Fannie Mae (Seite 1260)
eröffnet am 11.07.08 16:23:04 von
neuester Beitrag 17.05.24 19:22:18 von
neuester Beitrag 17.05.24 19:22:18 von
Beiträge: 20.469
ID: 1.142.789
ID: 1.142.789
Aufrufe heute: 3
Gesamt: 2.544.242
Gesamt: 2.544.242
Aktive User: 0
ISIN: US3135861090 · WKN: 856099 · Symbol: FNMA
1,5200
USD
+0,66 %
+0,0100 USD
Letzter Kurs 25.05.24 Nasdaq OTC
Neuigkeiten
Werte aus der Branche Finanzdienstleistungen
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 25,00 | +50,33 | |
| 7,0488 | +26,07 | |
| 5,8039 | +22,96 | |
| 15.000,00 | +11,11 | |
| 13,400 | +10,11 |
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 14,030 | -9,13 | |
| 8,4100 | -9,86 | |
| 4,2000 | -10,64 | |
| 1,0000 | -16,67 | |
| 1,3000 | -17,33 |
Beitrag zu dieser Diskussion schreiben
Feedback
Nachbörse gen Süden, DOW runter... meineee Güte.... 
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/nasdaqlastsale.aspx?symbol=FNM&se…
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/nasdaqlastsale.aspx?symbol=FNM&se…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 36.691.600 von Markus84 am 03.03.09 18:17:23 Äpfel und Birnen vergleichen??
FNM, den fast-Pleite-Versicherer AIG, die deutsche HRE und andere Absturz-Aktien (Hauptsache, deren Kurs zuckt mal kurz an)?
In FNM nicht investiert?
#7069 von Kotschubej 09.02.09 16:59:51 Beitrag Nr.: 36.542.632
Ich bin bei FNM schon länger dabei - als reiner Kurzfristanleger oder auch "Zocker", wie Airwave72 schreiben würde.
Hab aber nie gejammert, mich nur beim Lesen ab und zu so aufgeregt, dass ich mal schreiben musste, wenn ich die Glaskugel-Analysten und -Analystinnen (!) mit ihren "alles-unter-0,50-kaufe-ich-weg-", ihren "Monatsende"-Tips und ähnlichem Quatsch vernehmen musste.
MfG Kotschubej (Member of P.A.St.P.)
FNM, den fast-Pleite-Versicherer AIG, die deutsche HRE und andere Absturz-Aktien (Hauptsache, deren Kurs zuckt mal kurz an)?
In FNM nicht investiert?
#7069 von Kotschubej 09.02.09 16:59:51 Beitrag Nr.: 36.542.632
Ich bin bei FNM schon länger dabei - als reiner Kurzfristanleger oder auch "Zocker", wie Airwave72 schreiben würde.
Hab aber nie gejammert, mich nur beim Lesen ab und zu so aufgeregt, dass ich mal schreiben musste, wenn ich die Glaskugel-Analysten und -Analystinnen (!) mit ihren "alles-unter-0,50-kaufe-ich-weg-", ihren "Monatsende"-Tips und ähnlichem Quatsch vernehmen musste.
MfG Kotschubej (Member of P.A.St.P.)
WAS kann diesen Wert hier endlich wieder Richtung Norden drehen lassen? Ich glaube das weiss selbst Obama nicht...
Obama’s last hope on housing
March 3, 2009 2:43pm by FT
By Christopher Joye
Make no mistake: President Obama’s $75bn housing plan is a policy disaster. It merely treats the symptoms of the calamity in an extremely costly manner via short-term interest rate relief and remarkably does nothing to prevent the next generation of borrowers experiencing the same problems.
The administration’s response also exacerbates the underlying dysfunction that is the root cause of the US’s housing market woes by, for example, offering defaulting borrowers scope to wriggle out of their contracts through the judicial system.
This will only undermine the enforceability of US mortgages and embed a new risk premium that will inevitably lead to higher interest rates and likely funding uncertainty.
By reinvigorating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac without genuine reforms, the administration has demonstrated that it does not understand the fundamental flaws inherent in the US financing system, which precipitated this crisis in the first place.
There remains, however, hope that the more thoughtful decision-makers will search for superior long-term reforms. In this context, I was fortunate enough to be able to present a tractable solution to the US’s housing market problems at a summit in New York for Obama administration officials.
The plan I presented directly cauterises the US’s housing market dysfunction, delivers far greater and more permanent interest rate relief for distressed borrowers, allows banks to immediately recapitalise their balance-sheets with a $77bn cash injection, and costs taxpayers much less than the administration’s initiative. On all objective counts I feel that it is an unambiguous improvement on the administration’s alternative.
As I’ve noted previously, one of the most critical lessons from the global financial crisis has been that many households had far too much leverage, particularly in the US where the average borrower’s mortgage is now worth an astonishing 95 per cent of their home. The only genuine policy solution to the desire to deleverage is the development of external markets in housing equity – or ‘shared equity’ – which borrowers can use synergistically in combination with traditional debt finance.
Here’s how a government ‘debt for equity swap’ programme would allow distressed US borrowers to radically deleverage their balance-sheets:
Assume that the average ‘distressed’ borrower’s loan-to-value ratio is, say, 115 per cent. Under the debt-for-equity swap, the traditional lender would only write off 15 per cent of the value of their loan to bring the LTV back to 100 per cent (as opposed to writing off most of the loan). A similar write-down is anticipated in the administration’s scheme.
Yet instead of making a gift to lenders to temporarily cut borrowers’ repayments, the government would refinance 25 per cent of the reset home loan by swapping it with a taxpayer-funded ‘shared equity’ loan (this could be operationally achieved by having borrowers pay down 25 per cent of the reset loan).
Importantly, the shared equity loan carries no monthly repayments during its maximum 30-year life. In exchange, taxpayers receive half of the property’s future capital growth in lieu of interest when the home owner elects to repay the loan either on refinancing or sale of the property. The lender also owns no legal interest in the home since it is structured using a traditional mortgage contract; i.e. the owner retains control over what they do with their property.
The traditional lender is now left with a dramatically less risky 75 per cent LTV. They are also directly paid 25 per cent of the face value of their reset loan by the government and thus get the benefit of a significant cash injection – which is worth about $77bn – onto their balance-sheets.
The borrower is now only paying a full rate of interest on a home loan that is 65 per cent of its original value. They therefore benefit from a permanent 35 per cent reduction in their interest and principal repayments over the 30 year life of the package. In contrast, the lower repayments realised by borrowers under the administration’s proposal only last five years – after which rates are ratcheted back up, thereby raising the risk of ‘redefault’.
Assuming that house prices increase at a rate no greater than nominal gross domestic product during the next 30 years, which given the recent 25 per cent correction seems defendable, taxpayers could expect to earn a 5-10 per cent annualised, ungeared rate of return. This is patently superior to the 100 per cent losses that taxpayers will realise on their $75bn ‘gift’ to distressed borrowers under the existing plan.
How much would this cost? According to the Mortgage Bankers’ Association, 6.6 per cent of the circa $11tn of US home loans are in 60 days or more arrears. Assume that half of these borrowers go into foreclosure and need to access the programme. That gives $363bn worth of loans in distress. If the average LTV is 115 per cent, and the lender wears a 15 per cent write-down, a 25 per cent debt for equity swap would cost taxpayers roughly $77bn, which, coincidentally, is almost exactly the same size as the administration’s package.
Importantly, once the shared equity loans are repaid the government can recycle the capital to assist the next generation of households in distress. The $77bn equity fund could therefore be used to reduce the risk of families facing foreclosure in perpetuity. And since traditional lenders are minimising their foreclosure risk, they could ultimately contribute.
Successful private and publicly markets in housing equity now exist in Australia, NZ, and the UK. Combined with the fact that leading academics such as Ian Ayers and Barry Nalebuff, Luigi Zingales, and Edward Glaeser have recently made similar calls for the US government to help borrowers swap their debt for equity, it is hard not to acknowledge that there is immense merit to this plan.
Nobody would begrudge the administration the opportunity to refine their response to this calamity. I just hope they have the humility and foresight to listen.
Christopher Joye is chief executive of Rismark International
March 3, 2009 2:43pm
March 3, 2009 2:43pm by FT
By Christopher Joye
Make no mistake: President Obama’s $75bn housing plan is a policy disaster. It merely treats the symptoms of the calamity in an extremely costly manner via short-term interest rate relief and remarkably does nothing to prevent the next generation of borrowers experiencing the same problems.
The administration’s response also exacerbates the underlying dysfunction that is the root cause of the US’s housing market woes by, for example, offering defaulting borrowers scope to wriggle out of their contracts through the judicial system.
This will only undermine the enforceability of US mortgages and embed a new risk premium that will inevitably lead to higher interest rates and likely funding uncertainty.
By reinvigorating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac without genuine reforms, the administration has demonstrated that it does not understand the fundamental flaws inherent in the US financing system, which precipitated this crisis in the first place.
There remains, however, hope that the more thoughtful decision-makers will search for superior long-term reforms. In this context, I was fortunate enough to be able to present a tractable solution to the US’s housing market problems at a summit in New York for Obama administration officials.
The plan I presented directly cauterises the US’s housing market dysfunction, delivers far greater and more permanent interest rate relief for distressed borrowers, allows banks to immediately recapitalise their balance-sheets with a $77bn cash injection, and costs taxpayers much less than the administration’s initiative. On all objective counts I feel that it is an unambiguous improvement on the administration’s alternative.
As I’ve noted previously, one of the most critical lessons from the global financial crisis has been that many households had far too much leverage, particularly in the US where the average borrower’s mortgage is now worth an astonishing 95 per cent of their home. The only genuine policy solution to the desire to deleverage is the development of external markets in housing equity – or ‘shared equity’ – which borrowers can use synergistically in combination with traditional debt finance.
Here’s how a government ‘debt for equity swap’ programme would allow distressed US borrowers to radically deleverage their balance-sheets:
Assume that the average ‘distressed’ borrower’s loan-to-value ratio is, say, 115 per cent. Under the debt-for-equity swap, the traditional lender would only write off 15 per cent of the value of their loan to bring the LTV back to 100 per cent (as opposed to writing off most of the loan). A similar write-down is anticipated in the administration’s scheme.
Yet instead of making a gift to lenders to temporarily cut borrowers’ repayments, the government would refinance 25 per cent of the reset home loan by swapping it with a taxpayer-funded ‘shared equity’ loan (this could be operationally achieved by having borrowers pay down 25 per cent of the reset loan).
Importantly, the shared equity loan carries no monthly repayments during its maximum 30-year life. In exchange, taxpayers receive half of the property’s future capital growth in lieu of interest when the home owner elects to repay the loan either on refinancing or sale of the property. The lender also owns no legal interest in the home since it is structured using a traditional mortgage contract; i.e. the owner retains control over what they do with their property.
The traditional lender is now left with a dramatically less risky 75 per cent LTV. They are also directly paid 25 per cent of the face value of their reset loan by the government and thus get the benefit of a significant cash injection – which is worth about $77bn – onto their balance-sheets.
The borrower is now only paying a full rate of interest on a home loan that is 65 per cent of its original value. They therefore benefit from a permanent 35 per cent reduction in their interest and principal repayments over the 30 year life of the package. In contrast, the lower repayments realised by borrowers under the administration’s proposal only last five years – after which rates are ratcheted back up, thereby raising the risk of ‘redefault’.
Assuming that house prices increase at a rate no greater than nominal gross domestic product during the next 30 years, which given the recent 25 per cent correction seems defendable, taxpayers could expect to earn a 5-10 per cent annualised, ungeared rate of return. This is patently superior to the 100 per cent losses that taxpayers will realise on their $75bn ‘gift’ to distressed borrowers under the existing plan.
How much would this cost? According to the Mortgage Bankers’ Association, 6.6 per cent of the circa $11tn of US home loans are in 60 days or more arrears. Assume that half of these borrowers go into foreclosure and need to access the programme. That gives $363bn worth of loans in distress. If the average LTV is 115 per cent, and the lender wears a 15 per cent write-down, a 25 per cent debt for equity swap would cost taxpayers roughly $77bn, which, coincidentally, is almost exactly the same size as the administration’s package.
Importantly, once the shared equity loans are repaid the government can recycle the capital to assist the next generation of households in distress. The $77bn equity fund could therefore be used to reduce the risk of families facing foreclosure in perpetuity. And since traditional lenders are minimising their foreclosure risk, they could ultimately contribute.
Successful private and publicly markets in housing equity now exist in Australia, NZ, and the UK. Combined with the fact that leading academics such as Ian Ayers and Barry Nalebuff, Luigi Zingales, and Edward Glaeser have recently made similar calls for the US government to help borrowers swap their debt for equity, it is hard not to acknowledge that there is immense merit to this plan.
Nobody would begrudge the administration the opportunity to refine their response to this calamity. I just hope they have the humility and foresight to listen.
Christopher Joye is chief executive of Rismark International
March 3, 2009 2:43pm
Trading Spotlight
ich sehe ihr versteht mich 
aber STAR TREK?
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 36.691.103 von GorkoLuno am 03.03.09 17:27:12verbieten kann man keinem etwas, außer es ist strafbar, aber selbst strafe schützt nicht davor, verbotene dinge zu tun.
Mit gesunder kritik oder gesundem pessimismus kann ich gut leben. aber wenn hier jemand nur versucht ne sache schlecht zu machen, weil er es für angebracht hält und äpfel mit fisch vergleicht, hat das keinen sinn... in diesem sinne... auf die rakete des jahrtausends... hoffentlich wird das hier kein apolla13
Mit gesunder kritik oder gesundem pessimismus kann ich gut leben. aber wenn hier jemand nur versucht ne sache schlecht zu machen, weil er es für angebracht hält und äpfel mit fisch vergleicht, hat das keinen sinn... in diesem sinne... auf die rakete des jahrtausends... hoffentlich wird das hier kein apolla13
Soll ich mich jetzt freuen oder schreien???
At the time, the promise was to strengthen Freddie Mac (NYSE:FRE) and Fannie Mae (NYSE:FNM) and return them to private operations, The New York Times (NYSE:NYT) reported Tuesday.
At the time, the promise was to strengthen Freddie Mac (NYSE:FRE) and Fannie Mae (NYSE:FNM) and return them to private operations, The New York Times (NYSE:NYT) reported Tuesday.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 36.691.103 von GorkoLuno am 03.03.09 17:27:12
...der rakete des jahrtausends ....
...der rakete des jahrtausends ....
Durchsuchen
