Washington Mutual - Faktentread - 500 Beiträge pro Seite (Seite 3)



Beitrag schreiben

Begriffe und/oder Benutzer

 

Neuster Artikel von unserem Freund Peg Brickley:

By Peg Brickley
Of DOW JONES DAILY BANKRUPTCY REVIEW

http://www.djnewsplus.com/article/0,,SB126393026311514588,00…" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">http://www.djnewsplus.com/article/0,,SB126393026311514588,00…


Washington Mutual Inc. (WAMUQ) says it needs more time to file a Chapter 11
plan due to continued battles with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM), which bought
its chief property, Washington Mutual Bank, or WaMu.

Creditors have been hoping for a quick deal to settle disputes over who gets
some $4 billion in Washington Mutual cash and who will get to collect a tax
refund that may reach $5.6 billion, thanks to WaMu's losses.

A filing Friday with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., holds out
little hope of a speedy ending to the saga of WaMu, the mortgage-burdened
thrift at the heart of the biggest banking collapse in U.S. history.

Monday was the deadline for Washington Mutual's plan to be filed, setting out
how the bank holding company plans to distribute its assets to creditors.
Washington Mutual, however, says it can't file a plan yet because "there is
still substantial uncertainty regarding the ownership of (Washington Mutual's)
most significant assets."

Those assets include some $4 billion in cash that was in its bank accounts at
WaMu when the thrift was seized and sold, along with tax refunds that may total
as much as $5.6 billion. Washington Mutual is fighting J.P. Morgan for the
money, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. also weighing in.

WaMu's former parents has asked that the plan filing deadline be pushed to
March 26 due to the "hurdle" of continued litigation.

Unless it knows what it has to distribute, formulating a Chapter 11 plan will
be "extremely difficult, if not impossible," lawyers for Washington Mutual
wrote.

Regulators worried about the thrift's soundness seized WaMu in September 2008
and sold it to J.P. Morgan for $1.9 billion, sending parent company Washington
Mutual into bankruptcy.

Besides dealing with the cash fights, Washington Mutual is trying to question
former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and dozens of others in a
wide-ranging probe over how the WaMu deal came about. Creditors suspect J.P.
Morgan engineered WaMu's near collapse in order to acquire the thrift at "fire
sale" prices.

J.P. Morgan has declined to comment.

Judge Mary Walrath will hear debates over the probe later this month. She is
already weighing the question of who gets the $4 billion cash.

Washington Mutual says the money in the accounts belongs to it, just like the
cash of other WaMu depositors remained theirs when J.P. Morgan bought the bank.

According to J.P. Morgan, the cash should be treated like a capital
contribution from a worried parent company to an ailing subsidiary.

Dow Jones Daily Bankruptcy Review covers news about distressed companies and
those under bankruptcy protection.)

-By Peg Brickley, Dow Jones Daily Bankruptcy Review; 302-521-2266;
peg.brickley@dowjones.com
Die Forderung unsere EC Anwalts um beim nächsten Gerichtstermin vorsprechen zu dürfen:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001190000000…

Zu diesem Anwalt siehe hier:
http://www.venable.com/gregory-a-cross/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">http://www.venable.com/gregory-a-cross/


Ein weiterer Anspruch gegen WMI in der Höhe von 34.000 $ wwurde fallengelassen, siehe hier:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001190000000…
Die Forderung unsere EC Anwalts um beim nächsten Gerichtstermin vorsprechen zu dürfen:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001190000000…

Zu diesem Anwalt siehe hier:
http://www.venable.com/gregory-a-cross/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">http://www.venable.com/gregory-a-cross/


Ein weiterer Anspruch gegen WMI in der Höhe von 34.000 $ wwurde fallengelassen, siehe hier:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001190000000…
Der neuste Artikel unsere Freundin Kristen Grind:

FDIC’s WaMu role under investigation by Senate subcommittee

A congressional subcommittee is investigating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s role in the seizure and sale of Seattle-based Washington Mutual Bank in September 2008, a court document shows.

A document recently filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware as part of the Washington Mutual bankruptcy case shows that the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) has subpoenaed the FDIC for documents related to the resolution of WaMu.

The document describes the subpoena as “broad” and indicates that the PSI’s jurisdiction includes investigations into companies and regulatory bodies. The filing says the FDIC is responding to “a massive document request from Congress regarding the resolution of Washington Mutual Bank.”

PSI, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, declined to comment on whether an investigation exists.

The FDIC sold Washington Mutual to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) after the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) seized the bank in September 2008.The holding company of the bank immediately filed for bankruptcy.

The FDIC disclosed the PSI subpoena in an objection it filed in the WaMu bankruptcy case. The bank’s holding company has requested permission to subpoena the FDIC, OTS, credit rating agencies and others for information about how WaMu was seized and sold.

Last summer, the Wall Street Journal reported that the PSI had subpoenaed JPMorgan Chase regarding WaMu. An investigation, according to the Journal, appears to focus on whether bankers had private doubts about the soundness of complicated financial products.

The PSI also investigated Seattle-based Quellos, a giant manager of hedge funds that was later sold to BlackRock, a global investment manager. In a 2006 report, the PSI said that Quellos, “designed, promoted and implemented” a tax shelter that was used to shield $2 billion in capital gains from U.S. taxes, costing the U.S. Treasury $300 million in revenue.

The Office of Inspector Generals for the FDIC and the Office of Thrift Supervision, WaMu’s primary regulator, also are investigating the circumstances of WaMu’s seizure. Richard Del Mar, counsel to the Inspector General of the U.S. Treasury, said his office is aware of the congressional investigation. It’s unclear, however, whether the two agencies are working together.

The Inspector Generals’ WaMu report was initially planned for release in the fall of 2009 but has so far not been released.

http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2010/01/18/da…
Senate Asks FDIC for WaMu Documents

By Dan Freed 01/21/10 - 01:12 PM EST

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is responding to a "massive document request from Congress regarding the resolution of Washington Mutual Bank (WAMUQ.PK)," it disclosed in a recent bankruptcy court filing.

Washington Mutual's seizure and sale has drawn more considerable criticism from Washington Mutual shareholders, who have sued the FDIC and JPMorgan Chase (JPM Quote), which acquired the bulk of WaMu's assets in the Fall of 2008.

The inquiry first reported Wednesday by the Puget Sound Business Journal, comes from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Carl Levin (D., Mich).

Kevin Starke, an analyst at CRT Capital who has been following the proceedings closely, wrote in a research note Thursday that the news is positive for all securities issued by Washington Mutual's operating company and its holding company. Starke and others have been skeptical about the likelihood of a recovery in common shares, and Starke says his skepticism continues despite the positive news. Instead, he recommends senior bonds issued by WaMu's operating company, which were trading at about 43 cents on the dollar Wednesday.

"We think it should be politically unpalatable for JPMorgan (JPM) to 1. purchase the WMB assets for $1.9 billion; 2. subsequently write up the value of the assets by $1.9 billion; and 3. claim a multibillion-dollar tax refund on the basis of Wamu's prior-year losses. But we didn't have a sense that anyone in Washington was focusing on the transaction. The news of the broad subpoena indicates that perhaps some people are focused," Starke writes.

Starke believes Washington politicians and regulators will be hesitant to reward vulture investors who have bought WaMu securities on the cheap following its 2008 bankruptcy. However, he told TheStreet by phone that many WaMu shareholders and bondholders remain who purchased the securities before the company was seized and are sitting on considerable losses.

--Written by Dan Freed in New York.

http://www.thestreet.com/story/10665057/1/senate-asks-fdic-f…
Bair's Puzzling WaMu Comments

By Dan Freed 01/19/10 - 08:39 AM EST

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairwoman Sheila Bair made special mention of Washington Mutual (WAMUQ.PK) in her opening statement before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission last week, and her comments bear close scrutiny for a couple of reasons.

First, the mention of any company is interesting because regulators in general don't like to mention specific companies. In fact, not mentioning companies when speaking publicly seems to be a special trick of not only regulators, but investors, investment bankers, attorneys -- you name it. They must all take the same PR class. Lesson number one: Speak in generalities. Don't mention companies, dollar amounts -- certainly not people. If no one knows what you're talking about, it's harder to get into trouble.

Indeed, in a 20-page statement, Bair mentions only two other companies -- Fannie Mae(FNM Quote) and Freddie Mac(FRE Quote).

A second reason that Bair's mention of Washington Mutual is interesting is that the FDIC is a co-defendant with JPMorgan Chase(JPM Quote) in a lawsuit filed by WaMu creditors and shareholders, who accuse them of foul play in the seizure and sale of the giant Seattle thrift.

Bair does not mention the lawsuit in her statement before the commission. Instead, she singles out the resolution of Washington Mutual as an exemplary case of regulatory efficiency and good sense.

But what is especially puzzling is the context of the Washington Mutual reference. Bair first talks about what has become a familiar, and overstated point in commentary about the crisis: regulators did not have the tools to deal with large financial institutions that did not accept deposits from you and me.

According to this theory, addressing crises at Citigroup (C Quote) and Wachovia was no problem for regulators, while in cases like Lehman Brothers and AIG(AIG Quote), as Bair puts it (without, of course, mentioning any of these companies by name) "the government was forced to rely on ad hoc measures involving government support to stabilize the situation."

Possibly because Wachovia was technically not wound down: it was sold. Or possibly because the resolution of Wachovia was even more controversial than that of Washington Mutual. Bair first sold it to Citigroup, and then, when Wells Fargo came along with a higher bid, she changed her mind.

The problem with this logic is that to most of us, the government's handling of crises at deposit-taking institutions like Citigroup and Wachovia looked just as ad hoc as their handling of non-deposit-taking institutions like Lehman and AIG. (Never mind that Lehman and AIG actually DID take deposits.)

But even granting Bair her point--that lightly regulated "shadow banks" like AIG and Lehman were a major cause of the crisis -- there is a problem with her use of Washington Mutual as an example of how the system works. Here is how she puts it:

"By 2007, banking regulators had come to understand that they did not have the proper tools to wind down a large, complex non-depository institution without causing disruptions to the broader financial markets. As a result, the government was forced to rely on ad hoc measures involving government support to stabilize the situation. An exception was the Fall 2008 resolution of the $300 billion savings bank Washington Mutual."

The problem here is that Washington Mutual is NOT a large, complex non-depository institution. Therefore, even assuming its resolution was a great success, it is not an exception to her argument that large, complex non-depository institutions are hard to wind down. It would be an example of how large complex institutions that DO take deposits are relatively EASY to wind down.

However, if Bair wants to provide an example of the ease of winding down large complex deposit-taking institutions, why not choose Wachovia, which was larger than Washington Mutual?

Possibly because Wachovia was technically not wound down: it was sold. Or possibly because the resolution of Wachovia was even more controversial than that of Washington Mutual. Bair first sold it to Citigroup, and then, when Wells Fargo came along with a higher bid, she changed her mind.

My point is not to chastise Bair -- or any other regulator -- for how Washington Mutual was wound down. I don't have enough information to do that. However, Bair should not be allowed to claim, as she does, that the handling of Washington Mutual was an unqualified success without challenge. That is especially true if, as she says, "the WAMU resolution process mirrors the way in which a large interconnected financial institution would be treated under proposals currently before Congress."

As I have previously written, serious questions remain about how Washington Mutual was wound down. Before Bair puts it in her trophy case and we use it as a model for legislative reform of the financial system, it would be nice to learn more about what happened.

http://www.thestreet.com/story/10663059/1/bairs-puzzling-wam…
das EC hat eine der führenden Gesellschaften vor Ort beauftragt die Sache aufzuklären. Die Gesellschaft befasst sich mit der Aufklärung von komplexen internationalen Verflechtugen die das Ziel haben ein Unternehmen mit rechtswidrigen Mittel zu übernehmen. Mr. Cross ist einer der führenden Manager dort. Walrath hat Zustimmung unterschrieben das er gehört werden kann. Mit der Presse und Mr. Cross werden sich die Dinge nicht so vorteilhaft für JPM weiterentwickeln. Nun wühlen zu viele in der Story herum. Da kommt immer mehr heraus....

infos:
http://www.ariva.de/Wamu_WKN_893906_News_t364286

http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/pro_hac.php

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001210000000…
OPPOSITION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF EQUITY SECURITY
HOLDERS TO DEBTORS’ MOTION FOR AN ORDER (A) DISBANDING
SUCH COMMITTEE OR (B) LIMITING THE FEES AND EXPENSWHICH MAY BE INCURRED BY SUCH COMMITTEE

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2185.…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.789.418 von body1 am 22.01.10 11:14:23US Trustee Objection To Debtors Motion To Disband EC

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100122000000000004.p…

In support of her objection to the Debtors’ motion for an order (a) disbanding the Official
Committee of Equity Security Holders (the “Equity Committee”) appointed by the United States
trustee or (b) limiting the fees and expenses which may be incurred by such Committee (the
“Motion”), Roberta A. DeAngelis, Acting United States Trustee for Region 3 (“U.S. Trustee”), by
and through her counsel, avers:

[...]

For the reasons cited in paragraphs 21 through 41 of the Equity Committee’s
opposition to the Motion, the U.S. Trustee’s decision to form the Equity Committee was wellfounded.
This Court should deny the Motion. :)

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTA A. DeANGELIS
ACTING UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
By all accounts it looks like Washington Mutual's (WAMUQ.PK) chapter eleven bankruptcy is shaping up be a saga of Hollywood scripted proportions.

The Equity Strikes Back

On Thursday, Washington Mutual’s recently appointed equity committee filed their first major document in the holding company's ongoing litigation. The filing blasts the bondholder's legal counsel of Weil, Gotshal and Manges for using contradictory statements, "red herrings," and misrepresentation of the current bankruptcy code to support their motion for dissolution of the hard-earned committee.

While WaMu’s legal counsel has stated recently that nothing of the estate will be left over for its spurned shareholders, the equity committee turned Weil, Gotshal and Manges’ previous court filings against them, using the documents to demonstrate that at least $20.55 billion of assets may be available to cover the some $8.28 billion in liabilities the parent company currently owes. The remainder, the committee states, should be returned to, “WaMu shareholders who were instantly and inexplicably stripped of many billions of dollars in equity value…” when the FDIC foreclosed on the bank in September of 2008. The assets in question arise from pending litigation leveled against JP Morgan (JPM) and the FDIC in the form of cash deposits, tax refunds, trust preferreds, and clawbacks of capital contributions to the bank.

The committee, comprised of six retail investors and one hedge fund, argues that "even a partially successful recovery on the liquidated portion of the claims would net a substantial recovery to equity holders." The committee’s filing further states that it would seem that Weil, Gotshal and Manges are attempting to, “wrap up the estate with recoveries for the [bondholders] alone,” even when all parties affected should be considered.

Delaware chief bankruptcy judge Mary Walrath is set to decide whether the equity committee prevails on January 28th.

A New Hope

The equity committee’s filing comes on the heels of the news that Congress, through the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, has subpoenaed the FDIC for documents regarding the seizure and sale of Washington Mutual bank to JP Morgan. This information slipped out from one of the FDIC’s recent motions to dismiss which states it cannot comply with WaMu’s discovery process because of a, “massive document request from Congress regarding the resolution of Washington Mutual Bank.”

There is reason to believe that the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Financial Services Committee is also reviewing the FDIC’s actions because of its refusal to comply with multiple Freedom of Information Act requests regarding Washington Mutual, one of which was filed by the Puget Sound Business Journal. “I have requested [the committee’s] prompt review of this matter,” states Congressman Wally Herger (R-Calif.) through an e-mail with his office.

While shareholders who were “zeroed” by the sudden seizure of their bank are hopeful of what these investigations may reveal, which may include reparations, Jim Cramer’s TheStreet.com states that, “Washington politicians and regulators will be hesitant to reward vulture investors who have bought WaMu securities on the cheap following its 2008 bankruptcy.” Oddly enough this statement comes after the same article recommends investors purchase the distressed senior bonds of Washington Mutual Bank.

Vultures aside, politicians and regulators should keep in mind that there are plenty of sparrows who lost their retirements and employment because of the bank’s seizure. Many common shares of the company are still held by former employees and long term investors who in late 2007 paid upward of $36 a share for a piece of the 119-year-old WaMu. Now they sit on top of billions in losses. Some are hoping for a miracle to recover some of what they lost. Meanwhile WaMu's equity committee is looking for more: justice.

Attack of the Lawyers

Since its formation, WaMu’s equity committee has retained and filed for the representation of Gregory A. Cross to be a part of the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. Mr. Cross is the leading partner of Venable LLP’s bankruptcy arm, one of the top ten firms in the D.C. area. According to their website Mr. Cross has, “led fraud investigations and conducted trials involving complex international transfers of assets… which have led to criminal convictions for bankruptcy crimes.”

Is WaMu’s equity committee attempting to send JP Morgan a message?

Disclosure: Long WAMUQ.PK
VON IMPYER: CAYMANS SIND SACHE DER FDIC/JP

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/2190046.pdf

Der offizelle Prospekt zu den Caymans Pref`s.

Auf Seite 36 von 139 ist ganz klar zu lesen:

Der Wandel in WMI Prefs erst nach der Insolvenz angeordnet wurde!
(Damit ist dieser Wandel null und nichtig und somit haben wir nur 3,5 Mrd als Pref`s (WMI), wenn mein Wissen stimmt)

(Bopfan hat dies im März oder Mai 2009 schonmal behandelt gehabt und lag mit ihrer Einschätzung damals sehr richtig)

Die Caymans sind somit Angelegenheit der FDIC/JPM.

Damit sind die Commons mit $0,5 im Geld, sobald die 4 Mrd zugewiesen und die Steuerrückzahlung verbucht ist.

Also das EC ist vollkommen nötig!
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.802.461 von ms-trader am 25.01.10 09:13:28thema caymans von user meakuz:

Aus dem Prospekt geht hervor, dass ein Receivership durch die OTS ein "Exchange Event" ist - sofern die OTS mit oder nach dem Receivership eine Umwandlung angeordnet hat:


"Conditional Exchange
Each WaMu Cayman Preferred Security will be exchanged automatically for a like amount of newly issued Fixed Rate Depositary Shares, each representing a 1/1000th interest in one share of Fixed Rate WMI Preferred Stock, if the OTS so directs in writing upon or after the occurrence of an Exchange Event.
An "" Exchange Event'' will occur when:

-WMB becomes "" undercapitalized'' under the OTS' "" prompt corrective action'' regulations;
-WMB is placed into conservatorship or receivership; or
-the OTS, in its sole discretion, anticipates WMB becoming "" undercapitalized'' in the near term or takes a supervisory action that limits the payment of dividends by WMB and in connection therewith, directs an exchange."

Entscheidend dürfte also die Frage sein, ob die OTS eine Direktive herausgegeben hat, in dem die Umwandlung ("Conditional Exchange") angeordnet wird.
**Hearing 01/28/2010 - Phone Details and Audio Archive

LISTEN LIVE:
Dial-in at 3:55PM EST
Hearing begins at 4:00PM EST
The bridge number is 712-432-1001 and when prompted for the access code enter 477420980
You will hear no music just an intermittent beep until I join the call to the hearing.

To be notified as the audio archives become available:
http://twitter.com/WaMuAudio

AUDIO ARCHIVE:
The archived audio will be made available at the conclusion of the hearing:
www.viewip.net/wmi/Hearing/2010-01-28/

WMI calendar:
http://www.my.calendars.net/wmi

Quelle:
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_i…
The meat is on p14:

"...the insertion of the Equity at this juncture of the chapter 11 cases could disrupt the negotiations that have been ongoing between the Debtors, JPMorgan and the FDIC. Indeed, such disruption is almost a foregone conclusion as the Equity Committee has every incentive to try and disrupt the process to obtain a "gift" recovery."

Weil-WMI argues earlier that equity holders are already adequately represented...by the debtor...but then states later in its own argument that equity will seek a recovery that Weil-WMI will not, thereby undermining its claim to be representing equity holders. Weil-WMI is fighting gamely to disband the EC but there is no chance of success for them. Obviously, the only serious objection by Weil-WMI is that the negotiations will be disrupted which suggests that the negotiations are very close to being successful...without Equity at the table. JPM is now going to have to acknowledge the reality of the EC in the negotiations. JPM will need EC approval for a settlement...or the litigation will continue...by Quinn.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001250000000…

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…
interessant von faster:

ein vergleichstermin rückt näher, wieder wurden drei neue anwälte beim konkursgericht zugelassen.

die anwälte heroy, rose und marinuzzi
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001260000000…

wenn alle in den usa praktizierenden anwälte eine zulassung beim konkursgericht beantragt haben, könnte ihr mit einem baldigen vergleich rechnen, grins.

die hoffnung, das die packungsdichte im gerichtssaal so dicht wird, dass sie keine luft zum reden (und antragstellen) mehr bekommen, dürfte allerdings vergeblich sein.
bopfan medley thema WEIL !

I wouldn't worry. Under 1102(a)(1) the UST has unfettered discretion to appoint a committee, though not to determine its composition. Accordingly, Weil's claim that "[t]here is little reason to differentiate standards of review between a bankruptcy court's review of a UST's decision not to appoint an additional committee ... and the review of a UST's decision to appoint one", is specious. See p. 7.

I was amused by them calling the current prices of Ps and Ks options' prices. If you consider the manipulation on these stocks that should be trading at least 20% of face you would see the market believes they'll be paid very close to par.

As for the value of the commons it would seem Weil undermines its and Quinn's reputations by continuing to assert that Qs will receive nothing given that their combined skill and expertise is unsurpassed. Nevertheless, I maintain that this argument allows Weil to have its cake and eat it.

Weil cannot reasonably believe in the validity of many of the claims that have been filed against WMI (i.e., that these claims are in the $50 billion vicinity). Moreover, it cannot reasonably believe that (1) litigation against JPM and the FDIC and (2) NOLs, etc., will not yield a result for commons (i.e., A>L, by even a small amount), and they cannot believe Judge Walrath will buy the 'hopelessly insolvent' argument either.

As these are untenable positions, I maintain that is fighting to keep the EC from seizing power in the negotiations (which are probably very far along) AND preventing '34 Act liability. (It is probably more concerned about the former.) In any event, Weil has put up a vigorous fight which it knows it will lose, and longs will feel much better after Judge Walrath rules on the matter.





-----------
SEHR interessant !!!

Re: Unnerving...
19 minutes ago

Thanks, Fly.

In a way this dust up is a good thing in that it may make things clearer for longs.

To understand why Weil is saying what it is saying you have to deconstruct 'A' and 'L'.

To get a realistic picture of what WMI owes, look at its 6/30/08 10Q. Nothing has changed. The # was around $8 billion, I believe. However, so long as proofs of claim (filed under penalty of perjury) showing a notional debt of $50 billion, Weil must maintain that that is WMI's debt.

On the asset side, A is valued most conservatively at $6.7 billion because litigation recoveries and the NOLs etc., are, technically, 'contingent'.

As the notional debt of $50 billion is well above the contingent assets, Weil can -- and must (because of the '34 Act) -- continue to state what no one believes, i.e., that WMI is hopelessly insolvent.

Smart longs understand the $50 billion is the Wizard of Oz, and are not scared of it. They also understand that at $6.7 in assets WMI is only $1.3 billion from A=L. Accordingly, with $3.5 billion in preferreds, commons would be in the $ for $1 with only $6.5 billion infused from the NOLs and other non-litigation inflows (i.e., $1.3 to make A=L, + $3.5 billion for preferreds, + $1.7 billion for commons = $6.5 billion), which is a number in the vicinity quants on this board have calculated.

Accordingly, this is why I believe commons are holding stubbornly at around $.17. Ps and Ks are being brutally controlled as anyone with Level-II will tell you; Ps would be trading at $200 if not controlled, and commons are selling at at least an 80% discount if you assume the non-litigation inflows are forthcoming.

The preferreds will rise (perhaps dramatically) when Judge Walrath denies Weil's motion, and I see the commons heading north, too, albeit at a slower pace.

Weil is being slick, but I believe it is because it must. As for Quinn taking a larger role, I wondered about that last week but now think it is to emphasize the heightened litigation stance.

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.817.952 von body1 am 26.01.10 22:07:59Ergänzung

We lawyers are a slippery bunch when we need to be. I knew at once that Weil was tapdancing about the value of equity and the EC. I can't wait for Weil to get into bed with the EC after Judge Walrath denies the motion to dissolve the EC.

We have a reference point for the preferreds (par), and we know the truth behind the A/L smokescreen, hence even without the litigation $ preferreds have soared.

Of course, that's taking into account the non-litigation $ inflows. The only real mystery is what JPM and the FDIC have offered or will be forced to pay because that's where the key to commons above $1 lies. We'll get a hint when Q takes its next run (at some point after Thursday).

To guesstimate what will be available for commons look at the value of the seized assets. The EC will zero in on this. I wrestled enough with that 14 months ago and am satisfied I am on the right track though people thought I was crazy -- and said so.
von userin vivianbalboni

The $39 Billion Question - The Marta Claims

Part 1:

Hey all. I've not been posting much recently because of other commitments, but the Weil argument against EC citing $50 billion in unsecured claims got my attention, so I thought I'd weigh in on the biggest one of those claims, the MARTA claims:

Thanks to Ghost for posting a thread with links of this claim. See http://ghostofwamu.com/forum/index.php?topic=2709.0.

This $39 billion dollar claim represents fully 80% of the $50 billion in unsecured claims cited by Weil in its objection to the EC. This issue has been floating around since April 2009, but to my recollection nobody has addressed it in detail yet, so let me take a stab at explaining it for those who don't want to read the 100+ pages of relevant filings:

On 8/4/08 the law firm of Kipling Law Group LLC filed a class action suit in State Court (not federal) in King County, WA, on behalf of two employee retirement plans (MARTA and New Orleans Employee's Retirement System) against WMI, WMB, WMAAC, et. al., alleging securities fraud in the marketing and sale of certain collateralized debt obligations (CDO's), specifically several separate mortgage backed security offerings (MBS's) based on mortgages originated by WMB and marketed by and through WMAAC, a Delaware Corporation which is a wholly owned subsidiary of WMB. WMB "sponsored" these securities. WMI's liability is based solely on the fact that WMAAC was a subsidiary of a subsidiary (WMB) of WMI, and that therefore WMI was a "controlling entity" under the Securities Act. No fraud by WMI is alleged. The lawyers (Kipling) are a small "boutique" law firm (5 partners) in the Fremont district north of downtown Seattle, who style themselves as sort of counter-culture complex-litgation specialists. ( See http://www.kiplinglawgroup.com/)

The complaint contains a very thorough explication of what MBS's are, and how WMB collateralized and marketed them. It extensively piggyback's onto some of the more sensational disclosures regarding WMB's alleged unethical practices ("liar loans", etc.), focusing on the unholy relationships with property appraisers uncovered and publicized by New York Attorney General Cuomo. It alleges numerous misrepresentations of fact by WMAAC (and, impliedly, WMB) in the marketing of these securities. Finally, it alleges that, based on these misrepresentations, the plaintiffs and others bought the securities, to their financial detriment, and claims up to $39 billion in damages. The plaintiff's seek class action status in order to represent the claims of "thousands" of potential purchasers of these MBS's. It is important to understand that the causes of action alleged to not allege fraud, but merely alleged nondisclosure of relevant information under the Federal Securities Act. More specifically, it is claimed that the loan-to-value ratio of these various MBS's was not 64% to 73%, as advertised, but at a much higher (and riskier) ratio, because of inflated appraisals.

Part 2:

Later, on 12/16/08, for reasons I can't understand at all, Kipling filed a "First Amended Complaint", which appears to me to be identical to the original complaint in all particulars: Same parties, same factual allegation, same causes of action. The only difference I see is that they have deleted WMI as a party defendant. Why? Perhaps, at that point, they bought the Weil/Rosen line and believed WMI was judgment-proof and so abandoned that particular "deep pocket" defendant as an empty pocket.

However, still later, on 3/30/09, Kipling, through local counsel in Delaware, filed a claim in the WMI bankruptcy proceeding for the $39 billion. (Maybe by then they figured WMI might have something left in its pocket after all.) This was initially set for hearing on 7/27/09, but was continued by agreement of the parties. It is still pending. Before the hearing date, WMI filed a response alleging the claim was no good because it had been "removed" as a defendant by the First Amended Complaint and therefore could not be liable because it had been "dismissed" from the lawsuit. (This is nonsense: Even if this was a "dismissal", which it wasn't, that doesn't mean a claim can't be filed in bankruptcy.) On 8/12/09, Kipling's attorneys in Delaware responded, saying it dropped WMI from the amended complaint because of the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy court, and instead pursued its remedies by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.

(Along the way, Kipling appears to also have sued the FDIC in Federal Court in Washington. See See New Orleans Employees’ Retirement System, et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, et al., No. C09-134RSM (W.D. Wash.). I Googled this with no results.)

Part 3:


So what's it all mean? What is this $39 billion dollar "claim" worth? In my opinion, as a practical matter, nothing as far as WMI is concerned. If anyone is liable it should be FDIC, because they stupidly gave JPM all the assets and kept all the liabilities (less a $500,000,000 indemnification clause) for themselves. And, since JPM is WMB's successor in interest, it should have primary liability on any under-performing mortgages unless the FDIC does. After all, the alleged reason JPM got WMB so cheaply is because of all the "bad loans" it would have to absorb. Also, I don't know anything about how a "controlling entity" might be vicariously liable under the Securities Act, but under standard legal principles a parent corporation is not liable for the misdeeds of its subsidiaries. That limited liability is the whole purpose of having separate corporations: to limit liability.

Moreover, the claim itself is wildly inflated. If you look closely at the complaint you'll see that the total value of all the MBS's together was $39 billion. To have $39 billion in damages all those mortgages would have to be worth nothing at all. That's preposterous. (Heck, one of those mortgages is mine, and I paid a 40% down payment and have made accelerated principal payments for six years.) At worst mortgage defaults would impact those MBS's by about 10 to 20%.

I won't even touch upon the complexities of establishing a valid "class" for purposes of prosecuting a class action lawsuit, or how much more complicated that would become within the context of a bankruptcy court. I don't even know if it can be done.

So, my humble opinion: The Kipling firm thought they had a great lawsuit against "deep pockets" defendants that would net their clients (and, more importantly, themselves) a nice settlement based upon the "nuisance value" of their allegations. This is a typical modus operandi of class action lawyers. Make outrageous claims, threaten protracted litigation, get a nice settlement, almost all of which goes to the lawyers. Here, Kipling bit off more than it can realistically chew. They can't possibly afford to pursue this vs. WMI, which is why they now appear to be focusing on FDIC and made only a a pro forma response to WMI's objection. WMI should prevail on the merits (ironically, possibly saved by the seizure itself!) and maybe on the technicalities as well.

Hope this helps.
http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…
von faster thema claims:

für das gericht und für wmi ist es absolut unwesentlich, ob forderungen berechtigt sind oder nicht, sie bewerten die situation wie sie ist, und nicht wie sie sein könnte.
also hat wmi zur zeit eine belastung von soundsoviel mrd. (ich zähle zur zeit 107 mrd, davon 96 mrd. für die amrta und die irs, und 11 mrd, für die ich keine unterlagen habe, die aber zum grossteil ebenfalls forderungen an wmb haben dürften).

zur berechtigung des marta claims einen link:
http://www.globenewswire.com/newsroom/news.html?d=159878
und einen satz als auszug:
"On December 16, 2008, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in King County Superior Court that excluded Washington Mutual Inc. as a defendant in the case, but retained the allegations from the initial Complaint against all other defendants. "
sinngemäss übersetzt heist es, die kläger haben die klage gegen wmi ausgeschlossen, aber gegen die anderen weitergeführt. wenn sie die forderung gegen wmi vor dem bezirksgericht zurückziehen, wie hoch sehen sie wohl ihre chancen vor dem konkursgericht?
und, wmi, also weil hat bereits einen antrag gestellt, die forderung abzulehnen. dagegen gibt es einen einspruch.
nochmal, wmi muss diese claims berücksichtigen und ihre aussagen darauf begründen, alles andere wäre fahrlässigkeit, und würde schadensersatzklagen nach sich ziehen.

das rosen (der anwalt wmis) keine freude mit von korrupten washingtoner politikern eingesetzten ec anwälten hat, verstehe ich.
wenn plötzlich dieselben politiker, die die beschlagnahmung tatkräftig unterstützt haben oder weggeschaut haben, nun als hilfreiche retter auftretten, dann sehe ich das auch mit einer gehörigen portion skepsis.

es sollte allerdings nicht in ein kindisches gezänke über "wer hat den längsten" ausarten, vor allem von seiten des komitees, die nun seit 14 tagen im amt sind und bis jetzt nichts geliefert haben.
weder ein antrag auf offenlegung der anzahl der existierenden aktien wurde eingebracht. noch ein antrag auf umlegung der anwaltskosten auf alle claims, die auf die ablehnung mit einspruch reagiert haben und sie haben auch keinen antrag auf offenlegung der sec daten zum leerverkauf der aktien vor der beschlagnahmung eingebracht.

aber für mich sind das nebensächlichkeiten, der wichtigste punkt in der morgigen sitzung ist die genehmigung der erweiterten untersuchung gegen jpm. wenn die genehmigt wird, dann sind eine menge "angesehener" bürger akut mit gefängnis bedroht, und ich bezweifle stark, ob ihnen da ein paar milliarden wichtiger sind, grins.
Gepostet Von Tunisia

So wie es aussieht haben wir jetzt folgende Hearing:

Notice of Agenda of Matters Scheduled for Hearing Filed by Washington Mutual, Inc.. Hearing scheduled for 1/28/2010 at 04:00 PM
http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2228.pdf

Notice of Agenda of Matters Scheduled for Hearing Filed by Washington Mutual, Inc.. Hearing scheduled for 1/29/2010 at 10:30 AM
http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2242.…

und noch eines am 5.2.2010

----------

Von Winro gepostet

Washington Mutual: 0,12-Euro-Zombie-Zock - Entscheidung am Donnerstag?

- Es geht um Milliarden
- Neuer Zombie-Dance?

http://www.deraktionaer.de/xist4c/web/Washington-Mutual--0-1…
user sleepless

Here are screenshots of the largest present claims, broken into ranges and sorted by size:
- $50 M to $40 B
- $10 M to $50 M
- $3 M to $10 M
- $2 M to $3 M
- $1.35 M to $2 M





user sleepless

Here are screenshots of the largest claims as filed, broken into ranges and sorted by size:
- $1 B to $100 B
- $100 M to $1 B
- $50 M to $100 M
- $25 M to $50 M
- $10 M to $25 M
- $5 M to $10 M






Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.828.562 von born2live am 28.01.10 09:52:20FETT:laugh::cool:
Aus dem Hauptthread:

---

Hey und hallo,

ich habe nun die Claims gegen WAMU einmal in Excel ausgewertet und bin nun auf eine Summe gekommen:
$104.509.414.176,09 für die mit den Nullstellenproblem: $104,5 MRD

Allerdings sind in diesen $104,5 Mrd die beiden $39,8 MRD Klagen enthalten. ($24.835.200.394,09 + 2 x $39.837.106.891,00 = 104.509.414.176,09)

http://wp1114180.wp150.webpack.hosteurope.de/wamuclaimswo.xl…

Viele Grüße
Rufus
Von frankmaui gepostet

Yahoo: bopfan

Re: Wiley, Gotcha & Mangle..the bottom line !
14 minutes ago

She won't delay in issuing the ruling on the EC -- she can't.

So long as there's no ruling a specter of uncertainty will hang over the EC, preventing it from doing what the UST appointed it do: protect equity. JW is well aware of this and will send a strong message to WMI and the bond holders. While I doubt she'll rule from the bench the order denying WMI's motion (on all counts) will come within a week.

When it does it will be the 4th worst blow JPM and the FDIC have had (i.e., after (1) filing the FDIC claim, (2) filing the lawsuit against the FDIC, and (3) issuance of the 2004 order).

I expect the judge has been reviewing precedent and may have preliminarily drafted an opinion or is currently working on such an opinion to support her ruling.

And before anyone asks whether WMI can appeal Walrath's denial (i.e., is the denial final or interlocutory) someone with more time can research the issue. It may be helpful to start here (http://openjurist.org/824/f2d/176) with this 2d Cir. case, though Judge Walrath is controlled by 3d Cir. precedent.

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…
US Trustee is up ~ we have the right to seek the court to appoint an equity committee

Super!!!:D:D:D:D:D
.





[b]Jetzt mach ich mir 'nen Piccolo auf[/b]



damit nicht nur die Tränchen feucht sind
fürs archiv:

Die Richterin bestätigt die Aktionärsvertretung, da sie einen Sinn in dieser sieht und WMI nicht als "hoffnungslos insolvent" betrachtet.

Ergo haben wir nun definitiv einen Schutz für den Fall, dass es etwas zu holen gibt!

WMI und deren Vertreter haben versucht, sich mit Händen und Füßen gegen diese Aktionärsvertretung zu wehren, (ich zitiere unbestätige Quellen aus den Foren) weil dadurch der Preis für eine Einigung ("settlement") in die Höhe getrieben wird bzw. über dem liegt, was man wahrscheinlich bisher ausgehandelt hat.
Man wollte die Rechnung eben ohne uns machen und hat scheinbar schon etwas ausgehandelt bzw. einen gewissen Rahmen abgesteckt (zu geil, was die in ihrer panischen Argumentation so alles preisgeben), aber das geht jetzt partout nicht mehr.

Dass die Erweiterung der 2004 Untersuchung laut w : o auf den 05.02. verschoben wurde, erweckt bei mir den Eindruck, dass man den beteiligten Parteien nochmal einen kurzen Zeitraum für eine gütliche Einigung geben möchte, aber das ist nur meine Meinung.

Ich rechne mit reger Berichterstattung morgen und auch damit, dass einige auf den Zug aufspringen werden, die bisher gezögert haben.
Aber ich rechne nicht damit, dass der Kurs neue Rekordhöhen erreichen wird, auch wenn die Argumentation "commons sind eh nix wert" nun nutzlos ist und der Kurs von wem auch immer zumindest aus diesem Grund nicht mehr künstlich unten gehalten werden muss.
Einen Anstieg wird es meiner Meinung nach trotzdem geben - vielleicht ein guter Zeitpunkt, Teilgewinne bzw. den Einsatz wieder mitzunehmen, aber diese Aktie war bisher so unberechenbar, dass selbst das nicht eintreten muss.

http://www.ariva.de/Wamu_WKN_893906_News_t364286?page=1057#j…
UPDATE 1-WaMu shareholders get their voice in bankruptcy
Thu Jan 28, 2010 6:05pm EST
Stocks

Washington Mutual, Inc.
WAMUQ.PK
$0.17
-0.00-1.69%
8:59pm GMT+0100

* Shareholders to get unified role in bankruptcy

* Culminates year-long campaign by shareholders (Adds details throughout)

By Tom Hals

WILMINGTON, Del, Jan 28 (Reuters) - Shareholders of Washington Mutual Inc (WAMUQ.PK) will have an voice in the company's bankruptcy after a judge refused on Thursday to disband their committee, which Washington Mutual said would complicate the case.

The U.S. Trustee, which plays an oversight role in bankruptcy, appointed the committee earlier in January after being petitioned by 3,500 shareholders. The company immediately asked the court to disband it.

The committee will be able to speak with a unified voice and hire professionals, which would be paid by the company.

Washington Mutual has said since it filed for bankruptcy in 2008 that it is hopelessly insolvent, the legal benchmark for recognizing official committees of shareholders.

"Evidence that debt and equity are still trading at any number establishes that at least the market thinks the debt is not hopelessly insolvent," said Judge Mary Walrath.

She also denied a request to cap the committee's expenses at $250,000.

Much of the value of the company depends on the outcome of various legal disputes surrounding the government's seizure of the company's banking operations during the height of the financial crisis in 2008.

Brian Rosen of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, which represents Washington Mutual, said there was little need for an equity committee before settling outstanding lawsuits. "That's when the equity committee should come into being because that's when they will become unhappy as we settle at a number they may think is inappropriate."

Gregory Cross of Venable, which represents the equity committee, pointed out that the additional cost for the equity committee would be minimal for the company, which already pays for the work of 19 sets of professionals. "But one more is the straw that breaks the camels back?"

The hearing attracted an overflow crowd, drawing shareholders who have organized themselves over the past year through message boards and websites.

"There's no settlement or outcome that will have validity for the people in this courtroom or the 3,500 who wrote to the Trustee without a committee," said Cross.

The case is In re Washington Mutual Inc, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware, No. 08-12229. (Reporting by Tom Hals)

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2813570420100128
als ergänzung für den 28.01

Good Day in court I might add.

EC disban Motion "Denied"

Bow warning shot to FDIC and SEC.. Supeona's not to be issued today because WMI has avenues to get documents. WMI should get documents via the Freedom of Info Act. But if WMI shows proof that documents are not provided she at a later date can order the motion.

FDIC Automatic Stay Motion will be heard at the next omnibus.
5 Feb 2010 @ 10:30..AM.

Agreed, Once this motion is denied.. SJ soon to follow..

IMHO: Settlement is in the Air.. I beleive the FDIC is not cooperating at the table.. The discovery motion was to force FDIC back at the table.

I beleive the THJMW has given the FDIC one week to finalize settlement. Or else..
Ein Beitrag von Sleepless aus dem Ghostboard´( etwa eine halbe Stunde vor Beendigung des Hearings am 28.01.10)
in dem er den aktuellen Stand der Klagen(Gegenklagen,Einwände....) von/gegen WMI an wesentlichen Eckpunkten fest macht:

Updated 1/28/10: major court action list


Summary of major court action in WMI bankruptcy case:

- (Del) FDIC and JPM attempts to invoke FIRREA jurisdictional bar: denied
- (Del) FDIC and JPM motions to stay two adversary proceedings or remove to D.C.: denied
- (Del) WMI Rule 2004 motion to examine JPM: approved
- (Del) JPM motion for reconsideration of Rule 2004 motion approval: denied
- (Del) WMI subpoena of JPM for Rule 2004 documents: served
- (Del) JPM motion to dismiss WMI's 18 counterclaims: denied
- (Del) JPM attempt to categorize the two adversary proceedings as non-core: denied
- (Del) JPM attempt to divest bankruptcy court of authority pending appeals: denied as frivolous
- (DC) WMI motion to stay the D.C. proceeding in its entirety: approved
- (Del) Official equity committee: appointed
- (Del) WMI motion to disband official equity committee: denied 1/28
- (Del) WMI motion to cap expenses of official equity committee: denied 1/28
- (Del) Black Horse motion to reconstitute official equity committee: denied 1/28

Up next?
- (Del) FDIC-R motion to lift automatic stay to take possession of $4B cash
Der gute Autor dieses Artikels ist wohl wesentlich zu spät zum Hearing erschienen.
Das Wesentliche vorher scheint ihm komplett entgangen zu sein:

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010921399_a…



Originally published Thursday, January 28, 2010 at 4:15 PM


Bankruptcy judge denies Wamu request for subpoenas
A Delaware bankruptcy judge has denied Washington Mutual's request to force government regulators and others to turn over documents related to the bank's 2008 collapse.

By RANDALL CHASE

AP Business Writer

WILMINGTON, Del. —
A Delaware bankruptcy judge has denied Washington Mutual's request to force government regulators and others to turn over documents related to the bank's 2008 collapse.

The Federal Reserve and Treasury Department had agreed to turn over some records, but the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. objected to WaMu's request. The bank holding company is seeking records from regulators and others to determine whether it can pursue tort claims against JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Seattle-based Washington Mutual collapsed in 2008 and was acquired by JPMorgan for $1.9 billion in a deal brokered by the FDIC.

The judge last year allowed Washington Mutual to examine records of JPMorgan, but she ruled Thursday that issuing subpoenas against dozens of third parties goes too far.

Unfassbar wie hartnäckig die tendenziöse Presse sein kann !
Wenn ihr in deutschen Medien Artikel mit ähnlicher Realitätsverweigerung findet, so bitte ich euch umgehend
hier im Board mitzuteilen an welche Adresse wir noch Aufklärungsarbeit richten müssen!!!!
Noch mal für alle das Ergebnis von gestern:

Es ist gestern eine Zusammenschluss von Aktionären zur Durchsetzung der Interessen dieser Aktionäre vor Gericht zugelassen worden!
fürs archiv von extremrelaxer:

Guten Morgen,

das war ein krasser Tag! Ich hatte mich bezüglich des Ablaufs der Gerichtsverhandlung ziemlich verschätzt. Ich war davon ausgegangen, dass amn das EC kurz durchwinken würde und sich dann länger mit den 4 Mrd. beschäftigt. Eine Verschiebung der 2004 erweiterung hatte ich bereits einkalkuliert, da dies ein riesiger Eingriff in die "Privatsphäre" anderer Unternehmen darstellt.

Aber angesichts des Kampfes von David gegen Goliath muss ich klar sagen, das war ein sehr guter Gerichtstag für uns WAMUQ-Aktionäre. M. Walrath hat klar zu erkennen gegeben, dass sie auf Seiten der WMI-Aktionäre steht. Rosen hat anscheinend klar durchblicken lassen, dass es fortgeschrittene Settlement-Verhandlungen mit WMI gibt. Somit war es nur konsequent von "unserer" Richterin, den Rest auf den 05.02. zu verschieben. Hierdurch bleibt JPM und WMI jetzt eine Woche, um zu einer aussergerichtlichen Einigung zu kommen, welche die Aktionärsinteressen berücksichtigt. Eine voreilige Gerichtsentscheidung heute hätte eine aussergerichtliche Einigung evtl. erschwert. Jetzt muss JPM wohl noch ein paar Milliarden drauflegen, weil sie wissen, dass ein Settlement ohne das EC und damit ohne die WMI-Aktionäre nicht mehr zu machen ist.
Es ist jetzt erstmals eine Situation eingetreten, in welcher wir WMI-Aktionäre auf eine Institution vertrauen können, die unsere Interessen vertritt und verteidigt.
Bisher mussten wir davon ausgehen, dass es selbst in dem von uns so oft erhofften Fall eines Settlements zu einer WERTLOSEN AUSBUCHUNG kommen würde, da die WMI- und JPM-Anwälte über unsere Köpfe hinweg hätten entscheiden können. Der heutige Tag ist also ein absoluter Wendepunkt für die Aktionäre. Ein Settlement bei welchem die Aktionäre leer ausgehen würden ist meines Erachtens jetzt nicht mehr möglich, da die EC-Mitglieder dem nie zustimmen würden.
Somit bleiben jetzt mines Erachtens 3 Szenarien:

A)
Settlement mit guten Abfindungen für die Aktionäre (so gute Abfindungen, dass die EC-Mitglieder dem Anmgebot zustimmen)

B)
Kein Settlement, also Durchkämpfen der Forderungen vor Gericht (Wobei ich persönlich auch hier gute Chancen für die WAMUQ sehe, da ich den Großteil der Forderung gegen WMI als nicht haltbar betrachte)

C)
Rückabwicklung (halte ich für so gut wie ausgeschlossen, hätte aber natürlich auch seinen Reiz)

Was soll uns denn jetzt noch passieren? Den einzigen in dem gesamten Verfahren, denen ich persönlich voll vertraue sind 1. das EC und 2. die Richterin M. Walrath. Beide haben jetzt die Macht. Aussergerichtlich hat das EC das letzte Wort, vor Gericht die Richterin.

WERTLOSE AUSBUCHUNG MÖGLICH?
Diese Frage muss jetzt wohl neu beantwortet werden!

Grüsse, ER
fundstück von powerslave:

HJMW signed today the following order..

WAHUQ is now settled and approved by the court..

Payment Authorized.. 33.42$ per share. And back dividends of .675$ per share per qtr.

H's will be paid..

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001280000000…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.838.296 von body1 am 29.01.10 08:48:28Ergänzung bzgl. der Verhandlungen zu Rule 2004:
Die Antrag auf Erweiterung der 2004-Ermittlungen wurde nicht abgelehnt, eine entscheidung hierzu wurde nur auf den 05.02. vertagt. Möglicherweise könnte WMI jetzt versuchen, seinen Antrag nur auf wenige zu spezifizieren, um das Gericht dazu zu bewegen, z.B. die FDIC um Herausgabe von Beweismaterial zu zwingen. Alles in allem m.E. eine sehr weise Entscheidung "unserer" Richterin! ;)


Hierzu auch aus dem I-HUB:
Posted by: thepennyguy Date: Friday, January 29, 2010 3:42:46 AM
In reply to: mattydog who wrote msg# 143368 Post # of 143394

She didn't deny the motion, she simple stayed she wasn't ready to rule on it. It was a fair ruling. In other words if JPM/FDIC and others don't voluntarirly give information then the 2004 rule applies. It was stayed and thats a good thing. LEts look at the glass half full people



@ body: wenn Du meine unbedeutende persönliche Meinung schon in den Fakten-Thread stellst, dann vergiss bitte nicht den Disclaimer:

Alles nur meine Interpretation als Laie! keine Handelsaufforderung! keine Aufforderung zum Kauf oder Verkauf der Aktien. Irrtum vorbehalten, da alees nur meine persönliche Meinung...

:D

Gruß, ER

Wo die WAHUQ-Aktionäre wohl ihre erhaltene Kohle investieren werden?
fürs archiv thema wahuq faster:

wenn diese entscheidung hält, dann sollten wir die wahuq bei etwa 37,50 einstufen (33,3 plus rückwirkender dividenden für 6 quartale). und diese entscheidung liegt auf der linie der anderen konkursgerichte.

aber, grins, da war doch gestern so ein schwarzes pferd und hat heftig gegen die zusammensetzung des ec gewettert, und dabei festgestellt, sie halten wahuq und andere vorzüge. es würde mich nicht wundern, wenn wir in nächster zeit einen einspruch des funds gegen diese entscheidung sehen. schliesslich wurden die wahuq vor der beschlagnahmung mit 50 dollar bewertet, grins.

ich sehe hier das letzte wort noch nicht gesprochen. für den kurs könnte es nur positiv sein, nach menschlichem ermessen, wenn ein ec komitte eingesetzt wird, müssten alle bonds, also auch die h`s, fast voll gehandelt werden, und dass wäre nun bei etwa $35-37. mal sehen, ob unsere kurspfleger das kapieren, oder ob diese mathematik für sie noch zu hoch ist, grins.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291001280000000…
Aus gegenem Anlass möchte ich darüber informieren, dass mir bei vorangehenden Beiträgen hier im Faktenthread ein Fehler unterlaufen ist. Ich habe das zwar schon im Hauptthread richtig gestellt gehabt, es gehört aber letztlich auch hierher:

Entsprechend den Prospekten für WAMPQ (Serie R) und WAMKQ (Serie K) geht meines Erachtens hervor, dass R und K on par stehen, und nicht etwa K vor P. Das folgt aus dem Emissionsprospekt der später emittierten R, wo es u.a. heisst:

The Series R Preferred Stock will rank, with respect to the payment of dividends and distributions upon liquidation, dissolution or winding-up, (1) on a parity with our outstanding Series K Preferred Stock and any Series I Preferred Stock, Series J Preferred Stock, Series L Preferred Stock, Series M Preferred Stock and Series N Preferred Stock we may issue in the future

D.h. mit der Emission von R wurde die Provision im Prospekt von K, dass K senior zu zukünftigen Serien wäre, overruled, wie es ja auch im Prospekt von K vorgesehen ist.
So wurde es mir netterweise von @Pfandbrief erklärt.

Im Prospekt der Serie K heisst es, dass die Rechte der K "senior to our Series RP" sind. Ich war zunächst fälschlicherweise davon ausgegangen, dass es sich bei Serie RP um die WAMPQ handelt. Dies war nach meiner jetzigen Erkenntnis ein Fehler von mir. Ich hatte gedacht RP stehe für Serie R Perpetual oder Serie R Prefferd, anscheinend handelt es sich bei Serie R jedoch um die WAMPQ und bei Serie RP nochmals um eine andere Prefferd-Aktie?

Nachdem die Serie K (Prospectus Supplement dated September 11, 2006) jedoch vor der Serie R (December 11, 2007) kam muss ich wohl davon ausgehen, dass die Informationen im WAMPQ-Prospekt letztlich die aktuellere Information darstellt und somit Gültigkeit haben müsste.


Sollte es wirklich so sein, dass im Falle eines Settlements oder einer Liquidation K pari zu P ist, dann wundert mich der derzeitig extreme Aufschlag für die K´s:

K (25er) derzeit 3,17 USD
P (1000er) derzeit 95,00 USD

Nach Adam Rise müssten die WAMPQ bei einem WAMKQ-Kurs von 3,17 USD äquivalent bei 126,80 USD stehen, um pari zu sein.
Berücksichtigt man, dass im Falle einer nachträglichen Dividendenzahlung (wie jetzt wohl bei WAHUQ verhandelt wurde) auch eine nachträgliche Dividende bei den anderen Preffs möglich wäre, dann erstaunt diese Differenz noch mehr, da WAMPQ mit einem Dividendencoupon von 7,75% und WAMKQ nur mit einem variablen Dividendencoupon von 4% ausgestattet ist.
Die Tatsache, dass die EC-Mitglieder viele WAMPQ-Aktien halten und dagegen prozentual die WAMKQ-Aktien in ihrem Besitz kaum eine Rolle spielen, dürfte ein weiteres Argument für die WAMPQ im Vergleich mit der WAMKQ sein.
Das einzige Argument, was die WAMKQ-Aktie attraktiver machen könnte ist aus meiner Sicht die Tatsache, dass sie "optisch billiger" sind.

Disclaimer:
Dieser Beitrag dient nur dem Zweck, einen mir hier unterlaufenen Fehler zu korrigieren. Das ist keine Handelsaufforderung. Die Informationen habe ich von folgenden Seiten:

Überblick hierzu: http://streetace.com/wamu.php

WAMPQ-Prospekt: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/00009501340702…

WAMKQ-Prospekt: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/00009501240600…

Ich fordere jeden dazu auf, sich selbst die Prospekte durchzulesen und selbst zu recherchieren. Einen Irrtum meinerseits behalte ich mir vor, da ich lediglich Laie und kein Börsenprofi bin.

Grüsse, ER

Bitte entschuldigt mir den Fehler!
WaMu Judge Lets Shareholders Retain Bankruptcy Role (Update1) Share Business ExchangeTwitterFacebook
By Steven Church

Jan. 29 (Bloomberg) -- Shareholders of Washington Mutual Inc., the former parent of the biggest U.S. bank to fail, deserve their expanded role in the company’s bankruptcy case, a judge ruled.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Mary Walrath yesterday rejected a request from Washington Mutual’s lawyers to disband a court- sanctioned committee appointed to represent the interest of shareholders.

Shareholders “have a right to a place at the table,” Walrath said during a hearing in Wilmington, Delaware.

The office of the U.S. Trustee, which monitors corporate bankruptcies on behalf of the Justice Department, agreed to appoint a shareholder committee after hearing from more than 3,500 people, investor lawyer Gregory Cross said in court yesterday. Preferred and common shares of Washington Mutual, which is known as WaMu, have been actively traded since the company entered bankruptcy in 2008.

Shareholders claimed in court papers that Seattle-based WaMu could collect $20 billion from lawsuits, tax refunds and disputed cash deposits. That would allow all of the company’s $8 billion in debt to be paid in full and leave money to the owners of 23 million shares of preferred stock and 1.7 billion shares of common stock, shareholders claimed.

The shares are worth more than $500 million, based on January trades, shareholder attorneys said in court papers. WaMu’s common shares rose 4 cents, or 24 percent, to 21 cents at 10:16 a.m. New York time in over-the-counter trading.

Bank Deposits

Federal banking regulators seized WaMu’s main subsidiary, Washington Mutual Bank and sold it to JPMorgan Chase & Co. in September 2008. Since WaMu filed for bankruptcy, JPMorgan and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. have fought with the company over $4 billion in cash on deposit with the banking unit.

After Walrath ruled on the shareholder issue, she refused to force the FDIC and a group of banks to turn over documents that WaMu says it needs to press its claim against the FDIC in federal court in Washington, D.C.

WaMu sued the FDIC claiming the holding company is owed money by Washington Mutual Bank. When the federal regulators take over a bank, they set up a process that is similar to a bankruptcy to pay creditors. WaMu sued after the FDIC rejected the company’s claim that it was a creditor of the bank unit.

Walrath said that WaMu would have a chance to collect the kind of documents it wants should the company file a second lawsuit alleging that it was harmed by the FDIC’s takeover.

The judge also agreed to put off until next month a hearing to determine if the FDIC can seize $4 billion in deposits held by JPMorgan that WaMu claims it owns. The money was in accounts of Washington Mutual Bank when JPMorgan took over the bank.

The FDIC claims the money doesn’t belong to WaMu and has asked Walrath to give it permission to take the money on behalf of creditors of Washington Mutual Bank.

The bankruptcy case is In Re Washington Mutual Inc., 08- 12229, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware (Wilmington). The dispute over the cash is Washington Mutual Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA 09-50934 U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware (Wilmington).

To contact the reporter on this story: Steven Church in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Delaware, at schurch3@bloomberg.net.

Last Updated: January 29, 2010 10:17 EST
Wie ist die Share-Struktur der EC-Mitglieder?

Damit die Informationen zu der Aufstellung der EC-Mitglieder im Haupt-Thread nicht untergeht, fasse ich hier mal die von anderen zusammengestellten Informationen nochmals zusammen. Mir wäre es ein Anliegen herauszubekommen, welche EC-Mitglieder Pre- und welche Post-Sezure sind und ob sie schwerpunktmäßig in Commons oder in Preffs investiert sind. Falls jemand weitergehende Infos hat bitte ich um Ergänzung!

I. Beitrag von impyer vom 12.01.10 03.51 im Hauptthread:

#145303 von impyer 12.01.10 03:51:48 Beitrag Nr.: 38.713.995
Dieses Posting: versenden | melden

1. Esopus Creek Value, LLC, Attn: Joseph S. Criscione, 150 JFK Parkway, Suite 100, Short
Hills, NJ 07078, Phone: 973-847-5904

Esopus Creek Advisors LLC is the investment advisor of Esopus Creek Value L.P., a private investment fund that invests on behalf of institutions and high net worth individuals. Esopus seeks to achieve superior returns using a hybrid value approach.


2. Kenneth I. Feldman

vertritt:
(Faktenthread)

Common 59,483,566 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series K 175,393 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series R 10,593 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717


http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Ameritrade+Appoints+Kenneth+I.…

3. Saul Sutton

Auch ein Pre.

Hat leichte Abneigung gegen Damion

This investigation is needed, but how about investigating
Jamie Daimon for the underhanded dealings going
on two to three weeks before Wama was siezed, and
the Otc & Fdic Leak to the media that caused almost
17 billion to be withdrawn. At the moment the world was
watching , all the citizens and common people who bought
shares in our banking system , saw the goverment agency
pull the rug from under, causing my family a GIANT LOSS
along with all the other Common Share Holders.
This was very very Hard Earned Money that was invested
in an American Bank Institution that i thought would
have the full backing of the goverment. I call for a reverse
that JPM Chase { The Vulture Bank } Give It Back.
Why should the investers loss everything , the people
who carried the bank, And JPM Should Buy It For
{ Less Then A ” Song & Dance ” } And just add to theire
Portfolio of profits { While Others Are Crying And Suffering } . It’s true many unknow Family’s are suffering
from this , Jamie Diamon Should Return the Bank
Or Pay the Common Share Holders { A FAIR PRICE }.
He Cherry Picked , and did not buy the Bank In Whole.
Mr. Daimon is only looking after He’s Benifit While Others
Suffer and lost everything. Tell Me is this the thing to
do , take advantage of Common People that Worked
so hard , and make them suffer bitter losses , While JPM
Chase Walks Away Laughing. I just want to say i was crying for a week straight, i still cannot think straight my
mind wonders looking hoping for hope that the money that
was wiped out , will be given back . Saul
— Saul Sutton

http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/federal-investi…

unten bei den Kommentaren ist ein Beitrag.

4. Dorothea Barr

keine Infos

5. Joyce M. Presnall

http://www.wamuequity.org/

Hat sich sehr stark für das EC eingesetzt und ist ein Pre.

Hat auch einen sehr guten Anwalt fürs EC besorgt.
Dieser hat sie beraten, wie vorgegangen werden muss.

6. Tyson Matthews

Sehr Aktiv im Forum (wahrscheilich ab jetzt nicht mehr, da schweigepflicht)

Auch ein Pre


7. Michael Willingham

keine infos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Die Anwälte des EC`s:

Gregory A. Cross
Partner
Greg Cross is the partner in charge of Venable's bankruptcy group. Mr. Cross also leads Venable's Commercial Real Estate Servicing practice and is a member of Venable's management board.

During the past twenty years Mr. Cross has established himself as a nationally recognized leader in his practice areas. Mr. Cross has confirmed the only successful bankruptcy restructuring of a financial services firm, served as 'lead lenders' counsel in the nation's largest real estate bankruptcy case, served as debtors' counsel in some of the largest bankruptcy cases ever filed in the Mid-Atlantic, and has successfully litigated numerous cases of first impression throughout the country.

Long before the recent economic downturn, Mr. Cross assembled a team of more than 20 lawyers who focus the majority of their time on commercial real estate workouts. For more than a decade now, Mr. Cross has advised some of the nation's largest special servicers of CMBS assets on all aspects of commercial real estate loan workouts. Mr. Cross routinely develops training programs for these clients, is asked to lecture on commercial real estate and develops cutting edge approaches to structuring workouts.

Clients who hire Mr. Cross get far more than an experienced professional. Mr. Cross is an aggressive results-oriented practitioner with a strong business background. Mr. Cross' unique blend of business and litigation experience allows him to effectively immerse himself in all aspects of a business workout. Mr. Cross' in-depth understanding of complex financial structures and commercial real estate makes him an invaluable counsel to both creditors and debtors in today's economic environment. Mr. Cross can handle matters of any size anywhere in the United States. He has led Venable teams of twenty or more lawyers and has had cases in more than 40 states during the past five years. Mr. Cross' clients benefit from having an adviser who understands their business needs as they navigate a complex negotiation or dispute.

Representative Clients
Mr. Cross’ clients include Allied Capital Corporation, American Capital Strategies, CWCapital Asset Management, Celsion Corporation, J.E. Robert Company, Inc., Midland Loan Services, ORIX Capital Markets, LLC, Promark Technologies, New Horizons Diagnostics and enterprises throughout diverse industries.

Significant Matters
Coordinating counsel for all secured creditors in the General Growth Properties bankruptcy case. Represented entertainer Michael Jackson in the out-of-court restructuring of his assets. Represented the State of Maryland in the bankruptcy involving the Preakness Stakes. Debtors’ counsel in the Thornburg Mortgage bankruptcy case. Successfully restructured $2.0 billion of debt and confirmed Maryland’s largest plan of reorganization in the CRIIMI MAE bankruptcy case. Creditor's Committee counsel to the first committee of tenant in common investors in the Carolina 7 bankruptcy case initiated by Sunwest Senior Living. Successfully litigated some of the country's leading CMBS "repurchase" claims, where Mr. Cross has defined the rights of CMBS Trusts and mortgage loan sellers. Has led several fraud investigations and conducted trials involving complex international transfers of assets. Created denial of discharge and fraudulent conveyance records which have led to criminal convictions for bankruptcy crimes.

Activities
Mr. Cross has wide ranging interests and is an active member of his community. He was a member of former Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich's transition team. He has served as Trustee for the Maryland Affordable Housing Trust. Mr. Cross currently serves on the Board of Directors for the YMCA of Central Maryland, his community association and church. Mr. Cross is a graduate of the 2002 Baltimore City LEADERship class. Mr. Cross is a member of the American, Federal, Maryland State, and Baltimore City Bar Associations. He also belongs to the Defense Research Institute and Maryland Association of Defense Trial Counsel.


Bradford J. Sandler
Partner
Mr. Sandler is a partner with the firm's Business Reorganization Practice Group and a member of its China Group and Energy Group. He also serves on the firm's Professional Personnel Committee, Client Services Committee and Diversity Committee.

Mr. Sandler has substantial experience in the representation of businesses in out of court reorganizations, and of debtors, creditors’ committees, secured and unsecured creditors, purchasers, landlords, trustees and post-confirmation plan administrators in business bankruptcies. He also focuses on, and has substantial experience in, representing international and national businesses as well as entrepreneurs in corporate and commercial transactions.

Mr. Sandler is an active member of his community, has published numerous articles, and has been a frequent speaker on corporate law and business reorganization topics. He is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Temple University School of Law in Philadelphia, and is admitted to practice in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York.

In addition to his practice, Mr. Sandler maintains a blog on business and commercial bankruptcy law, available at http://absolutepriorityblog.com/.
Memberships/Affiliations

* Appointed Member, Mediation Panel for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
* Member, American Bankruptcy Institute (Co-Chair of the Special Projects Task Force of the Asset Sales Committee)
* Member, Delaware Bankruptcy American Inn of Court
* Member, International Federation of Insolvency Practitioners (INSOL)
* Member, Turnaround Management Association
* Member, Association for Corporate Growth
* Ambassador, Select Greater Philadelphia
* Member, The Union League of Philadelphia
* Director, Temple Adath Israel Preschool
* Director, The Philadelphia Art Alliance

Other Distinctions

more specifically:
http://www.venable.com/gregory-a-cross/
http://www.beneschlaw.com/professionals/xprProfessionalDetai…



Meine Meinung ab hier:

Für mich ist sehr wichtig, das EC besteht aus Pre`s und zudem auch Leuten die sich sehr für die kleinen Aktionäre eingesetzt haben und selbst nicht mehr als $1M Guthaben besitzen.

Es ist auch sehr schön zu sehen, die Leute sind nicht nur auf Geld aus, sondern wollen auch mehr!

Es ist auch ganz klar am Einspruch von Weil zu sehen, es gibt nicht wirkliches, was ein EC nicht zulässt.

Wir werden unser EC bekommen, da bin ich mir 100% sicher!

Ich hoffe auf weiter steigende Kurs bei allen Papieren P`s, K`s und Commons!


Die nächsten Wochen werden richtig spannend!

mfg

impyer




II. von born2live:



#155776 von born2live 30.01.10 13:38:33 Beitrag Nr.: 38.848.209
Dieses Posting: versenden | melden

Folgende Antwort bezieht sich auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.848.086 von extremrelaxer am 30.01.10 12:56:21
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
von WithCatz, die sehr detailliert gerade bei ghost ihren tag bei der anhörung beschreibt.

kleiner satz daraus. ein anwalt von blackhorse:


They argued that only 4 of the EC had preferreds.. (their intrepeataion of what a majority was of 7)

mcmahon ust

They got a big STFU when the UST came back and said uh, "Six of Seven hold preferreds"


III. Von Kristallweizen aus dem I-HUB:

Posted by: Kristallweizen Date: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 1:45:14 AM
In reply to: None Post # of 144216

Here are the 7 EC Members:

Pursuant to Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, I hereby appoint the following persons to the
Committee of Equity Security Holders in connection with the above-captioned cases:
1. Esopus Creek Value, LLC, Attn: Joseph S. Criscione, 150 JFK Parkway, Suite 100, Short
Hills, NJ 07078, Phone: 973-847-5904
2. Kenneth I. Feldman
3. Saul Sutton
4. Dorothea Barr
5. Joyce M. Presnall
6. Tyson Matthews
7. Michael Willingham

www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2130.pdf


2. Kenneth I. Feldman



Common 59,483,566 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series K 175,393 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series R 10,593 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717


http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_i…

Ergänzung von mir:
@ lamona: Vielen Dank! Somit kennen wir schonmal die Position von Kenneth I. Feldman:

Common 59,483,566
Series K 175,393
Series R 10,593

Das entspräche derzeit etwa

WAMUQ 11 Mio USD
WAMKQ 0,47 Mio USD
WAMPQ 0,93 Mio USD


IV: von impyer:

#155753 von impyer 30.01.10 13:05:09 Beitrag Nr.: 38.848.114
Dieses Posting: versenden | melden

Folgende Antwort bezieht sich auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.847.930 von extremrelaxer am 30.01.10 12:07:58
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In welchen Aktien sind die EC-Mitglieder im einzelnen und gesamten investiert?

Das EC hat P`s, K`s und Q`s in größren nicht bekannten Mengen, außerdem noch H`s.


Wieviel Prozent der von den EC-Mitgliedern sind Pre-Seizure gekauft?

5 der 7 Leute sind Pre und haben seit Anfang, für ein EC gearbeitet, es gibt Beiträge im Yahoo board, welche zeigen, mindesten $8 sind gefordert, einige des Ec wollten sogar 48.

Gibt es im EC überhaupt Pre-Seizure-Aktionäre? Wer?

wldgrdnr Joyce M. Presnall - Pre-Seizure-Aktionäre
TysonMM Tyson Matthews - Pre-Seizure-Aktionäre
hammr6 Michael Willingham (Chairman) - Pre-Seizure-Aktionäre
opnshrs Dorothea Barr - opnshrs = Dorothea Barr

den fünften kenne ich nicht, aber wurde auch gesat, er sei Pre, aber bei den oben genannten ist es 100% Pre!


Wieviel der EC-Mitgleider sind überhaupt in den Commons invesiert?

Alle oben genannten haben genug Commons.


V. Aus einem Artikel hierzu:

http://seekingalpha.com/article/182093-wamu-bankruptcy-retai…


Posted by: Kristallweizen Date: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 1:45:14 AM
In reply to: None Post # of 144216

Here are the 7 EC Members:

Pursuant to Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, I hereby appoint the following persons to the
Committee of Equity Security Holders in connection with the above-captioned cases:
1. Esopus Creek Value, LLC, Attn: Joseph S. Criscione, 150 JFK Parkway, Suite 100, Short
Hills, NJ 07078, Phone: 973-847-5904
2. Kenneth I. Feldman
3. Saul Sutton
4. Dorothea Barr
5. Joyce M. Presnall
6. Tyson Matthews
7. Michael Willingham

www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2130.pdf


2. Kenneth I. Feldman



Common 59,483,566 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series K 175,393 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717
Series R 10,593 TD AMERITR ISSUER SERVICES C/O ADP PROXY SERVICES 51 MERCEDES WAY EDGEWOOD, NY 11717


VI. von tunisia:

#145154 von tunisia 11.01.10 22:53:04 Beitrag Nr.: 38.713.392
Dieses Posting: versenden | melden

Folgende Antwort bezieht sich auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.713.380 von mmafr am 11.01.10 22:51:01
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joyce präsentiert knapp 170 Millionen commons und ich glaube knapp 1/3 der Prefs

Anmerkung meinerseits:
Für diese Bemerkung fehlt leider eine Quelle.

VII: St-Jean-Cap-F, ARIVA-Forum:


Im ARIVA-Forum wird von St-Jean-Cap-F am 11.01.10 um 23:57 Uhr PhiPIsland ebenfalls folgendermaßen zitiert:
"Joyce präsentiert knapp 170 Millionen commons und ich glaube knapp 1/3 der Prefs".
VIII: Aus der Erklärung des EC:

Those 3,500 letters of support came from holders of many classes of equity including:
 Holders of 572,000+ WMI Preferred Class R Shares
(approximately nineteen percent of such shares outstanding);
-- 5 --
3480975_1.DOC
 Holders of 900,000+ WMI Preferred Class K Shares
(approximately five percent of such shares outstanding); and
 Holders of 100+ million WMI common shares (approximately six
percent of such shares outstanding).

Quelle: http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2185.…
Zusammenfassung:

Joyce und die 3500 "Briefeschreiber":

19,07% der WAMPQ (572.000)
4,5% der WAMKQ (900.000)
5,88% der WAMUQ (100 Mio)

Kenneth I. Feldman:

0,35% der WAMPQ (10,593)
0,88% der WAMKQ (175,393)
3,47 % der WAMUQ (59 Mio)


Zu den restlichen 5 EC-Mitgliedern fehlen die Angaben
WaMu seeks to investigate JPMorgan conduct in deal
Fri May 1, 2009 8:34pm

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Washington Mutual Inc (WAMUQ.PK) on Friday asked a U.S. bankruptcy court to let it probe whether JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) had unlawfully damaged its former thrift unit's assets in order to buy it "on the cheap," at $1.9 billion, last September.

WaMu, the bankrupt holding company of what was Washington Mutual Bank, filed a motion in U.S. bankruptcy court in Delaware, charging that JPMorgan engaged in "sham negotiations" designed to get confidential information out of WaMu and gain an unfair advantage in buying its assets.

The request cited a federal lawsuit brought by WaMu stakeholders against JPMorgan in Texas in February. The suit claims that in the summer of 2008 JPMorgan leaked false and harmful information from WaMu's financial records, in an attempt to deflate its value and purchase WaMu's assets at a fire-sale price.

A JPMorgan spokeswoman said the firm does not comment on pending litigation.

WaMu's collapse was the largest U.S. bank failure in history. The bank was seized by U.S. regulators on September 25 and its deposits immediately sold to JPMorgan.

The surviving holding company filed for bankruptcy protection in Delaware a day later, with $32.9 billion in assets, including several corporate entities, real estate assets and an insurance business.

WaMu said in court documents that if the claims in the Texas suit turn out to be true, JPMorgan could be held responsible for the "destruction" of the parent company and the "total losses suffered by its creditors and shareholders."

WaMu said it wanted to investigate whether the sale could be classified as a fraudulent transfer, so that WaMu's creditors could get their money back, or whether it could sue JPMorgan for other claims like unfair competition, breach of contract, and misappropriation of confidential information.

WaMu, once the largest U.S. savings and loan, claimed in court documents that JPMorgan had "long coveted" the bank's depositor base.

The request was the second legal action taken by WaMu against JPMorgan this week.

WaMu sued JPMorgan on Tuesday seeking the return of more than $4 billion in cash deposits it lost access to when its bank was sold last year. In that suit WaMu said that JPMorgan wrongfully claims it acquired the deposits as part of the takeover transaction, but that they should have been treated like any other deposit at the bank.

Also last month, WaMu sued the FDIC for more than $13 billion, arguing that JPMorgan paid too little for its bank business and that more money should be available for creditors.

A hearing on WaMu's request to investigate JPMorgan is set for May 20, according to court documents.

(Reporting by Emily Chasan; Additional reporting by Elinor Comlay; Editing by Richard Chang
:rolleyes: Auf Wunsch eines einzelnen Users hier ein Chart - welcher alle zeigt - ;)



Allerdings ohne Erklärungen :rolleyes:
Aus dem Hauptthread zur Ergänzung bzgl. der Sktienstruktur der EC-Mitglieder (danke hierbei nochmals an impyer):

#156022 von impyer 31.01.10 11:38:01 Beitrag Nr.: 38.850.287
Dieses Posting: versenden | melden

Folgende Antwort bezieht sich auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.849.881 von Tizian888 am 31.01.10 07:36:23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ Impyer: Ich habe bisher noch keine aktuelle (!!) Aufstellung der WMI-Papiere gesehen, die die EC-Members halten (vertreten zählt ja wohl nach den CH11-Statuten nicht), bzw. wann sie diese in ihren Bestand kauften.
Nun bin ich bekanntermaßen nur ein Schnell-Leser und mache jeden Tag vermutlich dutzende Fehler; insofern ist es gut möglich, daß ich eine solche Aufstellung einfach überlesen habe.
Aber so lange ich diese nicht sehe und ich in dieser Liste nicht wenigstens im Durchschnitt eine deutliche Common-Lastigkeit sehe, bleiben meine mit ER diskutierten Bedenken bezüglich des EC.
Große P- und K-Halter schaden uns m. E. mehr als daß sie uns nützen.
Denkt dran, wenns ums Geld geht, ist die Nächstenliebe meist nicht nah.
Aber bitte versteht mich nicht falsch: ich wäre sehr froh, wenn mir jemand hier diese Bedenken zerstreuen könnte !!
Ich kann mich nur derzeit nicht ER´s gestrigem entspanntem Aufatmen bezüglich des EC anschließen.

Habe etwas gefunden was dich zufrieden stellen sollte!

http://www.viewip.net/wmi/Hearing/2010-01-28/20100128_06.mp3 Anhörung 28.01.10

Ab 3:10 bis 3:35 geht US Trustee auf die Zusammenstellung des EC ein!



6 der 7 Mitglieder sind Pre-Shareholder

Auflistung:

6 halten Prefs(K & P) und Commons
1 Member hält nur Commons


Keiner hält Debt und keiner hält Caymans.

Soweit ist es nun klar.

Die Menge ist meiner Meinung nach nicht so entscheiden, denn die Mitglieder des EC haben sich sehr stark für die Commons eingesetzt und das seit 2008!

Für mich ist ganz klar ,aus den Beiträgen vor dem EC:

Joyce M. Presnall ,Tyson Matthews, Michael Willingham und Dorothea Barr werden sich für die Commons mit Herzblut einsetzen!

mfg

impyer
erste entschuldigungsversuche .. bzw. zurückrudern !

Henry Paulson Discusses Financial Crisis, On the Brink
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7_HCHxzPiE

What I think is interesting is his point that the collapse happened six weeks prior to the election. So that makes me think...what if the whole thing was timed?

Feb. 2 (Bloomberg) -- Henry Paulson, former U.S. Treasury secretary and author of "On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System," talks with Bloomberg's Peter Cook about the financial crisis and the government's response. Paulson said the U.S. was "very close" to financial and economic collapse in 2008 that could have led to an unemployment rate of 25 percent. (This is an excerpt of the full interview. Source: Bloomberg)
Neue Gerichtstermine -> April, Mai bis Juni.

Ao alle 15 -20 Tage ist ein Gerichtstermin.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291002020000000…

Na wie war das mit "Stay long" ^^.
Gepostet von Impyer.

----
Für alle, welche Englisch könne und eine gute Übersicht über die Streitpunkte haben wollen, diese Seite bringt alles kurz und schlüssig auf den Punkt, mit dem Gerichtsunterlagen, welche dazu gehören.

http://www.finmire.com/WMI/WMB_Sale

http://www.finmire.com/WMI/Contested_Property


mfg

impyer
**Hearing 02/05/2010 - Phone Details and Audio Archive

LISTEN LIVE:
Dial-in at 10:25AM EST
Hearing begins at 10:30AM EST
The bridge number is 712-432-1001 and when prompted for the access code enter 477420980
You will hear no music just an intermittent beep until I join the call to the hearing.

AUDIO ARCHIVE:
To be notified as the audio archives become available:
http://twitter.com/WaMuAudio

The archived audio will be made available at the conclusion of the hearing:
This Hearing: http://www.viewip.net/wmi/Hearing/2010-02-05/
Hearing Index: http://www.viewip.net/WMI/Hearing


WMI calendar:
http://www.my.calendars.net/wmi
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.867.700 von Thisismylife am 02.02.10 22:10:29Ist aber nicht unterschrieben von MARY !!!!:confused:
#158703 von impyer

Wichtig, WMI(Weil&Quinn) bewegt sich nun die offnen Forderungen schnell zu klären!

Forderungen in der Größe von $50 Mrd sind, nach EC Bestätigung, von Weil auf der Abschussliste!

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291002020000000…

claims:
#3512 in Höhe von $39 Mrd (MARTA)
#3744 in Höhe von $9,8 Mrd (IRA - Steuern)

Einwände sind bis zum 16.02 einzureichen und die Anhörung findet am 4.3.2010 11:30am (EST) statt.


-------------------------------------------------------------------

Damit ist die Hälfte der Forderungen, welche zur Auflösung des EC vorgebracht wurde (rund 100 Mrd) auf der Agenda gelandet!

Es werden weitere folgen!

Damit zeigt sich, danke des EC , wechselt Weil seine Strategie und wir werden in den nächten Eochen weitere Wendungen sehen!

Es zeigt sich, WMI ist auf einem guten Weg.

Ich hoffe auch bald die ersten Eingaben des EC zusehen.

==============

Claims Übersicht

Für den Berzik-Delaware
Monatsgebühren für PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP-vom Zeitraum 01.-31.12.09.

TENTH MONTHLY FEE APPLICATION OF PRICE WATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP FOR COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AS SPECIAL ACCOUNTANTS TO THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1,2009 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2009

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2279.…

Einspruch kann bis zum 22.02.10 eingelegt werden.
von fastrer fürs archiv:

wmi hat gestern vor dem konkursgericht den antrag gestellt, von den 106 mrd claims gegen sie vor gericht etwa 49,5 mrd zurückzuweisen. wegen duplizität. langsam lichtet sich der dschungel, grins.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291002020000000…
fürs archiv : hearing am 05.02.2010 !


morgige anhörung von faster:

erstmal, es ist eine sitzung von vielen, und es wird eine von vielen entscheidungen vorbereitet. allerdings eine interessante entscheidung.

die fdic hat einen antrag eingebracht, der da sinngemäss lautet:

wenn das gericht der meinung ist, dass die 3,9 mrd auf einem konto der jpm bank zu wmi gehören, dann hat die fdic augenblicklich keinen zugriff darauf, da es durch das konkursrecht geschützt ist.
die fdic beantragt nun eine aufhebung dieses schutzes, um dieses geld, falls es tatsächlich wmi gehört, auf ein sperrkonto bei einer bundesbank zu transferieren, damit fdic die möglichkeit hat, es mit ihren forderungen zu verrechnen.

simpel ausgedrückt: "wir sind die fdic, wir wollen eine sonderbehandlung und alle anderen gläubiger sind dumme a.löcher, die gleichbehandlung nicht verdient haben. und deswegen wollen wir das geld, fals das gericht entscheidet, das es wmi gehört, in unsere gewalt bekommen, um wmi besser erpressen zu können"

und, freitag ist ne anhörung, es muss nicht sein, dass sofort eine entscheidung fällt.
allerdings ist in einer entscheidung für die fdic immer auch automatisch eine entscheidung für wmi und gegen jpm drin, da die fdic das geld ja nur beansprucht, wenn es wmi gehört.
bei einer entscheidung gegen die fdci hängt es von der begründung ab, wie gross der sieg für wmi ist.
wenns nur um das konkursrecht geht, ist es ein kleiner etappensieg, wenn die entscheidung auch gleichzeitig die depotfrage klärt, eine "atomic bomb" (ist nicht von mir, hat einer der anwälte so formuliert).
aus ghost von tunisia:

Der wichtigste von Punkt von morgen, Automatic Stay Motion of FDIC , wurde verschoben auf den 4.3.2010

Item 8:

"This hearing on this matter is continued to the omnibus hearing
scheduled for March 4, 2010 at 11:30 a.m. (EST)."


Die neue Agenda für morgen

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-2316.…
von punktt: zum termin am 04.03.2010 !

Der 4te März 2010 wird, sofern nicht weiter verschoben wird, ein sehr schöner Termin, da steht außer dem MARTA-Claim aucgh noch die 22te Entgegnung zu den Ansprüchen auf dem Programm.
Wesentlicher Inhalt gem. ERklärung des Treuhänders:


1. Supersedet by Subsequently Filed Claims

(Ansprüche die in nachfolgend eingereichten Ansprüche enthalten sind)

2. Inconsistent Claims

( In den Büchern von WMI finden sich keine Unterlagen die mit den gestellten

Forderungen in Übereinstimmung zu bringen sind)

3. Duplicate Claims der individual Noteholder

(Doppelt gemoppelte Ansprüche Einzelner)




Damit dürfte ca. 3Wochen vor Timeline des exclusiven Reorgplanes abzusehen/abgesegnet sein wie die Claims ausgehen werden.

Zufälliger Weise auch 14 Tage bevor die FDIC auf das Entschädigungsbegehren der Deutschen Bank als Treuhänder antworten möchte.


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/08122291002020000000…
Im "American Complaint" (vorher: "Texas Action") wurde das
folgende Dokument eingebracht. Es resultiert aus der Discovery
(Rule 2004) aus Delaware. Danke an Impyer fürs Ausgraben.

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/09-01743/09-01743-0101.…

Auf Seite 3 findet sich folgender Inhalt:

"Neither the Defendants nor the FDIC can claim unfair surprise (...).
The document is highly relevant to interpretation of the scope of
the indemnity provision contained in the WMB Purchase & Assumption
Agreement, which the Defendants and the Intervenor claim supports
the FDIC-Receiver’s intervention in this case."


Erinnert Euch, JPMC sagte sie haben WAMU nach dem Seizure "in
good faith" gekauft.

Aha !

Achtung: "Oral Argument on February, 18th !"

Gruß aus Hamburg,

Videtorial

PS: Beitrag zur Diskussion und als persönlicher Kommentar zu
verstehen. Keine Beratung, keine Handelsaufforderung, nur meine
persönliche Meinung als Laie. Ihr müßt in jedem Fall die
Orginaldokumente selbst lesen und verstehen.
Bankruptcy court hearing, 10-02-05, audio file 5, start 3:30
http://www.viewip.net/wmi/Hearing/2010-02-05/20100205_05.mp3

Walrath:
All right, tell me about the FDIC. Do you want me to hold off any ruling until the continued hearing on that?

Rosen (WMI):
On the 9.5 motion, that has been adjourned, there is nothing further your honor. You can do as you wish.

Clarke (FDIC):
Your honor, this is John Clarke from DLA Piper. If I might be heard on that question.

Walrath:
Yes.

Clarke (FDIC):
The FDIC-R does believe the court should hold off on that ruling on the summary judgement motion. Obviously the parties have different point of view on that.

Rosen (WMI):
Your honor, the parties' understanding was that the court could make a determination with respect to the summary judgement ruling. If the court did do so, however, the FDIC could come in and seek some form of expedited relief and we would have a hearing at that time.

Walrath:
When is it continued to? March 4th?

Rosen (WMI):
March 4th your honor.

Walrath:
Well, I'm going to hold off until the March 4th date. I don't need any more emergencies. All right, we're done then today?

.......

Walrath:
Thank you. We'll stand adjourned

Someone:
Tell me what happened. I'm not sure I... haha... even though I was an eyewitness.

Rosen (?):
There was one good thing that came out of it. She said "I don't need any more emergencies".

http://ghostofwamu.com/forum/index.php?topic=3074.msg24424;t…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.895.343 von yoyo64 am 06.02.10 02:35:36Gefunden von Yoyo; laufende Untersuchungen zu Washington Mutual

Cantwell reveals another WaMu inquiry

http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2010/02/01/da…

"(...)

More than a year after government regulators seized Seattle-based WaMu and sold it to JPMorgan Chase & Co., the number of parties investigating the seizure is growing. Among the agencies involved in WaMu investigations:

- The Inspector General offices of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), WaMu’s chief federal regulators

- The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ,which is heading up a larger task force.

(...)"
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.895.534 von Videtorial am 06.02.10 09:39:53Nachschlag aus:

http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2010/02/01/da…
"(...)

In WaMu’s case, Cantwell said she tried on several occasions to get answers from former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair about how the government was handling WaMu in the frantic days before the bank was closed in September 2008. At one point, she said, after Paulson didn't return her phone calls, she cornered him before a congressional hearing to ask about the bank. After she told him that WaMu had adequate capital and liquitity, he hurriedly answered,

“I know all this.”

(...)"
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.895.694 von Videtorial am 06.02.10 10:48:15Das bringt es doch auf den Punkt! ;)
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.895.694 von Videtorial am 06.02.10 10:48:15ist ja geil! :eek:

In ihrem ersten ausführlichen Interview über Washington Mutual, da direkt nach deren Stilllegung, offenbart Sen. Maria Cantwell gibt es eine zusätzliche Untersuchung laufenden Beschlagnahme in der Bank von der Regierung im September 2008.

Cantwell, D-Wash., Lehnte es ab, Einzelheiten der Untersuchung freigeben oder sogar sagen, ob eine Behörde beteiligt ist. In einem Interview mit der Puget Sound Business Journal in dieser Woche, sagte sie nur, dass "wir haben die Leute, die sich in sie und sie arbeiten mit uns geschoben."

Mehr als ein Jahr nach den Aufsichtsbehörden der Regierung beschlagnahmt Seattle-based WaMu und verkaufte sie an JPMorgan Chase & Co., die Zahl der Parteien untersucht die Beschlagnahme wächst. Unter den Agenturen in WaMu Untersuchungen beteiligt:

- The Inspector General Büros der Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC) und dem Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) WaMu Chef des Bundes Regulierungsbehörden

- Der Senat des Ständigen Unterausschuss für Untersuchungen

- Das Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), die Überschrift ist ein neues, größeres Task Force.

Cantwell sagte, sie ist vor allem die laufenden Untersuchungen bewusst und beschlossen, ihr eigenes in der Folge der WaMu Fallout wegen der anderen Beteiligten zu starten. Dennoch, sagte sie, dass eine zusätzliche Untersuchung im Gange ist, aber sie lehnte es ab, zu erarbeiten.

WaMu angesichts von mehr als 170 andere Banken Fehler im ganzen Land nach wie vor ein "entscheidender Bedeutung" Frage, sagte Cantwell.

"WaMu die Herausforderungen und sittliche Gefahren, die es gibt, wenn Sie versuchen, Gewinner und Verlierer Pick dar", sagte Cantwell. "Das ist nicht, was los ist, damit die Menschen Vertrauen in unser System."

Cantwell Bemerkungen über WaMu kommen, wie der Senator positioniert sich zunehmend als kritisch von Aktionen der Bundesregierung während der Finanzkrise. Sie habe gegen den Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) im Jahr 2008, der Regierung Milliarden-Dollar-Plan an die Banken zu helfen, und vor kurzem habe gegen eine zweite Amtszeit für Notenbankchef Ben Bernanke.

Sie kürzlich auch Lobbyarbeit Finanzminister Timothy Geithner für Milliarden von Dollar an zusätzlichem Kapital für Banken Gemeinschaft in einem bundesweiten Push-to-the flow von Krediten an kleine Unternehmen ziehen.

"Es ist ein Kampf gegen diese großen Institution Konglomerat Übernahme und dann eingerichtet, damit sie gerettet werden können, die von Steuerpflichtigen wieder", sagte Cantwell.

Bei WaMu, sagte Cantwell versuchte sie mehrfach auf die Antworten aus den ehemaligen Finanzminister Hank Paulson und FDIC-Vorsitzende Sheila Bair, wie die Regierung Umgang mit WaMu in den hektischen Tagen vor der Bank im September 2008 geschlossen wurde, zu erhalten. An einer Stelle sagte sie, nachdem Paulson kam nicht wieder ihre Anrufe, sie in die Enge getrieben ihn vor einem Kongress-Anhörung über die Bank zu fragen. Nachdem sie ihm sagte, dass WaMu über ausreichend Kapital und liquitity hatte, antwortete er hastig, "ich weiß das alles."

Cantwell sagte sie sagte Bair vor der Schließung der Bank, dass sie nicht verstehen, warum die Regulierungsbehörden würden gegen WaMu nehmen, wenn die Regierung rechnete die Verabschiedung von Rechtsvorschriften, dass alle Banken helfen würde.

Cantwell, sagte Bair sagte sie, dass "alles, was sie nicht besser verständlich und transparent sein."

Nach WaMu am 25. September 2008 geschlossen wurde, sagte Cantwell Bundes Regulierungsbehörden erklärte ihr, dass ein $ 16,7 Milliarden Bank führen Sie den Grund für die Schließung war. Diese Information wurde auch an die breite Öffentlichkeit freigegeben.
fürs archiv von faster:

For all the chaps, who ask for a lowball settlement offer, don`t forget, JPM made an offer in march 08 for wmi

+ 6.800 mm for the commons (850 mm shares x $8)

included in the deal was also the assumption of some debt

+ 3.400 mm for the preferreds
+ 13.100 mm for the bank bonds
+ 6.800 mm for the holding bonds
+ 1.400 mm other debt of wmi

+ 31.500 mm would have been the total cost for jpm

in september 08 jpm bought jpm from fdic only wmb for 1.888 mm, without the most liabillities, and wmb had additional

+ 7.200 mm injection from tpg
+ 4.000 mm cayman trust assets

+ 42.700 mm total

take off the

- 7.800 mm losse for wmi for the Q2 and Q3/08
- 1.888 mm price paid to fdic from jpm

makes a total profit for jpm

+ 33.012 mm or 33 billion

this is pure capital, and therefore jpm made unjustified profit with it until now:

33.012 x 20 x 0,04% / 12 = 2.200 per month,
until now x 16

+ 35.200 mm unjustified profit

+ 68.212 mm or $68,2 billion

or jpm made an illegal and unjustified enrichment of $68 billion until now!

And add $2.200 mm every month! And the numbers are from a jpm lowball offer!

And the reversal: some Departures:

-13.100 mm wmb bonds
-5.700 mm wmi bonds
-750 mm wahuq
-3.400 mm preferreds

22.950 mm plus 20% for lost interests or dividends

27.540 mm

40.672 mm, now subtract the 3.000 mm liabilities and you get

37.672 mm or 37,7 billion for a wmi without liabilities. Divide this with 1.705 billion share, and you get:

$22,09 per common share

now, if jpm is willing, to buy wmi, you have to add the tax benefits, ~12 billion and the dillution, if jpm pays with paper. You get $30,14 plus 25% =

$36,6 per share, and that is a 1 jpm against 1 wamuq.

Andt the preseizure holder are not the problem of the EC, they are the problem of jpm. Jpm and their criminal behavior caused the loss, and jpm should pay for it.
For all shares, sold before march 08, a payment of minimum 2/3 of the loss.
http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.897.049 von body1 am 06.02.10 18:56:14auf deutsch:

ein versuch einer bewertung:

auf basis des angebots von jpm im märz 08:

+ 6800 mio (850 mio aktien x 8 dollar)

plus die übernahme von schulden:

+ 3400 mio für die vorzüge
+ 13100 mio für die bankbonds
+ 6800 mio für die holdingbonds
+1400 sonstiger schulden

ergibt 31500 mio an totalen kosten für jpm

im september 08 hat jpm wmb für nur 1888 mio, ohne die meisten schulden, und wmb hatte zusätzlich

+ 7200 mio kapitalzufuhr von TPG
+ 4000 mio gewinn aus den cayman trust vorzugsaktien

ergibt insgesamt + 42700 mio

davon muss man abziehen

7800 mio verluste der wmi im 2. und 3 quartal 08
1888 mio der "kaufpreis" von jpm an fdic

das bedeutet, jpm hat gegenüber ihrem billigangebot von 3/08

33012 mio profitiert, oder 33 mrd dollar.

das ist pures kapital, und aus diesem kapital hat jpm profitiert
33012 x 20 x 0,04% /12 monate = 2200 mio jedes monat

also x16 bis heute

35200 mio

insgesamt hat jpm bis heute gegenüber ihrem billigangebot vom märz + 68212 mio, oder 68 mrd dollar verdient.
und jeden monat kommen 2200 mio dazu.

nun kann man das umdrehen, und falls jpm nur das zahlt, was sie illegal erwirtschaftet haben, also 68 mrd dollar, müsste man abziehen:

13100 mio für die bankbonds
5700 mio für die holding bonds
750 mio für die wahuq
3400 mio für die vorzüge

ergibt
22950 mio plus 20% zinsen und schadensersatz = 27540 mio abzug
plus 3000 mio andere schulden,

das würde bedeuten, 37672 mio für eine wmi ohne schulden.
dividiert das durch die anzahl der aktien, und ihr bekommt 22 dollar je aktie.

und, dazu käme im falle einer übernahme durch jpm noch 12 mrd dollar für die steuervorteile und die verwässerung durch die zusätzlichenjpm aktien, etwa 25%,. und das wäre dann pro stammaktie etwa 36,6 dollar.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.896.187 von HalfLife11 am 06.02.10 13:22:22man sollte jetzt sehr schnell reagieren



und wer sagt das es morgen einfach wieter geht mit der fdic und jpm der täuscht sich die fdic hat soviel macht und man wird denen jetzt genau auf die finger schauen wenn es sie bald überhaupt noch gibt



kein geld der welt kann das wieder gut machen was da an vertrauen zerstört wurde

-aktionäre
-angestellte
Sehr geehrter Wallstreet-online Nutzer,
@all Guten Tag,

um jedem User eine bessere Übersicht zu vorhanden Diskussionen zum Thema Washington Mutual
zu gewährleisten werden wir folgende Threads aktiv lassen.

Washington Mut - Grösste Sparkasse der USA! Chancen & Risiken.
Thread: Washington Mutual - Faktentread

WASHINGTON MUT. IN -- Aufarbeitung von Fakten und Quellen für die Presse
Thread: WASHINGTON MUTUAL -- Aufarbeitung von Fakten und Quellen für die Presse

Washington Mutual Realtime Charts
Thread: Washington Mutual Realtime Charts

Über die Funktion "zu Favoriten" im Kopf einer Diskussion lässt sich der neue Thread auf die Merkliste setzen,
so dass Ihr euren Thread schnell wiederfindet.

Es ist mit Sicherheit nicht leicht von lieb gewonnenen Dingen Abschied zu nehmen, jedoch macht gerade
der Austausch von Meinungen und die Fülle derer eine vorwärtsgerichtete Diskussion aus.
Dabei sollte jeder Teilnehmer auch offen für andere Argumente sein.

Wir gehen davon aus, daß jeder User den für sich geeigneten Thread findet und dort schreiben bzw. diskutieren kann.
Weiter erhoffen wir uns eine angenehme Diskussionsatmosphäre.

Dieser Diskussionsstrang wird für neue Beiträge geschlossen.
Alle bisherigen Beiträge bleiben zum Lesen erhalten.

Vielen Dank für das Verständnis und eine konstruktive Diskussion wünscht das w : o -Team

MfG MaatMOD
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.897.905 von MaatMod am 07.02.10 10:17:03Hallo !

habe respekt das ihr es wieder geöffnet habt

vielen dank


und möchte mich schon mal für alle entschuldigen , die sie persönlich angemeckert haben.


Gruss yoyo64

aus GE
Hallo Zusammen,

nach getätigten Überlegungen und Rücksprachen haben wir auch den Faktenthread nun wieder zur Diskussion freigestellt.

Wir bitten aber darauf zu achten,. dass dieser rein für Fakten verwendet wird, da wir ansonsten doch wieder zur Schliessung greifen müssen.

Wir wünschen Euch viel Spaß und jede Menge Informationsaustauch.

Euer community-Team
:kiss: for the Mod ;)

Die wahre Geschichte des Falls Washington Mutual!
7. Februar 2010 - 6:45 – ompyer
Am 25.09.2008 Washington Mutual Bank , „WMB“ , wurde durch die Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. „FDIC“ geschlossen und wenige Stunden später an JPMorgan Chase & Co. , „JPM“ für 1,9 Mrd verkauft. Damals waren alle beteiligten Parteien glücklich, außer den Gläubigern und Aktionären von Washington Mutual Bank und Washington Mutual Inc, „WMI“ , die Muttergesellschaft von WMB. Der Fall wurde als „WaMu case“ bezeichnet.

Im März 2009 began ein spannender Prozess vor dem Konkursgericht von Delaware, mit Foderungen gegen JPM und FDIC. Erste Gerichtsunterlagen beweisen, WMB war zum Zeitpunkt des eingreifens der FDIC nicht insolvent, nach den Regeln der FDIC, die Kapitalquoten wurden erfüllt.

Die Senatorin Cantwell , des Bundesstaates Washington, machte kürzlich folgdende Aussage:

„In WaMu’s case, Cantwell said she tried on several occasions to get answers from former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair about how the government was handling WaMu in the frantic days before the bank was closed in September 2008. At one point, she said, after Paulson didn't return her phone calls, she cornered him before a congressional hearing to ask about the bank. After she told him that WaMu had adequate capital and liquitity, he hurriedly answered, “I know all this.” „
Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle) - by Kirsten Grind

Übersetzung:

„Im Bezug auf „WaMu case“, sagte Cantwell, versuchte sie mehrfach Antworten vom ehemaligen Finanzminister Hank Paulson und FDIC-Vorsitzende Sheila Bair zu bekommen, in wie die Regierung den Umgang mit WaMu in den hektischen Tagen vor der Schließung der Bank im September 2008 betrachtet. An einer Stelle sagte sie, nachdem Paulson nicht ihre Anrufe erwiderte, trieb Sie Ihn in die Enge vor einer Kongress-Anhörung über die Bank. Nachdem sie ihm sagte, dass WaMu über ausreichend Kapital und Liquidität verfügt hatte, antwortete er hastig, "Ich weiß das alles." “

Die Begründung der FDIC war und ist: Es gab einen Abzug von 16 Mrd aus der Bank.

Doch nach dieser Definition hätten auch viele andere Banken geschlossen werden müssen.
Das ist aber nicht passiert, die FDIC hat bis heute keine weiteren Antworten geben.
Dabei ist vieles an Licht gekommen. JPM zahlte $0,019 für einen 1 Dollar Vermögenswert von Washington Mutual Bank.

Es gibt Gerichtsunterlagen welche offenlegen, JPM den Bieterprozess sabotierte und somit andere Bieter verhindert hat, was aber auch in den wenigen Stunden von Beschlagnahmung bis zum Verkauf an JPM von unter 12h schon sehr schwer war überhaupt einen Bieterprozess zu haben!

Aber das ist leider immer noch nicht der Boden des Fasses!

Die FDIC hat Vermögenswerte von 26 Mrd an JPMorgan Chase & Co. , „JPM“ , übertragen.
Nachweislich sind diese Besitz von Waschington Mutual Inc. und hätten nie an JPM übertragen werden dürfen.Auf Grund der Nachforschungen im Gericht und auch außerhalb haben mehrere Ermittlungen begonnen:

„The Inspector General offices of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. „FDIC“ and the Office of Thrift Supervision „OTS“, WaMu’s chief federal regulators
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
The Federal Bureau of Investigation „FBI“ ,which is heading up a larger task force.“
Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle) - by Kirsten Grind

Jedem ist das FBI ein wohlbekannter Begriff,

Am 4.3.2010 werden sich die Parteien wieder vor Gericht treffen. Thema wird ein Konto von WMI mit einem Kontostand von 4 Mrd sein, welche nun bei JPM geführt wird, ehemals bei WMB eingerichtet für WMI. WMI wird der Zugriff auf diese Konto verweigert von JPM.

Es kommt zur heißen Phase in diesem Prozess, wird vom Gericht angeordnet den Zugriff auf die 4 Mrd freizugeben, kommen JPM und FDIC in Erkläerungsnot.

Wie erklärt es sich 4 Mrd zu beschlagnahmen, welche garnicht WMB gehörten und warum verweigert JPM den Zugriff auf ein Konto?
so nacharbeit

geht es dimon jetzt an den kragen

e-mail verkehr zwischen dimon und banco santander wird öffentlich



http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2010/02/07/dimon-and-botin-plo…




gruss yoyo
aus ge
hier ein interessanter Bericht

über pre- und postaktien

werden gleichbehandelt


aus yahoo

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/stocks%28AtoZ%29/stocksW/t…

gruss yoyo
aus ge
Aus der Geschichte... Wamu und die kleinere Bank Wachovia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wachovia#Forced_government_sale

The purchase of Wachovia Corporation by Wells Fargo was completed on December 31, 2008. Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia after a government-forced sale to avoid a failure of Wachovia.

After Steel took over, he insisted that Wachovia would stay independent. However, its stock price plunged 27 percent during trading on September 26 due to the seizure of Washington Mutual the previous night. On the same day, several businesses and institutional depositors withdrew money from their accounts in order to drop their balances below the $100,000 insured by the FDIC—an event known in banking circles as a "silent run." Ultimately, Wachovia lost a total of $5 billion in deposits that day—about one percent of the bank's total deposits.[43] The large outflow of deposits attracted the attention of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks. Federal regulators pressured Wachovia to put itself up for sale over the weekend.

When FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair got word of Wachovia's situation, she decided have the Comptroller of the Currency seize Wachovia's banking assets and place them under the receivership of the FDIC. The FDIC would then sell the assets to the highest bidder. Bair felt this would best protect the small banks. However, several Federal regulators, led by New York Fed President Tim Geithner, felt such a course would be politically unjustifiable so soon after WaMu's seizure.

Though Citigroup was providing the liquidity that allowed Wachovia to continue to operate, Wells Fargo and Wachovia announced on October 3, 2008 they had agreed to merge in an all-stock transaction requiring no FDIC involvement, apparently nullifying the Citigroup deal. Wells Fargo announced it had agreed to acquire all of Wachovia for $15.1 billion in stock. Wachovia preferred the Wells Fargo deal, as it would be worth more than the Citigroup deal and kept all of its businesses intact.

Wamu = 1,9Milliarden für die FDIC
Wachovia = 15,1Milliarden in Wells Fargo Aktien für die Wachovia Aktionäre
JPM bot damals 8$ für Wamu (Kurs lag damals bei 11$ nach der TPG Kapitalspritze)

Ruling ends Wachovia case
Judge upholds settlement in shareholder lawsuit over quick sale to Wells Fargo. - Der Richter hat auf die Briefe der Aktionäre zumindest etwas gehört

http://www.charlotteobserver.com/business/story/1227988.html
In that lawsuit, a New York shareholder named Irving Ehrenhaus said Wells wasn't offering a fair price or giving shareholders a fair chance to vote against the deal.
neue documente

1. sieht aus wie eine neue 49b für den 4.3.



http://www.kcclls.net/documents/0812229/08122291002020000000…




2. Neue Anmeldung
WMI Verlängerung des Zeitraumes,in dem jeder Schuldner das ausschließliche Recht hat,ein ch11 Plan bis zum 26.10.2010 und zur verlängerung des Zeitraumes , in dem der Schuldner kann die übernommen davon zu akquirieren 26.mai 2010




http://www.kccll.net/documents/0812229/081222910020800000000…







so , wünsche eine gute Nacht




gruss yoyo


aus GE
Holdings/Transactions
Filed ↓ As-Of/On ↓ Form ↓ Fullname ↓ Fund Class ↓ Shares ↓ Activity ↓ Shares Change ↓ Shares Pct. Change ↓ Hypothetical Old Value ↓ Hypothetical New Value ↓ Hypothetical Value Chg. ↓ Hypotheticals Return ↓ Hypotheticals Results ↓ Director ↓ Other ↓ Ten Pct ↓ Officer ↓ Officer Title ↓ News Article ↓ History ↓
2010-02-04 2009-12-31 13F-HR Nisa Investment Advisors L L C Institution 410,600 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Nisa Investment Advisors L L C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-02-02 2009-12-31 13F-HR Grimes And Company Inc Institution 78,459 Added More 2,237 2.93 % - % News Article History of Grimes And Company Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-02-02 2009-12-31 13F-HR Iwamoto Kong And Co Inc Institution 150 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Iwamoto Kong And Co Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-28 4 Aardsma David A Insider 34,172 Sold Some -168 -0.48 % - % X Sr Vp Sales And Marketing News Article History of Aardsma David A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-28 4 Caldwell Barry H Insider 33,362 Sold Some -168 -0.50 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Caldwell Barry H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-28 4 Frazier Brett W Insider 10,204 Sold Some -208 -1.99 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Frazier Brett W Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-27 4 Aardsma David A Insider 34,340 Sold Some -441 -1.26 % - % X Sr Vp Sales And Marketing News Article History of Aardsma David A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-27 4 Caldwell Barry H Insider 33,530 Sold Some -441 -1.29 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Caldwell Barry H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-27 4 Derueda Patrick J Insider 26,318 Sold Some -441 -1.64 % - % X President Recycle America News Article History of Derueda Patrick J Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2010-01-27 4 Frazier Brett W Insider 10,412 Sold Some -248 -2.32 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Frazier Brett W Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2009-12-31 13F-HR Regions Financial Corp Institution 13,819 Sold Some -57 -0.41 % - % News Article History of Regions Financial Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-29 2009-11-30 N-Q Fidelity Advisor Series I - Balanced Fund Mixed-Asset Target Allocation Moderate 130,000 Sold Some -130,000 -50.00 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Advisor Series I - Balanced Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Odonnell Lawrence Iii Insider 266,635 Sold Some -1,591 -0.59 % - % X President And Coo News Article History of Odonnell Lawrence Iii Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Rice Cherie C Insider 27,497 Sold Some -285 -1.02 % - % X Vice President And Treasurer News Article History of Rice Cherie C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Robertson Greg A Insider 25,793 Sold Some -285 -1.09 % - % X Vp Chief Accounting Officer News Article History of Robertson Greg A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Simpson Robert G Insider 89,662 Sold Some -1,250 -1.37 % - % X Svp Chief Financial Officer News Article History of Simpson Robert G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Steiner David P Insider 317,052 Sold Some -3,097 -0.96 % - % X X Chief Executive Officer News Article History of Steiner David P Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-28 4 Wittenbraker Rick L Insider 33,367 Sold Some -455 -1.34 % - % X Svp And General Counsel News Article History of Wittenbraker Rick L Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Harris Jeff M Insider 13,661 Sold Some -225 -1.62 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Harris Jeff M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Odonnell Lawrence Iii Insider 268,226 Sold Some -1,543 -0.57 % - % X President And Coo News Article History of Odonnell Lawrence Iii Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Rice Cherie C Insider 27,782 Sold Some -324 -1.15 % - % X Vice President And Treasurer News Article History of Rice Cherie C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Robertson Greg A Insider 26,078 Sold Some -327 -1.23 % - % X Vp Chief Accounting Officer News Article History of Robertson Greg A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Simpson Robert G Insider 90,912 Sold Some -1,213 -1.31 % - % X Svp Chief Financial Officer News Article History of Simpson Robert G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Steiner David P Insider 320,149 Sold Some -4,288 -1.32 % - % X X Chief Executive Officer News Article History of Steiner David P Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 76,217 Sold Some -717 -0.93 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Weidman Mark A Insider 17,224 Sold Some -194 -1.11 % - % X President Wheelabrator News Article History of Weidman Mark A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Wittenbraker Rick L Insider 33,822 Sold Some -441 -1.28 % - % X Svp And General Counsel News Article History of Wittenbraker Rick L Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-27 4 Woods Duane C Insider 53,045 Sold Some -875 -1.62 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Woods Duane C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Frazier Brett W Insider 10,660 Sold Some -466 -4.18 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Frazier Brett W Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Harris Jeff M Insider 13,886 Sold Some -1,549 -10.03 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Harris Jeff M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Odonnell Lawrence Iii Insider 269,769 Sold Some -2,723 -0.99 % - % X President And Coo News Article History of Odonnell Lawrence Iii Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Rice Cherie C Insider 28,106 Sold Some -582 -2.02 % - % X Vice President And Treasurer News Article History of Rice Cherie C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Robertson Greg A Insider 26,405 Sold Some -582 -2.15 % - % X Vp Chief Accounting Officer News Article History of Robertson Greg A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Simpson Robert G Insider 92,125 Sold Some -2,196 -2.32 % - % X Svp Chief Financial Officer News Article History of Simpson Robert G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Steiner David P Insider 324,437 Sold Some -6,252 -1.89 % - % X X Chief Executive Officer News Article History of Steiner David P Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 76,934 Sold Some -1,343 -1.71 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Weidman Mark A Insider 17,418 Sold Some -908 -4.95 % - % X President Wheelabrator News Article History of Weidman Mark A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2010-01-26 4 Wittenbraker Rick L Insider 34,263 Sold Some -887 -2.52 % - % X Svp And General Counsel News Article History of Wittenbraker Rick L Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2009-11-30 N-Q Growth Fund Of America Inc - Growth Fund Of America Inc Multi-Cap Growth 24,571,428 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Growth Fund Of America Inc - Growth Fund Of America Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2009-11-30 N-Q Van Kampen Equity Trust Ii - Van Kampen Equity Premium Income Fund Equity Income Sold All -10,496 -100 % - % News Article History of Van Kampen Equity Trust Ii - Van Kampen Equity Premium Income Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2007-12-31 13F-HR/A Yale Capital Corp Institution Sold All -7,309 -100 % - % News Article History of Yale Capital Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-28 2007-09-30 13F-HR/A Yale Capital Corp Institution 7,309 New Holding 7,309 100 % - % News Article History of Yale Capital Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-27 2010-01-26 4 Romans Michael Jay Insider 10,782 Sold Some -753 -6.52 % - % X Sr Vice President People News Article History of Romans Michael Jay Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-27 2010-01-25 4 Romans Michael Jay Insider 11,535 Sold Some -2,818 -19.63 % - % X Sr Vice President People News Article History of Romans Michael Jay Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-27 2009-12-31 13F-HR Birmingham Capital Management Co Inc Institution Sold All -10,825 -100 % - % News Article History of Birmingham Capital Management Co Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-27 2009-11-30 N-Q Alliancebernstein Portfolios - Alliancebernstein Wealth Appreciation Strategy Global Multi-Cap Growth Sold All -32,900 -100 % - % News Article History of Alliancebernstein Portfolios - Alliancebernstein Wealth Appreciation Strategy Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-26 2009-12-30 13F-HR Doolittle And Ganos Investment Counsel Llc Institution Sold All -800 -100 % - % News Article History of Doolittle And Ganos Investment Counsel Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-25 2009-12-31 13F-HR Hutchinson Capital Management Institution 10,000 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Hutchinson Capital Management Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-25 2009-12-31 13F-HR Rothschild Investment Corp Institution Sold All -15,288 -100 % - % News Article History of Rothschild Investment Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Cafferty Pastora San Juan Insider 22,495 Sold Some -619 -2.67 % - % X News Article History of Cafferty Pastora San Juan Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Clark Frank M Insider 15,709 Sold Some -619 -3.79 % - % X News Article History of Clark Frank M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Gross Patrick W Insider 9,542 Sold Some -692 -6.76 % - % X News Article History of Gross Patrick W Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Pope John C Insider 34,879 Sold Some -100 -0.28 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Pope John C Insider 33,797 Sold Some -500 -1.45 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Pope John C Insider 34,297 Sold Some -400 -1.15 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Pope John C Insider 34,697 Sold Some -182 -0.52 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Reum W Robert Insider 14,338 Sold Some -626 -4.18 % - % X News Article History of Reum W Robert Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 15,838 Sold Some -100 -0.62 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 15,566 Sold Some -272 -1.71 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 15,266 Sold Some -300 -1.92 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-19 4 Weidemeyer Thomas H Insider 11,253 Sold Some -668 -5.60 % - % X News Article History of Weidemeyer Thomas H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Cafferty Pastora San Juan Insider 23,114 Added More 1,629 8.20 % - % X News Article History of Cafferty Pastora San Juan Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Clark Frank M Insider 16,328 Added More 1,629 12.46 % - % X News Article History of Clark Frank M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Gross Patrick W Insider 10,234 Added More 1,629 23.35 % - % X News Article History of Gross Patrick W Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Pope John C Insider 34,979 Added More 3,110 10.81 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Reum W Robert Insider 14,964 Added More 1,629 13.91 % - % X News Article History of Reum W Robert Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 15,938 Added More 1,629 12.84 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-20 2010-01-15 4 Weidemeyer Thomas H Insider 11,921 Added More 1,629 18.80 % - % X News Article History of Weidemeyer Thomas H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-19 2009-12-31 13F-HR Cambridge Investment Research Advisors Inc Institution Sold All -33,360 -100 % - % News Article History of Cambridge Investment Research Advisors Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-19 2009-12-31 13F-HR Reilly Financial Advisors Llc Institution 11,500 Added More 5,000 76.92 % - % News Article History of Reilly Financial Advisors Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-19 2009-12-31 13F-HR Vision Capital Management Inc Institution 10,532 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Vision Capital Management Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-12 2009-12-31 13F-HR Stock Yards Bank And Trust Co Institution 10,082 Sold Some -8,966 -47.07 % - % News Article History of Stock Yards Bank And Trust Co Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-08 2009-10-31 N-CSR Dreman Contrarian Funds - Dreman Contrarian Large Cap Value Fund No Data Sold All -14,600 -100 % - % News Article History of Dreman Contrarian Funds - Dreman Contrarian Large Cap Value Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-05 2009-12-31 4 Pope John C Insider 31,869 Sold Some -1,488 -4.46 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2010-01-05 2009-12-31 4 Pope John C Insider 33,357 Added More 1,488 4.89 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-30 2009-10-31 N-Q Fidelity Advisor Series I - Leveraged Company Stock Fund Mid-Cap Value 3,524,314 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Advisor Series I - Leveraged Company Stock Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-30 2009-10-31 N-Q Fidelity Devonshire Trust - Fidelity Utilities Fund Utility Sold All -7,134,514 -100 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Devonshire Trust - Fidelity Utilities Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-30 2009-10-31 N-Q Fidelity Puritan Trust - Fidelity Balanced Fund Flexible Portfolio Sold All -281,428 -100 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Puritan Trust - Fidelity Balanced Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-30 2009-10-31 N-Q Fidelity Securities Fund - Leveraged Company Stock Fund Mid-Cap Value 5,352,200 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Securities Fund - Leveraged Company Stock Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-29 2009-10-31 N-CSR Fidelity Advisor Series I - Value Strategies Multi-Cap Core 1,011,000 New Holding 1,011,000 100 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Advisor Series I - Value Strategies Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-21 2009-06-30 13F-HR/A Basswood Capital Management Llc Institution 744,005 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Basswood Capital Management Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-21 2009-06-30 13F-HR/A Basswood Capital Management Llc Institution 744,005 Added More 588,699 379.05 % - % News Article History of Basswood Capital Management Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2008-06-30 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data Sold All -19,655 -100 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2008-03-31 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data 19,655 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2007-12-31 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data 19,655 Sold Some -75,470 -79.33 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2007-06-30 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data 95,125 Added More 23,000 31.88 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2007-03-31 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data 72,125 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-11 2006-12-31 13F-HR/A Ramajal Llc No Data 72,125 No Compare - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-10 2007-09-30 13F-HR Ramajal Llc No Data 95,125 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Ramajal Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2009-12-01 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 78,044 Sold Some -1,600 -2.00 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2009-12-01 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 81,944 Sold Some -400 -0.48 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2009-12-01 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 81,444 Sold Some -500 -0.61 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2009-12-01 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 80,644 Sold Some -800 -0.98 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2009-12-01 4 Trevathan James E Jr Insider 79,644 Sold Some -1,000 -1.24 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Trevathan James E Jr Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-12-01 2008-03-31 13F-HR/A Yale Capital Corp Institution 11,085 New Holding 11,085 100 % - % News Article History of Yale Capital Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-30 2009-09-30 N-Q Pennsylvania Avenue Funds - Pennsylvania Avenue Event Driven Fund Specialty & Misc Sold All -1,000 -100 % - % News Article History of Pennsylvania Avenue Funds - Pennsylvania Avenue Event Driven Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-30 2009-09-30 N-Q Variable Insurance Products Fund - Growth Portfolio Multi-Cap Growth 574,300 Sold Some -1,719,642 -74.96 % - % News Article History of Variable Insurance Products Fund - Growth Portfolio Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-30 2009-09-30 N-Q Variable Insurance Products Fund Iv - Financial Services Portfolio Specialty & Misc 16,757 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Variable Insurance Products Fund Iv - Financial Services Portfolio Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-30 2009-09-30 N-Q Variable Insurance Products Iii - Balanced Portfolio Flexible Portfolio 101,600 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Variable Insurance Products Iii - Balanced Portfolio Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-27 2009-09-30 N-Q American Funds Insurance Series - Growth Fund Multi-Cap Growth 13,508,571 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of American Funds Insurance Series - Growth Fund Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-27 2009-09-30 N-Q Dws Variable Series Ii - Dws Strategic Income Vip Equity Income 1,394,944 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Dws Variable Series Ii - Dws Strategic Income Vip Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-27 2009-09-30 N-Q Investment Co Of America - Investment Co Of America Large-Cap Value 25,714,286 Added More 24,571,428 2149.99 % - % News Article History of Investment Co Of America - Investment Co Of America Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-25 2009-09-30 N-CSR Fidelity Central Investment Portfolios Llc - Fidelity Financials Specialty & Misc 543,828 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Fidelity Central Investment Portfolios Llc - Fidelity Financials Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-25 2009-09-30 13F-HR Horan Capital Management Institution Sold All -12,548 -100 % - % News Article History of Horan Capital Management Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-25 2009-09-30 N-Q Principal Variable Contracts Fund Inc - Largecap Blend Account Large-Cap Core Sold All -41,940 -100 % - % News Article History of Principal Variable Contracts Fund Inc - Largecap Blend Account Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-24 2009-11-23 4 Harris Jeff M Insider 15,435 Sold Some -258 -1.64 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Harris Jeff M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-24 2009-11-23 4 Harris Jeff M Insider 25,161 Added More 258 1.04 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Harris Jeff M Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-24 2009-09-30 13F-HR Gamble Jones Morphy And Bent Institution Sold All -17,000 -100 % - % News Article History of Gamble Jones Morphy And Bent Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-24 2008-06-30 13F-HR/A Yale Capital Corp Institution 11,086 Added More 1 0.00 % - % News Article History of Yale Capital Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-18 2008-09-30 13F-HR/A Yale Capital Corp Institution Sold All -11,086 -100 % - % News Article History of Yale Capital Corp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 18,209 Sold Some -2,400 -11.64 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 14,309 Sold Some -3,900 -21.41 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 24,309 Added More 10,000 232.07 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 24,209 Sold Some -100 -0.41 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 24,009 Sold Some -200 -0.82 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 23,509 Sold Some -500 -2.08 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 22,409 Sold Some -1,100 -4.67 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-11-13 4 Rothmeier Steven G Insider 20,609 Sold Some -1,800 -8.03 % - % X News Article History of Rothmeier Steven G Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-09-30 13F-HR Acadia Trust Na Institution Sold All -6,500 -100 % - % News Article History of Acadia Trust Na Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-09-30 13F-HR Basswood Capital Management Llc Institution Sold All -744,005 -100 % - % News Article History of Basswood Capital Management Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-09-30 13F-HR Silvercrest Asset Management Group Llc Institution 58,599 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Silvercrest Asset Management Group Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-09-30 13F-HR Tradewinds Global Investors Llc Institution Sold All -139,179 -100 % - % News Article History of Tradewinds Global Investors Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-16 2009-09-30 13F-HR Vicis Capital Llc Institution 1,068,100 New Holding 1,068,100 100 % - % News Article History of Vicis Capital Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-13 2009-11-11 4 Aardsma David A Insider 35,458 Added More 1,250 3.79 % - % X Sr Vp Sales And Marketing News Article History of Aardsma David A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-13 2009-11-11 4 Aardsma David A Insider 34,634 Sold Some -824 -2.32 % - % X Sr Vp Sales And Marketing News Article History of Aardsma David A Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-13 2009-09-30 13F-HR Ameriprise Financial Inc Institution 23 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Ameriprise Financial Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-13 2009-09-30 13F-HR Oak Hill Investment Management Lp No Data 910,000 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of Oak Hill Investment Management Lp Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-12 2009-11-11 4 Caldwell Barry H Insider 41,433 Added More 10,000 46.65 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Caldwell Barry H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-12 2009-11-11 4 Caldwell Barry H Insider 33,716 Sold Some -7,717 -18.62 % - % X Senior Vice President News Article History of Caldwell Barry H Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-12 2009-09-30 13F-HR/A Qa3 Financial Llc No Data Sold All -1,538 -100 % - % News Article History of Qa3 Financial Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-12 2009-09-30 13F-HR San Francisco Sentry Investment Group Institution 450 No Change 0 0 % - % News Article History of San Francisco Sentry Investment Group Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-10 2009-09-30 N-Q Credit Suisse Large Cap Blend Fund Inc - Credit Suisse Large Cap Blend Fund Inc Large-Cap Core Sold All -1,100 -100 % - % News Article History of Credit Suisse Large Cap Blend Fund Inc - Credit Suisse Large Cap Blend Fund Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-10 2009-09-30 13F-HR Glenmede Trust Co Na Institution 4,225 New Holding 4,225 100 % - % News Article History of Glenmede Trust Co Na Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-10 2008-12-31 13F-HR/A Dlibj Asset Management Co Ltd Institution Sold All -94,987 -100 % - % News Article History of Dlibj Asset Management Co Ltd Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-09 2009-11-09 4 Pope John C Insider 31,869 Sold Some -2,000 -5.90 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-09 2009-11-06 4 Pope John C Insider 39,180 Added More 10,000 52.13 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-09 2009-11-06 4 Pope John C Insider 33,869 Sold Some -5,311 -13.55 % - % X News Article History of Pope John C Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-09 2009-09-30 13F-HR Burney Co Institution 51,213 New Holding 51,213 100 % - % News Article History of Burney Co Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-09 2009-09-30 13F-HR Reilly Financial Advisors Llc Institution 6,500 New Holding 6,500 100 % - % News Article History of Reilly Financial Advisors Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-06 2009-09-30 13F-HR Doolittle And Ganos Investment Counsel Llc Institution 800 New Holding 800 100 % - % News Article History of Doolittle And Ganos Investment Counsel Llc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-06 2009-09-30 13F-HR Metlife Securities Inc Institution Sold All -1,124 -100 % - % News Article History of Metlife Securities Inc Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
2009-11-06 2009-09-30 13F-HR/A Trafalgar Asset Managers Ltd Institution 770,093 New Holding 770,093 100 % - % News Article History of Trafalgar Asset Managers Ltd Ownership Of Washington Mutual Inc
Returned 142 Records!
Controlled Choices Color: Background Color: Font Size: Font Family:
Odd Rows: Even Rows:
New Holdings: Additional Holdings: No Change:
Sold Some: Sold All: No Compare:
Result Lost Money: Result Made Money:

Ich hoffe die Liste ist ersichtlich, es steht wer was verkauft hat oder noch besitzt usw.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.908.978 von Pandora2009 am 09.02.10 11:37:51wieso kopierst du einfach von einem teil ins andere?
hm is vieleicht sinnvoller die excell datei oder was auch immer das sein soll hochzuladen? ;-)

http://www.fileshost.com/

oder

http://ultrashare.de/

danke und grüße
Von Boby ähm meine Enis21 / Tunisia

- die 4 Mrd. müssten bei strikter Trennung zurück an WMI
- die Halter der Caymans müssten ihre Ansprüche an WMB stellen
- die Steuerrückzahlungen müssten primär an WMI erfolgen und seitens von WMB anteilsweise nachträglich von WMI gefordert / beantragt werden
- den erlittenen Verlust durch den Wertverlust der WMB-Aktien bzw. anteile müsste WMI ebenfalls steuerrechtlich geltend machen können
- die 1,9 Mrd. müsste WMI erhalten (waren die in den Equity-Rechnungen von WMI berücksichtigt?)
- der MARTA-Claim (39 B), welcher am 04.03. behandelt werden soll dürfte mit Begründung der Nicht-Zuständigkeit von WMI abgewiesen werden."


http://www.2fast2focus.de/wbb3/index.php?page=Index

Zu 1.
DIe 4 Milliarden gehen an WMI zurück, Originalantrag auf SJ behinhaltet aber auch folgende Textpassage:

"WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs WMI and WMI Investment respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs
A. Ordering JPMC to pay the Deposits, including pre-judgment interest, in the Accounts to WMI and WMI Investment;
B. Ordering JPMC to pay restitution to WMI and WMI Investment in an
amount equal to JPMC's unjust enrichment;
C. Awarding Plaintiffs costs of suit herein; andD. Granting plaintiffs such other legal or equitable relief as is just."
http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/09-50934/09-50934-0001.pdf

Mit etwas Glück kriegen wie mehr als die 4 Milliarden ;)

2.
Die Caymans sind offizielle noch nicht geklärt, es kann jedoch davn ausgegangen werden, dass diese nicht zu Lasten WMI fallen


3.
Die 5.6 Milliarden sollten zu götem Teil an WMI gehen, sicher sind auf jeden Fall die durch das neue Gesetzt zuszätliche 2.6 Milliarden da JPM als TARP-Empfänger keinen Anspruch darauf hat.

4.
Ja von diese Möglichkeit habe ich auch gehoert ;)

5.
Die 1.9 Milliarden erhält WMI nicht, diese hat die FDIC momentan. Die einzigen Leute die darauf Anspruch erheben können , so traurig das auch sein mag, sind die WMB Bondholder. Diese müssen die 1.9 Milliarden unter sich aufteilen!

6.
Richtig der Marta Claim hat keine Anspruchsgrundlage. Von offiziell 104 Milliarden Claims sind wir schonmal auf 54 Milliarden zurückgekommen ;)
Der Marta Claim fehlt nocht und 4 Große IRS-Claims ;)
Gepostet von Body ähmm Enis21
zum nachdenken ! warum mary so gehandelt hat ;-)))

What is so speculative about a settlement occurring before she
rules on summary judgment? If she didn't think a settlement was
forthcoming she wouldn't have postponed the last hearing by a month. It
would have been a few days at most instead. Its her job to keep the case moving through her court.

---
^^ so.. aus dem dem Faktenthread steht ja...

Clarke (FDIC):
The FDIC-R does believe the court should hold off on that ruling on the summary judgement motion. Obviously the parties have different point of view on that.

Rosen (WMI):
Your honor, the parties' understanding was that the court could make a determination with respect to the summary judgement ruling. If the court did do so, however, the FDIC could come in and seek some form of expedited relief and we would have a hearing at that time.
---
Wenn ich das richtig übersetze, dann sagt Rosen "expedited relief", dass falls die Richterin die 4 Milliarden für WMI zustimmt, würde die FDIC zu einer "beschleunigten Unterstützung" kommen und wir würden eine Anhörung haben.

Daraufhin hat Mary gesagt "I don't need any more emergencies".

Nun stelle ich es mal so in den Raum, dass es Wink mit dem Zaunpfahl ist!
---
Keine Handelsaufforderung (Totalverlust möglich)
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.922.600 von yoyo64 am 11.02.10 01:49:26Bitte das Datum beachten!

Neu: Nein!

2008!

Tosca hat schon vor langer Zeit verkauft(Ende 08 oder Anfang 09) und hat dies im jetigen Jahresbericht für 09 vermerkt.

soweit mein Wissen.

mfg

impyer
Banking Stock Alert for Washington Mutual Inc. Issued by InvestorSoup


2010-02-10 06:50 ET - News Release

DALLAS, Feb. 10, 2010 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- InvestorSoup.com announces an investment report featuring Washington Mutual Inc. (Pink Sheets:WAMUQ). The report includes financial, comparative and investment analyses, and pertinent industry information you need to know to make an educated investment decision.

The full report is available at: http://www.investorsoup.com/lp/WAMUQ

Get our alerts BEFORE the rest of the market. Follow us on Twitter: www.twitter.com/investorsoup

Washington Mutual Inc. (WAMUQ) is a consumer and small business banking company with operations in U.S. markets. The Company is a savings and loan holding company. It owns two banking subsidiaries, Washington Mutual Bank (WMB) and Washington Mutual Bank fsb (WMBfsb), as well as numerous non-bank subsidiaries. The Company operates in four segments: the Retail Banking Group, which operates a retail bank network of 2,257 stores in California, Florida, Texas, New York, Washington, Illinois, Oregon, New Jersey, Georgia, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, Idaho and Connecticut; the Card Services Group, which operates a nationwide credit card lending business; the Commercial Group, which conducts a multi-family and commercial real estate lending business in selected markets; and the Home Loans Group, which engages in nationwide single-family residential real estate lending, servicing and capital markets activities. In September 2008, the Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Message Board Search for WAMUQ: http://www.boardcentral.com/boards/WAMUQ

In the report, the analyst notes:

"A Delaware bankruptcy judge in late January denied WAMUQ's request to force government regulators to hand over documents related to the 2008 collapse of WAMUQ. In a court filing last month, the bank holding company asked the court to direct the handing over of documents and the examination of witnesses from a host of regulatory bodies, ratings agencies, banks and other entities. Some, including the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, agreed to turn over at least some records, but the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. objected to WAMUQ's request.

To read the entire report visit: http://www.investorsoup.com/lp/WAMUQ

See what investors say about WAMUQ at penny stock forum

InvestorSoup.com is a small-cap research and investment commentary provider. InvestorSoup.com strives to provide a balanced view of many promising small-cap companies that would otherwise fall under the radar of the typical Wall Street investor. We provide investors with an excellent first step in their research and due diligence by providing daily trading ideas, and consolidating the public information available on them. For more information on InvestorSoup.com, please visit http://www.InvestorSoup.com

InvestorSoup.com Disclosure

InvestorSoup.com is not a registered investment advisor and nothing contained in any materials should be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. InvestorSoup.com is a Web site wholly owned by BlueWave Advisors, LLC. Neither InvestorSoup nor its affiliates have a beneficial interest in the mentioned company; nor have they received compensation of any kind for any of the companies listed in this communication. Please read our report and visit our Web site, InvestorSoup.com, for complete risks and disclosures.

CONTACT: InvestorSoup.com
Jeffrey Brown, Editor
(469)-252-3505
info@investorsoup.com

http://www.stockwatch.com/newsit/newsit_newsit.aspx?bid=U-z0…
das muß einfach in den Faktenthread:



hier nochmal eine sehr gute Übersicht über die Forderungen von WMI an JPM und FDIC:

(von Born2live aus "Just4Wamu")

PM vs WMI: WMI amended counterclaims, filed 9/11/09, Delaware Bankruptcy Court
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/…00000000003.pdf

A. Capital Contributions: by WMI to WMB (JPM)
-- constructive fraudulent transfers
-- value $6.5B

B. Trust Securities: WMI owns but value went to WMB (JPM)
-- constructive fraudulent transfers
-- value $4.0B

C. Other transfers: by WMI to WMB, fsb, or for benefit of WMB
-- constructive fraudulent transfers
-- value $3.4B

D. WMI received less than reasonably equivalent value for WMB when sold to JPM
-- unliquidated - no value specified
-- catch-all for total value not included in other claims?

E. Intercompany Accounts: owed by WMB to WMI (does NOT include $4B cash in DDA)
-- 177M + 22M + 490M
-- value $0.7B

F. JPM unauthorized, intentional, and infringing use of WMI intellectual property
-- trademarks/service marks, patents, copyrights
-- value of WAMU brand alone $6.0B

--------------------------------------------------------------------
WMI vs JPM total value = $20.6 billion + unliquidated claims
--------------------------------------------------------------------

======================================

WMI vs FDIC: filed 3/20/09, D.C. District Court
http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/09-00533/09-00533-0001.pdf

A. Intercompany Loans: owed by WMB to WMI
-- 82M + 74M + 8M + 13M
-- value $0.18B

B. Intercompany Receivables: owed by WMB to WMI
-- 22M + 185M
-- value $0.21B

C. Taxes: paid by WMI on behalf of WMB + refunds due WMI
-- unliquidated + 3.0B
-- value $3.0B+

D. Capital Contributions: by WMI to WMB (JPM)
-- constructive fraudulent transfers
-- value $6.5B

E. Trust Securities: WMI owns but value went to WMB (JPM)
-- voidable preference transfers
-- value $4.0B

F. Preference Claims: transfers WMI to WMB (JPM)
-- voidable preference transfers
-- value $152M

G. Vendor Contract Claims
-- unliquidated

H. Subrogation Claims
-- unliquidated

I. Improper Asset Sales: FDIC took WMI property, transferred to JPM
-- illegal conversion
-- unliquidated

J. Deposit Claim: lost use of funds in WMI's WMB and WMBfsb deposit accounts
-- unliquidated

K. Employee/Employer Related Costs and Insurance Claims
-- benefit plans, BOLI-COLI
-- unliquidated

L. Indemnification Claims: for WMI directors and officers
-- unliquidated

M. Other Claims
-- contingent, unliquidated claims

---------------------------------------------------------------------
WMI vs FDIC total value = $14.0 billion + unliquidated claims
---------------------------------------------------------------------



Daraus sollte für jeden ersichtlich werden, , wenn von den 50 Mrd nicht anerkannten Forderungen auch nur die Hälfte wegfäööt, sind die Commons auf dem Weg, sehr viel Geld zu sehen!

mfg

impyer
und gleich die Übersetzung hinterher, vielen Dank an impyer:



hier wie gewünscht die Übersetzung:

JPM vs WMI: WMI Gegenforderungen, eingereicht 9/11/09, Delaware Bankruptcy Court

A. Eigenkapital Zuschuss von WMI an WMB (JPM)
- Wert $ 6.5B

B. Trust Securities: WMI besitzt die Forderung, Wert ging nach WMB (JPM) (Caymans!)
- Wert $ 4.0B

C. Andere Kapital-Transfers: von WMI zu WMB, WMBfsb, oder zum Nutzen von WMB
- Wert $ 3.4b

D. WMI, weniger als angemessen der Gegenwert für WMB für den an JPM verkauft wirde

- Nicht bewertet - kein Wert angegeben


E. Intercompany-Konten: die WMB, WMI zu verdanken hat (hier sind nicht die $ 4 Mrd Bargeld des Kontos eingeschlossen!)
- 177M + 22M + 490m
- Wert $ 0.7b

F. JPM nicht autorisierte, vorsätzliche und verletzen Verwendung von WMI`s geistigem Eigentums

- Logos und Dienstleistungsmarken, Patente, Urheberrechte

Kein Wert festgelegt

(Aber der Wert der Marke allein WAMU war/ist $ 6.0b)

-------------------------------------------------- ------------------
WMI vs JPM: Forderungen im Gesamtwert von 20,6 Mrd. $ + nicht bewertete Forderungen
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------

======================================

WMI vs FDIC: 3/20/09 eingereicht, D. C. Amtsgericht


A. interne Darlehen: Forderungen gegen WMB von WMI
- 82M + 74M + 8M + 13M
- Wert $ 0.18B

B. Konzerninterne Forderungen: Forderungen gegen WMB von WMI
- 22m + 185M
- Wert $ 0.21b

C. Steuern: Bezahlt von WMI im Namen der WMB + Erstattungen durch WMI

- 3.0B + Strafzahlung
- Wert > $ 3.0B

(Das meinte ich mit Steuergeldern die WMI noch zustehen! zusätzlich zu den 5,2 Mrd)


D. Kapital Beiträge: von WMI zu WMB (JPM)

- Wert $ 6.5B

E. Trust Securities: WMI-Wert besitzt, sondern ging nach WMB (JPM)
- Anfechtbar Präferenz Transfers
- Wert $ 4.0B (Caymans)

Forderungen: Transfers von WMI zu WMB (JPM)
- Anfechtbar Präferenz Transfers
- Wert $ 152M

G. Hersteller Contract Patentansprüche
- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe

H. Forderungsübergang Patentansprüche
- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe

I. illigale Übertragung von WMI Vermögen: FDIC hat WMI-Vermögen an JPM übertragen

- Illegaler Transfer
- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe

J. Kaution Anspruch: verlust des Verwendunganspruchs der Mittel in WMB, WMI und WMBfsb Sparkonten

- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe


K. Arbeitnehmer / Arbeitgeber damit verbundenen Kosten und Insurance Claims

- Leistungsorientierte Pläne, Boli-Coli
- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe


L. Schadensersatzansprüche: für WMI-Direktoren und leitende Angestellte

- Nicht bewertet / keine Wertangabe


M. Sonstige Ansprüche
- Zufällig, nicht abgewickelten Forderungen

-------------------------------------------------- -------------------
WMI vs FDIC im Gesamtwert von 14,0 Mrd. $ = + Forderungen nicht abgewickelten
-------------------------------------------------- -------------------


Sollte grob stimmen, hab nicht alles geprüft so!

Aber es zeigt wo überall es brennt für JPM und FDIC!

mfg

impyer
unter 52 Mrd $ sollte bei einem fairen Settlement nix laufen:

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Business_%26_Finance/Inves…


und jede Woche kommen 200 Mio $ dazu:

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks…


macht einen Kurs für die Wamuq's von über 36 $.:eek::eek:
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.975.959 von chriroe am 19.02.10 17:33:36nein, sie werden von jpm nicht zum verkauf gedrängt,In E-Mail von JPM heisst es:
"Accordingly, you should consider taking action to liquidate any shares you hold in the WaMu Stock Fund by initiating a transfer to another fund within the WaMu Plan before 4 p.m. Eastern Time on March 22, 2010."
Und das bedeutet nicht dass JPM den Ehemaligen Angestellten von WaMu die jetzt bei JPM sind es untersagt die Wamuq zu halten. Die sagen nur dass sie es woanderes halten sollen als in diesen '"Saving Plans" die nun von JPM verwaltet werden ...

von myff aus dem wamutempel



gruss B.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.984.727 von chriroe am 22.02.10 12:39:52S. 368f JPM-Bestände an WMI-Shares: ungefähr 100 Mio Stück.

S. 712 Tosca-Bestände: 27 Mio.

S. 712 TPG-Bestände: 1,14 Mio.

S. 733 Wamu-Angestellte: 17,6 Mio.
Time to sell von Kirsten Grind
http://www.portfolio.com/industry-news/banking-finance/2010/…

Es gibt auch einen umfangreichen Kommentar von kylekrol zu diesem Thema mit sehr vielen Fakten und Quellenangaben (die meisten kennen bereits die Fakten ;).

Ich greife mal dein Thema mal auf chriroe.

17,6 Mio * 0,17Cent = 2,99 Millionen Eu würden die Mitarbeiter bekommen. An sich soll es ein Mitarbeiterfond sein und JP meint diese Aktien sind nichts mehr wert und passen in diesen Mitarbeiterfond nicht rein. "to move all employees into the same 401(k) plan."

JPMorgan’s move has rattled some former WaMu employees, who want to hang on to their stock despite its low value. The former employees worry that by selling they may forfeit claim to billions of dollars in assets currently in dispute in the bankruptcy case of WaMu’s holding company.

“People haven’t sold their stock because they think that maybe there’ll be a settlement or maybe it will have value someday,” said one former WaMu employee who now works at JPMorgan.
mit Dank an "the virginian"(Hauptthread S. 16817):



aus dem IHub:

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_i…

Frage eines besorgten users:

has anything been proved yet?

i have a lot of friends that say there is no way that JPM and the FDIC which is the government will ever lose this or let there be a settlement. one also said that there were lots of banks during the great depression that were bought at cheap prices but never compensated... says he has never heard of anything like it and that WAMUQ has no solid facts or evidence to prove anything and the government simply cannot and will not lose ... neither will a big bank like JPM. why would the commons get anything because you have to satisfy the preferred and creditors.. etc.. he listed a bunch. he went on to say that why would a shareholder like me or others get money if they werent there for the initial loss.. no one is going to allow a settlement to benefit those that lost nothing...and thats IF there is a settlement... which the likelihood is not that great... :/

I have money in this stock awaiting the conclusion but are we being overly optimistic ?? im just worried now.

thanks a lot.

Antwort von Remington2000:

1st reason I am still buying.I said the exact same thing almost verbatim to the person who told me to look at this cause he knew what I did in a past life. I said to him "You will not beat the FDIC, or JPM. The powers that be wont allow it to happen, they will say due to exigent circumstances we can do whatever we want" (sorta like eminent domain type of screwed). (maybe it was me who said that to you lol) I bought a small block of stock anyway. Then I went to annual Superbowl Sunday morning skeet shooting with some friends and met a BK attorney who drove out with us. I then laughed and asked him a silly question. " Are you familiar with this WAMU case going on?" I swear on my life I giggled like a little child when he said " Oh ya, I know the case very well. Do you own any of it he asked? I said yes what do you think? You actually might get money down to the commons with that case, that was a very messy takeover". I went further to say to him what your friends said to you (verbatim) and he said that this case was not a normal BK and that this judge is the one you want to have that case in front of. USED HER NAME LIKE THEY WERE FRIENDS. He had been in her court before. This is my truth take all with a grain of pessimism cause I would if I were you.
Then I did my own DD, found this board from friend who recommended WAMU to me, and with some more research provided here made an informed intelligent investment. Still buying!
der nächste Schritt der Finanzmafia:

http://www.mmnews.de/index.php/201002245010/MM-News/US-Banke…

Bei Wamu wurden viele kleine Sparer enteignet. Demnächst wird man also Probleme haben, bei den Banken überhaupt an sein Eigentum zu kommen. Unglaublich, aber wahr!

Wird Wamu gegen diese Mächte eine Chance haben? Ist die Justiz in den USA noch wirklich unabhängig?
Aus PSBJ vom 19.02.10:
JPMorgan says ‘sell’ — Washington Mutual shares must go


In a controversial move, JPMorgan Chase is forcing thousands of former Washington Mutual employees to sell their WaMu shares as the New York company combines the two banks’ retirement plans.

If former WaMu employees don’t cash out of the stock on their own by March 22, JPMorgan Chase & Co. will liquidate the shares in their 401(k) accounts and transfer the balance to their new JPMorgan accounts, according to an email obtained by the Puget Sound Business Journal and confirmed by a JPMorgan spokeswoman.

The move would affect about 32,800 former WaMu employees nationwide who now work at JPMorgan, including several hundred Seattle area workers.

Many former WaMu employees were heavily invested in the stock, which once fetched $40 a share and now trades for about 20 cents. The stock plunged after Washington Mutual’s banking assets were seized by regulators and sold to JPMorgan in September 2008, leaving behind the bank’s holding company, Washington Mutual Inc.
Aus JPM Form 10-K (Annual Report):



(in Millions)
As of or for the year ended December 31, 2009 2008
Extraordinary gain 76 1,906


On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual. On May 30, 2008, a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan
Chase merged with and into The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (“Bear Stearns”), and Bear Stearns became a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase.
The Washington Mutual acquisition resulted in negative goodwill, and accordingly, the Firm recorded an extraordinary gain. For additional information on
these transactions, see Note 2 on pages 143–148 of this Annual Report.
Business overview
JPMorgan Chase reported 2009 net income of $11.7 billion, or
$2.26 per share, compared with net income of $5.6 billion, or
$1.35 per share, in 2008. Total net revenue in 2009 was
$100.4 billion, compared with $67.3 billion in 2008. Return on
common equity was 6% in 2009 and 4% in 2008. Results
benefited from the impact of the acquisition of the banking
operations of Washington Mutual Bank (“Washington Mutual”)
on September 25, 2008, and the impact of the merger with The
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (“Bear Stearns”) on May 30,
2008.
Extraordinary gain
On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the
banking operations of Washington Mutual. This transaction
was accounted for under the purchase method of accounting
for business combinations. The adjusted net asset value of the
banking operations after purchase accounting adjustments
was higher than the consideration paid by JPMorgan Chase,
resulting in an extraordinary gain. The preliminary gain
recognized in 2008 was $1.9 billion. In the third quarter of
2009, the Firm recognized a $76 million increase in the
extraordinary gain associated with the final purchase
accounting adjustments for the acquisition. For a further
discussion of the Washington Mutual transaction, see Note 2
on pages 143–148 of this Annual Report.
von Haystack aus dem 10-Monatsbericht vom JPM bzgl. der zahlreichen laufenden Klagen und Gerichtsverfahren:

Habe hier ueber 290 Seiten den Bericht von JPM an die Aktionaere alles in englisch. Einige Auszuege was Wamu usw betrifft habe ich heraus kopiert.

http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/738353475x0xS9501…


Auszug aus dem vorherigen link von JPM

We face significant legal risks, both from regulatory

investigations and proceedings and from private actions

brought against us.

We are named as a defendant or are otherwise involved in various

legal proceedings, including class actions and other litigation or

disputes with third parties, as well as investigations or proceedings

brought by regulatory agencies. Actions brought against us may

result in judgments, settlements, fines, penalties or other results

adverse to us, which could materially adversely affect our business,

financial condition or results of operation, or cause us serious

reputational harm. As a participant in the financial services

industry, it is likely we will continue to experience a high level of

litigation and regulatory scrutiny and investigations related to our

businesses and operations.

There is increasing competition in the financial services

industry which may adversely affect our results of

operations.


und weiter geht es jetzt mit Aussagen zu WAMU u Bear Stearns


We may continue to experience increased credit costs or need to take

additional markdowns and allowances for loan losses on the assets

and loans acquired in the merger (the “Bear Stearns merger”) by

JPMorgan Chase and The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (“Bear

Stearns”) and in connection with the acquisition of Washington

Mutual Bank’s (“Washington Mutual”) banking operations (the

“Washington Mutual transaction”). We cannot assure you that as our

integration efforts continue in connection with these transactions,

other unanticipated costs or losses will not be incurred.

Acquisitions may also result in business disruptions that cause us to



Damage to our reputation could damage our businesses.

Maintaining a positive reputation is critical to our attracting and

maintaining customers, investors and employees. Damage to our

reputation can therefore cause significant harm to our business and

prospects. Harm to our reputation can arise from numerous...
und weiter geht's:


noch etwas aus dem Bericht heraus kopiert:


Washington Mutual Litigations. Subsequent to JPMorgan Chase’s

acquisition from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(“FDIC”) of substantially all of the assets and certain specified

liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson Nevada

(“Washington Mutual Bank”), on September 26, 2008,

Washington Mutual Bank’s parent holding company, Washington

Mutual, Inc. (“WMI”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, WMI

Investment Corp. (together, the “Debtors”) both commenced

voluntary cases under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States

Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of

Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Case”). In the Bankruptcy Case, the

Debtors have asserted rights and interests in certain assets. The

assets in dispute include principally the following: (a) approximately

$4 billion in securities contributed by WMI to Washington Mutual

Bank; (b) the right to tax refunds arising from overpayments

attributable to operations of Washington Mutual Bank and its

subsidiaries; (c) ownership of and other rights in approximately

$4 billion that WMI contends are deposit accounts at Washington



Mutual Bank and one of its subsidiaries; and (d) ownership of and

rights in various other contracts and other assets (collectively, the

“Disputed Assets”).

JPMorgan Chase commenced an adversary proceeding in the

Bankruptcy Case against the Debtors and (for interpleader purposes

only) the FDIC seeking a declaratory judgment and other relief

determining JPMorgan Chase’s legal title to and beneficial interest

in the Disputed Assets. Discovery is underway in the JPMorgan

Chase adversary proceeding.

The Debtors commenced a separate adversary proceeding in the

Bankruptcy Case against JPMorgan Chase, seeking turnover of the

same $4 billion in purported deposit funds and recovery for alleged

unjust enrichment for failure to turn over the funds. The Debtors

have moved for summary judgment in the turnover proceeding.

Discovery is under way in the turnover proceeding.

In both JPMorgan Chase’s adversary proceeding and the Debtors’

turnover proceeding, JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC have argued

that the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate certain

claims. JPMorgan Chase moved to have the adversary proceedings

transferred to United States District Court for the District of

Columbia and to withdraw jurisdiction from the Bankruptcy Court

to the District Court. That motion is fully briefed. In addition,

JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC filed papers with the United States

District Court for the District of Delaware appealing the Bankruptcy

Court’s rulings rejecting the jurisdictional arguments, and that

appeal is fully briefed. JPMorgan Chase is also appealing a separate

Bankruptcy Court decision holding, in part, that the Bankruptcy

Court could proceed with certain matters while the first appeal is

pending. Briefing on that appeal is under way.

The Debtors submitted claims substantially similar to those

submitted in the Bankruptcy Court in the FDIC receivership for,

among other things, ownership of certain Disputed Assets, as well

as claims challenging the terms of the agreement pursuant to

which substantially all of the assets of Washington Mutual Bank

were sold by the FDIC to JPMorgan Chase. The FDIC, as receiver,

disallowed the Debtors’ claims and the Debtors filed an action

against the FDIC in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia challenging the FDIC’s disallowance of the Debtors’

claims, claiming ownership of the Disputed Assets, and seeking

money damages from the FDIC. JPMorgan Chase has intervened in

the action. On January 7, 2010, the District Court stayed the action

pending developments in the Bankruptcy Court and ordered the

parties to submit a joint status report every 120 days. In connection

with the stay, the District Court denied WMI’s and the FDIC’s

motions to dismiss without prejudice.

In addition, the Debtors moved in the Bankruptcy Court to take

discovery from JPMorgan Chase purportedly related to a litigation

originally filed in the 122nd State District Court of Galveston

County, Texas (the “Texas Action”). JPMorgan Chase opposed the

motion, but the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the discovery

proceed. Debtors are also seeking related discovery from various

third parties, including several government agencies. Plaintiffs in

the Texas Action are certain holders of WMI common stock and the

debt of WMI and Washington Mutual Bank who have sued

JPMorgan Chase for unspecified damages alleging that JPMorgan

Chase acquired substantially all of the assets of Washington Mutual

Bank from the FDIC at an allegedly too low price. The FDIC

intervened in the Texas Action, had it removed to the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and then the FDIC

and JPMorgan Chase moved to have the Texas Action dismissed or

transferred. The Court transferred the Texas Action to the District of

Columbia. Plaintiffs have moved to have the FDIC dismissed as a

party and to remand the action to the state court, or, in the

alternative, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC have moved to have the entire

action dismissed. The motions to dismiss are fully briefed.

Other proceedings related to Washington Mutual’s failure also

pending before the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia include a lawsuit brought by Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company against the FDIC alleging breach of various

mortgage securitization agreements and alleged violation of certain

representations and warranties given by certain WMI subsidiaries in

connection with those securitization agreements. JPMorgan Chase

has not been named a party to the Deutsche Bank litigation, but

the complaint includes assertions that JPMorgan Chase may have

assumed certain liabilities.

Securities Lending



In both JPMorgan Chase’s adversary proceeding and the Debtors’

turnover proceeding, JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC have argued

that the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate certain

claims. JPMorgan Chase moved to have the adversary proceedings

transferred to United States District Court for the District of

Columbia and to withdraw jurisdiction from the Bankruptcy Court

to the District Court. That motion is fully briefed. In addition,

JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC filed papers with the United States

District Court for the District of Delaware appealing the Bankruptcy

Court’s rulings rejecting the jurisdictional arguments, and that

appeal is fully briefed. JPMorgan Chase is also appealing a separate

Bankruptcy Court decision holding, in part, that the Bankruptcy

Court could proceed with certain matters while the first appeal is

pending. Briefing on that appeal is under way.

The Debtors submitted claims substantially similar to those

submitted in the Bankruptcy Court in the FDIC receivership for,

among other things, ownership of certain Disputed Assets, as well

as claims challenging the terms of the agreement pursuant to

which substantially all of the assets of Washington Mutual Bank

were sold by the FDIC to JPMorgan Chase. The FDIC, as receiver,

disallowed the Debtors’ claims and the Debtors filed an action

against the FDIC in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia challenging the FDIC’s disallowance of the Debtors’

claims, claiming ownership of the Disputed Assets, and seeking

money damages from the FDIC. JPMorgan Chase has intervened in

the action. On January 7, 2010, the District Court stayed the action

pending developments in the Bankruptcy Court and ordered the

parties to submit a joint status report every 120 days. In connection

with the stay, the District Court denied WMI’s and the FDIC’s

motions to dismiss without prejudice.

In addition, the Debtors moved in the Bankruptcy Court to take

discovery from JPMorgan Chase purportedly related to a litigation

originally filed in the 122nd State District Court of Galveston

County, Texas (the “Texas Action”). JPMorgan Chase opposed the

motion, but the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the discovery

proceed. Debtors are also seeking related discovery from various

third parties, including several government agencies. Plaintiffs in

the Texas Action are certain holders of WMI common stock and the

debt of WMI and Washington Mutual Bank who have sued

JPMorgan Chase for unspecified damages alleging that JPMorgan

Chase acquired substantially all of the assets of Washington Mutual

Bank from the FDIC at an allegedly too low price. The FDIC

intervened in the Texas Action, had it removed to the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and then the FDIC

and JPMorgan Chase moved to have the Texas Action dismissed or

transferred. The Court transferred the Texas Action to the District of

Columbia. Plaintiffs have moved to have the FDIC dismissed as a

party and to remand the action to the state court, or, in the

alternative, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC have moved to have the entire

action dismissed. The motions to dismiss are fully briefed.

Other proceedings related to Washington Mutual’s failure also

pending before the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia include a lawsuit brought by Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company against the FDIC alleging breach of various

mortgage securitization agreements and alleged violation of certain

representations and warranties given by certain WMI subsidiaries in

connection with those securitization agreements. JPMorgan Chase

has not been named a party to the Deutsche Bank litigation, but

the complaint includes assertions
von drsch00:


Im unteren Part geht es um die zwingenden Vorschriften im Fall von laufenden und Ausstehenden Zahlungsverpflichtungen in welcher Form auch immer. (anfallende Gerichtstermine, settlements usw.)

Hier wird's interessant: aus dem Ihub Forum vom user: rainbow111

http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?publication…


Top 10 Issues to Consider When You Are Sued: Issue #8: Disclosing Litigation and Reserving for Litigation Losses
04.11.2007

Determining when and how to account for loss contingencies is an important decision for companies that have been sued. Reserving funds for possible litigation losses may significantly affect reported earnings. Worse, failing to book appropriate reserves may lead to restatements of earnings, which could invite an SEC investigation or shareholder litigation. Apart from reserves, the mere decision whether to disclose pending litigation in financial statements can also have major financial and legal ramifications. Moreover, both public and nonpublic companies are affected because both must properly account for and disclose litigation loss contingencies to comply with Generally Accepted Account­ing Principles (“GAAP”).

Unfortunately, setting loss reserves is not as easy as following simple steps or plugging numbers into a formula. The accounting standards are muddled and applying them requires a great deal of discretion and judgment. Even the disclosure rules are fraught with peril.

When Is a Litigation Loss Reserve Required?

Under Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 (“FAS 5”), a company must create a litigation loss reserve if (1) a loss is probable and (2) the amount of the expected loss is material and reasonably estimable.

(1) Is a Litigation Loss “Probable”?

The first challenge is to figure out when a loss is “probable.” FAS 5 identifies three categories of likelihood: “probable,” “reasonably possible” and “remote.”

Probable. According to FAS 5, a future event is “probable” if it is “likely to occur.” FAS 5 does not define “likely,” except to say that “probable” does not infer “virtual certainty.” Formal definitions aside, “probable” is usually interpreted in practice as meaning “highly likely.”

In evaluating the probability of an unfavorable litigation outcome, factors to consider include: (a) the nature of the litigation, claim or assessment; (b) the progress of the case; (c) the opinions of legal counsel and other advisers; (d) the experience of the company and others in similar cases; and (e) any deci­sion by management as to how the company will respond to the lawsuit. Deter­mining whether a loss is probable requires consider­able judgment, and the assessment may change as the litigation progresses.

Reasonably Possible. If the “chance of the future event or events occurring is more than remote but less than likely,” the adverse outcome is deemed “reasonably possible.” A loss reserve is not required, but disclosure may be (see below).

Remote. If the chance of an adverse outcome is slight, the event considered is “remote,” and that ends the analysis. No reserve or financial statement disclosure is required. Periodic re-assessments of pending and threatened litigation may be necessary, however, to determine whether a loss that once seemed remote is now probable or reasonably possible.

(2) If a Loss Is Probable, Is the Amount of the Loss Reasonably Estimable?

If a company determines that a loss is probable, it next must consider whether the amount of the loss will be material and if it can be estimated. If the loss is not material or cannot be reasonably estimated, no reserve is required. Even if it is impossible to estimate the exact amount of probable loss, however, a company should attempt to estimate the range of possible losses. If no amount within the range appears to be the best estimate, the company should reserve the low end of the range and then dis­close the remaining amount, up to the high end of the range, as a “reasonably possible” loss.

When Is Disclosure Required?

If a company determines that a loss is only “reasonably possible” or that a loss is “probable,” but the amount is not reasonably estimable, the company need not establish a reserve, but it still must disclose the nature of the possible loss and give an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss. The key is to ensure that the financial statements are not misleading.

In addition to the disclosure requirements of FAS 5, public companies must also disclose significant legal proceedings under SEC Regulation S-K Item 103, which requires disclosure of material legal proceedings in both the annual report (on Form 10-K) and the quarterly report (on Form 10-Q), unless the claims represent less than 10 percent of the company’s current assets. SEC Reg. § 229.103. Thus, in some instances Regulation S-K may require disclosure of pending litigation that need not be disclosed under FAS 5.

The following chart illustrates the decision process:


Poster's note, the chart didn't copy.


Practical Tips

Companies that either fail to establish sufficient litigation loss reserves or overstate litigation loss reserves (so that the company can “manage earnings” by releasing reserves into income in bad years) have faced private litigation and SEC enforcement actions. The following tips may help avoid common pitfalls.

Tip 1: Establish a company reserve policy and apply it consistently. A written and consistently applied reserve policy may help a company defend a decision not to book a reserve. Establishing and following the policy helps the company avoid appearing opportunistic in setting and maintaining reserves.

Tip 2: Err on the side of disclosure where there is any chance that a litigation loss could be considered “reasonably possible.” Failing to disclose the possibility of a material litigation loss can result in lawsuits and enforcement actions if it later becomes clear that reserves were inadequate and company executives knew or should have known that a material loss was reasonably possible.

Tip 3: Book a reserve only where a loss is probable and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. A reserve should not be booked unless both FAS 5 requirements are satisfied. The SEC views creation of reserves for an improbable amount of loss to be a form of earnings management. If a loss is only reasonably possible, the company should disclose the nature of the contingency and an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss (or state that such an estimate cannot be made).

Tip 4: Reverse a reserve only where a change in facts makes the reserve (or a portion of the reserve) unnecessary. The SEC looks unfavorably on a company’s release of reserves into income where no specific development or change justifies the release. Reversing a reserve in a bad year is particularly likely to be viewed as opportunistic.

Tip 5: Do not create general reserves to cover unspecified claims. Litigation reserves should be determined on a case-by-case basis and should not be created for general future litigation costs and expenses.

Tip 6: Periodically reassess pending and threatened litigation to determine the adequacy of reserves. The probability of a loss and the ability to estimate the amount of the loss will likely change as the litigation progresses. A litigation loss considered remote when the suit was filed may later become reasonably possible or probable if dispositive motions are unsuccessful or discovery reveals damaging facts. It is also important to reassess the amount of existing reserves. If the underlying case settles, for example, the reserves must be reversed into income.

This Update touches only briefly on the complex topic of litigation reserves. For more information, please contact the Perkins Coie attorney with whom you work.

This Update is also part of a series entitled "Top Ten Issues to Consider When You Are Sued." Read additional Updates in this series.
neuer Artikel von der aktionaer:

http://www.deraktionaer.de/xist4c/web/Washington-Mutual--Plu…


Und wieder ziemlich viel Getrommel und kaum Tiefergehendes. Ach wär das schön, wenn die Herren sich z. B. mal hier im Faktenthread ein wenig informieren und etwas investigativer schreiben würden.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 39.011.940 von chriroe am 25.02.10 15:43:11Nette zusammenfassung von ID_payback aus ariva:

... WAMU (oder die Bank von Washington Mutual = WMB) ist nicht in Konkurs gegangen und hat mit Lehman Brothers (LB) nichts zu tun. Lehman Brothers ist eine Investmentbank die, aufgrund von Schwierigkeiten beim Verkauf eines Mehrheitsanteils ihrer Investmentsparte bzw. der Ausgliederung von Gewerbeimmobilien und weiteren illiquiden Vermögenswerten, nach Bekanntgabe eines hohen Quartalsverlustes im 3.Quartal 2008 schließlich am 15. September 2008 Konkurs und Gläubigerschutz nach Ch11 anmeldete. Außerdem war die FDIC keine Regulierungsbehörde bei LB.


Washington Mutual Bank (WMB) wiederum war eine klassische "SAVINGS" und bot ihren Kunden verschiedene Finanzdienstleistungen an, darunter Hypotheken, Kreditkartenservice, Investmentfinanzierungen und Darlehen. WMB gab "zugegebener Maßen" öfter, anscheinend "faule" Kredite an Häuslebauer. Vorwiegend an Latinos, die bei keiner anderen Bank je einen Kredit für ihr Haus bekommen hätten (vorwiegend in California). Ein Kredit ist dann "faul" wenn der Kreditnehmer seine laufenden Kreditraten nicht mehr zahlen kann. Dann wird diese Hypothek zwangsversteigert (amerik. foreclosure). Kommen solche Immobilien nicht an den Mann, dann gibt es ein Problem und solch ein Problem hatte Washington Mutual. Anfangs 2008 häufte sich der Verlust, der aber abgedeckt werden konnte. Inzwischen hat sich aber herausgestellt, dass die Kreditnehmer brav zurückzahlen, sodass eine durch JPM sofort (2008) vorgenommene vorzeitige Abschreibung von US$ 29Mrd. im letzten Jahr (2009) wieder als Gewinn verbucht werden musste.

Das Übernahmeangebot mit einem PPS von US$ 8 wurde von Washington Mutual im März 2008 zurecht abgewiesen, es war zu gering. Erst jetzt kommt allmählich ans Tageslicht, dass die seinerzeitige "vertrauliche" Übergabe der Bankunterlagen von JPM dazu genutzt wurde, um sein "Project West" endlich zu realisieren. Washington Mutual wurde sukzessive, mit unlauteren Mitteln in die Knie gezwungen, wobei JPM sowohl mit dem OTS, FDIC, aber auch dem damaligen Finanzminister Henry M. Paulson, Jr. konspirativ unter einer Decke steckte.

Der FDIC hatte aufgrund eines bei WAMU festgestellten Bankruns am 25. September 2008 den Abgang von US$ 16,9Mrd. festgestellt (wobei kein EINZIGER Dollar aus der Einlagensicherung des FDIC zu zahlen war) und ließ über das OTS feststellen: "WAMU is highly likely insolvent" (höchstwahrscheinlich [!] insolvent) und beschlagnahmen. Zur Sicherung der Einagen übernahm die FDIC dann WAMU als "Receiver" und verkaufte eine 1/2 Stunde später an den "Bestbieter" JPM den gesamten Anlagenbestand und Kapitaleinlagen für US$ 1,9. Ein Schelm wer böses dabei denkt, wenn man weiß, dass JPM der einzige "akzeptierte" Bieter war und laut Gesetz die FDIC 90 Tage Zeit gehabt hätte, WAMU zu verkaufen.

"In der Kürze liegt die Würze". So auch hier. Die FDIC hatte vollkommen übersehen, dass es sich bei Washington Mutual um einen Konzern mit über 65 Firmen und einer Holdinggesellschaft WMI handelte, sie aber nur die Verfügungsgewalt über die WMB (Bank) verfügte. Eine dafür im Kaufvertrag vorgesehene Anlage 3.1a mit Auflistung der zu übernehmenden Anlage-und Vermögenswerte wurde gar nicht erstellt, wobei allerdings JPM der Meinung ist, sie hätten Washington Mutual im "guten Glauben" erstanden und damit den gesamten Konzern.

Daraufhin hat die Holdinggesellschaft WMI am 26.September 2008 Konkurs und Gläubigerschutz nach Ch11 angemeldet.

WMB hat damit überhaupt nichts zu tun und käme erst wieder ins Gespräch wenn dies in einem Reorgplan so vorgesehen würde, was aber eher unwahrscheinlich ist, nachdem JPM die gesamte Infrastruktur der WMB bereits in JPMChase eingebracht hat.

TPG hat sich niemals zu einem Settlement geäußert und der Betrag von US$ 8,75 betrifft die ursprüngliche Bemessung einer Stammaktie (Common) anläßlich einer Beteiligung an WAMU im April 2008.

Ihr wisst inzwischen mit wem ich hier diskutiere. Alles andere Zahlenspiel ist Humbug und ist nur reine Spekulation, wobei allerdings eine Bewertung des Settlements mit US$ 52Mrd. von verschiedensten Seiten begründet dargestellt wurde und auch ziemlich der Realität entspricht.
laut der Aussage des Anwalts der Federal Reserve Bank ist J.P. Morgan Chase für die Federal Reserve Bank in den Märkten tätig. Diese Aussage machte der Anwalt, als der wiederholt gefragt wurde(vor dem Untersuchungsausschuß des Senats, denke ich), ob die FED die Märkte manipuliert.

JPM ist demnach definitiv ein aktives Organ/ ein aktiver Bestandteil des Machtmonopols der FED.

http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/1468-Post-HR1207…
Avatar