eure meinungen zu qualcomm?? - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[hamdi2000]

---

[hamdi2000]

weiß jemand was von der geschichte mit indien?

[Timo57]

Du bist im falschen Board.

[hamdi2000]

wieso qcom ist doch ein wachstumswert

[oppaduska]

hab ich auch gehört, aber weiss nix genaues.

hatte mich vor monaten geärgert bei ende 60 den anschluss verpasst zu haben.

zum glück hatte ich jetzt nochmal die chance bei 69 zum zuge gekommen zu sein.

[hamdi2000]

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2001/nf200101…

[hamdi2000]

sollte eigentlich ein link werden,sorry.
euer hamdi

[hamdi2000]

Harvard Professor Debunks Japan`s Business Model

By KONSTANTIN RICHTER - WSJE
January 15, 2001

In the dictionary of business buzzwords, Michael E. Porter can lay claim to the term competitiveness. The Harvard Business School professor has published numerous bestsellers with titles such as "Competitive Strategy," "On Competition" and "The Competitive Advantage of Nations." Along with his Harvard colleague Jeffrey Sachs, he also prepares the annual "Global Competitiveness Report," which rates countries on a number of criteria, ranging from the role of government to infrastructure and technology. And last year, Mr. Porter and two colleagues -- Hirotaka Takeuchi of Japan`s Hitotsubashi University and Mariko Sakakibara of the University of California at Los Angeles -- published a book called "Can Japan Compete?" that challenges some common explanations for the success of Japanese companies. In a recent interview with The Wall Street Journal Europe`s Konstantin Richter, Mr. Porter discussed the book and its implications for European companies.

Q: What made you take a closer look at Japan in your latest book?

A: When Japan burst onto the scene in the 1970s and early part of the 1980s, it was widely believed that the nation had invented a superior form of capitalism. That belief was based on two elements: One was an active government policy to control and manage competition, including relaxed antitrust rules, government-subsidized cooperative research-and-development projects, targeting of priority industries and other approaches that seemed to eliminate the excesses of Western competition and to create a fairer outcome. Then there was a new management model: Japanese companies pioneered concepts like total quality management, the lean production system, just-in-time and rapid product improvement. These tools, and others, allowed Japanese companies to operate with remarkable productivity. They were able to enter Western markets with levels of quality and efficiency that had been unimaginable before.

Q: What did you find when you revisited that notion?

A: We found that the Japanese government model actually did not work. Japan has always had many uncompetitive industries, something that Western observers overlooked. By delving deeply into a large cross-section of Japanese industries, we found that the activist Japanese government model was far more common in the failure industries than in the successes. The role of government was more often negative than positive. It wasn`t really a better form of capitalism after all.

Q: What about the Japanese company model?

A: Here the story was more textured. As I said, there are many Japanese industries and companies that have never been competitive. The company model was not successful across the board. And in many of the internal success cases, the companies were not very profitable. Japanese companies were marvelous in making operational improvement but bad at strategy. They rarely managed to carve out a unique and distinctive position, and all the companies in any given industry looked alike. During the period when Japan led in quality, lean production, and so on, its companies were able to gain share in export markets. But when Western companies caught up on the operational level, the absence of strategy proved devastating. Even in celebrated success stories such as semiconductors, companies have been losing international market share. The Japanese companies whose success has endured, like Sony, were outsiders who behaved differently than the mainstream companies connected with the keiretsu.

Q: What implications, if any, would you see for European governments and companies?

A: There was tremendous interest in Europe for the Japanese model because Europeans have long been uncomfortable with unbridled competition and the winners and losers it produces. There has been a tendency to protect local companies from competition in various ways. The Japanese case illustrates the risk of this. Sheltered companies are rarely competitive internationally. There is also a sort of boomerang effect: If you shelter one local industry from real competition, its inefficiency poisons other local industries. In Japan, for example, exporting companies were forced to rely on inefficient transportation, construction and distribution companies that dragged them down. Europe has also had a tendency to favor cooperative solutions, as in research and development. What we found in Japan was that cooperative projects had decidedly mixed results, and a modest to negative impact on competitiveness.

Q: You argue that government-subsidized cooperative R&D is unlikely to produce business success stories. What about Airbus?

A: Airbus is a remarkable exception, not the rule. It`s the only example of its type that I am aware of where a transnational consortium involving government has produced a competitive outcome. Let`s put aside the issue of subsidies, and accept that Airbus produces a fine product. A rare combination of competitive pressure from Boeing, rivalry within the Airbus consortium, and the cultures of the associated companies seem to have offset the deadening effects of government-sponsored cooperation. Against this one success are numerous failures in Japan, the U.S. and Europe. Airbus would be a bad case for Europeans to use as a model.

Q: Can you give an example where cooperative R&D did not succeed?

A: There are many examples. In electric vehicles, the U.S. government and the big three U.S. car makers teamed up on a collaborative effort, with government investing upwards of $1 billion (1.05 billion euros). Ironically, Honda and Toyota, working independently, beat the U.S. companies to market with superior products. It`s typical in cooperative ventures that because companies all have to agree, they end up with the lowest common denominator or an obsolete product.

Q: What do you think is the role of government in innovation?

A: The appropriate role of government is not to take the lead itself but to provide the proper environment. Let`s take Nokia. The Nokia case illustrates one powerful lesson in government involvement. The best kind of government help is often to support the market rather than producers. In Finland and elsewhere in Scandinavia, there was an early recognition that wireless was important to a region with relatively few people spread out over a lot of space. Scandinavian governments created the Nordic Mobile Telephone standard (in 1981), encouraging the growth of the wireless market. Nokia benefited from this. Government can also spur innovation by setting high quality standards for products or environmental performance, as Japan has done in energy consumption.

Q: The Japanese corporate model is in a crisis right now. Do you see room for a successful model that is distinctly Japanese and doesn`t emulate the U.S.?

A: Japanese companies will need to emulate some elements of the American model, such as a greater focus on profitability, more accountability of management to shareholders, and more attention to innovation and strategy. Having said that, Japan has some unique characteristics that could support distinctive ways of competing. For example, Japanese companies still have a longer time horizon and should be well-suited to building market positions and investing in new technologies. Japan is also confronting trends early, such as an aging population, that will spread to other advanced nations. Japanese companies could pioneer new products, services and ways of doing business that addressed the new demographics, gaining a global competitive advantage in the process.

Q: Any ideas for a European model?

A: European companies have some real advantages. The average worker is better educated and better trained than in America. That should allow European companies to operate more productively. European aesthetic and environmental sensibilities are highly advanced, and should provide competitive advantages. Europeans should also be very capable global competitors with an ability to spot and occupy international market positions, because they are attuned to different cultures. The Swedes and the Swiss have been tremendously successful internationally for many decades, not the least because they were forced to compete abroad early on. But many European companies have not faced the fire of competitive pressures, and European workers and managers have been sheltered from real incentives and accountability. Europe is not nearly as successful as it should be.

[hamdi2000]

Nokia, Symbian to Pioneer
Color-Screen Mobile Phones

By DAVID PRINGLE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 15, 2001

A new color-screen mobile phone and personal organizer being developed by Nokia Corp. and operating-system ally Symbian Ltd. could beat similar products using Microsoft Corp. software to the market by at least several months.

Microsoft had hoped phones with color screens running its Pocket PC operating system would be available in the first half of 2001, but an official of the Redmond, Washington, software concern said last week that the first such products won`t be released until the second half.

Nokia plans to launch its 9210 Communicator phone, which uses Symbian`s operating system, in March or April in Europe and Asia. A U.S. launch hasn`t yet been scheduled. In addition to a color screen, the device offers wireless Internet access, e-mail, a video player, personal organizer functions, word processing and spreadsheet programs.

If Nokia and Symbian are indeed first to the market with a high-end device, it would mark a setback for computer makers such as Compaq Computer Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co., which plan to use the Microsoft technology. These companies face a dramatic slowdown in the cutthroat personal computer market, so they are targeting the market for these kinds of hybrid devices in search of sales growth. U.K.-based research firm Strategy Analytics forecasts that in 2004 more than 78 million dual-purpose personal organizers-mobile phones will be sold world-wide, compared with just two million last year.
The Race Is on: Symbian, Microsoft Compete in Mobile-Phone Software (Nov. 6)

In an interview last week soon after Mitsubishi Corp. unveiled a monochrome Pocket PC phone, Dilip Mistry, Microsoft`s mobility marketing manager in Europe, said: "We will have a workable [color-screen] product in six months." Microsoft`s hardware partners are still developing batteries and screens light and cheap enough to use in a color personal organizer with a built-in phone, he said, since the color screens use far more battery power than do monochrome screens.

But Nitesh Patel, an analyst with Strategy Analytics, doesn`t think the hardware is to blame for the delay. "The main issue here is that the Pocket PC [system] is relatively inefficient compared to the Symbian platform," he said, a conclusion that Microsoft rejects.

A spokeswoman for Compaq confirmed that a phone version of its iPaq organizer, which uses the Pocket PC system, won`t be available until the second half of the year.

In any case, the launch of the 9210 should provide a boost for Symbian, the London-based consortium, which is vying with Microsoft and Palm Inc. to become the dominant player in the market for personal-organizer operating systems. Symbian, which is owned by Psion PLC, Nokia, Telefon AB L.M. Ericsson, Motorola Inc. and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., is hoping the color screen of the 9210 will provide an eye-catching showcase for its software.

Palm, of Santa Clara, California, the leading supplier of personal organizers, declined to say which companies planned to use its operating system for color-screen devices.

Tarmo Jukarainen, senior product manager at Nokia, said that the 9210 uses "power-management techniques" to enable a user to hold between four and 10 hours of phone conversations without needing to recharge the battery. Japanese phone makers have been producing sophisticated color phones for the domestic market for about a year, although these handsets generally don`t include video players, word processing or other productivity features found on the 9210.

The Pocket PC phones envisaged by Microsoft would look like today`s personal organizers. In contrast, the 9210 resembles a conventional handset, but it flips open like a laptop to reveal a keypad with 60 buttons and a screen running the length of the device. At a demonstration in London, the 9210`s high-resolution display coped well with the fast action sequences in a video trailer for Walt Disney Co.`s Tarzan cartoon film.

Although the early arrival of the 9210 may suggest that Nokia has a technological lead on rivals in Europe, Peter Richardson, a London-based analyst with Gartner Group, a U.S.-based research firm, believes the device lacks an important feature. He says the 9210 isn`t compatible with the GPRS, or general packet radio services, technology being deployed by most European mobile-phone operators to speed up wireless Internet access. Although other phone makers are rolling out GPRS handsets, Nokia maintains that this technology is still too immature. Some devices being developed with the Pocket PC system are expected to be GPRS-compatible.

Moreover, the 9210 Communicator weighs a hefty 244 grams and its predecessors -- which admittedly were even larger and had monochrome screens -- didn`t have a huge impact. Although Nokia doesn`t reveal sales figures for individual phones, Mr. Richardson estimates that the company has sold one million Communicators since they were first launched in 1996.

Although that is only a tiny fraction of the 128 million phones Nokia sold in 2000, Mr. Richardson points out that the margins on these high-end devices are much larger than on conventional mobile phones. Like other Nokia handsets, the 9210 will be sold by mobile phone operators with a wireless contract at a subsidized price, but Gartner estimates it would sell at $700 (735 euros) unsubsidized.

Write to David Pringle at [e-mail]

[hamdi2000]

ist viel zu lesen aber es lohnt sich