying serious attention to the wishes of the international financial institution.

"The Vice President said increased cooperation with the IMF was not only in the best interest of Indonesia, but also the IMF," Burhanuddin, who in the past worked for the IMF in the United States, said as quoted by Antara.

He said good relations with the IMF would smoothen the loan rescheduling process of US$2.8 million from the Paris Club.

"So the letter of intent which has been signed with the IMF should be continuously discussed. Otherwise, all of us (Indonesians) will suffer and it will be a burden on the state budget (APBN)," he said.

Burhanuddin said the remaining obstacle to restoring relations with the IMF was the amendment on the central bank law, while there was no longer any problem with the revision of the 2001 state budget and asset securitization.

The Vice President also asked Burhanuddin to coordinate with coordinating minister for political, social and security affairs, citing that any economic policy often affected other sectors.

Regarding the request by Megawati that the settlement of political problems be separated from the monetary ones, Burhanuddin said anything was possible.

"We have learned from last year`s experience that social and political clamor do not affect economic development," he said.

"No matter what happens in politics, people still have to work and earn a living," he added.

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Wenn man den heutige Tag mit unseren neuen Markt vergleicht, dann steht man mit einem INDO-INVESTMENT recht gut da :-)

Last Update: June 26, 2001 Closed
Sector Last Chg %Chg
COMPOSITE 438.41 2.65 0.61 %
AGRI 148.78 -1.11 -0.74 %
BASIC-IND 50.54 0.17 0.35 %
CONSUMER 156.18 1.11 0.71 %
FINANCE 35.69 -1.14 -3.09 %
INFRASTR 113.35 0.3 0.26 %
LQ45 89.15 0.29 0.33 %
MANUFTR 103.51 0.7 0.68 %
MINING 141.08 7.52 5.63 %
MISC-IND 83.21 0.72 0.88 %
PROPERTY 25.25 0.2 0.79 %
TRADE 124.34 3.56 2.94 %
JII 66.08 0.6 0.91 %

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Na ja, die 6 Monate habe ich voller Geduld durchgestanden.
Vielleicht wird`s jetzt wieder was mit den weiteren Auszahlungen des IMF. Wenn nicht, dann warten wir halt wieder 6 Monate ;-)



IMF team to visit Jakarta soon: Minister


JAKARTA (JP): After six months delay, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may finally send its special mission to Jakarta next month to review the country`s economic reform program, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Burhanuddin Abdullah said on Wednesday.

Burhanuddin said that he had just talked over the phone in the morning with IMF top officials, including deputy managing director Stanley Fischer, and deputy director for the Asia Pacific Anoop Singh.

"The IMF is ready to come ... soon," Burhanuddin told reporters following a Cabinet meeting with Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

He added that there was a "strong possibility" that the special mission would arrive next month.

The arrival of the IMF review mission will pave the way for the disbursement of the IMF`s next US$400 million loan tranche to the country.

The disbursement of the IMF money is not just important to help revive investors confidence in the ailing economy, but also to allow the government to obtain a rescheduling facility from the Paris Club of creditor nations for sovereign debt maturing this year.

The improvement in relations with the IMF would also encourage other key multilateral lenders such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to increase their loan allocation to Indonesia.

The news, however, failed to affect the currency market, with the rupiah ending slightly lower at Rp 11,395 per U.S. dollar late on Wednesday from Rp 11,375 on Tuesday.

Traders said that the market remained jittery amid reports that Abdurrahman was still considering imposing a state of emergency as an option to avoid impeachment.

The IMF delayed the disbursement of its loan to the country last December following signs that the government was wavering in its implementation of agreed economic reform agenda. Since then, relations between the IMF and the administration of Abdurrahman have deteriorated.

The IMF has promised to provide the current administration a total of $5 billion in a bailout loan to help finance a three-year economic reform program. The IMF has so far disbursed around $1 billion.

Earlier this month, Abdurrahman reshuffled his key economic ministers in an apparent bid to improve relations with the IMF, by installing Burhanuddin Abdullah as the chief economic minister, replacing Rizal Ramli, who was appointed as finance minister.

Unlike Rizal, who often expressed strong criticism against the IMF, Burhanuddin considers the IMF important in helping the recovery of the ailing economy.

Immediately after his inauguration, Burhanuddin, previously a Bank Indonesia deputy governor who has several years of experience working at IMF headquarters in Washington, said that his short term goal was to improve the country`s relations with the IMF.

The government-proposed amendment of the central bank law seems to be no longer an issue between the IMF and the government.

Burhanuddin said that he would be "open to any option, including a delay" in the amendment of the Bank Indonesia law.

Head of the House of Representatives Commission IX on state budget and finance Benny Pasaribu demanded on Monday that the government delay the amendment of the central bank law.

The controversial amendment of the central bank law had been the only remaining stumbling block between the government and the IMF.

The government has said that it proposed the amendment to improve the accountability of the independent central bank. But the IMF worries that it would jeopardize the impartiality and independence of Bank Indonesia.

The main controversial issue is article 75 of the government proposed bill on the amendment, which stipulates that the existing board of governors must immediately resign once the House passes the bill. (rei/dja)

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[broker*709]

Hier eine Deutsche Übersetzung aus der Jakarta Post - sehr witzig durch Alta Vista ;-)

IWF-Team zum Besuchen Indonesien folgende Woche: Burhanuddin


JAKARTA (JP): Ein Internationales Währungsfonds(IWF) Team wird erwartet, in der späten folgenden Woche Indonesiens anzukommen, um ein neues Absichtsschreiben (LoI) zwischen Indonesien und IWF, der ältere Volkswirtschaftminister des Landes zu behandeln, der am Samstag aufgedeckt wird.

Das IWF-Team ist scharf, nach Indonesien wegen der Darlehen und der bedeutenden technischen Unterstützung zu kommen, die vorher zum Land bereitgestellt wird und koordiniert Minister für die Wirtschaft Burhanuddin Abdullah, der gesagt wird, wie von Antara veranschlagen .

Der Minister bildete die Anmerkung nach einer Sitzung mit Leitprogrammen der indonesischen Industrie- und Handelskammer (Kadin), das auch von eben festgesetztem Vorsitzendem der Investitionkorrdination Agentur (BKPM) bedient wurde, Theo F. Toemion.

Burhanuddin sagte, daß das IWF-Team ein neues LoI mit der indonesischen Regierung behandeln würde, die ökonomische Makrostabilität und finanzielle Angelegenheiten betrachten würde.

Änderungsvorschläge zur Bank Indonesien (BI) wurden lawpreviously ein Hindernis zu den IMF`s-Plänen, Indonesien zu besuchen und schließlich wurden Diskussion über die Änderungen hinausgeschoben.

Burhanuddin auch, das seine Aufgabe als koordinierenminister besagt ist, soll die ökonomische Stabilität erstellen, gegolten die Grundlage für langfristige ökonomische Entwicklung.

In einer Bemühung, gute Wirtschaftslage, entsprechend Burhanuddin zu erstellen, muß eine unpopuläre Entscheidung manchmal getroffen werden und er sprach die neue Zunahme der Kraftstoffpreise als Beispiel solch eines Masses an.

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Aus dem IMF-Server schon ein paar Tage alt, wurde aber erst vom IMF eingestellt.

Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas Dawson
Director
External Relations Department
International Monetary Fund
Friday, June 22, 2001, 9:30 a.m.
Washington, D.C.

MR. DAWSON: I have a few observations to make before I take questions.

First, I guess we should take note that this will be the last press conference attended in person by Dietrich Zwaetz, who will be retiring and moving to Florida, as I understand. We will miss him. But, of course, with the advances of technology, he will be able to tune in on the briefing with our Web streaming regularly. With the existing technology, he can`t ask questions, but I`m sure we can work something out.

MR. DAWSON: I have three notes to make. First, this week, Wednesday, Tunisia became the 49th subscriber to the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard. Tunisia is the first country in the Middle East to subscribe to the SDDS, which was established in March 1996 as a guide for countries that have or are seeking access to international capital on the public dissemination of economic and financial data. SDDS information is readily available on the Fund website, and I urge you to visit the data standards bulletin board for the latest developments.

I know there is interest in at least two countries in the Western Hemisphere today, so I thought I`d have a brief comment to make to help you frame the questions that you follow up with.

With regard to Argentina, I must say she faces a difficult situation, not least because of a deteriorating external environment over the last few months. The package of measures announced last week by the authorities is directed toward rekindling growth and improving economic fundamentals through simplifying the tax system and combating tax evasion. The measures have enjoyed a positive domestic response. We believe that the objectives of growth which inspired the government actions are attainable. The IMF continues to support the authorities` efforts in that direction.

With regard to Brazil, I think there have been some more recent developments. As you know, the Brazilian economy has been subject to internal shocks recently, mainly associated with the energy crisis, and it has also been negatively affected by the slowdown in the world economy and has suffered effects from Argentina. As a result, the currency has been under pressure.

During this difficult period, Brazil has continued to perform very well under the Fund-supported program, and the staff have recently received all the required information to certify Brazil`s compliance with end-March quantitative performance criteria. We welcome the action of the central bank of Brazil to raise the overnight interest rate by 150 basis points in light of the higher inflation and to help halt the slide of the currency and the announced plans to strengthen the country`s capital account.

We also look forward to the announcement of tax reform measures, of measures to strengthen the Brazilian federal banks, and of efforts to improve the investment climate in the energy sector that we understand will be made shortly by the Brazilian authorities.

As part of the efforts to strengthen gross international reserves, the Brazilian authorities have informed IMF Management that they would like to make a drawing from the Fund of about SDR 1.5 billion or US$2 billion from the resources currently available under the existing stand-by arrangement. This drawing will be made later next week.

Thank you, and now I`ll be happy to take questions.

QUESTIONER: Has a date been determined for a Board meeting to discuss Turkey [inaudible]?

MR. DAWSON: We have been planning for a Board date of end-June. We don`t have a precise date yet. It may well slip a day or two into the following month, but the program is on track and progress, good progress, has been made. So as far as the Board date goes, it is still conceivable it will be the end of June, but it`s possible it may slip a couple of days.

QUESTIONER: On Turkey, there were a number of conditions that have been met and a number of others which have not. Could you let us know which specific structural benchmarks have yet been met and which are yet to be met before this next [inaudible]?

MR. DAWSON: I`m not sure I can deal with the question in precisely that fashion. Let me go over where I think we are, and I think it should be reasonably complete.

As I noted, good progress has been made. There have recently been some deviations from program assumptions in some areas, such as the public sector wage settlement, and the wheat support price decision. The authorities have since taken measures to offset the fiscal impact of these decisions.

As the recent mission said in its concluding statement, there are important outstanding issues that needed to be resolved, and one of them was the passage of the tobacco law. And, therefore, we do welcome the passage--Turkey`s efforts and progress, rather -on the implementation of the program and look forward to the implementation of the remaining measures.

I would also note the recently completed swap operation, and in the banking area, regarding the closing of Emlak Bank and bank mergers, we understand the authorities are moving along with implementation of those measures. And then I guess that`s the guidance that I have on that point, so I think that`s reasonably complete.

QUESTIONER: [inaudible].

MR. DAWSON: Sure.

QUESTIONER: Today we are waiting for a constitutional court decision on one of the [inaudible] parties, [inaudible] parties` closure. What is IMF`s understand if this party were to be closed? How do you think it`s going to affect the implementation of the program? Do you think Turkey will be off track?

MR. DAWSON: We must wait for court decisions until they happen and see what the implications are then. So I don`t have any comment at this point.

QUESTIONER: On Argentina, Tom, when you mentioned in your initial remarks specifically about the growth-oriented policies that have been introduced recently, particularly last week, I presume you`re actually in particular referring to the new introduction of a dual tier approach to exchange rate and that Argentina is now going to seek to export its way out of trouble to a degree in an attempt to kick-start the economy again.

But what`s the IMF view on this two-tiered system in particular? Because surely it represents if not the beginning of the end to the currency board, then a particular distortion in the convertibility system--

MR. DAWSON: I don`t think I need to accept either the premise or the implications of your question.

QUESTIONER: Forgive my flawed way of presenting it then. What`s your comment on the convertibility system of Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: First of all, we have looked at the measures announced, and the measures introduced do not constitute a multiple currency practice under the definition used by the Fund.

Yes, certainly the measures were intended to boost exports, and yes, indeed, certainly that is part of the growth orientation of the package. I would, however, note there are also other elements to it, including the government`s intention to work in the area of tax reform toward simplification, reducing the number of taxes, and encouraging compliance and so on. So I think that`s the context in which we look at it. It is a growth-oriented policy, but as I say, it is not something that we view as a dual exchange rate, a multiple currency practice.
Yes?

QUESTIONER: Tom, today a Bundesbank member said that it can`t be ruled out that Germany will slip into a recession this year, and obviously the ECB has scaled back growth estimates for this year for the euro zone.

To what extent does the IMF think that Europe now is a risk for its global growth forecast for this year?

MR. DAWSON: We tend to look at this through the periodic WEO estimates. We, of course, are in the process of preparing the WEO for the fall. We don`t have any changes in the forecast in the interim period between those. I`m not familiar with the specific comment that you quote from a Bundesbank member, so I don`t really have any comment beyond that.

QUESTIONER: I want to follow up on what they call the expanding of the convertibility and inclusion of the euro. You said it doesn`t constitute a double exchange type system. What is it, then? Because, in fact, Cavallo made it very clear that we are going to have one exchange rate for the trade and the other one for the rest of the economy. First question.

Second is there are fears that this is the beginning of the end of the convertibility and this will lead to a devaluation. How does the Fund react --

MR. DAWSON: I mean, I think we take the government`s description and actions on face value. I would note-- I believe this has happened last night--that the parliament passed the modification of the convertibility law, which is more of a medium-term issue in terms of the addition of the euro into the basket. And, fundamentally, the reason that this is not viewed to be a multiple currency practice is that it works through the tariff system and it is not worked through the exchange rate system, and there are offsets, as we understand it, that are intended for it to be compatible with WTO obligations. So, of course, that is the first requirement of WTO to look at, but it`s our understanding that this is not multiple currency practice.

QUESTIONER: What about the devaluation fears? How do you assess that?

MR. DAWSON: The government has made it quite clear--and I think the actions of the Congress as well have been quite clear in the same direction--that the existing currency regime is one that enjoys broad support, and we are, as I said in my statement, supporting the Argentine authorities and the Argentine people.

QUESTIONER: Again, on Argentina and the currency, in the staff report that came out this week, the IMF says that one of the concerns in Argentina is confidence in the convertibility plan. Are you concerned that this move will take away confidence in the market in convertibility?

MR. DAWSON: Well, as I noted in my statement, certainly the domestic response seems to have been positive. There was uncertainty in the international markets, but things seem to have calmed down. So I think I would leave it at where it is. But I think at this point, I think people understand what has happened there. That`s all I have.

QUESTIONER: Tom, turning to Thailand, the central bank reserves are slipping, and there`s some discussion in the market about perhaps Thailand availing itself of the new currency swap arrangements that have been established in East Asia. Do you think--does the IMF think that it is ripe for the currency swap arrangements to be utilized for the first time in Thailand`s case?

MR. DAWSON: I was not aware of that speculation, so I don`t really have anything to answer on that, and I would, you know, have to look into that. But I was not aware of that, presumably media speculation, because I certainly haven`t read it in my own briefings.

QUESTIONER: On Argentina again, Tom, folks within the building here told me that Claudio Loser advised Minister Cavallo against these particular measures in April at the Spring Meetings, and that the Fund was not notified of the specifics of the last batch of measures that were taken until just moments before they happened. I was wondering on what basis can the Fund say that they support these particular measures since they do seem to run counter to what you tell people publicly. Also, why has it taken a full week for you to comment on the Argentine measures if indeed you are actually supportive of them?

MR. DAWSON: Well, first of all we do not comment on private advice and discussions that go on between the Fund staff and the authorities. With regard to we taking time before making comments, we did indeed need to take a look at what the measures were, which we have done.

The Fund Board, for example, was briefed only yesterday on the measures. So I think this is the timing that I would have normally expected. It`s conceivable that we might have put out a statement last night, but since the briefing was this morning, it seemed appropriate to wait until this morning.

And there was another part of the question that I`m not trying to forget, but I--

QUESTIONER: I was just wondering if this is the type of advice you would tend to give people. If Argentina is a country where confidence is important, is this shaking confidence in markets? Even if you don`t believe it, the markets believe this is a dual currency regime. If it`s not that, it`s a protectionist measure. It`s not good for Brazil, it seems to be sort of a negative move for the rest of the region, so [inaudible]--

MR. DAWSON: Well, I think that is a rather downbeat assessment of it all. I have seen in a number of the publications this morning positive reactions within Argentina, and there have been supportive reactions from around the region. They have a very difficult situation and the authorities have proven themselves quite resourceful in adapting to the sort of difficulties that they have had in recent months.

Want to try again?

QUESTIONER: Do you see a coincidence that within days of these measures, this sort of turmoil that we saw in the currency market has led Brazil to have to draw on its stand-by arrangement...

MR. DAWSON: Well--

QUESTIONER: And also you say that markets reacted well to it. Well, Argentine--the bond swaps sort of went down four points on the move, so it seems clear that at least international markets reacted badly--

MR. DAWSON: Well, indeed, the markets were caught by surprise, but I think things--as I indicated also-- things have calmed down since them. And I did indicate in my statement that the difficulties facing Brazil do include the effect of Argentina as well. So, yes, there is clearly a regional effect.

QUESTIONER: Again on Argentina, I`m sorry, but I just want to be clear on this. In your opening statement, you said you support the government`s efforts to spur growth. Are you saying that this measure in the IMF`s assessment will spur economic growth in Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: We believe that it can, yes.

QUESTIONER: That this measure will--

MR. DAWSON: Yes, we think that they can help them achieve their growth targets. They are not the only elements of the program, though.

QUESTIONER: On Turkey, concluding the talks in Ankara, Mr. Kahkonen, the IMF`s Turkey mission chief, mentioned four points, and they included the passing of the supplementary budget, the tobacco market law, the closure of a state bank, and appointing officials to the higher board of Turk Telecom. Three of them are finished, and just we are waiting for people for the telecom.

Are you specifically waiting for this to announce it specifically for a Board meeting?

MR. DAWSON: No. We are waiting for it, but the Board date could be set without regard to that, but also it is something that needs to be done. So we are not--the reason a Board date has not been set does not have to do with that particular measure. But that measure is still important and is needed for the discussion.

QUESTIONER: Is it a precondition still?

MR. DAWSON: It is.

Yes? We have to wrap up pretty soon.

QUESTIONER: Does the IMF plan to move on the Web some of its conferences as the World Bank did for the Barcelona conference? And does the IMF think that this is the right way to match the anti-globalization protests?

MR. DAWSON: I am not aware what our plans are on Web casting of conferences generally. We have no particular plans for any of ours at this point. I think the Bank`s action for continuing the Barcelona conference through a Web cast is really quite innovative, given the particular nature of this conference, which had a reasonably select academic orientation. But at this point we don`t see any implications for us. But I think it was a practical solution to a difficult situation.

QUESTIONER: How will the energy crisis affect the goals in the agreement between IMF and Brazil?

MR. DAWSON: As I indicated in my statement, we recognize that the energy crisis has created some of the difficulties that the economy is going through at this point. I don`t have any particular speculation as to what the impact is on the achievement of the government`s program. But as I indicated, through end-March the targets had been met.

QUESTIONER: My question is on Moldova. The new President of Moldova recently made a statement that he believes that the IMF should take some responsibility for the advice it gave the previous government and for the dire straits in which the Moldovan economy is at this point. Basically he suggested that the IMF might write off some of the debts of the country.

My question to you, of course, is: What`s your particular comment on this particular situation? But also in more broad terms, to the best of your knowledge, has there ever been an example where the IMF would take such a responsibility in a situation like that, or at least publicly admit that something with the recommendation was [inaudible]--

MR. DAWSON: As with an earlier question, I think I can challenge premises and conclusions.

With regard to the relations with the new Moldovan Government, I would note that we have indeed met with them, and they have expressed their strong desire to continue relations with the international financial institutions, especially the Fund, and made clear their intention to adhere to the memorandum of economic and financial policies signed by the previous government last November and approved by the Board in December. So I think that this is a slightly different orientation toward what their attitude is.

With regard to the Fund accepting responsibility for the advice that it gives, we do that. We are, I think, increasingly self-critical and open in that regard, and I would note, for example, the great volume of self-criticism that we engaged in in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.

QUESTIONER: A question on a different country, on Ukraine. Have you been in touch with the new authorities with what their plans are?

MR. DAWSON: Indeed, we have been in touch with the new authorities. I would direct you to the statement issued by the resident representative in Kiev yesterday, which I think I won`t re-read. For those who do not have it, we can provide it to you. But I will also note that for those of you who have gone through my experience of being asked questions about sunflower seed exports is that the Ukrainian parliament yesterday cut the duty from 23 percent to 17 in an action that goes, as the Reuters report notes, goes towards satisfying some of the concerns expressed by the international financial community.

QUESTIONER: Tom, on Indonesia, any word on when there might be a possible mission date to Indonesia?

MR. DAWSON: No, we do not have a specific date at this point. The approval of the 2001 revised budget shows a good step, a good progress forward. The action on fuel price increases was courageous on the part of the government. The effort to provide safety net for those most adversely affected also was positive.

The resumption of the negotiations on the new letter of intent in particular hangs on the resolution of the issues regarding the Bank Indonesia law amendments. We have had some discussions with the new coordinating minister on this subject. So I would say that there have been quite good discussions, but at this point we do not have a specific date for a new mission.

QUESTIONER: Yesterday, Mr. Ramli, the Finance Minister, made a pretty eloquent statement in a publication I won`t mention on why the law shouldn`t be changed. Is that a concern to you when there are public statements from the government going against the IMF`s advice?

MR. DAWSON: Well, I think that there are a number of views within the government, the Fund has its views, and this is sort of how the process works. So I think differing views is actually something always to be welcomed.

QUESTIONER: A question regarding Pakistan. To what extent the recent political developments could impact the ongoing discussions with the IMF?

MR. DAWSON: We are in the process of reviewing the new budget details that were revealed earlier this week. We do not yet have any reaction, and I do not have any information in terms of our views on political developments, although I would say that the initial reactions from staff on the budget, that it is in line with what we were expecting.

QUESTIONER: Would you address Yugoslavia, particularly the loan that was approved ten days ago for Serbia and Montenegro? The United States either abstained or was opposed to that. And what about the donors` conference that is coming up a week from today in Paris? And how are they doing in Belgrade on economic reform?

MR. DAWSON: I do not have anything on the donors` conference. That is something that we would be involved with, but it is not our lead, and I do not have any other information on that.

QUESTIONER: Is Mr. Fischer visiting Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: He will be there on Monday for a speech to the Argentine Bankers` Association. Yes, Monday morning.

Okay. One last question.

QUESTIONER: One final question about Mr. Fischer. How seriously did he take President Putin`s offer?

MR. DAWSON: I think he was quite intrigued. I was with him at that point. I think he was quite intrigued, and I think he got a lot of good-natured ribbing. But I suspect Mr. Fischer may well have more than one offer to consider.

Thank you very much.

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Da werden wir wohl bis zum 1. August warten und wir warten und warten :-(

IMF mission in Indonesia to recover loan program


JAKARTA (Agencies): Senior International Monetary Fund officials arrived here on Thursday on a mission aimed at reviving a stalled US$5 billion loan program.

Officials said the team, led by IMF Asia-Pacific deputy director Anoop Singh, was expected to begin talks with economics ministers later on Thursday as part of efforts to draw up a fresh reform agreement and start loans flowing again.

The program has been deadlocked for more than six months over Indonesia`s foot-dragging on economic reforms and most recently controversial central bank law amendments.

The delegation will stay at Grand Hyatt Hotel in Central Jakarta, Metro TV reported.

Agreeing to a new pact on reforms and releasing a delayed $400 million tranche from the three-year program would show skeptical donors and investors that economic restructuring was back on track and might also give President Abdurrahman Wahid a much-needed shot in the arm.

The IMF team is expected to remain here for up to 10 days. If it agrees to a new pact, or letter of intent, that will open the way for disbursement of the stalled loan.

John Dodsworth, the IMF`s senior resident representative in Jakarta, said on Wednesday it could take several months to reach agreement over contentious central bank law changes, but added there had been sufficient compromise to break the deadlock,Reuters said.

That compromise is to take more time discussing theamendments, which the IMF fears could undermine the central bank`s hard-won independence after decades of interference under the authoritarian rule of former president Soeharto.

Dodsworth said Jakarta would be working in consultation with the fund and the House of Representatives over the next six months to come up with amendments to the central bank law that were mutually acceptable.

The most controversial of the proposed changes is Article 75, which stipulates the central bank board resign once the amended law comes into effect.

Dodsworth has said the mission would be aimed at trying to reestablish the program, focusing on a range of macroeconomic fiscal and monetary reforms.

But not all analysts are optimistic the loan program will be resurrected during the current IMF visit.

In a research report issued on Wednesday, the Deutsche Bank expressed skepticism that a new pact would be agreed upon, partly because of the central bank law amendments.

It also predicted the IMF would rather wait for an outcome to President Abdurrahman`s impeachment hearing, which opens on Aug. 1, before signing a new agreement in case that had to be renegotiated.

Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri is expected to replace Abdurrahman should he be ousted, and would likely revamp the Cabinet.

[broker*709]

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[broker*709]

Na endlich, die 400 Mio`s sind für den August durch :-)

IMF to disburse US$400m tranche in August: House Speaker


JAKARTA (JP): House of Representatives (DPR) Speaker Akbar Tandjung said on Wednesday that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would disburse in August the US$400 million loan tranche.

The funds have been on hold since December.

Akbar told the media after meeting with IMF Asia Pacific director Anoop Singh and IMF representative in Indonesia John Dodsworth in the House that the disbursement of the funds had nothing to do with the People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR) special session in August, Antara said.

"The loan will be disbursed in August, but it has nothing to do with the special session of the MPR," Akbar said.

The release of the latest tranche, which has been on hold since December due to IMF concerns at slow asset privatization and proposed changes to laws governing the central bank, is a conditionality of the letter of intent (LoI) signing.

Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Burhanuddin Abdullah said on Wednesday that the LoI discussion was entering its final stage and would be completed on July 14.

The news agency also quoted Burhanuddin during a meeting with legislators in National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) office in Central Jakarta on Wednesday that the IMF had from time to time been criticized for its policy failure in the 1990s, which had caused misery, environmental damage and social unrest in several countries.

"There has been much criticism of IMF, and I personally know of many failures caused by the IMF in several countries," Burhanuddin said in a hearing with legislators led by Amin Arjoso of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan).

Other legislators attending the meeting were PDI Perjuangan`s Haryanto Taslam and Permadi, Jusuf Muhammad of the National Awakening Party (PKB) and Manasse Malo of the Love the Nation Democratic Party (PDKB).

[broker*709]

LoI auf geht`s macht endlich die Kiste zu !

IMF-Indonesia: Hopes dashed of full agreement this weekend


JAKARTA (Agencies): The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was unable to sign a new lending agreement with Indonesia to restart a stalled $5 billion lending program, both parties said on Friday.

The IMF`s high-level mission to Indonesia this week, led by Director for the Asia-Pacific Anoop Singh, was hoping to reach an agreement on economic reforms which would allow the restarting of lending, AP DowJones reported.

The Washington-based fund suspended loans in December after Indonesia fell behind in a number of economic reforms which were set as prerequisites to obtaining the loans.

But the IMF team will leave for Washington on Saturday without a final agreement -- known as a letter of intent -- which would unlock the latest $400 million tranche of loans.

"We have finished the draft letter of intent and this draft will be taken to Washington," Coordinating Minister for the Economy Burhanuddin Abdullah told a joint press conference to mark the end of the IMF mission.

"After it is approved, the government will sign the letter of intent and we expect this process to be completed before September," he said.

Earlier this week, Burhanuddin said he hoped the government would be able to reach a final letter of intent before the mission left.

The IMF`s First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer, however, poured cold water on these hopes, saying from Tokyo that slow progress in debt restructuring, bank sales and political instability continued to hamper discussions.

[broker*709]

Die Anzeichen verdichten sich, dass die nächsten IMF-Zahlungen ins rollen kommen.

Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas Dawson
Director
External Relations Department
International Monetary Fund
Friday, July 13, 2001
Washington, D.C.

[Due to a recording error, the introductory remarks by Thomas Dawson, Director of External Relations, are missing from the transcript. His prepared remarks are inserted in their place.]

MR. DAWSON: Turkey has already accomplished a great deal under its program. In particular, it has taken strong action on banking sector reform, fiscal adjustment, and bringing down inflation. These measures address ambitiously the core problems that led Turkey to seek Fund support in the first place. However, even while these important steps were being taken, politics in Turkey have fed doubts in the markets about the commitment of the authorities to stay the course of reform. The Fund urges the Turkish authorities to dispel these doubts and boost market confidence, by demonstrating unambiguously that the program has the full backing of all coalition partners. This, together with the support of the IMF, would be the best way to ensure that the people of Turkey can reap the full benefits of the strong measures that are being taken.

On Argentina, the staff briefed the Executive Board on recent developments in Argentina yesterday afternoon during the course of a regularly scheduled Board session. Such briefings, essentially for the purpose of giving information to Executive Directors, are commonly provided by staff. The program remains on track. We support the government`s objective of dealing with a critical fiscal situation. The actions demonstrate a clear commitment, dedication, to try to tackle this problem. [End of prepared remarks.]

[Press conference in progress.]

QUESTIONER: On Turkey, there seems to be some give-and-take on who is responsible for interest rates staying high. With your statement today, are you saying that it`s the politics that are responsible, and is there any idea of reformulating the IMF program to try to bring down those interest rates even more? And on Indonesia, there was an announcement today of a draft accord. Should we take that with some uncertainty as to whether there was an accord, or not? The word "draft."

MR. DAWSON: On the former, the markets determine the interest rates. I don`t think there should be any about that, and the markets make an assessment of political, economic, and other factors, and that`s how they made that judgment. I would note, actually, today, that rates seem to be heading back down in terms of the immediate reaction to the approval of the program yesterday. But it is quite clear that political uncertainty does feed into markets, and does have that effect on rates, and that`s not a uniquely Turkish phenomenon. I think it`s a market phenomenon.

With regard to the Indonesian situation, the mission is leaving Indonesia. There is a draft letter of intent that has been worked on. At the mission level, they have reached basic agreement with the authorities, but it is something that needs to be reviewed in Washington, and there may well be details that need to be worked out.

Anoop Singh, who spoke at a concluding press conference in Jakarta, indicated that our—and I`m quoting him here, courtesy of Reuters: "Our strategic objective has been and continues to be to complete the executive board meeting—which would be from a resumption of the program—well before the September meeting of the Paris Club." So we`re on a track, hopefully, over the next two months or so, which would be able to lead to the resumption of the program. But we`re not, we`re not quite there yet.

QUESTIONER: You said that the Argentine program seems on track. I wanted to know, then, if the mission is leaving next week, and when it would conclude, and when we can expect the next disbursement?

MR. DAWSON: The mission is still scheduled to go to Buenos Aires, but I don`t have a precise time on that, and in terms of when the next review will be, I don`t have anything on that because that of course is contingent on the mission going, and the mission concluding its work.

Questioner: Just on Argentina, there is speculation about whether or not the shortcomings that they`re facing this year, still, and meeting their debt repayments might necessitate some extra cash injection from somewhere. Would the IMF be prepared to perhaps more front-load its loan, bring forward some of the disbursements this year, if it turned out that Argentina did have problems meetings its debt commitments?

MR. DAWSON: I don`t believe there`s any consideration on that, that`s the first part of the answer. Secondly, clearly, if they are able to implement the sorts of measures that they`re talking about in this fiscal effort, that should reduce the likelihood of the scenario that you paint.

QUESTIONER: Many analysts repeatedly warn of a possible domestic debt rollover default risk in Turkey. Do you see such a risk?

MR. DAWSON: The markets, as I say, seem to have responded positively to the board approval yesterday, and the continued implementation of the program, and I would repeat what I stated earlier. This has been a very strong program, quite well implemented, and I think if that becomes clearer, and the political support becomes clear, I think that is also not a scenario likely to materialize.

It`s not my business to tout particular publications, but that salmon-colored financial daily that comes out, has a number of very interesting articles on Turkey, and on the strength of the program this morning, and I think that`d be worth referring to.

QUESTIONER: Suppose the Argentines, in their wisdom, or despair, or whatever, come to the Fund and say, look, we`ve tried everything, nothing`s working, the markets have clearly decided that we`re not going to make it, we`re just going to have to default or restructure the debt, or whatever you wan to call it, whatever term you wan to use, how would the Fund view such a development?

MR. DAWSON: I think that`s a quite hypothetical question and I don`t think you expect me to answer that.

QUESTIONER: But you said if they`re able to implement the measures, they will be able to avoid the risk.

MR. DAWSON: No. Substantially reduce the risk. That, clearly, the announcement contemplates a very tough fiscal policy which would reduce the risk.

QUESTIONER: But my question was since you put an "if" there, do you have any concerns from the political side, whether the political situation in Argentina will enable or not the government to do that?

MR. DAWSON: Well, obviously, that is the government`s primary responsibility to assess and work on that. I would, however, note in a positive commentary, that the former president, Alfonsin, last evening, came out in support of these "courageous measures", I believe he called them, and I understand as well there are meetings with governors scheduled for today.

QUESTIONER: I think the Argentine government has said that they cannot grow, which is obvious to the markets, and that they don`t expect to be able to grow in the immediate future. And these auctions have become a real big problem for Argentina, and they need to auction, I understand, five thousand million before the end of the year, and the idea that has come up in Argentina is that they might come to the Fund and ask it to cover that money.

MR. DAWSON: I`ve not heard, and I don`t expect anything along those lines.

QUESTIONER: Just so we`re clear. On Argentina, has there been any discussion so far about augmenting the amount for Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: No.

QUESTIONER: And is that a possibility?

MR. DAWSON: I don`t believe it`s on the table, so I don`t believe it`s a possibility.

QUESTIONER: The board has met on Turkey, after ten days of postponement, and on July 25, we wait for another, a third payment from the IMF, and we also know that Mr. Kahkonen will be going to Turkey on Monday, and the payment should come soon after July the 25. Shall we expect any changes on this date, due to this ten-day postponement in this release of the second payment? Or does this have nothing to do with that?

MR. DAWSON: All of your premises are absolutely correct—not always the case with questions—and indeed, Mr. Kahkonen is heading back. I`m not aware that the board date has slipped. It is possible it may, but it would not be other than a minor slippage. My understanding in terms of the expectation for the next review is that it is on track. Whether it`s delayed a few days is more likely to have to do with board scheduling issues than anything else.

QUESTIONER: How big do you think is the risk of "contagion" from Argentina and Turkey for other emerging markets such as Russia?

MR. DAWSON: "Contagion" is certainly something of a catchy word and I think one, in looking, you certainly see movements that have, to say the least, a degree of sympathy with other developments, and certainly, for example, Argentina and Brazil are clearly closely related. But as we look at the global picture and as we compare it with relatively recent episodes, going back, say, to the Mexican crisis, `94 or `95, and subsequently we do not see the signs of "contagion" in the context, in the meaning of the word that had existed previously.

QUESTIONER: On another subject, will anyone from the IMF be going to Genoa; right?

MR. DAWSON: I am not certain about that as a matter of fact. I think there is a particular focus on MDB reform, but we`re not involved in that.

QUESTIONER: And in terms of what the finance ministers discussed in their preliminary meeting in Rome, they seem to be putting this "brave face" on the situation, saying that the fundamentals are good, that the global economy is not in danger, basically. Do you feel that they had a reason, or they had the right to say that?

MR. DAWSON: Yes. But I would also note, I think it is fair to say, and it hasn`t really come up in the questions now, but I will interpret your question that way: There is no doubt that countries like Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, and others are in situations that are aggravated by the general slowdown in the global economy, and so in that context their difficulties should factor in that particular context, and I think the G-7 communiqué noted, indeed, the need for rejuvenating global growth, generally.

QUESTIONER: Can you clarify whether there`s been any discussion between the Fund and Brazil about extending their current program, or any discussion about new funds for Brazil?

MR. DAWSON: As you know, Brazil does have a program that I believe extends until December 1st of this year. I have seen some press commentary out of Brazil in regard to that question, and we remain in very close contact with the Brazilian authorities, with the minister and the governor, and I`m not aware of any specifics, but we are in close contact with them and quite supportive of them.

QUESTIONER: Can you say whether Brazil has asked for an extension yet of that program?

MR. DAWSON: I do not believe there has been any such request, but I think—as I say, if you take a look at some of the commentary coming out of Brazil, you will see that that issue has at least been raised.

QUESTIONER: Back to the G-7. Are you expecting any new message on the same line of the finance ministers from the summit on the economic situation, and do you expect a discussion on the IMF reform along the proposals of the United States?

MR. DAWSON: It`s not my position to forecast what G-7 discussions are going to be. Certainly, IMF reform is regularly discussed, although it is my impression that MDB reform is a bit more of a formal agenda item for this time, but it would not surprise me at all if they continue discussing that.

QUESTIONER: Going back to the "contagion," there are other countries, like Paraguay, Uruguay, because they are part of Mercosur, they can be affected, and besides there are other countries in Latin America that can be affected by what happens in Argentina. Is there any assessment on their ability to comply with the IMF programs, or has there been any consultation with other countries about the--

MR. DAWSON: Well, we certainly are in active consultation with all of our members that are potentially affected by these various difficulties, so I mean, the answer is yes, we are in active, frequent contact. But I think, at this point, it`s still a matter of observing how developments work.

QUESTIONER: You mentioned that there was a briefing by the staff to the board. Are you familiar with any of those discussions? Apart from the immediate situation, is there any discussion at the Fund about the medium- or long-term possibility for Argentina, because Argentina has been in recession for three years. All the approaches have failed. Have there been any reviews of the approaches to economic policy, or the economic plan in Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: Well, we are always looking at the short, medium and longer term, but I`m not sure what I have to go on in terms of providing to you on that, but certainly, while the immediate priority is dealing with the present situation, we need to keep in mind longer-term developments, and that`s something that we do in fact discuss with the Argentine authorities, and have discussed with the Argentine authorities as well.

As far as the first part of your question, it was a briefing of just the sort of nature that you would expect, but it`s not the sort of thing that I`m in a position to discuss here.

QUESTIONER: Looking at the countries which have suffered from financial crises in the recent past, it appears that most, if not all, have had either fixed exchange rates or currency boards, and that would include Argentina. In the discussions to come, would the possibility of actually floating the Argentinean currency come up?

MR. DAWSON: No, there certainly has been, and I will cite the two speeches given by the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director back in January of this year, the issue of fixed versus floating, and the conditions under which each would be adopted, or easily sustained, is obviously an active subject that we do discuss.

I don`t think it`s quite true to say that the present difficulties are confined to either floating, or fixed situations. But that`s obviously an issue that we look at. But, on the other hand, it`s also quite clear that countries that follow tough policies can in fact sustain currency boards and other fixed arrangements.

QUESTIONER: Just on a more theoretical plain, which I`m sure you love to roam around, O`Neill has raised the possibility, well, his view, in a speech, that the IMF and The World Bank have reacted too fearfully to "contagion" and the whole concept of it. He believes that the mere whiff of "contagion" is enough to spur very big lending out of the IFIs. You`ve been around quite a few years yourself. You`ve seen a lot of these things. How do you view "contagion"? Is it really something that has been blown out of proportion, to actually leaven more money out the institutions?

MR. DAWSON: Well, I certainly think I`ve seen the word used in headlines far more than it has in fact existed. So I think that`s a fair observation, but it also has in the past existed. But I think after having given you those two tidbits, I`ll take up your option to not answer the question.

QUESTIONER: The assessment that Argentina is not going to be able to pay its foreign debts creates a kind of a crisis in Turkey, just the day before the board met, and the stock market went down, and so on and so forth. Does the Fund predict that the problems in Argentina, or the problems in Turkey will directly have effects on each other as they are facing serious fiscal problems?

MR. DAWSON: I think there is probably some evidence that, in the last couple of weeks there have been effects, but, on the other hand, it could go both ways. So I`m not sure that I would isolate any particular cause.

I mean, there are a number of factors in each of those two major cases, there are significant domestic issues that need to be addressed, that both sets of governments are dealing with. There is a global economy that needs to be looked at, and as markets assess each country`s abilities, because both of these are significant countries in the world economy, and I would note, for example, the heavy weighting of Argentina in the emerging market bond index.

Obviously, there are relationships, but I don`t think that that is a case where one looks particularly externally for the cause of the problems in either of the countries.

QUESTIONER: Has the IMF been in contact with U.S. Treasury, consulting with Treasury on how the international community should react to, or can help in the Argentina situation?

MR. DAWSON: We are regularly in contact, both through the Executive Board as well as through bilateral contacts with governments, but I don`t think I`ll go beyond that.

QUESTIONER: Has there been any discussion of a credit line from the U.S. Treasury?

MR. DAWSON: I have not heard of anything like that; no.

QUESTIONER: There were some reports that have come out of Argentina last night, suggesting that the Argentine government is going to seek a $5 billion loan from the Fund.

MR. DAWSON: I`ve heard nothing about that.

QUESTIONER: Mr. Köhler suggested Turkey needs to show unified political leadership for the success of the Turkish program. Do you think there is not a unified political support to the Turkish economic program?

MR. DAWSON: I think you could look at that salmon-colored newspaper today and see the leader of one of the political parties making precisely that observation. So I think political unity in whatever form of government is obviously important for successful implementation of programs. It`s an aspect of what we call ownership.

QUESTIONER: When you ask what`s going on, why the spreads are so high for Argentina, one of the most common things they tell you is that everyone fears that Argentina won`t be able to pay down the debt. How does the Fund view this, I mean, given the fact that Argentina obviously has no chance to go out and borrow from--

MR. DAWSON: Well, I think I`ve already answered that question in terms of what the positive effect of these sorts of fiscal measures would be. I don`t think there`s any need to go beyond that. I think we`re about running out of questions, or at least I`m winding up giving the same answer.

QUESTIONER: [inaudible]

MR. DAWSON: Fiscal measures reduce the need to go out to markets, quite clearly, because this proposal is for quite a tough fiscal situation.

QUESTIONER: On Brazil, the other country. There were reports saying that the Fund would not be considering at this moment any more help for Argentina, but will be considering more help for the countries that could suffer from the "contagion," like Brazil, or others. Russia. Is this true? And second, would it be the CCL--

MR. DAWSON: Well, first of all, we do not see a generalized contagion of the sort that your question premises, and as countries are affected, either because of their own problems, or regional, or global problems, we certainly do look at how the Fund might assist them. That is in the present environment, not particularly the use for the CCL, because the CCL is more in terms of precautionary, somewhat further, an advanced, developed mechanism.

QUESTIONER: Can you confirm, was there any discussion of supporting the Euro at the finance ministers` meeting last week?

MR. DAWSON: I have no comment on that meeting, and we were not there in that sense of the word. So that`s not my business.

QUESTIONER: Well, I want to make a jump to a very small country, Costa Rica, and the president of Costa Rica is visiting Washington this week, and his main concern is how this HIPC Initiative is going to affect the country, because Costa Rica is a creditor of Nicaragua. Is there any position by the IMF on how this kind of emerging market, Costa Rica is going to be treated into this--

MR. DAWSON: Now I`m certainly aware that the issue of developing country creditors within the HIPC context, countries such as Costa Rica, with their debt to Nicaragua, and others, is an issue. I have no up-to-date briefing on that, and we`ll get back to you on that.

QUESTIONER: At the board meeting, when the Argentine situation was reviewed, did the question of the "contagion" effect of the situation there, was it discussed at any length? And what is the view of the staff at this point, of whether the global financial system is better able to withstand a, what shall we call it? a serious episode? I won`t use the word default in this question, so you don`t answer me with a hypothetical response. But is the view that the global financial system is better able to withstand that type of event than it was in, say, September of 1998?

MR. DAWSON: First of all, we do not discuss what is discussed in board meetings in the context that you were trying to get me to answer, but of course it is, as I said earlier, a full-time board, and it is regularly reviewing both country and systemic questions.

Now with regard to the latter part of your question, certainly, there are any number of indicators that show that the system is much better situated than it was previously, whether you talk about reserve levels, relative leverage of countries, financial systems that are stronger, financial systems that are much better understood, the entire transparency initiative that the Fund has been in the leadership of. So I think you do have a clear sense of a stronger situation and lessons having been learned from previous crises.

I think we can cut it off at that. Thank you.


IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: [phone]
Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: [phone]

[broker*709]

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Wahid backs away from emergency
July 18, 2001 Posted: 9:53 PM HKT (1353 GMT)



There are growing fears of violence on the streets of Jakarta


JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Indonesia`s President Abdurrahman Wahid is seeking a compromise with his political foes and appears unlikely to declare a state of emergency, as was threatened last week.

"The road towards a political compromise is getting stronger and the possibility to declare a state of emergency is very slim now," spokesman Adhie Massardi told Reuters.

Wahid had said he would impose a state of emergency by 6 pm (1100 GMT) on Friday unless his political opponents dropped plans to oust him.

The softer approach emerged as troops braced for violence ahead of the expected political showdown between the president and the country`s top legislature.

On Tuesday security was stepped up in Jakarta, with some 6,000 soldiers deployed to guard the parliament building.


In response to the president`s threat, Amien Rais, the speaker of the Indonesian parliament, has said he would bring forward the impeachment hearings to begin within an hour of any state of emergency being declared.

Reports say that parliamentarians have begun arriving in Jakarta ready to make good on Rais` threat.

Military evacuation
According to the English language Jakarta Post, Rais has asked all members of the People`s Consultative Assembly to remain in Jakarta from Thursday in anticipation of the possible issuance of a presidential decree.

The anticipated showdown between the president and opposition politicians sparked fears of violence on the streets of Jakarta where thousands of Wahid supporters have vowed to defend the president with their lives.

On Tuesday more than 1,500 troops in the town of Tangerang, just west of Jakarta, staged a simulated evacuation of assembly members in case of violence at the impeachment session.

At present lawmakers are scheduled to meet on August 1 to demand that Wahid deliver a report on his 20 months as president.

A majority of lawmakers have said they will reject the president`s accountability speech, a move that would end his troubled presidency.

Wahid, whose term of office runs until 2004, says the any move to remove him will be unconstitutional.

He has said he will declare emergency rule on Friday, dissolving the assembly, unless a compromise is reached that will allow him to stay in office.

[broker*709]

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[broker*709]

Alarmstufe 1, dann 2 und 3.

Und dann implodiert das INDO-Land - die Kurse gehen auf null.

Es gibt keine Börse in Jakarta mehr. Alles ist aus.

Unfug beiseite!

Jetzt kann mann, so glaube ich, noch sehr günstig einkaufen !


Police declare first alert status


JAKARTA (JP): National Police Headquarters announced on Friday afternoon a level one alert in Jakarta, placing all its city officers on guard, only allowing its civilian employees to go home, reports said.

The announcement was made around 4:15 p.m. through a loudspeaker at the office of the National Police Headquarters, El Shinta radio station reported.

It is also reported that around 1,000 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) Police personnel will be stationed at Bhayangkara field, just across the road from National Police Headquarters in South Jakarta. A public kitchen was being set up in the area.

[contrabass]

Mensch hört doch mit Eurem Indonesien auf, da ist doch
Hopfen und Malz verloren. Hört auf mit Euren scheinbaren
Informationen Hoffnung zu schüren.
Der Staat ist versaut und korrupt wie kein anderer.
Selbst eine Militär-Diktatur wäre in kürzester Zeit
genau so korrupt wie die jetzige.

[broker*709]

Wahid, das war`s !!!

Wahid impeachment proceedings begin
July 21, 2001 Posted: 7:20 PM HKT (1120 GMT)


JAKARTA, Indonesia -- The People`s Consultative Assembly has launched formal impeachment proceedings against President Adburrahman Wahid just 21 months after it picked him as Indonesia`s first democratic head of state in four decades.

A few hours earlier, Wahid declared on national television that he would boycott the hearing, which he described as unconstitutional and treasonous.

An overwhelming majority of assembly members voted to proceed with the impeachment process with or without the cooperation of the president, who has repeatedly threatened to declare emergency rule and dissolve the assembly.

Some predicted he could be dropped within days and replaced by Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia`s founding leader, Sukarno.

"Wahid has no chance at all," said Arifin Panigoro, a senior member of Megawati`s party.

The assembly elected Wahid, 61, over Megawati in October 1999.

Initially, the nearly blind Muslim scholar enjoyed wide support amid hopes that he would deliver economic and democratic reforms after years of corrupt dictatorship.

However, relations quickly soured with lawmakers, who accused him of erratic policies and claimed that he was too frail after a series of strokes.

He also failed to quell communal and separatist conflicts that have killed thousands across the sprawling archipelago.

Corruption continued to flourish and attempts to prosecute those guilty of graft, including former dictator Suharto, mostly came to nothing.

Moves to impeach Wahid were launched last year after he was accused of involvement in two multimillion-dollar graft scandals. He denied any wrongdoing and was cleared by police and prosecutors.

Legislators, however, pressed ahead with their campaign against him and censured the president three times this year as a prelude to formal impeachment proceedings.

Wahid also antagonized the military by sidelining several top generals accused of rights violations and graft.

There were no reports of protests or violence in Jakarta or elsewhere even though political turmoil in the past has led to bloodshed.

Hundreds of troops and police guarded the parliament building as the 700-member assembly voted 592-5 on Saturday to move against Wahid. The rest either abstained or refused to attend in protest, including members of Wahid`s minority National Awakening Party.

A 38-member bloc representing the military and police voted against Wahid.

Anthem
Lawmakers sang Indonesia`s national anthem after the result was announced in a televised broadcast.

The assembly has demanded that Wahid appear before it on Monday to defend his record and address allegations of corruption and incompetence.

Wahid said on Saturday he would not deliver an accountability speech.

Instead, he pleaded with his political foes to strike a deal to save Indonesia`s nascent democracy and prevent a wave of civil unrest.

"I will not attend this illegal meeting," Wahid said at a news conference at the state palace. "This is an act of treason."

Wahid predicted there would be a violent reaction to any move to impeach him, saying he enjoyed wide support among the people.

"Don`t blame me if the crowd takes care of everything by themselves," he said. He urged his supporters to refrain from violence.

Wahid said there were no grounds for holding him responsible for the country`s economic woes or for continuing separatist, ethnic and religious conflicts.

"Those were mistakes from the past" that could not be rapidly resolved, he said.

[broker*709]

Die Chinesen schauen sich das Amtsenthebungsverfahren lieber aus dem Ausland an.

Who Cares ?



Chinese Indonesians flee the country ahead of the special session


JAKARTA (JP): A number of Chinese Indonesians living in the Greater Jakarta area have reportedly flown to various destinations abroad, some claiming to go on vacation, while others are attending business matters, a report said on Saturday.

Antara reported that most local residents leaving the country from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were Chinese Indonesian.

They were departing from Terminal E at Soekarno-Hatta Airport for overseas destinations such as Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, United States, Taiwan and European countries, the news agency reported.

On Saturday, Antara reported that there were 32 incoming international flights while 35 overseas flights were recorded leaving the gate.

While, for domestic flights, the cities of destination were Denpasar, Pontianak, Pangkal Pinang, Batam, Surabaya, Makassar and Palembang.

"It`s better to leave town rather than be in Jakarta during the special session. I feel more secure (outside the capital) and at the same time can do some business," 47-year-old Lim Han Juan, who is an electronics trader at Glodok, Central Jakarta, said, asquoted by the news agency.

Similar views were also expressed by Cahyanto Halim, alias Tjin-Tjin, 46 and Santoso, alias Robet, 39. Both men said they, as well as their families, were still traumatized by the previous mid-May 1998 bloody riots. Halim and Santoso went to Hong Kong.

A local airport official named Judiestiawan said that all flights were normal on Saturday and that there were no delays for arrivals as well as departures.

[broker*709]

Ihr könnt wieder zurückkommen !

Gus Dur ist endlich weg !

Megawati installed as president


JAKARTA (JP): Immediately after securing the unanimous support of the registered members of the People`s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri was officially installed as president to replace Abdurrahman Wahid.

Clad in a white-and-purple kebaya, Megawati took her oath as the country`s fifth president.

She then gave her inaugural address to the MPR legislators, expressing her gratitude for her appointment as president.

Before Megawati delivered her speech, MPR secretary-general Umar Basalim read Assembly Decree No. 3/MPR/2001 which made official Megawati`s appointment as president.

Umar also announced the revocation of two MPR decrees -- No. 7/MPR/1999 on the installment of Abdurrahman Wahid as president and No. 8/MPR/1999 on the installment of Megawati as vice president.

The secretary-general also announced that the MPR had agreed to allow Megawati to complete Abdurrahman`s term to 2004.

All 591 MPR members registered to vote earlier rejected Abdurrahman`s accountability and voted to appoint Megawati to replace the embattled president.

As the announcement was being made of Megawati`s installment as president, bouquets were sent to her official residence on Jl. Teuku Umar in Central Jakarta and her personal residence in Kebagusan subdistrict, Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta, Antarareported.

[broker*709]

Ein bisschen was in deutsch!

Es ist endlich vollbracht, wir können durchstarten, ich hoffe, dass Rizal Ramli Finanzminister bleibt.

Montag 23. Juli 2001, 13:37 Uhr

Megawati als neue Präsidentin Indonesiens vereidigt

Jakarta (Reuters) - Die Beratende Volksversammlung Indonesien hat Präsident Abdurrahman Wahid am Montag abgesetzt und Vize-Präsidentin Megawati Sukarnoputri als Nachfolgerin ernannt. Nur wenige Minuten später wurde sie als fünfte Präsidentin des Landes vereidigt. Wahid hatte erklärt, er weigere sich abzutreten. Die von ihm verkündete Auflösung der Volksversammlung war vom Obersten Gericht zuvor aber für illegal erklärt worden. Polizei und Militär verweigerten ihm den Gehorsam. Ob er nun mit Gewalt aus dem Präsidentenpalast geholt wird, blieb zunächst unklar. Wahid steht unter dem Verdacht der Korruption. Außerdem wurde ihm eine chaotische Amtsführung vorgeworfen. Die nationale Währung gewann am Montag zehn Prozent an Wert. Der Aktienmarkt stieg auf den höchsten Stand seit zehn Monaten.


Megawati rief die Indonesier auf, ihre Differenzen zurückzustellen und sich für den Aufbau einer großen Nation einzusetzen. In ihrer siebenminütigen Rede ging sie auf Wahid mit keinem Wort ein. Sie rief aber alle Parteien auf, die Entscheidung der Volksversammlung zu akzeptieren. "Lasst uns zusammen unser Land aufbauen", appellierte sie an die Bürger. Alle Auseinandersetzungen, die so viel Leid gebracht hätten, sollten beendet werden.


Aus dem Präsidentenpalast kamen indes weniger versöhnliche Töne. Wahid werde bleiben, sagte einer seiner Berater. Er habe während der Abstimmung der Volksversammlung zwar geschlafen, aber er habe schon vorher gesagt, er werde nicht abtreten. Wahids Sprecher kündigte zudem "notwendige Maßnahmen" an, um das Land zusammen zu halten. Seinen Kampf zur Rettung des Landes betrachte er als "heiligen Krieg".


Nachbarländer Indonesiens und die USA drangen auf eine friedliche Beilegung der Krise. US-Außenminister Colin Powell sagte, die USA seien über die Entwicklung in Indonesien sehr besorgt. Er appellierte an alle Seiten, einschließlich Armee und Polizei, äußerste Zurückhaltung zu üben und dem demokratischen verfassungsmäßigen Prozess nicht im Wege zu stehen. Ähnlich äußerte sich der australische Außenminister Alexander Downer. Er rechne aber nicht mit einer Gewaltwelle in Indonesien, sagte Downer.


Mit der Ausrufung des Ausnahmezustandes hatte Wahid offenbar auch jeglichen Rückhalt in Armee und Polizei verloren. Der Polizeichef von Jakarta widersetzte sich der Anordnung Wahids und stellte Sicherheitskräfte zum Schutz der Volksversammlung ab. Ein Polizeisprecher sagte, die Polizei werde eine Präsidentschaft Megawatis als legitim anerkennen.


Die indonesische Währung war am Montag mit Kursen bei 11.138 Rupien zum Dollar so stabil wie seit vier Monaten nicht mehr. Der richtungweisende indonesische Aktienindex JSX legte bis zum Mittag bis zu 3,36 Prozent zu; nach Gewinnmitnahmen schloss er bei einem Plus von 2,2 Prozent, dem höchsten Stand seit dem 8. September 2000. Der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) hatte mitgeteilt, ein Regierungswechsel werde keine Auswirkungen auf das Kreditprogramm für Indonesien im Umfang von fünf Milliarden Dollar (rund 11,25 Milliarden Mark) haben.

[broker*709]

Heute gibt die Börse schon wieder alles ab.

Aber Gus Dur packt wohl endlich seine Sachen.

Gus Dur`s family starts to pack


JAKARTA (JP): The family of deposed president Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid has started packing their belongings at Merdeka Palace on Tuesday as they are leaving the palace soon, reports said.

Abdurrahman Wahid`s youngest daughter Inayah Wulandari said on Tuesday afternoon that she had begun to pack her clothes and other belongings, El Shinta radio reported.

"We are preparing to move back to Ciganjur (Abdurrahman`s residence). But when exactly we`re going, I don`t know yet," Inayah said, as broadcasted by the station.

Inayah said she had yet to discuss with her father on his latest plans.

"I know things have been very rough for my father and I don`t want to burden him further. To me, he is still my president and hero, and I am proud to be Gus Dur`s daughter," she said.

Inayah said she had always been happy being ordinary and free.

"Actually I did not want to live in the palace but at the time they said it would be difficult to secure my house in Ciganjur," she said.

She said she would love to go back to Ciganjur as the rooms in the palace were sometimes "very creepy".

"Many times the television in the room turned on by itself although it had been turned off. There is a big clock in the computer room that makes sounds every time I enter the room, but if I`m with others, it doesn`t make a sound," she said.

When asked if she wanted to become president, Inayah quickly replied: "No. I want to focus on children`s welfare."

[bullitteam]

wie ist denn bank bali einzuschätzen,war einmal ein depotwert bei 3satboerse und lag schon bei über 0,2 euro

[Kurswechsel]

@bullitteam,

es ist schon erstaunlich - je mehr ein Wert zum Sorgenfall wird, desto öfter wird er genannt, gerade bei w:o. Pleitekandidaten, Pfennigaktien und Problemfälle haben in manchen Foren wie "Neuer Markt" die meisten Beiträge.

Wenn etwas faul ist, wird es umkreist und umschwärmt. Viel Glück in der Faule-Kredite-Branche.

Zur Bank Bali kannst du dich im w:o Forum informieren. Es gab eine umgekehrte Spaltung (Verschmelzung), verbunden mit starker Kapitalerhöhung, die Altaktien drastisch entwertete. BNII soll durch eine Übernahme vor der Pleite gerettet werden.

Numerisch sieht es sicher toll aus, wie tief die unter den Höchstständen stehen. Im Forum Neuer Markt wird auch alle fünf Minuten ein neuer "Dausendprozenter" angepriesen, der leider meist der Null (Pleite) näher ist.

Ich wünsch` dir Glück und neue Höchststände, über die ich mich freuen würde. Es scheint mir aber aussichtsreichere Aktien im Indoland zu geben.

Grüße,

Kurswechsel

P.S.

Der Verfasser hält ein paar Anteile in Bank Bali Aktien und wäre glücklich, sie günstig verkaufen zu können. Also, bringt den Kurs mal schön nach oben. (War nur ein Scherz.)

[BXB]

fürs trading empfiehlt sich BNII: 889036 - für 0,003 rein und für 0,004 raus

aus 30.000 DM schnell 40.000 gemacht ;-))

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Nette Daten:

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2001 9:53:44 AM
For further information and firm prices, please contact :
Treasury Sales and Marketing Standard Chartered Bank
Tel. [phone] Fax. [phone]
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ROUNDUP

The dollar fades to 124.23 yen after again faltering at the 124.50 barrier as early Japanese fixing demand dries up leaving exporter offers to dominate.
The euro steady on the dollar for the moment at 0.8730 but well supported by a weak Wall Street and Fed Chairman Greenspan’s cautious view of the economy.
LOCAL MARKET ROUNDUP
The IDR open at 9775-9875 in a slightly dollar biddish sentiment came from corporates both local and multinationals. They feel that the dollar below 10000 level is quite good to buy. Beside, some exporters are waiting for 10000 level to sell their dollars spot and forward as well. Expected to break 9900 level intraday routed to 10000 level, but if failed the IDR could rebound to 9700 level area. Technically, the IDR could be traded in range of 9750-9950 until the end of the week.
Indonesia’s financial markets originally euphoric over the sacking of Abdurrachman Wahid awaited the choice for the new Vice President scheduled today. Five candidates have joined the race for the vacant VP : parliament speaker Akbar Tandjung, United Development party chairman Hamzah Haz, former top security ministers Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Agum Gumelar and former transmigration minister Siswono Yudohusodo.
The IDR kept a firm grasp on its recent gains after shooting past 10000 level yesterday. Rupiah reached a high of 9750 level from its opening at 10300 level. State banks were seen selling dollar against their long position as hopes rose that the new President Megawati can restore order o the country and its battered economy.
JKSE took a break after Monday’s euphoria over the appointment of Megawati Sukarnoputri as President and fell 12.3 points to close at 457.92, on profit taking on Tuesday.
SPOT MIDDLE RATES
USD/IDR SWAP EUR/IDR SWAP
1 WK 26 (13.51%) -
2 WKS 52 (13.51%) -
1 MTH 120 (14.08%) 135
2 MTHS 242 (14.19%) 275
3 MTHS 360 (13.93%) 423
6 MTHS 725 (14.25%) 852
12 MTHS 1550 (15.44%) 1860
SIBOR
(%)
1 MTH 3.81
2 MTHS 3.74
3 MTHS 3.70
6 MTHS 3.72
12 MTHS 3.89
INDICATIVE OFFER RATE
USD/IDR
CROSS CURRENCY SWAP
1 YR 20.05%
2 YR 19.50%
3 YR 18.60%
5 YR 16.80%
10 YR 16.50%


SPOT MIDDLE RATES
USD/MAJOR MAJORS/IDR
USD - 9875
EUR 0.8735 8626
JPY 124.25 79.48
CHF 1.7225 5733
GBP 1.4210 14033
SGD 1.8165 5436
AUD 0.5090 5026
NEW YORK TRADING
USD/IDR n.a. n.a.
EUR/USD 0.8737 0.8725
USD/JPY 124.38 124.18
USD/CHF 1.7273 1.7210
GBP/USD 1.4218 1.4207
AUD/USD 0.5091 0.5083

[broker*709]

Der Aufschwung kann eingeleutet werden.

Hamzah Haz zum indonesischen Vizepräsidenten gewählt
Jakarta (Reuters) - Indonesiens Beratende Volksversammlung hat am Donnerstag den Vorsitzenden der moslemisch orientierten Vereinigten Entwicklungspartei zum Vizepräsidenten des Landes gewählt. Haz hatte bereits in zwei Wahlrunden am Mittwoch die meisten Stimmen auf sich vereinen können, die notwendige Mehrheit jedoch verfehlt. Gegen Haz war der Vorsitzende der früheren Staatspartei Golkar, Akbar Tandjung, angetreten. Am Montag war der bisherige indonesische Präsident Abdurrahman Wahid abgesetzt und Vizepräsidentin Megawati Sukarnoputri als Nachfolgerin ernannt worden.


Megawati war bereits 1999 bei den Präsidentenwahlen angetreten. Haz hatte damals erklärt, Frauen seien nicht in der Lage, die größte islamische Nation der Welt anzuführen.


Die Weltbank erwartet von Megawati und ihrer Regierung Wirtschaftsreformen. Weltbankpräsident James Wolfensohn erklärte, er sei zuversichtlich, dass Indonesien unter Megawati wieder blühen und gedeihen werde. Nach Wahids Entlassung hatte sich die Landeswährung von 11.200 auf 9900 Rupien pro Dollar erholt.

[broker*709]

Der nächste Präsident steht auch schon fest.

Vom Königsmacher zum Königsmörder

Amien Rais, Chef der Volksversammlung, hat Wahid zur Macht verholfen – nun war er maßgeblich an seiner Absetzung beteiligt


Von Arne Perras

Im zähen Kampf um den Sturz des indonesischen Präsidenten Abdurrahman Wahid spielte Amien Rais eine entscheidende Rolle. Unermüdlich hat der Vorsitzende der Beratenden Volksversammlung, die den Präsidenten wählt, daran gearbeitet, die Anti-Wahid- Front zu verbreitern und zu befestigen. Vor zwei Jahren freilich hatte er noch genau das Gegenteil getan. Damals organisierte er eine Mehrheit für die Wahl des Überraschungskandidaten Wahid.

Der Wechsel vom Königsmacher zum Königsmörder ist dem 57-Jährigen nicht sonderlich schwer gefallen. Schon des öfteren hat Amien Rais bewiesen, wie wandelbar seine politischen Einsichten und Vorstellungen sein können, wenn es nur dem eigenen Fortkommen dient. Mühelos spielte er mal die religiöse Karte, gab sich mal als Nationalist, und präsentierte sich im nächsten Moment als moderater Demokrat. Wie kaum ein anderer indonesischer Politiker übt sich Rais in der Rolle des politischen Chamäleons. Da passt es auch, dass er Megawati Sukarnoputri mit ins Präsidentenamt verholfen hat – vergessen sein Satz, dass eine Frau nicht an der Spitze eines überwiegend von Muslimen bevölkerten Staates stehen könne.

Rais hatte sich noch in der Endphase der Suharto-Diktatur als kritischer Geist hervorgetan. 1998 trat er als Vorsitzender der zweitgrößten Muslim-Organisation „Muhammadiyah“, die 28Millionen Mitglieder zählt, zurück und gründete die „Partei des Nationalen Mandats“ (PAN). Sie schnitt allerdings bei den letzten Parlamentswahlen 1999 nicht so gut ab wie von vielen erwartet. Deshalb musste Rais damals seine Träume von der Präsidentschaft erst einmal begraben.

Im Westen wurde der promovierte Politologe, der unter anderem in den USA studierte, lange Zeit sehr positiv bewertet, weil er sich als Kämpfer gegen das Regime des Diktators Suharto profilierte. Später aber wuchs die Skepsis, weil sich Rais immer mehr als politischer Opportunist entpuppte. Als sich der blutige Konflikt zwischen Christen und Muslimen auf den Molukken zuspitzte, kritisierten westliche Diplomaten, dass Rais seinen Einfluss nicht nutzte, um mäßigend auf militante muslimische Gruppen einzuwirken. Manche Beobachter warfen ihm gar vor, den Konflikt hinter den Kulissen bewusst zu schüren.

Auch wenn Rais in den vergangenen Wochen bemüht war, seine politischen Ambitionen kleinzureden, so zweifelt doch kaum einer daran, dass er selbst nach dem Amt des Präsidenten strebt. Schon gibt es Spekulationen, Rais könnte den 180-Grad-Schwenk, den er bei Wahid vollzogen hat, auch bei Präsidentin Megawati wiederholen, und zwar noch vor den nächsten Wahlen im Jahr 2004. Gerüchte über Megawatis vermögenden Ehemann Taufik Kiemas und dessen angeblich korrupte Geschäfte sind schon seit einiger Zeit in Umlauf. Wahid stürzte, obgleich sich die Korruptionsvorwürfe gegen ihn als weitgehend unbegründet erwiesen haben. Seine Absetzung hat einen Präzedenzfall geschaffen, den machthungrige Politiker wie Rais wiederholen könnten, um sich selbst für das höchste Amt im Staat in Position zu bringen.

Rais ist bemüht, solchen Überlegungen den Boden zu entziehen. Erst kürzlich beteuerte er, er wolle bis 2004 Vorsitzender der Beratenden Volksversammlung bleiben. Megawati freilich weiß, wie viel solche Zusicherungen wert sind – zumal wenn sie aus dem Munde eines Amien Rais kommen.

[gholzbauer]

Hallo Indonesienexperten,
kann mir jemand sagen, warum Astra Agro in den letzten Wochen so stark gestiegen sind? Nur der Anstieg der Palmölpreise oder noch andere Gründe?
MfG

[broker*709]

Auch dem morgigen SPIEGEL, ist es einen Artikel über Indonesien wert:

30. Juli 2001




I N D O N E S I E N

Frau aus den Wolken

Machtwechsel in der größten Muslimnation: Wird die neue Präsidentin Megawati zur Marionette von Militärs und Großunternehmen?


Präsidentin Megawati beim Amtseid "Tochter der Republik"

Die erste Reise der frisch gekürten Politikerin führte auf den Friedhof. Knapp 48 Stunden nachdem Megawati Sukarnoputri unter einer Prachtausgabe des Korans als fünftes Staatsoberhaut Indonesiens den Amtseid abgelegt hatte, brach sie zu einer privaten Pilgerfahrt auf.
In Bendogerit, einem Dorf im Osten Javas, betete sie im Beisein von örtlichen Würdenträgern und Geistlichen am Grab ihres Vaters - des 1970 verstorbenen Staatsgründers Sukarno. Während der örtliche Imam göttlichen Segen erflehte, verweilte Megawati, begleitet von ihrer Tochter, ehrfürchtig an der Weihestätte.

Die Geste war mehr als ein Zeichen religiösen Respekts vor dem Toten, der in Indonesien als Schöpfer der Nation verehrt wird: Die vergangenen Montag gewählte Megawati stellte sich damit selbstbewusst in die Reihe der politischen Erbfolge als "Tochter der Republik".

Jetzt, nachdem der entmachtete Wahid in die USA abreiste und wütend gelobte, "der moralische Kampf geht weiter", muss die erste Frau an der Spitze des bevölkerungsreichsten Muslimstaats der Erde erst beweisen, dass sie für das intrigante Schattenspiel um Einfluss und Macht mehr mitbringt als einen Promi-Stammbaum: Das abgewirtschaftete Archipel mit 225 Millionen Menschen wird von Streiks, Attentaten, Protesten erschüttert; religiöse und ethnische Konflikte bedrohen den Zusammenhalt des 17 500-Insel-Staats.

Zweifel am Durchsetzungsvermögen der 54-Jährigen sind jedoch schon im Umlauf, seit Megawati 1999 die ersten demokratischen Parlamentswahlen seit 44 Jahren gewann. Damals errang ihre Demokratische Partei des Kampfes (PDI-P) mit 34 Prozent der Stimmen den Sieg; doch beim nachfolgenden Schacher um die Präsidentschaft wurde sie von dem halbblinden Muslimführer Abdurrahman Wahid ausgebootet.

Der gewiefte Religionsgelehrte, dessen "Nationale Erweckungspartei" (PKB) nur 13 Prozent der Stimmen holte, mobilisierte macho-muslimische Vorurteile; die düpierte Politikerin wurde mit dem Posten der Vizepräsidentin abgespeist.

Dort verharrte Megawati noch in politischer Duldungsstarre, als Wahid sie öffentlich als "dumm" beschimpfte. Während das Land unter dem zunehmend erratisch regierenden Politiker im Chaos versank, hüllte sie sich in vornehmes Schweigen. Bei den Separatistenaufständen in Aceh oder blutigen Fehden auf Borneo und den Molukken versagte Megawati als Troubleshooterin.

Kein Wunder: Aktenstudium und Briefings waren der matronenhaften Matriarchin eine lästige Pflichtübung, statt Visionen pflegte sie lieber ihren Garten. Zum Zeitvertreib kurvte sie mit ihrem blau gespritzten VW Beetle durch Jakarta oder frönte ihrer Kinoleidenschaft - Filme aus dem Hause Disney, Lieblingstitel: "Die Schöne und das Biest".

Bei öffentlichen Auftritten glänzte Megawati zwar bisweilen mit putzigen Kinderreimen, doch ihr Grundsatzprogramm beschränkt sich auf schlichte nationalistische Parolen. Neben der Indonesierin, so höhnte der britische "Economist", erscheint US-Präsident George W. Bush geradezu "wie ein Intellektueller".

Wie der Amtskollege aus Amerika ist Megawati eine politische Spätberufung. Eines von acht Kindern Sukarnos, der, je nach biografischer Quelle, vier oder gar sieben Gattinnen ehelichte, wurde sie 1947 in einer stürmischen Regennacht geboren: Ihre Eltern nannten sie Megawati - "Wolkenfrau".

Das Mädchen wuchs im Präsidentenpalast auf wie eine javanische Prinzessin. Das privilegierte Leben endete erst, als ihr Vater 1966 durch General Suharto entmachtet wurde. Dennoch - bis Megawati 1987 vor allem wegen ihres Namens als Abgeordnete der PDI aufgestellt wurde, genoss sie das typische Hausfrauenleben der indonesischen Mittelklasse. Sie hatte nach zwei abgebrochenen Studiengängen (Landwirtschaft und Psychologie) in dritter Ehe den Geschäftsmann Taufik Kiemas geheiratet und drei Kinder geboren.

Auch im Parlament blieb Megawati zunächst eine unauffällige Hinterbänklerin. Erst als Suharto die Seiteneinsteigerin 1996 mit brachialen Manövern aus dem Parteivorsitz der PDI hebelte, wurde sie über Nacht zur Symbolfigur des Widerstands: Seither genießt "Ibu Mega" unter den Ärmsten im Volk den legendären Ruf der tugendhaften Landesmutter.

Die blütenweiße Reputation ist Megawatis stärkster Trumpf. Doch da ihr Vizepräsident, Hamzah Haz, 61, aus der Suharto-Ära stammt und sich unter ihren Beratern frühere Generäle und reiche Anhänger des Ex-Diktators Suharto tummeln, fragen sich indonesische Intellektuelle, ob die populäre Präsidentin nicht bald zur Marionette von Militär und Großunternehmen geraten wird.

Vor allem die Geschäfte von Ehemann Kiemas drohen den Heiligenschein der neuen Präsidentin zu beschädigen. Der gewiefte Unternehmer machte als Tankstellenbesitzer Millionen und gilt als heimlicher Strippenzieher der PDI-P.

Der rührige Spendenbeschaffer sorgte nicht nur für den Finanzsegen der Partei. Obendrein stellte Kiemas eine bewaffnete Parteimiliz auf - deren Chef war früher Kommandeur einer berüchtigten paramilitärischen Miliz in Osttimor und gilt unter Uno-Vertretern als Kriegsverbrecher.

Bei solchen Querverbindungen sieht George Aditjondro die alte und neue Bewohnerin in Jakartas Merdeka-Palast eher als kurzfristigen Notbehelf. "Ich bin pessimistisch", orakelt der Indonesien-Experte der Universität Newcastle: "Wir werden wahrscheinlich den Wechsel von kurzzeitig amtierenden Präsidenten erleben, während das Militär sicherstellt, dass es keine ernst zu nehmenden Verfahren wegen Korruption und Verstößen gegen die Menschenrechte gibt."

STEFAN SIMONS

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[zinnbude]

So wie es aussieht ist das Schlimmste überstanden.

Lasst uns abwarten und die steigenden Kurse geniessen:

TINS 1750 IDR
IDR/EUR 8500

Eure
Zinnbude

[broker*709]

Ja, richtig so, der IMF bleibt auch auf Kurs und sieht keinen Grund zu hektischen Aktionismus.
Step by Step geht es voran!

Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas Dawson
Director
External Relations Department
International Monetary Fund
Wednesday, July 25, 2001
Washington, D.C.

MR. DAWSON: Good morning, everyone. I`m Tom Dawson, Director of External Relations at the IMF, and this is another in our series of regular press briefings. The briefing is under our standard ground rules, embargoed until 15 minutes after its conclusion, and we`ll set a precise time when we conclude.

The Executive Board is scheduled to go into its annual recess from August 6th through August 17th, so this will be my last briefing before the Board recess. I will be taking recess myself, but I can be reached. I will only remind you of my e-mail address not of my cell phone number. But if anything urgent, I look forward to hearing from you. So it probably will be three weeks or so before our next regular briefing.

I have no prepared remarks to offer at this point, so I`d just be happy to start by taking questions. As usual, in the interest of decorum, please identify yourself and your organization.

QUESTION: Stanley Fischer will be in Turkey quite soon. Could you tell us a few words about what he will be doing there? Does this have anything to do with the Ninth Review, and do you have an idea about when the next Board meeting on Turkey will be held? And a couple of remarks on the Turkish economy, please.

Thank you.

MR. DAWSON: I will try to answer most, if not all of that.

Mr. Fischer will be arriving in Turkey on Friday, as I believe the Prime Minister noted this morning, for a couple of days of discussions with the public sector, and the private sector. And there will be certainly some press availability as well. Our Mr. Hawley will be there, too, so that there will be a point of contact during Mr. Fischer`s visit.

As you know, there is presently a Fund mission led by Mr. Kahkonen in Turkey for the Ninth Review of the program, and Mr. Fischer`s visit there is obviously related to the mission being there because it makes it much more convenient in terms of both the visit and having conversations with the authorities. We expect the mission will conclude its discussions more or less with the timing of Mr. Fischer`s visit.

In terms of the next Board meeting, we anticipate a Board meeting on this Ninth Review to be held in early August, and this approval would make available additional funding.

In terms of the purpose of the visit, it is an opportunity for him to meet with the authorities with the advantage of having the mission there to discuss the progress, which we believe has been quite substantial under the program. And to have a chance to meet with various elements of the Turkish body politick, if I could call it that -- public, private, and press. So I think that`s the basic line.

But as I say, we do remain -- to answer your question on the program -- we do remain quite impressed with their commitment under the program and the achievements under the program.

QUESTION: The IMF is much more open. We know that they are in negotiations at this point. So when should we expect the letter, the new letter of intent to be signed?

MR. DAWSON: Be careful of what you think you know. Despite there having been a number of stories yesterday saying that the Ministry had announced that they were coming here to negotiate a program, we`ve checked with the Ministry and the Ministry says they, in fact, did not make such an announcement.

There is indeed a mission here from the Brazilians that will be discussing with the Fund recent developments in Brazil under the existing program as well as options to consider as the program approaches its conclusion, which is December 1st of this year. So to describe this as a mission to negotiate a new program I think is, at the least, premature -- that is not, in fact, precisely what is going on -- and the speculation that I noted in particular in yesterday`s press about amounts of a program are even more premature.

So that, yes, indeed there is a mission that will be here--I`m not sure if they`re here physically at the moment, but they`ll be here shortly -- to have meetings with IMF staff on the progress under the program as well as options for when the program expires. There are also a number of senior Brazilian officials who, coincidentally, happen to be in Washington this week, as well.

I know Arminio Fraga will be here for a conference, and I am certain he will be taking advantage of that visit to visit the Fund, and I believe one other of the senior officials will be here for the private sector seminar and will also be meeting with staff. And that`s quite common when senior officials come for Bank or IDB conferences to come over to the Fund, but as I think Francisco noted with one of the wire services last night, this is not a mission to negotiate a program -- even though I read it in at least six or eight publications yesterday.

QUESTION: Isn`t it too early -- isn`t it too early to discuss options for when the program expires? It expires in December, I mean, six months from now. And it was not only newspaper that said that. Secretary O`Neill yesterday said that Brazil should receive funds from the IMF. So I think it`s not only a speculation.

MR. DAWSON: No, that would still be a speculation, because the question is: `Is this a mission to negotiate the program?` That is a determination made by the authorities, the Brazilian authorities. And it`s actually four months from now, as a matter of fact, and, no, that is--by no means would that be early. Indeed, we would normally have program reviews of one sort or another since Brazil does have a program with the Fund. And as I indicated at my last briefing, we are in constant contact with the Brazilian authorities given the general situation in the markets, particularly in that region.

So it is not too early. This is, in fact, something that we would hope that would take place, and this is, I think, just another demonstration of the very open and cooperative attitude from the Brazilian authorities in recent times.

QUESTION: I`m sorry. I`m a little bit confused. This is not a mission.

MR. DAWSON: No. It is a mission.

QUESTION: But it`s not too early to negotiate or...

MR. DAWSON: No, that wasn`t the question.

QUESTION: No, no. Isn`t that what you just said?

MR. DAWSON: Is it too early...

QUESTION: I`m just confused. I`m sorry.

MR. DAWSON: What`s the confusion?

QUESTION: No, it`s not a mission, but, on the other hand...

MR. DAWSON: No. It is a mission. It is a mission.

QUESTION: Uh-huh. No, it`s not a mission to negotiate...

MR. DAWSON: A new program.

QUESTION: A new program.

MR. DAWSON: Correct.

QUESTION: Right. But you`re also saying that it`s not too early to start negotiating a new program. Is that what you said?

MR. DAWSON: No, I didn`t say that either.

QUESTION: Oh, no? I`m sorry.

MR. DAWSON: I said it is natural to be discussing options since the program has four months and seven or six days to go. It is natural for discussions to be taking place.

Secondly, there is, of course, an existing program, so it is also natural for discussions to be taking place.

QUESTION: So, just to be clear, it`s an informal discussion to negotiate...

MR. DAWSON: No, I didn`t say -- excuse me. It is a...

QUESTION: ...a new program.

MR. DAWSON: It is a mission to here to discuss current developments and options for the relationship as the program approaches its conclusion. And what it turns into is another question. But the idea that there`s a mission coming here and we expect the College of Cardinals to produce white smoke and there will be an agreement and money is premature, vastly premature. It is simply not. Who knows what will happen? Things do change. But the idea that this is a mission that has come with a mandate and an expectation that they will be negotiating a program, there will be an announcement and a news brief, that is simply not the case.

QUESTION: All that being the case on Brazil, is it reasonable to assume that, given their strong performance under the program, that should they seek an extension from the Fund that they will be in a relatively strong position to have their wishes granted?

MR. DAWSON: There are some hypotheticals in that. I certainly would agree with the premise regarding the strong performance under the program and also perhaps an unstated premise about the close cooperation with the Brazilian authorities.

But the nature of this continuing support, if the Brazilians are coming up, they will, I`m sure, be presenting ideas to us. We will have ideas. Whether that is an extension, as you call it, or what other form it takes and what timing this takes in terms of how quickly an agreement would be reached or a decision made as to how to go forward we don`t know at this point. Those discussions haven`t taken place.

I`m not saying that everyone should go off on recess and come back in September, but the reality is this is not something that is being done in some sort of crisis sort of mode. There are tensions in the region, obviously, but this is not sort of a rush to put together a program. Of course, there is a program.

QUESTION: There`s a mission in Buenos Aires now, and you said on your last briefing that the program was on track. And I think that would imply that the government has been saying that there`s no fiscal problems with the targets for this period. But are you reviewing now the targets for growth for the year? Because it`s clear at this point that Argentina won`t be able to grow 5 percent in the last period, as it`s on the letter of intent, and it would be 1 percent for the whole year. Are you going to look at it now?

MR. DAWSON: The mission is obviously reviewing performance. It is natural for the mission to look at the balance of the year targets and so on. So, I mean, those are all subjects that obviously come up in the discussion, but I don`t have any report in terms of -- or any specifics for you in terms of what the conclusions of it. The mission, of course, went down the end of last week and has been working at this point just a couple days, and I don`t have feedback from them. I know they are there.

QUESTION: I have a couple of questions, actually.

One, Mr. Fischer`s visit to Turkey, do we have any actual date for him and to start the talks with Turkey?

Second, I believe it was Ankara`s request to directly talk to Mr. Fischer. And so far we know a couple of items that they are going to discuss and lead to a revision in the program. And one which we find very, you know, important is the interest rates. And Mr. Fischer also himself stressed that a program starts it to work, and the inflation starts it to go down, but the interest rates are still up.

What are the measures that IMF can advise to control this? Or is IMF still, you know, in the understanding that there should be a political -- more stability to take the interest rates down? What`s the reason?

MR. DAWSON: Obviously, some of that is also speculative. It`s certainly true that Mr. Fischer is going to Turkey at the invitation of the authorities. He will be arriving on Friday and I believe departing Sunday.

I have seen some speculation as to elements of the program that are supposedly going to be revised or whatever. I would steer you away from taking those comments too literally because this, in fact, is a visit by Mr. Fischer at the request of the authorities to discuss it. We are quite firm, Mr. Fischer is very firm, that this program has been and is a strong one, that the authorities have accomplished a great deal, and we have also stressed, as you stated in your question, the need for strong domestic political consensus. But I don`t think one should expect that he is going there with specific revisions in mind that will be -- that are the subject of his visit. I think his visit is a somewhat broader -- has a somewhat broader purpose and it`s not to renegotiate the program.

QUESTION: [inaudible].

MR. DAWSON: I think I would describe it somewhat more broadly than that in terms of market confidence, of which that is an element.

QUESTION: I would like to know which kind of discussion the IMF is doing about Brazil. Which level is the...

MR. DAWSON: These are staff-level discussions.

QUESTION: Yes. Well, what they are talking about, because...

MR. DAWSON: They have the Secretary...

QUESTION: Excuse me...

MR. DAWSON: The Secretary of the Finance Ministry and senior officials from the Western Hemisphere Department.

QUESTION: And I know that you have made the last analysis...

MR. DAWSON: I think the Planning Ministry is there, too. But it`s not the Ministers, it`s not the Managing Director.

QUESTION: I also want to know, do you have any new analysis about Brazil? Because, of course, when we talked about Brazil earlier this year, it was a very different situation. What I want to know, if you can tell us what -- how the IMF is looking at Brazil at this moment, with all this Argentina crisis and so on? What is new in this analysis?

MR. DAWSON: I think that`s a bit too open-ended a question. We have made it clear that we believe the Brazilian performance under their program has been very, very strong and it remains strong. It is also quite clear that the Brazilian economy has been adversely affected by a number of developments, some domestic, some in terms of the global economy, some regional in terms of particularly the spillover from Argentina. All of those three broad categories are adverse developments that have impacted the external and internal performance. So it`s entirely appropriate that we would be intensifying our discussions with the Brazilians, they would be intensifying their own considerations, and that they`re up here to look at what all of that means for their relationship with the Fund at present under the current program -- and I will repeat, again, there is a program presently in effect -- and what implications there are from that for the relationship with the Fund as the program approaches its completion on December 1st.

QUESTION: I understand Daniel Marx from Argentina is coming up this week as well. Have you heard anything about that? And if so, are there particulars that you can discuss that he will be raising or that you will be raising with--the IMF will be raising with him?

MR. DAWSON: Yes, I did know Daniel Marx was coming up because I said to somebody to say hello to Daniel, and they said, "You`ll be seeing him in a couple of days."

I believe, unless I`m mistaken, he is coming up -- yes. He is coming up for the private sector seminar that we are putting on, on Thursday. A number of officials are coming up for that, so that is -- Daniel Gleizer was the Brazilian who was coming up for that whose name I couldn`t remember. So that is the reason that he is coming up.

But as I indicated, it is quite natural for them when they are up here -- and this actually is a Fund-sponsored seminar -- for them to be meeting with whoever happens to be around at that point. But he is not coming up for an Argentina agenda in particular. This is a seminar that has participants from eight or 10 countries on private sector involvement.

QUESTION: Could you just clarify how much money Brazil still has left under the old loan? And when would they expect to draw that between now and December?

MR. DAWSON: They have a stand-by that has an outstanding availability -- both availability and then balances yet to be made available.

The disbursements that potentially could still be made under the current stand-by amount to approximately 950 million SDR. Your multiplier is about 1.27 dollars. There`s about 515 million SDR of that would be available at the moment. In other words, it`s already passed reviews and is available. And approximately 434 million SDR would be available in the remaining two tranches of the program, the first of which would be made available on the conclusion of the Eighth Review, which at this point, according to the established schedule, would be sometime in September, and the balance would be available at some point in October. Their outstanding Fund credit -- not meaning to change your denominators on you -- is approximately 97 percent of quota. So they`ve actually paid down quite substantially the amount of borrowing that they had done originally.

QUESTION: Does the IMF have an opinion on O`Neill`s attempt to lower the global production of steel?

MR. DAWSON: No.

QUESTION: Yesterday, Alan Greenspan got the Argentina question, and he said, you know, looking at the financial markets, appears to be more confidence, danger, whatever, diminishing, and very limited danger of global contagion. Do you share that assessment?

MR. DAWSON: Well, it is all of our jobs to worry and to be on alert. We have made it clear -- in my last press briefing we discussed this issue, that we do not see contagion in the sense of the word that it was used in `94-`95, `97-`98 or the summer of `98. We are, of course, always on the alert.

I would note, for example, that for a number of countries that the spreads at the moment are lower than they were at the beginning of the year, and obviously for other countries they`re higher than they were at the beginning of the year. I mean, that may be slightly simplistic, but that is an indication that you don`t have some sort of generalized contagion.

So I think we see that in a number of ways the fundamentals are much more conducive towards stability and moving ahead than they were at some of those earlier periods. We talked about issues such as transparency, issues such as relatively less leverage in the financial system. And discrimination on the part of markets in terms of performers. So I think in that sense of the word we see a very similar picture.

QUESTION: Back to Argentina. Since "premature" seems to be the word of the day...

MR. DAWSON: What? I`m sorry?

QUESTION: "Premature" seems to be the word of the day for you. Last week...

MR. DAWSON: I thought "missions" was the word of the day.

QUESTION: Mr. Fischer kind of indicated that it was premature to discuss new restructuring of the disbursements for Argentina or even more money because he wanted to see what would happen in Argentina. The fiscal adjustments seem to be going on fairly well, but now it`s only the Senate that is remaining. And I was wondering whether you still considered this premature, or could this come up during Marks` discussions with IMF officials?

MR. DAWSON: As I say, I don`t see the Marx meetings with officials are heavily program-related in that sense. Obviously, the state of the developments will come up, but I do not believe that`s an issue that is on the agenda. I think, although I would agree with you -- and this point was made two weeks ago, made in our statement, and then we`ve discussed it since then -- is that this zero deficit plan does seem to be moving forward and there does seem to be, as you said, support for it.

So I think in that sense of the word, I wouldn`t necessarily say premature, but things are progressing in an orderly way. Things are moving forward. So I do not believe that`s an issue in terms of Daniel`s visit.

QUESTION: After the violence of the G-7 in Italy, are you planning any change for the next Annual Meeting?

MR. DAWSON: Caroline Anstey at the Bank, I think a couple weeks ago, 10 days or so ago, made it clear and I think we have confirmed in terms of there are a number of changes in terms of the format of the meeting, not in terms of the substance or the content, and that the activities, the official activities of the meetings will be consolidated into what I guess we might call a downtown campus centered on the Bank-Fund headquarters buildings, with the opening ceremony to be held at Constitution Hall. So those of you who were looking forward to spending a week of your life at the elevators at the Marriott will be spared that opportunity. But in terms of the planned events for the meetings, they are proceeding as we had anticipated.

QUESTION: Is there a local hotel here that you`re going to be holding some of the seminars in, the Melrose or one...

MR. DAWSON: No. The seminars will be held in the Bank and Fund buildings, as well as other office buildings in this area, within our campus.

QUESTION: A follow-up. Are the negotiations a little bit harder now that all kinds of negotiations...

MR. DAWSON: Could identify your country?

QUESTION: Sorry. Brazil. Are the negotiations now a little bit harder with the new government, the U.S. new government, with the more hands-off attitude from the Bush administration? Are the negotiations a little bit harder than they used to be under the older -- you know, Bill Clinton`s government?

MR. DAWSON: I don`t think I want to go there. I mean, first of all, there`s a premise in there about negotiations that I`m not sure is correct. It depends what you talk about what the mission is doing. And certainly the relationship of the Fund with the U.S. authorities is quite a good one. But the negotiations are, as I think your question implies, in fact, taking place between the Fund and the Brazilian authorities.

Obviously, major shareholders all have an interest in what is going on, but I`m not sure -- I would have a hard time seeing how it would be...

QUESTION: I`m sorry...

MR. DAWSON: ...made more difficult or easier.

QUESTION: The question is not even about Brazil. I`m talking in general. I mean, now with the new government, the new U.S. Government, with the new attitude that`s more hands-off, how are things are different, is my question.

MR. DAWSON: Ah, okay. Because I had the impression that the question somehow implied that there was something wrong with hands-off. The salmon-colored newspaper, the FT, has an extensive interview with Secretary O`Neill this morning, and I think he expresses quite clearly the administration`s attitude toward the Fund and the role the Fund should play in situations such as this. And I think I would just refer you to his quotes in terms of that -- of their attitude toward the Fund, and I think I would just complement that by saying that our relationship is a very strong one, as it has traditionally been with our major shareholder.

QUESTION: I might not have been clear. The question is: How is the Fund relating to the U.S. more than how the U.S. is relating to the Fund, how is your attitude, I mean, the Fund`s?

MR. DAWSON: We`re relating very well.

QUESTION: Yeah, but how is it different from the...

MR. DAWSON: Oh, I don`t think I need to go into those discussions. I mean, they both were good relationships. And we continue to enjoy strong support from our major shareholder, as we do from almost all of our shareholders.

Could we get some new questions? Or else I`m going to call it off. Okay.

QUESTION: Mr. Dawson, can you just confirm if...Just going back to Turkey, you said that there`s going to be an Executive Board meeting in early August. Is that right?

MR. DAWSON: After vacation, yes.

QUESTION: And they will...

MR. DAWSON: Or the recess.

QUESTION: They will vote then on a potential further tranche?

MR. DAWSON: Correct.

QUESTION: And have you been given any indications of how much that could be?

MR. DAWSON: We can get it for you. Yes, it would be approximately US$1.5 billion, which would bring total disbursements to about US$12 billion.

QUESTION: Going back to Argentina, in the last meeting, last press conference, you said that there wouldn`t be any speeding up of the disbursements for Argentina...

MR. DAWSON: There`s nothing planned at this point. No change.

QUESTION: Let me ask you why that is. Since then we`ve seen pension funds, we`ve seen local businesses promise to pay more funds. How come the IMF won`t come in there with faster disbursing funds to help them through this present crunch?

MR. DAWSON: Well, I think they are dealing with what is the domestic financing situation. I don`t think there`s an analogy there. I mean, our financing is sort of there, and then it`s a question of how else they meet program targets. But it`s a need to fulfill the program, so I don`t think that follows logically from that at all.

By the way, and all indications are they are, you know, meeting the targets.

QUESTION: Is the IMF planning a new mission to Indonesia or a mission to Indonesia to meet the new authorities in the near future?

MR. DAWSON: I just have to check my notes. We have the ad referendum letter of intent that was brought back a week or so ago. It is being reviewed by staff and management. We would expect that the new authorities there would be looking at it as well, although I would note that the mission did meet with then-Vice President Megawati at the time. And our expectation or our hope had been that we would be looking for a Board meeting coming after the recess, maybe in September. I don`t think there`s any change in that timing.

Whether there will be a mission before then or not, I honestly do not know. But I think there were a number of scenarios that were contemplated at the time of the mission. The developments in Indonesia in the last week were part of sort of that baseline scenario, so that the change in government itself need not cause a mission to go there. There may be some other reason that develops for a mission to go there, but as I say, the mission had been in touch with the then-Vice President and actually had a meeting with her.

Maybe just two more questions.

QUESTION: Going back to the fall IMF meetings for a moment, last time around the city spent about $8 million in security costs, and given what happened in Genoa, it`s likely to be much higher. I know the IMF doesn`t have an obligation to contribute to these costs, but is there any plan right now to contribute to the security costs of the fall meetings?

MR. DAWSON: I think that that`s a question best directed to the U.S. Treasury.

QUESTION: [inaudible].

MR. DAWSON: Microphone, please.

QUESTION: Mr. O`Neill said yesterday that exchange banks, foreign exchange banks are a problem in relation to Argentina. Does the IMF agree with this view that this is one of the main...

MR. DAWSON: No, I think...

QUESTION: ...risks for...

MR. DAWSON: As I discussed, I believe, in the last press briefing, the issue of exchange regimes is one that we have under intensive discussion and review, and I would direct you to the same -- to the speeches on the subject that I did last week, which were the speeches by the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director last January, in which they sort of laid out the conditions under which approach should be followed at which point.

They did point toward the conditions under which floating regimes were more appropriate and the conditions under which fixed regimes were more appropriate. And there indeed are such conditions, and they require, of course, very, very strong policies. And I think the Argentine authorities understand that. And as we look at, for example, the zero deficit proposal, that is a very, very tough policy that, if implemented, should be able to protect that sort of a regime.

I would not want to go beyond that in terms of discussions of philosophies of exchange rate regimes, but that is a big-- it is an issue, and the proper policies need to be followed under both regimes. They`re tough under fixed exchange rate regimes, but the Argentine authorities know that well and have quite a track record in being able to work with their system.

I think that`s it. The embargo will be lifted at 20 minutes after 10:00. Thank you very much. Everyone have a nice summer vacation, and I look forward to seeing you in three weeks.

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Hoffentlich ist Rizal Ramli mit von der Partie !!!

New Cabinet to have three coordinating ministers: Hamzah


JAKARTA (JP): Vice President Hamzah Haz said on Friday that, unlike the administration under deposed president Abdurrahman Wahid, the new Cabinet would go back to its previous formation with three coordinating ministries.

The three coordinating ministries would be people`s welfare, economic affairs and political, social and security affairs.

Hamzah also reiterated that the new Cabinet lineup would be announced on Thursday Aug. 9 and would be officially installed the next day on Friday Aug. 10.

Hamzah made the remark after chairing a United Development Party (PPP) meeting here on Friday, Antara reported.

He further denied rumors that the Indonesian Military (TNI) had asked for eight seats in the new Cabinet lineup.

Hamzah, who is also the PPP chairman, hinted that his party was nominating Bachtiar Chamsyah, Alimarwan Hanan and Sugiharto -- all three senior party members -- to sit in the Cabinet.

Regarding those to hold posts in the Cabinet economic team, he said, they should be honest, market-friendly and widely known by the international community as well as having a high level ofintegrity.

They must also be able to work with the House ofRepresentatives (DPR), Hamzah added.

"An economic minister who is `market-friendly` will receive a positive response from the market," he said.

Later in the evening, Hamzah attended a gathering at Hotel Mulia in Senayan, Central Jakarta

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Es wird spannend !

Cabinet lineup to be announced Thursday, no delays: Hamzah Haz


JAKARTA (JP): Vice President Hamzah Haz asserted on Tuesday that the much-awaited Cabinet lineup will be announced on Thursday without any further delays, reports stated.

"The new Cabinet will be announced this Thursday. On Friday ministers will be installed and they`ll go straight to work," Hamzah said as quoted by Antara.

Hamzah was speaking to media during his visit to flood and landslide affected areas in Padang, the capital of West Sumatra, on Tuesday, before leaving for Nias regency in North Sumatra.

Nias has also been hit by similar disasters, which have claimed at least 83 lives, wounded dozens others and left more than 2,500 people homeless.

He said that announcement of the new administration had been delayed because the President wanted to ensure selection of an effective team to work in the Cabinet.

"We want this Cabinet to be solid and able to fix the nation`s problems," Hamzah said.

Separately in Jakarta, People`s Consultative Assembly Speaker Amien Rais called on the nation to be patient in waiting for the new Cabinet lineup.

"It`s only about 48 hours from now ... our new President is employing a slow-but-sure strategy in preparing thisadministration so as not to experience too many Cabinet shake-ups before the end of the presidential term in 2004," Amien said at the Assembly building on Tuesday.

Abdurrahman`s administration was renowned for its chaotic Cabinet reshuffles.

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Noch was gefunden.

AUGUST 10, 2001

Balancing Act
Megawati Sukarnoputri was born to power. But in order to wield it for the benefit of Indonesia, she will have to learn to work with, and control, the powerbrokers in parliament and the military. Can she do it?
By WARREN CARAGATA in Jakarta

ALSO
In The Best Of All Worlds . . .: The new president needs a great cabinet to back her up
Something From Nothing: As it prepares for independence, the former Indonesian territory is struggling to build an economy from scratch


Emilio Rivera III.

On a day when most business executives in Jakarta were chasing rumors about the possible shape of President Megawati Sukarnoputri`s cabinet, investment banker Tim Gray was past caring. Let others worry whether her government will prove any more stable than that of her impeached predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid. Gray is leaving town. "The type of deals I do, the movement of capital into this market, those sources of capital have dried up," he says. After more than 10 years in Jakarta, he left his job as president of Development Capital, a privately held investment bank, and headed to Dubai. It`s a departure with regrets, says the American-born banker. But even with Megawati as president, there`s no sense staying. "They`ve dug themselves a deep hole. To dig themselves out is going to take years."

Megawati, eldest daughter of Indonesia`s founding president Sukarno, will soon return to the palace where she grew up a lively little girl. It`s been more than 35 years since a Sukarno has lived in the stately mansion, but Megawati will not be reliving any memories of cosseted palace life. Instead of play, there will only be duty, and the burden of implacable problems ranging from separatism to economic malaise. Many are left over from the fall of the Suharto dictatorship three years ago, many are new ones created or worsened by the erratic 21-month rule of her predecessor.

Wahid`s sacking by restive legislators and the blatant military support for his ouster have added new challenges. No wonder Amien Rais, chairman of the People`s Consultative Assembly that impeached Wahid two weeks ago, says a meeting this week with the country`s third president in as many years found Megawati in a serious mood. "She understands that her work is almost beyond anyone`s capacities," Rais told Asiaweek.

Rais himself may be one of Megawati`s main challenges. He, as chairman of the assembly, and Akbar Tanjung, as speaker of parliament, took what used to be rubber stamps under Suharto and turned them into power centers that first stymied and then brought down a president. (Parliament is the day-to-day legislature. The assembly, which includes all members of parliament plus other society and military representatives, elects the president.) One reason Megawati refrained for so long from publicly supporting Wahid`s ouster was the fear that Rais and Tanjung could take her down in her turn. "They won`t stop," a senior member of her Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P by its Indonesian initials) said a few weeks ago. No one is talking that way now amid talks to set up the new government, but Indonesia could face renewed instability once Megawati`s honeymoon ends.

The omens so far are mixed, threatening not so much opposition to Megawati but more squabbling. While the assembly voted unanimously to oust Wahid and elect Megawati, it quarreled for two days over who should be the new vice president. It finally chose Hamzah Haz, who represents a coalition of Islamic parties. Ironically, he was one of the leaders of the successful effort in 1999 to deny Megawati the presidency and hand it to Wahid — an effort masterminded by Rais. Running against Haz was Tanjung as leader of the Golkar party. Megawati instructed her caucus to support Haz because she feared the optics of an alliance with Golkar, which used to be Suharto`s main political support group and is still distrusted by many Indonesians. Tanjung took his defeat gracefully. The next step is to choose the cabinet (see story, page 19). The outcome of that could turn squabbling into serious opposition.

But Megawati may enjoy a longer than expected honeymoon. That`s because after six months of political infighting over Wahid`s fate, the country simply will not accept any more shenanigans. "Everyone is fed up," says Jusuf Wanandi, senior fellow at Jakarta`s Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Even Rais and Tanjung have to recognize this is the last chance." Wanandi says it`s the last gasp because, without stability, the economy will simply collapse on itself.

Analyst Umar Juoro says the real danger is that the army might lose patience if there`s more political bloodletting. "If she doesn`t survive, it will encourage the military to move in," he warns. Lt.-Gen. Agus Widjoyo, the head of the military`s territorial bureau — in effect its political department — says simply: "There should be a national commitment to realize that the remaining three years until the next election should be used to help bring the country out of its crisis."

Ultimately, Megawati`s biggest advantage may be that she is more careful in her handling of potential allies than Wahid, who came to power as head of a minority partner in a coalition and started governing as if he had a majority. Coalition partners were tossed from cabinet: Haz within a few months, Laksamana Sukardi, one of Megawati`s top advisers, soon after that.

Of course no one is going to give Megawati a free ride. But in addition to cabinet seats, what the parties want from her is what everyone else does: a government that works. Success, and the support that goes with it, is in her hands, says Fuad Bawazier, financial Eminence grise of Rais` Central Axis coalition of Islamic parties. "Megawati is driving the bus and I am only a passenger. Why ask me for a guarantee?" That`s a view shared by Sukardi, Megawati`s economics guru. "There won`t be any support that is perpetual," he said. "It depends on our performance."

So far, Megawati has had some beginner`s luck. The transition from Wahid was peaceful. The rupiah has bounced. Bond rating agency Standard & Poor`s raised its outlook for Indonesia to stable from negative. And, for the time being, everybody is saying, at least in public, that they want Megawati to succeed. Rais, famously ambitious for the presidency, says he wouldn`t mind if Megawati did so well that she became a sure thing in the next election in 2004. "I am a realistic politician. I would voluntarily go back to Yogyakarta (where he was a university professor)."

To send Rais back to Yogya, Megawati will first have to come to terms with the economic mess that prompted Tim Gray to pack his bags. The last few months were a disaster. "There was just uncertainty — who was at the helm?" says industrialist Aburizal Bakrie, head of the Indonesian chamber of commerce. "How can we live with that situation?" The first priority, Bakrie says, is to bring investors back, and that means rebuilding confidence. An early bellwether will be whether there`s a quick agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which has delayed a $400-million aid payment due last year because of Wahid`s failure to move ahead with promised economic reforms.

How reformist is Megawati? Critics say she is too close to the military, that Wahid was the best hope of fighting corruption and keeping the generals at bay. As one Wahid minister puts it: "It`s the return of the tanks." The night before the impeachment vote, the army sent tanks to the presidential precinct — with guns pointed at the palace. Officers then refused to implement Wahid`s decree to dissolve parliament.

Standing with parliament may have won the soldiers some friends, but Megawati`s enemies will remember the tanks. The military may also try to exact a price for its support, which could include demands for fewer restraints in the fight against separatism and protection from prosecution for human rights abuses. But, says former defense minister Juwono Sudarsono: "She will have to be careful about reinforcing this image of being over-reliant on the military." If Megawati gives the soldiers a free hand in Aceh, says Wanandi, "her credibility is finished."

Megawati got a taste for what lies ahead in her first few days on the job. The judge who convicted Suharto`s son Tommy of graft and was preparing to try generals accused of human rights abuses in East Timor was assassinated on a Jakarta street. A bomb blasted a police headquarters in Sulawesi, where communal violence simmers. Seven alleged guerrillas were killed by security forces in Aceh. As she moves into the palace where she once played childhood games, Megawati may be wondering what she`s got herself into.

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Vielleicht geht es dann mal los mit den Unternehmensverkäufen !

IBRA put under State Minister for State Enterprises


JAKARTA (JP): President Megawati Soekarnoputri has decided to put the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) under the supervision of State Minister of State Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi, a Cabinet minister said on Monday.

"The state minister will also become a stockholder in all state enterprises," Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said in a media conference after a Cabinet meeting at the state secretariat as quoted by Antara.

Meanwhile, Minister of Finance Boediono has been ordered to increase and safeguard state revenues, while improving the administration of the state budget, he said.

During the meeting, which went from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., the President gave directions to all ministers in the implementation of their jobs until 2004.

Susilo said the President asked State Minister for National Development Planning/Bappenas chairman Kwik Kian Gie to concentrate on development planning and funding.

"The agency will not be involved in project administration," said Susilo, who was accompanied at the media conference by Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti.

Susilo said that during the meeting the President emphasized the proper management of information on economic issues delivered to donor countries and agencies.

He said the President had referred to the past when ministers gave different explanations on a given topic.

"That is why the coordinating minister for economic affairs has been given the authority to issue formal explanations on such matters," he said.

[broker*709]

Es kommt Freude auf !!!

Monday August 13 8:20 AM ET
Indonesia Expects IMF Visit

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) - Indonesia`s new top economics minister said Monday he expects the International Monetary Fund (news - web sites) to dispatch a mission to Jakarta soon to get a stalled $5 billion program back on track.

Senior Economics Minister Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said he held talks with Stanley Fischer, a deputy managing director at the fund, and that both sides concluded that only ``formalities`` needed to be resolved before a new mission arrived.

``I expect them to come after August 17,`` Dorodjatun told Dow Jones Newswires.

Currency markets cheered the news. The rupiah ended 6 percent higher at 8,605 rupiah per dollar, its strongest finish since last September.

The IMF suspended its program to Indonesia in December after former President Abdurrahman Wahid`s government fell behind on a number of economic reforms it had promised.

Hopes that Indonesia may soon resolve its differences with the IMF got a boost last week when new President Megawati Sukarnoputri chose nonpolitical experts, including Dorodjatun, to head her economic team.

But markets also fear the Parliament may continue to block IMF-sponsored reforms, including plans to sell nationalized PT Bank Central Asia to foreign investors. Delays in selling the bank last year were a major reason the IMF suspended further lending.

Dorodjatun, a former Indonesian ambassador to the United States, has close ties with the Washington-based fund. Last week he said the IMF program was needed to restore foreign investor confidence in the battered economy.

The IMF loans are also crucial to Indonesia`s talks with the Paris Club next month. The Paris Club - an informal group of creditor governments from major industrialized countries - has set a condition that it won`t reschedule Indonesia`s $5.8 billion debt to the grouping unless the IMF program remains in place.

Indonesia relies on foreign donor loans to fill its budget deficit, which is set to reach 3.8 percent of GDP (news - web sites) this year due to the cost of bailing out the banking sector following the 1997 financial crash.

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Auch schön !

Wednesday August 15, 2:12 PM

Jakarta`s barefoot banker gives loans to poor
By John Ruwitch
Photo Gallery

Reuters Photo



JAKARTA (Reuters) - Sri Widiawati is one of the most successful bankers in Indonesia`s bustling capital, but she doesn`t drive a fancy car, wear expensive handmade suits or work in a glitzy office.



She earns little more than $1 a day, which is just enough to support her husband and two children while paying off a loan shark who conned her parents.

And her workplace is in the dusty back streets of the impoverished Jakarta neighbourhood where she lives.

But in the two years since she became involved with Kesuma Tiara, a grassroots savings-and-loan cooperative, she has travelled light years -- professionally and personally.

On the business side, each month, the native of East Java oversees loans to some 240 women -- men are not allowed to borrow from Kesuma -- across three neighbourhoods.

"I feel like I`m needed by the community," she said.

Her story highlights the victories of the unique "barefoot bank" she works for, set up in 1999 after the economic meltdown to help the poorest of the poor in Jakarta`s sprawling slums, called kampungs.

It was the impoverished, anonymous slum dwellers who bore much of the brunt of the financial crisis that slammed Indonesia in the late 1990s and sunk millions below the poverty line.


POVERTY RATE JUMPS

The World Bank estimated Indonesia`s poverty rate in 1997 before the crisis was 7.23 percent. By the second half of 1998, that number had jumped to 21 percent of the country`s more than 200 million people and the economy has yet to pick up.

Kesuma Tiara has made impressive inroads so far in helping ease the economic pain afflicting its growing base of borrowers. Sri Alam, a 45-year-old shopkeeper, is a typical success story.

Before becoming a member of the micro-bank, she saved little and poured most of the cash she made back into her tiny kiosk, which sells snacks, cigarettes and other small household products.

Since then she has been able to boost the amount of items she sells and that has allowed her to put some money aside to spend on her family.

"I have been able to send my son to school," she said.

In line with Kesuma`s regulations, depending on the loan size, she must immediately deposit 50,000 ($6) to 60,000 rupiah in a personal savings account with the cooperative.

Like similar micro-lending groups around the world, Kesuma Tiara gives small loans to those who otherwise have no access to capital or can only borrow from local lenders at high rates.

The organisation thrives off already existing social connections. And because its borrowers generally do not have anything of value for collateral, its strict rules are enforced by the subtle pressures of social networks.

Kesuma Tiara initially recruited members from one of the local savings societies known in Indonesia as Arisan. Members -- usually housewives -- meet in each other`s homes to pitch money into a pot, which they take turns "winning". The traditional Arisan groups evolved in the absence of consumer bank credit.

Kesuma Tiara does not give handouts; borrowers who default on one loan -- which can range from 100,000 rupiah to 600,000 -- lose their privileges for good.


AUSTRALIAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

But unlike its often larger counterparts around the world, Kesuma was built from the ground up with the goal of helping the women who work for it as much as the women who borrow from it.

"Everything was designed by the women who run the bank," said founder Lea Jellinek, an Australian anthropologist who with a colleague brought the basic idea, about $100 of seed money and a tonne of will, to the Kemanggisan kampungs of west Jakarta.

In the two years since it was founded, Kesuma Tiara`s clientele has grown from one group of 10 sceptical borrowers to 32 groups totalling 576 members.

The little details created by the women who run the cooperative have been critical to its successes, Jellinek said.

For example, Kesuma`s bankers don`t hold court in one place expecting those who want to borrow money to come and queue. Rather, they visit the kampungs and individual borrowers, mostly on foot. And they take punctuality seriously.

"You have to come to the poor," said Jellinek. "They don`t have time to sit around waiting."

Kesuma Tiara does not charge interest. Instead, they charge up to three percent in "operational fees" on all loans, which conforms with traditional Muslim banking practices. The fees help finance a "social fund" to help those ineligible for loans.

"Lea`s trying to build an institution. She`s trying to build new financial management habits among poor people. She`s trying to change people`s financial horizons," said a Western consultant with 10 years experience in micro-credit.

Now Kesuma plans to take its formula to the rest of the city.


AS IMPORTANT AS FAMILY

But the burdens of Indonesia`s impoverished die hard.

Widiawati may spend her days carrying stacks of cash and helping other women, but she has been unable to claw her way out of poverty despite having taken one loan herself and dipping once into an emergency fund set up for the cooperative`s workers.

Nonetheless, Kesuma Tiara has changed her life -- and those of its borrowers -- dramatically.

Down a narrow alley, sitting in the doorway of the home of a borrower, Jellinek speaks of the changes she has seen in Widiawati since they met in 1999.

When the financial panic swept Indonesia`s economy down the drain, Widiawati lost her job as a grocery store cashier and spent the next year-and-a-half depressed and confined to a dank room by her husband who refused to let her find work.

Now, she strides through the poor neighbourhoods near her one-room home with pride and she explains with the confidence of a pro the conditions of a 400,000 rupiah loan to a new borrower.

"You should have seen her two years ago."

To the women who work for Kesuma Tiara, Jellinek said, "This is as important as their families."

[broker*709]

Montags geht mit den Gesprächen zu den nächsten IMF-Zahlungen endlich los !

Economic Team to begin IMF talks next Monday
Thursday, August/16/2001 10:20:59 GMT+7.

The Indonesian economic team will start negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Jakarta next Monday (August 20), Coordinating Minister of Economy, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, said.
"We are no longer measuring the time left to finish our work to meet some IMF pre-conditions in hours. We are under a very tight schedule because we have to meet the IMF on Monday," Dorodjatun told reporters.

He said the economic team was determined to succeed in getting the IMF to agree to disburse more aid, after the IMF had made positive remarks on recent developments in the country.

Regarding the six preconditions set by the IMF for the signing of a new Letter of Intent (LoI), Dorodjatun said that technical efforts to meet them were still underway.

The six conditions are filling in account number 502.000.002, which is a banking guarantee fund to be covered by bonds, announcing the results of a study by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency`s Oversight Committee, making public efforts to privatize state-owned companies, fulfillment of a base money target, settling the BII bank problem and the implementation of the social compensation fund for the fuel price hike.

Asked whether IMF officials had already given any hint that the next tranche of the bailout aid package the Fund had pledged in 1997 would be forthcoming, Dorodjatun said market sentiment was already anticipating it.

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Das Team ist schon mal gut in Jakarta angekommen, los geht`s !

IMF mission arrives in Jakarta


JAKARTA (JP): Members of a mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived in Jakarta on Sunday afternoon in a bid to reach an agreement with Indonesia`s new economics team on a number of economic reform programs.

IMF deputy director for the Asia-Pacific region Anoop Singh declined to mention the substance of the planned meeting with the country`s economics team, but told reporters at the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport upon arrival that the results would be brought to the upcoming IMF executive board meeting, MetroTV television station reported.

The executive board is expected to meet in Washington early next month to decide whether to evaluate the country`s economic reform programs as stipulated in the letter of intent (LoI).

The approval of the new LoI will pave the way for the disbursement of IMF`s US$400 million loan tranche to the country that was put on hold late last year amid signs that the government was wavering in its implementation of reform programs.

Analysts have said the signing of a new agreement with the IMF would further boost the rupiah, which has been rallying since Megawati Soekarnoputri was appointed President and the new Cabinet was installed.

The agreement with the IMF will also prompt the Paris Club of creditor nations to agree to reschedule the country`s sovereign debt maturing this year, they said.

The Paris Club is scheduled to meet with the government on Sept. 10.

A failure to obtain the debt rescheduling facility will trigger a fiscal crisis, economists have warned.

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Alle sind sie optimisisch, Ihr auch ?


Indonesia looks to IMF to help revive economy
By Tom McCawley in Jakarta
Published: August 20 2001 17:04GMT | Last Updated: August 20 2001 22:31GMT



Indonesia began talks with the International Monetary Fund on Monday aimed at reviving a stalled $5bn loan programme to help repair the ailing economy amid optimism that a deal can be done.

An agreement with the IMF is an important goal for President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who assumed power a month ago, as she seeks to overcome deep political and economic problems and smooth ties with Indonesia`s international lenders.

Mrs Megawati, the country`s fifth president, has surprised many observers in her first month, appointing a cabinet team widely applauded by financial markets, but still faces huge challenges in leading the world`s fourth most populous nation out of crisis.

The Indonesian rupiah, which has climbed by 30 per cent since Mrs Megawati took office on July 23, rose higher on Monday on hopes of an IMF deal.

"We saw a firm commitment on the part of the new economics team to move ahead swiftly," Anoop Singh, IMF Asia-Pacific deputy director and leader of the delegation, said on Monday. The delegation is due to complete its assessment by next Monday.

An agreement with the IMF would bolster both domestic and international confidence in Mrs Megawati`s government, which took over after the erratic, 21-month administration of Abdurrahman Wahid, her predecessor, was ended when he was ousted by parliament.

The IMF suspended loans to Indonesia in December last year in frustration at Jakarta`s slow economic reforms and bureaucratic delays.

Laksmana Sukardi, state enterprises minister, said he expected to reach an agreement on economic reforms within days.

Indonesia must persuade the IMF to resume lending before winning approval for $5.8bn in rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club group of creditor nations due to meet next month.

The World Bank, another major creditor, has said it could double its $400m annual contributions to Indonesia if the IMF resumes lending.

Indonesia is still struggling to emerge from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, with economic growth due to slow to 3.5 per cent this year from 4.2 per cent last year.

In her state of the nation speech last week, Mrs Megawati warned of the dangers of disintegration, and separatism in two provinces, Aceh and Irian Jaya, also known as West Papua.

Foreign investment, critical for economic recovery has been deterred by Indonesia`s political instability and legal uncertainty.

[em.]

Broker nochmal, die Aktie reagiert leider überhaupt nicht,
zumindest ein kurzes Strohfeuer hätte man erwarten dürfen.

Offensichtlich erwartet der Markt, daß man als Anleger wieder einmal über den Tisch gezogen wird bei der Übernahme

wie gesagt würde mich wahnsinnig freuen, wenns anders wäre, sehe aber keinerlei Anzeichen im Moment!

[broker*709]

Der Gesamtmarkt ist doch eigentlich nicht so schlecht ?

Market awaits IMF talks announcement Monday, Jakarta shares end up 0.35%
Friday, August/24/2001 18:13:55 GMT+7.

Share prices on the Jakarta Stock Exchange closed slightly up at the end of trading Friday, with the composite index up 1.529 points, or 0.35%, to 441.219. The LQ45 index rose 0.577 points, or 0.64% to 90.344.
Losers were ahead of gainers 57 to 51 while 200 shares unchanged. Total trade stood at 324.8m shares worth at Rp268.5bn, reflecting quiet trade since early morning. On late Thursday, turnover stood at 477.1m shares worth at Rp400.6bn.

The market gave positive response after Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said this morning, that all talks with the IMF were finalized and there was no more strain in the relationship between Indonesia and the IMF. He also said that that the final result will likely to be announced on Monday.

The rupiah was quoted at 8,680-8,700 against the dollar, ended up 0.63% compared to 8,720-8,770 yesterday.

Semen Gresik bounced back and gained Rp550 or 7.64% to Rp7,750. State-owned Semen Gresik, Indonesia`s largest cement producer, posted Rp41.4bn net loss in the first semester this year, swinging from a net profit of Rp143.2bn in the same period last year. The loss was mainly caused by foreign exchange loss of Rp329.9bn, compared to Rp14.6bn gain in the first half year 2000.

Cigarette maker HM Sampoerna rose Rp200 or 1.18% to Rp17,200, rival Gudang Garam rose Rp100 or 0.84% to Rp12,050. Domestic call operator Telkom edged up Rp25 or 0.82% to Rp3,075, while Indosat unchanged at Rp9,300. Ramayana Lestari Sentosa rose Rp75 to Rp2,775. Indofood Sukses Makmur steady at Rp825. On the other side, Astra International lost Rp50 or 1.96% to Rp2,500.

[broker*709]

Die Demokratie in Indonesien macht sich - das Selbständige Ost Timor macht es vor.

E Timor`s Gusmao to run for president
August 25, 2001 Posted: 2:09 PM HKT (0609 GMT)


Gusmao`s announcement comes ahead of East Timor`s first democratic election

DILI, East Timor -- East Timorese freedom fighter Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao has ended months of speculation by announcing that he would run for the presidency of the new nation when it gains full independence next year.

"I will accept the candidacy for president," Gusmao told reporters in the capital, Dili, the Associated Press reports.

Gusmao, a former guerrilla commander, is wildly popular in the homeland that he helped free from 24 years of repressive Indonesian occupation.

He was captured by Indonesian forces in 1992 and remained a political prisoner in Jakarta until after East Timor`s people voted overwhelmingly to break free from Indonesian rule in a U.N. ballot in August, 1999.


Until now, he has often said that he had no ambition to become its first head of state. He had claimed that he would rather be a farmer or a photographer and that former rebel fighters usually do not make good presidents.

Under pressure
However, at Saturday`s news conference he said other Timorese political leaders had pressured him into running for the top job.

They have said that only Gusmao, 55, has the universal respect to unite the fledgling nation.


Gusmao says he is not the best man for the job
But even as he announced his candidacy, Gusmao protested that he "was conscious that I am not the best person for the job."

"I had nurtured the dream that after independence I would have time to cultivate pumpkins and animals," he said.

His announcement comes five days before East Timor holds it first democratic election for an 88-member assembly that will draft a constitution.

The body will decide on what kind of system is used to govern the half-island nation and how it will elect its president and parliament.

East Timor has been under temporary U.N. administration since it was ravaged by Indonesian soldiers and their militia allies after the 1999 independence ballot.

Gusmao said his pursuit of the presidency was conditional on a peaceful outcome to Thursday`s ballot that he insisted must be accepted by all political groups.

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Die IBRA ist nicht untätig !

6 September 2001

IBRA Sells 4 Holdiko Assets


Following the previous sales announcement of 8 Holdiko assets on 24 August 2001, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) announced another 4 asset sales from the same holding company, Holdiko.

This announcement indicates IBRA’s consistent effort in carrying out asset disposal programs in order to comply with the State Budget’s target for 2001, i.e. IDR 27 trillion in cash and IDR 10 trillion in bonds.

The four assets for sales are:


No Asset Industry Sector
1. Berdikari Flour Mills Four Milling
2. Indomarco Adi Prima Distribution
3. Edible Oil & Fats Group Edible Oil & Fats
4. Indogift Chuenher Indah Gift and Souvenir


Berdikari Flour Mills
Holdiko Perkasa intends to sell its entire 64 % ownership of PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills (“Berdikari”). Berdikari is one of the largest flour milling company in Indonesia. Berdikari, located in Makasar, South Sulawesi, recently completed its new plant expansion, raising its wheat milling capacity from 390,000 MT to 840,000 MT.

Ernst & Young Consulting has been appointed to act as Holdiko’s financial advisor for this transaction.

Indomarco Adi Prima
Holdiko will also dispose of all its 20.16 % ownership in PT Indomarco Adi Prima (“IAP”), one of the largest distributors in Indonesia for consumer goods. IAP, which started its commercial operations in 1954, has 22 branches spread all over major cities in Sumatera, Jawa-Bali, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. IAP’s total revenue increased from Rp 1.6 trillion in 1997 to Rp 4 trillion in 2000.

Acting as financial advisor to Holdiko for IAP’s disposal is Ernst & Young Consulting.

Edible Oil & Fats
Holdiko plans to sell its respective 20% ownership in three companies under the Edible Oils & Fats Group; i.e. PT Intiboga Sejahtera (“IBS”), PT Salim Oil Grains (“SOG”) and PT Bitung Manado Oil (“Bimoli”).

IBS is a prominent margarine and cooking oil producer in Indonesia. Some of its products have become market leaders as cooking oil brands such as Bimoli, Bimoli Special, Sunrise, Malinda Coco and margarine brands such as Simas, Palmia, Royal Palmia and Amanda.

IBS has three factories located in Jakarta and Surabaya. Producing high quality products with affordable price and supported with a large industrial based customers and distribution network, IBS has achieved many awards including the Customer Satisfaction Award for its branded cooking oil Frontier in 2000, The Most Valuable Brand for Bimoli from Mars and SWA in 2001 and ISO 9001 certification from SGS International in 1997 and 1998.

SOG is an edible oil trading company of Palm Oil, Coconut Oil, Palm Kernel Oil (crude & refined), PFAD (Palm Fatty Acid Distillate), Palm Kernel Expeller, and Soyabean Oil. IBS in its operation receives supplies of raw materials from SOG.

Bimoli, established in November 1970, is a producer and exporter of CNO and end products such as Copra Extraction Pellets (CEP), Copra Meal (CEX), and Refined Bleached Deodorized Coconut Oil (RDB CNO). Bimoli’s factories located in Bitung (North Sulawesi) and Muotong (Central Sulawesi) export 90% of its products to Asia, United States and Europe.

The total installed production capacity of Bimoli is 192,000 tons per year, which was increased to 230,400 tons per year as of the end of 1999.

OMG Group has been appointed as financial advisor to Holdiko for the disposal of Holdiko’s ownership in these three Edible Oils & Fats companies.

Indogift Chuenher Indah
Holdiko Perkasa holds 50% direct ownership in PT Indogift Chuencer Indah (“ICI”), which it plans to entirely divest. ICI is engaged in the production of poly-resin-based gift products, wooden furniture and fragrance candles. The production facilities are located in Cileungsi, West Java with a factory space of 16,000 sqm. The products are mainly exported to established customers in the United States of America, Japan and Europe.

PT Siddharta Consulting (member firm of KPMG International) is acting as the financial adviser to Holdiko for this sale.

All the above transactions are estimated to close by mid of December this year. Aside from trying to fulfill the state budget requirement, the above steps are part of IBRA’s effort to accelerate the asset disposal programs and restructuring process in order to return the companies back into the market while maintaining transparency.

PT Holdiko Perkasa was established in relation to the settlement between the Salim Group and IBRA with regard to loans extended by PT Bank Central Asia (BCA) to companies affiliated to the Salim Group. As part of the settlement agreement with IBRA, the Salim Group transferred shares and assets in more than 100 operating companies to PT Holdiko Perkasa.

As direct and indirect shareholder of these companies, it is Holdiko’s responsibility to supervise each individual company with the aim of disposing of a sufficient amount of these shareholdings. Holdiko will subsequently direct the disposal proceeds to IBRA as part of the settlement agreement.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is an agency of the government of Indonesia established at the beginning of 1998 as the primary agency to oversee the rehabilitation of the financial sector. IBRA is authorized to take over and control troubled banks and disposes of their assets and collateral.

Jakarta, 6 September 2001



I Putu Gede Ary Suta
IBRA Chairman

[broker*709]

Was meint Ihr ? 2002 wird es defintiv aufwärts gehen !

DPR, IMF give positive response on 2002 Budget draft
Friday, September/7/2001 15:41:01 GMT+7.

Many responded positively on the 2002 Budget draft unveiled by President Megawati Soekarnoputri in a plenary meeting today.
Chairman of Commission IX of the House of Representatives (DPR) Benny Pasaribu said the budget draft unveiled today was the best budget ever drafted by the Government. By promoting educational budget and other posts for social welfare, such as health and transportation, the Government seemed to pay more attention to the people.

“We’re just waiting for the implementation. Obviously, all bureaucracy must implement this seriously,” Benny told the press.

Benny added, this draft is better with lower deficit rate of 2.5% or Rp47.15tr of GDP. “However, external loan (to finance deficit) can be repressed,” he said.

Meanwhile, David Nellor, chief of IMF representative in Indonesia said that Indonesia 2002 Budget draft, struck the right balance between fiscal consolidation and promoting economic growth.

“It`s a prudent budget recognizing the importance of stabilizing the economy and social goals," Nellor said as quoted by Reuters.

"It`s in line with the goals of the government`s reform program and has struck a careful balance between fiscal consolidation and maintaining fiscal stimulus to promote economic growth," he added.

The fiscal blueprint pegged economic growth at an optimistic 5% from 3.5% in 2001, and put the problematic budget deficit at 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) compared to this year`s 3.7% forecast.

IBM

Reported by : IBM

[broker*709]

Na Megawati, dann sei mal strong !!!

Indonesia needs a strong navy: President


JAKARTA (JP): President Megawati Soekarnoputri said on Monday that Indonesia needed to develop a strong navy to guard the country`s territorial waters.

"A strong naval force reflects a nation`s dignity, thus (by having one), we can gain the respect of other countries in the world," the President said, while addressing the 50th anniversary of the Navy Academy in Surabaya, East Java, as quoted by Antara.

Indonesia, she said, also needed a strong commercial fleet so that the country would not be left behind in international trade.

Megawati further underscored the alarming security lapses amid increasing illegal activities in Indonesian waters.

Illegal fishing and piracy have increased and have yet to be kept in check by the Navy, she said.

In addition, many fishermen as well as fishing companies continue to ignore the preservation of marine resources, she added.

"We have to see all these problems as challenges in developing a better future for Indonesia," the President said.

Present at the ceremony were Defense Minister Matori Abdul Djalil, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Adm. Widodo AS, Indonesian Navy chief Adm. Indroko Sastrowiryono, and other high-ranking military officers

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Umfangreicher Bericht des IMF, was meint Ihr dazu ?

IMF Statements at Donor Meetings 2001 | 2000

For more information, see Indonesia and the IMF


Consultative Group Meeting for Indonesia

Jakarta, November 7-8, 2001

Statement by Mr. Daniel Citrin, Assistant Director, Asia & Pacific Department, IMF

1. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today and to report to you on the status of the Government of Indonesia`s economic program, supported by the IMF`s extended arrangement. As all of you are aware, in September, the IMF`s Executive Board approved the third review of the extended arrangement with Indonesia. The review was based on the government`s adoption of early confidence-building measures, as well as its resolve to maintain macroeconomic stability and reinvigorate reforms. An IMF team is beginning discussions this week with Coordinating Minister Dorodjatun and the government`s economic team on the fourth review under the IMF program.

2. The economic context for the implementation of the program is perhaps uniquely challenging at this juncture. The new government inherited a fragile economic situation that called for greater progress in critically needed structural reforms that lagged significantly behind schedule. The need to accelerate these reforms, and provide a firm basis for future growth, job creation, and poverty reduction, has been made ever more urgent by the aftermath of the events of September 11 and the evident global slowdown. I would like to note three aspects of the current economic context that warrant particular attention in that regard:

· Market sentiment has weakened significantly since September 11. Although conditions improved substantially in August on hopes of a return to political stability and early initiatives on economic policy, this optimism has been eroded by concerns related to events following the U.S. military action abroad as well as the effects of the global slowdown. The market has also taken note of delays in certain key reforms. The rupiah has weakened significantly more than other regional currencies, to once again breach the Rp 10,000 per dollar level, and the stock market also has been under downward pressure.

· The depreciation of the rupiah comes at a time when the risk of inflation has re-emerged, with the rate of price increase now in the 12-13 percent range. As a result, it has become more difficult to make the macroeconomic policy mix more supportive of growth. With a weak rupiah putting direct upward pressure on prices, and risk premia high, there has been no scope so far for reducing interest rates. Weakness in the rupiah also adds to pressures on the budget and creates a less conducive environment for progress in corporate restructuring.

· All this occurs at a time when Indonesia`s economic recovery is slowing. With weakening domestic and external conditions, real GDP growth for 2001 is now expected to slow to 3 percent, well below the 5 percent assumed in the original 2001 budget.


3. The latest developments highlight the vulnerability of the Indonesian economy and expose the distance that Indonesia still needs to travel to return to a path of sustained growth. The full impact of the global downturn on Indonesia`s economic recovery is still uncertain. However, it is clear that the government must press ahead with its macroeconomic and structural reform program. Particularly in a world where markets are increasingly differentiating among emerging market borrowers, the priority must be to reassure domestic and international investors that the strategy for economic recovery remains intact. Any other approach will risk a prolonged and even further weakening in the investment climate, and added delays to Indonesia`s recovery from the 1997-98 crisis.

4. The main policy requirements in such an approach lie in the following key areas, which are by now familiar to all of you:

· Making decisive progress towards fiscal sustainability and a reduction of Indonesia`s large public debt burden;

· Making headway in restructuring and privatizing assets held by the public sector;

· Implementing a monetary policy aimed at bringing inflation back to single digits over the course of next year;

· Strengthening efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the banking system and restore a functioning credit mechanism; and

· Accelerating efforts to improve the investment climate through governance and legal reforms.
Let me now turn to discussing each of these important areas in some further detail.

Fiscal Sustainability and the Macroeconomic Framework

5. The government is making a strong effort to re-establish a sustainable fiscal position. Through adherence to a conservative medium-term budget consolidation path, the government plans to reduce its debt to a manageable level.

6. In 2001, Indonesia`s fiscal outlook was significantly affected by the costs of decentralization and servicing the domestic debt that stemmed from the recapitalization of the banking system, as well as a weakening in the macroeconomic environment early in the year. The government and Parliament moved together in June to pass a revised budget aimed at containing the deficit in 2001 to 3.7 percent of GDP, the original budget target. We recently had the opportunity to review with the government the 2001 budget situation. The review indicated that revenues and expenditures appear to be evolving in line with the budget targets. There was a concern, however, that financing could fall short of the levels assumed in the budget. In order to avoid undue spending compression, the government is putting into place a comprehensive plan to address the financing problem, including steps related to asset sales, privatization, and reforms linked to external donor support.

7. Turning now to fiscal policy in the period ahead, let me start with the macroeconomic framework that underpins the 2002 budget. The budget is based on economic growth of 4 percent next year, and inflation of 9 percent. Despite the difficult external environment confronting Indonesia, we believe that these targets, while ambitious, are still achievable, provided policies are both strengthened and implemented consistently.

8. The current account surplus is projected to narrow in 2002, possibly sharply. Given the weak outlook for oil prices, the trade surplus is likely to narrow. Also, the prospects for income from tourism have clearly weakened. To maintain an adequate level of reserves amid this outlook, the persistent deficit on capital flows will have to be reduced. Clearly the priority must be on reducing private capital outflows, which will require strengthened policy implementation to boost investor confidence. However, continued inflows of official capital will also be needed.

9. This macroeconomic framework is clearly subject to significant downside risks and an immediate priority of our joint work with the authorities is to identify measures to mitigate these risks. Early measures in the key structural reform areas to improve market confidence in the program and ensure access to official financing will be critical in this regard.

10. With that as background, we welcome the passage by Parliament of the budget for 2002. The budget clearly signals the government`s commitment to restoring fiscal sustainability under difficult economic conditions. It targets a substantially lower deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP, based on conservative assumptions for key economic variables such as the exchange rate and interest rates.

11. To achieve the deficit target, Parliament has approved a package of measures-equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP-to increase non-oil revenues and reduce untargeted subsidies. The budget thus includes new tax policy initiatives to strengthen the income tax and broaden the base of the VAT, as well as measures to improve tax administration, particularly for large taxpayers. A technical assistance team from the IMF`s Fiscal Affairs Department is currently in Jakarta to assist with the detailed design of the proposed programs to strengthen large taxpayer compliance and arrears collection.

12. The budget also includes further increases in fuel and electricity prices to reduce energy subsidies. Before these price increases are effected, it is critical that adequate compensation mechanisms are in place to protect the poor. Efforts are also being made to secure savings in the wage bill. Such improvements in the structure of the budget provide scope for an overdue increase in outlays on programs to improve the delivery of basic social services such as education, health and social welfare.

13. The government has set ambitious targets for receipts from IBRA asset recoveries and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Of these receipts, those assumed to finance the budget deficit have been set conservatively, at around 1½ percent of GDP, with any additional receipts earmarked for domestic debt reduction. We support this approach, which is fiscally prudent and hopefully will help create the necessary political consensus for moving ahead more forcefully with asset sales and privatization. The budget therefore assumes net external financing of about 1 percent of GDP, or about $2 billion, significantly lower than in 2001. With scheduled amortization payments of around $5 billion estimated to fall due in 2002 (after taking into account the Paris Club rescheduling through March 2002), this implies a residual gross financing need of $7 billion.

14. We believe this is an appropriately ambitious budget, which is worthy of the continued support from the international community. While a large portion of the external financing need can be filled through disbursements of project financing, there is likely to remain a significant additional external financing need. This will require new exceptional financing either in the form of new program aid commitments or from a possible successor Paris Club rescheduling.

15. Another aspect of fiscal policy I should mention here is the process of fiscal decentralization. In consultation with Parliament, the government is reviewing the decentralization framework to improve its implementation in 2002. General areas where work is ongoing include possible refinements to the formula for allocating the general allocation grant across regions, regional taxation, and expenditure assignments between the center and the regions. Meanwhile, a key priority is to ensure that the immediate risks to macroeconomic stability from the decentralization process are well contained. In that regard, efforts need to be intensified to establish an effective financial reporting system at the regional level. Also, adequate safeguards need to be in place to control local government borrowing. All in all, our view is that the implementation of the 2002 budgetary framework will make an important contribution toward setting the stage for a sustained recovery over the medium term.

Other Key Policies

16. Let me now review what we regard as the other main policy priorities over the coming 12 months.

Monetary Policy

17. One of the key tasks will be for Bank Indonesia to arrest the upward trend in inflation, with the aim of bringing inflation back to single digits in the course of 2002. In the period since July as a whole, monetary conditions have tightened, with a rise in interest rates and a partial recovery of the rupiah. However, this tightening will only have an impact on base money growth and inflation with a lag, and the recent weakness in the rupiah risks putting renewed upward pressure on prices. It will be crucial for Bank Indonesia to maintain a firm monetary stance until inflation risks have been firmly contained.

Asset Recovery and Privatization

18. Indonesia must accelerate the restructuring and privatization of assets held by the public sector. This is an imperative for two reasons. First, to raise resources for the budget and help the government reduce its debt burden. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, to put the assets back to work in the private sector in order to strengthen the investment environment and boost growth. We therefore support the ambitious targets that the government has set for 2002. But they clearly pose a considerable challenge, and the government will need to take measures on a wide front to achieve the planned acceleration in recoveries. For IBRA, key steps that need to be taken include: reaching legal closure on loan restructurings related to IBRA`s largest obligors that are in line with the government`s restructuring principles, accelerating already planned initiatives to sell off IBRA`s stock of both unrestructured and restructured loans, setting concrete deadlines for the resolution of problems of non-cooperative bank owners, and selling IBRA`s banks.

19. Progress to date with the privatization of state-owned enterprises has been disappointing. To restore business confidence and sustain the economic recovery, it is vital that the government overcome obstacles in this area. The extent of government involvement in the productive sectors of the economy not only hinders efficiency, but is also difficult to justify given the large public debt burden. The government should make every effort to succeed in its approach of focusing on a few key sales to launch the process and demonstrate a clear break from the disappointing track record of the past.

Banking System

20. Reducing remaining vulnerabilities in the banking system and bringing it back to profitability remains a major challenge. Following the initial phases of stabilization and recapitalization the focus has turned increasingly to the process of consolidation and restructuring, with a view to revitalizing the credit process, entrenching sound governance, and returning banks to private ownership. The IMF-along with the World Bank, AsDB and others-is assisting in efforts to improve bank supervision and strengthen governance in the state banks. While some progress has been made in these areas, considerable challenges remain and further impetus needs to be given to such reforms to place the banking system on a sounder footing.

21. The government has, until recently, been unable to make a concrete start on returning the recapitalized banks to the private sector, a long-standing priority under the program. We therefore attach considerable importance to the successful majority sale of Bank BCA, as this would send a strong signal that Indonesia is firmly committed to return banking assets to the private sector. We therefore welcome the government`s plan to conclude this sale by the end of the year.

Institution Building and Governance

22. The economic program must continue to accord high priority to institution-building and improved governance, especially in the key economic institutions, without which a stable environment for investment cannot be established.

· As you know, agreement on the principles governing IBRA`s largest debt restructurings was an important initiative of the third review. Much now depends on the quality of the reviews conducted by IBRA`s oversight committee and the responses of the FSPC.

· Equally important for confidence in the reform process are legal and judicial reforms. Immediate priorities in that regard are reform of the insolvency system, a strengthening in court system governance and anti-corruption efforts more generally, and improvements in the functioning of the commercial court.

· Improved fiscal transparency, through the audit of off-budget funds and public enterprises and agencies remains an important objective of the program.

Progress is under way in all these areas, but it will require continued support, to enable these historic institutional changes to take root.

* * * *

23. I have outlined what we believe constitute the critical elements of Indonesia`s reform agenda at this juncture. Adhering to it will require a determined commitment by the government and by Parliament to the economic reform process. Notwithstanding the current difficult environment, we are encouraged that all parties agree on the imperatives of preserving economic stability, as evidenced by the agreement on a prudent budget supported by bold measures for 2002. Early confidence building steps are needed to solidify the process of structural reform. With strong implementation in these areas, we believe the Indonesian program deserves the continued support of the international community.




IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: [phone]
Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: [phone]

[broker*709]

Die IBRA bleibt am Ball - ich werde einfach nicht aufgeben :-)

IBRA / HOLDIKO Asset Sales On Track For 2001
Steel-Drum Manufacturing Company Sold - 11th Asset Sale This Year

07/11/2001


The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and PT Holdiko Perkasa (Holdiko), a holding company established pursuant to the Shareholding Settlement Agreement between IBRA and the Salim Group, today announced that Holdiko’s entire shareholding in PT Poli Contindo Nusa (Poli Contindo), a steel-drum manufacturing company has been sold to PT Kerismas Witikco Makmur (Kerismas), for IDR 49.5 billion. Poli Contindo is one of the major manufacturers of steel-drums in Indonesia, supplying its products to various industries.

"It is a pleasant surprise for us to learn that during these difficult economic times, investors continue to submit strong bids for our assets," states Dasa Sutantio, Deputy Chairman Ad Interim / AMI, IBRA. "In particular, we are pleased that Kerismas (the purchaser of Poli Contindo) has decided to increase their investment by acquiring Poli Contindo," he added. Kerismas is a major producer of galvanized iron sheet in Indonesia’s construction industry. Kerismas is a former subsidiary of Holdiko and was sold to PT Sentralindo Bumi Persada, a consortium company led by PT Trimegah Securities Tbk., a leading Indonesian investment banking house, in June 2001. Kerismas and Poli Contindo have complimentary activities in their businesses.

The sale process of Holdiko’s 100% shareholding in Poli Contindo was simultaneously launched with 8 (eight) other asset sales in late August 2001. The sale process implemented a two-tier selection method with AAJ Batavia as financial advisor to Holdiko for this transaction.

"Our acquisition of Poli Contindo is inline with our strategy to expand our presence in Indonesia’s steel related industries," states Lau Beng Sing, Director of PT Kerismas Witikco Makmur. "We believe that our expertise and presence in the galvanized iron-sheet industry will form synergistic benefits with Poli Contindo in the future," he adds.

Poli Contindo is one of the largest manufacturers of steel-drums in Indonesia. Its production facility is located in Cilincing, Jakarta with a total capacity of up to 1,500,000 drums/year. Poli Contindo manufactures a variety of steel drums and relies on local suppliers for cold-rolled sheet steel raw material. Poli Contindo supplies its products to a wide base of customers in diverse industries and holds an international accreditation of ISO 9002 by BVQI.

With regard to the positive market response to its asset sales, IBRA/Holdiko is confident that its target from the sale of its ex-Salim Group assets will be achieved. On this, Scott Coffey, Director of Holdiko commented, "Based on preliminary feedback from our various financial advisors for our upcoming sales this month, we are highly optimistic that we will meet our sales target on the back of strong bids from both local and foreign investors."

Up to date, Holdiko has disposed of almost 57% of its initial portfolio, having sold its ownerships in 61 out of 108 companies transferred under the MSAA.

NUMBER OF COMPANIES UNDER PT HOLDIKO PERKASA

MSAA Sold in
1999 - 2000 For Sale in 2001 Remaining for Sale in 2002
Sold In progress
108 48 13 13 35

Progress on Holdiko Asset Sales

The sale of Poli Contindo is Holdiko’s 11th (eleventh) completed transaction this year. Holdiko continues to progress with the sale process of its 8 remaining assets from a total of 19 scheduled transactions for 2001. These transactions include the sale of Holdiko’s ownerships in PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk., Sugar Group, PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills, PT Indomarco Adi Prima, Riau Industrial Estates (PT Herwido Rintis / PT Bintan Inti Industrial Estate / PT Karimun Sembawang Shipyard), Guangdong Jiangmen ISN Float Glass, PT Yakult Indonesia Persada and PT Indogift Chuenher Indah. The sale processes of these remaining asset sales commenced last August and September 2001 and are expected to be completed by mid-December, 2001.

IBRA/Holdiko is currently at the due-diligence stage of the sale process of these assets which is participated by investors who have been shortlisted from the preliminary bidding stage. These investors are presented with comprehensive information on the assets before being asked to submit their final and binding bids.

Asset Sale No. of Investor participating in the final phase Final Bid Date
Guangdong jiangmen ISN Float Glass 8 November 9, 2001
Riau Industrial Estates
(PT Herwido Rintis/ PT Bintan Inti Industrial Estate/PT Karimun Sembawang Shipyard) 6 November 12, 2001
Sugar Group 9 November 19, 2001
PT Yakult Indonesia Persada N/A (Offer to JV partners) November 19, 2001
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk. 7 November 23, 2001
PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills 10 November 23, 2001
PT Indomarco Adi Prima 4 November 26, 2001
PT Indogift Chuenher Indah N/A (Offer to JV partners) November 30, 2001

To date this year Holdiko has closed the following asset sale transactions:

Closed in 2001 (sold in 2000)
Salim Plantations USD 368 mn
- Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 357 bn
Mosquito Coil Group IDR 610 bn
Sold in 2001
First Pacific Co. Ltd. USD 8.55 mn
Indocoal USD 45.5 mn
Indomaret IDR 162 bn
Indocement (Tranch A) USD 43.8 mn
Indocement (Tranch B) IDR 250.4 bn
Kerismas IDR 297 bn
Indopoly USD 29.17 mn
Yunnan Kunlene USD 14.38 mn
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk.
- Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 400 bn
PT Salim Renggo Containers IDR 204 bn
PT Gumindo Perkasa Industri USD 1.68 bn
PT Poli Contindo Nusa IDR 49.5 bn
Total estimated gross proceeds from 13 transactions IDR 7,443 bn

*) IDR/USD exchange rate used as of date of sale

PT Holdiko Perkasa was established in relation to the settlement between the Salim Group and IBRA with regard to loans extended by PT Bank Central Asia (BCA) to companies affiliated to the Salim Group. As part of the settlement agreement with IBRA, the Salim Group transferred shares and assets in more than 100 operating companies to PT Holdiko Perkasa.

As direct and indirect shareholder of these companies, it is Holdiko’s responsibility to supervise each individual company with the aim of disposing of a sufficient amount of these shareholdings. Holdiko will subsequently direct the disposal proceeds to IBRA as part of the settlement agreement.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is an agency of the government of Indonesia established at the beginning of 1998 as the primary agency to oversee the rehabilitation of the financial sector. IBRA is authorized to take over and control troubled banks and dispose of their assets and collateral.

[gholzbauer]

http://business-times.asia1.com.sg/news/story/0,2276,27699,0…

November 14, 2001
JAKARTA
Jakarta may merge state tin giant with nickel, gold mining firm

Proposal follows Timah warning on profit, viability


INDONESIA may merge ailing state-owned tin giant PT Timah with nickel and gold miner PT Aneka Tambang (Antam) in a bid to help Timah stay afloat, a top official said yesterday.

Timah said earlier this month it might only be able to hold on for several more months due to plunging tin prices and rampant illegal mining, which had forced it to book a sharp drop in nine-month net profit.

State Enterprises Minister Laksamana Sukardi told reporters: `To restructure Timah, the possibility is to merge it with PT Aneka Tambang. We don`t know when exactly, it`s still being studied.`


It is the first move by the government to help out the battered state firm since it sounded a dire profit warning for 2001 around two months ago.

The news helped Timah`s share price rocket to 515 rupiah yesterday, up 47 per cent from Monday`s close. Antam shares also shot up and by 0823 GMT were up 75 rupiah or 10 per cent to 825. They closed at 775.

But the dual-listed companies reacted cautiously to the plan, which has to be approved by minority shareholders first.

`The government holds a majority (in Timah) so it can do whatever it wants. . .whether it can save Timah or not we still cannot predict,` Timah spokesman Prasetyo Budi Saksono told Reuters.

He said Timah had already raised the concept of a merger as a long-term strategy to save the company.

`But it was still an idea - we haven`t discussed the details (with shareholders),` Mr Saksono added.

Antam corporate secretary Dohar Siregar said he feared there would be a negative impact from taking on Timah, which last week reported a 92 per cent drop in net profit for the first nine months of the year to 25 billion rupiah. Timah has also said it was likely to post its first ever net loss next year of 516 billion rupiah.

``It has to be carefully considered if this option would be a good business deal for both. If it is done only to save one party but could harm or burden the other, then it`s not a good business deal,` Mr Siregar said. - Reuters

[broker*709]

Ach - schon wieder wird was auf die lange Bank geschoben !

IMF yet to decide on extension of lending contract with Indonesia


JAKARTA (JP): The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Deputy Director for Asia Pacific Daniel Citrin said on Friday that the organization had yet to decide on Indonesia`s request to extend the IMF`s lending contract from 2002 to 2003.

"The Indonesian government`s request will first be recommended to the IMF board of executives, which will decide on it," Citrin was quoted by Antara as saying after his meeting with Minister of Finance Boediono.

In reply to a question on whether the request to extend the contract by one year would be enough, Citrin said he believed it was enough, but the decision would be up to the IMF board of executives in Washington.

Citrin also said that the time, when the decision on whether or not the Indonesian government`s requirement would be met, had not yet been set.

On Thursday, Boediono said the Indonesian government had decided to extend the lending contract, which will expire this December, until December 2003.

The extension of the contract is expected to provide an umbrella for the government`s foreign debt repayments, which are due between April 2002 and December 2003.

[broker*709]

Licht am Ende des Tunnel`s ?

Ich meine schon !

Govt to complete key talks with IMF today


Dadan Wijaksana and Berni K. Moestafa, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

After weeks of intense discussion, the government and the visiting International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission team are expected to complete the assessment of the country`s economic condition and reform programs on Tuesday.

"(The discussion) has been going well, but it`s not finalized just yet. We`ll still have a chance to meet tomorrow, we`ll wrap it up all by then," Finance Minister Boediono told reporters late on Monday following a meeting between key economic ministers and the IMF team.

He declined to provide further details.

A special mission of the IMF, led by the Fund`s senior adviser for the Asia Pacific department Daniel Citrin, has been in Jakarta for two weeks not only to review the country`s latest economic condition, but also together with the government to draft Indonesia`s fourth letter of intent (LoI).

The LoI, in this case, is a set of economic targets and reform programs which must be achieved and implemented by the government within a certain period of time to qualify for further loans under the IMF`s structural adjustment program.

The draft of the LoI will be brought to the IMF board of directors in Washington for approval, which will pave the way for the disbursement of the Fund`s next US$400 million loan tranche.

The government expects the IMF to make the next loan disbursement later this year. The disbursement of the IMF money is crucial to help revive investor confidence in the ailing economy.

Indonesia has so far received around $1.2 billion out of the $5 billion loan program agreed upon in late 1999.

Meanwhile, State Minister of State Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi also confirmed the smooth process of the discussions, saying that so far there had been nothing that could lead to any disagreement.

Among the economic targets set for the fourth LoI, according to sources, were an economic growth target of 3-4 percent for 2002, inflation of 9-10 percent and Rp 42.5 trillion ($4 billion) proceeds from the sale of assets under the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).

Earlier, a Bank Indonesia (BI) senior official said that one important item to be included in the LoI was a plan to launch a new investigation into alleged misuse of some Rp 138.4 trillion in BI emergency loans.

The case centers around the central bank`s liquidity support to 48 local banks during the peak of the 1997 financial crisis.

Although two separate investigations have been conducted in the case, they yielded neither prosecutions nor the repayment of the loans.

Meanwhile, regional banking analyst Lin Che Wei at SG Securities warned the move might stir legal uncertainties for debtors under IBRA.

"The implications of this (probe) can spread everywhere," he told The Jakarta Post.

Any follow-up on the probe will inevitably lead to reviewing IBRA`s Master of Settlement and Acquisition Agreements (MSAA) - a deal requiring bank owners to surrender assets to IBRA as collateral for their debts to the government.

He said forcing debtors to transfer more assets despite the MSAA, would hurt debtors` rights guaranteed in that document.

Che Wei said the government should realize that the loan abuse case may not get resolved within a short time. It must also know the consequences if this were to become an item on the next LoI.

[broker*709]

Weiter so !!!

Tuesday November 20, 5:47 PM

IMF reaches deal with Indonesia on reforms



JAKARTA (Reuters) - The IMF and Indonesia reached agreement on Tuesday on broad economic reforms to be implemented next year, a ray of light in the country`s floundering efforts to convince investors to return after four years of crisis.

But investors are unlikely to stampede back to Indonesia until the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri proves its critics wrong by pushing the reforms through a maze of vested interests that have hobbled recent restructuring efforts.

In a statement, the International Monetary Fund said the agreement was reached by a team visiting Jakarta. It said the pact had to be submitted to IMF management for approval before it could be finalised or signed, and then go to the Fund`s executive board.

"The IMF mission believes that strong endeavours in implementing these reforms will restore confidence in the GOI (government of Indonesia) reform programme and sustain Indonesia`s economic recovery in the period ahead," the IMF said.

IMF Asia-Pacific assistant director Daniel Citrin later told reporters the Fund`s board hoped to meet by early January.


FOURTH LETTER

The fresh programme is expected to be the fourth letter of intent under a $5 billion IMF loan programme to the battered country and should pave the way for fresh loans. It includes reforms covering banking, privatisation and legal issues.

More important than the money is the apparent vote of confidence an active IMF programme gives the world`s fourth most populous country as it struggles to navigate a traumatic and messy transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

But even active IMF deals have not rolled back perceptions about the difficulty of doing business in Indonesia or the belief powerful central and local political interests oppose the measures needed to restore the country to rapid economic growth.

"Assuming nothing goes wrong...we hope to have a board meeting at the end of December or early January," Citrin said.

It was unclear when details of the deal would be released.

Under a draft agreement obtained by Reuters last Thursday, the two sides targeted the economy to grow 3-4 percent next year while on a cash basis the budget deficit for this year was expected to be less than the 3.7 percent of GDP forecast.

That draft also said the target was to bring inflation down to 9-10 percent by the end of 2002. Year-on-year inflation in October was 12.47 percent. The government forecast economic growth in the 2002 budget to swell to four percent from 3.5 percent this year.

Indonesia`s statistics bureau said on Thursday GDP growth for 2001 would be at least 3.47 percent, the same as third quarter growth from a year earlier.

While those figures look reasonable by regional standards, Indonesia fell hardest during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s and has also found it the most difficult to recover.

Analysts have questioned whether the forecast for the whole year would actually be so robust given the global slowdown.

[em.]

Ich schau hier nur ab und zu mal rein und habe von Details keine Ahnung.

Das einzige was mir aber immer auffällt ist das es hier sehr oft heißt " ja endlich" und "Trendwende"
das könnte die Wende sein.

Indes BII dümpelt nach wie vor rum und entäuscht am laufenden Band!

Was machen? Bleibt eigentlich nur warten und hoffen!!!

[broker*709]

Die IBRA verkauft weiter.

Sugar Group Sold For IDR 1.16 Trillion

29/11/2001


Holdiko’s Biggest Asset Sale So Far in 2001

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and PT Holdiko Perkasa (Holdiko), a holding company established pursuant to the Shareholding Settlement Agreement between IBRA and the Salim Group, today announced that Holdiko’s 100% effective ownership in the Sugar Group has been sold to PT Trimanunggal Jaya - PT Garuda Pancaarta Consortium. This asset sale is thus far Holdiko’s biggest transaction in 2001, realizing gross proceeds of IDR 1.16 trillion.

The sale process of Sugar Group commenced last August and implemented a two-tier open tender process. Nine short-listed investors from the preliminary bidding stage proceeded to the due-diligence stage, six of which submitted their final and binding bids. PT PricewaterhouseCoopers FAS acted as financial advisor to Holdiko for this transaction.

"We are delighted to announce the sale completion of the Sugar Group, and we hope that this will bring a positive impact towards the overall sugar industry," states Dasa Sutantio, Deputy Chairman Ad Interim - AMI, IBRA. In the sale and purchase agreement, PT Trimanunggal Jaya - PT Garuda Pancaarta Consortium has agreed to endeavor to support the national sugar industry, among others through programs involving the local government, working together with national companies, and conducting community development programs. "We are particularly pleased that a domestic investor who offered the highest price has emerged as the winner of this sale process. We hope that their commitment will further develop the Sugar Group in the future in contribution to the enhancement of the Indonesia’s sugar industry in general," he added.

The Sugar Group consists of two holding companies, PT Inti Petala Bumi and PT Eka Primaguna Perkasa, which holds investments in cane plantations sugar factories and an ethanol distillery. Located in the Lampung province of South Sumatra, together the companies form an integrated (upstream and downstream) sugar producer. The Sugar Group’s combined planted area of approximately 59,000 hectares (as at 31 March 2001) yield a high level of productivity of 7.9 tons sugar per hectare of cane harvested (as at October 2001), compared to the national average level of approximately 4.6 tons.

"We believe that our acquisition of the Sugar Group will add to its value in the future. We also trust that this investment will also benefit the Indonesian sugar industry as a whole," states Nicholas J. Serwer, advisor to PT Trimanunggal Jaya - PT Garuda Pancaarta Consortium. "This acquisition is one of our long-term strategic investments, in which we will continuously strive to achieve even higher levels of operational efficiency and productivity of both the cane plantations and sugar factories, with the objective of meeting the national demand for sugar in the future," he added. PT Trimanunggal Jaya - PT Garuda Pancaarta Consortium is a private investment group which is currently engaged in diversified investment activities in Indonesia.

"The sale of the Sugar Group is thus far our biggest transaction this year and brings Holdiko’s total gross proceeds from its asset sales to nearly IDR 10 trillion," states Scott Coffey, Director of Holdiko. This asset sale is Holdiko’s fourteenth transaction from a total of 20 scheduled transactions for 2001.

On Holdiko’s remaining asset sales, Coffey commented, "We are now working against time to finish the process of all our asset sales and plan to have received all final bids from investors by the first week of December. On top of the asset sales we started last August and September, we have recently added the divestment of IBRA/Holdiko’s stakes in Indomobil to our list of assets for sale before the end of the year." During the next one week, IBRA/Holdiko expects to conclude the sale process of PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills, PT Yakult Indonesia Persada, Riau Industrial Estates and the Sulfindo Group.

To date, Holdiko has disposed of 61% of its initial portfolio, having sold its ownership in 66 out of 108 companies transferred under the MSAA.

NUMBER OF COMPANIES UNDER PT HOLDIKO PERKASA

MSAA Sold in 1999 - 2000 For Sale in 2001 Remaining for Sale in 2002
Sold In progress
108 47 19 11 31

Progress on Holdiko Asset SalesHoldiko continues to progress with the sale process of its other assets from a total of 20 scheduled transactions for 2001. These transactions include the sale of Holdiko’s ownerships in PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills, PT Yakult Indonesia Persada, Riau Industrial Estates (PT Herwido Rintis / PT Bintan Inti Industrial Estate / PT Karimun Sembawang Shipyard), PT Indogift Chuenher Indah, PT Indomarco Adi Prima, Sulfindo Group, and PT Indomobil Sukses Internasional Tbk. The sale processes of these remaining asset sales commenced last August and September 2001 and are expected to be completed by mid-December 2001.

To date this year Holdiko has closed the following asset sale transactions:

Closed in 2001 (sold in 2000)
Salim Plantations USD 368 mn
- Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 357 bn
Mosquito Coil Group IDR 610 bn
Sold in 2001
First Pacific Co. Ltd. USD 8.55 mn
Indocoal USD 45.5 mn
Indomaret IDR 162 bn
Indocement (Tranch A) USD 43.8 mn
Indocement (Tranch B) IDR 250.4 bn
Kerismas IDR 297 bn
Indopoly USD 29.17 mn
Yunnan Kunlene USD 14.38 mn
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk.
- Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 400 bn
PT Salim Rengo Containers IDR 204 bn
PT Gumindo Perkasa Industri USD 1.68 bn
PT Poli Contindo Nusa IDR 49.5 bn
Guangdong Jiangmen ISN Float Glass USD 34.17 mn
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri IDR 755 bn
Sugar Group IDR 1,162 bn
Total estimated gross proceeds from 14 transactions IDR 9.71 trillion

*) IDR/USD exchange rate used as of date of sale

PT Holdiko Perkasa was established in relation to the settlement between the Salim Group and IBRA with regard to loans extended by Bank Central Asia (BCA) to companies affiliated to the Salim Group. As part of the settlement agreement with IBRA, the Salim Group transferred shares and assets in more than 100 operating companies to PT Holdiko Perkasa.

As direct and indirect shareholder of these companies, it is Holdiko’s responsibility to supervise each individual company with the aim of disposing of a sufficient amount of these shareholdings. Holdiko will subsequently direct the disposal proceeds to IBRA as part of the settlement agreement.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is an agency of the government of Indonesia established at the beginning of 1998 as the primary agency to oversee the rehabilitation of the financial sector. IBRA is authorized to take over and control troubled banks and dispose of their assets and collateral.

[broker*709]

Ziemlich aktiv - oder was ?


Berdikari And Yakult Sold!

04/12/2001


***

Joint-Sale of Berdikari with PBUMN

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and PT Holdiko Perkasa (Holdiko), a holding company established pursuant to the Shareholding Settlement Agreement between IBRA and the Salim Group, today announced the result to be received from two more asset sales; the sale of Holdiko’s ownership in PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills (Berdikari) and PT Yakult Indonesia Persada (YIP), further adding IDR 285.3 billion to Holdiko’s target from its year 2001 asset sales. These asset sales are Holdiko’s 16th and 17th transactions of the year.


"IBRA/Holdiko is committed to conduct each asset sale according to best practices and maintaining principles of fairness and transparency. It is also in our interest to seek ways to increase the attractiveness of our assets," said Dasa Sutantio, Deputy Chairman Ad Interim – AMI, IBRA. "In light of this, we took the opportunity to coordinate with The Board of Investment & State-Owned Enterprises (BPM-PBUMN) in selling our combined ownership. We are also glad to learn from the Yakult transaction, as well as several of our previous asset sales that many industries in our economy are still performing very well and remain attractive to foreign investors," he added.

PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills The sale of Berdikari is a joint-sale between IBRA/Holdiko and The Board of Investment & State-Owned Enterprises (BPM-PBUMN), where a combined shareholding of 92.55%, consisting of Holdiko’s 85.17% and BPM-PBUMN’s 7.41% interests, was sold to ATS Consortium. Total gross proceeds to be received by IBRA/Holdiko amounts to approximately IDR 225.3 billion, which consists of a USD 5.7 million for equity and IDR 165.9 billion for convertible loans.

ATS Consortium is a US based international group of regional millers and commodity specialists.

"We are pleased to be making this investment in the future of eastern Indonesia and the Indonesian flour milling industry. Berdikari Flour Mills is one of the driving forces for future growth in the region. We look forward to a long and beneficial association with our Indonesian counterparts in the public and private sectors as well as to the country’s continuing economic growth," states consortium leader Allan Harari.

The sale of Berdikari was done through a two-tier open tender process, which was launched in early September. PT Ernst & Young Consulting acted as financial advisor to Holdiko for this transaction.

Berdikari is a wheat milling company located in Makassar (South Sulawesi) with a current production capacity of 840,000 MT/year, or about 15% of national capacity. In sales volumes terms, Berdikari is Indonesia’s second largest flour milling company and dominates the flour market in the Eastern Part of Indonesia.

Berdikari divides its product lines into food flour ("Kompas", "Gunung", "Gembok" and "Gatotkaca" brands), industrial & other flour ("Matahari" brand) and by-products (bran, pollard and pellet).

PT Yakult Indonesia PersadaHoldiko’s indirect 51% ownership in YIP was sold to Holdiko’s joint-venture partner and existing shareholder in YIP, Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd. of Japan, for gross proceeds of IDR 60 billion. The sale process commenced in August and was initiated with an offer to Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd. in honor of the pre-emptive rights it holds as joint venture partner in YIP. Within the period of time given, Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd. accepted IBRA/Holdiko’s offer for its shareholding and agreed to conclude all matters regarding the transaction by the first week of December. PT Ernst & Young Consulting also acted as financial advisor to Holdiko for this transaction.

"We are pleased to have been able to increase our investment in the Indonesian market. After years of presence, Yakult has become a household name in Indonesia. However, in our view, the Indonesian health drinks market currently remains largely untapped and still provides extensive opportunities for investments. We are therefore confident that we will be able to serve a larger portion of the Indonesian health drinks consumer in the future," states Mr. S. Hori, President of Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd. (Jepang).

Yakult is the market leader in fermented milk drinks in Indonesia. Partnering with Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd., YIP is the second largest health drink producer in Indonesia. YIP currently sells its products mainly for the domestic market especially in the western part of Indonesia. YIP’s plant in Cicurug, West Java, uses the most advanced technology in health drink processing and produces 160,000,000 bottles per year, with a production capacity is 533,000,000 bottles per year.

"Last week we announced the result of three asset sales," states Scott Coffey, Director of Holdiko. "Within these two weeks we also hope to be able to announce the results of our remaining transactions for the year," he added. To date, Holdiko has disposed of over 66% of its initial portfolio, having sold its ownership in 71 out of 108 companies transferred under the MSAA and raising to date IDR 10.7 trillion in gross proceeds for 2001.

NUMBER OF COMPANIES UNDER PT HOLDIKO PERKASA

MSAA Sold in 1999 - 2000 For Sale in 2001 Remaining for Sale in 2002
Sold In progress
108 47 24 6 31

Progress on Holdiko Asset SalesHoldiko continues to progress with the sale process of its remaining assets from a total of 20 scheduled transactions for 2001. These transactions include the sale of Holdiko’s ownerships in Sulfindo Group, PT Indomobil Sukses Internasional Tbk. and PT Indogift Chuenher Indah. The sale processes of these remaining asset sales are expected to be completed by mid-December.

To date this year, including the sale of those two assets, Holdiko has closed the following asset sale transactions:

Closed in 2001 (sold in 2000)
Salim Plantations USD 368 mn
-Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 357 bn
Mosquito Coil Group IDR 610 bn
Sold in 2001
First Pacific Co. Ltd. USD 8.55 mn
Indocoal USD 45.5 mn
Indomaret IDR 162 bn
Indocement (Tranch A) USD 43.8 mn
Indocement (Tranch B) IDR 250.4 bn
Kerismas IDR 297 bn
Indopoly USD 29.17 mn
Yunnan Kunlene USD 14.38 mn
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk.
-Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 400 bn
PT Salim Rengo Containers IDR 204 bn
PT Gumindo Perkasa Industri USD 1.68 bn
PT Poli Contindo Nusa IDR 49.5 bn
Guangdong Jiangmen ISN Float Glass USD 34.17 mn
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri IDR 755 bn
Sugar Group IDR 1,162 bn
Riau Industrial Estates IDR 710 bn
PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills IDR 5.7 mn
-Loan repayment to Holdiko IDR 165.93 bn
PT Yakult Indonesia Persada IDR 60 bn
Total estimated gross proceeds from 19 transactions IDR 10.7 trillion

*) IDR/USD exchange rate used as of date of sale

PT Holdiko Perkasa was established in relation to the settlement between the Salim Group and IBRA with regard to loans extended by PT Bank Central Asia (BCA) to companies affiliated to the Salim Group. As part of the settlement agreement with IBRA, the Salim Group transferred shares and assets in more than 100 operating companies to PT Holdiko Perkasa.

As direct and indirect shareholder of these companies, it is Holdiko’s responsibility to supervise each individual company with the aim of disposing of a sufficient amount of these shareholdings. Holdiko will subsequently direct the disposal proceeds to IBRA as part of the settlement agreement.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is an agency of the government of Indonesia established at the beginning of 1998 as the primary agency to oversee the rehabilitation of the financial sector. IBRA is authorized to take over and control troubled banks and dispose of their assets and collateral.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Vielleicht bekommt die IBRA nun endlich vernünftige Leute ?

Replacement of IBRA Four Deputy Chairmen

06/12/2001


On December 3 2001, State Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Affairs issued Decree no. KEP-30/M-BUMN/2001 on Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency Deputy Chairmen replacement.

The Deputy Chairmen are:

Soebowo Musa as Deputy Chairman of Bank Restructuring replacing Felia Salim.
I Nyoman Sender as Deputy Chairman of Asset Management Credit replacing Irwan Siregar.
Heri Wahyu Setiyarso as Deputy Chairman of Risk Management replacing Hendy Herijanto.
Junianto Tri Priyono as Deputy Chairman of Support & Administration replacing Chandra Purnama.
With the replacements, it is hoped that IBRA will improve its performance in achieving target, which will be harder in the future.

[broker*709]

Zeit wird`s ja !

Rupiah gains stronger ground


The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The rupiah surged to breach the 10,000 level against the U.S. dollar on Wednesday trading, as corporate demand for the foreign unit declined ahead of year`s end, dealers said.

Players taking profit on the weak dollar dragged the rupiah back to old territories albeit at 10,210 still higher than Tuesday`s closing at 10,220

The rupiah`s sharp gains marked a turnaround for the battered local unit, which has been hovering at above 10,000 since last October.

Bank Indonesia Governor Sjahril Sabirin attributed the rupiah`s recent surge on an upswing in market sentiment.

He said the market took confidence in the rupiah following the successful sales of two state companies.

These were the telecommunication firm PT Telkom Indonesia, which sold for some US$300 million, and plantation firm PT Socfindo, which sold for around $40 million.

Sjahril said the central bank had intervened in the money market, but added the amount had been too insignificant to have helped the rupiah much.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was also seen converting dollars from the proceeds of its asset sales program.

IBRA secured several large deals this month as it went after its target to raise Rp 27 trillion (about $2.64 billion) in cash.4

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[gholzbauer]

Indonesia To Probe Illegal Tin Mining In Bangka-Belitung

JAKARTA, Jan. 4 (Dow Jones) - Indonesia`s government will send a team to the
Bangka-Belitung province in mid-January to investigate claims of illegal tin
mining in the region, Industry and Trade Minister Rini Soewandi said Friday.

Rini said the government will then formulate a regulation governing tin
mining and export activities in the area based on information gathered by the
team.

"The (federal) government wants to help local economies, but we don`t want
any illegal mining or exports either," Rini said.

According to Rini, the ministry`s Director General of Foreign Trade Sudar
will lead the team.

PT Tambang Timah (P.TAM), the world`s largest integrated tin producer, had
said that illegal tin mining in the Bangka-Belitung province contributed to
tin`s sharp price fall in 2001.

Timah also said that illegal tin mining was one of the reasons its net profit
declined 92% on year in the first nine months of 2001.

The Indonesian government holds a 65% stake in Timah.

Timah and another producer PT Koba Tin hold tin deposits and production
operations on the two islands.

After Indonesia`s regional autonomy law became effective in the beginning of
2001, the two islands` local governments issued export licenses to local people
to export tin concentrates.

Only Timah and Koba Tin have licenses to mine tin on the islands. The export
authorization has enabled local residents on the island to sell tin ores and
concentrates from unlicensed sources.

The local governments earn royalties from the tin exports.

Frans Ruffino, Dow Jones Newswires; 62-21-3983-1277;
[e-mail].


(END) Dow Jones Newswires 04-01-02

0927GMT

---------
Bis diese Untersuchung abgeschlossen ist, könnte Timah weg vom Fenster sein.
Indonesia sucks.

[broker*709]

Lebt der Markt eigentlich noch? Ich glaube schon.

Money Market Commentary

Today`s Commentary >> Daily Foreign Exchange
MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 2002 3:01:40 PM
For further information and firm prices, please contact :
Treasury Sales and Marketing Standard Chartered Bank
Tel. [phone] Fax. [phone]
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ROUNDUP

Dollar/yen was little changed from New York’s closing levels on Monday in Asia with the euro a touch firmer. Volumes will be light with Tokyo out for the Coming of Age Day holiday. Dollar/yen at 132.06/10 against New York’s 132.21 with the euro at 89.41-46 against 89.22. Euro/yen was steady at 117.88/92.
Greenspan’s comment on Friday that the U.S. economy showed signs of stabilising but still faced risks helped the euro’s firmer tone. The yen was held in check by Trade Minister Hiranuma’s remark the yen was nearing appropriate levels around 135 and Economics Minister Takenaka saying he believed the yen was to levels justified by economic fundamentals.
LOCAL MARKET ROUNDUP
IDR open at 10375-10425 in a mixed market. Expected to test 10400 level to break following some profit-taking activities by interbank player and ahead of tax payment due every mid-month. If failed, IDR could bounce back to 10450 level area intraday.
On Friday, IDR was traded in tight range of 10350-10450 level with lack of news and corporate demand in the market.
Technical view : USD/IDR : Tight ranges had seen short-position in play but the negative crossover of daily MACD is improving stronger chance of a downside break but would see initial dips to be limited towards the 10340/300 supports. Greater efforts needed to break below the latter for momentum to pick-up towards initial 10265 ahead of 10150. The overhead 10445/465 barrier continues to keep any upmove on check.
JKSE made another positive gain of 9.706 points to close at 411.775 on Friday, mainly on foreign investors buying on blue chip stocks on attractive prices.
Japanese PM Koizumi stressed on Saturday the importance of stability in Indonesia and won support for his regional free-trade vision from Indonesia. Speaking after holding talks with President Megawati Sukarnoputri during the latest leg of a trip through Southeast Asia, Koizumi reaffirmed Japan’s backing for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
SPOT MIDDLE RATES
USD/IDR SWAP EUR/IDR SWAP
1 WK 29 (14.27%) -
2 WKS 58 (14.27%) -
1 MTH 142 (16.31%) 120
2 MTHS 265 (15.21%) 245
3 MTHS 415 (15.88%) 375
6 MTHS 835 (15.98%) 745
12 MTHS 1675 (15.81%) 1470
SIBOR
(%)
1 MTH 1.82
2 MTHS 1.82
3 MTHS 1.83
6 MTHS 1.93
12 MTHS 2.34
INDICATIVE OFFER RATE
USD/IDR
CROSS CURRENCY SWAP
1 YR 20.75%
2 YR 19.40%
3 YR 19.20%
5 YR 18.00%
10 YR 17.50%


SPOT MIDDLE RATES
USD/MAJOR MAJORS/IDR
USD - 10400
EUR 0.8945 9300
JPY 131.75 78.95
CHF 1.6530 6290
GBP 1.4490 15070
SGD 1.8390 5655
AUD 0.5185 5390
NEW YORK TRADING
USD/IDR - -
EUR/USD 0.8929 0.8912
USD/JPY 132.10 131.69
USD/CHF 1.6580 1.6535
GBP/USD 1.4495 1.4435
AUD/USD 0.5235 0.5222

[broker*709]

Für Indonesien kann es nie genug sein !

IMF Conditionality: How Much is ‘Enough’?
An Economic Forum
International Monetary Fund
Multipurpose Room
Washington D.C.
Wednesday, December 19, 2001

Participants:

Masood Ahmed, Deputy Director, IMF Policy Development and Review Department

James Boughton, Assistant Director, IMF Policy Development and Review Department

Joanne Salop, Vice President, Operations Policy and Country Services, World Bank

John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics
MR. AHMED: Today`s topic is IMF conditionality. It`s a topic, of course, that`s been on the table for a long time in different ways, but more recently, I think, it`s been particularly interesting in the context of looking at aid effectiveness work.

And, another strand has been looking at it in terms of the relationship between countries and international institutions. Does conditionality infringe on or undermine the ownership of programs that countries develop and implement? Does the way in which conditionality is structured affect the likelihood of success of those programs?

So there is a whole debate over the last three or four years, coming out first from the crisis in Asia, which then spread out to other countries in `97-98, but also coming out of the work done in many low-income countries where there were ongoing programs in Africa that the Fund and other agencies were supporting, where the same kinds of questions about ownership and about effectiveness kept cropping up. This led the Fund under the leadership of the new Managing Director to look at the experience of conditionality in Fund programs, but within the broader context of looking at conditionality as it`s being developed and applied by other institutions. The result of that has been a review of the Fund`s conditionality, which has been ongoing now for almost a year.

So we`re at this point where we have drawn a lot of lessons from the first year of looking at our own experience, looking at other people`s work, and we are ready to start thinking about how to draw and synthesize all these lessons in terms of now developing some guidelines for the Fund`s conditionality going forward, building on a set of interim guidelines that we have.

At the same time, other people obviously have been looking at conditionality, too, and the World Bank in particular has also been looking at its experience in terms of the way in which conditionality has worked in the context of Bank-supported programs. And they, too, have been trying to draw some lessons in terms of how they could move forward to make that more effective in support of implementation of programs in client countries.

And while these agencies have been looking at their own experience and drawing on others, people who are academics or civil society organizations or researchers have also been examining this set of issues and contributing in many ways to the processes that have been underway in the institutions.

So at today`s Economic Forum, we thought we`d start off with a panel and then open it up and get inputs and comments and questions from many of you. And I see in the audience a number of you who I know have been thinking and working on these issues. Some of you we have talked with in the past year as we`ve done our own work. To get us started, we have three people who`ve been thinking hard about this set of issue.

To my immediate left is Jim Boughton, who, in addition to being the author of the book that John was showing you, has also been leading our work on the conditionality review in the IMF. Jim`s currently with the Policy Development and Review Department in the IMF, but has also been previously in the Research Department and during a period was the historian of the Fund, which is when he worked on his book.

Next to Jim is Joanne Salop. Joanne is currently Vice President of Operational Policy and Core Services in the World Bank. Her job is to head up the Bank`s work in framing the set of operational policies that guide the Bank`s work in adjustment lending and in its operations more broadly. And Joanne has also in a previous incarnation, before she went to the World Bank, been a staff member in the IMF, so she has a good perspective of how the work of the two institutions has evolved over the years. Other than her current job in the World Bank, she has done a number of other assignments, including being chief economist for South Asia in the World Bank.

Next to Joanne is John Williamson, who is currently a senior fellow at the IIE, the Institute of International Economics, but who has also over the course of his long and distinguished career been a staff member at the IMF some years ago and more recently at the World Bank where I believe he succeeded Joanne as the chief economist for the South Asia Region.

So as I was going through the bios of these people, it struck me that there is a certain overlap, and I hope that we`ll be able to get sufficiently challenging perspectives from the three to start the discussion. But then I also very much hope that you all will come in with your perspectives, and not just questions but also your own ideas and advice on how we could explore this issue further.

I`m going to ask each panelist to take 10 or 12 minutes to give us their initial perspectives on the topic, and then we`ll open it out, have some questions and answers. And before we end, which we will at 4 o`clock, I`d like to give each of them a couple of minutes to come in with any final thoughts that they have.

So that`s how we might organize ourselves between now and 4 o`clock, and without further ado, let me turn to Jim.

MR. BOUGHTON: Thank you, Masood. Welcome, everybody, and thank you thank you, John Starrels, for plugging my book in my presentation. I`ve also slipped in a little subliminal plug for my book in my presentation. It looks like a standard IMF logo on the screen. If you look closely, you`ll see that I`ve managed to slip the title of my book into the logo, in case people stare at it long enough.

I also have a less subliminal plug that I can give you, showing you the cover of the book. You can buy it on your way out in the Visitors Center.

So, having done that, let me turn to the topic for this afternoon. I`ve turned around the title of the event very slightly. The subtitle that had been announced in the fliers was how much is enough in terms of conditionality. I`m not sure that there`s really an answer, and I certainly wouldn`t want you all to be sitting there thinking that we`re going to come up with a number for exactly how much conditionality is enough. So I`ve turned it around a little bit to say let`s focus on what we`re trying to achieve with conditionality, which is to enable borrowing countries to implement strong economic policies that they can, in fact, themselves take responsibility for, that they can own in some sense. And I will look at what the role of IMF conditionality might be in trying to bring that about.

Now, having written a work of history over the last several years here, I`m going to start by giving a little bit of history on just how we got to the point where we are now. In other words, we`re going through this review to see where we should be--how we should be changing our approach to conditionality, but I think in order to do that, it`s important to understand why we`ve been doing what we have been doing.

The Fund has been doing conditional lending, lending conditional on policy changes in countries, for almost half a century. The very first time that the Fund experimented with conditional lending was in a stand-by arrangement for Peru in 1954, which was made conditional on Peru promising not to change its policies with regard to intervention in foreign exchange markets, basically saying we thought Peru had a means of keeping its exchange rate stable and sustainable, and they had to promise to keep doing that. And so that was our very first effort at conditionality. It was a fairly modest beginning.

But over the next few years, the practice of conditionality became much more formalized, very largely as a result of some very forward, innovative thinking by a gentleman who is here in the audience with us today, Jacques Polak, who developed a model that had very clear policy implications in linking restoration of stability in the balance of payments to money leaking out into the balance of payments through excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. So that instead of requiring countries to try to act directly on the balance of payments, which would be very difficult, we wanted them to act directly on policies that they could control, monetary and fiscal policy.

The first time this was actually applied in practice through what were called performance clauses or performance criteria was in a program, a stand-by arrangement for Paraguay in 1957. They actually had four conditions. They had to do what Peru had promised to do, which was to maintain a stable exchange rate policy. But they also had to promise not to exceed a ceiling on domestic credit creation and not to exceed a ceiling on spending on both the current and capital account of the government.

So that then became the basis, this basic application of a model linking the balance of payments to monetary, fiscal, exchange rate policies, that then became the basic way of applying conditionality. But it was done in a very haphazard way. If we thought it was necessary, we did it. If we thought it was not necessary to impose conditions, we didn`t do it.

As late as 1967, when the Fund had a large stand-by arrangement with the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom was able to borrow from the Fund without any explicit performance criteria at all. And that was because of kind of a special relationship, if you will, having been one of the two major founding countries of the IMF. But it made a lot of people nervous. It raised questions of uniformity of treatment. A lot of these other countries who had been borrowing subject to policy conditionality said this wasn`t fair. And so that led to the first effort for the Fund to write down a set of guidelines governing the policy conditionality on IMF lending.

Those guidelines established principles of uniformity of treatment among member countries, and said that any time a country was going to be borrowing in what we call the upper credit tranches, borrowing more than small amounts in relation to its quota, aside from a few well-defined exceptions through special facilities, that it would be subject to a standard set of performance criteria. So it was really 1968 that marked the regularizing, if you will, the institutionalizing of these conditions.

In the 1970s, economic coordination got more complicated. By this time the fixed exchange rate system had broken down, and countries were using lots of different exchange rate systems. We had the two oil shocks, the huge increases in oil prices, and other major instabilities in the economy. And the Fund had started experimenting with more extensive policy conditionality, a longer laundry list, if you will, of conditions that countries had to meet. And so then an effort was made in the late `70s for the Fund to say let`s try to cut back a little bit, let`s establish principles of parsimony, making conditionality less burdensome, again, trying to restore something of this uniformity of treatment among countries.

So those guidelines were codified in 1979, and those are the guidelines that we still operate under today. So for those of you who are schooled in advanced mathematics, you`ll see it`s been more than two decades that we`ve been operating under these guidelines. And just as we slipped away from some of the earlier agreements during the`70s, during the `80s and `90s we slipped away from some of the principles that were enshrined in these guidelines in 1979.

The point I want to emphasize is that the drift in the nature of conditionality over the last 20 years has been made for some very, very good reasons, that there were limitations to the guidelines that had been agreed on, reacting to an earlier age, that became apparent in the `80s and the `90s that led the Fund to expand the nature of its conditionality. And there were two things that I would mention:

One was that by focusing on overall aggregates, the overall fiscal deficit, total level of domestic credit creation and so on, you leave a lot of scope for the government to fix its own policies within those overall guidelines, that overall conditionality. That`s a good thing up to a point if the government makes the right choices. If the government makes the wrong choices, then you get bad outcomes. And what we were finding was that there are a lot of cases where you got some pretty bad outcomes; that if the Fund just said you have to cut down on your fiscal deficit, in many cases the easiest way to cut down the fiscal deficit is to cut back on subsidies on bread prices. And that means that you may have millions of people out there who can`t afford to buy bread anymore. And so the protests against the Fund and against countries` governments for making bad choices led the Fund to be more specific about the nature of its conditionality.

Secondly, countries started experiencing very long-lasting structural problems. We were dealing with more low-income countries, countries with really deep-seated economic problems. It became natural for the Fund to try to help those countries deal with those problems. And so we started broadening conditionality into more structural issues, and that particularly became apparent in the 1990s. Even though the 1979 guidelines said that conditionality shall be on macroeconomic policies not on structural policies, except insofar as they influence the macro, that was an exception that you could drive a truck through, and we kept driving bigger and bigger trucks through it as time went on.

This came to a head by the late 1990s when, in the course of trying to solve a financial crisis in Indonesia, Indonesia submitted a Letter of Intent on its policy intentions to the IMF in April of 1998 that listed 117 specific structural actions that the government intended to take during the course of this program, covering a very, very wide range of policy issues, including six conditions that were related to the environment, not a traditional area of concern for the IMF at all.

Now, all of these conditions or nearly all of these conditions were put in there for very good reasons. Only a small portion of these conditions were related in any very specific way to IMF conditionality. In other words, these were not performance criteria that the country had to meet in order to qualify for the next drawing. But they were promises that were going to be evaluated over time, and before the Fund would agree to the next stage of the program, before it would agree to the next round of disbursements to the country, these items would be subject to a review.

Now, obviously, nobody expected Indonesia to fulfill all 117 of these promises. It was impossible, and everybody recognized it was impossible. So the problem was that even though these were not specific policy conditions, there was no real assurance, there was no point at which Indonesia could say, okay, if we do these things, then we will be assured of drawing the money three months from now, or whenever. So there was an ambiguity that had crept into the whole process over time that was, I think people realize now, beginning to get out of hand. It was serving very useful purposes because Indonesia had to do these things, but it was making IMF conditionality very difficult to apply.

So that brings us to where we are now, as Masood summarized at the outset. We`re trying to develop new guidelines for the 21st century that will enable us to pull back, restore some of those old principles, but still meet the problems of today.

There are three goals to this current review: streamlining, focusing, and fostering ownership. I`m just going to say a very few words about each one of these three before I finish.

We all know what streamlining means. It means that instead of having a clunky old 19th century steam train, you have a nice streamlined train. On the screen now you see a steam train, a French steam train of the 1930s. It was one of the very first efforts at streamlining. But what does streamlining mean in this current context? It means, first of all, less extensive conditionality. It means you`re not going to write down a program that has 117 structural conditions in it. That`s going to require a lot more collaboration with the World Bank, which my friend and colleague Joanne Salop is going to talk about in a few minutes.

It also means less detail. It means that if we think, for example, that a country needs to impose a value-added tax, whereas in the recent past we might have specified every step that the government needs to take in order to get that value-added tax in place and working properly, now we might have a much more general condition on what they need to do.

We`re not trying to go back to what I would call and characterize as the bad old days of just saying we`re going to impose overall conditions on fiscal deficits and so on, which we know led to a lot of bad outcomes. But we are going to try to cut back in those two areas.

Another thing we`re not trying to do is we`re not trying to weaken programs. We`re not trying to get to a situation where we`re just going to say countries can do whatever they want and all we`re going to do is lend to them, because we also know that that can lead to some very bad outcomes. So that`s what streamlining is.

Now, we also all know what focusing means. Here we have a photograph of a very large Japanese telescope focused on outer space. You probably can`t see it, but there are two very small human figures down there, which shows you this thing must be hundreds of feet high. But, anyway, that is what focusing is.

Now, what is focusing in the context of this review? First of all, it means you have a clear view of goals. What are the goals of Fund conditionality? First of all, the primary goal has always been and still is to help countries alleviate their balance of payments problems. But at the end of this program, the country has to be able to finance its balance of payments. If you don`t solve that problem, you haven`t solved any problems at all. So that`s goal number one.

The second goal--and this is language taken directly from Article I of the IMF`s Articles of Agreement--is that the country should not be taking measures destructive of national or international prosperity in order to solve its balance of payments problems. That was originally a code for saying you don`t have a competitive devaluation, you don`t try to solve your problems at the expense of your neighbors. And that`s still a principle that`s enshrined very clearly in everything that we do.

But, third--and this is a goal that has become extremely important over time; it was always there, but it`s risen to the fore--is that the Fund has to help the country improve its sustainable growth rate, that solving your balance of payments problem through compressing your imports, squeezing people`s incomes, hurting the poor--none of these things solve any problems in the long run, and so you have to stay focused on that goal as well.

The idea, then, is to have the minimum--you want to end up having the minimum amount of conditionality that enables you to help the country meet those goals. That`s what the whole exercise is all about, and that`s really the answer to the question that John posed in setting up this forum of saying how much is enough.

The third element, ownership. Again, we know what ownership is. What does it mean in this context?

First of all, it means that the country has to take responsibility for strong policies. It does not mean that the country does whatever it would have done in the absence of getting into this mess in the first place. It means that the country`s expected to reform, but it`s also expected to design its own program. And the idea of the Fund coming in and telling the country what it has to do, which is an idea that has crept in over time, has to be completely disposed of to the fullest possible extent.

What will it take to achieve this? That`s a very tall order, by the way. If we`re going to achieve that, first of all, we need more flexibility on the IMF`s part. If a country comes to the IMF and says we want to borrow from you, we need your financing, we`re prepared to change our policies in order to try to solve our problems, but we also need your financing, instead of having the Fund go in and saying then in order to qualify for our financing you need to do X, Y, and Z, the Fund has to be prepared to say to the country, okay, then tell us what policy changes you`re prepared to make and then we`ll have a dialogue about it. Let the country put its program on the table first. That`s the kind of flexibility that this is going to take.

Secondly, then, you have to have active participation in the process by the country. That means that in the course of having this dialogue you need to have as broad a participation as you can. We`ve been doing this for the last few years through the process of--what we call the PRSP process, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process. And we`re trying to generalize that process in order to encourage broad participation in the country.

Thirdly--and this is in a way the tallest order of all--is you need selectivity by the Fund. The Fund has to be prepared to wait until this whole process of flexibility, participation, and dialogue has got us to a point where the country is ready rather than going in and saying we`re going to lend to this country just because the country needs our help.

Will we succeed in doing this? Some success is already evident. The streamlining process is underway. If you compare programs being approved by the Fund`s Executive Board now with programs being approved two or three years ago, on average you`ll see some major changes.

Collaboration with the World Bank has been strengthened, as Joanne is going to tell you in a few minutes. But the other things, these other--these tall orders I`ve been talking about, the real challenges of this, trying to achieve more flexibility, trying to get more participation by countries, trying to get selectivity on the part of the Fund, these things are going to take some time. We`re really at the early stages now, and I think although those of you out there who may be skeptical about how far we`re going to get, I think your skepticism based on past performance is probably well founded. But hopefully when we have another forum along these lines two years from now or three years from now, you`ll have less reason to be skeptical.

So stay tuned, wait for the movie. You can see we have--this is an advanced poster for the movie about streamlined IMF conditionality, and so when it comes out, we`ll see you all here again in a couple of years.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much, Jim, for the show.

Let me turn it over to Joanne, and I`m hoping that Joanne will talk about not only the Bank-Fund collaboration I mentioned, but also how thinking about conditionality is evolving in the context of the Bank`s own work.

MS. SALOP: Actually, I would have preferred it if Masood had suggested that earlier, but I`ll try to do my best.

Anyway, clearly, from Jim`s presentation, this is not the Fund that I left in 1986. And I wanted to say at the outset a couple of things. One, I`m very happy to be here, very happy to be back at the Fund, and just to let you know, before we on the panel came here today, we had a very nice lunch that John [Starrels] and Masood hosted. And it was very interesting, and clearly the focus of the lunch was really on history, and, of course, largely led by Jim, not to plug his book, although we were all instructed to plug is book. But, nevertheless, at the table a lot of historians, John Williamson, of course, on my left, and myself. I`ve been a history of the international financial system for many years. I`m delighted, of course, to see Mr. Polak in the audience who hired me into the Fund many, many years ago.

So a couple things in terms of history, I think, that I wanted to put on the table from the Bank`s perspective, and particularly following up on what Jim had said in terms of the Bank-Fund perspective. A little bit of history from where I sit and what I see in that long history.

I think many of the people in the audience are probably Fund staff. Is that correct? I don`t see the little yellow tags. Does that mean Fund staff? Yeah? Because I don`t see Bank staff, but just in terms of what your--what you know.

Well, you know that the Bank was created at the same time as the Fund way back when in the late 1940s, and the Bank first was called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And the reconstruction was an important part of the Bank. Our first loans were to Europe. Our first loan was to France and then to Netherlands, Luxembourg.

Interestingly, though, the Bank was created really as an investment bank. Engineers, et cetera, were really there. It was--our first loans were program loans, so in some sense, the Bank`s return to work on what has come to be called structural adjustment is in some sense, in some ways a return to our roots. But we were basically a project--institutional lending, institution for physical investment projects. We didn`t even start lending for education I think until the `70s, et cetera, and even then the people who did education loans in the Bank were architects because what we built were schools. We didn`t worry about the curriculum. Today we do education, of course, it`s different. We do the curriculum. We do the business strategy for running the schools. We do sustainability issues.

But the World Bank has changed a lot over its more than 50 years, although we retain some of those things from the beginning. And, similarly, Bank-Fund relations, of course, have changed over that period. You can imagine during the period in which the Bank was an investment lending bank--and I was not there then--that we didn`t talk a whole lot to the Fund. I guess we--well, I guess we did talk a whole lot because we probably shared the same building and we certainly shared the library and other things. But in terms of our work, the overlap in the work is much smaller.

But, nevertheless, clearly, macroeconomic issues, the central issue for the Fund, was important in some project issues, and I`m sure there was a dialogue throughout the `60s and the `70s. Clearly, in the beginning of the 1980s, that changed a lot. The Bank moved into structural adjustment lending with the debt crisis, the oil crisis, et cetera. And there the overlap between the Bank and the Fund, the mutuality of interest in terms of day-to-day, became much more center stage.

And so this was really what I would characterize in this era as very much the Bank moving into an area where it had previously been very much the Fund`s preserve in terms of macroeconomic issues, and then sorting out Bank-Fund collaboration in that era and conditionality was very much focused on that.

How did we in the Bank take into account the Fund`s views on macro? Could we go ahead with a program if the Fund was unhappy with the macro? How did we take those things into account? Did we do in the Bank our own macro work, or did we rely on the Fund`s macro work? So those were the kinds of issues that needed to be sorted out on a day-to-day basis.

And there were some highly publicized cases where things did not go so right and which changed then the way we dealt with those in the late 1980s, Argentina at that time.

Now, during the `90s--and we saw this in Jim`s slide--I see the transfer being very much the other way, and that it was during the `90s that the Fund started to move into areas of the Bank`s concern, and Jim laid that out, in terms of the Fund became much more interested in structural issues. So just as the Bank moved into the Fund`s areas in the `80s, taking up macro, worrying about macro much more, building up its macro people, in fact, I was part of the exodus from the Fund to the Bank in the `80s as part of that, when, in fact, staff were moving from the Fund to the Bank, macro staff, as the Bank built up on the macro side.

In the `90s, as the Fund worried about structural issues, actually, you probably saw the reverse movement in terms of Bank staff moving to the Fund in terms of structural expertise. And what`s behind this? Well, what`s behind this is the fact that we all have a common, increasingly common model, which is everything matters, and that it`s not just macro matters for stabilization programs, et cetera, and that structural policies matter for structural programs.

Basically, the story that we all have is that for country development, it`s good policies, and those are the mutuality of structural and macroeconomic issues. So that, not surprisingly, the Fund--the Bank worries about structural and macro issues, the Fund worries about structural and macro issues.

Now, this brings us institutionally, I think, globally and for students of the international financial system and shareholders, well, what kind of system do you want to have? You know, if you`re designing the overall system of institutions, do you want to have a set-up where you have a Bank that looks just like the Fund and that maybe they compete against each other or maybe they work together, but that the Fund has the same kind of staff, structural, social, environmental, macro, as the Bank, structural, social, macro, environmental? And that you move to--do you want to have a set-up of the Bretton Woods institutions in which you have maybe more generalists everywhere, or maybe a whole lot of specialists everywhere? But do you want to have two institutions that basically look just like each other, twin sisters, if you will? Or do you want to have a situation where you have more specialist institutions who cooperate? So that you have deep within the Fund maybe real expertise on the macro stuff, as indeed you do, and then in the Bank real expertise on the structural issues and that you cooperate with each other and share.

It`s broader than the Bank and the Fund. It goes to the multilateral development banks, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank. It goes to bilateral donors as well. And, in fact, throughout the 1990s, we all know partnership became one of the bywords of the day, and partnership among donor agencies really recognizing the issue of we need to drill down, get strong, be deep in our areas, and share expertise across, that model being accepted rather than a model, if you would, of dilution where we all replicate within our agencies all of the expertise and maybe at not such a degree of depth.

Now, what I see is where we are now is on that--basically the choice has been made by our shareholders that we ought to go for the drilling down, the deep drilling within the institutions in the partnership model, and that`s how I interpret in part the streamlining discussion here, and particularly the Bank-Fund role. So an attempt now to, for the Fund, pull back into areas of core competency, for the Bank to pull back into areas of core competency, and to talk.

Now, that`s not so easy because we talk, but lots of issues in talking. I want to tell you about three of them.

One, well, which are our areas of core competency in the Bank and which are the Fund`s? Some are quite clear. Jim even alluded--environment I think everybody accepts, World Bank. Certain issues, I guess central bank, technical assistance, the Fund. And we could array all of the issues along a spectrum, some clearly Bank, some clearly Fund, some in the gray area in between. And there`s been much debate and discussion about what those are, and some areas are clearly shared: financial sector, trade, tax, et cetera. So--and I think that is pretty well sorted out.

And then what`s the protocol? How do we decide what`s what and where`s where? How do you resolve conflict? How do you--if one agency says, you know, it`s pink and the other agency says it`s blue, who decides? Which is it? Or is it, you know, purple? What is it? So how are those things--but I think that--a lot of progress has been made on that.

Two, the second, more serious and current issue is, well, how do you handle cross-conditionality? How do you handle issues with the Boards? How do you handle legal issues? Because if indeed the Fund is running macro, and with support from the Bank in structural areas, and the Bank is running, managing, helping, expertise in structural areas, with support from the Fund, and you have to take a program to the Board, you know, say the Fund, relying on support from Bank staff, well--well, what? I mean, what does the Board do? And do respective Boards then rely on a decision from--the Board of the Fund rely on a decision from the Board of the Bank?

Now, here the decision is also clear and been taken, no cross-conditionality and basically what we have set up is a system where--or that we`re working towards in which it`s quite clear individual Boards make their decisions, and make their decisions as always based on advice from management and their own considerations, but that the advice from management may well be informed by the views, et cetera, of staff of the other agency. So the so-called lead agency concept, and that is what we are pursuing.

So that I think is pretty much resolved. We have to play it out, but that`s the second point, again, the first point being which areas do you specialize in, pretty much clear. How do you handle cross-conditionality? Pretty much clear. Third issue, major challenge, and this I think is where we are right now, and an issue that we`re working on. And certainly an issue that I am personally involved in, you know, in terms of the operational management side in the Bank and working with Masood and his colleagues on this at the Fund. And, that is, how do you actually handle--how do you actually manage the work, and particularly if there are differences in culture between the Bank and the Fund?

Fund, emergency work, a country, you know, needs help right away, needs a program, needs stuff, needs fast action. The Fund, of course, has a strong reputation for very rapid and effective action, quick.

The Bank, on the other hand, does not have that reputation, and so how to square that circle. If the Fund goes out, gee, they need something, you know, tomorrow, very quickly, the Bank--where is the Bank on these issues? So, one, how do you handle the different perception of timing.

Two, on these issues of depth--and that`s related to the question of timing--again, much of the discussion at our lunchtime was focused on privatization issues, where I think it was clear--and we were discussing what the lessons learned from history and research are, and clearly accepted that on privatization, you know, it`s not a revenue-raising vehicle, it`s really a structural issue, shouldn`t be having conditionality on numbers, et cetera, in programs. But that question of the detail, the devil being in the detail in a lot of the structural issues requires then a lot of--oftentimes a lot of prep time to get ready, not to say that macro programs don`t require prep time, but, nevertheless, if you`re doing a continual Article IV, up-to-date, et cetera, and moving in on macro, monetary, and fiscal aggregates, it may be possible to do those more quickly than developing the detailed work that is needed on some of the structural issues. In addition, on the structural issues, breadth, lots of them, and they range from environment to social to infrastructure, regulatory framework for this, that, and the other thing, huge range in the structural area.

So consider, gee, Fund mission goes, needs help or needs support from the Bank on structural issues, are we ready? Have we done the prep work? Have we done the prep work in the required detail that we could give to the Fund, look, here, we`ve analyzed this sector, here`s this, this, this, can we be ready every day of the week, every month of the year? The answer is no.

So how do we manage that? I mean, how do we manage these different kinds of time frames where, again, the Bank has been working on more of a--not the bullet train, not the fast train--by the way, we did finance the bullet train in Japan.

[Laughter.]

MS. SALOP: This is true. But we were on--you know, on a different train. How do we marry, how do we merge those two things? And that, again, is one thing, as I say, we`re working on that now. One solution we are putting on the table is, well, fine, staff ought to talk to each other earlier, you know, and if, in fact, there are issues that are likely to come up that the Fund staff can be seeing, we in the Bank really need to know about those things earlier on, be talking about those, getting them into our work program so that we can have done the detailed work, indeed, in a timely manner should the issues come up.

So I think, road ahead, I think that the position here on the effectiveness of this work we`re doing in terms of teaming up, trying, each of us, to specialize in our particular areas, work out the actual day-to-day work modalities in this stuff really will be critical for how successful we both are in streamlining of conditionality, and, in fact, making a stronger international financial system where we`re all much more able to specialize at the same time that we partner across.

A final word, just to respond to the point that Masood had asked me at the outset, just much of the work we are doing in a parallel fashion along with the Fund staff on conditionality, we also have some--we don`t have Jim`s book, but we have some other things, and we have them on the website. If you give me your name, I can send it to you. But we have been doing work, of course, on conditionality, many of you know, and we`ve talked to some of you. We are doing this work to really revise our guidelines as well. The same stories coming out all over, as you know. The real issue is country ownership, country programs, et cetera. The question, the challenge for us all is how do we effectively influence countries. How do we get--inform the policies that they want to take. So I`d be happy to follow up on any questions.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much, Joanne, and thank you for putting it also in this kind of historical context of Bank-Fund relations, because I think it is important when we talk about conditionality not to think of it as a disconnected phenomenon, but that it is part of an overall process of technical assistance, policy advice, program design, monitoring. It`s one part of it. It`s not some self-contained dimension of our work.

Let me now turn to John, who`s looked at this from both the inside and the outside. John?

MR. WILLIAMSON: But who hasn`t recently been looking at it in the same sort of detail as the two previous speakers, so my apologies.

I was sent some background reading, incidentally, by the organizers of this meeting, and it consisted of the 69-page chapter of Jim Boughton on this subject. Let me say, it was actually an excellent read. I thought it was a masterful weaving together of the story of IMF conditionality in the `80s, so I add my endorsement of this volume.

I want to--I interpreted our terms of reference as being to talk essentially about the role of the structural conditionality in IMF programs, and so that`s what I plan to do. I understand why structural conditionality got there in addition to the traditional conditionality. I think the reasons, in fact, were touched on by Jim Boughton.

There was a lot of concern in the early `80s that IMF conditionality had a deflationary bias, that it was, therefore, bad for growth. There was a lot of concern that when governments were simply told to cut public expenditure, they very often cut the wrong things--things that were bad for long-run growth, things that were bad for short-run equity, and, therefore--and then they blamed the IMF for forcing them to do it, so the IMF tried to get out of that.

So I understand the pressures that led to the emergence of structural conditionality, but it seems clear that, in fact, this has bred its own set of problem. There have been far too many conditions. Regarding those 117 conditions in the Indonesia program, maybe the IMF didn`t expect all 117 to be fulfilled, but listing 117 and then saying you have to satisfy who knows how many of them in order to get this released I think wasn`t helpful. So there were too many conditions covering things that really were not critical to the immediate problems of the country.

It led the Fund into a series of areas where it doesn`t have any comparative advantage, and it undermined country ownership. So it has bred its own set of problems, and the question is, therefore, today what should be done about this.

Now, what has surprised me about the discussion of the two previous participants is that they didn`t distinguish between the different facilities of the Fund, which, to my mind, pose some very different issues. The Fund`s traditional stand-by facilities and the new Supplemental Reserve Facility. The crisis one-the SRF, right? These ones are there to deal with the balance of payments problem, and that may be a traditional balance of payments problem of the current account type, or it may be the new capital account type of crisis where there`s a capital account reversal. I think that is a meaningful distinction. It`s obviously one where there`s no sharp dividing line between the categories. But there are polar types, and it`s useful to make that distinction.

But in both of those cases, one really looks to the Fund`s stand-bys or the supplementary reserve facility or, in principle, the contingent credit line, if any country ever uses it, as the instruments that are appropriate. And it seems to me that in that context the need for structural conditions is really -- [tape ends].

-- yeah, okay, you may want to pay some attention to how you safeguard the poor in the immediate course of adjustment or, for that matter, safeguarding the environment, conceivably. But it`s the traditional macroeconomic instruments, some combination of devaluation and monetary and fiscal deflation that are really relevant to correcting the balance of payments problem. And the objective is to let the country correct that and then get on with life as before, as soon as possible.

As I see it, the big need in this area hasn`t anything to do with conditionality. It`s to give the Fund the new power to agree to standstills, the sort of thing that was discussed by Anne Krueger in her speech two weeks ago, so that especially in a capital account crisis it has an instrument with which it can take the immediate pressure off the Fund and allow its rather traditional type of measures to take effect.

I think where one gets into much more need for structural measures is when one comes to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, as it`s now called. The new program there is to get the country to draw up its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and basically it lays out its intended program, and that`s supposed to be done in consultation with its own population, even more than with the international institutions, the multilaterals but also the bilateral donors. This is indeed envisaged as a partnership between the various groups, but primarily it`s the country itself that`s expected to draw up the program and take ownership of it.

And then the sort of role, the natural role of the IMF, it seems to me, is to make sure that the macroeconomic part of the program hangs together, that this isn`t a program that is heading for--that is inconsistent and is, therefore, going to run into problems in the short run because of macroeconomic imbalances. And as I see it, there is one major problem in the way that the IMF is set up to go about that, and that is that it does its accounting wrong.

When it looks at the fiscal accounts of the country, which is a crucial thing, then for aid-dependent countries it actually puts the aid receipts below the line. They`re current account receipts. They don`t create indebtedness. They should be above the line. And in some of the aid-dependent countries this creates problems that the IMF does appear to have an excessive zeal for fiscal contraction in circumstances where it is not appropriate.

I don`t believe that the Fund always does that. In fact, I read this morning the Argentines are now saying that the IMF was irresponsible for having endorsed the previous administration`s excessive fiscal expansion. And I have a lot of sympathy with the present Argentine Government in that respect. So I`m not saying this always is a problem, but I think it is a problem in the aid-dependent countries, and it`s a problem for a very fundamental reason, namely, that the accounting is done wrong, and that should be remedied.

Now, when it comes to all the other issues--well, there are one or two marginal issues which could be argued to be either Fund or Bank responsibilities, and I think Joanne mentioned in that context the financial sector, trade, and the tax system. But even if you count those as marginal issues, there is still a whole range of other issues that are absolutely fundamental to the sort of growth programs that the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility is intending to promote, things from governance, from the institutional infrastructure for a market economy, liberalization, privatization, social expenditures, financial sector, infrastructure, various other sector programs, environment. You can go on and on. And all of those, it seems to me, are the areas in which the Bank has had--traditionally it has built up a comparative advantage, and I indeed cannot see the sense of the Fund starting to compete over that vast range of areas.

So the question then becomes how does one coordinate between the two institutions in this type of program? As I see it, there are three basic possibilities. One is for the IMF to lend simply on macro conditions and for the World Bank to lend its poverty reduction support credits on structural conditions and for them to go along more or less independent of one another. And I can`t say that seems to make much sense because if you don`t get both of them roughly right, then the country is going to run into trouble not too far down the road. So I don`t think that would be a good solution.

A second one would be for each of them to lend with their own set of conditions, but to look for some sort of approval by the other, and that is cross-conditionality, and I`m a little bit not clear as to--it seems to me that is basically what is happening, but Joanne says there`s no cross-conditionality so I guess I don`t quite understand how this is being organized, and maybe she or Masood can come back and clarify this for us.

The third solution, of course, is to consolidate the lending into one organization, and that`s the solution which the report to which I was signatory last year of the Overseas Development Council suggested would be appropriate, and we argued that the right--given that most of the issues were ones with which the World Bank had the primary responsibility, that was the natural place to concentrate that type of lending, and so the PRGF should be moved from the Fund to the Bank, and that still seems to me to be a logical type of reform to look at. And then the Fund would continue to be a lender--it would continue to have a role in this type of program in certifying that the macroeconomic conditions held together and made sense, but it would continue to have a role in these countries when they ran into balance of payments crises, but much more the traditional type of role in these low-income countries, and doubtless one would need to have cheaper credits for them, but they would be given in response to the same type of problems, and there wouldn`t be an attempt to get into this longer-term development lending, which is what the PRGF basically does.

Now, you might argue isn`t there a fourth possibility, which is to abandon conditionality and have both organizations lead in saying whether the country strategy is appropriate as regards the outcomes in a particular area. This is sort of--this is looking at the common-pool propose of Ravi Kanbur which says that in the new conditionality, it would make sense for really all the donors to do the same type of thing that is now happening with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, that the country draws up its program and puts it before the donors, and then the donors say how much money they`re prepared to put in, and then the Fund provides guidance on whether the program is appropriate on the macro side and the Bank on these series of structural issues.

It seems to me it`s still necessary there to decide whether IMF approval depends just on the macro or whether it also depends on Bank approval. So I don`t see it really gets one away from that dilemma, although I am very much in favor of moving in the direction of the common-pool proposal for lending to these low-income countries. But I don`t think it gets away from that particular dilemma.

So let me--finally, there`s one Fund facility--I`m not sure how much it`s still used these days, but where maybe the structural conditions have a more central role, and that`s the Extended Fund Facility. This was a facility created in the `70s on the argument that some countries had balance of payments problems that were never going to be resolved without structural change in the economy, and so the IMF should be prepared to lend longer term and to get into structural issues of those types of countries. And maybe there`s a case there for retaining structural conditionality more or less as it seems to have evolved, but as regards both of the facilities where the bulk of the Fund lending goes on nowadays, it seems to me that one ought to move back to a much sharper division of labor.

I take Joanne`s point that everything matters to everybody, but, nevertheless, I think making progress really does depend on trying to establish a fruitful division of labor, and one shouldn`t simply allow a relapse into each organization doing everything, which I don`t think would be productive.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much, Joanne, and thank you for also introducing this point about the distinction across different kinds of Fund facilities and, more importantly, different kinds of Fund roles in different groups of countries. So I think that will be something that no doubt people will want to pick up on.

I see a number of people who want to contribute, and could I just get, to get a sense of the time, a show of hands of the number of people who are likely to want to say something or to raise a question? Okay. So we have seven or eight people so far, and we have about half an hour. So I just encourage you to use that time accordingly.

Let me start over there, and could I ask you to do what John asked, which is to go up to the microphone and identify yourself, please.

MR. LEVINSON: Jerry Levinson. It seems to me that the discussion has largely revolved around organization and process, and the underlying assumption is that the Fund and the Bank know, to use Boughton`s observations, good policies and Joanne`s idea of a model. And that`s precisely the issue, what is at issue. Do you know? And is it reasonable to expect the Bank and the Fund to know?

And my question is--first, just let me back up, and I won`t take any more time. I`m not sure that Boughton`s characterization of the bad old days is too--or I am sure it`s too simplistic because the bad old days had one virtue, that is to say, I was the Assistant Director of the aid mission in Brazil during the `60s, and the Fund and the Bank would come down, and they would concentrate on just what Joanne said, that is to say, the macroeconomic conditions most directly related to the balance of payments. And essentially it said to the country how you distribute the burden of adjustment is a problem, a political problem within your own society--it`s for you to solve.

But it also left the countries room for different roads to development, different paths to development, different balances between the public and private sector, different modes of collective bargaining arrangements arising out of the particular history of the countries.

So my question to the panel is this: Do the Fund and the Bank believe there are different paths to development which will indeed involve in different societies a different balance between the private and public sector, different emphases upon privatization, different collective bargaining arrangements, rather than what seems to be the case now, which is an almost mindless insistence upon privatization under any and all circumstances, regardless of how it`s carried out, and a single collective bargaining arrangement that, in reality, is a shorthand for labor market flexibility? In effect, launching the Fund in the `80s into structural reform really derived from Secretary Baker`s 1985 Seoul, Korea speech in which effectively he laid out an American model of capitalism, and that seems to be the model that the Fund and the Bank are promoting.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much.

Let`s take three or four questions.

My name is K.K. Samanta. I`m a consultant. I will raise here the same basic structural points which I raised in the meeting of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Now, your method of dealing--you have all--all the speakers have done something very unconstitutional by referring to countries and peoples. Your constitution only allows you to deal with the governments and speak with the governments.

Now, when you speak of Argentina, certainly you are not speaking about the country or people of Argentina. You are dealing with the little Finance Ministry there, and your country department and maybe your [inaudible]. You have not consulted the chambers of commerce of Argentina. You have not consulted the professional bodies of Argentina which have functioned maybe for hundreds of years, and they have a huge reservoir of expertise, which you never care to tap or to take their views or their suggestions. This you are doing with every country, and every country is very much frustrated that something is going on between the Finance Ministry and the World Bank and the IMF which is not serving the purpose of the people at all.

The government wants to survive. He wants to take a loan. He comes to IMF. Their Finance Ministry goes to the World Bank, takes some loan and survives. What good does it do to the country?

So what I suggested to Mr. Wolfensohn is this: that now the time has come to get out of the old World Bank and the Finance--the International Finance Corporation from being an old relic. Go into the next century. Involve the people, their representatives, the chambers of commerce, the professional bodies and NGOs, and reduce the participation of the governments. Most of them are corrupt and inefficient; otherwise, they wouldn`t have come to you.

[Laughter.]

MR. AHMED: Okay, great.

MR. Samanta [continuing] And I want to ask the same question. When will you let in in your organization the professional bodies and the chambers of commerce with full power and facilities as you offer to the governments?

MR. AHMED: Good, and I`m sure my colleagues will want to answer both on the facts and on the implications.

I`m going to work my way down here and then come back here. I have two people here, and then in the back.

I`m David Roodman with the World Watch Institute. I want to first just thank--congratulate the IMF on the relative transparency with which it has run this review of conditionality. I think that`s something of a break with the past and is a welcome development, and I hope that that sort of development will be forthcoming more in the future.

That said, I am somewhat concerned about the nature of this inquiry. There seems to be a great deal of focus on streamlining and also focus, which is certainly warranted, but I think it also prematurely narrows a whole discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of conditionality and how to fix it. The subtitle of this seminar is how much is enough. I think there`s a bigger question, which is why hasn`t conditionality worked very well on its own terms and what is to be done about it, and there are many answers to that. One is quite likely for streamlining and focus, but there are also a lot of other problems: pressure to lend within the institution and pressures applied to the institution, which maybe the IMF cannot really solve, the fact that providing finance to a borrower government can actually bolster forces within the government that are opposed to reform, and so on.

James Boughton acknowledges this at the end, talking about the need for more selectivity, which I very much support. But it seems to me mostly to have been dismissed or relegated to footnotes in the IMF documents.

So I think I should just stop there and say I`m concerned that the IMF still isn`t demonstrating capacity to really honestly criticize itself in a way that I think is ultimately needed for its own health.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much.

I`m Jo Marie Griesgraber. I`m Director of Policy for Oxfam America. And I`d like to second the first three set of questions, but also add that I`m sure the Fund is not supportive of monopolies, and I think there`s a monopoly on policy prescriptions in the approach that`s taken, even when there`s the target set and the government is invited to design its own policies to arrive at the desired outcome. Ordinarily there is an acceptable route to that end and those that are not.

And so I guess I`m very concerned that even in the capacity building and the training that`s offered at the IMF, it`s more of the same or the same. I don`t think there`s a diversity welcomed in how to achieve the desired outcomes.

I`d also want to second Jerry Levinson`s concern on the fact that it tends to be contractionary rather than growth-promoting policies.

And, finally, kind of the chronic theme of the non-governmental organizations is how do you know what works, because the Fund is so reluctant and apparently doesn`t know how to do the ex ante impact assessments. What do your policy prescriptions mean to the poor, the poor disaggregated by sectors and by regions of the country, and what does it do to the environment? And I think until that task is accomplished, you probably should just put a freeze on your policy recommendations because you don`t know what you`re doing if you don`t know how to anticipate the outcome and demonstrate that.

Sorry to be so harsh, but I have limited time.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much.

I think I had three people here, so I`ve got Jacques Polak, the gentleman behind, and then there was the--yes?

MR. POLAK: Jacques Polak I would like the speakers to address this question: Conditionality in the Bank and conditionality in the Fund are two entirely different things. There was a story in the press this morning that the Bank had lent $400 million to Colombia to finance its fiscal reform. Now, fiscal reform doesn`t cost any money. You have to hire--it certainly doesn`t cost $400 million to organize fiscal reform. The loan by the Bank of $400 million for fiscal reform is essentially a bribe to introduce--to induce the Colombians to engage in fiscal reform.

The distinction I would like to make is that in the Fund conditionality is used to support its loans. In the Bank it`s the opposite. The loans are introduced to support its conditionality.

I`d like the speakers to address this question.

MR. AHMED: Thank you very much, Jacques.

The gentleman here?

My name is Maxim Kishmir, and I`m an economist at International Equity Management. My question to you all is: What are you (?) cooperation with the capital market is part of your work plan for the next decade or two, or are you simply trying to cooperate with each other across the street and ignore the capital market? If yes, then what is the mechanism you are contemplating, and how are you going to make it work? If not, then no, just say no.

MR. AHMED: All right. Is that pretty much it--or I have--oh, I`m sorry. You were right between me and the screen here.

My name is Brett Schaefer. I`m with the Heritage Foundation. I guess I would disagree with a couple of the commentators already on emphasis. I heard the quote up there saying that everything matters. My response would be that if everything matters, nothing matters, and I would ask you to maybe take a step back and prioritize. What is your top goal? What is the thing you want to accomplish most?

And I found the comment on selectivity to be very interesting, and I was wondering if you could answer very briefly, just name four or five countries that in your opinion don`t deserve loans.That`s it.

MR. AHMED: And I think we have the last two, and then I`d like to ask the panelists to come back. The lady over there.

I`m Elizabeth Drake from the AFL-CIO. I have a question, first of all, about specialization and how, if the Fund only focuses on macroeconomic conditions, which I think is appropriate for it to do, it can also ensure that the social impacts of their macroeconomic policy prescriptions are positive rather than negative. I wonder if this is a question of Bank-Fund collaboration. I think in the context of the PRSP there is a commitment to do social impact assessments of both the policies in the PRSP and the lending that comes out of the PRSP. And I just wonder how you see your role in terms of the social impact of your programs if we do have a more clear division of labor, which I think is desirable, but carries difficulties as well.

And on the question of flexibility, on the Fund being flexible in the conditions that it applies to countries, I guess I would also like an example. Do you have an example of when a country has said we cannot comply with that condition or we would not like to and the Fund has changed its mind and said, okay, instead of privatizing 87 corporations in the next year, you can only privatize 42, or something. Just a concrete example of what sort of things you would be flexible on and what things you wouldn`t be flexible on, where you would say, no, you absolutely cannot have a non-transparent budget, it has to be transparent. I mean, I think you cannot just say the word flexibility without getting a little bit into the substance of what things you`d be flexible on and what things you wouldn`t be.

Thank you.

MR. AHMED: Last gentleman.

My name is Jerry Nisenson. I formerly worked with the Treasury through the `80s that reviewed many of the programs, and I do some teaching now. I just had one question. I`d like the panel to address the subject of exchange rate, what the Fund`s position on exchange rates for the individual countries and conditionalities, in particular the prevalence of using a fixed exchange rate as an anchor of the whole program. The most recent example is in Turkey, which failed.

Thank you.

MR. AHMED: Okay. So we have a large number of questions, and let`s try and see if we can deal with this. I think that they fall into some groups, and perhaps if you`ll allow me, I`d like to ask my colleagues to deal with them in that manner.

There is a set of questions about how much flexibility there is in the approach. Do we accept that there are different paths to the same outcome, or do we have a sort of single model which we try to rigidly apply? Are there limits to what countries can come up with in terms of their programs? And, in some sense, do we know what we`re doing? I think it was Jo Marie Griesgraber who sort of said let`s put a freeze on all policy prescriptions, and I`m not sure where that would lead one to. But, in any event, does one have a sense of what it is that we are doing? Just one block of questions.

Then there`s a second set of questions that`s related to the work--the review itself. Have we too quickly narrowed down the focus on looking at streamlining and focusing of the review? Have we looked at the experience on conditionality more broadly, what works, what doesn`t? And in that sense, it would be useful to perhaps say one word on that.

Then I think there was also a question about whether, if everything mattered, do we have a sense of putting priorities into our work--how do we prioritize in different country contexts?

Maybe if I could ask my colleagues to just start on those, and then if any of you feel that your questions haven`t been addressed--and then there was Jacques` question as well, which was: Is the link between conditionality and lending the fl

[broker*709]

Der Markt holt gegen den negativen Trend mächtig auf !

Ist die Wende geschafft ?

Weekly Market Commentary


January 14, 2002

What may happen this week ?

Beyond expectations, Jakarta stocks continued their rally on Friday last week. The Jakarta Composite Index reached as high as 417 in the second trading session on Friday, before it finally ended the day at 411.77. Trading volume was high, with estimated turnover on Friday of 1.285 trillion rupiah. The main driver for the rise in the index was Gudang Garam (GGRM), which rose on Thursday from 9,000 to 9,700 rupiah and jumped further to 10,850 rupiah on Friday. Other blue chips followed the lead of this heavily-weighted cigarette maker. On the currency front, the rupiah closed at 10,428 to the greenback. The volatility of the exchange rate shows a downward trend, while the short-term 1-month and 3-month swap-rate has dropped gradually.

What may have been the reason behind the sudden rally of Jakarta stocks? On the macroeconomic level, was the decline in SBI-rates in the last two auctions. This may have pumped liquidity into the market. With an absorption rate of only 39.4 percent in the January 2 auction and 53.28 percent in the January 9 auction, a lot of money stayed in circulation. This money might have been placed in the stock market as the currency/forex and bond markets remained sluggish.

On individual stocks, GGRM had long been trading at a deep discount, while the risk premiums on equity both in USD terms and in rupiah terms tended to fall. When the JCI moved sluggishly between 380 and 390, players must have known that Jakarta stocks were too cheap. The volatility of the market, as measured along the 1-month standard deviation of the daily percentage change of the JCI, has fallen steadily over the last two months, indicating that the downside risk was already limited. A brief lookback at the last 12-year historical cycle of the JCI reveals that a level below 400 is quite low. As such, these factors might have been the driver of the strong rally of the JCI last week.

Major bourses in Asia are still overshadowed by high uncertainty. The US Federal Reserve chief, Alan Greenspan, warned that the US economy still faced considerable hurdles ahead before recovery could take place in the second semester of this year. The best year-to-date performer in the region was the SET in Thailand with a year-to-date gain of 6.15 percent, followed by the JCI with a year-to-date gain of 5.03 percent. The worst year-to-date performer was the HSI in Hongkong with a year-to-date loss of 2.02 percent, followed by the NKY in Tokyo with a year-to-date loss of 0.96 percent. On the back of global economic uncertainty, the major Asian markets may remain under pressure.

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Wie oft muss die Trendwende noch angekündigt werden ???

Monday January 28, 11:32 PM

Deutsche Bank Asia chief says region has high potential
By Richard Hubbard

Photo: Reuters
Click to enlarge


SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Asia`s potential is high and in Southeast Asia neither terror threats nor China`s emergence have so far had much impact on the outlook, according to Hubert Neiss, chairman of Deutsche Bank`s Asian operations.

But Neiss, formerly Asia-Pacific chief of the International Monetary Fund, says much hinges on how governments respond to these challenges.

"Asia has a high potential. It is an expanding region and is the fastest growing region in the world economy," the 66-year-old banker told Reuters in an interview.

Neiss, who has long been bullish on Asia, said that nothing he had seen in recent months, including the sudden weakness of the Japanese yen, had changed his view.

The spectre of terrorism which has fallen across Singapore, Malaysia, the Philipipines and Indonesia in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States had not yet had much impact on investor sentiment, he said.

"I`m not sure how terrorist threats will really affect perceptions because that depends on how resolutely government`s deal with the threat," he added, referring specifically to the arrest of suspects in Singapore.

Neiss acknowledges that much of the Asian region`s recent performance has been the result of strong growth in China and to a lesser extent India but, as he noted, even Indonesia has done well.

"It`s growing by three to four percent and will probably do the same this year. This is better than the average -- a lot better," he said.

Indonesia`s chief economic minister, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti recently forecast 4.0 percent growth this year while indicating that preliminary figures showed 3.5 percent improvement in 2001.


CHALLENGES REMAIN

Neiss`s positive assessment may come as no surprise, given that Deutsche Bank is keen to grow its business in the region, but he also says that much still depends on how well each new challenge is met.

He sees the sudden drop in value of the yen as a double-edged sword for Asia.

"A steady weakening of the yen does not have to create havoc in the market and spoil perceptions of Asia, " he said.

"It has mixed consequences for Asia. On the one hand, it contributes to the Japanese recovery, which contributes to regional stability," he added.

"On the other hand, it toughens the competition, especially for a few countries."


CHINA QUESTION

Likewise with China, where Neiss believes Asia`s future performance depends heavily on how the various nations react.

"The major part of the adjustment process to China is still ahead...adjusting to China`s competition but also taking advantage of the new opportunities in the Chinese market," he said.

"It up to the governments to provide a good environment for such changes."

As an Austrian, Neiss comes from a country which has survived and prospered beside a much larger neighbour in Germany.

"Nobody ever said Germany is so much bigger and so much better at everything so we will hopelessly fall behind," he said.

"It hasn`t happened. It depends on how economies react."

[broker*709]

Mit den ersten grosse Beteiligungsverkäufen geht`s definitiv aufwärt`s. ENDLICH! Ich blicke durchaus optimistisch nach vorne. Jetzt müssen die anderen Banken ran und in private Hände, dann fährt der Zug so richtig an !!!

IBRA Accepts Final Bid On BCA Shares From Four Strategic Investors

28/01/2002


Today, The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN) has accepted the final bid of BCA Shares from four strategic investors.

The final bid opening process was conducted by Soebowo Musa (IBRA Deputy Chairman of Bank Restructuring) and Heri Wahyu Setiyarso (IBRA Deputy Chairman of Risk Management), witnessed by notary Moendjiati, S.H. This final bid opening was also witnessed by the World Bank representative Mike Edwards, IMF representative David Nellor and Financial Advisors (PT Danareksa Sekuritas, Merrill Lynch Pte. Ltd., and Deloitte &Touche).

Investors proposing the final bid for BCA shares are:

Farallon Capital Consortium (lead: Farindo Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. member: Alaerka Invesment Ltd., whose shares are owned by PT Djarum shareholder)
Bank Mega Consortium
GKBI Consortium (member: PT Jamsostek (Persero), GKBI Invesment, PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya & PT Rifan Financindo Asset Management)
Standard Chartered Consortium (according to letter of bidding dated 28/01/2002 with a purpose to establish a consortium with Government of Singapore Investment Corp. Pte. Ltd., Prudential Plc. & PT Berca Indonesia)
Then, on the accepted final bid, IBRA will determine the potential investor suited to the criteria established based on recommendation from Financial Advisors and Legal Advisor.

Announcement on winner of the BCA shares sales tender will be distributed to the society, only after the evaluation process on fulfillment of preset criteria, including Fit & Proper Test by Bank Indonesia (BI) has been completed.

[em.]

Bin nicht so im Indonesien Thema drin, aber könnt Ihr einem Laien mal erklären worauf Ihr Euren Optimismus gründet.

Der Blick auf meine BII Position die von ehemals knapp 10.000 Euro auf 700 Euro gefallen ist und da regelrecht festgenagelt scheint bestätigt mir dies nicht. Man wäre ja schon über JEDE Bewegung froh, um zu sehen ob die Bank noch lebt! Hab schon öfter mal katastrophal laufende Aktien beobachtet, aber sowas hab ich noch nicht erlebt.

Wer kann einen (begründeten) Funken Hoffnung geben, oder besser verkaufen und den Rest versaufen???

[TheRealInsider]

hi,

em: kann dir nur sagen: versauf das geld. die bank ist am ende. war selber vor kurzem in jakarta und was bezueglich dieser bank auch von den kunden gesagt wird, will ich hier gar nicht weiter eroertern.

ich kann dir nur empfehlen, dir die aktientipps von indoexchange.com reinzuziehen, da diese erste sahne sind. seit den lows hab ich jetzt mal eben wieder 20 prozent gemacht.

da diese werte in deutschland illiquide, bzw. nicht gehandelt werden, kann ich euch nur waermstens den online brokerage service von www.tradeezy.com empfehlen.

den benutz ich schon die ganze zeit und ich kann nicht klagen. zumal es relativ einfach ist das depot aufzumachen. damit koennt ihr dann auch die ganzen small-caps kaufen, die eine upside von mehr als 100 prozent haben.

hoffe, ich konnte dir helfen

TheRealInsider

[broker*709]

Die Trendwende ist eingeläutet !

Bank international Indonesia + 5 auf 25 Ruphia !

Bank Bali + 5 auf 45 Ruphia !

Bank Niaga + 10 auf 65 Ruphia !

Bank Lippo 45 Ruphia mit Riesenumsätze !

Und der IMF legt auch bald nach :-)

News Brief No. 02/7
January 29, 2002 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Fourth Review of Indonesia Program,
Approves $341 Million Disbursement and One-Year Extension of the Program
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed yesterday its fourth review of Indonesia`s performance under a three-year, SDR 3.638 billion (about US$4.5 billion) Extended Fund Facility (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 275.24 million (about US$341 million) from the arrangement.
The Board also approved Indonesia`s request for a one-year extension of the current arrangement to provide time for the reforms envisaged in the program to take hold. Accordingly, the current arrangement will now expire on December 31, 2003.

At the conclusion of Executive Board discussions on Indonesia`s economic program, First Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger stated:

"The fourth review under the Extended Arrangement between Indonesia and the IMF has been concluded on the basis of the relatively encouraging overall performance under the program, and the Board granted the two necessary waivers with respect to the structural performance criteria that were not observed. However, the conditions under which Indonesia is implementing its economic program have become more challenging since the third review. Market sentiment has been adversely affected by conflicting signals in some key areas, such as privatization, and continued concerns about progress on the broader reform agenda. These considerations highlight the need for firm and consistent policy implementation to boost market sentiment and spur a recovery in investment, which is essential to strengthen growth and reduce poverty.

"Indonesia`s program aims at making progress in restoring market confidence and containing inflation, while promoting the recovery of investment and output through accelerated asset recovery and privatization as well as supporting structural reforms. In this context, the 2002 budget approved by Parliament represents a significant step toward ensuring medium-term fiscal sustainability. The timely implementation of the recent budget measures to reduce energy subsidies accompanied by measures to compensate the poor are welcome initiatives, as is the government`s plan to strengthen tax administration in 2002. Securing available financing will depend importantly on implementing the structural reforms to access donor funding pledged at the November Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI) meeting, and on moving ahead forcefully with Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) asset recovery and the privatization of state-owned enterprises.

"Banking reform remains a key element of the government`s economic program. The recent strengthening of prudential standards represents a further move to enhance public confidence in the banking system. It will also be important to avoid further delays in privatization efforts in the banking sector. The successful sale of majority stakes in Bank Central Asia (BCA) and bank Niaga will be key first steps in this regard. Improvements in state bank governance, enhanced financial sector supervision, and prompt resolution of any remaining bank weaknesses also remain essential elements of the banking reform agenda.

"Accelerating IBRA asset recovery and debt restructuring are essential to reduce the public debt, revive private investment flows, and secure the efficiency gains to promote stronger economic growth. In this context, the Fund welcomes the decision to set higher targets for IBRA asset recovery in 2002, the achievement of which will require acceleration of IBRA loan disposal, progress in the sale of IBRA`s bank holdings, and more decisive action with respect to the chronic problems with noncooperative bank owners. The government is considering a review of the bank shareholder settlement agreements currently in dispute. Due regard to the need to contain moral hazard, maximize recoveries for the government, and ensure that strong safeguards are in place to enforce compliance as well as maintain good governance will be necessary in this area.

"The government will need to make every effort to accelerate corporate debt restructuring under the Jakarta Initiative Task Force-led framework following the slowdown in 2001. It will also be important to give new momentum to other legal reforms aimed at tackling continued debtor recalcitrance and improving court system governance.

"In adopting a strong program for 2002, the Indonesian authorities have signaled their continued determination to respond decisively to the economic challenges and market uncertainty with which they are confronted. The program deserves the strong support of the international community. In this connection, the Fund supports Indonesia`s request for an extension and rephasing of the current arrangement for a further year to provide more time for the reforms envisaged in the program to take hold," Ms. Krueger said.

[Informator]

kann www.tradeezy.com auch empfehlen!

man handelt zu 0,15% Provision, besser als Consors etc., kriegt fast 10% Zins auf die tendenziell wohl eher steigende Rupiah, und kann die second liner mit KGVs zT nahe 1 und 20% Div Rendite liquide handeln!

[broker*709]

Was geht geht bei der Bank Niaga ab !!

+ 15 Ruphia auf 75 !!!

Nicht schlecht bei einem so negativen Marktumfeld.

Weiter so :-)

[broker*709]

Es sieht ganz so aus, dass für Indonesien die Trendwende eingeläutet ist.

In vielen kleinen Trippelschritten geht es vermutlich in den nächsten 3 - 5 Jahren satt aufwärts!

Weekly Market Commentary

February 11, 2002

What may happen this week ?

This week the Jakarta stock market may see some bullishness. The JCI is quite likely to move between 430 and 450. The Turning Point Indicator of the index is still firmly in positive territory. However, players should be cautious as it is moving down to the zero line, which might send a signal to the market that the bullishness is easing. This may cap the upside potential of the stocks for a while. The Equity Hurdle Rate (EHR) of the JCI and the risk premium on equity in USD terms are starting to rise again, though they are still on a downward trend. The risk premium on equity in rupiah terms tells the same story. It is also starting to rise again. Additional liquidity in the market is unlikely, as the need for cash transactions is imminent in the face of uncertainty created by the recent heavy rains and floods. Fresh news from domestic sources is unlikely this week, unless a surprise from the sale of BCA hits the market. On the other side of the globe, positive signs on Wall Street may turn the attention of foreign players to the major markets in the region. As such, the JCI (according to some indicators) is likely to be subject to a hit-and-run trading strategy. Hence, the composite index may be capped at 450, while at 430 bargain hunting may prevent it from sliding down further. On the currency front, the rupiah may move between 10,200 and 10,300 to the greenback with trading volume remaining thin.

HOT ISSUE

A New Fight
The fate of Akbar Tanjung and the Golkar party is now in the hands of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). PDIP now has to decide on its political stance: whether to support the formation of a special parliamentary committee to investigate Akbar Tanjung’s alleged involvement in a graft case, or to leave it up to the Attorney General’s Office to conduct an investigation. Ultimately, PDIP’s stance will depend on how the party settles its internal differences on this issue first. But even if PDIP decides to support the formation of a special parliamentary committee, the party will still need support from an alliance of Islamic parties.

Weekly Economic and Political News Update
• Central bank says inflation target is still attainable
• Uncooperative debtors to be excluded from deal
• IMF backs central bank’s stance on interest rates
• S&P may lower Indonesia’s long-term sovereign debt rating
• IBRA raises Rp554 billion from sale of corporate loans
• BCA bidders must submit documents by Monday 11 February
• Timah to postpone plans to lay off employees
• Semen Gresik set for management shakeup


Weekly Commentary Team
Chief Research Officer :
Dr. Raden Pardede ( [e-mail] )
Analyst :
Ferry Latuhihin ( [e-mail] )
Taufik Sumawinata ( [e-mail] )
Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa ( [e-mail] )
Compliance :
Steve Susanto ( [e-mail])

[broker*709]

Jetzt steht sie auf 80 Ruphia und nach dieser Nachricht könnte er ruhig noch ein Stückchen weiter gehen.

Was meint Ihr ?


IBRA Announces Divestment Of Bank Niaga Shares

11/02/2002


The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has announced the plan for divestment of its shares at PT Bank Niaga Tbk (Bank Niaga). The divestment plan has won an approval from the Commission IX of the Indonesian House of People`s Representatives (DPR-RI) dated 1 March 2001, of which IBRA will sell 51% of its shares through private placement sales method to be on offer to strategic investors (strategic sale).

The activity plan related to the process of Bank Niaga shares divestment breaks down as follows:

Activity Target Completion by Week
Divestment Program Announcement II February
Distribution of teaser letter and Confidentiality Agreement (CA) II February
Acceptance of Letter of Interest (LoI) and Confidentiality Agreement (CA) II March
Sending Info Memo IV March
Acceptance of Preliminary Bid II April
Selection of Short-listed Bidders III April
Preparation for Fit & Proper Test (Document Completion by Bidders) III April - II June
Due Diligence by Prospective Investors III April - III May
Acceptance of Binding Bids IV May
Nomination of the Winner I June
Signing of Sales & Purchase Agreement II June

To ensure transparency in the process of Bank Niaga shares divestment, IBRA will publicize information about the ongoing significant activities.

The distribution of teaser letters is addressed mainly to prospective investors who have the potential to conduct investment in Bank Niaga and improve future performance of Bank Niaga. The criteria that prospective investors have to meet are:

Bank/financial institution or a legal entity in full compliance with the prevailing laws;
Showing sound financial reports and fixed fund sources;
Passing the fit & proper test by Bank Indonesia;
Commitment to the national interests;
Bid price and Terms and Conditions acceptable to IBRA.
To smooth the progress of shares divestment, IBRA has appointed PT. Trimegah Securities, Tbk as the financial advisor and Kartini Muljadi & Associates Law Firm as Legal Advisor. The appointment process of these advisors has gone through a beauty contest, which began on 28 September 2001.

Bank Performance

Bank Niaga has again booked profits since 2000, after two previous years of loss due to economic crisis in Indonesia. Based on its consolidated financial report (un-audited), Bank Niaga as of 30 September 2001, Bank Niaga`s net profit for the period ended 30 September 2001 was Rp 41.1billion. Its total assets as of 30 September 2001 reached Rp 20.8 trillion with Capital Adequacy Ration (CAR) of 18.7%.

Bank Niaga also succeeded to minimize its Non Performance Loan from 73.8 % as of 31 December 1999 to 9.75 % as of 31 September 2001. As of 31 December 2001, Bank Niaga owned 123 branch offices (consisting of 48 branch, 61 sub-branch, and 14 payment service points), and 175 ATM and 10 mobile cash units 10 throughout Indonesia. Bank Niaga also provides its customers with additional services to enable them to have access to 500-shared ATM units in Indonesia.

In Indonesia, the image of Bank Niaga is excellent with prime quality services. Based on a survey by a marketing research, from 1996 to 1997 Bank Niaga was first ranked in term of quality and services in Indonesia and second ranked after a foreign private bank in 1998 and 1999. In 2000, Bank Niaga was awarded "the best service quality bank" 19 banks in Indonesia from MARS. To further improve its customer services, Bank Niaga has introduced Television Banking in 2001 following after the Internet banking services on the run since 2000.

[broker*709]

Heute schon auf 100 Ruphia !!!

Weiter so :-)

[broker*709]

105 der Schlussstand, ich glaube es nicht !

Last Trade
4:00am · 105 Change
+25 (+31.25%) Prev Cls
80 Open
80 Volume
94,505,000
Day`s Range
80 - 105 Bid
100 Ask
105 P/E
80.00 Mkt Cap
N/A Avg Vol
N/A
52-wk Range
45.00 - 90.00 Bid Size
N/A Ask Size
N/A P/S
N/A Div/Shr
34.09 Div Date
18-Aug-97

[broker*709]

Jetzt geht es Schlag auf Schlag !

IBRA Completes Restructuring of PT Dan Liris Industrial & Trading Company

14/02/2002


The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has completed the debt restructuring of PT Dan Liris Industrial & Trading Company worth USD23,198,128. The Debt Restructuring Agreement (PRH) was signed by IBRA and the debtor company`s share holders in the end of January 2002.

The restructuring scheme mutually agreed by IBRA and PT Dan Liris Industrial & Trading Company sums up as follows:

Tranche A:
Ex debt principal of USD5,000,000. converted into Term Loan with tenor of 8 years and step up Sibor interest rates + 2.5% pa - Sibor + 5.5% pa.
Tranche B:
Ex debt principal of USD6,434,476. switched into Convertible Bond (called CB 1) with tenor of 8 years. The coupon 0.5% pa and yield step up 7.5%-11.5%
Tranche C:
Ex Overdue Interest of USD6,017,352. converted into Term Loan with tenor of 3 years.
Tranche D:
Ex debt principal of USD5,746,300 switched into Convertible Bond (called CB 2) with tenor of 2 years and coupon 10.5% pa.
PT Dan Liris Industrial & Trading Company is a debtor under the obligor Batik Keris. The company is operational in textile industry including the production printing fabrics and garment for domestic and export market destinations.

[broker*709]

Indonesien wird als besonders günstig eingestuft !

Von Christof Schmidbauer


Die Rückkehr der Tiger


Bevor es den Neuen Markt gab, galten sie als Garant für ein schnell steigendes Aktienvermögen: Die sogenannten Tigerbörsen in Asien. Nachdem sich an einigen asiatischen Börsen die Leitindizes von 1985 bis 1994 teilweise verzwanzigfacht hatten, wurde es mit der Asienkrise im Jahr 1997 sehr still um die einstigen Anlagefavoriten. Nun scheinen Hedgefonds Asien für sich zu entdecken.

Christof Schmidbauer

Lohnt es sich hintern dem Smart Money, also dem Geld angebliche besonders cleverer Großanleger herzulaufen? Den Boom bei asiatischen Hedge-Fonds sollten Anlegere jedenfalls nicht überbewerten. Stehen doch hinter dem Engagement der Fonds, die allerlei komplizierte Börsengeschäft machen dürfen, auch andere Motive. Bereits vor vier Jahren schossen plötzlich eine Reihe neuer europäischer Hedge-Fonds aus dem Boden. Europäische Investment-Bänker lockte der Weg in Selbstständigkeit als Hedge-Fondsmanager, der ihnen von den üppigen Verwaltungs- und Leistungsgebühren versüßt wurde. Gleichzeitig hatten die Fonds-Vermarkter die vermögenden europäischen Privatanleger und Institutionen als neuen Absatzmarkt entdeckt. Schließlich kam noch die zu erwartende Bereinigung der europäischen Unternehmenslandschaft hinzu. Sie bietet Chancen für die auf Fusionen und Unternehmensrestrukturierungen spezialisierte Manager.

Asien nicht nur für Hedge-Fonds interessant

Ähnliches geschieht auch in Asien. Einige Fonds wollen Anlagechancen nutzen, die dem Privatanleger verschlossen sind. Etwa bei Engagements in faule Kredite. Die Fondsmanager kaufen Anleihen angeschlagener Unternehmen und beteiligen sich auf aktiv an deren Restrukturierung. Ihr Risiko sichern sie häufig durch den Leerverkauf von Aktien des Unternehmens ab.

Doch auch für ganz gewöhnliche Aktiengeschäfte scheint die Zeit in einigen Ländern gekommen sein. In Malaysia, Thailand, die Philippinen und Indonesien verbessert sich die wirtschaftlichen Rahmendaten. Die Währungen gelten als unterbewertet, die Zahlungsbilanz in der Region wendet sich zum Besseren. Das schafft Raum für eine lockerere Geldpolitik und für Zinssenkungen. Neben diesem Treibstoff für steigende Notierungen sind auch die fundamentalen Bewertungen der asiatischen Unternehmen interessant.

Billiges aus Indonesien

Einer der billigsten Aktienmärkte weltweit ist Indonesien. Das Pharmaunternehmen Kalbe Fram wird zum sechsfachem seines Jahresgewinns gehandelt. Ähnlich billig ist der Nahrungsmittelkonzern Indofood Sukses Makmur mit einer Dividendenrendite von vier Prozent. Ähnlich günstig präsentieren sich einige indische Aktien.

Wie wenig die Anleger den sogenannten Tigerbörsen zutrauen, zeigen die aktuellen Notierungen geschlossener Aktienfonds an der New Yorker Börse. Die Papiere werden 20 Prozent unter ihrem inneren Wert gehandelt. Für deutsche Anleger lohnt sich der Kauf aber nicht. Die Fonds sind in Deutschland nicht zum Vertrieb zugelassen. Deshalb werden Kursgewinne mit drakonischen Steuern belegt.

Der Vertrauensverlust in die asiatischen Börsen ist in erster Linie dem vorher überschäumenden Optimismus der Fondsgesellschaften und Aktienstrategen zu zuschreiben. Lieblingsargument waren die billigen und gut ausgebildeten Arbeitskräfte der Region, die mit steigenden Löhnen den Konsum ankurbeln sollten. In der Euphorie wurde die Misswirtschaft, die Korruption, die steigenden Auslandsschulden und die wenig effizient organisierte Betriebe übersehen. Letztlich führten diese Faktoren zur Asienkrise. Zunächst hofften noch die Börsenauguren auf eine schnelle Wirtschaftserholung. Als diese ausblieb, warfen sie das Handtuch und wandten sich den boomenden Technologieaktien zu.


Zeit für die Trendwende

Nach rund sieben Jahren ist es Zeit für eine erneute Trendwende soweit: Asiatische Unternehmen sind nach ihrer Neuorganisation den Konkurrenten aus den USA und Europa gewachsen. Besonders um ihren Heimatmarkt brauchen sie sich keine Sorgen mehr zu machen, nachdem viele der großen Ausländer trotz riesiger Marketingausgabe an kulturellen Barrieren gescheitert sind. In Asien wird auch weiterhin gedünstetes Gemüse zum Frühstück gegessen, die neugierig gekauften Kellogs Cornflakes verschimmeln im Küchenregal.

Wegen ihrer höheren Kursschwankungen eignen sich asiatische Aktien – wie auch Technologieaktien – in erster Linie zur Beimischung in langfristig orientierten Depots. Dabei spielt die individuelle Risikoneigung eine große Rolle. Mehr als 20 Prozent des Vermögens sollte auf keinen Fall in asiatische Werte wandern. Denn sonst droht selbst mutigen Anlegern die eine oder andere schlaflose Nacht bescheren. Als Vehikel eignet sich ein breit gestreuter asiatischer Aktienfonds. Die Vergangenheit zeigt, dass ein Management-Team vor Ort eine bessere Wertentwicklung erwirtschaftet, als eine Verwaltermannschaft in der Ferne . Gut haben sich in jüngster Zeit der Carlson Fund Equity Smallcap Asia und der Newton Oriental Fund entwickelt. Der einstige Asien-Superstar Mark Mobius, Manager des Templeton Ermerging Markets Fund, scheint hingegen mehr mit seinem Einstieg in Aufsichtsrat der russischen Ölgesellschaft Lukoil beschäftigt zu sein. Die Wertentwicklung seines Fonds läst in jüngster Zeit zu Wünschen übrig.

Stand:09.02.2002
© 2002 sharper.de

[broker*709]

Das Tempo der IBRA ist einfach atemberaubend !

IBRA Finalizes Restructuring Of Media Group Obligor

18/02/2002


The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has completed the debt restructuring of Media group obligor by restructuring 2 (two) subsidiary companies namely PT Citrasarana Graharealty Corporation and PT Bakti Citra Daya. The Debt Restructuring Agreement (PRH) was signed by IBRA and the aforementioned debtors in the beginning of February 2002.

1. PT Citrasarana Graharealty Corporation

The company, operational in the developer (property) industry, had a debt obligation to IBRA (former Bank BNI) USD24,276,488,40,-. The total debt consist of principal USD 21,079,440,- and an interest of USD3,197,048,4 after recalculation.

The total debt USD24,276,488,40,- was converted to term loan (3 years) and interest rate 10,5% p.a. (floating).

2. PT Bakti Citra Daya

The company, operational in holding property and supplier, had a debt obligation to IBRA (former Bank BRI) IDR17,325,500,000,-. The total debt consist of debt principal IDR 10,000,000,000,- and an interest of IDR7,325,500,000,- after recalculation.

The total debt of PT Bakti Citra Daya is restructured with scheme as follow:

Cash settlement IDR1,000,000,000,-
Term Loan IDR 9,000,000,000,- will be settled installed during 7 years without grace period; interest 18% p.a. (floating)
Past due interest ID7,325,500,000,- will be paid during 3 years without grace period.
Under IBRA, the Media group obligor comprised of 3 debtors. Aside from the two debtors being restructured, another debtor, PT Surya Persindo has also completed its debt obligation of IDR 702,298,098,- in a cash settlement on 3 November 2000.

[broker*709]

Und von Rezession keine Spur :-)


Economy grew by 3.32 percent in 2001


JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia`s economy fared better last year compared to many other economies in the region amid the global economic slowdown with gross domestic product (GDP) growing by 3.32 percent.

The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) said in a report released on Monday that domestic consumption, which grew by 5.94 percent, had been the prime mover of the economy in 2001.

Despite the devastating impact of the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesian households have been on a spending spree particularly following the election of President Megawati Soekarnoputri in July last year.

The government is expecting domestic consumption to continue to play a major role in pushing economic growth this year.

But the BPS report suggested that the economy was weakening in the fourth quarter due to slower export performance as the country`s main export market, the U.S., has been in an economic recession.

The bureau said that although fourth quarter GDP grew by 1.6 percent compared to the same period in 2000, it contracted by 1.21 percent when compared to the third quarter of 2001.

Economists said that the fourth quarter economic contraction was partly due to the decline in exports.

BPS deputy chief Kusmadi Saleh said that the global economic slowdown, which was aggravated by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., had affected the country`s export performance and the fourth quarter GDP.

There has been concern that a continued slowdown in exports could put the government`s 4 percent economic growth target this year in jeopardy particularly with investment expected to remainscarce.

Exports have been the main driver of the 4.8 percent economic growth in 2000.

But the country`s export performance, which relies on low-end manufacturing products and commodities, fared better than the high-end electronic export products of other countries like Singapore and Malaysia.

BPS said that exports still managed to grow by 1.88 percent in 2001.

Economists said that the strong domestic consumption and the positive export growth, helped the economy to grow in line with the government`s forecast of 3.5 percent.

In comparison, Singapore`s economy contracted by 2.2 percent last year.

Senior economist Emil Salim said that the government economic growth target of 4 percent this year could still be achieved despite the poor export performance in the final quarter of 2001as long as the government could move quickly to restore the investment climate at home and take advantage of the expected rebound in the U.S. economy in the second half of this year.

"Last year, we managed to grow significantly better than our neighbors only because of strong domestic consumption.

"If we can improve our exports and investment performance, then we could grow more this year," the former economic minister said.

He was quick to add, however, that it depended on whether the government could provide stability and certainty in order to lure more investment.

Another economist Raden Pardede from Danareksa Research Institute also stressed the importance of the government`s role in ensuring a better investment climate to prop up the country`s growth.

"Last year`s figure shows that both investment and export performance are still slowing down," he said.

[broker*709]

Die IBRA ist in aller munde - weiter so !

Govt mulls plan to help industries under IBRA


Berni K. Moestafa, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The government is mulling over accelerating the recovery of a number of industries under the control of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), as part of a stimulus package for the private sector to help drive economic growth.

Among the industries the government may be aiming at is the electronics, textile, pulp and paper, and the shoe and leather industries, according to a senior government official on Tuesday.

Secretary to the Financial Sector Policy Committee (FSPC) Syafruddin A. Temenggung said the government planned to speed up the restructuring of debts in these industries.

These are the debts of companies that IBRA took over as bad loans from banks during the financial crisis in the late 1990s.

"The direction of revitalizing strategic sectors is that we will prioritize those that are under IBRA. There will be a faster restructuring (of debts)," Syafruddin told reporters after an FSPC meeting. He said the FSPC had yet to approve the plan.

The FSPC groups together senior economic ministers, and is in charge for the restructuring of IBRA debts worth over Rp 1 trillion (about US$98.13 million).

Most of the country`s vital industries remain paralyzed given the huge size of the debts they still owe under IBRA.

Slow debt restructuring talks have been a major drag on the recovery of industries from the blow they took during the financial crisis.

Workable restructuring deals reduce the debt burden on companies, and allow them seek new loans for investment.

The bottom line is that private investment boosts economic growth.

Shifting the economic growth engine to the private sector is necessary in the absence of a strong state budget to fuel growth.

The government had said earlier it was devising a stimulus package for the private sector to boost investment.

The need for investment on the part of export-oriented companies is likely to pick up as world markets gear up for a U.S.-led recovery.

Syafruddin said that expediting IBRA`s debt restructuring deals was part of the overall stimulus package currently planned.

But as yet, there was no clear explanation as to how the government would create the stimulus given the constraints on the state budget.

Syafruddin further said that IBRA planned to sell unrestructured loans through securitization to raise more cash from the loans.

"We will collect the IBRA loans, particularly the sustainable debts and these are the ones we will securitize and auction off," he said without elaborating.

Details of the plan remain sketchy, but an FSPC official said the securitization of IBRA loans allowed the agency to issue bonds through a third party, which would later be determined.

"Securitization means IBRA can issue commercial papers like bonds using its loans and their collateral," he explained.

The official, who refused to allow his name to be quoted, said the bonds would carry coupon rates based on the interest rate installments of the IBRA loans.

Also, bondholders would receive the backing of the collateral that came attached to the loans, he explained.

In case of default, he added, the investor could seize the collateral.

At present, IBRA disposes off its assets through the sale of both restructured and unrestructured loans. That however has earned it low recovery rates, as most investors purchase the loans at heavily discounted prices.

The official said that through the securitization of IBRA loans, the agency would be able to auction the loans without offering discounts.

He did not mention the value of the loans that IBRA would securitize. And it was unclear whether the scheme would guarantee that the loans would be auctioned off at a better price than when they were sold directly.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated its support for the securitization of the loans and the forming of joint ventures in speeding up the restructuring of debts under IBRA.

[broker*709]

Die IBRA ist in aller munde - weiter so !

Govt mulls plan to help industries under IBRA


Berni K. Moestafa, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The government is mulling over accelerating the recovery of a number of industries under the control of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), as part of a stimulus package for the private sector to help drive economic growth.

Among the industries the government may be aiming at is the electronics, textile, pulp and paper, and the shoe and leather industries, according to a senior government official on Tuesday.

Secretary to the Financial Sector Policy Committee (FSPC) Syafruddin A. Temenggung said the government planned to speed up the restructuring of debts in these industries.

These are the debts of companies that IBRA took over as bad loans from banks during the financial crisis in the late 1990s.

"The direction of revitalizing strategic sectors is that we will prioritize those that are under IBRA. There will be a faster restructuring (of debts)," Syafruddin told reporters after an FSPC meeting. He said the FSPC had yet to approve the plan.

The FSPC groups together senior economic ministers, and is in charge for the restructuring of IBRA debts worth over Rp 1 trillion (about US$98.13 million).

Most of the country`s vital industries remain paralyzed given the huge size of the debts they still owe under IBRA.

Slow debt restructuring talks have been a major drag on the recovery of industries from the blow they took during the financial crisis.

Workable restructuring deals reduce the debt burden on companies, and allow them seek new loans for investment.

The bottom line is that private investment boosts economic growth.

Shifting the economic growth engine to the private sector is necessary in the absence of a strong state budget to fuel growth.

The government had said earlier it was devising a stimulus package for the private sector to boost investment.

The need for investment on the part of export-oriented companies is likely to pick up as world markets gear up for a U.S.-led recovery.

Syafruddin said that expediting IBRA`s debt restructuring deals was part of the overall stimulus package currently planned.

But as yet, there was no clear explanation as to how the government would create the stimulus given the constraints on the state budget.

Syafruddin further said that IBRA planned to sell unrestructured loans through securitization to raise more cash from the loans.

"We will collect the IBRA loans, particularly the sustainable debts and these are the ones we will securitize and auction off," he said without elaborating.

Details of the plan remain sketchy, but an FSPC official said the securitization of IBRA loans allowed the agency to issue bonds through a third party, which would later be determined.

"Securitization means IBRA can issue commercial papers like bonds using its loans and their collateral," he explained.

The official, who refused to allow his name to be quoted, said the bonds would carry coupon rates based on the interest rate installments of the IBRA loans.

Also, bondholders would receive the backing of the collateral that came attached to the loans, he explained.

In case of default, he added, the investor could seize the collateral.

At present, IBRA disposes off its assets through the sale of both restructured and unrestructured loans. That however has earned it low recovery rates, as most investors purchase the loans at heavily discounted prices.

The official said that through the securitization of IBRA loans, the agency would be able to auction the loans without offering discounts.

He did not mention the value of the loans that IBRA would securitize. And it was unclear whether the scheme would guarantee that the loans would be auctioned off at a better price than when they were sold directly.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated its support for the securitization of the loans and the forming of joint ventures in speeding up the restructuring of debts under IBRA.

[broker*709]

Und der IMF lobt unser INDO-Land auch nicht schlecht.

Fein, fein !

CGI, IMF satisfied with development in Indonesia`s macroeconomy


JAKARTA (JP): The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have expressed satisfaction over the progress made in implementing Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies.

The donor countries are satisfied with the progress in Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies, expert member of staff at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Mahendra Siregar said on Thursday, as quoted by Antara.

"They also hoped that Indonesia would be able to sustain the progress in selling assets controlled by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to support the state budget," Mahendra quoted World Bank representative Mark Baird as saying.

He noted that the good performance of the economy would enable the government to discuss long-term problems.

"It is time to shift the attention to poverty alleviation and boost efforts to manage thoroughly all legal cases," he added.

Mahendra said the CGI and the Indonesian government met on Wednesday to discuss progress in the nation`s development following their last meeting, which was held here in November.

The meeting was also aimed at making an inventory and to plan further steps, he said, adding that another meeting would be held later this year.

Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said, "The evaluation has forced us to become disciplined and gave us a chance to exchange views, explain our policies and listen to their aspirations."

Meanwhile, IMF representative, David Nellor, said the country`s macroeconomic stability stood on good foundations.

[broker*709]

Und der IMF lobt unser INDO-Land auch nicht schlecht.

Fein, fein !

CGI, IMF satisfied with development in Indonesia`s macroeconomy


JAKARTA (JP): The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have expressed satisfaction over the progress made in implementing Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies.

The donor countries are satisfied with the progress in Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies, expert member of staff at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Mahendra Siregar said on Thursday, as quoted by Antara.

"They also hoped that Indonesia would be able to sustain the progress in selling assets controlled by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to support the state budget," Mahendra quoted World Bank representative Mark Baird as saying.

He noted that the good performance of the economy would enable the government to discuss long-term problems.

"It is time to shift the attention to poverty alleviation and boost efforts to manage thoroughly all legal cases," he added.

Mahendra said the CGI and the Indonesian government met on Wednesday to discuss progress in the nation`s development following their last meeting, which was held here in November.

The meeting was also aimed at making an inventory and to plan further steps, he said, adding that another meeting would be held later this year.

Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said, "The evaluation has forced us to become disciplined and gave us a chance to exchange views, explain our policies and listen to their aspirations."

Meanwhile, IMF representative, David Nellor, said the country`s macroeconomic stability stood on good foundations.

[broker*709]

Und der IMF lobt unser INDO-Land auch nicht schlecht.

Fein, fein !

CGI, IMF satisfied with development in Indonesia`s macroeconomy


JAKARTA (JP): The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have expressed satisfaction over the progress made in implementing Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies.

The donor countries are satisfied with the progress in Indonesia`s macroeconomic policies, expert member of staff at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Mahendra Siregar said on Thursday, as quoted by Antara.

"They also hoped that Indonesia would be able to sustain the progress in selling assets controlled by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to support the state budget," Mahendra quoted World Bank representative Mark Baird as saying.

He noted that the good performance of the economy would enable the government to discuss long-term problems.

"It is time to shift the attention to poverty alleviation and boost efforts to manage thoroughly all legal cases," he added.

Mahendra said the CGI and the Indonesian government met on Wednesday to discuss progress in the nation`s development following their last meeting, which was held here in November.

The meeting was also aimed at making an inventory and to plan further steps, he said, adding that another meeting would be held later this year.

Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said, "The evaluation has forced us to become disciplined and gave us a chance to exchange views, explain our policies and listen to their aspirations."

Meanwhile, IMF representative, David Nellor, said the country`s macroeconomic stability stood on good foundations.

[Rhum56]

@broker709

Stell doch mal ein par gute Werte vor, mit bisgen Background
Würde sich doch bestimmt gut machen")

z.: Indofood, Timah

so Werte werden bei einer Gesundung/Marktwiederbelebung mit
Sicherheit extrem ab gehen.
Indofood stand ja auch mal bei o,9E!

so long

[broker*709]

Der BCA-Verkauf wird uns den weiteren Weg weisen !

Farallon may pull out from BCA bidding process


Berni K. Moestafa and Dadan Wijaksana, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

As the race to win a 51 percent stake in Bank Central Asia (BCA) nears its end, one of two favorite bidders, the U.S. investment firm Farallon Capital Management, said it might pull out from the bidding process, citing concerns of unfair practices.

Farallon investment director G Raymond Zage III said on Monday he suspected bidders altered their final bids after submitting them to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) on Jan. 28.

According to him, final bids should remain final, and changing them may be seen as a manipulation of the sale process.

"If the end conclusion is that no matter how you play the game you won`t win, than it sure doesn`t make sense to keep on playing," he said, explaining this applied to all members of the consortium Farallon was leading in the bid.

Four consortia submitted their final bids for BCA. IBRA should have named a winner shortly afterwards, but decided to wait until after Bank Indonesia examined the bidders` credentials.

That was four weeks ago, but since then IBRA has allowed bidders to "revise" their final bids.

Zage said IBRA`s advisors for the BCA sale approached the consortium for a better bid, which he rejected as he felt Farallon had already made their best offer.

"You have this huge amount of time after the final bids were submitted when nobody knows what`s happened," Zage said.

Farallon`s concern comes amid talks that its closest rival, the consortium led by the British-based Standard Chartered Bank, were offered the chance to top Farallon`s final bid.

Sources said the government was leaning in favor of StanChart after the bank was forced out of a deal to acquire Bank Bali.

But pressure against StanChart also grew on reports its local bidding partner PT Berca decided to pull out from the contest.

Berca was quoted by Reuters as saying it decided to withdraw from the bidding process due to heavy risks. There was no explanation on what was termed heavy risk, but sources said Berca pulled out because it had failed Bank Indonesia`s screening test.

StanChart reportedly said it would go ahead without Berca, and give the latter an option to purchase BCA`s shares later on.

The newswire said local bidder PT Jamsostek also pulled out, citing political reasons, which the state-owned pensions firm did not elaborate on. Jamsostek was a member of the local GKBI consortium. The other local consortium is the Bank Mega consortium.

IBRA took over BCA after spending billions of U.S. dollars to bail out the bank from the financial crisis in the late 90s.

BCA`s sale would mark the first of its kind, and would lead the way for other bank sales by IBRA. Also on the tables this year is the sale of Bank Niaga.

Selling BCA to the right investor without a glitch is paramount in ending the dry spell of investment in this country.

The process has been mired in politicking that ended twice with attempts to sell the bank since its launch in 2000.

Elsewhere, Bank Indonesia said it had completed its fit and proper test on the four bidders on Monday. The winner for BCA will now be announced within the next 10 days, IBRA added.

[broker*709]

Erste Ergebnisse !

IBRA Announces Names of BCA Bidders Qualified for Evaluation Stage II

26/02/2002


Farallon and Standard Chartered Consortiums Pass Drop Dead Test

Further to the Bank Central Asia (BCA) shares divestment process by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), on Monday evening of 25 February 2002, IBRA received the results of the fit & proper test conducted by Bank Indonesia (BI) on the four potential investors for BCA.

Based on the results of evaluation on the fulfillment of 4 (four) drop dead test criteria (evaluation stage I), one of which is the fit &proper test by the central bank on the BCA bidders, IBRA has today determined that the Farallon and Standard Chartered Bank consortiums have passed the test.

In the following are the four drop dead test criteria to be fulfilled by prospective investors for BCA in the evaluation stage I :

Letter of Statement from the potential investor that it has neither direct nor indirect relations to the Salim group just as the reference to the FSPC Decree No. Kep.03/K.KKSK/11/2000 dated 10 November 2000;
If the prospective investor is a consortium, the consortium must be led by a bank or financial institution holding a voting rights majority;
The prospective investor must have submitted an irrevocable standby letter of credit (LC) or another form of guarantee letter of equal level in the value of US$ 50 million for a 60 days` period. The L/C is issued by a bank with investment grade rating;
The prospective investor passes the fit & proper test by Bank Indonesia.
It is noteworthy that in the evaluation process IBRA upholds the principle of equal opportunity to the four final bidders who take part in the first stage of evaluation.

The two final bidders who have passed the first stage of evaluation process will be administered into the second stage of evaluation process in which IBRA conduct the evaluation based on the following criteria:

No. Criteria Score
1. Quantitative Criteria : Bidding Price maximum 50 points
2. Qualitative Criteria:
Structure of Consortium (scoring on the consortium leader and members)
Terms and conditions in the sale & purchase agreement
Business plan for future development of BCA


maximum 20 points

maximum 25 points

maximum 5 points
T o t a l 100 points

It will take about 2 (two) weeks for IBRA to carry out the evaluation based on the aforementioned criteria. Subsequently, IBRA will announce the name of the BCA shares divestment tender.

The evaluation conducted by IBRA on the final bidders is aimed at drawing in the investor with capability of improving BCA`s performance so as to boost up the banking sector development in general, as well as accelerating the national economic recovery.

[broker*709]

Neues vom IMF:

Transcript of a Press Briefing
by Thomas C. Dawson
Director
External Relations Department
International Monetary Fund
Thursday, February 28, 2002

View this press conference using Media Player



MR. DAWSON: Good morning, everyone. I`m Tom Dawson, Director of External Relations at the IMF, and welcome to another of our regular press briefings.

First of all, I`d like to acknowledge the presence here of Jacques Polak, the legendary former Director of Research of the IMF, and the father of the financial programming approach that has so captured much of the world, and also an individual whose knowledge in history of the Fund is something that we all can benefit from, although I don`t know that he`s available for interviews after this briefing.

Tomorrow, March 1st, we will open press registration on our website for the 2002 Spring Meetings of the IMFC and the Development Committee. The meetings will be held on April 20th and 21st at Fund headquarters in Washington. Media Relations has handed out a note on the online registration details, and this note will also be circulated to media outside of Washington. If you have any further questions, please contact Media Relations. The deadline for press registration is April the 12th.

At my last briefing on February 13th, I encouraged everyone to submit a feedback questionnaire on IMF transparency. If you haven`t, I`d encourage you to fill out and answer the questionnaire. If you have lost it or haven`t received one or want to vote twice, please contact Media Relations. Tomorrow is the deadline for submissions.

My next briefing will be on March the 13th. I`m flagging this now because there will be a bit of a twist. I will be traveling in Europe that week, and the briefing will be held at the Bank of England. The Bank of England has graciously made available a briefing room, and we`ll circulate details of the briefing when arrangements are completed. I believe tentatively we were looking at 10:00 a.m. on the 13th of March. So that you don`t miss me, we will post a transcript of the press conference for the press here in Washington.

On March 14th at IMF headquarters, Gerd Häusler, Director of the International Capital Markets Department of the Fund, will conduct a press briefing on the department`s inaugural Global Financial Stability Report. The International Capital Markets Department will be preparing this report on a quarterly basis, and it succeeds a variety of publications that existed prior to the establishment of the department.

I think that is all I have at this point. I`d be happy to take your questions.

QUESTIONER: As you probably know, the government [of Argentina] has achieved an agreement with the provinces. I want to know the IMF reaction.

MR. DAWSON: We have taken note of that. We have received the text and so on of the agreement, and we have also taken note this morning of Minister Remes Lenicov`s indication that he expected a Fund mission to be going down in the near future. Indeed, from our point of view, this is a very welcome sign since we have, in fact, been awaiting a signal from the authorities for a mission to go down. We`ve been waiting for that sign and that invitation from the authorities. So hopefully this is—that is on track.

Certainly an agreement with the provinces on a sustainable relationship is something to be welcomed. I would note that there are a number of areas that the authorities and we have been working on, where progress has been made, but I would stress that there is a considerable amount of work remaining to be done, not only in terms of fully understanding this particular arrangement with the provinces but the overall fiscal situation as well, the situation in the banking sector, issues regarding the treatment of investors both domestic and foreign. So there is a lot of work to do. It remains a very major challenge. This is going to take a great deal of work, and we had been concerned a bit that perhaps time was passing. Now I think, however, this is a good sign that we will be able to start up the negotiations in Buenos Aires in the near future. But I would again stress there is a lot of work to do, but we are committed to work with the authorities as intensively as we and they possibly can.

QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up on that. You said that this is a good sign, you were waiting for an invitation from the authorities. Do we take that as meaning that they have done sufficient work to send a mission down and you would actually—

MR. DAWSON: No, no. I think you take quite the opposite. There never was a necessary condition for us to agree to a mission. We were waiting for an invitation.

QUESTIONER: Can you be a little bit more specific about the treatment of investors both domestic and foreign? There`s been a lot of speculation among investors that there needs to be a certain amount of work done towards restructuring the debt. So if you can provide some kind of general time line, that would be really helpful. And, also, what do you mean by "near future"?

MR. DAWSON: The near future I think was referring to the mission. The Minister, as I understand it, indicated this morning he hoped it would be next week, and we would hope so, too. But that decision is really in the hands of the Argentine authorities. As I indicated, we are and have been for a while ready to send a mission once they indicated they were ready to receive one.

[Going back to the first question] I don`t have a time line on that, no. That is a very important issue, but as you well know, debt is one of the more complicated issues in any country program, and this is one of the more complicated country program cases. So I think the idea of setting up a timeline on that is just not realistic. But it is clearly a very important component of what needs to be done as part of an overall program. But there aren`t any particularly triggering devices or points that I could identify now in that area that have to be met.

QUESTIONER: There has been the creation of a new Special Operations department at the IMF. I`d like to ask you to tell if you can what kind of focus would that be in relation to Latin America with the situation in Argentina, with the situation in Colombia, and what kind of, if any, new light this could turn to the economy of Brazil, for instance?

MR. DAWSON: Well, first of all, I would note it is not a new department. Anoop Singh, who has been appointed as Director for Special Operations, will have a few people working with him. He will be reporting to Anne Krueger, the First Deputy Managing Director. Also, this new position and new unit is not focused on Latin America in particular. I think it reflects a view that has been developing over time here at the Fund that for critical country cases, such as Argentina, that we need to involve at senior levels a large number of departments, intensive effort, that the somewhat more traditional approach of area department-headed teams has proven to be something that has not worked as smoothly as we would wish. So in this particular case, and potentially in other cases, this Director for Special Operations would have responsibility for coordinating a Fund-wide effort.

In this regard, the Western Hemisphere Department remains critical, in fact, the most critical unit of this effort, because obviously it is Argentina that we are dealing with. But there are other departments, other parts of the Fund that need to be involved. A salmon-colored, U.K.-based publication this morning talks about structural considerations being involved in the establishment of this office, and I think, as we`ve looked at how to handle critical country cases, I think there`s a need for a new approach toward coordination, and that is what this is.

There are no other countries on which there`s an expectation that this would be applied at this point, although one of Mr. Singh`s tasks will be, as the release last Monday indicated, to make recommendations about enhancing the Fund`s capacity in managing critical country situations.

QUESTIONER: Again, with the question of investors, the time frame for the agreement, the eventual agreement with Argentina, it`s thought about in a month or a bit more, a bit less. But the question of the treatment of the negotiation of external investors will take longer. So my question is: What`s the Fund expecting? I mean, what is to be included in an agreement about the treatment of investors, some general propositions, some principles?

MR. DAWSON: The general approach the Fund has taken in these sorts of cases is that the authorities and investors, if we`re talking about debt in particular, that there need to be discussions and negotiations going on in good faith. That`s a basic, our basic principle.

I would, however, note that you may have gotten a slightly misleading impression of my comment. My comment was not just about foreign investors. It`s also about domestic investors. It`s about the general investment climate, which is important to get Argentina back onto a sustainable basis. But if you`re thinking in terms of the classic debt negotiation situation, we have an established procedure for the Fund in terms of making decisions on programs in the context of negotiations that may not have been concluded.

QUESTIONER: Two Argentina-related questions. You mentioned the banks as one of the critical issues. Could you elaborate on that? And, specifically, is it quite conceivable that Fund money would be used in a recapitalization exercise? And to come back to this point about the special operations, the salmon-colored publication you mentioned interprets this appointment or this announcement as indicating a rather high degree of dissatisfaction with the Western Hemisphere Department, and, indeed, it seems difficult to interpret it any other way. Since Anoop Singh was put in charge of the Argentina negotiations, I`ve never seen a situation where someone has been put over an area department in a case like this. Is that not a reasonable interpretation that there is some dissatisfaction with the Western Hemisphere Department? And can you tell us precisely what that dissatisfaction concerned?

MR. DAWSON: No.

[Laughter.]

MR. DAWSON: On the first part of your question about recapitalization, I think it is too early to answer that question as to whether Fund support, if there is some Fund support, how it would be used. That is a question that obviously comes up in country cases, and it certainly is a case that will come up in the case of Argentina. But recapitalization of the banking sector is obviously an important issue there.

With regard to the establishment of this new unit, it is not a vote or an expression of dissatisfaction with individuals or with the department. I mean, the reality is that the Argentine program is in many senses one of the most complex as well as important ones that the Fund has had.

As time develops, in any organization different management structures develop. We have had, of course, changes in the Fund`s management as well, and I think at this point the idea of a unit that would report to management to help coordinate these cases, is, in fact, an idea that has been discussed off and on at the Fund for some time, despite the salmon-colored newspaper quoting someone as saying that people were surprised. The people who didn`t know were surprised, but the people who knew that something like this was under consideration were not surprised.

I do regret, of course, that transparency didn`t go so far that you all knew about it before the staff. But, in any event, no, we do not view it that way. Claudio [Loser] was held in very high regard by management and by his colleagues, and he continues to be actively involved in the other cases within his remit in the Western Hemisphere Department, which are all of the other countries. And, indeed, there is a great deal of work to be done in those countries, and he continues to be the point person on all of those.

QUESTIONER: Stanley Fischer was described as sort of a battlefield medic. So could we interpret that Mr. Singh would be doing a lot of the flying around that he used to do and fire-putting-outing...

MR. DAWSON: No, I don`t think that`s really a fair description. I will let Mr. Fischer describe himself, and I`ll even let you describe Mr. Fischer. But first of all, Mr. Singh`s remit at this point in a country context is a single country. Stan, just as Anne Krueger in her present position, had broad responsibility for the Fund`s relationships around the world, particularly with major countries, and I think there will be no change in that regard, although it is certainly expected that Anoop, as being in charge of the Argentine team, will be going to Buenos Aires. So that should be clear. But I don`t think it is a transfer of the medical license from one person to the other.

QUESTIONER: Will Anoop Singh be leading the mission?

MR. DAWSON: I would expect that Mr. Singh will be leading the mission, yes.

QUESTIONER: To clarify your answer to my question, will Claudio continue to be involved with Argentina?

MR. DAWSON: I`m sure he will be involved in terms of giving advice and so on. But as we indicated, Mr. Singh will be leading the mission. I have had conversations with Claudio since the decision on Argentina, but the responsibility for the mission is with Anoop Singh, although, as I say, much of the manpower continues to be from the Western Hemisphere Department.

QUESTIONER: I just want to clarify something. You said we were just waiting for an invitation to send a mission.

MR. DAWSON: That is correct.

QUESTIONER: There was no necessary condition.

MR. DAWSON: That is correct.

QUESTIONER: I was under the impression for quite some time that you weren`t waiting for an invitation, that there was progress, good progress, and then when you get to good progress then you send a mission.

MR. DAWSON: No, that...

QUESTIONER: It sounds like you`re saying we could have gone a month ago if only...

MR. DAWSON: No, I would not say a month ago, but certainly with the visit of Minister Remes Lenicov approximately two weeks ago, at that point we were ready to send a mission, and the indication was that, you know, they would invite us when they were ready to invite us. A month ago you may be correct, but that is not the case for the last couple of weeks.

QUESTIONER: So is it correct to infer that Argentina had this message clear that you guys were just waiting for it and it was...

MR. DAWSON: Yes. I myself discussed it with Mr. Amadeo, so it`s been very clear.

QUESTIONER: When will you be resuming the lending to Belarus?

MR. DAWSON: I don`t, I don`t have any timing on that. Indeed, in particular, I don`t have any indication of when there will be another mission there, which would obviously be a prerequisite in that regard.

QUESTIONER: About the recent Board meeting on Belarus, I understand the staff presented a report that was on the pre-monitoring, or whatever you call that. The staff presented a report that was rather critical of the situation of the achievements of the Belarussian government. How would you describe the support for the report at the Board among the Board members?

MR. DAWSON: To be frank, I am aware that there was a discussion. I was not present at the discussion. I don`t recall what the report on it was, so we`ll get back to you on that.

QUESTIONER: Tom, could you update us on where talks in this new loan for Egypt are at the moment?

MR. DAWSON: Yes. The Egyptian authorities have sought external financing to help them weather the external shocks, including especially in the tourism sector in the wake of September 11. We have had preliminary discussions about possible Fund support for a compensatory financing facility, and we`ve discussed the policies that would be necessary for such a facility. Those discussions were held I think in late January in Cairo. And the authorities are still considering whether they wish to make such a request in light of both the prospective recovery in tourism, earnings, and other financing options. So I don`t have anything up-to-date on that, but that is the status.

QUESTIONER: Moving to Japan, can you update us how the FSAP mission to Tokyo went? I believe they came back about two weeks ago from Japan. And, specifically, does the IMF actually support channeling more public funds into Japanese banks as a way to reinvigorate the country`s banking system?

MR. DAWSON: I don`t have anything on the FSAP visit. As I recall, this was a fairly preliminary visit in terms of organization, so I don`t have any more on that.

I don`t have a reaction on the particular budget question. A number of steps have been taken in Japan that are in the right direction, but I think we continue to believe that more action is needed in a range of areas on the fiscal and monetary side. I do not have a particular answer, though, on the question of the supplementary budget.

QUESTION: Can you briefly respond to some of the new suggestions in Indonesia about how to go about regulation? Also, there`s been some talk about expanding HIPC going further in part because the prices of some commodities exported by HIPC countries have plummeted to the level where the debt relief has been cancelled out by other economic troubles. And then, finally, if you have anything to say about Soros` suggestion on SDRs, please comment on that, too.

MR. DAWSON: That`s a three-part question. I`m not quite sure what your question is about Indonesia, so let me come back to that. Let me do the other two first.

The issue of debt sustainable for HIPC countries is something we keep under constant review, and, indeed, the level of commodity prices is something that has attracted the attention and the concern of a number of observers, and it`s something we take quite seriously, and I know this is an issue that is presently under review in the Fund as well as elsewhere. And I think we will be looking at this in the next few months. I would suggest you ask me again as we get closer to the Spring Meetings, but this certainly is a subject that is under review.

With regard to the Soros SDR proposal, we are certainly aware of it. He has been in touch both directly and indirectly with us. It remains an item that is discussed quite actively in the international community, conferences and so on. It is not, however, something that appears to have gathered wide support among the membership. I would note that any SDR allocation requires an 85 percent vote of the membership and any special-purpose allocation in the case of the United States requires an actual affirmative vote of the Congress.

So I think it is an idea that people are looking at, but I don`t have any sense that there is the kind of support necessary for it, although I will be at a conference in a couple of weeks where that`s going to be discussed. So it`s becoming something of a perennial. Now, again, last chance on Indonesia.

QUESTIONER: There`s been an announcement that they`re going to sort of combine some of the regulatory agencies.

MR. DAWSON: I`m sorry. I don`t have anything on that.

QUESTIONER: Going back to Mr. Loser, the fact that Mr. Loser was born in Argentina, did it have any kind of relation to...

MR. DAWSON: It has absolutely nothing to do with it.

QUESTIONER: Is he still participating in other programs in Latin America except for Argentina now?

MR. DAWSON: People are appointed to positions in the Fund without regard to nationality. It`s in our Articles of Agreement.

QUESTIONER: Could you update us on the stand-by credit for Ecuador?

MR. DAWSON: A mission is currently in Quito to continue discussions on a new stand-by arrangement. The authorities are seeking a 12-month stand-by through March 2003. The discussions are focusing on establishing an appropriate fiscal target for 2002, and on structural reforms to improve productivity and competitiveness in the now-dollarized economy, and they are also looking at helping to sure a sustainable medium-term fiscal position and debt profile.

It`s too early to say whether the discussions will need to be extended after the return of the mission, which is expected early next week. If the necessary agreements can be reached, the staff could conceivably have a Board meeting in late April.

QUESTIONER: Could you update us on the status on Dr. Krueger`s bankruptcy proposal, and especially in light of the comments that Treasury Secretary O`Neill has made about it. The U.S. side seems to be rejecting it as too broad and is looking more for specific majority causes and bond contracts and...

MR. DAWSON: I think you`re confusing Secretary O`Neill`s comment with Undersecretary Taylor`s comment in that regard. I believe that Secretary O`Neill`s comments have been rather more general, and John Taylor`s comments were with regard particularly to the bond covenant issue. I`d also note the G-7 communiqué from Ottawa, which was quite clearly supportive of the idea of the need for such a mechanism, and that was a communiqué, as I say, of the G-7.

With regard to the ideas put forward by Ms. Krueger, there`s already been an initial preliminary discussion, a seminar in the Board. We expect that there will be an additional discussion in the near future with the staff having prepared some additional analyses in response both to the reactions from the Board in the first discussion, but also in reaction to comments that we`ve been getting from outside, from the business community, from other governments, and so on. So I think it`s something where we`re actually quite impressed with the comments that we`ve received, even though we have not to date in a formal sense been soliciting comments. But I expect that after the next stage it may well be that Ms. Krueger has an additional speech or we put out in some other fashion additional views so that we can continue what has already become a discussion of this issue. But I think there is a very broad expression of interest in this proposal from around the world.

QUESTIONER: Just on Argentina again, you said you were waiting for an invitation. What Remes Lenicov said today seems to indicate, I mean, is it formalized or are you waiting for him to physically send you a letter...

MR. DAWSON: No, we don`t stand on protocol. We don`t need letters.

QUESTION: So you`ve been...

MR. DAWSON: But a phone call, a phone call will do.

QUESTION: So you`re waiting but the phone call hasn`t arrived yet?

MR. DAWSON: Not to my knowledge. Not certainly as of about 45 minutes ago. Or it can be a fax, it can be a letter.

[End of press briefing.]

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Die Daten sprechen eindeutig für eine Trendwende !

Weekly Market Commentary


March 04, 2002

What may happen this week ?

The Risk Premiums on Equity - both in USD and in rupiah terms - are still in an upward trend. This may cap the upside potential of the JCI at 460 this week. On the currency front, we expect the rupiah to remain stable against the USD. The local currency unit is likely to move between 10,100 and 10,200 to the USD this week.

HOT ISSUE

Heating Up
To everyone’s surprise, Rahadi Ramelan, the former head of Bulog (the State Logistics Agency), will have to go to jail for at least 20 days pending trial for his alleged role in the embezzlement of Rp54.6 billion of funds belonging to the agency. This twist in the political drama is really unexpected as it is a widely held belief that Dadang Sukandar, a Golkar member who does not hold an important position in the party, will be sacrificed to save Akbar Tanjung as well as Golkar.

Weekly Economic and Political News Update
• Standard Chartered and Farallon remain in race for BCA stake
• Govt. still plans to divest its Semen Gresik shares
• Indonesia’s country risk up
• IMF reportedly seeks six prior actions before LoI approval
• New financial services supervisory authority planned
• Megawati gives assurances on security
• Fuel prices stable
• No toll road tariff hikes until deal revoked, says Minister
• Honda targets motorcycle sales of 1.5 million units in 2002
• January 2002 exports down by 18.14% y-o-y (up by 0.28% m-o-m)
• Trade Outlook
• February Inflation reached 1.50%



Weekly Commentary Team
Chief Research Officer :
Dr. Raden Pardede ( [e-mail] )
Analyst :
Ferry Latuhihin ( [e-mail] )
Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa ( [e-mail] )
Compliance :
Steve Susanto ( [e-mail])

[Rhum56]

und in Deutschland gibt es immer noch genug EMI-Jünger.
Kaum spricht der EMI wieder in seiner gewohnt euphorischen
Art über einen Wert, springen alle drauf.
heute dann Indosat
über 10%+

na ja

[broker*709]

Hört, hört ! Der künftige WTO-Chef kommt aus Indonesien, wenn das nicht ein Glücksfall für INDO-Land ist, der wird einiges für seine Heimat entscheiden.

Mittwoch 6. März 2002, 10:52 Uhr
Künftiger WTO-Chef empfiehlt Einigung im Stahlstreit

Für September ist ein Wechsel in der WTO-Spitze vorgesehen. Der bisherige Generaldirektor aus Neuseeland, Mike Moore, wird von Panitchpakdi Supachai aus Indonesien ersetzt. Der künftige WTO-Chef fordert nach Reuters-Angaben, dass sich die Stahl exportierenden Staaten und die USA untereinander einigen.
Um die US-Stahlindustrie zu schützen, will die USA bei 16 Produktgruppen die Zölle um 20 bis 30 Prozentpunkte erhöhen. Die EU kündigte bereits an, notfalls die USA bei der WTO zu verklagen.

Supachai glaubt nicht, dass die WTO sofort reagieren kann, deshalb empfiehlt er den beteiligen Staaten, selbst eine Einigung zu finden. Nur wenn diese Versuche erfolglos verlaufen, bleibt der Weg über eine WTO-Entscheidung.

[broker*709]

Nachdem Anoop Singh in INDONESIEN seine Arbeit wirklich gut gemacht hat, übernimmt er nun das schwierige Projekt Argentinien.



IWF beruft neuen Krisen-Manager

Um besser auf Krisen-Situationen reagieren zu können, hat der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) die Position eines Direktors für Sonderaufgaben eingesetzt.

Der Inder Anoop Singh wird den neuen Posten übernehmen. Singh werde umgehend die Verantwortung des IWF-Teams für Argentinien übernehmen und versuchen, sich mit der argentinischen Regierung auf ein Wirtschaftsprogramm zu verständigen, erklärte IWF-Chef Horst Köhler in einer Mitteilung.

Singh war bislang stellvertretender IWF-Direktor für Asien und Pazifik. Hier hatte er sich bei der Überwindung der Asien-Finanzkrise 1997 bis 1999 engagiert, die vor allem Länder wie Thailand und Indonesien getroffen hatte.

Reuters

26.02.2002 08:06:04

[broker*709]

Wenn es die Justiz wirklich schaffen sollte "Suharto`s wohlgehüteten Sohn Tommy" der gerechten Strafe zuzuführen, dann kommt neue Glaubwürdigkeit in das Rechtssystem! ... mal abwarten und sehen.

Donnerstag 7. März 2002, 19:05 Uhr
Klage gegen Suharto-Sohn wegen Mordes erhoben

Jakarta (Reuters) - In Indonesien ist am Donnerstag Klage gegen den Sohn des früheren Präsidenten Suharto wegen Mordes an einem Richter erhoben worden. In einer zweiten spektakulären Entscheidung ließ die Staatsanwaltschaft den Parlamentspräsidenten unter Korruptionsverdacht festnehmen.


Staatsanwaltschaft wirft Tommy Suharto vor, hinter der Ermordung von Syafiuddin Kartasasmita, einem Mitglied des Obersten Gerichtshofes, zu stehen. Der Richter, der Tommy Suharto wegen Korruption zu einer 18-monatigen Haftstrafe verurteilt hatte, war im Juli 2001 erschossen worden. Tommy Suharto droht im Falle eines Schuldspruchs die Todesstrafe. Parlamentspräsident Akbar Tandjung von der Golkar-Partei wurde im Zuge einer Korruptionsaffäre festgenommen, bei der es um vier Millionen Dollar geht und in den die staatliche Lebensmittelbehörde Bulog verwickelt sein soll.


Das Verfahren gegen die Verdächtigen im Mordfall des Richters, die die Tat ausgeführt haben sollen, läuft bereits. Tommy Suharto verfügte während der Herrschaft seines Vaters neben zahlreichen Unternehmen auch über einen bedeutenden politischen Einfluss. Tommy Suharto, der sich bereits seit November 2001 in Haft befindet, hat die Vorwürfe zurückgewiesen.


Die Staatsanwaltschaft wirft ihm auch illegalen Waffenbesitz und Strafumgehung im Fall der Korruption vor. Alle drei Anschuldigungen wurden zu einer Anklage zusammengefasst. Tommy Suhartos Anwalt Elza Syarif sagte, er habe die Unterlagen noch nicht einsehen können. "Ich habe sie erst heute erhalten." Sein Mandant und er seien aber für den Prozess bereit.


Der Fall gilt wie auch der Korruptionsfall um Tandjung als Test für die Unabhängigkeit der indonesischen Justiz, der in der Vergangenheit oftmals selbst Korruption vorgeworfen wurde.


Tandjung sei im Gewahrsam der Staatsanwaltschaft, sagte ein Sprecher der Behörde. Er habe sich aber geweigert, den Haftbefehl zu unterschreiben.


Tandjung hatte jede Verwicklung in den Korruptionsfall zurückgewiesen. In den Vorfall sollen auch mehrere Abgeordnete der Golkar-Partei verwickelt sein. Die zweitgrößte Partei des Landes ist an der Regierungskoalition von Präsidentin Megawati Sukarnoputri beteiligt und wird von Tandjung geführt.

[broker*709]

Für den, der viel lesen möchte ...

Farallon Capital Consortium
Wins Bank Central Asia Bid
15/03/2002 (21:00)

Click Here to Send Messege
[Kirim Pesan]



JAKARTA, Indonesia (SuratkabarCom) - In a surprising choice that followed months of delays, Indonesia picked U.S. investment fund Farallon Capital Management as the winner of a controlling stake in PT Bank Central Asia, the country`s largest and most important retail bank.

The International Monetary Fund and many analysts hailed the news, noting that it could be a first step toward helping to rebuild Indonesia`s tattered reputation with investors. But the decision also shocked some observers, who thought a counteroffer from a group led by Standard Chartered Bank PLC represented a better deal for the country, and came amid continuing questions about the procedures followed by the government in conducting the sale.

Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi said Farallon and its partners would buy a 51% stake in Bank Central Asia, raising a total of about 5.4 trillion rupiah ($541.6 million) for the government at a price of 1,775 rupiah a share. Farallon, a San Francisco fund manager, leads a group of investors that also includes PT Djarum, Indonesia`s third-largest cigarette maker, and Farindo Holdings Ltd., an investment vehicle based in Mauritius.

Financial Flagship

The decision caps nearly two years of on-again, off-again efforts by the government to sell the bank, which was nationalized in 1998 after Indonesia`s financial crisis drove it to the brink of ruin. The bank was the financial flagship of Indonesian tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, founder of the Salim Group and one of former President Suharto`s closest friends. With 800 branches and 21,000 employees, BCA has by far the greatest reach of any retail bank in Indonesia, and is considered the backbone of the country`s payments system.

The government hopes that BCA will be the first of a series of state-controlled businesses that will be sold this year in an effort to recover some of the $60 billion the government spent to recapitalize and rebuild Indonesia`s banks. Those hopes have lifted Indonesia`s stock market and its currency, the rupiah, in recent weeks, as investors anticipate that foreign investors will finally return to the local market after steering clear for the past few years because of political discord and a lack of clarity on economic-reform plans.

The sale is seen as especially symbolic because several previous efforts to sell BCA have been stymied by public opposition to giving away prized Indonesian assets to foreigners at what are seen as artificially low prices. Labor groups have also worried about potential job losses, forcing the government to postpone the announcement of a winner earlier this week until unions were assured that the sale won`t significantly jeopardize jobs.

By finally overcoming those hurdles, the hope now is that the BCA sale will unleash a string of further asset sales that will raise cash for the government`s budget and put state-run companies to more productive use.

`Positive Impact`

The sale "underscores the government`s commitment to pursue key economic reforms," said David Nellor, the IMF`s chief representative in Jakarta, adding that he expects markets to welcome the decision.

Other analysts generally agreed. "I think this will have a positive impact on our banking sector as a whole," said Raden Pardede, the head of research at Danareksa Research Institute in Jakarta. He said Indonesia needs to seek buyers for a series of other banks during the next few months, beginning with PT Bank Niaga later this month. By demonstrating that Jakarta is able to take difficult decisions, even in the face of domestic political criticism, Thursday`s decision should make that process easier, he said.

Indonesian officials have also repeatedly stressed that another key objective of the privatization drive is to bring better skills and expertise to the banking sector, so that future financial problems can be avoided. But some analysts questioned whether Indonesia might be losing out in that effort by turning down the offer by Standard Chartered. The British institution is one of the most experienced banks in emerging markets. Farallon has never run a bank, though it has recruited Deutsche Bank AG as a technical adviser to help it with BCA.

BCA shares fell sharply after the announcement Thursday, ending down 3.8%, or 75 rupiah, at 1,900 rupiah. The selloff dragged the Jakarta Stock Exchange`s Composite Index down 1.3%. But traders attributed the decline to news that the price Farallon paid for the shares was below the prevailing market prices, rather than disappointment that Farallon was chosen as the winner.

Sharp Criticism

Questions have also been raised about the process the government followed in the BCA sale, which could make it a poor benchmark for future efforts. In particular, attention has focused on a government decision-later reversed-to allow the bidders to change their "final bids` after they were submitted on Jan. 28.

Farallon sharply criticized that decision, saying it allowed Standard Chartered to drop terms and conditions attached to its offer that made it less attractive than Farallon`s. Its claims were later backed by a government oversight committee charged with ensuring that the process was fair and transparent.

While officials involved in the deal insisted that negotiations over terms were standard practice and the same opportunities were given to both bidders, the move was widely portrayed in the media as an unfair effort to help Standard Chartered`s chances of winning, triggering a political backlash against it. Indeed, in naming Farallon the winner Thursday, Mr. Laksamana was careful to note that the decision was based on the original offers submitted to the government, and not the revised terms received after bidding closed on Jan. 28. He said the decision to stick with the Jan. 28 bids was taken "to protect the integrity of the process."

At a news conference, Mr. Laksamana said Farallon`s offer was priced below Standard Chartered`s bid of 1,800 rupiah per share. But he said that Farallon had triumphed because its Jan. 28 offer contained fewer conditions than Standard Chartered`s. In particular, he said, Standard Chartered`s bid suffered because it required some of the funds to be paid into an escrow account and called for a special management fee to be paid to the British bank. Farallon also benefited because it agreed to reduce the $6 billion in recapitalization bonds held at the bank, which will help the government cut costs on interest payments over time.

No Major Changes

Like Standard Chartered, Farallon also allayed the concerns of BCA workers by stressing that it doesn`t plan to eliminate workers once it takes control of the bank.

Farallon "does not expect any major changes at BCA," said Tameen Ebrahim, a company spokesman. In a statement, the company added that it believes BCA "has outstanding potential to develop as a business and at the same time play a part in the growth and development of the Indonesian economy." Farallon has hired Deutsche Bank as a "technical partner" to help it run the bank, and expects to increase its lending in coming years.

But the decision is another blow to Standard Chartered`s long-standing efforts to build up its presence in Indonesia. The bank was forced to back out of a 1999 effort to take over PT Bank Bali, another nationalized bank, after workers rebelled, and has been actively seeking other investment opportunities in the sector ever since.

Standard Chartered said it was "disappointed" with the decision, but said it "remains committed to its business in Indonesia." A spokesman declined to comment on whether Standard Chartered would now lodge a bid for Bank Niaga, the next Indonesian bank to go on the block.

(WSJ)

[broker*709]

Jetzt geht alles über den Tresen.

Wahnsinn was z. Zt. bei den INDO-Banken abgeht.

NIAGA:

Last Trade
5:00pm · 140 Change
+25 (+21.74%) Prev Cls
115 Volume
176,235,008 Div Date
18 Aug, 1997
Small: [1d | 5d | 1y | none]
Big: [1d | 5d | 3m | 6m | 1y | 2y | 5y | max]
Day`s Range
110 - 140 Bid
135 Ask
140 Open
115 Avg Vol
N/A Ex-Div
9 Jul, 1997


BALI:

Last Trade
4:59pm · 100 Change
+20 (+25.00%) Prev Cls
80 Volume
49,865,000 Div Date
25 Feb, 1998
Small: [1d | 5d | 1y | none]
Big: [1d | 5d | 3m | 6m | 1y | 2y | 5y | max]
Day`s Range
80 - 100 Bid
100 Ask
105 Open
80 Avg Vol
N/A Ex-Div
21 Jan, 1998


LIPPO:

Last Trade
4:59pm · 75 Change
+5 (+7.14%) Prev Cls
70 Volume
310,575,008 Div Date
1 Aug, 1997
Small: [1d | 5d | 1y | none]
Big: [1d | 5d | 3m | 6m | 1y | 2y | 5y | max]
Day`s Range
70 - 80 Bid
75 Ask
80 Open
70 Avg Vol
N/A Ex-Div
25 Jun, 1997

[broker*709]

Jetzt hat die Ruphia die 10.000 Punktemarke gegenüber dem Dolar hoffentlich das letzte mal von oben gesehen!

Es könnte jetzt ruhig Richtung 9.000 - 8.000 Ruphia gehen und dort auch bleiben, das wäre eine faire Bewertung.

Was meint Ihr ?

FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 2002 11:06:25 AM
For further information and firm prices, please contact :
Treasury Sales and Marketing Standard Chartered Bank
Tel. [phone] Fax. [phone]
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ROUNDUP

Dollar slightly firmer against yen in early Tokyo from late New York level, helped by some dollar-demand ahead of local fixing. But upside expected to be limited amid lack of immediate market-moving factors.
Market also pondering pace of U.S. economic recovery, prospects for interest rate hikes and how they would affect forex market. Dollar now at 132.20-25 yen versus 131.99 in late New York on Thursday. Euro at 0.8820-25, also little changed from late U.S. level.
Criticism of Bush administration’s strong-dollar policy by U.S. labour unions and National Association of Manufacturers also had little impact on currencies.
LOCAL MARKET ROUNDUP
IDR open at 9840-9890 in a thin market. Players expected not to be aggressively selling dollars ahead of weekend and heard some corporates interested to buy at around 9850 level. Expected to be traded in tight 9830-9900 range today.
Yesterday, IDR inched higher above 9900 against the dollar, as players dumped more of their long dollar positions in the market ahead of March 28th, when U.S. investment house Farallon was expected to pay the government for a 30% stake in BCA.
State Enterprises Minister, Laksamana Sukardi said on Thursday that the government was seeking a new chief for IBRA but a replacement had not yet been decided.
JKSE gained 3.336 points and closed at nearly 19-months high at 480.65 on Thursday as players bought Telkom and other blue chips on a stronger rupiah and rising hopes for more progress in the crucial privatization program.

[broker*709]

Wenn Indonesien an Chinas Wachstum der letzten Jahre anknüpfen könnte wäre das ein Riesenerfolg !

Schön wär`s ja !

Megawati in China to push trade
March 24, 2002 Posted: 3:59 AM EST (0859 GMT)

BEIJING, China (Reuters) -- Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri has arrive in Beijing and expects to be greeted by reassurances from Chinese leaders that China`s speedy economic growth will not hurt Southeast Asia.

During her four days in China, Megawati is expected to focus on promoting trade to help Indonesia through tough economic times and showcasing Indonesia`s increasingly China-friendly policies, analysts said.

For its part, China will try to polish its image with its Asian neighbour and prepare for a planned free-trade area with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

"China has been very concerned with lessening the mistrust among ASEAN countries," said Zhang Xizhen, a Southeast Asia specialist at Peking University`s School of International Relations.

"China of course welcomes her (Megawati) and in the process may seek to further explain China`s policies to help eliminate the feeling of mistrust in ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia," he said.

Relations between China and Indonesia, first established in 1950, were suspended after Jakarta accused Beijing of backing a communist coup in 1965. In 1990, the two resumed ties and since then relations have slowly been getting back on track.

Chinese statistics show bilateral trade grew from $1.18 billion in 1990 to $7.46 billion in 2000.

China and ASEAN hope to establish the proposed free-trade area within a decade.

Seeking political support
Megawati, who was in Shanghai last October for a meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders, will also be seeking Chinese support.

Sandwiched between growing U.S. pressure to do more in the fight against terror and domestic opposition to the it, the Indonesian president is trying to shore up outside support and China could provide a key counterbalance, Zhang said.

"She needs more and varied support and aid. I think this visit to China could have this intention," he said.

The United States sees Indonesia`s cooperation as essential to the success of the global war on terror. But U.S. officials believe the world`s most populous Muslim country is a fertile breeding ground for the al Qaeda network, which Washington blames for the September 11 air attacks.

China has supported the war on terror, but opposes its expansion to other countries.

Megawati will have to overcome some lingering discomfort in China about Indonesia, where the ethnic Chinese community which was targeted in mob attacks after the economy crashed in 1998.

"The issue remains a big question mark for China, it`s about how we treat our ethnic Chinese community," said Indonesian analyst Kusnanto Anggoro, a political analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.

Ethnic Chinese, who make up four percent of the country`s 210 million people, control up to 80 percent of its wealth and Jakarta knows wooing back ethnic Chinese capital that fled after the attacks in 1998 will give a boost to its recovery.

In a positive gesture, Megawati declared the Chinese Lunar New Year a national holiday last month. The holiday was banned after a 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia.

She also has a leg up in relations with China as the daughter of Indonesia`s founding father, Sukarno, who enjoyed close ties with late Chinese leaders Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, analysts said.

Energy cooperation
Several Indonesian officials, including the mines and energy chief, will accompany Megawati to push economic cooperation.

Indonesia is trying to boost energy cooperation with China after offshore oil giant CNOOC announced in January it would buy the Indonesian assets of Spanish oil giant Repsol-YPF, its biggest international expansion to date.

Last month, state oil company Pertamina said it was ready to cooperate with China`s leading oil firm PetroChina in upstream and downstream activities and hoped to sign a memorandum of understanding this month to formalise the cooperation.

Megawati is scheduled to deliver a keynote speech at a luncheon for Indonesian and Chinese business leaders on Monday.

Megawati will spend two nights in Beijing before heading to the western city of Chengdu and coastal city of Fuzhou. After China, she will travel to North and South Korea and India.

[broker*709]

Auch Indonesien wird positiv gesehen.

Überflieger in den Schwellenländern


Die Emerging Markets ziehen davon. Nicht alle und nicht alle gleich kraftvoll, doch fast überall mit Verve. Das galt 2001, und das gilt auch 2002. Trotz Tango Infernale in Argentinien. Trotz Dauer-Krise in der Türkei. Seit Jahresanfang legten viele Börsen in Schwellenländern kräftig zu und übertrumpften deutlich die Indizes der etablierten Märkte. sharper.de nennt die Highlights und sagt, wo jetzt noch der Einstieg lohnt.

Ronald Tietjen

Das chinesische Jahr des Pferdes hat begonnen. Für die Börsen bedeutet das: Es wird nicht wirklich ruhiger werden. Selbst wer nicht an Magie oder Astrologie glaubt, kann es nicht abstreiten. Die Börsenwelt entwickelt sich nicht im Gleichklang. Es geht wellenförmig auf und ab. Was auf die Weltmärkte zutrifft, tangiert die Welt der kleinen Märkte oftmals nur peripher. Und das scheint noch eine Weile so zu bleiben, denn das Kapital fliesst den Berg hinauf. Das Institute of International Finance rechnet – Ausnahme Lateinamerika - mit steil ansteigenden Kapitalzuflüssen in die Schwellenländern. Der Grund: Attraktive Bewertung, hohe Renditechancen.

Die neuen Favoriten sind für die Mehrzahl der in Emerging Markets investierenden Fondsmanager überwiegend die alten geblieben: Thailand (plus 18 Prozent seit Jahresbeginn), Taiwan (plus 6,5 Prozent), Korea (plus sechs Prozent), dazu noch Osteuropa, besonders Rußland, und ein Neuling: China. Historisch gesehen ist der Einstieg jetzt besonders günstig: Immer dann, wenn die US-Zinsen nach einer Senkungsphase vor der Trendumkehr stecken, konnte man in Schwellenländern die höchsten Gewinne abschöpfen.

Bei Hyundai brummt das Geschäft

Dabei kann es nicht schaden, den Charakter der Märkte zu kennen. So unterscheidet der erfahrene Emerging Markets-Anleger vier Länder-Typen. Die Frühzykliker sind dabei noch am Abhängigsten von den Kapriolen der Weltkonjunktur. Sie zeichnen sich durch eine hohe Exportquote aus. Beispiele: Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong. Wer auf die Frühzykliker setzt, sollte die globale Börsenlage im Auge haben. Entwickeln sich die Weltmärkte langfristig positiv, wird es zuerst auf die Frühzykliker durchschlagen.

Die interessantesten Einzelwerte: Samsung und Hyundai aus Südkorea. Mit Samsung investieren Anleger in einen der günstigsten Chip-Werte auf dem Globus. Sollte die Konjunktur anziehen, die Krise in der PC- und Telekombranche nachhaltig zurückgehen, wird Samsung zuerst profitieren.

Für Hyundai Motors brummt das Geschäft im Ausland. Ein Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis von fünf für 2003 spricht für eine Unterbewertung des Autokonzerns. Nach einem Rekordgewinn 2001 soll 2002 sogar noch ein besseres Ergebnis erzielt werden.

Ein ganz anderer Markt-Typus findet sich in sogenannten Reformerstaaten. Darunter werden hauptsächlich Länder in Osteuropa (Polen, Ungarn, Russland, Baltikum), teilweise in Süd- und Mittelamerika (Brasilien, Chile, Mexiko), aber auch in Asien (Indien) verstanden. Ihre hervorstechendste Eigenschaft ist eine Wirtschaft, aus der sich die Politik immer mehr herauszieht und eine rasante Privatisierung. Besonders in Russland finden sich zahlreiche Konzerne, die sich von ihrer Substanz her mit jedem West-Unternehmen messen können. Der steile Haussetrend an der Moskauer Börse seit September vergangenen Jahres ist noch voll intakt.

Sibneft trotz Versechsfachung attraktiv

Der RTS-Index stieg zuletzt sogar auf ein neues Drei-Jahres-Hoch von 340,26 Indexpunkten, was ein Kursplus von 30,84 Prozent seit Jahresbeginn bedeutet. Damit zählt der russische Aktienmarkt wie schon im vergangenen Jahr wieder zu den Top-Performern unter den Weltbörsen. Immer mehr ausländische Investoren, vor allem amerikanische Hedge- und Emerging Markets-Fonds entdecken Russland als unterbewertet.

Unterstützung bekommen russische Aktien erneut durch ein auf ein Jahreshoch gestiegenen Ölpreis. Die russische Regierung will die OPEC unterstützen, den Ölpreis in der Spanne 22 bis 28 Dollar zu halten. Interessanter Einzeltitel ist Sibneft, obwohl der Kurs des Energieriesen sich in den vergangenen zwölf Monaten schon versechsfacht hat. Sibneft will die Produktion weiter deutlich ausbauen, was zu weiteren Wertsteigerungen führen sollte. Auch auf der Empfehlungsliste: Der nach dem Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis von zwei preiswerteste russische Öl-Standardwert Tatneft und die Mobilfunkaktie Mobile Telesytems.

Noch mehr Chancen auf große Kurssprünge, aber auch ein größeres Risiko hat der Anleger, der auf die Eigenbrödler der Weltwirtschaft setzt. Staaten wie China oder Peru gehen ihren eigenen Weg. Sie koppeln sich ab von den Welttrends und sind relativ autark. Dafür ist ihre Abhängigkeit vom Binnenmarkt um so stärker. Noch wartet die Volksrepublik auf ihre eigentliche Entdeckung durch ausländische Groß-Investoren. Erst dann sollten auch Kleinanleger in den Markt gehen. Lukrative Branchen gibt es zuhauf. Beispiel: Energiemarkt. Schon in ein bis zwei Jahren soll ein staatlicher Stromgigant aufgespalten und an vier einzelne Versorger aufgeteilt werden. Favorit ein großes Stück vom Kuchen abzubekommen ist Bejing Data. Die Aktie wird in Hongkong gehandelt und ist mit einem Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis von unter neun günstig.

Die krisengeschüttelten Underdogs sind der letzte Länder-Typus. Zu ihnen gehört Argentinien aber auch Türkei und Indonesien. Sie bieten die Chance für Langfristanleger, die auf eine Auferstehung hoffen, was sich am Beispiel der Türkei schon abzeichnet. Was sie verbindet, ist, dass sie am Tropf der Weltgemeinschaft hängen. Allein die Türkei steht beim Internationalen Währungsfonds mit 16 Milliarden Dollar in der Kreide. Das macht eine Investition nicht ungefährlich, auch wenn sich die wichtige Binnennachfrage zunehmend verbessert. Die Top-Empfehlungen kommen aus Thailand: Bangkok Bank und Banpu. Während das Finanzinstitut 2001 den ersten Gewinn seit vier Jahren ausweisen konnte, boomt auch das Geschäft der Minengesellschaft Banpu wieder. Der Einstieg in den Stromsektor sollte den Margen zusätzlich Anschub geben.
Stand:30.03.2002
© 2002 sharper.de

[broker*709]

Und alles wartet wieder einmal auf den Pariser Club !

Mal sehen ?!

JAKARTA (AFX-ASIA) - Share prices were mixed in lacklustre morning trade
after the long Easter weekend, with most investors sidelined as they await
the outcome of the Paris Club meeting early this month, dealers said.
Gains in Telkom and Bank Central Asia shares offset further selling in
Indosat amid concerns over the government`s privatisation strategy, they
added.
At 10.31 am, the composite index was up 0.593 points or 0.12 pct at 482.
368 on 427.6 mln shares worth 92.1 bln rupiah.
Fallers led gainers 33 to 26 with 49 stocks unchanged.
"There`s no catalysts in the market, I think it will trade in a narrow
range waiting for the next catalyst which is the Paris Club meeting," a
dealer with a foreign brokerage said.
Finance Minister Budiono last month said the government expects the group
of foreign creditors to approve the rescheduling of up to 5.5 bln usd in
government debt, comprising both principal and interest, until the end of
2003.
The dealer said the market is largely optimistic about the meeting, but
is showing caution because of the government`s determination to seek interest
payment rescheduling despite warnings from international ratings agencies
that such a move could lead to downgrades of Indonesia`s sovereign debt
rating.
He also investors are positive on BCA after the successful sale of a 51
pct government stake in the bank, for which the first payment came through on
Thursday.
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency received the first payment of
320.7 mln usd from Farallon Capital for the acquisition of an initial 30 pct
stake in BCA from the government, IBRA deputy head Subowo Musa said.
BCA was up 25 at 2,600 rupiah on 4.1 mln shares.
Indosat continues to fall on concerns that the government may sell a 45
pct stake in the company too cheaply, after State Enterprises Minister
Laksamana Sukardi said the government expects to receive between 4.0-5.1 trln
rupiah from the sale.
"Even though it`s still uncertain what the price will be, in the meantime
it makes a lot of people nervous and that`s reflected in the recent falls in
Indosat`s share price," the dealer said.
Indosat was down 200 at 9,950 on 453,500 shares.
Telkom was up 50 at 4,125 on 6.6 mln shares.
Gudang Garam was flat at 10,900 on 156,500 shares and Sampoerna also flat
at 4,525 on 35,000 shares.
Astra International was up 25 at 2,575 on 1.7 mln shares.
mtc/jg

AFN
01Apr02 03:43 GMT
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Want more? Check out http://www.indoexchange.com/afx for more information and samples.
If you have any question or comments, please contact us at: [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Enorm gute Entwicklung des Gesamtmarktes vor dem Hintergrund der Weltwirtschaftslage!

Die 500 Punkte-Marke (nach oben!) im JKSE und die 10.000 Rupiah-Marke (nach unten!) scheinen deninitiv gebrochen!

FRIDAY, APRIL 05, 2002 1:35:01 PM
For further information and firm prices, please contact :
Treasury Sales and Marketing Standard Chartered Bank
Tel. [phone] Fax. [phone]
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ROUNDUP

Dollar drifting slowly lower to 132.25 yen with market uncertain where to take it next after offshore fall to 131.59 lows and subsequent sharp bounce. FM Shiokawa says current forex levels are favourable and no need to act against yen weakness or yen strength.
Euro subdued at 116.10 yen after its retreat from above 116.70 overnight. Support seen at 116.00 but traders see risk of pullback to more important chart level around 115.35. Euro edges up to 0.8780 from lows around 0.8765 but sentiment fragile after its rapid retreat from 0.8857 highs offshore following news of President Bush’s new peace initiative in the Middle East.
LOCAL MARKET ROUNDUP
IDR open at 9600-9650 in a slightly dollar-selling mode. Expected to break 9600 to test 9550 level intraday, but if failed IDR could bounce back to 9700 level area again.
Yesterday, IDR climbed higher thanks to the steady dollar sales from foreign names who were eyeing investment flows into Indonesia. Corporate dollar bids, however, slowed the IDR’s progress and seemed to be capped the currency has been consolidating around 9600 level for the week.
Indonesia’s telecom giant PT Telkom confirmed it had signed a deal with Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) to sell a 12.7% stake in its cellular unit, Telkomsel. The stake amounts to USD 429 million in cash. The deal would would reduce Telkom’s holding in Telkomsel to 65% and raise Singtel’s ownership to 35%.
JKSE jumped 14.343 points to close at 502.5 points on Thursday, to finish at a 19-month high, boosted by a stronger rupiah and the exchange’s largest capitalized stock PT Telkom’s deal with Singtel.

[laigueglia]

Schon seltsam: Jakarta steigt sukzessive und befindet sich in einem sehr gesunden Aufwärtstrend, doch offensichtlich interessiert das niemanden. Weder die Fonds sind investiert noch gibt es grössere Diskussionen in irgendeinem Board.

Evtl. ein idealer Einstiegszeitpunkt?
Vorstellbar wäre es, denn aufgrund der Enge des Marktes könnte bei einem Einstieg des ein oder anderen Fonds der Markt faktisch explodieren. Schaut Euch mal den Langfristchart (Basisverlauf der letzten 5 Jahre)an!

Einzelwerte oder Indexspekualtion?
Im Gengensatz zum SET würde ich in Jakrata nur auf den gesamten Markt spekulieren, da Einzelwerte in D wirklich schwer handelbar sind und zu total konträren Verläufen neigen!

Ähnlich wie in den Gesamtmarkt Türkei könnte sich eine Investition auf Jahressicht durchaus mehr als bezahlt machen.

Ich will das mal hier so in den Raum stellen und würde mich über den ein oder anderen Gedankenaustausch freuen.

Als subjektive Anmerkung: Gefährlicher als ein Investment in irgendeinen NM-Wert oder auch den Neuen Markt via Indexspekualtion ist es kaum.
Meine Erfahrung hat mir in den Jahren gezeigt, dass die ach so gefährlichen Emerging Markets wesentlich ungefährlicher sind als Neuer Markt, Nasdaq & Co.
Ich selbst habe mir die Finger in zwei Anläufen an diesen sog. Zukunftsmärkten verbrannt und bin konsequent auf Turnaround und Emerging-Market-Inverstments umgestiegen, was sich mehr als bezahlt gemacht hat (trotz Asienkrise etc.).

[laigueglia]

Schon seltsam: Jakarta steigt sukzessive und befindet sich in einem sehr gesunden Aufwärtstrend, doch offensichtlich interessiert das niemanden. Weder die Fonds sind investiert noch gibt es grössere Diskussionen in irgendeinem Board.

Evtl. ein idealer Einstiegszeitpunkt?
Vorstellbar wäre es, denn aufgrund der Enge des Marktes könnte bei einem Einstieg des ein oder anderen Fonds der Markt faktisch explodieren. Schaut Euch mal den Langfristchart (Basisverlauf der letzten 5 Jahre)an!

Einzelwerte oder Indexspekualtion?
Im Gengensatz zum SET würde ich in Jakrata nur auf den gesamten Markt spekulieren, da Einzelwerte in D wirklich schwer handelbar sind und zu total konträren Verläufen neigen!

Ähnlich wie in den Gesamtmarkt Türkei könnte sich eine Investition auf Jahressicht durchaus mehr als bezahlt machen.

Ich will das mal hier so in den Raum stellen und würde mich über den ein oder anderen Gedankenaustausch freuen.

Als subjektive Anmerkung: Gefährlicher als ein Investment in irgendeinen NM-Wert oder auch den Neuen Markt via Indexspekualtion ist es kaum.
Meine Erfahrung hat mir in den Jahren gezeigt, dass die ach so gefährlichen Emerging Markets wesentlich ungefährlicher sind als Neuer Markt, Nasdaq & Co.
Ich selbst habe mir die Finger in zwei Anläufen an diesen sog. Zukunftsmärkten verbrannt und bin konsequent auf Turnaround und Emerging-Market-Inverstments umgestiegen, was sich mehr als bezahlt gemacht hat (trotz Asienkrise etc.).

[laigueglia]

Schon seltsam: Jakarta steigt sukzessive und befindet sich in einem sehr gesunden Aufwärtstrend, doch offensichtlich interessiert das niemanden. Weder die Fonds sind investiert noch gibt es grössere Diskussionen in irgendeinem Board.

Evtl. ein idealer Einstiegszeitpunkt?
Vorstellbar wäre es, denn aufgrund der Enge des Marktes könnte bei einem Einstieg des ein oder anderen Fonds der Markt faktisch explodieren. Schaut Euch mal den Langfristchart (Basisverlauf der letzten 5 Jahre)an!

Einzelwerte oder Indexspekualtion?
Im Gengensatz zum SET würde ich in Jakrata nur auf den gesamten Markt spekulieren, da Einzelwerte in D wirklich schwer handelbar sind und zu total konträren Verläufen neigen!

Ähnlich wie in den Gesamtmarkt Türkei könnte sich eine Investition auf Jahressicht durchaus mehr als bezahlt machen.

Ich will das mal hier so in den Raum stellen und würde mich über den ein oder anderen Gedankenaustausch freuen.

Als subjektive Anmerkung: Gefährlicher als ein Investment in irgendeinen NM-Wert oder auch den Neuen Markt via Indexspekualtion ist es kaum.
Meine Erfahrung hat mir in den Jahren gezeigt, dass die ach so gefährlichen Emerging Markets wesentlich ungefährlicher sind als Neuer Markt, Nasdaq & Co.
Ich selbst habe mir die Finger in zwei Anläufen an diesen sog. Zukunftsmärkten verbrannt und bin konsequent auf Turnaround und Emerging-Market-Inverstments umgestiegen, was sich mehr als bezahlt gemacht hat (trotz Asienkrise etc.).

[laigueglia]

Sorry an alle, doch vorgängiges "triple-posting" ist versehentlich entstanden. Bitte nochmals um Entschuldigung!

[broker*709]

News from Paris Club !

RI not likely to obtain haircut from Paris Club: Kwik


JAKARTA (JP): A Cabinet minister said there was little chance Indonesia would obtain a haircut on its foreign debts from Paris Club creditor countries opening their third meeting in Paris on Thursday.

The chairman of the National Development Planning Board, Kwik Kian Gie, said Indonesia had no bargaining power to obtain a haircut.

"The only possible bargaining power we could have is if we disclosed to them our real capability. Still it would be up to them to decide," Kwik said as quoted by Antara after attending a Cabinet meeting.

He also said Indonesia did not have a chance of having its debts changed into grants because it was not considered a poor country.

Kwik said if the Indonesian delegation to the Paris Club meeting could have the country`s debts rescheduled over a period of 10 years "that would be a good enough result".

Some international experts have called on Paris Club countries to write off Indonesia`s foreign debt in order to help the country recover from its economic crisis.

Short-term debt rescheduling schemes would do little to help Indonesia`s economy, they said.

The Indonesian delegation to the Paris Club meeting on April 11 and April 12 reportedly will propose the rescheduling of US$5.5 billion of the country`s debts maturing between April 2002 and December 2003 over a period of 20 years or more.

[broker*709]

Weitere News !

Calls for debt write-off mount as Paris Club starts


The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

As debates on whether the government should pursue a debt reduction from foreign lenders intensified here, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and Finance Minister Boediono met on Thursday for a two-day debt rescheduling conference with the Paris Club of creditor nations.

The government is seeking to reschedule US$5.5 billion in foreign debt which is set to mature over the next 17 months beginning this month. The rescheduling facility is seen as crucial to help ease the burden on the state budget.

This is the third time the government has sought to reschedule their loans from the Paris Club since the country was hit by the 1997 economic and financial crisis.

But non-governmental organizations (NGOs) said that the usual debt rescheduling facility offered by the Paris Club would not solve the country`s huge debt estimated to be $131 billion, of which $71 billion is owed to foreign lenders.

"I can`t understand why the government has gone to Paris with such a minimal proposal," Sugeng Bahagijo of the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) said on the sidelines of a seminar on debt.

He said that the government should instead seek a debt write-off to help the country lift itself out of the prolonged crisis.

Other NGO activists argued that a huge portion of the foreign debt had long since been misused and squandered by corrupt officials in previous administrations.

"Indonesia must be brave, and vow not to pay debts incurred by the previous regime, especially the New Order (Soeharto) government," economist Revrisond Baswir from Gadjah Mada University told participants at the seminar.

The participants argued that a debt write-off would be fair because the Soeharto administration used the foreign loans to oppress people and totally defeated the main aim of the loans, which was to raise the welfare of people.

Revrisond said that Indonesia, especially the current Megawati government, should be given the right not to pay the New Order debts.

"We cut our links with the corrupt regime in 1998, and the new generation should not have to inherit those debts, since the debts brought suffering to people," he said, adding that around 40 million Indonesians had fallen below the poverty line, an amount higher than the entire populations of some nations in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which are eligible for debt cuts.

But others opposed such extreme measures, saying it would only create more damage to the country`s economy as investors would shun Indonesia.

Not to mention, it would add pressure to the local currency as well as raising the cost of lending for the corporate sector.

Even Vice President Hamzah Haz expressed disagreement over a debt cut, saying it only applied to a country that is so poor that it had no means to repay its debts.

"The way I see it, a (write-off) is impossible," Hamzah said after a Cabinet meeting.

Revrisond acknowledged that such a controversial request might meet strong challenges from the creditors, and added a nationalist tone to the debate.

"They might boycott us, but we must show a sense of nationalism, that we are not easily colonized by other nations," he claimed.

[broker*709]

Man(n) hat den Eindruck, das die IBRA jetzt wie am Fliessband arbeitet !

Schön so !

Chandra Asri signs $1bn debt deal with IBRA, Japanese creditors
Friday, April/12/2002 17:11:07 GMT+7.

PT Chandra Asri Petrochemical Co. has signed a deal with Japanese and local creditors to restructure more than one billion dollars in debt after more than two years of haggling, it was announced Friday.
Chandra Asri signed the deal with its Japanese creditors led by Marubeni Corp., and with the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), the state agency said in a statement.

The deal will increase the Japanese companies` combined holding in Chandra Asri to 24.59% from 23.81% and give IBRA a 25.86% stake.

It will reduce the stake held by debtor businessman Prajogo Pangestu, representing the Indonesian Petrochemical Investment Corp., to 49.55% from 76.19%. Prajogo has a call option to buy up to four percent of IBRA`s shares at a price and time to be determined by IBRA.

In return, Prajogo -- founder of the Barito Group -- has agreed to pledge additional assets or company shares to strengthen the guarantee of Chandra Asri`s debt, all of which has been transferred to him.

The deal involves converting $417.4 million in IBRA loans into common shares, along with $147 million in Japanese loans. It will leave sustainable debt of $584.2 million to the Japanese creditors and about $100 million to IBRA.

The balance of the loans from both sides will be repaid over 15 years at an annual interest rate of LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate) plus 1.25%.

IBRA said the new deal followed a meeting on Monday when the parties reached a settlement over several key sticking issues.

An earlier planned deal was derailed last year when IBRA`s oversight committee found it disadvantaged IBRA to the benefit of Marubeni, as it converted 89% of IBRA`s debt into shares but just 14 percent of the Japanese lenders` debt.

The Japanese creditors are grouped under the Japan Indonesian Petrochemical Investment Corp. IBRA disposes of company assets which had previously been pledged to banks as collateral for loans.

[broker*709]

Schon wieder ein neuer Chef !

Hoffentlich kommt in die Arbeit der IBRA endlich Kontinuität !

Temenggung appointed as new IBRA chief


The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Months of speculation ended Friday when the government fired I Putu Gede Ary Suta as the chairman of the powerful Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), replacing him with Syafruddin A. Temenggung.

The decision will make Temenggung the seventh IBRA chairman in just over four years.

State Minister of State Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi confirmed the reshuffle on Friday after keeping quite over the issue since news of it leaked about two months ago.

"I confirm that it was decided yesterday (Thursday) to replace the head of IBRA, " Laksamana told reporters in a signing ceremony with the Coordinating Investment Board (BKPM).

According to him the reshuffle is routine, but analysts have long said Ary Suta`s bent for controversial decisions would cost him his job one day.

The outgoing chairman drew fire for policies that appear to favor conglomerates, and for overriding procedures at IBRA to shortcut bureaucracy but what some officials at the agency said was to seize more control.

Laksamana said changes at IBRA`s leadership were needed to ensure what he called "built in control".

Whoever chairs IBRA will have authority over some Rp 600 trillion (about US$63 billion) worth of state assets under IBRA.

The assets were taken over when IBRA bailed out local banks from the devastating impact of the late 90`s financial crisis.

Getting the assets back to work is key to revitalize a struggling private sector - once a pillar of economic growth but whose debts have turned now into a liability to the state budget.

In spite of this urgency, progress on IBRA`s asset sales have been painstakingly slow with only two years left before its 1998 mandate expires.

Against this backdrop comes Temenggung`s appointment.

The secretary to the Financial Sector Policy Committee (FSPC), which oversees Rp 1 trillion (about US$106 million) worth debt restructuring deals and asset sales at IBRA, Temenggung is no stranger to the problems pressing the agency.

He helped negotiate deals with tough creditors such as Japan`s Marubeni Corps, with which IBRA was in talks to settle debts of petrochemical giant PT Chandra Asri.

Temenggung is supervising the settlement of around $10 billion in debts by some of the country`s large conglomerates, who have been neglecting payment over the past four years.

On the downside, analysts said, was his lack of practical knowledge in the restructuring of banks and debts.

His little known track record and lack of political clout could also spell trouble in a place where political undercurrent run strong, they said.

His appointment made few waves in trading at the currency market, with one analyst at a foreign bank saying that attention was slim.

The rupiah gained to 9,360 but more on news of an imminent disbursement of around $400 million in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), he said.


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[broker*709]

NEWS, NEWS !!!

Wieder ein neuer "Letter of Intent" des IMF - vom Chef persönlich.


Indonesia—Letter of Intent

April 9, 2002

The following item is a Letter of Intent of the government of Indonesia, which describes the policies that Indonesia intends to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF. The document, which is the property of Indonesia, is being made available on the IMF website by agreement with the member as a service to users of the IMF website.


Mr. Horst Köhler
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, DC 20431

Dear Mr. Köhler:

Steady progress is being made in implementing the Government of Indonesia`s economic program supported by the extended arrangement from the Fund and set out in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) of December 13, 2001. This letter builds upon and updates the economic program described in the MEFP of December 13, 2001.

All end-December and end-January quantitative performance criteria were met (Table 1). The indicative target for base money at end-January was met, after a small overrun at end-December was registered. We propose to leave unchanged the quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets for the remainder of 2002 that were presented in the MEFP of December 13, 2001, but we request a waiver of applicability for the end-March 2002 quantitative performance criteria and a waiver of nonobservance for the end-March 2002 structural performance criterion related to the BLBI arrangement. We propose that the latter structural performance criterion be postponed to end-June 2002 to enable an international team of experts to finalize its recommendations on this issue. Given that Parliamentary approval of the Sovereign Debt Securities Law has been delayed, we also propose to rephase the structural benchmark related to the treasury bill auction to end-July 2002 to enable all the necessary preparatory work to be completed. To strengthen the program, additional structural performance benchmarks are proposed for IBRA cash recoveries, the resolution strategy for bank BII, and for finalizing the determination of compliance with IBRA`s shareholder settlement agreements, as discussed below (Table 2).

The government remains firmly committed to restoring medium-term fiscal sustainability. The budget deficit for 2001 was contained within the target of 3.7 percent of GDP, and implementation of the 2002 budget is proceeding satisfactorily. With a view to achieving the targeted reduction in budget subsidy expenditures, energy prices were raised in January by an average of 22 percent, and an automatic mechanism for adjusting domestic fuel prices in future was introduced. Also, the initiatives to strengthen tax administration are proceeding according to schedule, and the majority of the tax policy changes announced in the budget are in place. Nevertheless, achievement of the budget deficit target for 2002 remains a challenge, and the budget situation is being monitored closely. The government stands ready to take prompt corrective actions as needed, in close consultation with Parliament, to keep the budget on track.

In the area of monetary policy, we will continue to gear policies towards achieving single digit inflation by the end of 2002. The rise in headline inflation in early 2002 reflects the planned hikes in fuel and other administered prices, as well as the impact of the recent floods on the supply of basic commodities. While we expect these pressures to subside over the course of the year, BI will tailor its monetary stance to ensure that these developments do not lead to a more generalized increase in inflation.

Important progress has been made with the divestiture of the government`s holdings in the banking system. The sale of bank BCA to a strong strategic partner was concluded. IBRA also launched the sale of bank Niaga on February 11, 2002, and the swap of its fixed for variable rate bonds has been completed. We are also implementing the strategy to resolve bank BII. In that regard, we will ensure that the bank is adequately capitalized to meet Bank Indonesia prudential standards and to assure its sustainable performance. Under the strategy, we plan to reduce fully the equity position of the original shareholders and we will install an independent management team to protect the government`s interest.

In the key area of asset recoveries, IBRA has formalized its strategy for 2002 and published its quarterly cash recovery targets (Table 3). Roughly two-thirds of recoveries are set to come from the sale of restructured and unrestructured loans, and we will use a variety of mechanisms, including new joint venture and securitization schemes, to achieve the desired result. In addition, we will launch a program to sell retail and currently outsourced commercial loans by mid-year.

As part of the asset recovery effort, on March 7 the government decided on a strategy to resolve the long-standing problem of shareholder settlement agreements with former bank owners that have fallen into dispute and /or default. As a first step, a determination will be made within 30 days regarding which former bank owners are in compliance with the terms of their agreements. Those found not to be in compliance will then be given three months to fulfill their obligations under their existing agreements. The government has committed to take strong actions against those former owners who fail to come into compliance with their obligations by the end of this period. These actions include bankruptcy, asset seizures, debtor imprisonment, and criminal charges for corruption. These actions will be enforced through a coordinated effort among the relevant government agencies, including the FSPC, IBRA, the Attorney General`s office, the police and the legislature and judiciary. To ensure full transparency and accountability, all determinations of compliance, legal actions, and release and discharge will be made available to the public.

We have also made progress in the other areas of the structural reform agenda. In the area of privatization, we have finalized and published our program for 2002, and are confident we will achieve our targets under the program`s budget financing plan. With regard to decentralization, there has been steady improvement in the coverage of the reporting of regional finances and we are confident that the GOI will be able to produce a full year outcome for the 2001 local government finances by end-June 2002. In the area of developing the small and medium size enterprise sector, the SME task force, formed by the GOI in 2001, will develop a policy, in collaboration with the World Bank, AsDB, and bilateral assistance, that is consistent with our budget and efforts to strengthen the financial sector. We expect to be in a position to finalize our policy by the time of the next review.

As part of its ongoing efforts to improve accountability, BI plans in future to publish its complete audited financial statements, starting with the 2001 accounts. BI has also decided to establish an audit committee to strengthen oversight of the external and internal audit mechanisms. In line with the IMF`s recently established general policy on safeguards, BI`s foreign reserves practices for the half-year ended June 2002 will be audited by an internationally recognized audit firm with the involvement of BI`s constitutionally appointed external auditor.

On this basis, the government requests completion of the fifth review under the extended arrangement. During the remaining period of the arrangement, we will continue to consult with the Fund on future economic policies and in order to assess progress under the program and reach understandings on any additional measures that may be needed to achieve its objectives. The next review of the program will be completed by June 2002.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti
Coordinating Minister for
Economic Affairs

/s/

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Boediono
Minister of Finance

/s/

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Syahril Sabirin
Governor
Bank Indonesia



Table 1. Indonesia: Quantitative Performance Criteria (PC) and
Indicative Targets (IT) Under the Extended Arrangement, 2001-021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mar.
Actual Jun.
Actual Sept.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mar.
PC Jun.
PC Sept.
IT Dec.
IT
PC2 Actual PC2,3 Actual PC2 Actual

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Monetary and fiscal targets

Net domestic assets (NDA) of Bank Indonesia4 -21.9 -18.7 -8.6 -13.9 5.3 -2.7 -3.8 -12.0 -11.5 -11.0 -8.5 3.9
Base money (indicative target)5 102.2 109.3 110.5 113.7 122.9 124.7 117.8 115.6 117.8 123.7 128.2 138.2
Overall central government balance6 -1.0 -3.7 -31.5 -3.5 -54.6 -52.1 . . . . . . -2.7 -14.0 -27.9 -42.1

External targets (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Net international reserves (NIR) of Bank Indonesia4,7 17.7 18.3 17.0 18.2 16.8 18.2 . . . . . . 18.7 19.5 19.8 19.8
Contracting or guaranteeing of new nonconcessional
external debt8 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.5 1.2 . . . . . . 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5
Of which: Government debt to commercial creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Stock of short-term external debt outstanding9 0.4 0.5 2.5 0.4 2.5 0.5 . . . . . . 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Public external arrears 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1Definitions are contained in the Technical Memorandum of Understanding dated December 13, 2001. Continuous performance criteria are: the non-accumulation of external arrears, and no securitization or forward sale of receipts from natural resources.
2Adjusted program targets for NDA and NIR.
3Monetary targets for December 2001 are indicative due to seasonality effects associated with end-calendar and end-fiscal years. Instead, a performance criterion on NDA is set for January 2002.
4Targets for NDA and NIR through January 2002 are based on one-month averages centered on end-month. Thereafter, targets are end-period values.
5Base money targets are one month averages centered on end-month.
6Cumulative balances from beginning of fiscal year (floor). Data on the outturn for March, June and September 2001 have been revised. Central government bonds issued to district and provincial governments are included as financing of the central government deficit.
7Outstanding stocks (floor).
8Cumulative amounts from beginning of fiscal year (ceilings).
9Data on the outturn for September 2001 has been revised.



Table 2: Structural Benchmarks


December 2001

Collect at least Rp 27 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).
Conclude tender process of bank BCA.
Initiate sale process of Bank Niaga.
January 2002

Publish IBRA`s schedule for quarterly asset recovery targets for 2002.
March 2002

Formulate plans for national audit and tax arrears collection, along with reporting systems.
April 2002

Finalize and publish determination of former bank owners` compliance for each of the shareholder settlement agreements.
June 2002

Finalize and implement burden-sharing agreement on BLBI credits between BI and the government.1
Commence operations of Large Taxpayer Directorate at headquarters of the Directorate-General of Tax, and 1-2 large taxpayer offices in Jakarta.
Produce report on 2001 local government finances.
Conclude majority sale of bank Niaga.
Achieve at least half of 2002 target for privatization receipts.
Establish Anti-Corruption Commission.
Collect at least Rp 13.0 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).
July 2002

Begin primary auctions of treasury bills.
Implement new tax filing and payment systems at large taxpayer office(s).
Under the bank BII strategy, reduce fully the equity position of the original shareholders and install an independent management team.
September 2002

Collect at least Rp 23.5 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).
December 2002

Complete third round of special audits of state enterprises and adopt corrective actions.
Collect at least Rp 36.1 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).

1Performance criterion.


Table 3. Indonesia: IBRA Asset Recovery: 2001 and Targets for 20021

2001

2002


Actual Jan.-Jun. Jul.-Sep. Oct.-Dec. Total

Total cash receipts (net of expenses) 27.1 13.0 10.5 12.6 36.1
AMC (loans and non-core assets) 14.4 7.5 9.8 7.2 24.5
AMI (industrial and other assets) 10.1 3.9 1.2 4.6 9.7
BRU (bank equity) 0.9 3.0 0.0 1.3 4.3
Other (net)2 1.7 -1.3 -0.6 -0.5 -2.4

Total bond receipts 6.6 0.0 3.0 4.5 7.5
Bonds recovered by IBRA (+) 20.5 0.0 3.0 4.5 7.5
Bonds recycled by IBRA (-)3 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total recoveries (cash and bonds) 33.7 13.0 13.5 17.1 43.6

Sources: IBRA`s Finance and Accounting Division, AMC, and AMI.
1Data are on a cash basis. Components may not sum due to rounding.
2In 2001, represents other income net of operating expenses and other payments; in 2002, represents operational expenses and other payments only.
3In 2001, represents recap bonds placed by IBRA in bank BII in exchange for Sinar Mas Group loans.

[broker*709]

Wer fast das Schlusslicht bildet, kann ja nur noch aufholen !

Was meint Ihr ?

Dienstag 30. April 2002, 09:43 Uhr
USA auch 2002 an der Spitze der wettbewerbsfähigsten Länder

Lausanne (Reuters) - Die USA haben in einem schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Umfeld einmal mehr ihre Position als weltweit wettbewerbsfähigstes Land behauptet. Auf Platz 2 und 3 folgen Finnland und Luxemburg, die ihre Position gegenüber dem Vorjahr um je einen Platz verbessern konnte, teilte das International ANZEIGE

Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Lausanne Dienstagnacht mit. Die USA lagen bereits 2000 und 2001 auf Platz 1.


Das IMD gibt jedes Jahr das stark beachtete World Competitiveness Yearbook heraus, in dem 49 Länder anhand von 314 Kriterien auf ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hin bewertet werden.


Dänemark und die Schweiz konnten ihren Rang mit Platz 6 und 7 deutlich verbessern. Dänemark lag im Vorjahr noch auf Platz 15, während die Schweiz Platz 10 belegte.


Vom wirtschaftlichen Abschwung besonders betroffen sind Singapur, Hongkong und Irland, deren Position sich jeweils um drei Ränge verschlechterten und die auf die Plätze 5 (Singapur), 9 (Hongkong) und 10 (Irland) abrutschten.


Deutschland wurde 2002 weiter abgeschlagen und verschlechterte sich auf Platz 15 von Platz 12 im Vorjahr. England und Frankreich verbesserten ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und rückten jeweils drei Ränge auf Platz 16 beziehungsweise 22 vor.


Das Schlusslicht bildet 2002 Argentinien nach der Türkei, Indonesien und Venezuela.


Die in der Gesamtwertung auf Platz 7 liegende Schweiz erhielt besonders im Bereich Infrastruktur und bei qualitativen ökonomischen Merkmalen gute Noten. Bei der Motivation der Mitarbeiter belegt sie sogar den ersten Platz. Rang zwei nimmt das Land bei der Arbeitslosenrate, Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben für Forschung und Entwicklung und den Kapitalkosten ein. Bei der Lebensqualität rangiert die Schweiz nach Österreich, Luxemburg und Australien auf Platz 4.


Weit abgeschlagen auf Platz 31 liegt die Schweiz bei der Höhe der Lebenshaltungskosten. Bei der Glaubwürdigkeit von Verwaltungsräten sackte die Schweiz, auf Patz 17 von 31 ab. Das gleiche gilt für die Glaubwürdigkeit von Managern. Hier büsste die Schweiz sechs Plätze ein und rutschte auf Rang 25 ab. Schlechte Noten bescheinigte die Studie der Schweizer Regierung, wenn es um die Anpassungsfähigkeit an neue wirtschaftliche Gegebenheiten, Proktektionismus und Immigration geht.

[broker*709]

Wieder neues vom IMF - auch Indonesien wird angeschnitten.

Transcript of an Economic Forum
Foreign Direct Investment in China: What Do We Need To Know?
International Monetary Fund
IMF Auditorium
Thursday, May 2, 2002
Washington, D.C.

Panelists
Wanda Tseng, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF
Yasheng Huang, Associate Professor of Business, Harvard University
Nicholas Lardy, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Markus Rodlauer, Division Chief, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF
Harm Zebregs, Economist, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF



MR. STARRELS: Welcome to the International Monetary Fund. My name is John Starrels, of the External Relations Department, and you`re here for another Economic Forum in our ongoing series of engagement with the outside community.

We have an absolutely stellar presentation today. Before commencing, two very brief housekeeping announcements. Literature is available and we hope you will take it with you. We welcome lively dialogue and encourage you to avail yourselves of the microphones located on the arm rest next to you. With that, I take pride and pleasure in turning the floor over to Wanda Tseng of the IMF`s Asia and Pacific Department.

TSENG: Good afternoon. Again, welcome to the International Monetary Fund. I think the topic of our Forum this afternoon is particularly timely given the attention that has been focused on China in recent years and the challenges that the economy is facing.

I have had the opportunity to travel to China quite frequently in the last several years, and I have witnessed for myself the tremendous changes and transformation that has been brought to this very dynamic economy.

China`s economic performance has been very impressive by most standards. This year the IMF`s World Economic Outlook is forecasting growth of 7.5 percent and a bit more next year. China was able to weather the storm of the Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed, and it had worked to reduce its external vulnerabilities by its high level of reserves and its favorable debt indicators. And I think at the same time, and most important of all, it has taken lessons from the Asian financial crisis and accelerated reforms of the state enterprise sector and the corporate sectors.

These achievements in China have added to the visible successes in the economic transformation of China that has been brought about by two decades of economic reforms. These reforms have resulted in spectacular growth, substantial inroads in reducing poverty, and the development of a very vibrant non-state sector.

One of the key driving forces of this transformation has been China`s progressive opening to the outside world through trade and foreign direct investment, and most recently, that has culminated in China`s accession to the WTO.

Our Economic Forum this afternoon will look at China`s experience with foreign direct investment. The questions that we will be asking are: What have been the driving forces behind these flows? How have they contributed to the performance of the Chinese economy? And what is the outlook for the period ahead, both in terms of further liberalization and the implications particularly regarding the convertibility of the renminbi exchange rate?

Our distinguished panel of experts will be addressing these issues, and I would like to start our discussion by having Markus Rodlauer make a very brief presentation on putting FDI in China into a more macro context.

Just let me set down some of the rules. I would like to ask all the presenters to keep your remarks to about ten minutes, and I think that will leave time for us to have a more interactive discussion with the audience.

So let me first introduce Markus Rodlauer. Markus is a division chief in the China Division. He has been heading the work on China for the last year or so. Before that he worked on a number of Asian countries and some transition economies. He has been the Fund`s resident representative in both Poland and the Philippines. So he has had tremendous experience with the problems and challenges of transition economies.

Markus is also one of the authors of a book that the IMF is putting together called "China - Competing in the Global Economy" that will be coming out fairly soon.

Markus?

MR. RODLAUER: Thank you, Wanda. Good afternoon again. I will just start very briefly and give you a short overview of China`s balance of payments in recent years and how these external flows relate to the domestic economy in terms of the savings-investment balance.

This provides a background to the subsequent discussion by Yasheng, Nick, and Harm on the role of foreign capital and foreign investment in China.

Table 1 summarizes the balance of payments of China in recent years. It shows, as you can see, a fairly substantial current account surplus in recent years, on average about US$25 billion, which is about 2.5 percent of GDP. And, in addition, it has received foreign direct investment net inflows of about $40 billion on average, which is about 4 percent of GDP. And this is, as I said, on a net basis, so the gross flows, inflows, were even somewhat larger, on the order of 4.5 to 5 percent of GDP. So, together, money coming into the current account and FDI amounts to something like 6.5, 7 percent of GDP, $65 to $70 billion.

Where has all this money gone to in the balance of payments sense? Well, first, a substantial amount you can see has ended up in the central bank where the sort of reserve increase—and this is a negative, if there is an increase. The reserve increase has averaged about US$22 billion over the past years, 2.2 percent of GDP. And for the remaining two-thirds, it`s very hard to say, which are basically non-FDI capital flows and errors and omissions. Data weaknesses really prevent a clear analysis of where these moneys have gone.

There are some data from the Bank For International Settlements which have identified flows through the banking system, through the equity markets. Those are roughly balanced. So, you know, the rest is sort of outflows through the balance of payments or errors and omissions, fairly large, of about $40 to $50 billion on average over the past few years.

Now, in this context, a noteworthy development that you may see here in the last year has been that, while there have been substantial outflows in the years up to 2000, $50 billion, China`s balance of payments, other than FDI and current account, has actually strengthened a lot in the last year, which has then boosted the reserve increase to almost $50 billion in the last year, in 2001.

So let me then move on and see how these BOP flows relate to China`s domestic economy.Here we see that one of the most striking features of the Chinese economy is the huge amount of domestic savings in the economy,averaging about 40 percent of GDP, which compares very favorably, of course, with basically almost all international comparisons. China`s domestic savings, nearly 40 percent of GDP,compares favorably not just with other developing countries or other advanced economies, but even within Asia they have a huge margin, and emerging Asia, basically 15 percent of GDP higher savings.

And the next chart shows how China`s high domestic savings rate has financed an equally astounding aggregate level of domestic investment, not quite as high but, also 35 to 40 percent of GDP, which in the end means that we have very high domestic savings of about 40 percent of GDP, and slightly less domestic investment which resulted in what we call net foreign savings or a current account surplus of about 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP negative net foreign savings.

So what do these numbers say about the role of foreign capital, of foreign investment in China? Well, I`m just going to throw up a few hypotheses here, several points that could be made, and then those will be discussed further in the subsequent presentations.

On the one hand, clearly, given the very high domestic savings rate, China does not need foreign capital from a financial balance of payments point of view to supplement domestic savings. It has been able to finance a very high, a very decent amount of investment without the financial contributions from foreign savings.

So on the need for foreign direct investment, therefore, one could draw two broad conclusions.On the one hand:foreign investment has plugged a fairly large hole in the BOP because of these capital outflows, other outflows, and FDI has been the counterpart that has made the balance of payments close more or less—although this, of course, has changed last year. This other balance has improved a lot, which then improved the reserve balance. Or one could say that while FDI inflows are clearly not needed in a balance of payments sense, from an external finance perspective, it may have been critical in raising the productivity of all this investment that has occurred, 35 percent of GDP of total investment. As we know, China has had this fabulous growth record of about 10 percent on average GDP growth per year, which means that an incremental capital output ratio of about 3 looked very high, and certainly, given the technological contributions of foreign direct investments and so forth, the role of foreign investment was not so much in financially contributing to the balance of payments, but in improving the productivity of all this investment and, therefore, contributing to growth.

So maybe I should just stop here and then ask our subsequent presenters to speak more on FDI in particular. Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Markus.

For our next speaker, we are very fortunate to have Professor Huang from Harvard University. He was gracious enough to fly down through the weather this morning from Boston. Professor Huang is an Associate Professor of Business at Harvard University. His current work focuses on the institutional and policy determinants of foreign direct investment in China. He has published widely, including a book called "Inflation and Investment Control in China." Before joining the Harvard faculty, he taught at the University of Michigan, and he was also a consultant at the World Bank from 1987 to 1989.

Professor Huang?

PROFESSOR HUANG: I am going to pick up where Markus left off, and I very much agree with him that at the macro level, FDI into China, and I believe actually FDI in general in a number of Asian countries, is not a macroeconomic phenomenon, but is a microeconomic one.

I agree with the observation that FDI has possibly improved productivity of investment, but the overall theme of my research shows that FDI has done that in a very specific institutional context, and let me just spell out what that context is before making my presentation.

That context basically is one in which the government, the Chinese Government, has systematically suppressed efficient private entrepreneurs from making the same contributions, same productivity improvements as foreign entrepreneurs did; and, therefore, the effect of FDI on productivity boosting. The productivity boosting effect of foreign entrepreneurs is made artificially greater in that specific context. That`s sort of the overall theme of my presentation.

Before I get to that, I need to illustrate why I view FDI that way, why I view FDI as making this type of contribution in the institutional context that I just laid out.

First, I`m going to give a very brief overview of FDI, and the idea there is that FDI has actually played an incredibly important role in China, in the Chinese economy, and possibly more important than many people previously have realized. And then I`m going to talk about the drivers of FDI, and there I`m going to argue that a lot of conventional ideas about what drove up FDI inflows into China are partially correct, which means they`re partially wrong. And so I`m going to address why they are wrong. Those ideas, the conventional ideas have to do with market size, cheap labor, things like that. I believe they don`t adequately explain the FDI patterns in China.

Then I`m going to provide an institutional story why institutions are a very important part of the FDI story.

Just to show how important FDI has become, this is a picture that shows the growth of FDI relative to the domestic firms across a number of categories, across three categories: The share of industrial output value has increased from the early 1990s, about 7 percent to about 28 percent. You see also the share of value-added tax, which has increased dramatically in the course of the 1990s.

What`s very interesting is this: In the 1990s, FIEs, foreign-invested enterprises, including both joint ventures as well as wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, accounted for 15 percent of exports. In 2000, they accounted for 48 percent.

The conventional wisdom says that, look, FIEs have made huge contributions to the Chinese export performance. I agree with 30 percent of that. I think 70 percent of the story is foreigners come into China and take away the export opportunities previously performed by domestic firms, domestic private firms and—because domestic private firms face very, very stringent credit constraints, so they cannot finance their export production. And foreigners come in, mostly from Hong Kong—and I include them as foreigners for technical reasons—foreigners and Taiwanese and firms from Macao essentially provide equity financing to the credit-constrained private Chinese entrepreneurs. So there`s both a boosting effect of exports, but there`s also a switching effect from domestic to foreign production.

Another picture that shows how important FDI is, and I think this is a dramatic picture. If you use FDI flows, this is the average, the annual average between 1992 to 1998. If you use the FDI flows divided by non-state gross fixed capital formation, that`s—because SOEs in China play such an overwhelming investment role, and it`s, I think—analytically it`s more appropriate to compare foreign firms to non-state firms. If you take out the SOEs, the share, the annual average share of FDI in China is about 28 percent. Singapore, which is traditionally an FDI-dependent—extremely FDI-dependent country, is 30 percent. Malaysia is 24 percent.

What`s very interesting, if you look at these three countries, is, in fact, they share many, many similarities at a micro and institutional level, and I would argue—and I`m doing research on Singapore and Malaysia now, and there is a lot of evidence to show that. If you go back to the 1960s and 1970s, what the Singaporean Government did and what the Malaysian Government did was very similar to what the Chinese Government did in the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s, which was to adopt policies that systematically suppressed local entrepreneurs, and so the basic idea is that if you think about FDI as an import of foreign know-how, if you suppress domestic know-how, to grow the economy at a certain level you need to import more foreign know-how to get to that level.

In Singapore, the same thing happened. It`s not a terribly well-publicized story. In Malaysia, it also happened because of the ethnic tensions between the economic elites, who are just Chinese, and the political elites, who are Malays. So there was that.

In China, I think it`s more because of an ideological consideration. Government is concerned about the power of the private firms. It`s not ethnic.

There`s one sort of [inaudible] idea out there which says that it is the coastal regions in China that receive most of the FDI. That`s absolutely true if you look at the percentage distribution of FDI across different provinces. But what`s really—what`s missing in that judgment is the fact that interior regions in China, in fact, have depended very, very heavily on FDI. Think about the growth of FDI flows from 1990 to 1999. In 1990, China got about $3 billion, $4 billion of FDI. But in the second half of the 1990s, China got about $40 billion of FDI per year.

So even a small percentage of $40 billion is actually a huge number, but one estimate, about 13 percent of the cumulative FDI flows between 1990 and 1998 went to interior regions. These are interior regions that don`t have easy access to Hong Kong. The transportation system is poor. The economy is very, very small.

If you take the FDI stock-GDP ratio in 1998, in interior Chinese provinces, it`s about 11 percent. To put that number in perspective for North America, it`s about the same. It`s about 11 percent. Central and Eastern Europe is about 13 percent. And for Southeast and Southeast Asia, it`s about 11 percent.

So we are talking about poor interior regions in China that have depended on FDI to the same degree as these economies that are very, very open. So the puzzle for me is not why these interior regions don`t get much FDI. The puzzle for me is why they get any FDI at all. The linguistic ties between those regions and Taiwan are not there. And one of the reasons—let me show another picture and then I`ll get to the reason.

This is from the World Bank report, and it`s a pity that no recent study has been done on this topic, which is to compare FDI dependency in a number of provinces with inter-provincial capital mobility, so a firm located in one province investing in another province.

What this 1994 World Bank study shows is that for the six provinces for which they have data, it`s the domestic investment data that are lacking. It`s not the foreign direct investment data. For six provinces for which there are data, about four of them depended significantly more on FDI than they do from investment from other regions. So there`s a great mobility of foreign capital. There`s a great dependency on foreign capital and the mobility of foreign capital.

What makes that statement really, really interesting is lack of mobility of domestic capital, and there is some evidence to show that the domestic capital mobility has actually declined over the reform era while China has become more dependent on FDI. And this tells us something about the barriers in the Chinese system that are systematically promoting FDI but restricting domestic investment at the same time.

One of those barriers is local protectionism, and if you believe that one province has a net deficit in terms of its saving relative to its investment requirement, if it has a project that cannot be financed from investment from a different province, then FDI plays a very, very important role because essentially a foreign company is not restricted in terms of its capital mobility.

That`s why in China you`ll find very small firms establishing multiple plants across a number of provinces, and you`ll find very large Chinese firms establishing all its plants in one province. The largest auto company in China is Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation. As of 1998, all of its 38 subsidiaries were located in Shanghai; whereas, you`ll find a small [inaudible] company known as China`s Strategic Investment, which acquired 200 companies across nine provinces. So if you believe that there is an economic need to integrate the assets disbursed across different provinces, if domestic firms cannot do that, somebody has to do it, and that somebody turns out to be foreigners more often than not.

What`s also interesting about the distribution of FDI is that not only FDI is found in many, many provinces in China, including poor interior provinces; they are found in many, many industries in China. The industry concentration of FDI in China is extremely low compared to industry concentration in other countries. And this shows—or it tries to show that the top three industries with most of Hong Kong FDI in Taiwan accounted for 86 percent of the FDI. For Indonesia, the top three industries accounted for 79 percent; for Malaysia, 75 percent.

And you`ll find the same thing in Latin America. Basically FDI only goes to a few industries. You know, the analytical reason for that is very, very simple. They are industries that locals are good at, and they are industries that foreigners are better at. So what you`ll find is concentration of FDI. What you don`t find is disbursement of FDI—except in China. In China, these top three industries accounted for 47 percent, only 47 percent of the FDI. So FDI—and there are a number of industries that you wouldn`t necessarily expect to see FDI, such as silk manufacturing, ivory sculptures, herbal medicine. These are the things that the Chinese are very good at and they have been doing this for thousands of years, and yet you find these industries populated by foreign firms.

One idea is that China is a huge, growing market, and that`s why China gets a lot of FDI. That`s kind of true—it`s only true in explaining the absolute increase of FDI. So in 1990, China received $4 billion of FDI. In 1999, it received $40 billion of FDI.Market fundamentals can only explain that story.

The reason why—it doesn`t explain why China shall over time become more dependent on FDI, which is FDI divided by domestic investment. It`s the fact that a growing,good market fundamentals should appeal to both foreign investors and to domestic investors.

That actually is what you see in Taiwan, in Malaysia, in the United States. In the United States, the economy expanded tremendously in the 1990s, but the share of FDI relative to domestic investment hardly changed. If a German company wants to invest in the United States, Microsoft also wants to invest in the United States. So the denominator and the numerator increase at the same time. So the share of the investment changes.

What you see in China is this incredible growth in the first half of the 1990s. And then what`s also very interesting is this sharp decline beginning around 1996, 1997. And I believe this decline is a result of the fact that the government began to treat private entrepreneurs much better. So private entrepreneurs are also motivated to increase their investment and become more optimistic about the future.

I know I`m sort of running out of time. Let me just show a few more slides.

The export functions of the foreign firms in China, as I showed before, are extremely important. They are important relative to the similar export functions of foreign firms in other economies. In China, you find—this is 1995. You find foreign firms accounted for about 61 percent of the garment and footwear exports. In Indonesia, it`s only 33 percent. In Taiwan, it`s only 5.7 percent.

What`s also interesting is that foreign companies are playing a much more important role compared to foreign companies in Indonesia and Taiwan, both in labor-intensive industries, which are these three industries—leather and fur products and furniture—as well as in capital-intensive and technologically intensive industries.

What`s very interesting about Taiwan`s story is that Taiwan is also known as a huge export success. And what`s important there is that the export success was achieved by local entrepreneurs, and local entrepreneurs were able to get financing in a way that the Chinese entrepreneurs until recently were not able to get from the formal financial system.

Let me just explain the connection between the importance of local financing vis-à-vis contract export. If I`m a Chinese entrepreneur and Wanda is a Hong Kong entrepreneur, Wanda can give me an export contract which represents a business opportunity. But the business opportunity has to be financed, and if the local bank doesn`t give me money, then I cannot finance the production of the export contract.

In that situation, what Wanda is going to say is: Yasheng, why don`t I provide some equity financing. I will own 50 percent of your business, and I will give you some capital so you can carry out the export activities.

In Taiwan, you don`t have to do that. And what`s very interesting is that in this particular case, even though we are talking about simple manufacturing operations in garments and footwear, essentially foreign entrepreneurs are playing the role of a venture capitalist, providing seed capital to businesses that are discriminated against by the banks. There are no technological risks. There are no product risks. These are mature industries, mature products. There are political risks because the private entrepreneur is not favored by the banks.

Another role that foreign companies have played is privatization. Just now I told you a story about the connection between FDI and the private production of export products. A lot of FDI has also gone into SOEs, and there`s this idea that a lot of the FDI that has gone to the state sector finances greenfield investment, new investment. That`s actually just not true.They are thought of as greenfield investments only because of the legal format which they take, which is joint venture. But that`s just a legal fiction. That`s a legal requirement. That has nothing to do with the underlying nature, economic nature of these transactions.

In my field study, I have found many, many examples of SOEs contributing their brand name, contributing their customer base, contributing their own operating assets in order to finance an equity claim on a newly created joint venture. After the joint venture is created, the SOE becomes a shareholding company. That doesn`t have any operating assets on its balance sheet.

If you look at the balance sheet before the joint venture creation and after the joint venture creation, before the joint venture creation it will have operating assets like machinery and equipment. After the joint venture creation, it would have essentially financial claims on the joint ventures. And this is one of the fundamental reasons why there are a lot of conflicts between Chinese shareholders and foreign shareholders, because the Chinese shareholders—in this case, the SOEs—have lost the sources of alternative income. Their only source of income is the dividend income from the operations of the joint ventures. So the Chinese firms tend to want a dividend distribution, whereas foreign firms want to reinvest the earnings, and this is one of the reasons why there is such a conflict.

In the machinery industry, an industry populated by the SOEs, what`s very interesting is—this is sort of a complex story, but the basic message of this picture is that the investment income—this is SOEs. The investment income more than makes up the operating income. I think this is 1997. In 1997, the SOEs in the machinery industry collectively made a loss of 10 billion Yuan in profits, in operating income, but they more than make up that loss by the dividend payment from the joint ventures, which is 16 billion Yuan.

If you look at other firms, no other firms exhibit this kind of behavior. If you look at private firms, for example, the private firms, there are not many private firms, so this is a small number, 0.2 billion in operating income, and there`s practically no dividend income at all.

The SOEs are in a class by themselves. This is a factory in Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, and the factory manager told us that they formed a joint venture with Phillips in 1994. After the formation of the joint venture, his predecessor, the general manager at the time, had to sit behind a cardboard box which was used as a desk and had to sit on another cardboard box as his chair, because the office furniture was also contributed as the equity contribution to the joint venture. Nothing was left. Nothing was left. So there`s that—it`s a privatization story, and it`s a privatization story that has taken place in a specific context, and that context is that the Chinese Government has not allowed domestic private companies to acquire the same SOE assets that are available to foreigners.

So essentially the Chinese Government encouraged FDI, and a lot of it is a de facto privatization story. And then the Chinese Government has not allowed until very, very recently domestic private companies to bid for the same assets. That`s one of the reasons why the valuation of the Chinese assets is actually very low, and that has nothing to do with the morality of the SOE managers. It has to do with a lack of competition for the same assets. If the Chinese Government allows privatization, then the valuation would be higher.

The third institutional driver, which I already alluded to, is the fragmentation of the capital market and economic market. And that also drove up FDI flows enormously, and we can, you know, debate whether this way of attracting FDI is a good way of attracting FDI. I have some issues about this way of attracting FDI, but we can talk about that in the question and answer period.

Thank you very much.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Professor Huang, for your very comprehensive introduction on the FDI story in China.

I now invite Harm Zebregs to give a somewhat different perspective on the FDI story. Harm is an economist in the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF. He`s been working on China for the last two or three years, and he`s been writing a number of papers on productivity growth in China and trade and investment.

MR. ZEBREGS: Thank you, Wanda. Good afternoon. Today I will discuss the main determinants of FDI in China. I will also briefly touch on the contribution of FDI to GDP growth and Total Factor Productivity growth in China, and I will conclude with some preliminary lessons that can be drawn from China`s experience.

We`ve already discussed the numbers a bit. As this chart clearly shows, China`s success in attracting FDI is mostly in the 1990s. After Deng Xiaoping`s tour of the southern provinces in 1992 where he reaffirmed China`s commitment to market-oriented reforms and policies to open the economy, FDI surged from almost nothing to $40 to $45 billion per year in the 1990s.

When you express FDI flows to China as a percent of GDP, it`s about 5 percent during the 1990s, and then it looks somewhat less impressive as other countries—for example, Malaysia have attracted even more, like over 8 percent of GDP in the early 1990s.

What also should be mentioned, of course, is that part of China`s success may be exaggerated because of round-tripping and misreporting. Round tripping is capital that originates from Mainland China and that returns to China disguised as FDI to take advantage of tax benefits and tariff benefits.

The sources of FDI. The main sources have been Hong Kong and Taiwan, and their importance declined somewhat in the 1990s as enterprises from the United States and the EU and Japan entered China in larger numbers. But, still, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, areas with a large Chinese Diaspora, account for over 50 percent of FDI flows to China.

The geographical distribution, Professor Huang already discussed this in terms of FDI as a percent of GDP.This is in absolute numbers, and here you can see that in absolute numbers, the coastal regions attract close to 88 percent of FDI inflows, whereas the central and western provinces get, respectively, 9 percent and 3 percent.

The determinants of FDI: In the economic literature many determinants of FDI have been identified I`ll only discuss those that are relevant for the case of China. I start with those determinants that related to a country`s economic structure. Market size, that`s an obvious one, I guess, in the case of China. Both at the national level and at the provincial level, market size has been found in empirical studies to be an important determinant of FDI.

There is an issue about two-way causality here because, on the one hand, FDI is attracted by a large market; at the same time, FDI contributes to GDP growth.

Market size has apparently been more important for FDI from Europe and United States than for FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which tends to be more export-oriented.

China has an abundant supply of cheap labor, and some analysts have suggested that the low-wage costs have been a very important factor in attracting export oriented FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan, especially because of rising wage costs in other economies in the region. And this has contributed to China`s rapid emergence as an important competitor in labor-intensive manufacturing.

Infrastructure: China`s infrastructure compares favorably to some other economies` in the region, but especially when you compare FDI flows to different provinces, it`s been found in several empirical studies that infrastructure has been an important determinant. The coastal regions have better infrastructure, and that has also contributed to their success in attracting large sums of FDI.

Scale effects: Another issue that`s found in many studies is that there`s a strong persistency in FDI flows, both to China and to individual provinces. This suggests that once a province has attracted a critical amount of FDI, they`ll find it easier to attract more FDI. This has been interpreted as a signaling effect.—Once there is a large enough number of foreign investors present in a certain area, it`s a signal to other investors that conditions are apparently good or are good enough in that area to do business, and that will subsequently attract more foreign investors.

The cultural and legal environment: We already saw that a large—or more than half of FDI came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore where there`s a large Chinese Diaspora. I`ll skip that.

Bureaucracy and legal environment: Many foreign investors perceive the Chinese legal system as ambiguous. Legal disputes are often settled through personal contacts rather than through formal contracts that are enforced by the court. This ambiguity in the law has in turn led to corruption. China scores actually relatively low on corruption and governance indicators in international comparisons, and this has deterred FDI from Europe and the United States apparently more than investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

It seems that familiarity with local culture has proven to be helpful in surpassing bureaucratic hurdles and corruption, and this is also one of the reasons that investors from Europe and the United States have often sought local counterparts so that they can do business in China.

Reduced barriers and preferential policies. The reduction of these barriers to FDI and policies to improve the investment environment have played a key role in attracting FDI in China, and from the beginning of the reform process, the Chinese authorities considered attracting FDI as an important goal as it would introduce new technologies, know-how, and capital, and it would also help develop the export sector. But initially the laws and regulations were too strict to attract significant amounts of FDI, as we saw in the first chart, where you could see that throughout the 1980s FDI inflows were not that dramatic.

These preferential policies have been in the form of tax concessions and special privileges — [tape ends].

— reduced enterprise income tax rates and tax holidays. The special privileges apply mostly to enterprises in open economic zones.

The open economic zones have played a central role in the gradual opening of the economy to foreign investors, and an important difference between these zones and other areas in China is the administrative decentralization that permitted investment decisions in open economic zones to be taken largely outside the state plan.

I`ll briefly discuss the impact of foreign direct investment on the economy.

FDI has raised GDP growth in two ways. One is through higher capital accumulation. That effect is relatively small and is estimated at about 0.4 percent per year of GDP growth during the 1990s. The more significant contribution is through higher productivity growth, and this has been estimated at about 2 to 2.5 percent of GDP growth during the 1990s, or about half of total TFP growth.

This chart shows that there has been a strong co-movement between the stock of FDI and total factor productivity. Also at the provincial level, there is a positive relation between FDI and TFP growth. The yellow dots are provinces.

FDI has also generated positive externalities through foreign-funded enterprises on the rest of the economy. These foreign-funded enterprises are the most productive enterprises. Their labor productivity is about twice as high as that of SOEs. And some preliminary empirical results suggest that the presence of foreign-funded enterprises is positively correlated with output growth of other enterprises in the same province.

FDI has created job opportunities. Foreign-funded enterprises currently account for about 3 percent of urban employment. FDI has also contributed to the transformation of the industrial structure. China`s trade growth during the reform period has been about 4.5 times as fast as world trade growth, and the foreign-funded enterprises have played a key role in this achievement. Their share in exports has risen from 1 percent in 1985 to between 45 and 50 percent currently.

What are the lessons for other countries? These are tentative lessons. More work needs to be done to draw firm conclusions, but, first of all, in my view, China`s success is not unique in the sense that factors that have been important in attracting FDI to China have also been important in attracting FDI to other countries. Large domestic markets, low-wage costs, improved infrastructure, all this complemented with the open FDI policies and especially the establishment of the open economic zones, they all seem to have been very important factors in attracting FDI. But they have also been important elsewhere.

Then there`s political commitment. China had to overcome several obstacles to FDI that were rooted in history and in ideology. And it did so by limiting the opening of the economy in a few localities initially and by giving autonomy to those localities where it allowed foreign-funded enterprises to set up a business. Thereby, it allowed a market-based economy to develop alongside a centrally planned economy, and although the decentralization created some problems, it also gave local authorities strong incentives to grow and to develop their economies.

The success of these initial experiments created strong demonstration effects, which then induced broad support for further reforms and opening up.

As we saw, FDI contributes to GDP and productivity growth. I think China is a clear example of that case.

Then, of course, there are some pitfalls. The tax incentive system in China has become increasingly complex and biased, and this problem has become even more prominent now with WTO accession. But the authorities are addressing the problem and are working towards unifying the tax rates for foreign-funded enterprises and domestic enterprises.

There are also regional income disparities. By focusing on special regions, China`s FDI policy has contributed to the growing income disparities between coastal and inland provinces, and the authorities are now giving priority to reducing regional income disparities by developing the western and central regions of the country, including by attracting FDI and by investing in infrastructure in these regions.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you very much, Harm.

Our next speaker is Dr. Nicholas Lardy. Dr. Lardy is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution here in Washington. He is a well-known China scholar, and he has written on Chinese trade and foreign economic policies. He was a member of the Yale School of Management in 1997 to 1999, and his most recent book is called "Integrating China in the Global Economy."

Nick?

DR. LARDY: Thank you. Thank you very much and thank you for inviting me to participate in the Forum this afternoon.

The previous speakers have given a very comprehensive overview of trends in foreign direct investment. My charge is really to look a little bit more forward and look at what the effects of WTO might be on the patterns that have been analyzed. Before I do that, though, very briefly I`d like to cover a couple of topics.

First, I tend to agree with Professor Huang that distortions in the financial system have been a very important determinant of the reliance on the external sector. You can see it in foreign direct investment. You can see it in capital markets as well, where the domestic stock markets have developed at such a slow pace that more capital by a very substantial margin is still being raised on external capital markets rather than on domestic markets, even though there`s a very high savings rate and a very huge pool of savings, as Markus` slides showed us at the outset. So there are some distortions, but yet I do think the policy issues that Harm has touched on are quite important. I think the two that have not been given sufficient attention in the remarks earlier I would say first is the processing program or the processing arrangement that China has put in place that allow foreign firms to operate at international prices within China by allowing duty-free imports of both capital goods and parts components and assemblies that are used for export processing. Processing has been an enormous driver of China`s trade growth. It`s certainly one of the most important reasons that by last year China was the sixth largest trading country in the world as compared to about the 37th largest trading country in the world when reforms began in the late 1970s.

Another policy I would just point to very quickly that hasn`t been mentioned, which I do think is important, and that is, convertibility on the capital account which has existed since 1996, which allows foreign-invested firms to repatriate declared dividends from joint ventures. I think that`s another thing that should be highlighted on the policy side.

I`d like to talk, before turning to WTO, also about two what I would consider to be myths that I think are fairly widespread. The first is that all of this processing activity and the role of foreign firms, which have been so important in driving exports, really in some sense are detached from the domestic economy, that they`re really an enclave. Obviously, the previous presenter doesn`t agree with that. He thinks there are productivity effects. But I think also one can look at what`s happened to value-added in the processing sector. And it is true the rate of value-added in the processing sector in the early 1990s was relatively low, but over the decade of the 1990s, value-added as a percentage of output in the processing sector roughly doubled. And what that means is as more and more foreign firms have been operating, they`re creating a demand. There has been the development of backward linkages. You get a lot of domestic firms that are now beginning to produce more parts and components that are going into processing activity that has generated all the exports.

So I think we`re seeing an economy where the integration or the linkages between the externally oriented processing sector and the domestic economy has increased over time.

The second myth which is very widespread these days, I think in particular, is whether or not foreign investment has been profitable for those firms that have undertaken it. There have been two recent books—one called "The China Dream" and one called "China`s Coming Collapse"—which really look at China`s experience of reform over the last 20 years, primarily through the lens, I would say, of foreign-invested companies, foreign joint ventures, and basically they pile anecdote on anecdote about all the foolish investment choices that foreign firms have made and all of the bureaucratic and other obstacles that the Chinese Government has placed in their way. And, of course, one can compile a rather large number of such cases.

But I think given the fact that foreign direct investment in China is now well over US$400 billion and involves tens of thousands of companies, in any universe that large one is bound to find all kinds of disastrous outcomes. And so I prefer to look at the more systematic data on what has happened to profitability of foreign-invested companies in China, and here, contrary to what a lot of people think, that nobody has ever made any money in China, if you look at the data that, for example, were in Alexander Lehmann`s recent IMF working paper, which looks at the profitability of American-invested companies in China, you find that profitability in the 1990s or the second half of the 1990s was about 14 percent after tax, which is almost the same as profitability of American investment in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. In other words, China does not look like an outlier at all; it rather looks fairly usual comparable to some other large emerging markets economies.

Chinese data, which cover all foreign-invested companies in China, tell a very similar story. Between 1994 and end 2000, profitability on a pre-tax basis of foreign-invested companies in China has averaged about 8 percent. Returns were somewhat higher in the early and mid-1990s; then they fell in the Asian financial crisis, and in the year 2000 they reached a new high of 9.9 percent.

Now, this does not take into account returns such as royalty fees and license payments that flow from foreign affiliates to corporate parents. It`s just simply looking at the profitability of the joint venture company itself. And on a comparative basis, these returns look even more favorable since almost all joint ventures in China are eligible for 100 percent tax exemption in their first two years of profitability and a 50 percent tax exemption on the next three years of profitability and a 17 percent rate of taxation going forward after the fifth year, although that may be subject to some adjustment, as has already been mentioned.

So I think the idea that the foreign sector in China is an enclave is overstated, and the idea that foreign investors in China aren`t making any money I think is also a misstatement.

Now, let me return to my assigned topic of what`s the effect on foreign direct investment in China, WTO entry for China, what will it be. I think the main effect of China`s WTO commitments is to liberalize foreign investment access, particularly in telecommunications, financial services, and distribution. And most of these sectors have been, by and large, closed to foreign investment.

For example, if you look in the late 1990s, the share of FDI going to financial services was 0.2 percent of the total. In distribution in the form of wholesaling and retailing, it was only about 2 percent. And manufacturing was about 55, 60 percent in most years in the second half of the 1990s.

Now, I think some commitments on rules-based issues such as TRIPs and TRIMs will make certain kinds of manufacturing investment in China more attractive, and eliminating a lot of other conventions in China like offset requirements and a number of other practices that have been common also will make investment in manufacturing more attractive.

But I do think that there will be a shift of investment towards the service sector because, as I said, the greatest liberalization is in financial services, telecommunications, and distribution. These are sectors of the economy that are underdeveloped by a variety of different measures.

So, on balance, I expect a moderation in the rate of increase in the inward flows of foreign direct investment. I know Goldman Sachs has predicted they`re going to be $100 billion a year by 2005. I quite frankly would be surprised. I think they will continue to go up at a fairly modest pace over the next three to five years, but I don`t think they`re going to be at $100 billion in only three years. The second trend, as I`ve already indicated, is likely to be a change in the composition with some gradual decline in manufacturing and a rise in the importance of services.

This will be moderated somewhat, as I`ve already indicated, by the fact that some of China`s commitments will make manufacturing more profitable. Even some of their distribution commitments will make investments in manufacturing more attractive, and also China is going to get the advantage of the phase-out of quotas that have governed world trade in textiles and apparel for several decades at the end of the year 2004, and I think there will be substantial additional investment in China by foreign firms, particularly in the apparel sector. So that will tend to offset what I see as the decline, the general trend for a decline in the manufacturing share.

But I think the policy environment remains favorable and, indeed, WTO has improved it substantially for foreign firms in China, and so I think that the outlook is moderate growth in the totals and some significant change over time in the sectoral composition.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you very much, Nick, for this forward-looking perspective on FDI in China.

Now I ask Markus to give the last presentation, which is also a forward-looking piece, looking at what are the implications of the liberalization on the capital account, including FDI, for the convertibility of the renminbi.

MR. RODLAUER: Thank you, Wanda. Given the advanced time, I`ll try to be very brief and race through. I`ll talk briefly about the outlook for convertibility of the renminbi and the further liberalization of the capital account.

As you all know, China has started in the late 1970s, early 1980s by opening up its foreign trade regime and foreign direct investment regime, and recently has then also opened a bit the portfolio inflows. Two recent milestones in external liberalization were the unification of the exchange rate system in 1994 and then the achievement of current account convertibility in 1996. That means today exporters or importers basically can do their transactions and get foreign exchange if they can prove they have an underlying current transaction.

However, there still are extensive capital controls. China basically maintains these very tight controls on the capital account for several policy reasons. First, it allows scope for an independent monetary policy and at the same time keeping a stable exchange rate. Second, it limits the vulnerability to capital flow reversals. And, third, it helps to protect certain domestic industries.

So in the current regime, as I said, FDI is fairly open, so it`s a very encouraging attitude to foreign investment. But one should still remember it`s very tightly regulated on an individual basis. For each deal, for each foreign investment that comes in, there are very precise conditions specified at the outset on employment, on the way of financing and how much money has to be brought in and so forth.

Then there are the portfolio and other capital flows like loans. Those, again, are very tightly, strictly controlled, and the way the control system works is that it`s segregated between domestic enterprises, domestic agents, and foreign enterprises, foreign agents.

So, for example, in the equity markets, there are two divided markets. One is for domestic residents and domestic renminbi. You can buy and sell stocks if you`re a Chinese citizen and have renminbi. This is one side of the market. The other side of the market is foreigners with foreign exchange who can buy another type of stocks. This has recently been opened up a bit. Some domestic residents now can buy foreign stocks, B market stocks, but still this principle pretty much applies to all the capital account transactions, loans and so forth.

So while these capital controls, as I said, are fairly comprehensive from a regulatory perspective, they have proven to be not watertight. Particularly during the Asian crisis, we have seen a very large amount of disguised outflows, and you`ll recall the numbers in the first table where we had about 50 billion of outflows, which really there isn`t a very good explanation for. These large outflows during the Asian crisis then prompted some tightening of these controls by the authorities, and they were somewhat effective but, still, we have fairly large unexplained outflows.

Now, where do we go from here? Should and will China further open its capital account? Clearly, there is a strong case for China to eventually open up the capital account with the ultimate goal of full convertibility. I don`t think it`s necessary to restate the quite well known overall benefits of convertibility. In one way, it`s unavoidable. Every advanced economy today has an open capital account, and, specifically what`s in there for China, clearly it would provide access to cheaper financing, new technologies, and for individual Chinese agents, access to much more diversified and risk-balanced portfolios; and in the end it would result in higher investment and higher growth. And also given the difficulties of actually keeping capital controls in place effectively, it is in the end, in the long run, inevitable, particularly since, as Nick has explained, WTO now has created concrete commitments of the authorities to integrate the financial sector much more.

Now, one could conceivably think that these financial sectors could become integrated but still keeping capital controls. But the more you integrate in the real side and have businesses coming in and out, the more pressure there will be to actually allow also a freer flow of capital. So, in the end, I think it will become inevitable, and it is, I think, a very appropriate long-term goal. And it is, therefore, not surprising, and appropriate, that China itself has stated explicitly and set itself these goals, this long-term goal.

While the benefits are very well known of capital account liberalization, so are, of course, the risks. Capital account liberalization affects financial stability through two main interrelated channels. On the one hand, there is the risk of overheating from very large capital inflows, and, on the second part, on a more micro level, opening up the capital account to free flows of capital across borders really allows excessive risk taking by individual enterprises, and especially banks. And so that from the micro level, it fosters, because of the well-known problem of asymmetric information, the risks that banks just go overboard and assume excessive risk and excessive liabilities.

These conditions raise the risk of sudden reversals of these capital flows, which could then lead to external payments crises and, therefore, large output losses and welfare losses.

A third risk which we have learned in recent years also is that initial shocks in one country to one economy, to one financial system, can be transmitted and spread much more easily to other countries through the so-called contagion effect if you have an open capital account.

Now, the Chinese authorities, of course, are very well aware of this risk and have, therefore, chosen a very deliberate and a very gradual path of capital account liberalization. And the authorities—when you ask them why is it that you keep your capital account still under control, what they mostly mention very specifically is that until their enterprises and their banks are reformed and have tight budget constraints and behave in a commercial manner, they are afraid that you would just have excessive borrowing, huge excessive borrowing, like we have had in many other transition economies, where increased latitude for enterprises and banks to make economic decisions without having the commercial orientation, the tight budget constraints, leads to huge excessive borrowing and, therefore, instability. And the second reason they mention is that their still fairly narrow capital markets could lead to very large volatility if you have uncontrolled flows across the border.

So how then to go about capital account liberalization? Well, two broad lessons from the country experience in recent years we have drawn is that those countries that have avoided crises are those that have strong macroeconomic policies and those that have a strong financial system. For China, on the macro side, I think they rank very well on one of three items, which is the external position. It`s very, very strong as we know. But there are two other issues that are still to be resolved. One is you need to have sustainable public finances, which in China is still something to work on given the problems in the enterprises and in the banks. And then also the choice of the exchange rate regime, the more you open up your capital account, the more it will be necessary to have a flexible exchange rate system. And also given the very large structural changes underway in the economy, our advice has been in recent years increasingly that at some point China will have to move from its currently fixed exchange rate or very stable exchange rate system to greater flexibility gradually.

So on the macro side, there is still some work to do on the public finances and on the exchange rate and monetary policy side. In the banking and SOE side,—certainly it`s key to rehabilitate the state-owned enterprises and the state-owned banks before you can think of substantially further opening up the capital account. You need a strong prudential system to contain excessive risk taking, and you need good accounting, auditing, disclosure standards to allow information to be transmitted to the markets, as well supervisors.

So, there is a large work program ahead to be able to reach this ultimate goal of convertibility, but I`d like to emphasize another point here, too. Our experience has been that opening up and liberalization is a very complex and interrelated enterprise. And while full liberalization has to come, of course, at the later stages, one cannot really wait with individual opening up until everything is perfect. Market reforms, as I said, are inter-dependent. For example, markets will not develop at all unless you open up a bit. So one has to do many of these things in tandem and gradually at the same time, which necessarily creates uncertainties and is certainly a volatile enterprise. But one has to start somewhere, and then the key is, of course, to monitor very closely, very carefully, and to be very flexible along the way and implement carefully.

China I think has got it quite right from the beginning in terms of the sequencing of what flows to open first and what last. It started with FDI. It then went over to portfolio equity flows in the stock market, and other debt-creating flows, particularly in the short end, should come last.

So, in conclusion, maybe three points. One is convertibility certainly is a valid long-term goal, and the authorities have adopted it. However, it needs to be very carefully phased in and supported by reforms and appropriate macro policies. It is, however, an inevitable process that will come, and certainly WTO accession has provided further impetus both for the actual integration of China`s economy to the rest of the world, for the further opening of the capital account, and for all the necessary supporting reforms.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Markus.

I think we don`t have too much time left. I wasn`t a strong enough chairman, I think. But if you are available we can make about 20 minutes for questions and answers, and I`ll take questions from the floor.

QUESTION: This is primarily directed at Professor Huang and Mr. Zebregs, but other panelists may have some light to shed on it. It concerns the financial cost of FDI relative to other sources of financing, and I pose that question both at the firm level and at the macro level. Let me start with the macro level.

As Markus Rodlauer pointed out at the beginning, China is an odd animal from a macro perspective. It exports net savings and then imports huge amounts of investment capital in the form of FDI. It gets very little return on the foreign investments—on the investment in foreign reserves, U.S. treasury bills and other things like that, but it pays very heavily on the foreign loans and on FDI.

FDI typically is considered an expensive form of financing because foreign equity return expectations are typically much higher than the cost of bank loans.

What does it mean at the macro level for China as a whole? Is China as a whole on the margin losing huge amounts financially because of this inefficient domestic recycling?

And, secondly, because of the heavy dependence on FDI, do a lot of firms get stuck with high cost levels, high financial cost levels?

MS. TSENG: Professor, do you want to take that question?

PROFESSOR HUANG: Let me sort of get about this issue from a more micro level than macro level. I agree with you that FDI is a very expensive way of financing economic development. In part, it`s equity financing. It`s not contractual financing.

Nick was very perceptive in raising this issue about export processing. Here I think it`s very, very important to emphasize FDI is an ownership arrangement. By the IMF definition, FDI establishes foreign control of a domestic firm. There are other ways foreign firms can do business in China, interact with Chinese domestic firms on a long-term basis. One is export processing. It`s a contractual mechanism. In labor-intensive industries, you find prevalence of contractual mechanisms in practically every other country except in China—I mean Africa. In Africa, I think there are two issues: one is the low level of savings, so it is a sort of more macro story; there is also a low level of indigenous capabilities. A government firm in Hong Kong actually sets up operations in Africa, and they import labor from China to manage these operations.

Unless you believe the Chinese are not capable of sewing the sweater, knitting the things together, putting up these shirts and stuff like that, so you need to import foreign know-how through FDI, unless you believe that, then you think FDI makes a lot of sense.

I don`t believe Chinese are that incapable compared to Taiwanese, compared to Hong Kong entrepreneurs and workers in the 1960s and 1970s who relied mostly on contractual mechanisms.

And then the issue of financing comes in. Until 1998, Chinese private entrepreneurs could not export. That means they couldn`t, even if their production generated foreign exchange earnings, they couldn`t keep it.

The one way you can keep the foreign exchange earnings is to convert your business into a foreign-owned enterprise, therefore raising the demand for FDI. So the costs are extremely high, and you look at the recent developments in the Chinese current account, the dividend outflow, which didn`t leave the country because it comes through the capital account, but the dividend as a debit item has picked up substantially from 1994 to 2000. In the long run, I think China will pay a very, very high price for this way of attracting FDI.

And I have to say, I have to add a few positives. In 1997, the Chinese Government began to allow privatization on a smaller scale. The Chinese Government has allowed private financing to private firms beginning in 1998. In 2001, Jiang Zemin welcomed private entrepreneurs into the Communist Party. You actually see a dramatic impact on the FDI front.

Labor-intensive FDI has fallen sharply. Export processing, which Nick talked about, increased dramatically since 1997, and Nick probably—I don`t know if Nick knows these statistics. Export contract—export inflows, which basically is the buyer credit extended by a Hong Kong entrepreneur to a Chinese entrepreneur in China in Guangdong Province, in absolute terms it declined—it began to—in absolute terms. We are not talking about relative terms. It began to decline in 1989. 1989 is a significant year in China. There`s a lot of political turmoil, and the government went after the private entrepreneurs, politically and financially. So the private entrepreneurs couldn`t finance the production, relying on export contracts.

In the garment industry, out of 800 firms, 800 foreign joint ventures established in the 1980s, 500 of them were established in 1989 and 1990—two years that were not known for being friendly to FDI, but two years that were known for being hostile toward domestic firms.

So the private firms in those two years lacked property rights, security. They began to convert their operations massively into foreign-owned operations. Beginning in 1997, you see the reverse. You see export contracts began to increase dramatically, especially the export contract production engaged in by private entrepreneurs. The increase is from $60 million in 1997 to $500 million in 2000. We are talking about a dramatic increase by private entrepreneurs through contractual mechanisms—it`s a contract; it`s through contractual mechanisms—because the Chinese banks are more willing now to provide financing.

So all the contribution—I don`t disagree with Harm about the contributions that foreign firms made to export production, but that contribution has occurred in the very specific institutional context which we need to pay attention to.

MS. TSENG: Thank you.

I think I would just like to add one point. You know, in my experience with working on China, the Chinese authorities are very pragmatic. In many ways, yes, it may be a costly way of financing investment. But at the same time, I think FDI allowed the government to overcome existing imperfections in the economic system, most notably the weak financial system. As we know now, the non-state sector accounts for something like 60 percent of GDP, but the bulk of domestic credit through the domestic banking system continues to go to the

[broker*709]

Das einzige was zur Zeit steigt, ist der Rupiahkurs - auch nicht schlecht !

Was meint Ihr ?

Rupiah strengthens to new eight-month high


The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The rupiah closed higher at Rp 8,960 to the U.S. dollar on Thursday, making it the first time the local currency had crossed the psychologically important boundary of Rp 9,000 since September last year.

Traders said state-owned banks were aggressively selling dollars as the U.S. greenback also lost strength against the yen and other regional currencies.

The dollar was trading late on Thursday at 124.00 yen, down from 124.21 yen late Wednesday, Dow Jones said.

The rupiah was quoted at Rp 9,055 on Wednesday.

Currency analyst Farial Anwar of PT Currency Management Group said that positive sentiment created by progress in the implementation of the country`s key economic reform program had continued to drive the rupiah`s value up.

"The positive sentiment has prevailed until now," he told The Jakarta Post.

The rupiah has been strengthening since the beginning of the year. The local currency received a major boost after the government completed the sale of its majority stake in the giant retail bank, Bank Central Asia (BCA), in March, and obtained a sovereign debt rescheduling approval from the Paris Club of creditor nations in April.

Farial said that the rupiah would continue to appreciate in the short term.

"The rupiah could still be hovering in the range of Rp 8,800 to Rp 9,000 until the end of June, provided there is no bad news," he said.

A stronger rupiah is crucial to help the country resolve its various economic problems, including curbing inflation, reducing the high interest rate environment and easing pressure on the state budget to cover the interest rate of huge government bonds issued to bailout banks.

The current state budget assumes an average exchange rate of Rp 9,000.

But many analysts said that the local currency was capable of plummeting to the Rp 10,000 level again because of the country`s huge foreign debt burden.

Any signs of the government backtracking on its promised economic reform programs, analysts said, could also easily erode the enthusiasm surrounding the rupiah.

Meanwhile, Vice President Hamzah Haz said on Thursday it was most important that there was not a quick appreciation of the local currency, but a stable exchange rate to help provide certainty for businesses and the government.

"What is important for us is to maintain the stability (of the exchange rate)," he told Antara.

He said that the ideal level of the exchange rate of the rupiah was between Rp 8,000 and Rp 9,000.

"If it quickly strengthens to the Rp 8,000 level, we`ll be worried because it would make the economy unstable," Hamzah said.

He added that to maintain the current positive sentiment in the rupiah, other economic indicators, such as inflation and exports, had to be improved, and a reform commitment made with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) must be implemented.

Separately, former coordinating minister for the economy Rizal Ramli said the positive sentiment in the rupiah was attributed to the strengthening of other regional currencies against the dollar and the expectation of dollar inflow from the sale of state assets.

He added that the relatively stable political condition under President Megawati Soekarnoputri was also a significant factor.

But he warned against becoming overconfident with the rupiah because there had been no significant change in the fundamental condition of the economy, with its sluggish export performance and lower-than-expected first quarter economic growth.

[broker*709]

Auch INDO-Land wird erwähnt !

Transcript of an Economic Forum
Foreign Direct Investment in China: What Do We Need To Know?
International Monetary Fund
IMF Auditorium
Thursday, May 2, 2002
Washington, D.C.



View this press conference using Media Player



Panelists
Wanda Tseng, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF
Yasheng Huang, Associate Professor of Business, Harvard University
Nicholas Lardy, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Markus Rodlauer, Division Chief, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF
Harm Zebregs, Economist, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF


MR. STARRELS: Welcome to the International Monetary Fund. My name is John Starrels, of the External Relations Department, and you`re here for another Economic Forum in our ongoing series of engagement with the outside community.

We have an absolutely stellar presentation today. Before commencing, two very brief housekeeping announcements. Literature is available and we hope you will take it with you. We welcome lively dialogue and encourage you to avail yourselves of the microphones located on the arm rest next to you. With that, I take pride and pleasure in turning the floor over to Wanda Tseng of the IMF`s Asia and Pacific Department.

TSENG: Good afternoon. Again, welcome to the International Monetary Fund. I think the topic of our Forum this afternoon is particularly timely given the attention that has been focused on China in recent years and the challenges that the economy is facing.

I have had the opportunity to travel to China quite frequently in the last several years, and I have witnessed for myself the tremendous changes and transformation that has been brought to this very dynamic economy.

China`s economic performance has been very impressive by most standards. This year the IMF`s World Economic Outlook is forecasting growth of 7.5 percent and a bit more next year. China was able to weather the storm of the Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed, and it had worked to reduce its external vulnerabilities by its high level of reserves and its favorable debt indicators. And I think at the same time, and most important of all, it has taken lessons from the Asian financial crisis and accelerated reforms of the state enterprise sector and the corporate sectors.

These achievements in China have added to the visible successes in the economic transformation of China that has been brought about by two decades of economic reforms. These reforms have resulted in spectacular growth, substantial inroads in reducing poverty, and the development of a very vibrant non-state sector.

One of the key driving forces of this transformation has been China`s progressive opening to the outside world through trade and foreign direct investment, and most recently, that has culminated in China`s accession to the WTO.

Our Economic Forum this afternoon will look at China`s experience with foreign direct investment. The questions that we will be asking are: What have been the driving forces behind these flows? How have they contributed to the performance of the Chinese economy? And what is the outlook for the period ahead, both in terms of further liberalization and the implications particularly regarding the convertibility of the renminbi exchange rate?

Our distinguished panel of experts will be addressing these issues, and I would like to start our discussion by having Markus Rodlauer make a very brief presentation on putting FDI in China into a more macro context.

Just let me set down some of the rules. I would like to ask all the presenters to keep your remarks to about ten minutes, and I think that will leave time for us to have a more interactive discussion with the audience.

So let me first introduce Markus Rodlauer. Markus is a division chief in the China Division. He has been heading the work on China for the last year or so. Before that he worked on a number of Asian countries and some transition economies. He has been the Fund`s resident representative in both Poland and the Philippines. So he has had tremendous experience with the problems and challenges of transition economies.

Markus is also one of the authors of a book that the IMF is putting together called "China - Competing in the Global Economy" that will be coming out fairly soon.

Markus?

MR. RODLAUER: Thank you, Wanda. Good afternoon again. I will just start very briefly and give you a short overview of China`s balance of payments in recent years and how these external flows relate to the domestic economy in terms of the savings-investment balance.

This provides a background to the subsequent discussion by Yasheng, Nick, and Harm on the role of foreign capital and foreign investment in China.

Table 1 summarizes the balance of payments of China in recent years. It shows, as you can see, a fairly substantial current account surplus in recent years, on average about US$25 billion, which is about 2.5 percent of GDP. And, in addition, it has received foreign direct investment net inflows of about $40 billion on average, which is about 4 percent of GDP. And this is, as I said, on a net basis, so the gross flows, inflows, were even somewhat larger, on the order of 4.5 to 5 percent of GDP. So, together, money coming into the current account and FDI amounts to something like 6.5, 7 percent of GDP, $65 to $70 billion.

Where has all this money gone to in the balance of payments sense? Well, first, a substantial amount you can see has ended up in the central bank where the sort of reserve increase—and this is a negative, if there is an increase. The reserve increase has averaged about US$22 billion over the past years, 2.2 percent of GDP. And for the remaining two-thirds, it`s very hard to say, which are basically non-FDI capital flows and errors and omissions. Data weaknesses really prevent a clear analysis of where these moneys have gone.

There are some data from the Bank For International Settlements which have identified flows through the banking system, through the equity markets. Those are roughly balanced. So, you know, the rest is sort of outflows through the balance of payments or errors and omissions, fairly large, of about $40 to $50 billion on average over the past few years.

Now, in this context, a noteworthy development that you may see here in the last year has been that, while there have been substantial outflows in the years up to 2000, $50 billion, China`s balance of payments, other than FDI and current account, has actually strengthened a lot in the last year, which has then boosted the reserve increase to almost $50 billion in the last year, in 2001.

So let me then move on and see how these BOP flows relate to China`s domestic economy.Here we see that one of the most striking features of the Chinese economy is the huge amount of domestic savings in the economy,averaging about 40 percent of GDP, which compares very favorably, of course, with basically almost all international comparisons. China`s domestic savings, nearly 40 percent of GDP,compares favorably not just with other developing countries or other advanced economies, but even within Asia they have a huge margin, and emerging Asia, basically 15 percent of GDP higher savings.

And the next chart shows how China`s high domestic savings rate has financed an equally astounding aggregate level of domestic investment, not quite as high but, also 35 to 40 percent of GDP, which in the end means that we have very high domestic savings of about 40 percent of GDP, and slightly less domestic investment which resulted in what we call net foreign savings or a current account surplus of about 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP negative net foreign savings.

So what do these numbers say about the role of foreign capital, of foreign investment in China? Well, I`m just going to throw up a few hypotheses here, several points that could be made, and then those will be discussed further in the subsequent presentations.

On the one hand, clearly, given the very high domestic savings rate, China does not need foreign capital from a financial balance of payments point of view to supplement domestic savings. It has been able to finance a very high, a very decent amount of investment without the financial contributions from foreign savings.

So on the need for foreign direct investment, therefore, one could draw two broad conclusions.On the one hand:foreign investment has plugged a fairly large hole in the BOP because of these capital outflows, other outflows, and FDI has been the counterpart that has made the balance of payments close more or less—although this, of course, has changed last year. This other balance has improved a lot, which then improved the reserve balance. Or one could say that while FDI inflows are clearly not needed in a balance of payments sense, from an external finance perspective, it may have been critical in raising the productivity of all this investment that has occurred, 35 percent of GDP of total investment. As we know, China has had this fabulous growth record of about 10 percent on average GDP growth per year, which means that an incremental capital output ratio of about 3 looked very high, and certainly, given the technological contributions of foreign direct investments and so forth, the role of foreign investment was not so much in financially contributing to the balance of payments, but in improving the productivity of all this investment and, therefore, contributing to growth.

So maybe I should just stop here and then ask our subsequent presenters to speak more on FDI in particular. Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Markus.

For our next speaker, we are very fortunate to have Professor Huang from Harvard University. He was gracious enough to fly down through the weather this morning from Boston. Professor Huang is an Associate Professor of Business at Harvard University. His current work focuses on the institutional and policy determinants of foreign direct investment in China. He has published widely, including a book called "Inflation and Investment Control in China." Before joining the Harvard faculty, he taught at the University of Michigan, and he was also a consultant at the World Bank from 1987 to 1989.

Professor Huang?

PROFESSOR HUANG: I am going to pick up where Markus left off, and I very much agree with him that at the macro level, FDI into China, and I believe actually FDI in general in a number of Asian countries, is not a macroeconomic phenomenon, but is a microeconomic one.

I agree with the observation that FDI has possibly improved productivity of investment, but the overall theme of my research shows that FDI has done that in a very specific institutional context, and let me just spell out what that context is before making my presentation.

That context basically is one in which the government, the Chinese Government, has systematically suppressed efficient private entrepreneurs from making the same contributions, same productivity improvements as foreign entrepreneurs did; and, therefore, the effect of FDI on productivity boosting. The productivity boosting effect of foreign entrepreneurs is made artificially greater in that specific context. That`s sort of the overall theme of my presentation.

Before I get to that, I need to illustrate why I view FDI that way, why I view FDI as making this type of contribution in the institutional context that I just laid out.

First, I`m going to give a very brief overview of FDI, and the idea there is that FDI has actually played an incredibly important role in China, in the Chinese economy, and possibly more important than many people previously have realized. And then I`m going to talk about the drivers of FDI, and there I`m going to argue that a lot of conventional ideas about what drove up FDI inflows into China are partially correct, which means they`re partially wrong. And so I`m going to address why they are wrong. Those ideas, the conventional ideas have to do with market size, cheap labor, things like that. I believe they don`t adequately explain the FDI patterns in China.

Then I`m going to provide an institutional story why institutions are a very important part of the FDI story.

Just to show how important FDI has become, this is a picture that shows the growth of FDI relative to the domestic firms across a number of categories, across three categories: The share of industrial output value has increased from the early 1990s, about 7 percent to about 28 percent. You see also the share of value-added tax, which has increased dramatically in the course of the 1990s.

What`s very interesting is this: In the 1990s, FIEs, foreign-invested enterprises, including both joint ventures as well as wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, accounted for 15 percent of exports. In 2000, they accounted for 48 percent.

The conventional wisdom says that, look, FIEs have made huge contributions to the Chinese export performance. I agree with 30 percent of that. I think 70 percent of the story is foreigners come into China and take away the export opportunities previously performed by domestic firms, domestic private firms and—because domestic private firms face very, very stringent credit constraints, so they cannot finance their export production. And foreigners come in, mostly from Hong Kong—and I include them as foreigners for technical reasons—foreigners and Taiwanese and firms from Macao essentially provide equity financing to the credit-constrained private Chinese entrepreneurs. So there`s both a boosting effect of exports, but there`s also a switching effect from domestic to foreign production.

Another picture that shows how important FDI is, and I think this is a dramatic picture. If you use FDI flows, this is the average, the annual average between 1992 to 1998. If you use the FDI flows divided by non-state gross fixed capital formation, that`s—because SOEs in China play such an overwhelming investment role, and it`s, I think—analytically it`s more appropriate to compare foreign firms to non-state firms. If you take out the SOEs, the share, the annual average share of FDI in China is about 28 percent. Singapore, which is traditionally an FDI-dependent—extremely FDI-dependent country, is 30 percent. Malaysia is 24 percent.

What`s very interesting, if you look at these three countries, is, in fact, they share many, many similarities at a micro and institutional level, and I would argue—and I`m doing research on Singapore and Malaysia now, and there is a lot of evidence to show that. If you go back to the 1960s and 1970s, what the Singaporean Government did and what the Malaysian Government did was very similar to what the Chinese Government did in the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s, which was to adopt policies that systematically suppressed local entrepreneurs, and so the basic idea is that if you think about FDI as an import of foreign know-how, if you suppress domestic know-how, to grow the economy at a certain level you need to import more foreign know-how to get to that level.

In Singapore, the same thing happened. It`s not a terribly well-publicized story. In Malaysia, it also happened because of the ethnic tensions between the economic elites, who are just Chinese, and the political elites, who are Malays. So there was that.

In China, I think it`s more because of an ideological consideration. Government is concerned about the power of the private firms. It`s not ethnic.

There`s one sort of [inaudible] idea out there which says that it is the coastal regions in China that receive most of the FDI. That`s absolutely true if you look at the percentage distribution of FDI across different provinces. But what`s really—what`s missing in that judgment is the fact that interior regions in China, in fact, have depended very, very heavily on FDI. Think about the growth of FDI flows from 1990 to 1999. In 1990, China got about $3 billion, $4 billion of FDI. But in the second half of the 1990s, China got about $40 billion of FDI per year.

So even a small percentage of $40 billion is actually a huge number, but one estimate, about 13 percent of the cumulative FDI flows between 1990 and 1998 went to interior regions. These are interior regions that don`t have easy access to Hong Kong. The transportation system is poor. The economy is very, very small.

If you take the FDI stock-GDP ratio in 1998, in interior Chinese provinces, it`s about 11 percent. To put that number in perspective for North America, it`s about the same. It`s about 11 percent. Central and Eastern Europe is about 13 percent. And for Southeast and Southeast Asia, it`s about 11 percent.

So we are talking about poor interior regions in China that have depended on FDI to the same degree as these economies that are very, very open. So the puzzle for me is not why these interior regions don`t get much FDI. The puzzle for me is why they get any FDI at all. The linguistic ties between those regions and Taiwan are not there. And one of the reasons—let me show another picture and then I`ll get to the reason.

This is from the World Bank report, and it`s a pity that no recent study has been done on this topic, which is to compare FDI dependency in a number of provinces with inter-provincial capital mobility, so a firm located in one province investing in another province.

What this 1994 World Bank study shows is that for the six provinces for which they have data, it`s the domestic investment data that are lacking. It`s not the foreign direct investment data. For six provinces for which there are data, about four of them depended significantly more on FDI than they do from investment from other regions. So there`s a great mobility of foreign capital. There`s a great dependency on foreign capital and the mobility of foreign capital.

What makes that statement really, really interesting is lack of mobility of domestic capital, and there is some evidence to show that the domestic capital mobility has actually declined over the reform era while China has become more dependent on FDI. And this tells us something about the barriers in the Chinese system that are systematically promoting FDI but restricting domestic investment at the same time.

One of those barriers is local protectionism, and if you believe that one province has a net deficit in terms of its saving relative to its investment requirement, if it has a project that cannot be financed from investment from a different province, then FDI plays a very, very important role because essentially a foreign company is not restricted in terms of its capital mobility.

That`s why in China you`ll find very small firms establishing multiple plants across a number of provinces, and you`ll find very large Chinese firms establishing all its plants in one province. The largest auto company in China is Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation. As of 1998, all of its 38 subsidiaries were located in Shanghai; whereas, you`ll find a small [inaudible] company known as China`s Strategic Investment, which acquired 200 companies across nine provinces. So if you believe that there is an economic need to integrate the assets disbursed across different provinces, if domestic firms cannot do that, somebody has to do it, and that somebody turns out to be foreigners more often than not.

What`s also interesting about the distribution of FDI is that not only FDI is found in many, many provinces in China, including poor interior provinces; they are found in many, many industries in China. The industry concentration of FDI in China is extremely low compared to industry concentration in other countries. And this shows—or it tries to show that the top three industries with most of Hong Kong FDI in Taiwan accounted for 86 percent of the FDI. For Indonesia, the top three industries accounted for 79 percent; for Malaysia, 75 percent.

And you`ll find the same thing in Latin America. Basically FDI only goes to a few industries. You know, the analytical reason for that is very, very simple. They are industries that locals are good at, and they are industries that foreigners are better at. So what you`ll find is concentration of FDI. What you don`t find is disbursement of FDI—except in China. In China, these top three industries accounted for 47 percent, only 47 percent of the FDI. So FDI—and there are a number of industries that you wouldn`t necessarily expect to see FDI, such as silk manufacturing, ivory sculptures, herbal medicine. These are the things that the Chinese are very good at and they have been doing this for thousands of years, and yet you find these industries populated by foreign firms.

One idea is that China is a huge, growing market, and that`s why China gets a lot of FDI. That`s kind of true—it`s only true in explaining the absolute increase of FDI. So in 1990, China received $4 billion of FDI. In 1999, it received $40 billion of FDI.Market fundamentals can only explain that story.

The reason why—it doesn`t explain why China shall over time become more dependent on FDI, which is FDI divided by domestic investment. It`s the fact that a growing,good market fundamentals should appeal to both foreign investors and to domestic investors.

That actually is what you see in Taiwan, in Malaysia, in the United States. In the United States, the economy expanded tremendously in the 1990s, but the share of FDI relative to domestic investment hardly changed. If a German company wants to invest in the United States, Microsoft also wants to invest in the United States. So the denominator and the numerator increase at the same time. So the share of the investment changes.

What you see in China is this incredible growth in the first half of the 1990s. And then what`s also very interesting is this sharp decline beginning around 1996, 1997. And I believe this decline is a result of the fact that the government began to treat private entrepreneurs much better. So private entrepreneurs are also motivated to increase their investment and become more optimistic about the future.

I know I`m sort of running out of time. Let me just show a few more slides.

The export functions of the foreign firms in China, as I showed before, are extremely important. They are important relative to the similar export functions of foreign firms in other economies. In China, you find—this is 1995. You find foreign firms accounted for about 61 percent of the garment and footwear exports. In Indonesia, it`s only 33 percent. In Taiwan, it`s only 5.7 percent.

What`s also interesting is that foreign companies are playing a much more important role compared to foreign companies in Indonesia and Taiwan, both in labor-intensive industries, which are these three industries—leather and fur products and furniture—as well as in capital-intensive and technologically intensive industries.

What`s very interesting about Taiwan`s story is that Taiwan is also known as a huge export success. And what`s important there is that the export success was achieved by local entrepreneurs, and local entrepreneurs were able to get financing in a way that the Chinese entrepreneurs until recently were not able to get from the formal financial system.

Let me just explain the connection between the importance of local financing vis-à-vis contract export. If I`m a Chinese entrepreneur and Wanda is a Hong Kong entrepreneur, Wanda can give me an export contract which represents a business opportunity. But the business opportunity has to be financed, and if the local bank doesn`t give me money, then I cannot finance the production of the export contract.

In that situation, what Wanda is going to say is: Yasheng, why don`t I provide some equity financing. I will own 50 percent of your business, and I will give you some capital so you can carry out the export activities.

In Taiwan, you don`t have to do that. And what`s very interesting is that in this particular case, even though we are talking about simple manufacturing operations in garments and footwear, essentially foreign entrepreneurs are playing the role of a venture capitalist, providing seed capital to businesses that are discriminated against by the banks. There are no technological risks. There are no product risks. These are mature industries, mature products. There are political risks because the private entrepreneur is not favored by the banks.

Another role that foreign companies have played is privatization. Just now I told you a story about the connection between FDI and the private production of export products. A lot of FDI has also gone into SOEs, and there`s this idea that a lot of the FDI that has gone to the state sector finances greenfield investment, new investment. That`s actually just not true.They are thought of as greenfield investments only because of the legal format which they take, which is joint venture. But that`s just a legal fiction. That`s a legal requirement. That has nothing to do with the underlying nature, economic nature of these transactions.

In my field study, I have found many, many examples of SOEs contributing their brand name, contributing their customer base, contributing their own operating assets in order to finance an equity claim on a newly created joint venture. After the joint venture is created, the SOE becomes a shareholding company. That doesn`t have any operating assets on its balance sheet.

If you look at the balance sheet before the joint venture creation and after the joint venture creation, before the joint venture creation it will have operating assets like machinery and equipment. After the joint venture creation, it would have essentially financial claims on the joint ventures. And this is one of the fundamental reasons why there are a lot of conflicts between Chinese shareholders and foreign shareholders, because the Chinese shareholders—in this case, the SOEs—have lost the sources of alternative income. Their only source of income is the dividend income from the operations of the joint ventures. So the Chinese firms tend to want a dividend distribution, whereas foreign firms want to reinvest the earnings, and this is one of the reasons why there is such a conflict.

In the machinery industry, an industry populated by the SOEs, what`s very interesting is—this is sort of a complex story, but the basic message of this picture is that the investment income—this is SOEs. The investment income more than makes up the operating income. I think this is 1997. In 1997, the SOEs in the machinery industry collectively made a loss of 10 billion Yuan in profits, in operating income, but they more than make up that loss by the dividend payment from the joint ventures, which is 16 billion Yuan.

If you look at other firms, no other firms exhibit this kind of behavior. If you look at private firms, for example, the private firms, there are not many private firms, so this is a small number, 0.2 billion in operating income, and there`s practically no dividend income at all.

The SOEs are in a class by themselves. This is a factory in Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, and the factory manager told us that they formed a joint venture with Phillips in 1994. After the formation of the joint venture, his predecessor, the general manager at the time, had to sit behind a cardboard box which was used as a desk and had to sit on another cardboard box as his chair, because the office furniture was also contributed as the equity contribution to the joint venture. Nothing was left. Nothing was left. So there`s that—it`s a privatization story, and it`s a privatization story that has taken place in a specific context, and that context is that the Chinese Government has not allowed domestic private companies to acquire the same SOE assets that are available to foreigners.

So essentially the Chinese Government encouraged FDI, and a lot of it is a de facto privatization story. And then the Chinese Government has not allowed until very, very recently domestic private companies to bid for the same assets. That`s one of the reasons why the valuation of the Chinese assets is actually very low, and that has nothing to do with the morality of the SOE managers. It has to do with a lack of competition for the same assets. If the Chinese Government allows privatization, then the valuation would be higher.

The third institutional driver, which I already alluded to, is the fragmentation of the capital market and economic market. And that also drove up FDI flows enormously, and we can, you know, debate whether this way of attracting FDI is a good way of attracting FDI. I have some issues about this way of attracting FDI, but we can talk about that in the question and answer period.

Thank you very much.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Professor Huang, for your very comprehensive introduction on the FDI story in China.

I now invite Harm Zebregs to give a somewhat different perspective on the FDI story. Harm is an economist in the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF. He`s been working on China for the last two or three years, and he`s been writing a number of papers on productivity growth in China and trade and investment.

MR. ZEBREGS: Thank you, Wanda. Good afternoon. Today I will discuss the main determinants of FDI in China. I will also briefly touch on the contribution of FDI to GDP growth and Total Factor Productivity growth in China, and I will conclude with some preliminary lessons that can be drawn from China`s experience.

We`ve already discussed the numbers a bit. As this chart clearly shows, China`s success in attracting FDI is mostly in the 1990s. After Deng Xiaoping`s tour of the southern provinces in 1992 where he reaffirmed China`s commitment to market-oriented reforms and policies to open the economy, FDI surged from almost nothing to $40 to $45 billion per year in the 1990s.

When you express FDI flows to China as a percent of GDP, it`s about 5 percent during the 1990s, and then it looks somewhat less impressive as other countries—for example, Malaysia have attracted even more, like over 8 percent of GDP in the early 1990s.

What also should be mentioned, of course, is that part of China`s success may be exaggerated because of round-tripping and misreporting. Round tripping is capital that originates from Mainland China and that returns to China disguised as FDI to take advantage of tax benefits and tariff benefits.

The sources of FDI. The main sources have been Hong Kong and Taiwan, and their importance declined somewhat in the 1990s as enterprises from the United States and the EU and Japan entered China in larger numbers. But, still, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, areas with a large Chinese Diaspora, account for over 50 percent of FDI flows to China.

The geographical distribution, Professor Huang already discussed this in terms of FDI as a percent of GDP.This is in absolute numbers, and here you can see that in absolute numbers, the coastal regions attract close to 88 percent of FDI inflows, whereas the central and western provinces get, respectively, 9 percent and 3 percent.

The determinants of FDI: In the economic literature many determinants of FDI have been identified I`ll only discuss those that are relevant for the case of China. I start with those determinants that related to a country`s economic structure. Market size, that`s an obvious one, I guess, in the case of China. Both at the national level and at the provincial level, market size has been found in empirical studies to be an important determinant of FDI.

There is an issue about two-way causality here because, on the one hand, FDI is attracted by a large market; at the same time, FDI contributes to GDP growth.

Market size has apparently been more important for FDI from Europe and United States than for FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which tends to be more export-oriented.

China has an abundant supply of cheap labor, and some analysts have suggested that the low-wage costs have been a very important factor in attracting export oriented FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan, especially because of rising wage costs in other economies in the region. And this has contributed to China`s rapid emergence as an important competitor in labor-intensive manufacturing.

Infrastructure: China`s infrastructure compares favorably to some other economies` in the region, but especially when you compare FDI flows to different provinces, it`s been found in several empirical studies that infrastructure has been an important determinant. The coastal regions have better infrastructure, and that has also contributed to their success in attracting large sums of FDI.

Scale effects: Another issue that`s found in many studies is that there`s a strong persistency in FDI flows, both to China and to individual provinces. This suggests that once a province has attracted a critical amount of FDI, they`ll find it easier to attract more FDI. This has been interpreted as a signaling effect.—Once there is a large enough number of foreign investors present in a certain area, it`s a signal to other investors that conditions are apparently good or are good enough in that area to do business, and that will subsequently attract more foreign investors.

The cultural and legal environment: We already saw that a large—or more than half of FDI came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore where there`s a large Chinese Diaspora. I`ll skip that.

Bureaucracy and legal environment: Many foreign investors perceive the Chinese legal system as ambiguous. Legal disputes are often settled through personal contacts rather than through formal contracts that are enforced by the court. This ambiguity in the law has in turn led to corruption. China scores actually relatively low on corruption and governance indicators in international comparisons, and this has deterred FDI from Europe and the United States apparently more than investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

It seems that familiarity with local culture has proven to be helpful in surpassing bureaucratic hurdles and corruption, and this is also one of the reasons that investors from Europe and the United States have often sought local counterparts so that they can do business in China.

Reduced barriers and preferential policies. The reduction of these barriers to FDI and policies to improve the investment environment have played a key role in attracting FDI in China, and from the beginning of the reform process, the Chinese authorities considered attracting FDI as an important goal as it would introduce new technologies, know-how, and capital, and it would also help develop the export sector. But initially the laws and regulations were too strict to attract significant amounts of FDI, as we saw in the first chart, where you could see that throughout the 1980s FDI inflows were not that dramatic.

These preferential policies have been in the form of tax concessions and special privileges — [tape ends].

— reduced enterprise income tax rates and tax holidays. The special privileges apply mostly to enterprises in open economic zones.

The open economic zones have played a central role in the gradual opening of the economy to foreign investors, and an important difference between these zones and other areas in China is the administrative decentralization that permitted investment decisions in open economic zones to be taken largely outside the state plan.

I`ll briefly discuss the impact of foreign direct investment on the economy.

FDI has raised GDP growth in two ways. One is through higher capital accumulation. That effect is relatively small and is estimated at about 0.4 percent per year of GDP growth during the 1990s. The more significant contribution is through higher productivity growth, and this has been estimated at about 2 to 2.5 percent of GDP growth during the 1990s, or about half of total TFP growth.

This chart shows that there has been a strong co-movement between the stock of FDI and total factor productivity. Also at the provincial level, there is a positive relation between FDI and TFP growth. The yellow dots are provinces.

FDI has also generated positive externalities through foreign-funded enterprises on the rest of the economy. These foreign-funded enterprises are the most productive enterprises. Their labor productivity is about twice as high as that of SOEs. And some preliminary empirical results suggest that the presence of foreign-funded enterprises is positively correlated with output growth of other enterprises in the same province.

FDI has created job opportunities. Foreign-funded enterprises currently account for about 3 percent of urban employment. FDI has also contributed to the transformation of the industrial structure. China`s trade growth during the reform period has been about 4.5 times as fast as world trade growth, and the foreign-funded enterprises have played a key role in this achievement. Their share in exports has risen from 1 percent in 1985 to between 45 and 50 percent currently.

What are the lessons for other countries? These are tentative lessons. More work needs to be done to draw firm conclusions, but, first of all, in my view, China`s success is not unique in the sense that factors that have been important in attracting FDI to China have also been important in attracting FDI to other countries. Large domestic markets, low-wage costs, improved infrastructure, all this complemented with the open FDI policies and especially the establishment of the open economic zones, they all seem to have been very important factors in attracting FDI. But they have also been important elsewhere.

Then there`s political commitment. China had to overcome several obstacles to FDI that were rooted in history and in ideology. And it did so by limiting the opening of the economy in a few localities initially and by giving autonomy to those localities where it allowed foreign-funded enterprises to set up a business. Thereby, it allowed a market-based economy to develop alongside a centrally planned economy, and although the decentralization created some problems, it also gave local authorities strong incentives to grow and to develop their economies.

The success of these initial experiments created strong demonstration effects, which then induced broad support for further reforms and opening up.

As we saw, FDI contributes to GDP and productivity growth. I think China is a clear example of that case.

Then, of course, there are some pitfalls. The tax incentive system in China has become increasingly complex and biased, and this problem has become even more prominent now with WTO accession. But the authorities are addressing the problem and are working towards unifying the tax rates for foreign-funded enterprises and domestic enterprises.

There are also regional income disparities. By focusing on special regions, China`s FDI policy has contributed to the growing income disparities between coastal and inland provinces, and the authorities are now giving priority to reducing regional income disparities by developing the western and central regions of the country, including by attracting FDI and by investing in infrastructure in these regions.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you very much, Harm.

Our next speaker is Dr. Nicholas Lardy. Dr. Lardy is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution here in Washington. He is a well-known China scholar, and he has written on Chinese trade and foreign economic policies. He was a member of the Yale School of Management in 1997 to 1999, and his most recent book is called "Integrating China in the Global Economy."

Nick?

DR. LARDY: Thank you. Thank you very much and thank you for inviting me to participate in the Forum this afternoon.

The previous speakers have given a very comprehensive overview of trends in foreign direct investment. My charge is really to look a little bit more forward and look at what the effects of WTO might be on the patterns that have been analyzed. Before I do that, though, very briefly I`d like to cover a couple of topics.

First, I tend to agree with Professor Huang that distortions in the financial system have been a very important determinant of the reliance on the external sector. You can see it in foreign direct investment. You can see it in capital markets as well, where the domestic stock markets have developed at such a slow pace that more capital by a very substantial margin is still being raised on external capital markets rather than on domestic markets, even though there`s a very high savings rate and a very huge pool of savings, as Markus` slides showed us at the outset. So there are some distortions, but yet I do think the policy issues that Harm has touched on are quite important. I think the two that have not been given sufficient attention in the remarks earlier I would say first is the processing program or the processing arrangement that China has put in place that allow foreign firms to operate at international prices within China by allowing duty-free imports of both capital goods and parts components and assemblies that are used for export processing. Processing has been an enormous driver of China`s trade growth. It`s certainly one of the most important reasons that by last year China was the sixth largest trading country in the world as compared to about the 37th largest trading country in the world when reforms began in the late 1970s.

Another policy I would just point to very quickly that hasn`t been mentioned, which I do think is important, and that is, convertibility on the capital account which has existed since 1996, which allows foreign-invested firms to repatriate declared dividends from joint ventures. I think that`s another thing that should be highlighted on the policy side.

I`d like to talk, before turning to WTO, also about two what I would consider to be myths that I think are fairly widespread. The first is that all of this processing activity and the role of foreign firms, which have been so important in driving exports, really in some sense are detached from the domestic economy, that they`re really an enclave. Obviously, the previous presenter doesn`t agree with that. He thinks there are productivity effects. But I think also one can look at what`s happened to value-added in the processing sector. And it is true the rate of value-added in the processing sector in the early 1990s was relatively low, but over the decade of the 1990s, value-added as a percentage of output in the processing sector roughly doubled. And what that means is as more and more foreign firms have been operating, they`re creating a demand. There has been the development of backward linkages. You get a lot of domestic firms that are now beginning to produce more parts and components that are going into processing activity that has generated all the exports.

So I think we`re seeing an economy where the integration or the linkages between the externally oriented processing sector and the domestic economy has increased over time.

The second myth which is very widespread these days, I think in particular, is whether or not foreign investment has been profitable for those firms that have undertaken it. There have been two recent books—one called "The China Dream" and one called "China`s Coming Collapse"—which really look at China`s experience of reform over the last 20 years, primarily through the lens, I would say, of foreign-invested companies, foreign joint ventures, and basically they pile anecdote on anecdote about all the foolish investment choices that foreign firms have made and all of the bureaucratic and other obstacles that the Chinese Government has placed in their way. And, of course, one can compile a rather large number of such cases.

But I think given the fact that foreign direct investment in China is now well over US$400 billion and involves tens of thousands of companies, in any universe that large one is bound to find all kinds of disastrous outcomes. And so I prefer to look at the more systematic data on what has happened to profitability of foreign-invested companies in China, and here, contrary to what a lot of people think, that nobody has ever made any money in China, if you look at the data that, for example, were in Alexander Lehmann`s recent IMF working paper, which looks at the profitability of American-invested companies in China, you find that profitability in the 1990s or the second half of the 1990s was about 14 percent after tax, which is almost the same as profitability of American investment in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. In other words, China does not look like an outlier at all; it rather looks fairly usual comparable to some other large emerging markets economies.

Chinese data, which cover all foreign-invested companies in China, tell a very similar story. Between 1994 and end 2000, profitability on a pre-tax basis of foreign-invested companies in China has averaged about 8 percent. Returns were somewhat higher in the early and mid-1990s; then they fell in the Asian financial crisis, and in the year 2000 they reached a new high of 9.9 percent.

Now, this does not take into account returns such as royalty fees and license payments that flow from foreign affiliates to corporate parents. It`s just simply looking at the profitability of the joint venture company itself. And on a comparative basis, these returns look even more favorable since almost all joint ventures in China are eligible for 100 percent tax exemption in their first two years of profitability and a 50 percent tax exemption on the next three years of profitability and a 17 percent rate of taxation going forward after the fifth year, although that may be subject to some adjustment, as has already been mentioned.

So I think the idea that the foreign sector in China is an enclave is overstated, and the idea that foreign investors in China aren`t making any money I think is also a misstatement.

Now, let me return to my assigned topic of what`s the effect on foreign direct investment in China, WTO entry for China, what will it be. I think the main effect of China`s WTO commitments is to liberalize foreign investment access, particularly in telecommunications, financial services, and distribution. And most of these sectors have been, by and large, closed to foreign investment.

For example, if you look in the late 1990s, the share of FDI going to financial services was 0.2 percent of the total. In distribution in the form of wholesaling and retailing, it was only about 2 percent. And manufacturing was about 55, 60 percent in most years in the second half of the 1990s.

Now, I think some commitments on rules-based issues such as TRIPs and TRIMs will make certain kinds of manufacturing investment in China more attractive, and eliminating a lot of other conventions in China like offset requirements and a number of other practices that have been common also will make investment in manufacturing more attractive.

But I do think that there will be a shift of investment towards the service sector because, as I said, the greatest liberalization is in financial services, telecommunications, and distribution. These are sectors of the economy that are underdeveloped by a variety of different measures.

So, on balance, I expect a moderation in the rate of increase in the inward flows of foreign direct investment. I know Goldman Sachs has predicted they`re going to be $100 billion a year by 2005. I quite frankly would be surprised. I think they will continue to go up at a fairly modest pace over the next three to five years, but I don`t think they`re going to be at $100 billion in only three years. The second trend, as I`ve already indicated, is likely to be a change in the composition with some gradual decline in manufacturing and a rise in the importance of services.

This will be moderated somewhat, as I`ve already indicated, by the fact that some of China`s commitments will make manufacturing more profitable. Even some of their distribution commitments will make investments in manufacturing more attractive, and also China is going to get the advantage of the phase-out of quotas that have governed world trade in textiles and apparel for several decades at the end of the year 2004, and I think there will be substantial additional investment in China by foreign firms, particularly in the apparel sector. So that will tend to offset what I see as the decline, the general trend for a decline in the manufacturing share.

But I think the policy environment remains favorable and, indeed, WTO has improved it substantially for foreign firms in China, and so I think that the outlook is moderate growth in the totals and some significant change over time in the sectoral composition.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you very much, Nick, for this forward-looking perspective on FDI in China.

Now I ask Markus to give the last presentation, which is also a forward-looking piece, looking at what are the implications of the liberalization on the capital account, including FDI, for the convertibility of the renminbi.

MR. RODLAUER: Thank you, Wanda. Given the advanced time, I`ll try to be very brief and race through. I`ll talk briefly about the outlook for convertibility of the renminbi and the further liberalization of the capital account.

As you all know, China has started in the late 1970s, early 1980s by opening up its foreign trade regime and foreign direct investment regime, and recently has then also opened a bit the portfolio inflows. Two recent milestones in external liberalization were the unification of the exchange rate system in 1994 and then the achievement of current account convertibility in 1996. That means today exporters or importers basically can do their transactions and get foreign exchange if they can prove they have an underlying current transaction.

However, there still are extensive capital controls. China basically maintains these very tight controls on the capital account for several policy reasons. First, it allows scope for an independent monetary policy and at the same time keeping a stable exchange rate. Second, it limits the vulnerability to capital flow reversals. And, third, it helps to protect certain domestic industries.

So in the current regime, as I said, FDI is fairly open, so it`s a very encouraging attitude to foreign investment. But one should still remember it`s very tightly regulated on an individual basis. For each deal, for each foreign investment that comes in, there are very precise conditions specified at the outset on employment, on the way of financing and how much money has to be brought in and so forth.

Then there are the portfolio and other capital flows like loans. Those, again, are very tightly, strictly controlled, and the way the control system works is that it`s segregated between domestic enterprises, domestic agents, and foreign enterprises, foreign agents.

So, for example, in the equity markets, there are two divided markets. One is for domestic residents and domestic renminbi. You can buy and sell stocks if you`re a Chinese citizen and have renminbi. This is one side of the market. The other side of the market is foreigners with foreign exchange who can buy another type of stocks. This has recently been opened up a bit. Some domestic residents now can buy foreign stocks, B market stocks, but still this principle pretty much applies to all the capital account transactions, loans and so forth.

So while these capital controls, as I said, are fairly comprehensive from a regulatory perspective, they have proven to be not watertight. Particularly during the Asian crisis, we have seen a very large amount of disguised outflows, and you`ll recall the numbers in the first table where we had about 50 billion of outflows, which really there isn`t a very good explanation for. These large outflows during the Asian crisis then prompted some tightening of these controls by the authorities, and they were somewhat effective but, still, we have fairly large unexplained outflows.

Now, where do we go from here? Should and will China further open its capital account? Clearly, there is a strong case for China to eventually open up the capital account with the ultimate goal of full convertibility. I don`t think it`s necessary to restate the quite well known overall benefits of convertibility. In one way, it`s unavoidable. Every advanced economy today has an open capital account, and, specifically what`s in there for China, clearly it would provide access to cheaper financing, new technologies, and for individual Chinese agents, access to much more diversified and risk-balanced portfolios; and in the end it would result in higher investment and higher growth. And also given the difficulties of actually keeping capital controls in place effectively, it is in the end, in the long run, inevitable, particularly since, as Nick has explained, WTO now has created concrete commitments of the authorities to integrate the financial sector much more.

Now, one could conceivably think that these financial sectors could become integrated but still keeping capital controls. But the more you integrate in the real side and have businesses coming in and out, the more pressure there will be to actually allow also a freer flow of capital. So, in the end, I think it will become inevitable, and it is, I think, a very appropriate long-term goal. And it is, therefore, not surprising, and appropriate, that China itself has stated explicitly and set itself these goals, this long-term goal.

While the benefits are very well known of capital account liberalization, so are, of course, the risks. Capital account liberalization affects financial stability through two main interrelated channels. On the one hand, there is the risk of overheating from very large capital inflows, and, on the second part, on a more micro level, opening up the capital account to free flows of capital across borders really allows excessive risk taking by individual enterprises, and especially banks. And so that from the micro level, it fosters, because of the well-known problem of asymmetric information, the risks that banks just go overboard and assume excessive risk and excessive liabilities.

These conditions raise the risk of sudden reversals of these capital flows, which could then lead to external payments crises and, therefore, large output losses and welfare losses.

A third risk which we have learned in recent years also is that initial shocks in one country to one economy, to one financial system, can be transmitted and spread much more easily to other countries through the so-called contagion effect if you have an open capital account.

Now, the Chinese authorities, of course, are very well aware of this risk and have, therefore, chosen a very deliberate and a very gradual path of capital account liberalization. And the authorities—when you ask them why is it that you keep your capital account still under control, what they mostly mention very specifically is that until their enterprises and their banks are reformed and have tight budget constraints and behave in a commercial manner, they are afraid that you would just have excessive borrowing, huge excessive borrowing, like we have had in many other transition economies, where increased latitude for enterprises and banks to make economic decisions without having the commercial orientation, the tight budget constraints, leads to huge excessive borrowing and, therefore, instability. And the second reason they mention is that their still fairly narrow capital markets could lead to very large volatility if you have uncontrolled flows across the border.

So how then to go about capital account liberalization? Well, two broad lessons from the country experience in recent years we have drawn is that those countries that have avoided crises are those that have strong macroeconomic policies and those that have a strong financial system. For China, on the macro side, I think they rank very well on one of three items, which is the external position. It`s very, very strong as we know. But there are two other issues that are still to be resolved. One is you need to have sustainable public finances, which in China is still something to work on given the problems in the enterprises and in the banks. And then also the choice of the exchange rate regime, the more you open up your capital account, the more it will be necessary to have a flexible exchange rate system. And also given the very large structural changes underway in the economy, our advice has been in recent years increasingly that at some point China will have to move from its currently fixed exchange rate or very stable exchange rate system to greater flexibility gradually.

So on the macro side, there is still some work to do on the public finances and on the exchange rate and monetary policy side. In the banking and SOE side,—certainly it`s key to rehabilitate the state-owned enterprises and the state-owned banks before you can think of substantially further opening up the capital account. You need a strong prudential system to contain excessive risk taking, and you need good accounting, auditing, disclosure standards to allow information to be transmitted to the markets, as well supervisors.

So, there is a large work program ahead to be able to reach this ultimate goal of convertibility, but I`d like to emphasize another point here, too. Our experience has been that opening up and liberalization is a very complex and interrelated enterprise. And while full liberalization has to come, of course, at the later stages, one cannot really wait with individual opening up until everything is perfect. Market reforms, as I said, are inter-dependent. For example, markets will not develop at all unless you open up a bit. So one has to do many of these things in tandem and gradually at the same time, which necessarily creates uncertainties and is certainly a volatile enterprise. But one has to start somewhere, and then the key is, of course, to monitor very closely, very carefully, and to be very flexible along the way and implement carefully.

China I think has got it quite right from the beginning in terms of the sequencing of what flows to open first and what last. It started with FDI. It then went over to portfolio equity flows in the stock market, and other debt-creating flows, particularly in the short end, should come last.

So, in conclusion, maybe three points. One is convertibility certainly is a valid long-term goal, and the authorities have adopted it. However, it needs to be very carefully phased in and supported by reforms and appropriate macro policies. It is, however, an inevitable process that will come, and certainly WTO accession has provided further impetus both for the actual integration of China`s economy to the rest of the world, for the further opening of the capital account, and for all the necessary supporting reforms.

Thank you.

MS. TSENG: Thank you, Markus.

I think we don`t have too much time left. I wasn`t a strong enough chairman, I think. But if you are available we can make about 20 minutes for questions and answers, and I`ll take questions from the floor.

QUESTION: This is primarily directed at Professor Huang and Mr. Zebregs, but other panelists may have some light to shed on it. It concerns the financial cost of FDI relative to other sources of financing, and I pose that question both at the firm level and at the macro level. Let me start with the macro level.

As Markus Rodlauer pointed out at the beginning, China is an odd animal from a macro perspective. It exports net savings and then imports huge amounts of investment capital in the form of FDI. It gets very little return on the foreign investments—on the investment in foreign reserves, U.S. treasury bills and other things like that, but it pays very heavily on the foreign loans and on FDI.

FDI typically is considered an expensive form of financing because foreign equity return expectations are typically much higher than the cost of bank loans.

What does it mean at the macro level for China as a whole? Is China as a whole on the margin losing huge amounts financially because of this inefficient domestic recycling?

And, secondly, because of the heavy dependence on FDI, do a lot of firms get stuck with high cost levels, high financial cost levels?

MS. TSENG: Professor, do you want to take that question?

PROFESSOR HUANG: Let me sort of get about this issue from a more micro level than macro level. I agree with you that FDI is a very expensive way of financing economic development. In part, it`s equity financing. It`s not contractual financing.

Nick was very perceptive in raising this issue about export processing. Here I think it`s very, very important to emphasize FDI is an ownership arrangement. By the IMF definition, FDI establishes foreign control of a domestic firm. There are other ways foreign firms can do business in China, interact with Chinese domestic firms on a long-term basis. One is export processing. It`s a contractual mechanism. In labor-intensive industries, you find prevalence of contractual mechanisms in practically every other country except in China—I mean Africa. In Africa, I think there are two issues: one is the low level of savings, so it is a sort of more macro story; there is also a low level of indigenous capabilities. A government firm in Hong Kong actually sets up operations in Africa, and they import labor from China to manage these operations.

Unless you believe the Chinese are not capable of sewing the sweater, knitting the things together, putting up these shirts and stuff like that, so you need to import foreign know-how through FDI, unless you believe that, then you think FDI makes a lot of sense.

I don`t believe Chinese are that incapable compared to Taiwanese, compared to Hong Kong entrepreneurs and workers in the 1960s and 1970s who relied mostly on contractual mechanisms.

And then the issue of financing comes in. Until 1998, Chinese private entrepreneurs could not export. That means they couldn`t, even if their production generated foreign exchange earnings, they couldn`t keep it.

The one way you can keep the foreign exchange earnings is to convert your business into a foreign-owned enterprise, therefore raising the demand for FDI. So the costs are extremely high, and you look at the recent developments in the Chinese current account, the dividend outflow, which didn`t leave the country because it comes through the capital account, but the dividend as a debit item has picked up substantially from 1994 to 2000. In the long run, I think China will pay a very, very high price for this way of attracting FDI.

And I have to say, I have to add a few positives. In 1997, the Chinese Government began to allow privatization on a smaller scale. The Chinese Government has allowed private financing to private firms beginning in 1998. In 2001, Jiang Zemin welcomed private entrepreneurs into the Communist Party. You actually see a dramatic impact on the FDI front.

Labor-intensive FDI has fallen sharply. Export processing, which Nick talked about, increased dramatically since 1997, and Nick probably—I don`t know if Nick knows these statistics. Export contract—export inflows, which basically is the buyer credit extended by a Hong Kong entrepreneur to a Chinese entrepreneur in China in Guangdong Province, in absolute terms it declined—it began to—in absolute terms. We are not talking about relative terms. It began to decline in 1989. 1989 is a significant year in China. There`s a lot of political turmoil, and the government went after the private entrepreneurs, politically and financially. So the private entrepreneurs couldn`t finance the production, relying on export contracts.

In the garment industry, out of 800 firms, 800 foreign joint ventures established in the 1980s, 500 of them were established in 1989 and 1990—two years that were not known for being friendly to FDI, but two years that were known for being hostile toward domestic firms.

So the private firms in those two years lacked property rights, security. They began to convert their operations massively into foreign-owned operations. Beginning in 1997, you see the reverse. You see export contracts began to increase dramatically, especially the export contract production engaged in by private entrepreneurs. The increase is from $60 million in 1997 to $500 million in 2000. We are talking about a dramatic increase by private entrepreneurs through contractual mechanisms—it`s a contract; it`s through contractual mechanisms—because the Chinese banks are more willing now to provide financing.

So all the contribution—I don`t disagree with Harm about the contributions that foreign firms made to export production, but that contribution has occurred in the very specific institutional context which we need to pay attention to.

MS. TSENG: Thank you.

I think I would just like to add one point. You know, in my experience with working on China, the Chinese authorities are very pragmatic. In many ways, yes, it may be a costly way of financing investment. But at the same time, I think FDI allowed the government to overcome existing imperfections in the economic system, most notably the weak financial system. As we know now, the non-state sector accounts for something like 60 percent of GDP, but the bulk of domestic credit through the domestic banking system co

[broker*709]

Auch Indonesien wird angeschnitten :-)

Meeting the Challenges for the Chinese Financial Sector: What Have We Learned from Other Countries?
By Stefan Ingves
Director, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department
International Monetary Fund
Second China Financial Forum
Beijing, China, May 15-16, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, for inviting me to this conference. It is an honor for me to discuss this important topic among such distinguished speakers and such an eminent audience. Securing financial sector soundness is among China`s most important structural reform challenges. The country`s long-term growth prospects and macroeconomic sustainability are affected by it. At the same time, the financial sector has the potential to serve as an agent of economic change and transformation in the more immediate term—a point I will return to later in the discussion.

Today, I going to first take stock of financial sector reforms in China and identify some of the challenges that lie ahead. Then, I shall to turn to lessons learned from other countries on macroeconomic and financial stability and bank restructuring. Finally, drawing upon those lessons, I shall try to offer some thoughts on the medium-term reform agenda in China.

Financial Sector Reforms and Key Challenges

Over the past decade, much has been achieved in building the institutions, markets, and legal infrastructure for a market economy in China, although a large unfinished reform agenda remains.

The financial sector has been transformed from a monobank system to a more diversified, multilayered system with a central bank at the helm.
State banks were relieved from policy lending duties through the creation of policy banks, and the banking law laid the foundation for commercially-oriented banking.
Interbank, securities, equity, and foreign exchange markets have been established and progress has been made in the use of indirect instruments of monetary policy.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 underscored the importance of developing a credit culture and strengthening market discipline, heightening the priority accorded to financial sector reform, including:

Greater transparency. The government has announced increasingly more reliable statistics on banks asset quality. Similarly, aided by external audits, state banks have disclosed more detailed and accurate financial statements.
Better prudential regulation. Improvements have been made to prudential rules, particularly with respect to loan classification. The recent adoption of a new loan classification system and plans to implement corresponding provisioning requirements represent critical steps in improving the accuracy and credibility of microprudential indicators.
Stronger bank balance sheets. Banks have been recapitalized and their nonperforming loans (NPLs) have been transferred to newly established asset management companies (AMCs).
Internal reforms. State banks are strengthening governance and credit risk management, including by establishing boards of directors and by upgrading credit risk analysis and approval practices. The PBC`s goal of reducing NPLs in state banks gives further impetus to deepening internal reforms.
Perhaps most importantly, the economic leadership in China is cognizant of the challenges ahead and has a credible strategy for reform. Thus, the basic elements for bank restructuring—leadership, institutions, regulations, and strategy—are largely in place or in progress.

Despite progress made, important weaknesses in the financial sector remain. Non-commercial lending to SOEs has continued, albeit on a diminishing scale; prudential regulation and enforcement still lag behind international best practice; banks are undercapitalized and their risk management, lending practices, and internal controls remain inadequate; and the stock of problem loans is very large.

Against this background, what are some of the key challenges that lie ahead?

One of the most central economic policy challenges is to strike a balance between stability and reform in the financial sector. Clearly, there is no single "right" place on this continuum. Ultimately, the issue is about balancing the economic, financial, and social costs in the short term with potential gains in the long term. Allowing problems in the financial sector to fester may preserve stability in the short run, but could lead to pronounced distress, and higher costs later on. At a minimum, sufficient progress has to be made to avoid deepening existing vulnerabilities, while building the capacity to manage financial distress when and if it occurs in the future.

A key challenge will be to develop a credit culture and contain the flow of new NPLs. With the stock of problem loans already high, it is crucial to avoid a further build-up. This goal is interdependent with developing a credit culture and with improvements in corporate governance, state enterprise reforms, and sustaining economic growth. Fostering a credit culture and better governance, in turn, hinge on a reliable legal framework supportive of private sector activity.

A closely related task is to resolve the stock of distressed debt in the economy. In essence, distressed debt is the counterpart to a portion of the capital stock and enterprises that need to be restructured or written off and closed. Once these restructurings and write-offs take place, resources—currently tied up in NPLs—will be freed up to finance new investment and consumption opportunities.

In the longer term, the financial sector needs to adapt to a new economic environment. The Chinese economy is becoming increasingly market-oriented and opening up to foreign competition, including in financial services. The financial sector in particular may have to compete for creditworthy borrowers and skilled banking personnel. As flexibility is introduced into the exchange rate and interest rates over time, financial institutions will have to become adept at pricing credit risks and managing market risks.

Another long term challenge is to deepen capital markets in order to diversify the sources of investment financing. Greater equity financing can help transform the ownership structure of the economy, attract strategic investors capable of restructuring their firms, and bolster market discipline. As with bank lending, the efficiency of equity financing will be a function of the quality of investment decisions made by investors and their ability to monitor and manage firms under their ownership through effective accounting, disclosure, and governance standards. Capital markets would also provide opportunities for risk diversification by investors, whose savings are still primarily invested in low-yielding bank deposits or in shares on the relatively undeveloped stock market.

What Have We Learned About Macroeconomic and Financial Stability?

Let me now turn to some of the key lessons learned over the past decade. The financial crises in the 1990s, starting with the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, followed by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and the crises in Russia and Brazil, have provided a wealth of experience from which to draw lessons. The IMF`s intensified financial sector surveillance activities—primarily through the Financial Sector Assessment Program, jointly with the World Bank—have also helped to assess member countries` financial stability.

Much of the experience over the past decade highlights the critical importance of establishing fiscal and monetary control as the bedrock of macroeconomic stability. Fiscal and monetary control, in turn, ultimately rest on containing public sector financial imbalances, including quasi-fiscal lending through the financial system. Although a discussion of the principles of sound fiscal management are beyond the scope of this presentation, quasi-fiscal activities can become major threats to securing and maintaining monetary control.

This is why I mention the elimination of quasi-fiscal lending as the first pillar of fiscal and monetary control. Using the banking system to subsidize real activities undermines the development of a credit culture and has long been established as a key source of banking unsoundness. Soft loans to the agricultural sector in Turkey and to large state enterprises in Russia, for example, were major sources of financial fragility in both countries in the run-up to their recent financial crises. Moreover, quasi-fiscal lending undermines the integrity of public financial flows and stocks, which may be burdened by contingent liabilities from the financial system that are difficult to quantify. Similarly, the difficulty of distinguishing between commercial and soft loans impairs the quality of banking indicators, which may consequently underestimate the depth of asset quality problems. Therefore, support for loss-making enterprises or special public investment programs, if unavoidable, should be extended directly through the budget to improve transparency and avoid impairing banking soundness.

A second pillar of fiscal and monetary control is to clearly define the state`s role in the financial system. The state plays a vital role in preserving financial stability by containing moral hazard through prudential regulation and supervision and by protecting depositors through a safety net, including deposit insurance and central bank emergency lending. In doing so, however, it is critical to draw a line in the sand. The potential scale, scope, and duration of the state`s financial guarantees—for example, on the types of financial institutions and classes of liabilities that will be protected—ought to be spelled out in advance. Making explicit the extent of the state`s support for the financial system can reduce moral hazard in the economy, so long as it is credible. Credibility will be established or lost ultimately by demonstration. Moreover, over time, the state guarantee should be replaced, for example, by an adequately funded risk-based deposit insurance scheme, once the financial system is placed on a sound footing.

A third pillar—and an essential prerequisite—of fiscal and monetary control is reliable and timely information on the financial and nonfinancial sectors. Decision-makers in central banks, supervisory agencies, and finance ministries need adequate financial information to monitor and diagnose financial sector problems and to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency of individual institutions. Similarly, banks and investors need good financial information to assess and monitor the creditworthiness of borrowers and issuers of shares.

Admittedly, even with the best possible data, distinguishing between liquidity and solvency pressures may not be possible in crisis situations. Still, without good information on the financial and corporate sectors, fiscal and monetary control become much more difficult to secure, as the cases of Indonesia and Thailand demonstrate. Like most of their regional peers, most Indonesian and Thai firms did not adhere to international accounting standards. The absence of reliable data on financial sector asset quality and corporate sector indebtedness prevented the timely detection of growing corporate leverage and financial system fragility in both countries. Hence, by the time investor confidence was shaken in 1997, it was impossible to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity among banks; a problem which was compounded by deposit runs.

Steps that can be taken to improve the quality of information include (1) strengthening accounting and disclosure standards; (2) making use of external audits by reputable international accounting firms; and (3) requiring disclosure of more detailed financial statements, including on asset quality. Indeed, the failure of Enron in the United States demonstrates the type of colossal failures that can occur in the absence of reliable and transparent financial statements and that no country can take the quality of information for granted. Given the length of time and amount of effort required to develop the infrastructure for reliable financial information, these reforms should start early on.

A fourth pillar is the specific rules on accessing central bank credit facilities that are well-defined, clearly articulated and publicized, and consistently applied. This principle applies to all types of central bank credit provided in the course of regular monetary operations or extended to the government, other public authorities or private companies, either on a regular or emergency basis. Although there is a tradition among central banks to maintain secrecy in emergency lending, there is a growing consensus in support of a rules-based approach. Under this approach, the central bank specifies the preconditions for providing support, but its lending decisions are still made on a case-by-case basis. This way, the central bank maintains a degree of constructive ambiguity.


In the same vein, the modalities and lines of accountability for central bank lending need to be established. Central bank lending, unless well-managed, can pose serious risks to macroeconomic and financial stability. Therefore, the precise modalities of lending, including its size, maturity, purposes, and eligible institutions and collateral need to be spelled out ex ante, as well as the trigger points for when and in whom lending decisions are vested. The role of collateral can be particularly important when liquidity and solvency pressures are difficult to distinguish. Moreover, decisions to lend to systemically important institutions at risk of insolvency or without sufficient collateral should be made jointly with the fiscal authorities.

In times of systemic crisis, the usual preconditions for liquidity support, such as solvency and collateral requirements, may have to be suspended. In an environment of panic and instability, the emergency lender`s resolve should not be doubted by market participants. Emergency lending decisions in a systemic crisis, however, should involve all relevant authorities and be an integral part of a comprehensive crisis-management strategy designed to restore confidence. Regular training exercises involving senior officials on crisis management can enhance the capacity of policymakers to effectively respond to potential financial distress.

In the absence of clear lines of accountability and rules on access and ex post disclosure, central banks can be subjected to undue political pressure, leading to the exercise of excessive forbearance and to the abuse of the lender of last resort (LOLR) facility. In Hong Kong, SAR, for example, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has a policy statement on LOLR outlining in detail the preconditions and instruments for support, as well as the procedures for exceptions. Where exceptions are concerned, decisions to grant or deny support should be made at predetermined levels of authority to ensure a clear demarcation of responsibility, and that any discretion is matched by adequate checks and balances. Again in Hong Kong, if the potential borrower is unable to comply with the preconditions, then the prior approval of the Financial Secretary is required. HKMA`s long-standing institutional credibility, built in part on the transparency and stringency of central bank lending, was an important factor in Hong Kong SAR`s resilience during the Asian financial crisis.

A fifth pillar is central bank autonomy, without which clear lines of responsibility and accountability are difficult to establish. There is now considerable evidence that suggests that central bank operational autonomy plays an important role in financial stability. Clearly, central bank autonomy needs to be accompanied by accountability to ensure central bank objectives are met.

Developing instruments and markets for effective control of money supply is an important complement to central bank autonomy and lending operations. For example, central banks often need to withdraw liquidity injected into the economy through the LOLR facility to ensure money supply growth is consistent with low inflation. Effective intervention and sterilization, in turn, depend on the availability of indirect monetary instruments and deep money and securities markets.

The experience of Indonesia once again highlights what can go wrong when the institutional prerequisites for monetary control are missing. By the time financial sector problems grew into a full scale crisis, the central bank had little choice but to provide liquidity support, but lending was not adequately controlled, for example, by ensuring that central bank credits were commensurate to the loss of deposits. Indonesia was not alone in providing large amounts of liquidity support to problem banks; but unlike Korea and Thailand, it lacked the monetary instruments and deep markets needed to sterilize central bank liquidity injections. Its loss of monetary control led to high inflation and a collapse of the rupiah.

Macroeconomic stability also depends on policy credibility, founded upon a reliable judicial system, transparency, and well-defined institutional responsibilities.

Strong and reliable legal and regulatory frameworks are the foundations upon which policy credibility and financial stability rest. In their absence, economic and financial policies can not be implemented. Legal and regulatory enforcement is needed to ensure action is taken against those that violate their prudential and financial obligations, and to act as a credible deterrent for all market participants.

Lack of transparency was a significant contributor to the emerging market crises in 1990s—especially to those in Mexico and Thailand, prompting a great deal of change since then. The international community`s efforts to prevent future financial crises—through reforms such as the development of international codes and standards—are built partly on a commitment to greater transparency. There is a consensus that openness in economic policymaking and in disseminating data on economic and financial developments is a key component of reform programs designed to strengthen economic fundamentals. Similarly, central banks are devoting sizable time and resources to developing a consistent monetary strategy—whether they are focused on a monetary or an inflation target—and are using their strategies to communicate their intentions and actions both to the public, local and regional governments, and the participants in the decision making processes over monetary policy. In Europe, historically the Bundesbank, and more recently the European Central Bank, used their clearly defined monetary strategies and targets—in both cases "monetary targeting"—to enhance their autonomy, accountability, and credibility. Central banks more generally are providing greater insight into monetary policy objectives and decisions, and the instruments and operations used to achieve them. Many central banks publish inflation and financial stability reports, and have deepened their contacts with a wide range of institutions—including companies, industry associations, labor unions, and universities—which help the public and markets understand monetary policy decisions and operations. To achieve transparency in monetary policies, central banks have had to reorganize themselves and allocate adequate resources to external relations and economic research to build transparency.

Policy credibility also requires clearly defined institutional responsibilities, and where necessary, their reallocation. For example, the central bank ought to have the mandate and operational autonomy to pursue price stability as its primary objective. Only then can it be held accountable for its performance. Similarly, the supervisory authority should have the authority to adopt prudential regulations and intervene in financial institutions. Otherwise, it cannot be held accountable for the soundness of the financial sector. Shared or divided responsibilities in these areas often create conflicts of interest and undermine systems of accountability.

What Have We Learned About Bank Restructuring?

Now I would like to turn to the lessons learned from other countries on bank restructuring. Since the late 1980s, the emergence of many transition economies in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union has provided fertile ground for learning in this area as have the numerous financial crises, including in my own country, Sweden.

In managing financial crises, bank restructuring is an essential prerequisite for, but also highly dependent on macroeconomic stabilization. Given their interdependence, restructuring and stabilization need to be pursued in parallel. The essential preconditions for fiscal and monetary control, including those outlined above, need to be met as soon as possible. The formulation and implementation of a credible and comprehensive stabilization and structural reform program are also needed for stable prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, which are prerequisites for market participants to value firms and assets, and execute transactions. Even where a full-blown financial crisis has not occurred, as was the case in many transition economies, relative price changes, including the transition to market-based interest rates, must be effected before bank restructuring can begin in earnest; otherwise firms and collateral become impossible to value. Similarly, enterprises must be subjected to hard budget constraints to avoid distortions in relative prices. In the absence of profit-maximizing behavior by firms, prices may not reflect the true cost and demand for goods and services, distorting relative prices in the economy.

The first step in launching a successful bank restructuring program is to undertake a diagnostic review of financial institutions to assess their true condition, separate viable versus nonviable institutions, and identify candidates for restructuring.

On the basis of the financial sector assessment, the authorities must then develop a comprehensive reform strategy that includes (1) a long-term vision for the financial sector, including its size, institutional composition, and ownership structure; (2) a commitment and timetable for privatization, including after banks have been taken over by the government following a crisis; and that (3) coordinates banking and state enterprise reforms. Pursuing state enterprise and financial sector reforms simultaneously is particularly important in transition economies, where the scale and scope of both corporate and bank restructuring are large and highly interdependent. On the basis of the reform strategy, the institutional framework and incentives need to be strengthened to achieve reform objectives. This involves several elements:

First, an out-of-court mechanism for corporate debt restructuring should be established to help restore debt-repayment capacity among viable firms and to recover NPLs. Recourse to informal mechanisms often becomes necessary during large-scale corporate restructuring because formal insolvency procedures are often too cumbersome and judicial systems have limited capacity to process a large number of cases. Moreover, the liquidation bias built into Western insolvency laws may result in the closure of companies whose value as going concerns are greater than their liquidation value, provided that they are given the right incentives and relieved from the burdens—including social welfare obligations—placed on them during the command economy era. Throughout the process of corporate restructuring, it is important to facilitate foreign investment in restructuring firms; both as a source of capital and as a source of management know-how and technology transfer to catalyze the transformation of companies into profitable competitors.

In this context, an important question arises as to who should lead the way in enterprise restructuring. There are two main candidates: the government, usually through a centralized AMC or bank restructuring agency; or creditor banks, including through bank-owned AMCs or work-out units. There are compelling reasons why banks and particularly their work-out units may be best suited to spearhead the restructuring of loss-making enterprises, especially in transition economies. Banks, more than anyone else except enterprise managers, are likely to have more access to inside information on a debtor company`s prospects through their existing credit relationship. More importantly, it is easier to structure banks` incentives towards rapid restructuring, asset resolution, and privatization. After all, banks potentially have the most to gain from the success of restructuring debtor enterprises and recovering distressed assets, especially if their own privatization is in prospect. But if banks are charged with the task of leading enterprise restructuring and resolving distressed debts, these tasks should be carried-out by a separate unit or wholly-owned entity to relieve banks of the burden of managing bad loans and to allow them to conduct normal banking operations.

Some argue that banks in transition economies may not be well-equipped to take the lead in enterprise restructuring given their limited experience with operating commercially. While this may be true in varying degrees, the same holds true for the government as well. Moreover, banks ultimately must learn to live on a commercial basis. Although banks with the wrong incentives can take excessive risks, it is easier to provide commercial incentives to banks and their managers compatible with sound banking and eventual privatization than it is to provide such incentives to public officials. This does not rule out a role for the government. Quite the contrary, the government must develop a consensus behind the restructuring program, formulate the policies and laws needed to strengthen the institutional framework, and decide when and how to use public funds to support state enterprises and recapitalize banks.

Perhaps most important is that the AMC or work-out units—whether centralized under the government or decentralized under banks—are organized according to available professional and institutional expertise in the economy and in a way that maximizes incentives for asset resolution. For example, while the scarcity of skilled expertise may call for a centralized approach to debt restructuring, the information-content of borrower and lender relationships and the potentially large number of distressed borrowers may favor a decentralized approach. If a decentralized approach is chosen, skilled personnel shortages may be offset by making use of foreign expertise through sub-contracting, joint ventures, or technical cooperation agreements. Regardless of the particular approach adopted, AMC or work-out units should be managed by professionals whose primary objective is to maximize asset recoveries. Moreover, it is crucial that the accounting practices of the AMC or work-out units are transparent and reliable enough to provide a basis for measuring and monitoring their performance and for peer analysis when many AMCs or work-out units are in operation.

Second, in order for out-of-court mechanisms to work, they need to be backed up by a supporting legal framework, which clearly defines the rights and obligations of creditors and debtors. A credible framework for corporate insolvency and creditor rights also serves to deter uncooperative behavior in out-of-court restructuring negotiations.

A third and critical component of the institutional framework for bank restructuring is adequate prudential regulation and supervision consistent with international best practice. Particularly important is the implementation of a loan classification and general portfolio review system to allow regulators to detect trouble early on and take prompt corrective actions, where necessary. Prudential regulations also need to ensure an appropriate level of disclosure to protect depositors and investors and to enable the exercise of market discipline. Such reporting systems need to be supported by in-depth onsite examinations and external audits to ensure compliance with regulations.

A crucial complement to prudential regulation and supervision is regulatory enforcement. Without it, policy and institutional credibility weakens, moral hazard grows, and manageable systemic deficiencies fester unchecked, creating the conditions for a crisis. The main challenge in enforcement is to insulate it as much as possible from political interference. In some countries, vesting key enforcement issues in one institution is most effective, provided that it has the independence and stature to resist pressure. In others, there is a strong argument for vesting enforcement decisions in a banking commission, consisting, for example, of the finance minister, the governor of the central bank, and sometimes securities regulators. Such a commission is often more difficult to manipulate than an institution where authority ultimately rests with one person. Regardless of the mechanism chosen, achieving the outcome of strict regulatory enforcement is critical.

Once the institutional framework and incentive structures have been strengthened, the restructuring of banks should be pursued vigorously. Here the challenge is to provide credible and effective incentives to the management of viable institutions to change and restructure. Incentives for restructuring can be provided, for example, by developing time-bound restructuring agreements between the supervisory authority and banks, against which management is held accountable, and in which the conditions for recapitalization are delineated. These agreements should include specific financial performance and prudential compliance targets, and benchmarks for restoring solvency and capital adequacy, including through conditional injections of public funds. It is critical to maximize the government`s leverage associated with the prospective injection of funds by conditioning bank recapitalization on specific achievements on operational restructuring by bank management. Restructuring agreements require well-defined benchmarks on progress in risk management, credit risk analysis and staff training and can be complemented by including financial incentives for management and employees to improve performance, especially for banks earmarked for privatization.

As with the corporate sector, once bank restructuring has progressed enough and solvency has been restored, selling selected financial institutions to strategic foreign investors can provide equity capital and catalyze operational restructuring through the transfer of technology and modern management to domestic financial institutions. Many transition economies, including Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have benefited greatly from foreign investment in their financial sectors.

Let me emphasize that piecemeal approaches do not work. Similarly, attempts to grow out of the problem are also likely to fail, as the case of Japan demonstrates. Countries have had to intervene in the financial sector repeatedly owing to the incomplete nature of previous restructuring efforts, costing the government much more than necessary if the real sources of fragility had been addressed early on. Recapitalizing banks before restructuring, for example, risks wasting more resources. On the other hand, restoring solvency and capital adequacy to financial institutions is necessary to ensure that bank managers have the incentive to improve the net worth of their banks. Hence the challenge is to pursue restructuring and recapitalization simultaneously in a manner that maximizes the government`s leverage and gives bank management incentives to perform along the way.

Finally, it is important to adopt the overall reform strategy to the country circumstances. Each country faces the task of reform against the backdrop of various opportunities and constraints, including the pace of economic activity, fiscal flexibility or the lack thereof, and the social and political impact of economic dislocation. The challenge is to coordinate and sequence policies in a way that minimize the constraints and permit the implementation of reforms at the maximum sustainable speed.

Let me now turn to Poland, whose approach to financial sector restructuring was both novel and exemplary, and which helps illustrate some of the issues discussed earlier. While there is a wide range of lessons to be learned from the experiences of several transition economies, Poland, which has some similarities with China, is an interesting example to explore. Among transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland was among the largest, with an economy composed of a substantial industrial sector and a large, underdeveloped agricultural sector. Not unlike China, the Polish banking system was dominated by state commercial banks, and burdened by a high level of NPLs—with nearly one-third of total loans nonperforming, which were owed principally by state enterprises. Clearly, there are also important differences between China and Poland, including the scale of their economies and restructuring challenges, and the relationship between central and local governments.

The Polish program was comprehensive and sought to achieve bank and enterprise restructuring at once. The strategy rested mainly on an informal out-of-court settlement approach under which banks kept NPLs on their books and were charged with restructuring and recovering bad debts through negotiated work-out programs with debtors. Banks were not allowed to extend new loans to debtors in default unless a restructuring agreement was signed and an acceptable business plan was presented. The out-of-court restructuring framework was enshrined in the Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks, which was in force from March 1993 to March 1996. By design, the law had a built-in sunset provision to reinforce the one-off nature of the exercise and to maximize the incentive of all parties to cooperate and restructure with in the prespecified timeframe.

In effect, debt was used as control device for banks to play a major role in corporate governance. The law gave banks temporary powers to lead out-of-court restructuring agreements with distressed enterprises. Banks were equipped with three tools. Bank-led conciliation agreements (BCAs), the sale of bank debts in the secondary market, and the option to convert bad loans into equity in state enterprises. BCAs were the most original and far-reaching feature of the program. Banks assumed de facto leadership in administering the agreements—even though a creditor council comprising the bank, the Ministry of Finance, and other creditors had to be established—and a simple majority based on outstanding debts was sufficient to impose a solution on dissenting creditors and approve the BCA. While the BCA was in effect, the borrower was protected from formal insolvency proceedings; but if the borrower failed to fulfill its obligations, banks were empowered to terminate the agreement, paving the way to pursue debtors in court.

In order for banks to act as an effective agent for monitoring, controlling and restructuring enterprises, banks too had to be subjected to effective control and discipline. This was achieved through improvements in prudential regulation and supervision and the discipline brought to bear by intensifying competition.

The program included two additional noteworthy features. First, nonviable enterprises whose immediate closure was considered too costly from a social welfare perspective were not included in the program. Instead, their delinquent loans were transferred from the originating bank to the government resolution agency, the so-called Industrial Development Agency (IDA). Then, these firms were restructured or liquidated with conditional support provided through the IDA, which itself was financed through the budget. Second, insolvent state banks were recapitalized based on thorough portfolio reviews early in the program, giving bank management strong incentives to maximize loan recoveries. These incentives were complemented with financial incentives, which included stock options in state banks, all nine of which were earmarked for privatization within 3-5 years.

The decentralized and comprehensive approach to dealing with the twin problems of bank and enterprise restructuring in Poland was effective in transforming the economy and establishing the foundation for a sustained economic growth. During the period of 1991-1997, bank NPLs declined and the number of creditworthy enterprises rose substantially.

Some Further Thoughts on the Medium-Term Reform Agenda in China

Based on what we have learned from other country experiences, let me offer some thoughts on the medium-term reform agenda in China. In doing so, I am mindful of the difficulty of transposing strategies or solutions from other countries to China. China`s situation is clearly very unique. In particular, the scale of China`s transformation surpasses that of all of Central and Eastern European economies combined. Hence there are both tremendous opportunities and challenges. While the size and diversity of the Chinese economy and its labor force magnify the challenge, they also present the opportunity to experiment locally with certain approaches to various problems, before they are adopted at the national level.

Against this background, the future reform agenda may include some of the following issues:

First, fiscal control could be consolidated by containing quasi-fiscal lending and the flow of bad loans. Achieving this objective, however, is complex and involves decisions on when and how to deal with loss-making enterprises and weak financial institutions. The simultaneous pursuit of bank and enterprise reforms may be the most effective route, but requires the design of a credible set of market-based incentives and rules of accountability, underpinned by strong legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks. Part of the solution lies in holding the management of banks accountable for internal bank restructuring in the short run, and transferring ownership to the private sector in the long run. Privatization, however, should be preceded by a strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision to preempt excessive risk taking by banks, and by a well-designed, risk-based deposit insurance scheme that protects small depositors.

Second, the framework for distressed debt resolution could be established, including through an out-of-court mechanism for debt restructuring. The role of the recently formed AMCs is part of this issue. The framework could potentially give banks a more active role in a coordinated effort to tackle bank and enterprise restructuring, given their interdependence.

Third, somewhat greater exchange and interest rate flexibility could enhance macroeconomic policy flexibility and allow banks to price risks more effectively. There are, however, a number of important sequencing issues to be considered in making such a move. For example, banks need to be prepared to assess and price credit risk before interest rate liberalization, yet they cannot be expected to acquire such skills without enough incentive and ability to actually price those risks. Similarly, greater exchange rate flexibility will require the development of an alternative anchor for monetary policy, and the markets and instruments for foreign exchange management, yet these markets and instruments can hardly develop without flexibility in interest and exchange rates in the first place. Hence, moving towards greater flexibility needs to be carefully sequenced and accompanied by supporting measures, including enhanced prudential regulation and supervision to minimize risks.

Finally, capital account liberalization and financial sector restructuring and market development should be managed in an integrated, coordinated, and well-sequenced fashion. Permitting and attracting foreign direct investment into the financial services industry could serve as a catalyst for bank restructuring through the transfer of know-how and technology and by intensifying competition. Similarly, liberalizing portfolio flows over time can help deepen capital markets and strengthen the role of market discipline in the economy, provided that supporting prudential measures are adopted to contain greater foreign exchange risks associated with a higher volume of capital flows.

It is easy to offer suggestions on how to go forward. To create change on the ground takes vision, a lot of hard work, and a willingness to execute policies at all decision-making levels in the economy. With these words I conclude my reflections. Thank you again for this opportunity to share some thoughts on these issues. I would be happy to take questions.

[broker*709]

Wo soll das nur hinführen ?

We must not blindly attack IMF: Economic Minister


JAKARTA (JP): Coordinating Minister for Economic affairs Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Djakti called on Monday for all people not to blindly critisize and attack International Monetary Funds (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) since it wouldjeopradize Indonesia`s position in dealing with its abundant debts problems, reports said.

Speaking during a sesion with the House of Representatives (DPR) on Monday, Dorodjatun reiterated the fact that "Indonesia is facing tough problems of foreign debts and that we must make the best of the opportunity that we have, and therefore we must notblindly attack IMF, World Bank or ADB."

Dorodjatun urged all elements of the country to respect the multilateral institutions such as IMF or World Bank since such bodies represented political systems of hundreds of established countries.

"If the donor countries think that Indonesia treat them that way.. of course it would position Indonesia in difficult spot," Dorodjatun said.

Also attended the hearing with Commission V DPR were TradeMinister rini Suwandi and Finance Minister Boediono.

Previously chairman of the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) who is once former economic minister Kwik Kian Gie has expressed concerns about the way IMF handled Indonesia`s foreign debts and have called the government to review its cooperation with IMF since it is no longer suitable for thecountry.

IMF has been widely criticized and described by prominent Indonesian non-government organization as a giant loan shark which also has played a big part in determining the course of Indonesian economic and political conditions. (edt)

[broker*709]

Das Geld kommt !

News Brief No. 02/51
June 21, 2002 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Sixth Review of Indonesia Program, Approves US$358 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its sixth review of Indonesia`s performance under a SDR 3.638 billion (about US$4.7 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 275.24 million (about US$358 million) from the arrangement, which would bring total disbursements under the program to SDR 1.987 billion (about US$2.6 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"The conclusion of the sixth review under the Extended Arrangement between Indonesia and the IMF is based on the continued strong performance under the program since the fifth review. Market sentiment and the macroeconomic outlook have improved. With continued implementation of the reform agenda, Indonesia has the opportunity to create the conditions for more rapid economic growth and a sustained reduction in poverty.

"Indonesia has made steady progress toward achieving its core economic objectives. The substantial fiscal adjustment envisaged in the 2002 budget is an important step toward ensuring medium-term fiscal sustainability. Although the first quarter deficit target was exceeded by a small margin, corrective measures have been adopted to bring budget execution quickly back on track. The authorities recognize that downside risks remain to the budget outlook and have reaffirmed their commitment to take additional measures as needed to achieve the annual budget target.

"The strengthening of the rupiah is encouraging, and inflation has declined in recent months despite increases in administered fuel prices. As a result, monetary policy has become more supportive of the economic recovery.

"Financial sector reforms continue to advance. The government has presented to Parliament a comprehensive plan for divesting the remaining IBRA banks. Conclusion of the sale of Bank Niaga, followed by the sale of Bank Danamon and Bank Lippo, will be important milestones under the program. Good progress has also been made towards resolving the long-standing BLBI issue, which will be an important step toward normalizing the financial relations between the government and the central bank.

"Enhanced asset recovery is essential to reduce public debt and promote corporate restructuring, and to this end, IBRA is pushing ahead with a new program of accelerated loan sales. Timely and resolute implementation of the government`s strategy to increase compliance under the bank shareholder settlement agreements will also be important. The pace of privatization has lagged, however, and accelerated progress will be needed in the second half of the year.

"Legal and judicial sector reforms remain critical to a sustained improvement in the investment climate. A recent high-profile controversial ruling underscores the need for an acceleration of reforms in this area. More forceful progress is needed, notably with respect to creation of an anti-corruption commission, reform of the commercial court, and revision of the bankruptcy law," Ms. Krueger said.

[broker*709]

Die IBRA ist schon wieder aktiv !

IBRA willing to work with APP creditors
Tuesday, June/25/2002 16:43:59 GMT+7.

Indonesia`s powerful Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) said on Tuesday it was willing to work with creditors of debt laden Asia Pulp and Paper on a debt workout plan for the company.
But IBRA chairman Syafruddin Tumenggung said the agency would only sit down for talks after Sinar Mas, APP`s parent company, met this month`s debt payment deadline on part of its own $1.3 billion owed to the state.

"After Sinar Mas pays the 20% by June 30, I told the creditors that I am willing to sit and talk about it (a workout plan)," Tumenggung told reporters at a lunch meeting.

Around one billion dollars of this $1.3 billion are owed by APP which itself is also struggling to restructure a massive $12 billion in debts borrowed from mostly foreign creditors.

Tumenggung said some of APP`s creditors had recently met him to discuss the possible restructuring but all agreed Sinar Mas should make its own debt payment first.

"I told them I would agree to work with them on the restructuring of the rest of Sinar Mas debts, particularly those related to APP, on three conditions," Tumenggung said.

"First, that Sinar Mas must pay 20% by the June 30 deadline, second, that I will not share the pledged assets, and third, that the recovery rate should be around 70%."

"And they agreed, so perhaps sometime next week I will sign some kind of MOU with them on this".

Tumenggung said Deutsche Bank , which together with BNP Paribas had recently filed a legal action in Singapore to replace the current APP management, was not among the creditors who had met him.

Both Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas, which are seeking to get debts worth over $200 million repaid, jointly filed a request at the Singapore High Court on Monday for the appointment of a judicial manager for APP.

Judicial management typically involves the appointment of an accounting firm to go through the books and begin restructuring.

Both said their intention was to facilitate the restructuring of APP, not to seek its liquidation.

Bankers said the renewed attempt might have been spurred by IBRA, which had said it would start seizing assets if Sinar Mas failed to make its key debt payment by June 30.

Tumenggung said he was not concerned with the legal action, only on Sinar Mas`s looming deadline.

"I`m only worried if they (Sinar Mas) don`t pay".

[broker*709]

Der IMF gibt wieder kräftig Gas


News Brief No. 02/120
December 5, 2002 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Seventh Review of Indonesia Program, Approves US$365 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its seventh review of Indonesia`s performance under a SDR 3.638 billion (about US$4.8 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 275.24 million (about US$365 million), bringing the total amount drawn under the arrangement to SDR 2.262 billion (about US$3 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"Indonesia has made continued progress in program implementation since the last review. Macroeconomic developments in 2002 have been favorable, with steady economic growth, moderating inflation, and a strengthening balance of payments. However, the economic outlook has deteriorated as a result of the recent terrorist attack in Bali. The attack poses new challenges, which must be met, on the economic front, through the continued firm implementation of the government`s reform program.

"Indonesia has made important progress during 2002 in laying the foundation for a durable improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals. After a small breach in the first quarter, 2002 budget execution has been brought back on track. The recently-approved 2003 budget strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring further fiscal consolidation to reduce the public debt and providing support for the economy in the aftermath of the Bali attack. The budget preserves development and social spending, while eliminating remaining fuel subsidies (with the exception of those on household kerosene). The budget also targets an appropriately ambitious non-oil and non-gas revenue increase through improvements in tax administration and additional tax policy measures.

"The prudent conduct of monetary policy has contributed to a further decline in inflation, which is expected to reach single digits by the end of the year. While there was some short-term weakness in the rupiah immediately following the Bali attack, the underlying strength of the currency has allowed a further easing of monetary conditions since the last review. A continued cautious monetary stance will be important to ensure that the program`s inflation objectives are met.

"Continued recoveries of bank and state enterprise assets are an important element of the government`s strategy to reduce the level of public debt. IBRA`s broad-based loan sale program has been successfully concluded. The priority now is to press ahead with the sale of IBRA`s remaining assets, and to collect payment from cooperating debtors under the revised terms of the bank shareholder settlement agreements, while taking enforcement actions against debtors who remain noncompliant with their settlement agreements. A sustained effort will also be needed to consolidate the momentum of the government`s privatization program, which was reinvigorated with the sale of a small stake in PT Telkom and the launching of the sale of a strategic stake in Indosat.

"The momentum of bank divestment has been restored with the sale of Bank Niaga. The focus has now shifted to the sale of a majority stake in Bank Danamon, to be followed in 2003 with the sale of Bank Lippo and, thereafter, the remaining IBRA banks.

"Accelerated progress in implementing legal and judicial reforms and establishing the rule of law is critical to improve governance and strengthen the investment climate, which continues to suffer from the widespread perception of judicial corruption and weaknesses in the legal framework. Establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, ongoing reform of the commercial court, and revisions to the bankruptcy law will be important milestones in this effort," Ms. Krueger said.

[broker*709]

Sie wollens Ende 2003 ohne den IMF packen !

Mal sehen

Government told to abandon IMF next year

JAKARTA (JP): Raden Pardede, an economist with the Indonesian Mutual Fund (Danareksa), said here on Thursday that Indonesia was capable of running its economy without the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when its contract with the Fund ends in December 2003.

"If the government is ready, we can run our economy without the IMF," Raden told Antara, adding that toward that end, the government must make preparations for meetings of the Paris Club of creditor nations in 2004 and 2005 to reduce pressure on the state budget and balance of payments.

To become self-reliant without the IMF, Raden proposed, the government must concentrate its efforts on intensifying bilateral egotiations to obtain as much money in loans and aid as possible.

He noted that the government could still raise local funds by, among other things, transferring funds in the investment fund account (RDI) from state enterprises to the government. It could also offer bonds to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank so as to access large-scale funds, he added.

In addition, he said, the government could still raise its tax revenues by ensuring administrative discipline without raising tax rates, which could have an adverse impact on the competitive edge of industry.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[broker*709]

Die Weichen wurden vom IMF gestellt - jetzt liegt es in der Hand von Indoland

Consultative Group Meeting for Indonesia
Remarks by Mr. Daniel Citrin
Senior Advisor, Asia & Pacific Department
International Monetary Fund

January 21, 2003

1. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for the opportunity to address you once again on the occasion of the annual CGI meeting. Since the last occasion more than a year ago, there have been a number of domestic and external events that have had significant impacts on Indonesia`s economic and financial circumstances. The following stand out of course: the weakening in global growth in the aftermath of September 11th, and more recently, the tragic events here in Bali in October. Such events would have profound effects on any country, let alone one in the midst of recovery from crisis. It is at such a time that strong support from the international community for Indonesia is all the more important.

2. In my remarks today, I will address the following topics. First, I will take stock of developments over the last year, assessing them in relation to the key policy priorities that were identified in the Government`s economic program for 2002 supported by the IMF. Second, I will provide you with our assessment of Indonesia`s short-term economic prospects in light of the current global environment and in the wake of the Bali attacks. Finally, I will address what we see as the main priorities for 2003.

3. Before doing so, however, let me briefly report on the status of Indonesia`s EFF program, which is now on its fourth and final year. The seventh review of the program was completed last December, following satisfactory progress in policy implementation scheduled for that review, and we have now initiated discussions for the eighth review, which will set out the government`s economic program for 2003 in detail. We will continue these discussions following the conclusion of this meeting, with a view to completing the review by the end of the first quarter of this year.

Achievements During 2002

4. In reviewing Indonesia`s performance during 2002, it would be useful to remind ourselves of the challenges facing the government when it formulated its 2002 economic program in late 2001. Market sentiment had deteriorated as a result of the September 11th attacks, global growth was weakening, and there was a perception that the pace of structural reform implementation in Indonesia would slow.

5. In light of the challenging economic environment, the following main policy priorities were identified for achieving macroeconomic stability and promoting growth:


Making decisive progress towards fiscal sustainability and a reduction of Indonesia`s large public debt burden;


Implementing a monetary policy aimed at bringing inflation back to single digits;


Making headway in restructuring and privatizing assets held by the public sector;


Strengthening efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the banking system and restore a functioning credit mechanism; and


Accelerating efforts to improve the investment climate through governance and legal reforms.

6. How has performance in the past year measured up? On the macroeconomic front, performance has been positive. Major progress was made towards restoring a healthy and sustainable budget position. The budget deficit is estimated to have fallen to under 2 percent of GDP, below the program target of 2.5 percent of GDP, and down from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2001. As a result of this success, and helped by the appreciation of the rupiah, 2002 also witnessed a large reduction in Indonesia`s public debt burden. The public debt-to-GDP ratio fell from nearly 90 percent at the end of 2001 to almost 70 percent by the end of last year. Further in this area, the Government in November restructured a significant portion of its debt held by state banks, lengthening and smoothing the maturity of its debt repayment profile in coming years.

7. On the monetary policy front, Bank Indonesia was successful in containing the price pressures that emerged in 2001, and although the government`s goal of reducing inflation to single digits by year-end was not quite reached, single-digit inflation is likely to be achieved early this year. Lower inflation and a stronger rupiah have enabled BI to lower interest rates —from nearly 18 percent in December 2001 to under 13 percent at present—thus providing support for the economi recovery.

8. Let me now turn to the implementation of reforms in the three other priority areas, where performance was more mixed. Even there, however, there was good progress on a number of fronts. Let me highlight a few:


IBRA asset sales accelerated significantly during 2002, raising Rp 46 trillion and exceeding IBRA`s ambitious recovery target for the year. IBRA has now disposed of over half of the original portfolio of NPLs taken over from weak and closed banks. These asset sales play a major role both in restoring corporate finances and in financing the deficit and paying down public debt.


The Government has also made progress toward enhancing recoveries under the settlement agreements with former bank shareholders, reaching understandings with a number of shareholders on an accelerated repayment schedule in exchange for a reduction of interest and penalties. It is now important for the government to take a firm stand against uncooperative shareholders who remain delinquent in meeting their obligations. Seeking economic justice in this area matters not only for the public purse, but also sends an important signal that the rule of law is taken seriously by this Government.


There has also been progress on the bank restructuring and divestment agenda. Perhaps most noteworthy here were the successful sale of the government`s majority stakes in two banks and the launching of the sale of a third. I believe these successes were key milestones that significantly buoyed investor sentiment towards Indonesia. In addition, as part of the Government`s program to strengthen the banking system, the mandatory capital adequacy ratio was increased to 8 percent last year, while the financial solvency of a number of banks was restored through an injection of some additional public funds and a merger.


Even in the area of privatization, which had lagged earlier in the program, the Government recently sold as you all know a major stake in its international telecommunications company—Indosat. As a result, the Government exceeded its 2002 privatization target of Rp 6.5 trillion, collecting Rp 7.7 trillion.

9. Notwithstanding all of this progress, the investment climate remains weak. Although financial market conditions improved considerably, several high-profile legal cases focused observers` attention on the slow pace of reform in the legal and judicial sphere. The recent establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission is welcome, but much will depend on its implementation and operation. Decentralization, which on the whole has proceeded relatively well, has also raised problems for both existing businesses and prospective investors, in the form of new and conflicting regulations and taxes. Investors have also expressed increasing concern about the framework for labor regulations and the trend of increasing minimum wages. And recently, the terrorist attack in Bali has heightened concerns related to internal security. All this means that the Government must do all it can to improve the investment climate and build growth prospects in the period ahead.

Indonesia`s Current Economic Prospects

10. Indonesia`s economic prospects for 2003 in particular will depend on a number of factors. Late last year, particular attention was focused on the impact of the Bali attacks. Together with the Indonesian authorities, we have reviewed the latest indicators and updated the outlook. I should highlight that there is still much uncertainty regarding the likely response of tourism. The main features of our current assessment is as follows:


Financial markets showed surprising resilience to the Bali attack, coming under modest pressure in the immediate aftermath but stabilizing quickly thereafter. After an initial weakening, the rupiah strengthened back below Rp 9,000 per dollar, and by year-end the stock market had rebounded to above its pre-Bali level. Interest rates were held steady in the weeks following the attack and have since been reduced modestly. To a large extent, these positive trends reflect a generally favorable assessment of the Government`s efforts on the security front as well as progress late last year on the economic reform agenda.


That said, the economic outlook no doubt is less favorable than before the Bali attack. With a significant drop in tourism likely, we expect a direct impact on growth of around one half of a percentage point. This comes on top of the effects of a slowing global economy since the previous forecast. All told, we are of the view that growth in 2003 will be about 1 percentage point weaker than previously foreseen, or down to 3½-4 percent.

Priorities for 2003

11. Let me now turn to the key policy priorities for this coming year. While much has been achieved, the reform agenda remains unfinished. Growth, while positive, remains disappointing relative to the 6 percent pace needed to make significant inroads to reducing poverty and unemployment. The overriding objectives for the 2003 program therefore are to: (i) consolidate recent gains in macroeconomic stability; (ii) strengthen public debt sustainability over the medium term; (iii) continue to make progress in restoring a sound banking sector capable of performing its critical financial intermediation function; and (iv) enhance the investment climate through a range of reforms.

12. The government has already made a good start toward meeting these challenges:


The approved 2003 budget, which targets a deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP, represents an appropriate balance between keeping the budget on a firm path of lower deficits while maintaining adequate support to the economy in the face of a weaker growth picture. In this connection, let me touch briefly on the Government`s reduction of fuel subsidies, which has been on the minds of all of us in recent days. At their peak in 2000, these subsidies cost the Government around 6 percent of GDP. With so much of the nation`s resources spent on subsidies that were in any case not well targeted on the poor, less was left to spend on high-priority areas like health, education, and infrastructure. Reducing subsidies is of critical importance, not only to reducing the burden of public debt, but also to allow the Government to reallocate spending to where it matters most. At the same time, the Government has taken complementary actions to compensate the most vulnerable groups in society for the associated price increases, as detailed in the World Bank report for this meeting.


IBRA has already put in place its program for disposing its remaining assets in 2003, and it will need to continue to work forcefully in this area.


In the area of bank divestment, the Government has already announced its intention to divest majority stakes in the remaining IBRA banks this year. Completing these sales would represent a major achievement, as it would entail the return to majority private ownership of all private banks taken over during the crisis. With regards to state-owned banks, the Government is also preparing to moving ahead with their divestment and restructuring.


Efforts are already in train on the privatization front as well, with the divestment process having been launched for stakes in several public enterprises. These efforts not only raise important budget financing but also allow state-owned enterprises to benefit from the efficiency gains that are likely to accrue from private ownership.

13. In addition to these efforts, we are confident that a prudent monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation further will be maintained, and that additional steps to enhance bank stability through continued improvements in supervisory capacity and the regulatory framework will be taken.

14. In order to lay a firm foundation for Indonesia`s economic recovery, however, it will also be essential to begin to tackle more decisively the problems related to the investment climate. Historically, Indonesia`s considerable economic strengths have made it an attractive destination for foreign investment: a large domestic market and labor force, abundant natural resources, a solid infrastructure, and a strategic location among some of the world`s major trade routes. However, foreign direct investment flows into Indonesia remain at less than half their pre-crisis peak. Investment by Indonesians also remains weak, with the result that through September of 2002, gross fixed capital formation was still running about 35 percent below its pace in 1997.

15. What then is most needed to restore market confidence and support investment in Indonesia? Legal and judicial sector reform must be a critical element of any strategy to produce sustained improvement in the investment climate. Ensuring the effective operation of the newly-created Anti-Corruption Commission, passage of amendments to the bankruptcy law, and continued efforts to strengthen the commercial court are specific priorities. A sensible labor market policy that strikes a balance between protecting workers` rights and preserving a flexible labor market is also important in light of recent concerns that have been expressed. Continued care will need to be taken to ensure that decentralization does not lead to an unduly complex and unstable regulatory framework that discourages investors. Customs and tax administration, which are often reported to have deteriorated in terms of transparency, predictability, and fairness, are also frequently cited as disincentives for investment. These are some key areas where the Government will need to make a serious commitment to addressing problems if it is to have a significant impact on the overall investment climate.

Concluding Remarks

16. To conclude, thanks to the significant achievements that have been made this past year, the Government has begun to lay a solid foundation for Indonesia`s economic recovery from the crisis. While the Bali attacks pose a significant concern for the outlook, Indonesia stands a good chance of weathering the incident with only a modest impact. However, without further progress on critical reforms as outlined above, there is a risk that growth over the medium term will not reach the pace needed to generate enough jobs and reduce poverty in a meaningful way.

17. We have provided our assessment of what is needed over the next year for Indonesia to cross the bridge towards a sustainable recovery. Implementation of such an agenda will require broad-based commitment from the Government and its partners in Parliament and elsewhere. As we have seen in the last few weeks, the pre-election environment in 2003 poses greater challenges for the Government as it seeks to implement its reform program. The economic team will need to work even harder to convince the public of the merits of its program. With such a show of commitment, we believe that the Government`s economic program for 2003 would deserve the continued strong support of the international community.

18. Finally, the Government is now considering its strategy for 2004 and beyond, following the expiration of the current Fund arrangement. We certainly share in the wish that Indonesia can complete its recovery from the 1997-98 crisis as soon as possible, thereby no longer needing to seek recourse to exceptional financial support from the international community. But this will require that Indonesia redouble its effort in the implementation of the reform agenda. In the meantime, together with the Indonesian authorities, we will assess the outlook as it evolves, and in due course consider all options.

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Und die nächste Tranche vom IMF ist im Anmarsch

Govt to get $450 million from IMF


Dadan Wijaksana, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Following two weeks of discussion, the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) wrapped up on Thursday the country`s new economic reform programs, outlined under the eighth letter of intent (LoI), to clear the way for the disbursement of some US$450 million in IMF loan.

Under the reform programs, the government must increasingly focus on speeding up growth and making significant inroads into reducing poverty and unemployment, the fund said in a media release.

It also added that there was agreement on overriding priorities -- consolidating gains in macroeconomic stability, strengthening public debt sustainability over the medium term, continuing progress in restoring a sound banking sector and improving the investment climate.

"With strong implementation, the mission team believes these policies will help attain the overarching goals of boosting economic growth and reducing poverty in Indonesia," the statement said.

Consequently, enhancing the investment climate through legal reforms would form a major part of this year`s program.

Although successful in stabilizing the country`s macroeconomic indicators, progress in reforming its judiciary -- one of the main prerequisites for returning confidence to investors -- has been slow.

As a result, investment, both from foreign and domestic sources has remained scarce.

Consequently, this has hampered efforts to accelerate economic growth. If this continues, the economy would only grow at a mediocre level.

The economy is targeted to grow by around 4 percent this year, which is deemed insufficient to absorb rising unemployment. New jobseekers alone are estimated to reach 2.5 million annually.

The LoI contains a set of economic targets and a reform agenda that must be completed within a certain period of time by the government in exchange for the IMF money.

It will be presented to IMF management for approval before being finalized and signed. The letter will then be submitted to the IMF`s executive board for approval.

The last disbursement, amounting to $365 million, was made in December to bring the total loans the country has taken out so far to around $3 billion, from a total loan package of $4.8 billion agreed between the government and the IMF in 1999.

This means that $1.8 billion is left from the program, slated to expire this year.

The government is under pressure not to extend the IMF program on the grounds that the IMF`s medicine has failed to cure the country`s ailing economy.

[broker*709]

Gute Nachrichten - auch ohne den IMF gehts weiter

Economists say RI is better off without IMF


Dadan Wijaksana, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Campaigns to end the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the country intensified on Wednesday after a group of 35 leading economists said the economy would fare better without the IMF.

Rizal Ramli, former chief economic minister who leads the coalition, told reporters that once the IMF gets its hands off Indonesia, the economy would expand stronger and even return to pre-crisis levels of around 7 percent by 2005.

"The sooner Indonesia parts with the IMF the better for the economy, as without the IMF means that we have the flexibility to do a lot of things," Rizal said, adding that Indonesia hardly benefited from the presence of the IMF as most of its programs had simply pushed the economy deeper into crisis.

His remarks pour fuel on the prolonged debate over whether the country should extend its economic reform program with the IMF when it expires by the end of the year.

Signed in 1999, the program allows the country to obtain around US$5 billion in loans in return for implementing a number of key economic reforms.

The involvement of the IMF was meant to help Indonesia`s economy get back on track after the 1997 financial crisis.

The IMF assistance has benefited the country, not only in terms of financial aid, but also in terms of gaining support from other foreign countries and institutions for debt relief purposes -- such as the Paris Club and the London Club -- whose judgments on Indonesia`s economy are always based on the IMF`s assessment.

And since the cash-strapped country is still highly dependent on the foreign debt rescheduling facilities, many have raised the need for the government to extend the IMF`s role in the country. Currently, the country`s outstanding sovereign debt amounts to around $74 billion.

However, Rizal said such arguments were baseless.

"We are a rich-resource country. If we could maximize that, who needs the Paris Club and others, we could even generate a huge amount of funds of our own to stimulate the economy."

Rizal said there are currently various on-hand funding sources available that could generate huge revenues to finance economic activities, without having to beg other countries or institutions.

"If we are serious, in the next three years, we can generate a total of Rp 524 trillion (US$58 billion) from domestic sources, which we can use to generate higher growth through stimulus".

Of the total, he went on, some Rp 96 trillion could easily be generated directly from sources such as funds that are stashed in "account No. 69," and investment funds account (RDI).

Account 69 is where the government amasses the gains coming from the margin of oil revenues between the actual prices and the ones targeted in the state budget.

Elsewhere, Rizal said the coalition groups together around 35 economic experts from various institutions. Included are Didik J. Rachbini, Hartoyo Wignyowiyoto, Revrisond Baswir, Sri Edi Swasono, Aviliani and Dradjat Wibowo.

[broker*709]

Aber die aktuelle Tranche tut uns noch richtig gut

Press Release No. 03/43
March 28, 2003 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Eighth Review of Indonesia Program, Approves US$469 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its eighth review of Indonesia`s performance under a SDR 3.6 billion (about US$5 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 344 million (about US$469 million), bringing the total amount drawn under the arrangement to SDR 2.6 billion (about US$3.6 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"Indonesia has continued to make good progress in implementing economic reforms under the program. Economic growth has been sustained, inflation has declined, the banking system has been strengthened, and asset recoveries have advanced. Nevertheless, weaknesses in the investment climate continue to hold back a more robust economic recovery. Sustained efforts for further reform will be necessary in the context of the 2003 program, to lay the basis for more rapid economic growth.

"Indonesia achieved a significant fiscal consolidation in 2002, with the budget deficit outturn well below the target of 2.5 percent of GDP. The 2003 budget builds on this accomplishment, and is expected to contribute to a further decline in public debt levels, while preserving key development expenditures. The sharp rise in oil prices led to a partial re-introduction of fuel subsidies. It will be important to reduce these subsidies as soon as possible, to enable a reorientation of expenditure priorities toward key social and development needs.

"Inflation has declined steadily in recent months and the rupiah has remained stable, allowing monetary policy to be more supportive of economic recovery. Looking ahead, monetary policy will need to continue to strike an appropriate balance between supporting the economy and contributing to a further reduction in inflation risks.

"Strengthening the financial sector is a central element of the program. With the launch of the sale of Bank Danamon, further progress continues to be made toward the goal of returning to private ownership banks that were taken over during the crisis. Further steps are required to strengthen the monitoring, governance, and accountability of state banks as they are prepared for divestment. Over the longer term, a key step will be the development of a comprehensive plan for the reform of the financial sector safety net, including the creation of a deposit insurance agency and the transition to an independent financial sector supervisory agency.

"The increased momentum of recoveries from IBRA loan sales and state enterprise divestment should be maintained. A key element of the strategy to maximize IBRA recoveries is the strict enforcement of shareholder settlement agreements, along with the initiation of legal actions against noncompliant former bank owners. In general, further progress in privatization is encouraged.

"Further progress in implementing legal and judicial reforms is critical to strengthen governance and improve the investment climate. Key steps will include operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Commission, strengthening the commercial court, and adopting amendments to the bankruptcy law," Ms. Krueger said.

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Gute Nachrichten

Indonesia—Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding

Jakarta, Indonesia, March 18, 2003

The following item is a Letter of Intent of the government of Indonesia, which describes the policies that Indonesia intends to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF. The document, which is the property of Indonesia, is being made available on the IMF website by agreement with the member as a service to users of the IMF website.


Mr. Horst Köhler
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431

Dear Mr. Köhler:

We have continued to make progress in implementing our economic program, with increasing signs that our efforts are laying the basis for a durable recovery. Over the past year, the rupiah has strengthened, interest rates have fallen along with inflation, and our balance of payments position has improved with a further build-up in international reserves. Notwithstanding the tragic events in Bali last October, economic growth has been sustained. These positive developments were facilitated by a cautious monetary policy and continued fiscal consolidation, as well as further advances in structural reforms.

Our program for 2003 aims to strengthen growth and employment prospects by enhancing competitiveness and fostering a more attractive investment climate. As described in the attached Memorandum of Economic Policies (MEFP), our strategy rests on the continuation of prudent fiscal and monetary policies, with an emphasis on sound debt management in support of fiscal sustainability, and the vigorous implementation of the structural reform agenda.

With respect to the monitoring of the 2002 program, we are pleased to report that all end-December quantitative performance criteria were met, and that good progress was made against the structural benchmarks for November and December. We request a waiver for the nonobservance of the end-December structural performance criterion concerning financial issues related to the BLBI, whose implementation awaits completion of ongoing parliamentary consultations. In view of our performance under the program, we request completion of the eighth review under the Extended Arrangement.

We will continue to consult with the Fund on economic policies during the remaining period of the arrangement. The next review of the program is to be completed by June 2003, at which time we will reassess the 2003 program in light of developments in the first quarter, in particular budget prospects and tax and spending policies, and will identify additional structural benchmarks for the second half of 2003, as needed, to ensure that the objectives of the program are achieved.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti
Coordinating Minister for
Economic Affairs /s/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boediono
Minister of Finance
/s/
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Syahril Sabirin
Governor
Bank Indonesia




Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies
Government of Indonesia and Bank Indonesia
1. We have made significant progress over the past year in implementing our economic program. Despite the setback from the tragic events in Bali last October, the economic recovery continues and macroeconomic stability has been maintained. Economic growth in 2002 was positive for the fourth consecutive year, and real GDP has now recovered to its pre-crisis level. At the same time, the balance of payments has strengthened, with a further build-up in international reserves.

2. These positive developments were facilitated through sound macroeconomic management and further advances in structural reforms. The fiscal deficit outturn was well within the government`s 2002 budget target, contributing to a reduction in public debt. Important strides were also made in improving tax administration and debt management. Bank Indonesia`s (BI`s) prudent monetary policy stance led to a decline in inflation which, together with the rupiah`s stability, allowed interest rates to decline in support of the recovery. In the financial sector, bank divestment gained momentum with the sale of two banks taken over during the crisis and the launching of the sale of a third. IBRA asset recoveries and privatization receipts exceeded expectations. In the legal sphere, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established.

3. This Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) lays out our economic strategy for 2003, the final year of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) launched in January 2000. While much has been achieved under the EFF, strengthening growth and employment prospects by enhancing business competitiveness and fostering a more attractive investment climate remains a key challenge. Our strategy for 2003 rests on the vigorous implementation of the reform agenda, with special emphasis on increasing non-oil exports and investment, sound debt management in support of fiscal sustainability, and the rehabilitation and development of vital infrastructure. Against this background, our program for 2003 is framed around the following objectives:

consolidation of recent gains on the macroeconomic front through the continued implementation of prudent fiscal and monetary policies;


enhancement of financial system stability by further strengthening the banking system, state bank governance, and the regulatory framework; and


improvement of the investment climate through legal and other structural reforms.
4. In addition to the policies outlined in this memorandum, we will continue our efforts in other areas, including rice policies, state-owned enterprise reform, natural resource management, civil service reform, and poverty reduction.

I. Macroeconomic Framework and Policies

5. The basic macroeconomic objectives for 2003 are as reflected in the assumptions for the budget approved by Parliament in November 2002. The framework targets GDP growth of 4 percent, and aims to reduce inflation to 9 percent by year-end (Table 1).

Monetary Policy

6. Monetary policy will be geared toward maintaining a downward trend in inflation and preserving broad exchange rate stability. Consistent with this, and the need to support the economic recovery, BI has designed a monetary program around a target range for base money growth of 13-14 percent for end-2003. We will review the monetary stance throughout the year to ensure that monetary policy remains consistent with the program`s inflation objective.

Fiscal Policy

7. The government is firmly committed to further fiscal consolidation to reduce public debt to more manageable levels, while maintaining spending on infrastructure and boosting the provision of key social services. In 2003, we are targeting a budget deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP, as approved by Parliament in November. We are aiming for a significant increase in non-oil tax revenues and higher outlays on priority social and development programs. In January, we also adopted a package of tax measures to further stimulate economic activity, that comprised a reduction in luxury taxes on consumer goods, interim relief from the VAT for businesses, and an elimination of income taxes for minimum wage workers.

8. The strategy to mobilize non-oil tax revenues centers on a continuation of tax administration reforms initiated in 2002. In this connection, the initial operations of the Large Tax Payer Offices (LTOs), now under way since last September, have been promising. We will expand operations of the LTO in Jakarta to more taxpayers while we evaluate an expansion to other regions at a future date. The new electronic payment system will be extended nationwide in 2003. In addition, we plan to expand the coverage of corporate tax audits, intensify the collection of arrears, enhance control of nonfiling taxpayers, and take steps to increase the taxpayer population. The governance framework of Directorate General of Taxation (DGT) will also be strengthened and extended to all tax offices nationwide in 2003. The action plan for 2003 is shown in Annex A; a medium-term reform plan is also under preparation. We have also initiated a comprehensive strategy to reform customs administration, focusing on strengthening governance, facilitating trade, and combating smuggling and tax evasion. Detailed plans for the 2003 reform agenda will be ready for implementation by June.

9. Our aim remains to further reduce fuel subsidies, which are not well-suited to helping the poor, and to shift our assistance to more targeted schemes. The approved budget for 2003 had planned for the elimination of fuel subsidies with the exception of those on kerosene consumed by households. However, in view of the spike in international oil prices resulting from the prevailing abnormal world market conditions, the government has decided to smooth the adjustment of domestic fuel prices and temporarily restore some subsidies until market conditions stabilize. Our deficit target for 2003, as well as spending in priority areas, will not be affected. At the same time, we have expanded programs to improve the welfare of low-income groups, and are examining ways to improve their targeting on the poor.

10. To enhance the efficient use of public funds, the government intends to take a number of steps to strengthen expenditure management. The initial focus will be on strengthening the treasury and budget functions of the Ministry of Finance. A blueprint for this reform, along with the timetable for its implementation, is expected to be finalized in April. Once the blueprint is in place, the government intends to establish dedicated task forces by July to review the reform of the government`s payment and receipts system, consolidation of bank accounts, and the restructuring of budget preparation procedures.

Financing and Debt Management

11. With regard to financing of the budget, we expect domestic sources, consisting of receipts from IBRA asset sales and privatization, to provide 1.4 percent of GDP. This leaves a net external financing need of 0.4 percent of GDP to be met by commitments from official creditors received at the recent meeting of the CGI, from Paris Club rescheduling, and by other official loans.

12. Our public debt management strategy aims to lower the budget`s debt service costs, and to minimize refinancing risk by improving the maturity profile of our debt. The Government Debt Securities Law has been enacted, and an interdealer market has been established to provide transparent price discovery for market players. We are strengthening the regulatory framework and developing the market infrastructure needed to enhance the liquidity of the secondary market for government securities. We have also issued decrees setting out the procedures for issuing government securities, enabling auctions to begin on a regular basis. Moreover, the structure of our debt has been significantly improved by the reprofiling of government recapitalization bonds held by state banks, and the debt stock has been reduced by using asset recoveries to redeem bonds. We intend to take further steps to reduce the burden of the public debt through exchange offers and debt buybacks. The agreement between the government and BI concerning financial issues related to the BLBI has been presented to Parliament. We will work closely with Parliament to ensure its timely implementation, which will reduce the public debt burden while preserving the financial soundness of the central bank.

Decentralization

13. While significant progress has been made, further work is needed to strengthen the fiscal, legal, and administrative framework for decentralization. A priority will be to strengthen the procedures governing the issuance of regional regulations that have the potential to conflict with the national interest. To this end, we intend to continue our efforts to enforce existing reporting requirements and ensure compliance with government directives canceling problematic regulations.

14. The development of an effective regional budget reporting system also remains a priority. While some progress toward this objective was made in 2002, with the finalization of the regions` 2001 accounts, further efforts will be necessary in the coming year to establish a comprehensive quarterly reporting system. The strategic aim remains to produce regular quarterly budget reports within six months of the end of each quarter. To ensure timely data submission, sanctions such as postponement of transfers will be imposed on regions that fail to comply with the reporting requirements. We have prepared a preliminary report on the regional budget outturn for the first half of 2002, and aim to complete a report with coverage of at least 85 percent of the regions by end-April; we also aim to produce the full year report by June 2003. During the first half of the year, the government will issue generally accepted government accounting standards to ensure uniform reporting standards across regions. Existing regulations on local government financial management will be modified in line with these standards. New government accounting systems are being developed to support the implementation of the forthcoming standards, and will be introduced on a gradual basis over the course of the year.

15. A ministerial decree has been issued extending the existing moratorium on local government borrowing (except through the center) until end-2003. This is needed to provide additional time for the reporting system to become fully operational. In the meantime, we are working to strengthen the borrowing framework for regional governments. We are also putting in place a framework to enable regions to borrow from external sources through the central government.

Fiscal Transparency and Public Sector Governance

16. Improving fiscal transparency and public sector governance remain priorities in 2003. We will continue our efforts at budget consolidation. All remaining funds not previously consolidated will be brought under the control of the central government by June 2003. The State Audit Agency (BPKP) will continue its routine audits of government agencies with a view to identifying any additional nonconsolidated funds. The main findings of the audit of the Reforestation Fund completed last year have been submitted to Parliament, and corrective action plans adopted. The primary actions are to integrate its bank accounts into the Treasury and bring their use under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The first progress report on the implementation of the corrective action plans will be published by September 2003. In addition, the main findings of the audits of the two investment funds (RDI and RDA) completed last year have been submitted to Parliament. Necessary corrective action plans will be developed by the government in consultation with Parliament.

17. The performance of the public sector is also being strengthened through the ongoing program of performance audits of state enterprises: (i) corrective actions identified under the second round-audits are being carried out (for Garuda, Pelindo II, Jasa Marga, Telkom, PT PN-IV), and a progress report on their implementation has just been published; (ii) the third-round audits (for PT Dirgantara, PT Kereta Api, PT Taspen, Semen Gresik, and PT Pusri) are underway, and are expected to be completed by July, with corrective actions beginning in August; and (iii) a fourth round of audits, covering state enterprises in the banking, transportation, tourism, and basic industry sectors, will be launched by June 2003, for completion in early 2004.

18. The legal framework for public sector financial management is in the process of being updated. The recently approved law on state finances, which covers all state funds in all state institutions, and the draft laws on state treasury and state audit, aim to improve accountability and transparency in government financial management. We have asked Parliament to prioritize the finalization of these laws. On our part, we are in the process of revising the drafts in light of comments received from Parliament, and intend to strengthen the drafts further to bring the legislation into line with international best practice. Specifically, we would like to ensure that the draft state audit law, which complements Law 5/1973, does not undermine the constitutional authority of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK).

19. The government will also take steps to strengthen the framework for auditing military and other foundations receiving state funds or financing state activities. The government is preparing amendments to the Foundations Law, to be presented to Parliament in its next session, to clarify the legal basis for the BPK to undertake such audits.

Balance of Payments and External Policies

20. The external current account recorded another sizeable surplus in 2002, estimated at $7.2 billion (4.2 percent of GDP), facilitating a further build-up in international reserves. The surplus, however, is expected to narrow in 2003, as imports rebound and tourism receipts recover only gradually in the aftermath of the Bali incident. The capital account is also expected to remain in deficit. Even still, gross international reserves are targeted to rise by $0.6 billion, sufficient to maintain import coverage at current levels and to increase the coverage of short-term debt.

21. The government remains committed to a liberal and open trade regime, and will continue to honor its WTO and AFTA commitments. We will maintain our dialogue with concerned IFIs on a regular basis to review our overall trade strategy.

II. Structural Reforms

Financial Sector

22. A core objective of our economic strategy in 2003 is to further advance the process of bank restructuring and to restore a strong, private sector-led banking system essential for establishing efficient credit flows and reviving investment. Accordingly, the 2003 program includes further significant progress in the bank divestment program, and improving the governance of state banks.

Bank Divestment and Restructuring

23. With regard to IBRA bank divestment, the sale of Bank Danamon has been launched, and is expected to be completed by April. We also plan to launch the sale of Bank Lippo in the second quarter, with a view to completing its sale by end-September. The government remains committed to selling the remaining IBRA banks by the time IBRA winds down in early 2004.

24. Our efforts to strengthen state bank governance center on steps to improve oversight and accountability. First, we are strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises to monitor state bank performance, and additional staffing resources are being provided to the Ministry for this purpose. Second, additional independent, qualified commissioners will be appointed, with a view to ensuring that each state bank has four to five commissioners by mid-year. Third, new annual performance contracts will be prepared by April, which will contain benchmarks developed from their annual business plans. And finally, the external audit mechanism of state banks will be strengthened in the first half of the year, through the development of follow-on external audit corrective action plans.

25. With respect to the restructuring and divestment of state banks, the initial public offering (IPO) of Bank Mandiri is expected to be listed in the second quarter, following the issuance of the final prospectus in April. We intend to announce a strategic plan for the future of the bank in the second half of the year. We also expect to launch an IPO of shares in BRI during the second half of 2003. The strategy for BNI is to implement its approved business plan that sets forth action items designed to strengthen the bank, such as improving the quality of assets, developing the information technology network, and continuing further divestment efforts. We will develop, during the second quarter, a time-bound action plan to resolve its impaired assets. With respect to BTN, external consultants have been engaged to develop a restructuring plan, based on which we will adopt a specific implementation schedule based on the plan by end-March 2003.

Financial Sector Safety Net

26. The Ministry of Finance, with inputs from Bank Indonesia, is developing a comprehensive plan for a sound financial sector safety net, expected to be completed by end-March 2003. The key elements of the plan are to create a limited coverage deposit insurance scheme (LPS), an enhanced lender of last resort function for BI, a framework for bank resolution, and an agency that integrates supervision and regulation of the financial sector (OJK). The plan will also set out criteria and procedures for bank resolution through a Committee chaired by the Ministry of Finance with representatives of OJK, BI, and LPS.

27. The plan will contain detailed proposals on the institutional structure of the financial safety net and on sequencing and transitioning arrangements, including measures for an orderly phase-out of the blanket guarantee. In this regard, the first task will be to establish a deposit insurance agency to administer a deposit insurance fund financed by premiums paid by the banking sector, and with a role in bank resolution. We will also give priority to a review of BI`s lender of last resort function, including any needed changes to the BI law, to ensure that it will be adequate to provide emergency liquidity support to the banking sector once the blanket guarantee is removed.

28. We are also preparing the groundwork for the new Financial Supervisory Agency (OJK). Safeguards will be put in place to ensure the independence of the new agency and that its funding arrangements provide it with adequate resources to attract and retain staff with appropriate skills and experience. The transition to the OJK will be managed carefully to ensure that financial system stability and effective supervision are not undermined. We will utilize an independent assessment of the supervision of the nonbank financial sector against the relevant international standards, and will prepare action plans to remedy any identified deficiencies prior to the transfer of these functions to the new agency.

Bank Indonesia

29. We remain committed to improving the oversight and accountability of the central bank, in a manner that preserves its operational independence. In line with this objective, we intend to work with Parliament to enact amendments to the central bank law that are fully consistent with the recommendations of the independent panel of experts published in April 2001. In line with international practice, BI will also establish an audit committee, whose membership will include outside experts, to subject its internal financial policies and procedures to regular independent review. As a follow-up to the recommendations from the mid-year review of its foreign exchange operations, BI is taking steps to strengthen its control and accounting procedures. Progress in this regard will be reviewed in the context of BI`s forthcoming 2002 annual audit, conducted by its constitutionally appointed auditor. The process of restructuring BI`s overseas subsidiary is proceeding and its sale will be completed in the first half of 2003. Assets removed in the restructuring process will be sold by the end of the year.

30. As part of ongoing efforts to bring the banking supervision function, currently located in BI, into line with international best practice, we will reform the organization of this function to improve its efficiency, accountability and internal coordination. This is expected to be completed by September. Also, BI will establish by June a dedicated financial stability unit to monitor the soundness of the overall financial system.

IBRA Asset Recoveries

31. The strategy remains to maximize recoveries from IBRA`s remaining assets, in advance of its scheduled winding-down. In this regard, IBRA has announced a detailed plan for asset recovery, with quarterly targets, to meet its annual asset recovery target of Rp 26 trillion. To ensure transparency, the Oversight Committee (OC) is reviewing the proposed asset sales mechanisms, and will provide any recommendations regarding their strengthening to IBRA and the FSPC. The FSPC will publish its decisions regarding the mechanisms chosen for these sales, as well as its responses to OC recommendations.

32. We are nearing final resolution of the bank shareholder settlement agreements. We aim to collect Rp 6-7 trillion from these agreements in 2003. All noncash assets pledged or that have fallen due under agreements with cooperative shareholders are being transferred to IBRA; this process is planned for completion by May. We have collected the initial 30 percent cash payment due from 9 out of 30 shareholders of banks closed in 1999 and 2000 (so-called APU cases) under the revised settlement terms set out in the October 2002 FSPC decision. With regard to shareholders of banks closed in 1998 who issued personal guarantees toward settling their obligations (under the so-called MRNIAs), we will conduct forensic audits to identify any additional shareholder assets that may be needed to settle outstanding obligations under existing agreements. Full settlement of the commercial terms stipulated under all the bank shareholder agreements is due by June 2003.

33. As set out in Presidential Instruction No. 8 signed on December 30, 2002, the government remains committed to taking strong legal and other enforcement actions against former bank shareholders who fail to meet their obligations under their settlement agreements. We are increasing the effectiveness of our enforcement strategy by including the original Directors and Commissioners of noncompliant shareholders` banks in our legal actions. The cases of five noncompliant shareholders were transferred to the police and AGO in February, and IBRA is preparing to forward 12 additional cases to the legal authorities, thereby covering all shareholders who failed to make the initial payment under the revised settlement agreements for banks closed in 1999 and 2000, as well as two other noncompliant shareholders. To those who have fulfilled their obligations under the shareholder settlement agreements, the government is ceasing legal actions relating to any criminal charges or other irregularities that gave rise to the agreements.

34. IBRA is finalizing its plans for the winding down of its operations. Administrative preparations are well advanced and a strategy for the resolution of any assets that may remain unsold at the end of IBRA`s mandate will be finalized and published by September 2003. The strategy will ensure that adequate recoveries will be maintained, on the basis of full transparency and accountability, after IBRA is closed.

Privatization

35. The government remains committed to its privatization program, which is critical for improving economic performance and strengthening the public finances. The divestment plan for 2003, which builds on the progress generated in 2002, is designed to achieve the budget target of Rp 8 trillion. The plan has been approved by the Privatization Committee chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs.

Corporate Debt Restructuring

36. With the Jakarta Initiative Task Force`s (JITF) mandate set to expire on December 31, 2003, the strategic objective now is to process the remaining 40 cases in its docket (total debt of $10.1 billion), through either mediated resolution or dismissal. In 2002, the JITF met its targets for debt restructurings, and by end-December the cumulative total for JITF-mediated debt reaching the MOU stage amounted to $18.9 billion, representing the debt of 86 companies. Going forward, the JITF aims to process half of its remaining cases by July, and by November it will issue a final report, setting forth its assessment of corporate debt restructuring, and outlining the disposition of all major cases during the course of its operations.

III. Policies to Improve the Investment Climate

37. While significant progress has been made under the program to restore macroeconomic stability and advance the structural reform agenda, investment--the engine of long-term growth and employment generation--remains weak. A number of the policies described above will contribute to an improvement in the investment climate. These include improvements to the decentralization framework, strengthened tax and customs administration, improved public sector governance, and maintenance of a liberal trade regime. In addition, establishing certainty for investors with respect to the application of commercial and bankruptcy laws, and improving the industrial relations framework are also important for improving the investment climate.

Legal and Judicial Reform

38. The emphasis in 2003 will be on the further development of the Commercial Court, which has jurisdiction over bankruptcy and intellectual property rights cases. A number of steps have already been taken to strengthen the administration and procedures of the Court, and to enhance the transparency of the Court`s decisions. The Blueprint formulated in 2001 for the development of the Commercial Court has been key to this effort and an updated version will be issued in May 2003. Going forward, emphasis will also be placed on setting the Court`s finances on a sounder basis. To maintain the capacity of the Court and the transparency of its decisions, we will work with the Supreme Court to restore the number of qualified ad hoc judges to an adequate level.

39. With respect to other judicial reforms, the government intends to work closely with the Supreme Court and other concerned parties to facilitate the establishment of a Judicial Commission, an initiative central to strengthening the governance and administration of the judiciary. The Supreme Court is currently finalizing its proposals in this area, and the law establishing the Commission is expected to be adopted by end-2003. Steps will also be taken to ensure that the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is fully operational by no later than December 2003, as required by the Anti-Corruption law. In this regard, the government intends to submit names of candidates for the five positions of members of the ACC to Parliament by July 2003.

40. We intend to integrate the functions of the Independent Commission for the Audit of the Wealth of State Officials (KPKPN) into the ACC, as required by the Anti-Corruption law, in a manner that preserves the integrity of the wealth declaration process. To this end, the government will issue a decree by August 2003 that will ensure that the capacity to obtain and analyze wealth declarations is maintained, and that the ACC has the powers to enforce the wealth declaration requirements.

41. The government is working with Parliament to expedite passage of amendments to the bankruptcy law, which is expected in the second quarter of 2003. The amendments improve the existing law by adding definitions and clarifications on a number of points that will make the law easier to apply in practice.

Labor Policies

42. Establishing a sound framework for labor relations is central to generating employment, improving the welfare and skills of workers, and providing a stable environment for business. Following the major reform of the rights of association and union activity in 2000, modernization of complementary labor legislation relating to industrial relations has become a priority. A bill relating to labor protection has now been passed, and we are working closely with Parliament to ensure that the other bill in this area, on industrial dispute resolution, is enacted during the first half of 2003. We are working with labor and business to ensure that the laws strike an appropriate balance between protecting the rights of workers, including freedom of association, and preserving a flexible labor market.

43. With the devolution of minimum wage setting to the regions, it has become increasingly important to provide standards to guide the minimum wage setting process to ensure that it is in accordance with the national interest. To this end, we have recently reconvened the national tripartite council comprising government, labor groups, and employers to consider options for developing national guidelines in this area. The council will be a regular vehicle to facilitate a national dialogue on broader labor policy issues.

Table 1. Indonesia: Macroeconomic Framework, 2002–03
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002
Prel. 2003

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Real GDP growth 3.7 4.0

Inflation (end of period) 10.0 9.0

Current account balance
In billions of U.S. dollars 7.2 4.7
In percent of GDP 4.2 2.2

Gross reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars) 32.0 32.6

Central government balance (in percent of GDP) -1.6 -1.8
Revenues and grants 18.6 17.3
Expenditures and net lending 20.3 19.1

Base money growth (end of period) 8.3 13-14


Table 2. Indonesia: Quantitative Performance Criteria (PC) and Indicative Targets (IT) Under the Extended Arrangement, 2002-031
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PC2 Actual PC PC IT IT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Monetary and fiscal targets
Net domestic assets (NDA) of Bank Indonesia 10.9 -16.8 -24.5 -19.4 -15.6 0.6
Base money (indicative target)3 138.2 132.2 129.3 134.5 138.1 150.4
Overall central government balance4 -42.1 -26.3 -7.6 -15.6 -25.6 -34.4

External targets (in billions of U.S. dollars)

Net international reserves (NIR) of Bank Indonesia5
18.8
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.2

Contracting or guaranteeing of new noncessional external debt6
1.5
0.8
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.5

Of which: Government debt to commercial creditors
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2

Stock of short-term external debt outstanding
2.5
0.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1Definitions are contained in the attached Technical Memorandum of Understanding. Continuous performance criteria are: the nonaccumulation of public external arrears and no securitization or forward sale of receipts from natural resources.
2Adjusted program targets for NDA and NIR.
3Base money targets are one-month averages centered on end-month.
4Cumulative balances from beginning of fiscal year (floor). Central government bonds issued to district and provincial government are included as financing of the central government deficit.
5Outstanding stocks (floor).
6Cumulative amounts from beginning of fiscal year (ceilings).


Table 3. Indonesia: Structural Benchmarks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

March 2003

Finalize comprehensive plan for financial sector safety net.


Formulate plans and targets for audits, tax arrears collection, and registration of taxpayers.


Collect at least Rp 3 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).


Adopt implementation schedule for the restructuring of BTN.
April 2003

Conclude majority divestment of Bank Danamon.


Launch majority divestment of Bank Lippo.


Finalize blueprint for strengthening the treasury and budget functions of the Ministry of Finance.


Issue ministerial decree liberalizing conditions under which VAT refund claims may be approved.
June 2003

Collect at least Rp 7 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).


List IPO for Bank Mandiri on the stock exchange.


Appoint additional commissioners to ensure each state bank has four to five commissioners in place.


Launch a fourth round of performance audits of state enterprises.


Produce report on 2002 local government finances, with coverage of at least 85 percent of jurisdictions.


Complete sale of BI`s overseas subsidiary.
September 2003

Collect at least Rp 18 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).


Launch IPO for BRI.


Finalize strategy for the resolution of assets that may remain unsold at the end of IBRA`s mandate.
December 2003

Launch majority divestment of remaining two IBRA banks.


Announce strategic plan for future of Bank Mandiri.


Complete the expansion of large taxpayers` offices to increase coverage to 35 percent of the tax collections of the Directorate General of Taxation.


Ensure that the Anti-Corruption Commission is fully operational.


Achieve budget privatization target of Rp 8 trillion.



Revenue Administration Initiatives for 2003

Key initiatives for strengthening revenue administration are set out below.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation approves an "extensification" program that will register 60,000 companies and 50,000 individuals. Ten percent of the individual registrants will have income of at least Rp 100 million. A tax return for 2002 income and profits taxes will be secured from 60 percent of the new registrants.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation formulates a national audit plan for 2003 that provides for (nonrefund) audits of 1,250 "large" taxpayers and 12,600 "medium-sized" taxpayers.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation formulates a national arrears collection plan for 2003 aimed at: (1) keeping the stock of tax arrears deemed to be collectible at a level no higher than that at the end of 2002, and (2) resolving 5 of the largest 10 arrears cases deemed to be uncollectible.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation formulates a plan to control registered taxpayers who fail to file tax returns.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation prepares a plan to further modernize the large taxpayer offices` taxpayer services, audit, arrears collection, and information technology programs during 2003.

March 2003, Directorate General of Taxation and Directorates General of Customs and Excises (DGCE) will reach agreement on a program of cooperation with the National Ombudsman Commission (NOC) to publicize the existence of the NOC, establish time standards for responding to NOC recommendations on specific cases, and make summary information available to the public two times per year on the actions taken by DGT and DGCE in implementing NOC recommendations.

April 2003, the Ministry of Finance`s Inspector General submits to the Minister of Finance the first of four quarterly reports detailing violations of the tax and customs codes of conduct, the number of investigations initiated and completed, and the number and types of sanctions imposed. Within two weeks of receipt by the Minister, summary statistics from the report will be made available to the public.

April, 2003, Ministerial Decree issued that liberalizes the conditions under which claims for VAT refunds may be approved without requiring a pre-refund audit (but continuing to allow post-refund audits on a selective basis), with a view to increasing the coverage of nonrefund audits.

April 2003, Director General of Customs and Excises implements the first phase of the customs administration modernization strategy involving trade facilitation, combating undervaluation, and promoting governance, and approves a detailed work plan for the balance of 2003 and 2004.

May 2003, the Minister of Finance will appoint a task force (comprising private sector representatives and public sector officials) to review all aspects of the value-added tax--including its policy features, administrative provisions, information reporting requirements--with a view to proposing ways to reduce the cost of compliance to taxpayers and cost of administration to the government. A draft report will be submitted to the Minister of Finance by September 2003 and final report by December 2003.

June 2003, the electronic tax filing and payment system will be expanded to process 75 percent of DGT tax collections. The electronic payment system will also be introduced at one large customs office and one large budget office to process the remittance of import duties and taxes collected or withheld by these offices.

June 2003, the inter-ministerial task force will prepare a government-wide anti-smuggling strategy. The strategy is to be approved by the government and begin to be implemented by end-June 2003.

June 2003, Directorate General of Taxation prepares a plan to expand the large taxpayer offices by December 2003 to administer those taxpayers who collectively account for 35 percent of total DGT tax collections.

June 2003, the government will allocate sufficient resources to the National Ombudsman Commission to establish 5 regional offices and create a telephone hotline by end of December 2003.

June 2003, the Ministry of Finance will streamline the procedures by which it requests from BI access to a taxpayer`s banking information in cases where a bonafide tax audit has been initiated. The new procedures will include appropriate safeguards to protect confidentiality and taxpayers` rights.

July 2003, Directorate General of Taxation will instruct tax offices to conduct tax audits of companies in the oil and gas sector.

July 2003, Directorate General of Taxation and the MOF Inspector General`s office will extend the governance framework for tax officers--including the code of conduct, hotline for taxpayers to report misconduct by tax officers, code of conduct committee, and special team of inspectors at the Inspectorate General--at all DGT tax offices. A "Taxpayer Bill of Rights" will also be introduced.

December 2003, Directorate General of Taxation will complete the expansion of the large taxpayers` offices to administer those taxpayers who collectively account for 35 percent of total DGT tax collections.

December 2003, revise the Law on General Rules and Procedures of Taxation and the Law Concerning Tax Collection and present to Parliament for approval.


Indonesia: Technical Memorandum of Understanding
March 18, 2003
A. Monetary Targets

1. Performance Criterion on Net Domestic Assets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outstanding Stock As Of: Program Limit
(In trillions of rupiah)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

End-December 2002 (actual) -16.8
End-March 2003 (performance criterion) -24.5
End-June 2003 (performance criterion) -19.4
End-September 2003 (indicative target) -15.6
End-December 2003 (indicative target) 0.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Net domestic assets (NDA) of BI are defined as the difference between base money and net international reserves (NIR) of BI as defined in Section D, converted into rupiah at an accounting exchange rate of Rp 7,000 per U.S. dollar. Base money is defined as currency in circulation, bank deposits at BI in rupiah, private sector demand deposits at BI, and the aggregate reserve deficiency. The aggregate reserve deficiency is defined as the amount by which aggregate statutory reserves against rupiah third-party liabilities exceed bank deposits at BI.

The NDA targets will be subject to the following adjustors:

(i) In the event of shortfalls of balance of payments support from that assumed in Section E, the ceiling on NDA will be adjusted upward by the rupiah equivalent of the shortfall, up to a maximum of US$1.0 billion1 The ceiling on NDA will be adjusted downward by the rupiah equivalent of any excess of balance of payments support over that set out in Section E.

(ii) Changes in reserve requirements will modify the NDA ceiling according to the formula:



where denotes the change in the ceiling on NDA of BI; r0 denotes the reserve requirement prior to any change; B0 denotes the rupiah reservable base in the period prior to any change; is the change in the reserve requirement ratio; and denotes the immediate change in the rupiah reservable base as a result of changes in its definition.

2. Indicative Targets on Base Money
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outstanding Stock of Base Money As Of: Indicative Limit
(In trillions of rupiah)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

End-December 2002 (actual) 132.2
End-March 2003 (indicative target) 129.3
End-June 2003 (indicative target) 134.5
End-September 2003 (indicative target) 138.1
End-December 2003 (indicative target) 150.4

The indicative target on base money at the test date will be measured as the average of its value from the first business day after the fifteenth day of the month up to (and including) the fifteenth day of the following month (or the last business day preceding the sixteenth day, if the fifteenth day is not a business day). The target on base money will also be adjusted by changes in reserve requirements according to the same adjustor applied to NDA in the previous section.

B. Fiscal Targets

1. Performance Criterion on the Overall Central Government Balance (Financing Side)
Cumulative Balance Floor
(In trillions of rupiah)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From January 1, 2003 to:

End-March 2003 (performance criterion)
-7.6

End-June 2003 (performance criterion)
-15.6

End-September 2003 (indicative target)
-25.6

End-December 2003 (indicative target)
-34.4


For the purposes of the program, all interest payable, including the interest costs associated with bonds and other debt issued by the government to cover the costs of bank restructuring will be placed above the line. The fiscal balance is therefore defined as the negative of the sum of: (i) net foreign borrowing; (ii) the change in net credit to the central government from the banking system, excluding the amount of government bonds, and excluding changes in the balances on the Haj account and the deposit guarantee accounts (accounts 502 and 519); (iii) the change in the stock of government bonds (excluding new issues of bonds to cover the cost of bank restructuring); and (iv) net financing from all other sources to the government, including receipts from privatization and divestiture.

Net foreign financing is defined as government foreign borrowing less amortization payments (including debt prepayments) of foreign debt, with transactions converted into rupiah each month at the average exchange rates for that month. Net credit from the banking system is defined as the change in net credit to government (including commercial loans and the extrabudgetary funds), as reported in the central government accounts in the monetary survey. Net financing from all other sources includes receipts from the sale of government assets and recoveries of assets held by IBRA, including any sale or swap of IBRA (or other government) assets for government securities.

Monthly changes in government foreign currency balances will be converted into rupiah at the average exchange rate (based on the rates reported to IFS) prevailing for that month.

C. IBRA Asset Recovery

The target for IBRA`s net cash recovery is defined as the sum of all cash receipts stemming from transactions related to IBRA assets (including but not limited to the sale of assets, debt service on loans, dividend payments, and shareholder settlement payments) minus IBRA operating expenses. Income from recapitalization bond interest and payments of deposit guarantee premia are excluded.

D. External Sector Targets

1. Performance Criterion on Net International Reserves of Bank Indonesia
Outstanding Stock As Of: Floor
(In billions of U.S. dollars)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

End-December 2002 (actual) 22.2
End-March 2003 (performance criterion) 22.2
End-June 2003 (performance criterion) 22.2
End-September 2003 (indicative target) 22.2
End-December 2003 (indicative target) 22.2

For monitoring purposes, net international reserves of BI (NIR) are defined as (i)+(ii)-(iii):

(i) the U.S. dollar value of gross foreign exchange assets in foreign currencies minus gross liabilities in foreign currencies; (ii) the net forward position of BI; and (iii) reserves against foreign currency deposits.

NIR is based on the SDDS concept of gross reserves based on data from the general ledger of BI. Accordingly, foreign exchange assets are defined as those assets that are in convertible currencies, are under the direct effective control of BI, and are readily available for such purposes of BI as intervention or the direct financing of payment imbalances. Such assets may be in any of the following forms, provided that they meet the test of effective control and ready availability for use: currency, bank deposits in nonresident institutions and government securities and other bonds and notes issued by nonresidents (with a rating not below "A" in the classification of Fitch IBCA and Standard and Poor`s or "A2" in the classification of Moody`s). In addition, holdings of SDRs and of monetary gold are included (provided that they too meet the test of effective control and ready availability for use), as is the reserve position in the IMF.

Excluded from the definition of gross foreign exchange assets are all foreign currency claims arising from off-balance sheet transactions, claims on residents, capital subscriptions in international financial institutions, any assets in nonconvertible currencies, claims on any nonresident Indonesian-owned institutions, or any amounts (in all components of assets, including gold) that have been pledged in a direct or contingent way.

Gross foreign liabilities are all foreign currency-denominated liabilities of contracted maturity up to and including one year plus the use of Fund credit. Foreign currency liabilities to the central government are excluded. All assets and liabilities will be valued using the exchange rates and gold price shown in Section E.

The net forward position is defined as the difference between the face value of foreign currency-denominated BI off-balance sheet claims on nonresidents (forwards, swaps, options, and any futures market contracts) and foreign currency obligations to both residents and nonresidents.

The NIR floors will be subject to the following adjustors:

(i) In the event of shortfalls of balance of payments support from those assumed in Section E, the NIR floor will be adjusted downward by the amount of the shortfall, up to a maximum of US$1.0 billion. The NIR floor will be adjusted upward by the amount of any excess of balance of payments support over that set out in Section E.

The adjustors and definition of NIR will be subject to review to take account of new sources of financing not anticipated under the program.

2. Performance Criterion on Contracting or Guaranteeing of New Nonconcessional External Debt
Cumulative Change in Stock
Limit
(In billions of U.S. dollars)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From end-December 2002 to:

End-March 2003 (performance criterion)
0.3

End-June 2003 (performance criterion)
0.6

End-September 2003 (indicative target)
1.0

End-December 2003 (indicative target)
1.5




The limit applies to the contracting or guaranteeing by the nonfinancial public sector of new nonconcessional external debt2 with an original maturity of more than one year, which is defined as loans containing a grant element of less than 35 percent on the basis of currency-specific discount rates based on the OECD commercial interest reference rates.3 Excluded from the limits are credits extended by the IMF and balance of payments support loans extended by multilateral and bilateral creditors. Debt falling within the limit shall be valued in U.S. dollars at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the contract is entered into, or guarantee is issued.

3. Performance Criterion on Contracting or Guaranteeing Debt to Commercial Creditors
Cumulative Change in Stock Limit
(In billions of U.S. dollars)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From end-December 2002 to:

End-March 2003 (performance criterion)
0.2

End-June 2003 (performance criterion)
0.2

End-September 2003 (indicative target)
0.2

End-December 2003 (indicative target)
0.2



The limit applies to the contracting or guaranteeing by the central government or Bank Indonesia of new debt to commercial creditors. Excluded from this limit are export credits extended or guaranteed by official creditors.

4. Performance Criterion on the Stock of Short-Term Debt Outstanding
Outstanding Stock As Of:
Limit
(In billions of U.S. dollars)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


End-December 2002 (actual)
0.5

End-March 2003 (performance criterion)
2.5

End-June 2003 (performance criterion)
2.5

End-September 2003 (indicative target)
2.5

End-December 2003 (indicative target)
2.5




The limits apply to the stock of debt of original maturity of one year or less, contracted or guaranteed by the nonfinancial public sector. Excluded are normal import-related credits, reserve liabilities of Bank Indonesia, forward contracts, swaps, and other futures market contracts.

5. The non-accumulation of public external arrears during the program period is a performance criterion and will apply on a continuous basis. The program contains a continuous performance criterion that there will be no securitization or forward sales of receipts from natural resources.

E. Program Assumptions and Reporting


1. Program Baselines for Balance of Payments Financing Package
Cumulative Amounts From
Floors
(In billions of U.S. dollars)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BOP Support1

From end-December 2002:

End-March 2003
0.7

End-June 2003
2.0

End-September 2003
2.9

End-December 2003
4.2


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1Includes all quick-disbursing balance of payments support loans from multilateral and bilateral sources, including similar loans channeled to the government budget and rescheduling of government or Bank Indonesia debt-service falling due, but excluding short-term loans that are reserve liabilities of BI as well as IMF purchases.


2. Exchange Rates and Gold Price to be Used Under the Program1

Foreign Currency per U.S. dollar

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Japanese yen 104.85
Deutsche mark2 1.8711
Pound sterling 0.61177
French franc2 6.2753
Swiss franc 1.5339
SDR 0.72426
Euro 0.9567
Gold price (U.S. dollars per ounce) 299.10

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1Currencies not shown here will be converted using the official rate for October 31, 1999 used by IMF`s Treasurer`s Department.
2Deutsche mark and French franc are converted against the euro based on fixed conversion rates as of December 31, 1998.


3. Reporting

Monitoring the program requires accurate and timely data. All information on performance criteria, indicative targets, and balance of payments support loans will be reported to Fund staff within two weeks of the reference date with the exception of data on the central government balance, which will be provided within one month. In addition, detailed data on government revenues and expenditures, costs of financial sector restructuring, and the monetary survey will be provided monthly within 30 days of the reference date. Monetary statistics covering developments in the banking system, including third-party liabilities, monetary accounts, and deposit and lending rates will be provided monthly (with a five-week lag). Data on base money (showing all the factors affecting reserve money), foreign exchange intervention in both the spot and forward markets, as well as use of reserves for financing and liquidity support will be provided daily (with a 2-day lag). The net forward position, net foreign assets, liquidity support to banks under various facilities, and open market operations (including the stocks of SBIs and SBPUs) will be provided daily (with a 2-day lag). Information on access by individual banks and nonbanks to BI credit (either in rupiah or foreign currency) will be provided on request. Debt stocks and associated flows broken down by both creditor and debtor types and maturity will be provided on a quarterly basis.

BI will publish weekly, with 3-day lag, key monetary data, (which may be subject to revision) including base money, gross international reserves of BI, NDA of BI, and NIR of BI (the information could be made available through special press releases and/or by updating BI`s web site).

Within three weeks of the end of each month, IBRA will provide to Fund staff its financial results of the most recent month and of the year-to-date, as prepared by its Finance and Accounting Division. These data will be broken down as follows: (i) AMC (receipts from loan work out, outsourcing, core asset sales, noncore assets, and litigation); (ii) AMI (receipts detailed by individual asset sales and/or dividends); (iii) BRU (receipts detailed by individual asset sales and/or dividends); (iv) other income (receipts detailed by investment income, guarantee premia, and other); and (v) operating expenses.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1Converted at the accounting exchange rate of Rp 7,000 per U.S. dollar.
2The term "debt" has the meaning set forth in point number 9 of the Guidelines on Performance Criteria with respect to Foreign Debt (Decision No. 12274-00/85, August 24, 2000).
3For loans with a maturity of at least 15 years, the 10-year average commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs) published by the OECD should be used as the discount rate for assessing the level of concessionality, while the 6-month average CIRRs should be used for the loans with shorter maturities. To both the 10-year and the 6-month averages, the following margins for differing repayment periods should be added: 0.75 percent to repayment periods of less that 15 years; 1 percent for 15-19 years; 1.15 percent for 20-29 years; and 1.25 percent for 30 years or more.

[broker*709]

Sie braucen den IMF nicht mehr - von da an geht`s bergauf

Indonesia: Prepared to Exit IMF Programme this Year
Wednesday, May/7/2003 10:13:01 GMT+7.

Indonesia is ready to exit the International Monetary Fund`s (IMF) economic programme when it expires at the end of this year, top economy minister Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti said. "The Indonesian government has the right to end the programme with the IMF as mandated by the People`s Consultative Assembly," today`s Jakarta Post quoted him as saying. "The government has prepared strategies for the future, not only for the 2004 budget but also a mid-term strategy."
The government has been under pressure from lawmakers not to extend the IMF`s USD5 billion, five-year economic programme when it ends this year. A visiting IMF team led by IMF Asia-Pacific senior adviser Daniel Citrin is currently conducting a periodical review of the programme. A successful review will pave the way for the next disbursement of funds from the USD1.8 billion programmed for release this year. Mr Kuntjoro-Jakti, as quoted by the state Antara news agency, said foreign exchange reserves have been increasing and currently stand at USD33 billion. Indonesia will lose some USD3 billion in financing concessions from the Paris Club of creditor nations if if quits the IMF programme.

But Morgan Stanley Economists, in a study last month, said it was time for the country to start designing a new economic development path for itself. It said lost financing could come from increased domestic bond issuance, international bond issuance and increased bilateral and supranational aid in 2004. The economists said they expected the World Bank and Asia Development Bank, together with Japan, at least to marginally increase their aid and concessional lending to Indonesia.

Reported by : Bluebull

[broker*709]

Die Rupiah wird immer stärker - wer hätte das gedacht.
Ich meine aber, beim Kurs von 1 $ : 8000 Rupiah ist es gut.
..............................................

Rupiah off to 33-month high, heading for 8,000
Dadan Wijaksana, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Bank Indonesia (BI) said on Friday the rupiah could strengthen to the level of 8,000 per dollar provided there is further encouraging news from the country`s economic activities.

BI senior deputy governor Anwar Nasution said that "If exports run well, oil prices remain high and a successful IPO (initial public offering) of Bank Mandiri," the local currency has a good chances of reaching that level.

Anwar was commenting on the rupiah`s strong showing recently due primarily to a slumping U.S. dollar against most currencies in the world, coupled with increasing demands for the rupiah from foreign investors wishing to invest in the country.

On Friday, the local unit rose again to 8,275 per dollar, the highest level in the past 33 months, in what traders saw as the latest signs of more capital inflows here.

However, while admitting that a stronger rupiah would help sustain monetary stability, experts warned that it could also come at a price, especially when the appreciation takes place drastically.

StanChart economist Fauzi Ichsan told The Jakarta Post that the most important thing at the moment was to strike a balance between the good and the bad impacts of the rupiah`s current rally.

"The good side of it is that we can expect a low rate of inflation as many of our goods are imported," Fauzi said, adding that high inflation would erode people`s purchasing power.

While people`s buying power remains strong, he said, it would prove beneficial for efforts to maintain the current strong domestic consumption, the main engine of the country`s economic growth.

Moreover, a benign inflation could mean more leeway for the central bank to cut its interest rate in an attempt to push higher bank lending to the corporate sector.

But, the trend also has negative effects.

"Imagine an exporter who paid for imported raw material at Rp 9,000 per dollar four months ago, but then the firm has to receive payment for the products at an exchange rate of around Rp 8,200 or Rp 8,300.

"For export-oriented businessmen, the drastic change is not good," he said referring to the fact that most exporters here use raw materials from overseas.

The stronger rupiah does not only mean less earnings for exporters, it could also erode the competitiveness of exporters` in the global market, particularly when compared to exporters from nations whose currency had not been as strong as the rupiah.

Acknowledging these factors, Anwar said the central bank would carefully assess the rupiah`s rising trend against the U.S. dollar to find out at what level the trend would still be tolerable

[broker*709]

Der Markt will weiter nach oben

Der heutige Handelstag hat es wieder bewiesen - weiter so

JCI Closed Higher In Late Trade After Break Psychological Level
Thursday, May/29/2003 17:02:30 GMT+7.

Jakarta (Indoexchange) – The Jakarta composite index closed higher Thursday in late trade after as investors take gains from the recent market up after break psychological level at 500 in first sessions, and exercise caution ahead of the long weekend. Gains in big cap stocks; Gudang Garam Indosat and HM.Sampoerna hold JCI index in positive area.
The composite index closed higher 1.958 points or 0.40 pct at 494.776, with heavy volume more than 1,000 mln shares worth 809.6 bln rupiah but fallers stock still led gainers 85 to 65, with 85 stocks unchanged. The LQ-45 closed at 103.860 or up 0.385 point.

The rupiah closed at 8,435 to the dollar, compared to Wednesday’s closing rate of 8,530.

In Cigarette makers stock - Gudang Garam closed higher 2.56% or IDR250 at IDR10,000. HM Sampoerna with supporting good news regarding corporate plan to buy back program in market closed higher 2.67% or IDR100 at IDR3,850 and Bentoel International stagnant at IDR115.

Telecommunications stock generated as a top value transaction. Indosat closed up 2.19% or IDR200 at IDR9,350 with total value more than 138 million and Telkom closed stagnant at IDR4,675 as the second top value.

Astra International as the biggest car manufacture closed lower 0.69% or IDR25 at IDR3,600, but its crude palm oil unit – Astra Agro Lestari closed higher at 1.59% or IDR25 at IDR1,600 and United Tractor closed up 2,94% or IDR15 at IDR525.

Meanwhile, in banking stock, Bank BCA continued book gain at 0,95% or IDR25 at IDR2,650, Following the market trend Lippo Bank closed up 5% or IDR25 at IDR525.

Reported by : FJR

[broker*709]

Ich glaube, das INDO-Bankenproblem ist überstanden

IBRA Does Well by Jakarta
Wednesday, June/11/2003 14:02:26 GMT+7.

The agency`s mission is twofold: to rebuild the country`s crippled banking sector, and raise revenue for the state budget through its asset sales programme. On Monday, Ibra confirmed that it will wrap up by mid-June the sale of Bank Danamon, the country`s fifth largest bank, to Asia Financial Indonesia, a consortium led by Singapore-government-owned Temasek Holdings and Germany`s Deutsche Bank following approval of the sale by Bank Indonesia. Over the past three years, Ibra has also sold Indonesia`s largest private bank Bank Central Asia (BCA) and mid-sized Bank Niaga, amidst political controversy and much public opposition, to other foreign-owned consortiums. And from now until its mandate expires in March 2004, the agency hopes to offload its shares in Bank Lippo, Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII) and Permata Bank.
The transfer of ownership of these banks from Ibra, and thus the government, to private hands is critical in rebuilding the country`s banking sector, which was devastated in the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. It is hoped private owners will provide technology transfer, add fresh capital and introduce innovative banking products that will help revive these banks.

Thus, by transferring ownership to a new group of internationally credible financial institutions, Ibra is also playing a crucial role in transforming the mindset of the country`s banking community. To put it bluntly, before the crisis, many of these same banks were used by the conglomerates that owned them as a cheap source of funds, which were then channelled into related companies. This can hardly be described as sound banking practice.

That Ibra is open to having these banks, most of which are household names, controlled and managed by international institutions is a significant development that should not be overlooked. Not only does it demonstrate willingness in the highest echelons of the Indonesian governmentto fight nationalistic sentiment that seeks to retain domestic control over the country`s financial institutions to the detriment of the country`s financial sector, it also signals a significant shift in the way the country`s economy will be managed in the future.

A sound banking system is the heartbeat that keeps a country`s economy ticking. By ensuring that domestic banks are well run and managed with proper accounting and lending practices under foreign ownership if necessary, Ibra is in fact putting in place a safeguard against future economic meltdowns. By building a strong banking sector, the government also is protecting the interests of millions of Indonesians who deposit their life savings with these banks. It is now incumbent on the new owners to take the difficult path in developing their banks to conduct business in such a way that they can compete regionally with the likes of Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank and HSBC, in the region at least.

Now that the government has proved it is prepared to do the right thing despite strong opposition, it must tackle the equally important task of reforming the legal system. If creditors feel comfortable that the courts can and will settle loan disputes fairly and impartially, the last hurdle in the way of a complete revival of Indonesia`s banking sector will have been removed.

Reported by : Business Times

[broker*709]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[broker*709]

Die 9. Tranche vom IMF ist im Anmarsch

Press Release No. 03/95
June 25, 2003 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Ninth Review of Indonesia Program, Approves US$486 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its ninth review of Indonesia`s performance under a SDR 3.6 billion (about US$5 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 344 million (about US$486 million), bringing the total amount drawn under the arrangement to SDR 2.9 billion (about US$4 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"The Indonesian authorities are to be commended for their continued strong policy performance under their arrangement with the Fund. The economy is sustaining steady growth despite a number of external and domestic shocks; inflation has continued to decline; and there has been an additional buildup of international reserves. These developments have contributed to a further improvement in financial market sentiment, manifested in a strengthening of the rupiah, and a sharp rise in the stock market.

"Indonesia`s fiscal policy remains geared toward achieving a significant fiscal consolidation and reduction in public debt. Budget performance through the first quarter was well within the program`s target and is on track to achieve the full-year target of 1.8 percent of GDP. Other priorities in the fiscal area are being met through a strengthening of the decentralization framework and efforts to enhance the public expenditure management system.

"Bank Indonesia`s prudent conduct of monetary policy has contributed to a sustained decline in inflation and appreciation of the rupiah. These developments have allowed interest rates to decline in support of economic recovery, and a continued cautious monetary stance will help achieve a further and lasting decline in inflation.

"Progress has also been made in structural areas, including on IBRA recoveries, which are on track to meet the annual target. Going forward, the priority is to ensure a transparent disposition of the assets of IBRA`s largest debtors, and enhance recoveries from the bank shareholder settlement agreements through intensified efforts to ensure compliance. The authorities are also encouraged to keep up the momentum of the privatization program.

"Financial sector reforms continue to advance on schedule. The divestment of Bank Danamon was recently concluded, the timetable for the divestment of Bank Lippo has been announced, and the initial public offering (IPO) of the country`s largest bank, Bank Mandiri, is expected to be concluded shortly. A comprehensive plan to strengthen the financial sector safety net has been completed, representing an important milestone in the reform of the financial system.

"Sustained strong progress on the government`s comprehensive reform agenda will be key to improving Indonesia`s investment climate and maintaining market confidence. Priorities are legal and judicial reforms, including the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the adoption of amendments to the bankruptcy law, and the reform of the Commercial Court.

"The Fund looks forward to a continued close cooperation and policy dialogue with the authorities in the period ahead," Mr. Sugisaki stated.

[broker*709]

Jetzt weiß ich auch, warum die INDO-Banken heute so angezogen haben

Index Closed Higher Supported by Banking Sector
Wednesday, July/9/2003 17:15:14 GMT+7.

Jakarta (Indoexchange) - Indonesian shares closed higher Wednesday, with fresh buying in many banking shares after Indonesian parliament commission approved to sell two major banks – Lippo Bank and Bank Internasional Indonesia – this year.
The commission approved a 52 percent stake sale in medium-sized Bank Lippo and a 71 percent stake sale in the sixth-largest bank, Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII).

The composite index closed up 1.281 points or 0.25 pct at 519.811 with volume more than 952.8 mln shares worth 363.5 bln rupiah. Gainers led fallers 83 to 35, with 88 stocks unchanged. The LQ-45 was up 0.028 point at 116.330.

The rupiah closed at 8,188 to the dollar, compared to Tuesday’s closing rate of 8,210.

Gajah Tunggal today booked as the top value with a 33.8 million rups. Gajah Tunggal closed up 4.55% or IDR20 at IDR460.

Telecommunication stocks today hit by profit taking after gain for days. Both Telekomunikasi Indonesia and Indosat has decreased 1.06% and 1.11% at IDR4,650 and IDR8,950.

Today HM Sampoerna and Gudang Garam stagnant at IDR4,100 and IDR10,650.

Meanwhile, car maker, Astra International closed up 0.66% or IDR25 at IDR3,825, and so its subsidiaries such as United Tractors and Astra Otoparts which have increased 1.94% and 3.77% at IDR525 and IDR1,375. The strengthen of Astra International was support by debt restructuring program after the company buys back USD113.52 debt.

Reported by : BYH

[omegaman]

Ich verstehe es einfach nicht.......in Indonesien steigen die Kurse wg. dem geplanten Bankenverkauf und hier knallt meine BII mal wieder um 10 % runter!!! Ist der Verkauf denn sooo schlecht für BII ??? Ich dachte immer nach einem Verkauf würde es endlich aufwärts gehen.
Wer klärt mich auf,schnief??

[broker*709]

Mal sehen, wie`s ohne IMF am Ende des Jahres weitergeht

Press Release No. 03/129
July 29, 2003 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Supports Indonesia`s Decision to Enter into Post-Program Monitoring
Ms. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued the following statement today:

"The IMF welcomes the success achieved by the Indonesian government in its program of economic recovery and reform, and supports its decision yesterday not to request a new financial arrangement with the Fund when the current program expires at the end of the 2003.

"The substantial improvement in Indonesia`s economic performance brought about by the implementation of its reform program over the last few years-supported by the Fund-has led the Government to conclude that Indonesia would not need further exceptional financing from the international community to sustain its balance of payments position. This conclusion is also based on the Government`s commitment to continued macroeconomic stability and progress in structural reforms, which would maintain the confidence of domestic and international capital markets.

"The IMF welcomes the intention of the government to maintain a close dialogue with the IMF and the international community through engagement in post-program monitoring. The IMF looks forward to continued close cooperation with the Indonesian government through an exchange of views on key policy priorities and through the provision of technical assistance when and as requested," Ms. Krueger stated.

Under post-program monitoring, a member engages in discussions with IMF staff on its economic outlook and policies. Fund staff report formally to the Executive Board (normally twice a year) on their discussions with the member, including the consistency of the member`s policies with the objective of medium-term viability, and the implications for the member`s capacity to repay the Fund.

[broker*709]

Wieder News aus dem EM-Bord zum BANK-LIPPO-Verkauf

Betreff: Bank Lippo - nur zur Info - mkt
Geschrieben von: ThaiClaus am Donnerstag, 25 September 2003, um 12:16 p.m.


Hi,

News zu Bank Lippo - für jene die investiert sind.

Grüße
ThaiClaus

IBRA Shortlist 3 Investors for Lippo
25-SEP-03

JAKARTA (Bisnis): Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) had short-listed three investors to bid 52.05% shares of Bank Lippo.
I Nyoman Sender of IBRA said that the agency would conduct due diligence process to the three investors, among others, to know where the investors would get the money from.

"We already set some conditions. Among other conditions is that the candidates must be bank or consortium with at least a bank as its member. The three candidates meet the criteria," he said.

Another official of IBRA Junianto T. Prijono added that IBRA and the independent committee had observed the documentations of the three candidates and decided that they were eligible to bid the shares of Lippo Bank.

The three investors were Eurocapital Asia Limited, Summit Investment Limited and Swissasia Global.

The members of the independent committee were Binhadi, Raden Pardede, Darmin Nasution, Rhenald Khasali, Gunarni Soeworo, Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo and Bacelius Ruru.

I Nyoman Sender added that the three investors had met the criteria set by the agency.

Eurocapital Consortium

Bisnis Indonesia data showed that Export and Industry Bank (EIB), a member Eurocapital Asia Limited consortium, belonged jointly to Philexport and Medco Holdings, Inc. Medco Holdings is joint venture between Lippo Ltd. Hong Kong and China Resources, Inc.

EIB was established in the Philippines in 1997, specialized in trade financing.

Nyoman Sender said he did not aware about the data. The agency would know the real investor after the due diligence process.

Today the agency just knew that the investors were coming from the Philippines, Hong Kong and Switzerland.

Junianto added that Bank Indonesia would decide whether an investor was eligible to buy the shares of Lippo.

The three investors would conduct due diligence process until the second week of October. They had to submit their final bid on the third week of October.

IBRA was scheduled to name the winner of the bid in the midst of November.(mmh/msl)


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BI: All Banks In CAR Over 8%
25-SEP-03

DUBAI (Bisnis): The Central Bank stated on Wednesday national banks have all met minimum CAR requirement of 8% while non performing loan (NPL) position has remarkably reduced to only 1.02% as of June this year.
Governor of Bank of Indonesia (BI) reported in IMF - World Bank Annual Meetings of the improved condition of national banking sector along with the recovering macro economy.

"This is reflected in the strengthened capital position, remarkably reduced NPL position, increased margin, and also improved bank intermediation function," he cited when delivering speech in the meeting as reported by Y. Bayu Widagdo, yesterday.

He further elaborated banks have all met minimum CAR requirement of 8%, allowing the industry to rake more margin along with the boosted credit extension.

"New credit extension showed a rapid growth in the first half of the year while NPL remain under control, standing only at 1.02% as of June 2003," he said.

Commenting to the statement, an economist Dradjad H. Wibowo said banks CAR and NPL position have indeed improved particularly of recap banks.

"We still see late last year small banks with CAR position of below 8%, but it may have improved by now."

According to him bank recovery rest primarily on three pillars, minimum CAR position, supervision, and market discipline.

"Admittedly, the last two aspects are still awful," he said.

Bank Architecture

Burhanuddin further explained the central bank is working on Indonesian Bank Architecture (API) to be used as a platform in a more comprehensive policy making in the sector.

"We will also intensify supervision and encourage capital market to play greater role in financial system," he stated.

API is designed as part of government efforts to keep restructuring and financial reform flowing.

"This serves as second of the three pillars in economic policy to begin running in 2004 as cooperation with IMF ended," he said adding that the first pillar in Indonesia`s new economic policy is macro economic stability and the third one is investment climate recovery.

Dradjad recognizes the importance of API to help figure future bank road map which the White Paper (Inpres No. 5/2003) fails to describe.

The Inpres, he added, only highlights divestment program and good governance of state run banks, ignoring the most required picture of national banks map.

"I really think we should cut down number of existing banks to only 15 for major banks and 40-50 for regional banks."

He added the Inpres divides restructuring and bank recovering policy into two. The first, divestment of banks under IBRA control and unsold assets. Secondly, strengthening governance of state run banks such as Bank Mandiri, BNI, BTN, and BRI.

Reliable source said the Inpres left a number of team`s recommendations undelivered in the policy package. One of them to name is the recommended bank road map.

The team, he disclosed, did recommended a strong national private bank such as Bank Mandiri or BNI besides other one specially intended to provide service of micro credit, BRI. (ens)

[broker*709]

Bei der BANK-Niaga tut sich wieder ein bischen.
Bei grossen Umsätzen wurde die 35er-Marke wieder angekratzt.

30
Trade Time: 12:59AM ET
Change: 0 (0.00%)
Prev Close: 30
Open: 30
Bid: 25
Ask: 30
1y Target Est: N/A

Day`s Range: 30 - 35
52wk Range: 25 - 50
Volume: 502,376,992
Avg Vol (3m): 0
Market Cap: N/A
P/E (ttm): 16.67
EPS (ttm): 1.8
Div & Yield: 34.09 (N/A)

[broker*709]

Sieht doch gut aus - oder ???

Press Release No. 03/165
October 8, 2003 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Tenth Review of Indonesia Program, Approves US$493 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its tenth review of Indonesia`s performance under a SDR 3.6 billion (about US$5.2 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). This opens the way for release of a further SDR 344 million (about US$493 million), bringing the total amount drawn under the arrangement to SDR 3.3 billion (about US$4.7 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"Indonesia`s economic performance has continued to evolve favorably under the Fund-supported program, with a sustained economic recovery, a continued easing of inflation, and a further increase in external reserves. These favorable developments have bolstered financial market sentiment toward Indonesia, and have further reduced the economy`s vulnerability to external shocks.

"Fiscal policy is on track, with the budget deficit outturn through the first half of the year well within the mid-year target for 2003. The government`s 2004 budget proposal represents a further welcome step toward fiscal consolidation. To enhance Indonesia`s tax base, the government is pressing ahead with efforts to strengthen tax and customs administration. Work is also proceeding with the restructuring of the Ministry of Finance, to strengthen its treasury and budget operations.

"The authorities are to be commended for the continued downward trend in inflation which, together with the stable exchange rate, has enabled interest rates to be reduced further in support of the economic recovery. Bank Indonesia`s commitment to maintain a cautious monetary stance is also welcome given the need to consolidate the recent gains in inflation and exchange rate stability.

"The authorities have continued to advance important financial sector reforms, and the divestment of government ownership in banks is proceeding well. Efforts toward implementing the government`s plan for a strengthened financial sector safety net, including the establishment of a deposit insurance scheme and clarification of the Bank Indonesia`s role as lender of last resort, are well advanced. The on-going improvement in the health of the banking system is welcome, and the authorities are taking appropriate steps to strengthen the governance and monitoring of state banks. The structural reform program is also progressing in other areas. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency is, for example, expected to complete its asset sales programs ahead of its scheduled closure in early 2004.

"Nevertheless, the authorities need to make further progress to strengthen the investment climate to enable Indonesia to realize its economic potential. They need to redouble efforts to strengthen governance and sustain the momentum of legal and judicial system reforms, for example, through the early establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission.

"The government`s decision to graduate from exceptional financing when the current arrangement expires is welcome. Indonesia`s challenge is to maintain investor confidence through the continuation of sound policy implementation after the Fund-supported program concludes and as the 2004 elections draw near. The government`s detailed "White Paper" laying out the economic strategy will play an important role in this regard. It will be essential for the government to ensure an adequate prioritization, and consistent and timely implementation, of reforms. The authorities can look forward to continued support with their policy implementation during the remainder of the program and to maintaining a close policy dialogue with the Fund thereafter in the context of post-program monitoring," Ms. Krueger stated.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: [phone]
Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: [phone]

[broker*709]

Was meint Ihr was der 5%-Verkauf an die Mitarbeiter bringt?
Mehr Motivation und somit einen steigenden Kurs

Indonesia Bank Niaga Plans to Sell 5% Stake to Employees
Tuesday, December/2/2003 14:23:40 GMT+7.

Indonesia`s PT Bank Niaga (JSX: BNGA) said Tuesday it plans to sell as many as 3.9 billion shares, or 5% of its total equity, to its employees.
The bank said that the shares will carry a par value of IDR5 ($1=IDR8,500) each, but hasn`t determined the issue price of the shares.

The bank said the employee stock option program will reduce Malaysia`s Commerce Asset Holding Bhd. (P.CAH) stake in Bank Niaga to 50.31%, from 52.82%. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency will hold a 24.9% stake in Bank Niaga, down from 26.15% currently, while the public ownership will increase to 24.79%, from 21.03%.

Bank Niaga said it will use the proceeds from the sale to strengthen its working capital.

To realize the plan, the bank will seek approval from its shareholders on Dec. 17.

Bank Niaga shares are currently trading at IDR25 a share.

[broker*709]

Wie geht`s jetzt ohne den IMF weiter ?


Press Release No. 03/225
December 19, 2003 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20431 USA



IMF Completes Eleventh and Final Review of Indonesia`s EFF Program, Approves US$505 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today its 11th and final review of Indonesia`s performance under an SDR 3.6 billion (about US$5.3 billion) Extended Fund Facility arrangement (see Press Release No. 00/4). The completion of the review enables the release of SDR 344 million (about US$505 million), which would bring total disbursements under the program to SDR 3.6 billion (about US$5.3 billion).

At the conclusion of the Executive Board`s discussion on Indonesia`s economic and structural reform program, Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chairman, stated:

"The Indonesian authorities are to be commended for bringing their Extended Arrangement with the Fund to a successful conclusion. An impressive fiscal consolidation and disinflation effort, together with reduced external vulnerability, have laid the basis for a sustained improvement in growth and employment prospects in the period ahead. The Fund is encouraged by the government`s determination to build on these achievements by further strengthening the institutional and governance underpinnings for a durable recovery of investment and business activity.

"Policy performance since the last review has continued to evolve favorably. Fiscal consolidation continues to advance. Budget execution is on track to achieve the 2003 deficit target. The 2004 budget, underpinned by ongoing reforms to tax and customs administration, represents a further step towards a sustainable fiscal position. Maintenance of market confidence will help ease the transition to the increased reliance by the authorities on domestic financing sources expected in 2004.

"A stable exchange rate and continued declines in inflation have allowed reductions in interest rates in support of the economic recovery. With inflation risks now more balanced, Bank Indonesia`s commitment to maintain a cautious monetary stance will help safeguard the hard-won gains in inflation and exchange rate stability.

"Satisfactory progress continues to be made with key structural reforms. The divestment of government ownership in banks is proceeding well; the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency is making good progress in bringing its asset sales programs to a successful conclusion; and preparations toward the establishment of a strengthened financial safety net are at an advanced stage. It will be important to sustain these reform efforts and, in particular, to follow up decisively on the recent steps to address the financial irregularities at a major state bank by strengthening the governance and monitoring of state banks.

"In the period ahead the challenge before the Indonesian authorities will be to maintain investor confidence through the continuation of sound policies, while acting vigorously to strengthen the investment climate to enable Indonesia to realize its economic potential. The government`s economic package for 2004, as set out in its "White Paper", provides a sound framework for meeting this challenge. The Fund will continue to work closely with the authorities to assist with the implementation of these reforms, and looks forward to maintaining a close policy dialogue in the context of post-program monitoring," Mr. Sugisaki stated.

[broker*709]

Die Jakartabörse erreicht seit langem neue Höchststände.
Wann wirkt sich das auf die Banken aus ?

JCI Closed Soar More 20 Points
Monday, January/5/2004 16:34:50 GMT+7.

Jakarta (Indoexchange) � Jakarta Composite Index closed in significant higher Monday�s on bargain hunting in Telecommunications stock and foreign buying in big cap. Positive sentiment also supported in today traded after Megawati � Indonesian President as a symbolic open the market in the morning session with hope Indonesia`s capital market industry will grow further and give an optimum contribution to the economy.

Psychology level at 700 is changing to become a support level. The Jakarta Stock Exchange composite index ended in significant higher 20,974 points or 2,970 pct at 725,472 on volume of 3,814.4 million shares worth IDR1,328.4 billions. Gainers led Fallers 104 to 44, with 62 stocks unchanged. The LQ-45 also closed up 5.513 point at 161.016.

The rupiah closed strengthen at 8,398 to the dollar.

Bakrie Brothers closed continued higher Idr15 at Idr65 with value more than 100 billions and but its subsidiary Bumi Resources closed lower on profit taking Idr10 at Idr465.

London Sumatra Plantation today traded very active after the Malaysian Investors to have acquired the company. LSIP closed soar Idr100 at Idr 1,375.

The Indonesian�s second largest telecommunication company Indosat has risen Idr600 at IDR15,800 running with gain due on expectations of a higher revenue to grow around 10 trillion rupiah from a target of around Idr 8 trillion in 2003, also its rival Telekomunikasi Indonesia closed strength on the back of its prospects of improved financial results on year 2004 and pushed the shares up Idr500 to Idr7,550 the highest level since IPO

Shares of carmaker, Astra International has gained Idr300 at Idr5,400 due to expected sales growth to soar in line with the new car launch, and United Tractor closed up Idr25 at Idr1,350 on hoping debt restructuring will finish this year.

Bank Mandiri today closed up Idr50 at Idr1,050 and so with Bank BCA up Idr50 at Idr3,375.

Three cigarette maker company Gudang Garam, HM Sampoerna and Bentoel International together closed higher Idr300 at Idr13,950, Idr50 at Idr4,525 and Idr5 at Idr90.

[amorosodo]

Zitat : " Die Jakartabörse erreicht seit langem neue Höchststände.
Wann wirkt sich das auf die Banken aus ? "

gute Frage :
Ich bin zwar SEHR geduldig, aber so langsam könnte mal was kommen !
Sitze und sitze auf Lippo Bank und werde allmählich ganz wund.
Naja, da wenigstens die "( Nachbar-)" Banken in Thailand weiterhin so schön laufen, halten sich die paar Schmerzen bzgl. Lippo in engen Grenzen Was spricht dagegen , daß Indonesiens Banken ähnlich auferstehen werden ??
Wird schon noch......
örgendwann

[amorosodo]

Hat jemand ne Meinung zur Lippo Bank ???
Die Erholung sieht doch ganz passabel aus.
Bei 525-550 rupiah scheint allerdings ein dicker Deckel drauf zu sein.
Grüsse

[trador]

Hallo!

Offenbar will die Lippo Bank niemand so richtig haben. Die Erholung seit dem letzten Fehlschlag der IBRA, ein paar Banken an den Mann zu bringen und in anderen Indo banken ebenfalls zu verzeichnen ist, ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die IBRA bald Schluss machen will. Es ist also leider so, dass jetzt Schlussverkauf ist und für die Lippo ist nach letzten Nachrichten nur ein Bieter vorhanden, der natürlich den nach unten treiben kann.

Ich sitze auch auf Lippo, die ja schon seit Ewigkeiten um die 0.05c herumeuert.

Bye

[NasdaqHase]

die Trendwende in Indonesien ist tatsächlich erreicht,
die Hühnerpest ist auch in Indonesien aufgetreten

[amorosodo]

Danke für die Infos trador.
Lippo heute mit +50 auf 575 ! Trotz der schlechten Stimmung wegen Vogelgrippe.
Mal seh`n wie´s weiter geht.

Grüsse