Gazprom: Bösartiges Weihnachtsgeschenk zum Abschluss - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[AlfaRus]

Zum Abschied noch eine kleine Bösartigkeit!

Vorsicht mit Gazprom ADRs, laßt Euch nicht von der Deutschen ins Bockshorn jagen! Liberalisierung steht in den Sternen. UFG darf Ausländern keine locals mehr schmackhaft machen.

UO AB49 / RPI

Gazprom Investment Warning

As of this morning (10.12.2004), approximately 3.bn$ has moved from Western-based hedge funds to special purpose vehicles (SPVs) associated with Cypriot-based private banking entities. Some European market information sources suggest the transfers are in anticipation of a relaxation in foreign ownership restrictions on Gazprom domestic stock. We are advising that this view is currently incorrect. Until further notice, we recommend [Kunde] refrain from participating for the following reasons:

1.) Our Moscow and Nicosia sources contend the SPVs are more immediately to be used for collateralization of funds Gazprom is assembling in advance of the 19 December Yuganskneftegaz (YNG) auction, not for the development of Gazprom domestic stock purchases. Neither Gazprom nor Rosneft, and therefore the new Gazprom crude oil unit Gazpromneft (GPN) which will be the actual bidder of record, currently have sufficient liquid capital to meet the government`s minimum bidding requirement of 8.bn$ for the 76.79% position in YUKOS` major production unit. Gazprom has assembled almost 1bn$ in foreign bank lines for the auction, but has not completely secured them.

2.) The actual cost of the auction acquisition, however, is still impossible to know with any certainty. The overall YUKOS tax indebtedness continued to expand. The total currently exceeds 20bn$. A $11mn$ charge was levied against unit Tomskneft this morning and additional bills are forthcoming. The new Tomskneft bill, for example, is for 2001 only. This makes the actual cost of the buy quite uncertain.

3.) Gazprom, as the parent of GPN, will only liberalize the foreign ownership restrictions over its stock if the absorbing of Rosneft, the acquisition of YNG, and the creation of GPN will allow a swap of shares resulting in a 50% + ownership in Gazprom by the government (which currently directly controls about 38%). Any transfer of SPV funds from collateral usage to the suggested purchase of stock shares would await government control over Gazprom. We have concluded that the assessed valuation placed upon YNG by the government (about half the level calculated by outside assessors) and the expected range of the winning bid will result in a market value insufficient to provide the government with its desired new majority Gazprom share package. This will further delay any improvement in foreign ownership restrictions, undercutting the rationale for the Cypriot moves.

4.) Foreign owners are currently restricted to ADRs which trade at a hefty premium to domestic stock. Total foreign ownership is also limited to 10% of the outstanding common shares (as reflected in the ADRs; each receipt represents 10 underlying domestic shares). These limitations will remain, in our judgment, and legitimate foreign access to domestic shares will continue to be denied.

5.) 3 funds have attempted to overcome the restrictions, in each case utilizing offshore locations. Gazinvest Fund (Bahamas) has closed additional investments, with about 40% of existing funds being removed by investors following threats from Moscow to prosecute. Renaissance Capital (Moscow) has announced a new fund to entice foreign ownership of domestic Gazprom shares, but will not exercise until GPN is operating and the government has clarified the foreign ownership issue. Moscow`s United Financial Group`s fund was investigated by the Russian Prosecutor General`s Office. While no action has been taken, UPG has entered into a side bar agreement with the government to suspend the attracting of additional outside investment until the matter is resolved.

6.) Crucial to all of the above is the ability of GPN to operate. We foresee significant managerial difficulties and a slow process of absorbing assets which will prevent normal operations until 2007 or 2008.

Frohe Weihnachten !

[Peter_Lemming]

AlfaRus, kannst Du meinen grauen Zellen da mal auf die Sprünge helfen? Ich sehe das als "Laie" doch eher positiv für die Gazprom ADRs und eher negativ für die Gazprom Locals und die "grey shemes", über die Ausländer in die Locals gehen.
Die ADRs sind "legal" für Ausländer, und haben damit keine Probleme. Die "grey shemes" wie die hier erwähnten Fonds und auch andere (es gibt da ja auch den Pharos Fund, Vostok Nafta etc.) hingegen könnten (!) da u.U. Probleme mit dem russischen Gesetz bekommen.

OK, ADR-Aufgeld gegenüber den Locasl ist noch imemr ein klarer Fakt der an sich aus kurstechnischer Sicht gegen die ADRs spricht, aber dieses Aufgeld gibt es schon seit Jahren und liegt schon längst nicht mehr bei 100% wie es vor 1 Jahr schon mal war (weil die "Locals" im Kurs kräftig aufgeholt haben)

Also ich komme da nach Studium Deines Beitrages auf die Losung: Wenn Gazprom (als Ausländer) dann "sicherheitshalber" doch die ADRs (weil "legal") kaufen.

Oder habe ich da was nicht richtig kapiert ?

[AlfaRus]

Antowrt: Was könnte kurzfristig passieren, wenn die Hoffnungen auf eine Handelsliberalisierung schwinden? Abgesehen von weiteren negativen Fragen (Merger und weiteres Vorgehen Rosneftegaz/Gazpromneft, Verschuldung, Verteilung), wird der Phantasie der Schwung genommen. Das ist doch - sicher nicht - stimulierend, oder?

[Peter_Lemming]

Ja natürlich.
Das aber betrifft nicht speziell die ADRs sondern generell Gazprom. Anderserseits- die Yukos-Assets in den Händen von Gazprom sind a la long ne schöne Story.
So oder so - ich habe meine "grey shemes" auch versilbert weil ich ausserhalb Russlands bessere Chancen sehe, aber das Thema hatten wir ja schon bei der Ukraine diskutiert.

[AlfaRus]

Zum Satz 1: Jein. das Sentiment könnte erst mal auf beiden Seiten einen vor den Bug bekommen.

Satz 2: Geschmackssache. Zumindest aus heutiger Sicht nicht verkehrt.