Betrug bei Fondgesellschaften - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[day_sleeper]

Wer schon immer mal wissen wollte, was für Gauner manche Fondgesellschaften in Wirklichkeit sind, dem empfehle ich die Lektüre des aktuellen Telebörse-Magazins. Dort wird beschrieben, dass einige amerikanische Fonds, die sich selber als "aktiv verwaltet" bezeichnen, nichts weiter als pure Index-Fonds sind. Bei den Index-Fonds fallen ja sehr viel niedrigere Kosten an, normalerweise kein Ausgabeaufschlag und nur ca. 0,2% Verwaltungskosten. Die aktiv verwalteten Fonds schlagen da natürlich kräftig zu und verlangen Ausgabeaufschlag und Verwaltungskosten, was leicht 5 bis 6% ausmacht. Diese werden dann natürlich zu Unrecht kassiert. Als Betrüger werden in dem Artikel z.B. die Gesellschaften Goldman Sachs und AXP genannt. Ich denke mal in Deutschland gibt es auch Fonds, die das genauso machen.

[caramanga]

welche?
übrigens würde ich vorsichtig sein, von Betrug zu reden, wenn man nicht genau definiert, was sind Indexfonds und was sind indexnahe Fonds. Was ist alles aktives Management und was ist semi-passives.

[day_sleeper]

das ist der Original-Artikel aus Barron`s, der sich mit dem Problem beschäftigt:

La Cage Aux Funds
Or, why pay a manager to impersonate the S&P when a machine can do it cheaper?

By Gene Epstein


Call it a rampant case of closet indexing -- or a form of fund-manager misbehavior that dates to the 1970s. Instead of trying to beat the market, as an active fund manager should, the closet-indexer would secretly invest in such a way as to do no worse, but no better, than the market itself.

Hence, the manager gives up the glory of outsmarting the S&P 500, but spares himself the ignominy of getting outsmarted by it.

Perhaps our closet indexer was beaten by the market once too often or, worse, burned by the stomach-churning sight of the Dow going north while his stock picks headed south. So he`d come to live by a variant of that time-worn corporate slogan: Cover your butt.

Such closet indexers don`t deserve their paychecks -- assuming they ever did. And they can now be replaced by machines, in this case, computers that are cheaper to operate than they are.

Meanwhile, customers looking to simply match the market could put their money in a passively managed index fund, while saving themselves a hefty sales-load fee in the process. Customers pay that fee because they harbor hopes of doing better.

While the nine offending mutual funds listed in the table linked below all claim to be actively managed, all nine can fairly be branded closet index funds.

No evidence will here be adduced to try to explain just how these funds fell into this woeful pattern, whether it was by design or unintentional. All that can be reported, based on research prepared for Barron`s by RiskMetrics Group, is that in each case, the total return and risk profile have long been virtually the same as the return and risk on the S&P 500. To echo the disclaimer of the standard prospectus, past performance is not necessarily an indication of future patterns.


However, the two years under review have witnessed bull, bear and sideways markets. And if an actively managed fund can consistently track the S&P through this varied period, then it surely deserves a big fat caveat emptor stamped on its nose.

As mentioned, this particular violation of truth-in-packaging carries cash consequences that few would call trivial. Note that the table also includes data on the passively managed Vanguard 500 Index Fund, provided for comparison. Like most passive funds, Vanguard carries no load, and its ongoing charge ( "total expense ratio" ) runs only 0.18%. So against an investment of $10,000 in the fund, the cost comes to just $18 per year.

Now compare that 18 bucks with any of the nine "actively managed" funds listed in the table.

The least expensive of all, the Lutheran Brotherhood Fund, carries a maximum sales load of 4%, or $400 on $10,000, plus a total expense ratio of 0.83%, or $83 per year on that same $10,000. Ironically, American Express offers its own no-load index fund tied to the S&P. But the venerable credit-card issuer has two offending funds on our list, AXP Blue Chip and AXP Research Opportunities, which carry maximum sales loads of $575 on $10,000. Nations Blue Chip takes the dubious prize of being costliest, charging a load of 5.75% and an expense ratio of 1.21%. Think of it this way: In these humble times, a one-year gain of 7% on an equity investment would be deemed respectable.

In the first year, the unhappy customer would earn virtually nothing from Nations Blue, since the fund`s load and expense ratio already total 6.96%. And if the past is prologue, then Nations would be returning 7% only because the S&P has done that well. However, the investor could keep most of those returns by buying an index fund, which exacts a mere fraction of 1%.


As analyst Michael Thompson of RiskMetrics remarks, "If you act like spinach, and taste like spinach, why pretend you`re caviar?"

As noted, the quants at RiskMetrics used two criteria for comparing these funds to the behavior of the S&P 500: total return, as measured by capital gains or losses, plus dividends; and risk, measured by volatility. Based on these indicators, and looking back at the past two years, they painstakingly ran the daily net asset values of the 742 actively managed funds invested in large cap stocks against the S&P.

Happily, they found that the overwhelming majority of these funds were not imitating the S&P, or at least not the S&P 500. (As we`ll soon see, other, more subtle varieties of closet indexing are also possible.) Less happily, and unintentionally or not, nine definitely were.

The table ranks each of the nine in descending order of how closely they`ve matched the S&P based on the two criteria. The chart tracks total returns on the S&P against the fund ranked first -- Goldman Sachs Core Equity -- and the one ranked ninth -- AXP Research Opportunities. Note that the three lines barely differ.

Not that RiskMetrics is the first rating institution to notice this kind of unfortunate pattern. The rating agency Morningstar comments in its "QuickTake Report" that Goldman Sachs Core Equity "resembles the S&P index," and that the "fund has failed to consistently beat the index`s annual returns."

However, the comment concludes that investors "might consider a low-cost index [fund] instead," even though options come highly leveraged.

As for Goldman Sachs Capital Growth (eighth on our list), Morningstar calls it a "solid choice for investors who seek a growth-oriented core holding." Solid it may be, but the S&P has been similarly growth-oriented these past two years.

As you might expect, the issuing companies themselves are not about to advertise the closet-indexing ways of some of their products.

According to the Dreyfus Corporation, the Dreyfus Premium Large Company Stock Fund (fifth on our list) seeks "investment returns ... that are consistently superior to the Standard & Poor`s 500." As John Hancock Insurance will tell you, John Hancock Core Equity Fund (fourth on the list) "seeks above-average total return." But haven`t those sought-after returns been a bit too average for a bit too long?

Only the Lutheran Brotherhood keeps its claim modest, stating simply that its LB Fund (third on the list) "seeks long-term growth of capital and income by investing in common stocks of leading U.S. companies," adding that the "underlying belief is that ... these leading companies will grow and prosper with a strong American economy."

But index-fund investors hold to that belief as well, and for a lot less money.

As noted, one may pursue the art of closet-indexing in other ways. For example, how many funds consistently track the value or growth indexes of the S&P 500, for which low-cost vehicles are also available?

That tantalizing question, as the academics like to say, is a topic for further research.

------------------------------------------------------------

The Not-So-Nifty Nine

Of the mutual funds invested in large-cap stocks, there are nine that have shown a clear pattern of tracking the S&P 500 Index. All nine are actively managed, and charge fees accordingly. The table lists each fund in descending order of being most like the S&P. The 10th fund listed is the passively managed Vanguard 500 Index Fund, which is meant to track the S&P, and has a far lower fee structure.

Goldman Sachs Core U.S. Equity 6.64%
Nations Blue Chip 6.96%
Lutheran Brotherhood 4.83%
John Hancock Core Equity 6.41%
Dreyfus Premier Large Company Stock 6.90%
One Group Diversified Equity 6.45%
AXP Blue Chip Advantage 6.58%
Goldman Sachs Capital Growth 6.94%
AXP Research Opportunities 6.88%
Vanguard 500 Index Fund 0.18%

[Klingvestor]

Auch Journalisten sind nur Menschen und machen Fehler.
So behauptet die Telebörse, die teuersten amerikanischen aktiven Fonds würden jährlich 6-7% Kosten verursachen. Das ist definitiv falsch, denn der Herr Journalist (noch Azubi?) hat einfach Ausgabeaufschlag und Managementgebühr addiert, obwohl der Ausgabeaufschlag nur einmalig anfällt.
So kann man die Leute auch verarschen.