Venezuela fördert weniger Öl als mit der Opec vereinbart - 500 Beiträge pro Seite
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Gewerkschaft: Nur Hälfte der Anlagen in Betrieb
von Hildegard Stausberg
Berlin - Die Lage in der venezolanischen Erdölindustrie spitzt sich zu. Letzte Woche hatte der linksnationalistische Präsident Hugo Chavez zum ersten Mal zugegeben, daß die Förderquote unter dem von der Opec fixierten Level liege und die Besetzung eines Teils der im Westen liegenden Ölfelder durch venezolanisches Militär angeordnet. Energieminister Rafael Ramirez behauptete dann allerdings, daß keine "Militarisierung der Ölindustrie" stattfände, während Verteidigungsminister Jorge Luis Garcia Carneiro den Einsatz des Militärs bestätigte.
Sein Ministerium hatte zuvor das Gerücht gestreut, der amerikanische Geheimdienst CIA betreibe Sabotage in den Ölanlagen, durch die die Förderkapazität empfindlich getroffen würde. Vor dem Streik Ende 2002, der sich gegen Chavez richtete, wurde in den westlichen Ölfeldern 1,4 Mio. Barrel täglich gefördert. Chavez bekräftigte nun, diese Produktion liege "um 100 000 Barrel niedriger". Allerdings heißt es aus Kreisen der Ölgewerkschaft die Produktion liege "weit darunter" und weniger als die Hälfte der Öllöcher produzierten überhaupt noch.
Erst vor zehn Tagen hatte Chavez die über 30 Jahre dauernde militärische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Caracas und Washington aufgekündigt. Nun fragt sich, ob er die Produktionsengpässe bei der staatlichen Ölholding PDVSA zu einem Abbau der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten nutzen will. Heinz Mewes, Chefökonom der Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika (DBLA), ist davon überzeugt, daß Chavez "solche Gedankenspiele" hat.
Venezuela liegt als Erdölförderland weltweit an achter, bei den Ölreserven an siebter Stelle. Für die Vereinigten Staaten ist Kanada längst der wichtigste Lieferant geworden. Für Venezuela allerdings sind die Vereinigten Staaten immer noch der wichtigste Handelspartner. Erdölminister Ramirez hat angekündigt, daß die Regierung bestehende Ölkontrakte aus den Jahren 1992 bis 1997 ändern will. Eine venezolanische Kapitalmehrheit von 51 Prozent soll durchgesetzt und die Steuerschraube für Ausländer drastisch angezogen werden. Diese sollen in Zukunft nicht mehr 32,5 Prozent sondern 50 Prozent Einkommensteuer zahlen.
Ende der neunziger Jahre förderte Venezuela gut drei Mio. Barrel täglich. Nach der politischen Krise 2002/2003 konnten diese Zahlen nie mehr erreicht werden und liegen nun bei gut zwei Mio. Nach einem dramatischen Einbruch des venezolanischen Wirtschaftswachstums um minus 7,7 Prozent im Jahre 2003 verzeichnete das Land mit einem Anstieg des Bruttoinlandproduktes um 17,3 Prozent im letzten Jahr das höchste Wirtschaftswachstum der Region. Allerdings wird es nach DBLA-Schätzung in diesem Jahr nur noch sechs Prozent betragen.
Artikel erschienen am Mo, 9. Mai 2005
von Hildegard Stausberg
Berlin - Die Lage in der venezolanischen Erdölindustrie spitzt sich zu. Letzte Woche hatte der linksnationalistische Präsident Hugo Chavez zum ersten Mal zugegeben, daß die Förderquote unter dem von der Opec fixierten Level liege und die Besetzung eines Teils der im Westen liegenden Ölfelder durch venezolanisches Militär angeordnet. Energieminister Rafael Ramirez behauptete dann allerdings, daß keine "Militarisierung der Ölindustrie" stattfände, während Verteidigungsminister Jorge Luis Garcia Carneiro den Einsatz des Militärs bestätigte.
Sein Ministerium hatte zuvor das Gerücht gestreut, der amerikanische Geheimdienst CIA betreibe Sabotage in den Ölanlagen, durch die die Förderkapazität empfindlich getroffen würde. Vor dem Streik Ende 2002, der sich gegen Chavez richtete, wurde in den westlichen Ölfeldern 1,4 Mio. Barrel täglich gefördert. Chavez bekräftigte nun, diese Produktion liege "um 100 000 Barrel niedriger". Allerdings heißt es aus Kreisen der Ölgewerkschaft die Produktion liege "weit darunter" und weniger als die Hälfte der Öllöcher produzierten überhaupt noch.
Erst vor zehn Tagen hatte Chavez die über 30 Jahre dauernde militärische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Caracas und Washington aufgekündigt. Nun fragt sich, ob er die Produktionsengpässe bei der staatlichen Ölholding PDVSA zu einem Abbau der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten nutzen will. Heinz Mewes, Chefökonom der Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika (DBLA), ist davon überzeugt, daß Chavez "solche Gedankenspiele" hat.
Venezuela liegt als Erdölförderland weltweit an achter, bei den Ölreserven an siebter Stelle. Für die Vereinigten Staaten ist Kanada längst der wichtigste Lieferant geworden. Für Venezuela allerdings sind die Vereinigten Staaten immer noch der wichtigste Handelspartner. Erdölminister Ramirez hat angekündigt, daß die Regierung bestehende Ölkontrakte aus den Jahren 1992 bis 1997 ändern will. Eine venezolanische Kapitalmehrheit von 51 Prozent soll durchgesetzt und die Steuerschraube für Ausländer drastisch angezogen werden. Diese sollen in Zukunft nicht mehr 32,5 Prozent sondern 50 Prozent Einkommensteuer zahlen.
Ende der neunziger Jahre förderte Venezuela gut drei Mio. Barrel täglich. Nach der politischen Krise 2002/2003 konnten diese Zahlen nie mehr erreicht werden und liegen nun bei gut zwei Mio. Nach einem dramatischen Einbruch des venezolanischen Wirtschaftswachstums um minus 7,7 Prozent im Jahre 2003 verzeichnete das Land mit einem Anstieg des Bruttoinlandproduktes um 17,3 Prozent im letzten Jahr das höchste Wirtschaftswachstum der Region. Allerdings wird es nach DBLA-Schätzung in diesem Jahr nur noch sechs Prozent betragen.
Artikel erschienen am Mo, 9. Mai 2005
Orinoco Flows
by John Mackenzie
July 20, 2005
Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan Government are striking back.
They have summoned the courage to take the offensive in reminding Chevron and nearly two dozen additional Energy Companies need to cough up $3 billion in back taxes. Venezuela is the world`s fifth largest petroleum exporter, accounting for a sizeable account of OPEC’s 40% share of Global Supply.
Venezuela regularly exceeded its OPEC oil production targets prior to President Chávez`s December 1998 election. Since his election and until quite recently, Chávez has maintained a policy of strict adherence to OPEC quotas.
He required the PdVSA (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum) to cut production dramatically at existing fields, and reduce investment and total production capacity.
Current estimates suggest Venezuela has been producing less than its current OPEC production quota of 2.7 million bbl/d, instead holding the line at 2.35 million bbl/d in order to conserve oil resources until equitable agreements can be reached.
Venezuela presently has little interest in achieving its OPEC mandated quota @ 2.9 million bbl/d; despite all the mass media pabulum to the contrary. Chávez is first and foremost seeking reparations for previous Kleptocratic resource rape and pillage executed prior to his tenure.
In October 2004, he began raising royalty fees to an average of ~ 17% from 1%. More importantly, he began exercising currency seignorage in paying for contract services in nonconvertible Venezuelan Bolivares as opposed to U.S. Dollars; ordering well contracts to be converted into Venezuelan Government controlled joint ventures with partners taking the minority position @ 49%.
Venezuelan has the largest reserves in the Western Hemisphere.
The U.S. Majors have made overtures to the tune of $50 billion in capital investment dollars for Venezuelan fields. The reason is quite simple; Venezuela is a 100 hour tanker trip to the Gulf Coast refineries. As the fourth largest supplier of crude oil to the U.S., Venezuela remains a strategic source of vital energy to this nation.
Although Chávez’s capital investment plans under joint venture appear restrictive, the fact is very few OPEC producers even allow direct foreign investment. Mexico decided the Rockefeller gringo’s were a most unwelcome partner when they suggested PEMEX be sold to the highest bidder. An easy feat when printing Dollars costs damn near nothing.
Despite failed coup attempts, assassinations and failure of the economic hit men, Chávez has remained willing to send oil our way; such is the present power of the Petro Dollar and risks to the Global Economy.
Chavez presently wants to attract $10 billion in foreign direct investment from oil companies to improve economies of scale and vastly expand Venezuela`s total oil output to 5 million barrels a day by 2009.
There is little doubt Chavez has very carefully observed the Yukos debacle. Russia, the world`s second-largest oil exporter, has essentially nationalized oil production in taking a most precious and scarce resource out of the hands of Kleptocrats and placed them firmly within Mother Russia’s control.
The Rockefellers were again rebuffed after dramatic plans to position themselves with a 17.5% stake in Yukos prior to President Putin’s assumption of control under the auspices of the Rothschild’s. They did, in fact, place Putin in power after the endless theft under Boris Yeltsin had created a Mafia Nation State; untenable to the austere Red Shield.
The simple fact is Oil Producers face higher royalties in order to do business in Venezuela.
And pay up, they most certainly will; at least until a successful attempt on President Chávez’s life can install a more friendly regime. This effort is likely to have the desired effect, regardless of Pat Robertson’s embarrassing diatribe.
What is not being said by our major media (propaganda outlets) is far more important than what is reported.
President Chávez clearly wants to expand output, but under terms which are fair to one and all. He is looking to assist the impoverished and in turn receive a fair price for Venezuela’s resources.
Call him what you will, Marxist, Communist or whatever label suits you. Reality is as such, benevolence is on display; ignore this at your peril goes the warnings.
Venezuela’s President is leading Latin America by example and I happen to believe the balance of Central and South American Nations States will be very quick on the uptake. The IMF & World Bank must be fuming.
Chávez has publicly stated he prefers a reduction in Venezuela`s dependence on oil sales to the U.S., which accounts for about 60 percent of the nation`s crude exports.
Chávez has signed agreements throughout 2004 and 2005 to boost oil sales to Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Paraguay and Uruguay. In addition, he has proposed constructing a pipeline to Pacific ports in Colombia in order to ship increasing quantities of crude to China; who has been exceptionally vocal with respect to inducing bilateral trade.
The U.S. imports 15 percent of its crude oil from Venezuela. In March of this year Chávez restated Venezuela’s intent to reduce sales to the U.S. market by selling off the assets of Citgo Petroleum Corporation. Citgo is a Houston-based refinery and gas station chain that the Venezuelan PDVSA owns with 13,500 gas stations in the United States.
Our Foreign Policy clearly lacks a coherent strategy to deal with the ever changing energy arena.
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/mackenzie/2005/…
by John Mackenzie
July 20, 2005
Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan Government are striking back.
They have summoned the courage to take the offensive in reminding Chevron and nearly two dozen additional Energy Companies need to cough up $3 billion in back taxes. Venezuela is the world`s fifth largest petroleum exporter, accounting for a sizeable account of OPEC’s 40% share of Global Supply.
Venezuela regularly exceeded its OPEC oil production targets prior to President Chávez`s December 1998 election. Since his election and until quite recently, Chávez has maintained a policy of strict adherence to OPEC quotas.
He required the PdVSA (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum) to cut production dramatically at existing fields, and reduce investment and total production capacity.
Current estimates suggest Venezuela has been producing less than its current OPEC production quota of 2.7 million bbl/d, instead holding the line at 2.35 million bbl/d in order to conserve oil resources until equitable agreements can be reached.
Venezuela presently has little interest in achieving its OPEC mandated quota @ 2.9 million bbl/d; despite all the mass media pabulum to the contrary. Chávez is first and foremost seeking reparations for previous Kleptocratic resource rape and pillage executed prior to his tenure.
In October 2004, he began raising royalty fees to an average of ~ 17% from 1%. More importantly, he began exercising currency seignorage in paying for contract services in nonconvertible Venezuelan Bolivares as opposed to U.S. Dollars; ordering well contracts to be converted into Venezuelan Government controlled joint ventures with partners taking the minority position @ 49%.
Venezuelan has the largest reserves in the Western Hemisphere.
The U.S. Majors have made overtures to the tune of $50 billion in capital investment dollars for Venezuelan fields. The reason is quite simple; Venezuela is a 100 hour tanker trip to the Gulf Coast refineries. As the fourth largest supplier of crude oil to the U.S., Venezuela remains a strategic source of vital energy to this nation.
Although Chávez’s capital investment plans under joint venture appear restrictive, the fact is very few OPEC producers even allow direct foreign investment. Mexico decided the Rockefeller gringo’s were a most unwelcome partner when they suggested PEMEX be sold to the highest bidder. An easy feat when printing Dollars costs damn near nothing.
Despite failed coup attempts, assassinations and failure of the economic hit men, Chávez has remained willing to send oil our way; such is the present power of the Petro Dollar and risks to the Global Economy.
Chavez presently wants to attract $10 billion in foreign direct investment from oil companies to improve economies of scale and vastly expand Venezuela`s total oil output to 5 million barrels a day by 2009.
There is little doubt Chavez has very carefully observed the Yukos debacle. Russia, the world`s second-largest oil exporter, has essentially nationalized oil production in taking a most precious and scarce resource out of the hands of Kleptocrats and placed them firmly within Mother Russia’s control.
The Rockefellers were again rebuffed after dramatic plans to position themselves with a 17.5% stake in Yukos prior to President Putin’s assumption of control under the auspices of the Rothschild’s. They did, in fact, place Putin in power after the endless theft under Boris Yeltsin had created a Mafia Nation State; untenable to the austere Red Shield.
The simple fact is Oil Producers face higher royalties in order to do business in Venezuela.
And pay up, they most certainly will; at least until a successful attempt on President Chávez’s life can install a more friendly regime. This effort is likely to have the desired effect, regardless of Pat Robertson’s embarrassing diatribe.
What is not being said by our major media (propaganda outlets) is far more important than what is reported.
President Chávez clearly wants to expand output, but under terms which are fair to one and all. He is looking to assist the impoverished and in turn receive a fair price for Venezuela’s resources.
Call him what you will, Marxist, Communist or whatever label suits you. Reality is as such, benevolence is on display; ignore this at your peril goes the warnings.
Venezuela’s President is leading Latin America by example and I happen to believe the balance of Central and South American Nations States will be very quick on the uptake. The IMF & World Bank must be fuming.
Chávez has publicly stated he prefers a reduction in Venezuela`s dependence on oil sales to the U.S., which accounts for about 60 percent of the nation`s crude exports.
Chávez has signed agreements throughout 2004 and 2005 to boost oil sales to Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Paraguay and Uruguay. In addition, he has proposed constructing a pipeline to Pacific ports in Colombia in order to ship increasing quantities of crude to China; who has been exceptionally vocal with respect to inducing bilateral trade.
The U.S. imports 15 percent of its crude oil from Venezuela. In March of this year Chávez restated Venezuela’s intent to reduce sales to the U.S. market by selling off the assets of Citgo Petroleum Corporation. Citgo is a Houston-based refinery and gas station chain that the Venezuelan PDVSA owns with 13,500 gas stations in the United States.
Our Foreign Policy clearly lacks a coherent strategy to deal with the ever changing energy arena.
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/mackenzie/2005/…
Chavez Sees `True Crisis` Over Oil Reserves
http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2005/09/16/chavez-venez…
http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2005/09/16/chavez-venez…
EASY COME, EASY GO
This past week saw already unsettling rhetoric between the U.S. and Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez ‘kick it up a couple notches,’ so to speak, when it was revealed on Friday, Sept. 30 – that Venezuela had moved its central bank foreign reserves out of U.S. banks, liquidating its holdings in U.S. Treasury securities – moving the proceeds to Europe.
"We`ve had to move the international reserves from U.S. banks because of the threats from the U.S.,” Chavez said during televised remarks from a South American summit in Brazil.
Anyone ever wonder what the Venezuelans might be purchasing with those proceeds?
While it’s perhaps somewhat difficult to view this development in a positive light – it did shed some light on what might have been motivating the Fed’s aggressive actions ‘behind the curtain’ where their Open Market Operations are concerned:
In viewing the chart above, one can clearly see the recent obscene parabolic “add” of liquidity thru open market operations by the Fed thru their daily activity in the context of the year to date. To the uninitiated, what this graphically depicts – categorically - is the Fed responding to “systemic stress” on the financial system. My guess that the action depicted above was the Fed’s response to a Venezuelan ‘liquidation’ of their U.S. obligations is pure conjecture on my part. It is my sincere hope that my conjecture on this matter proves to be accurate, because if I’m wrong – systemic problems in the financial system still exist – and we, the great unwashed, simply do not know what the cause really is.
While I have grown to be suspect of most Fed data – the above scenario seems to be somewhat plausible given this August 12, 2005 amendment to the Venezuelan Central Bank Act – where it was reported:
"The National Assembly has passed the amendment to the Central Bank of Venezuela Act, making changes to the system to be followed for delivery of oil income in foreign currency and authorizing the transfer of part of the international reserves when they climb above the appropriate level of US$20 billion.
The money will be deposited in the National Development Fund (Fondem), to be created by presidential decree, in order to provide the resources to be used by the Executive Branch in financing investment projects, education and health plans, and payment of the foreign debt."
It has yet to be seen how these new rules will affect the country’s monetary policy and financial system, especially once the rules governing the Fondem have been defined.
On my planet, this seems to be highly indicative that Venezuela’s U.S. dollar holdings were already being somewhat curtailed given that U.S. dollar balances would naturally have been accruing at an ever increasing pace – arising from the ever increasing price of crude oil exports that--currently--all settle in U.S. dollars.
The only question that I’m left with – another conundrum inducing head scratcher – why didn’t Venezuela’s 20 odd billion of U.S. obligations ever get them included on this illustrious TIC data list?
http://www.financialsense.com/Market/wrapup.htm
This past week saw already unsettling rhetoric between the U.S. and Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez ‘kick it up a couple notches,’ so to speak, when it was revealed on Friday, Sept. 30 – that Venezuela had moved its central bank foreign reserves out of U.S. banks, liquidating its holdings in U.S. Treasury securities – moving the proceeds to Europe.
"We`ve had to move the international reserves from U.S. banks because of the threats from the U.S.,” Chavez said during televised remarks from a South American summit in Brazil.
Anyone ever wonder what the Venezuelans might be purchasing with those proceeds?
While it’s perhaps somewhat difficult to view this development in a positive light – it did shed some light on what might have been motivating the Fed’s aggressive actions ‘behind the curtain’ where their Open Market Operations are concerned:
In viewing the chart above, one can clearly see the recent obscene parabolic “add” of liquidity thru open market operations by the Fed thru their daily activity in the context of the year to date. To the uninitiated, what this graphically depicts – categorically - is the Fed responding to “systemic stress” on the financial system. My guess that the action depicted above was the Fed’s response to a Venezuelan ‘liquidation’ of their U.S. obligations is pure conjecture on my part. It is my sincere hope that my conjecture on this matter proves to be accurate, because if I’m wrong – systemic problems in the financial system still exist – and we, the great unwashed, simply do not know what the cause really is.
While I have grown to be suspect of most Fed data – the above scenario seems to be somewhat plausible given this August 12, 2005 amendment to the Venezuelan Central Bank Act – where it was reported:
"The National Assembly has passed the amendment to the Central Bank of Venezuela Act, making changes to the system to be followed for delivery of oil income in foreign currency and authorizing the transfer of part of the international reserves when they climb above the appropriate level of US$20 billion.
The money will be deposited in the National Development Fund (Fondem), to be created by presidential decree, in order to provide the resources to be used by the Executive Branch in financing investment projects, education and health plans, and payment of the foreign debt."
It has yet to be seen how these new rules will affect the country’s monetary policy and financial system, especially once the rules governing the Fondem have been defined.
On my planet, this seems to be highly indicative that Venezuela’s U.S. dollar holdings were already being somewhat curtailed given that U.S. dollar balances would naturally have been accruing at an ever increasing pace – arising from the ever increasing price of crude oil exports that--currently--all settle in U.S. dollars.
The only question that I’m left with – another conundrum inducing head scratcher – why didn’t Venezuela’s 20 odd billion of U.S. obligations ever get them included on this illustrious TIC data list?
http://www.financialsense.com/Market/wrapup.htm
Venezuela’s “Demonstration Effect”: Defying Globalization’s Logic
Were Venezuela to decide to switch partially to the euro—a move that would make economic sense should the dollar continue to depreciate and the European Union get its house back in order—other OPEC and Latin American nations would very likely follow suit.
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1579
Were Venezuela to decide to switch partially to the euro—a move that would make economic sense should the dollar continue to depreciate and the European Union get its house back in order—other OPEC and Latin American nations would very likely follow suit.
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1579
Trading Spotlight
Ask Venezuela`s President Hugo Chavez
What do you want to ask Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez?
Mr Chavez has been criticised by the United States for being Fidel Castro`s ally and promoting left-wing causes in Latin America.
Since coming to power in 1998 he has split the country between those who say he has become increasingly autocratic, and those who say he speaks for the poor.
Venezuela is the world`s fifth largest oil producer and a key member of Opec, supplying 15% of US oil imports.
Is President Chavez the voice of the poor? Or is he an autocrat? Is he a hero or a villain? What do you think of his attitude to the USA? Send your questions to President Hugo Chavez using the form on the right.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4350254.stm
What do you want to ask Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez?
Mr Chavez has been criticised by the United States for being Fidel Castro`s ally and promoting left-wing causes in Latin America.
Since coming to power in 1998 he has split the country between those who say he has become increasingly autocratic, and those who say he speaks for the poor.
Venezuela is the world`s fifth largest oil producer and a key member of Opec, supplying 15% of US oil imports.
Is President Chavez the voice of the poor? Or is he an autocrat? Is he a hero or a villain? What do you think of his attitude to the USA? Send your questions to President Hugo Chavez using the form on the right.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4350254.stm
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