Lehman Brothers: ABB Kaufen!!!!!! - 500 Beiträge pro Seite
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ISIN: CH0012221716 · WKN: 919730
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Letzter Kurs 28.04.24 Lang & Schwarz
Neuigkeiten
23.04.24 · Der Aktionär TV  |
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20.04.24 · wO Chartvergleich |
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Werte aus der Branche Elektrogeräte
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 1,3000 | +71.367,84 | |
| 25,12 | +39,05 | |
| 0,7000 | +32,08 | |
| 0,5900 | +31,11 | |
| 1,0400 | +28,38 |
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 6,1100 | -9,75 | |
| 2,0200 | -9,82 | |
| 3,1400 | -11,55 | |
| 0,7300 | -26,26 | |
| 4,0000 | -33,33 |
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ABB: Overweight (Lehman Brothers)
Aktien & Co
Die Analysten von Lehman Brothers stufen in ihrer Analyse vom 21. Februar die Aktie des Schweizer Anlagen- und Maschinenbauers ABB Ltd. unverändert mit "Overweight" und einem Kursziel von 8 CHF ein.
In einer ersten Beurteilung der Zahlen des vierten Quartals haben die Analysten den Auftragseingang und die Zahl der unerwarteten Aufwendungen als enttäuschend bezeichnet. Ansonsten habe man ein weiteres Quartal mit einer starken Cash-Flow-Entwicklung abgeschlossen. Der Auftragseingang sei lediglich in den Kerngeschäftsfeldern flach ausgefallen (+5 Prozent im Turbinenbereich und -2 Prozent bei der Automatisierungstechnik). Die book-to-bill-Zahlen seien mit 107 und 103 Prozent jedoch beeindruckend ausgefallen.
Analyst: Lehman Brothers
KGV: 11.7
Rating des Analysten: Overweight
Diese Seite drucken
Quelle: Aktien & Co 23.02.2005 11:17:00
Aktien & Co
Die Analysten von Lehman Brothers stufen in ihrer Analyse vom 21. Februar die Aktie des Schweizer Anlagen- und Maschinenbauers ABB Ltd. unverändert mit "Overweight" und einem Kursziel von 8 CHF ein.
In einer ersten Beurteilung der Zahlen des vierten Quartals haben die Analysten den Auftragseingang und die Zahl der unerwarteten Aufwendungen als enttäuschend bezeichnet. Ansonsten habe man ein weiteres Quartal mit einer starken Cash-Flow-Entwicklung abgeschlossen. Der Auftragseingang sei lediglich in den Kerngeschäftsfeldern flach ausgefallen (+5 Prozent im Turbinenbereich und -2 Prozent bei der Automatisierungstechnik). Die book-to-bill-Zahlen seien mit 107 und 103 Prozent jedoch beeindruckend ausgefallen.
Analyst: Lehman Brothers
KGV: 11.7
Rating des Analysten: Overweight
Diese Seite drucken
Quelle: Aktien & Co 23.02.2005 11:17:00
ABB-Ideenprogramm feiert 55-jähriges Bestehen: Bester Mitarbeitervorschlag 2004 sparte 147.000 Euro
ABB-Ideenoskar für beste Idee / Qualität der Vorschläge deutlich verbessert
Mannheim, 21. Februar 2005 - Das Ideenprogramm für Mitarbeiter von ABB in Deutschland feiert in diesem Jahr sein 55-jähriges Bestehen. Allein in den vergangenen 15 Jahren reichten ABB-Mitarbeiter fast 60.000 Vorschläge zur Verbesserung von Arbeitsabläufen und Produkten ein, mit denen das Unternehmen Kosten in Höhe von rund 50 Millionen Euro einsparen konnte. Dafür zahlte ABB seinen kreativen Köpfen rund 10,5 Millionen Euro an Prämien. Zum zweiten Mal nach 2004 verleiht ABB in diesem Jahr den „ABB-Ideenoskar“ für die beste Mitarbeiteridee.
„Das ABB-Ideenprogramm stärkt die Identifikation der Mitarbeiter mit ihrem Aufgabengebiet und ist damit auch ein wichtiger Baustein für den Unternehmenserfolg“, hob Personalvorstand Paffenholz die Bedeutung des Ideenprogramms hervor. Allein im Jahr 2004 reichten mehr als 2.300 Mitarbeiter rund 1.850 Verbesserungsvorschläge ein. Die dadurch erzielte Einsparung betrug knapp 2,3 Millionen Euro, mehr als 310.000 Euro zahlte ABB in Deutschland als Prämien aus. Auch die Qualität der Ideen hat sich in der Vergangenheit deutlich verbessert. Lag der Nutzen pro Vorschlag im Jahr 2003 bei rund 900 Euro stieg er im vergangenen Jahr um 35 Prozent auf mehr als 1.200 Euro an.
Wie im Vorjahr zeichnete Personalvorstand Paffenholz auch für das Jahr 2004 den besten Mitarbeitervorschlag mit dem „ABB-Ideenoskar“ aus. In diesem Jahr ging die Auszeichnung an einen Mitarbeiter der ABB Utilities GmbH in Minden. Der Projektingenieur hatte eine Softwarelösung entwickelt, die den sicheren Betrieb von Rechnern bei Ausfall der Spannungsversorgung ermöglicht und damit dem Unternehmen eine jährliche Einsparung von 147.000 Euro bringt. Der zweite Platz ging an einen Mitarbeiter der ABB Utilities GmbH am Standort Mannheim. Er verbesserte die Datenpflege für ein computergestütztes Einkaufsinstrument, so dass der Zeitaufwand und die Fehlerkosten gesenkt werden konnten. Die Kosteneinsparung seiner Idee liegt bei rund 74.000 Euro jährlich. Den dritten Platz erreichte ein Mitarbeiter der ABB Calor Emag Hochspannung GmbH am Standort Hanau-Großauheim. Sein Vorschlag verbessert die Fertigung und die Qualität von Pumpengehäusen und spart im Jahr etwa 40.000 Euro.
ABB in Deutschland erzielt mit rund 14.300 Beschäftigten einen Umsatz von drei Milliarden Euro. ABB ist führend in der Energie- und Automationstechnik. Das Unternehmen ermöglicht seinen Kunden in der Energieversorgung und der Industrie, ihre Leistung zu verbessern und die Umweltbelastung zu reduzieren. ABB beschäftigt etwa 102.000 Mitarbeiter in rund 100 Ländern.
ABB-Ideenoskar für beste Idee / Qualität der Vorschläge deutlich verbessert
Mannheim, 21. Februar 2005 - Das Ideenprogramm für Mitarbeiter von ABB in Deutschland feiert in diesem Jahr sein 55-jähriges Bestehen. Allein in den vergangenen 15 Jahren reichten ABB-Mitarbeiter fast 60.000 Vorschläge zur Verbesserung von Arbeitsabläufen und Produkten ein, mit denen das Unternehmen Kosten in Höhe von rund 50 Millionen Euro einsparen konnte. Dafür zahlte ABB seinen kreativen Köpfen rund 10,5 Millionen Euro an Prämien. Zum zweiten Mal nach 2004 verleiht ABB in diesem Jahr den „ABB-Ideenoskar“ für die beste Mitarbeiteridee.
„Das ABB-Ideenprogramm stärkt die Identifikation der Mitarbeiter mit ihrem Aufgabengebiet und ist damit auch ein wichtiger Baustein für den Unternehmenserfolg“, hob Personalvorstand Paffenholz die Bedeutung des Ideenprogramms hervor. Allein im Jahr 2004 reichten mehr als 2.300 Mitarbeiter rund 1.850 Verbesserungsvorschläge ein. Die dadurch erzielte Einsparung betrug knapp 2,3 Millionen Euro, mehr als 310.000 Euro zahlte ABB in Deutschland als Prämien aus. Auch die Qualität der Ideen hat sich in der Vergangenheit deutlich verbessert. Lag der Nutzen pro Vorschlag im Jahr 2003 bei rund 900 Euro stieg er im vergangenen Jahr um 35 Prozent auf mehr als 1.200 Euro an.
Wie im Vorjahr zeichnete Personalvorstand Paffenholz auch für das Jahr 2004 den besten Mitarbeitervorschlag mit dem „ABB-Ideenoskar“ aus. In diesem Jahr ging die Auszeichnung an einen Mitarbeiter der ABB Utilities GmbH in Minden. Der Projektingenieur hatte eine Softwarelösung entwickelt, die den sicheren Betrieb von Rechnern bei Ausfall der Spannungsversorgung ermöglicht und damit dem Unternehmen eine jährliche Einsparung von 147.000 Euro bringt. Der zweite Platz ging an einen Mitarbeiter der ABB Utilities GmbH am Standort Mannheim. Er verbesserte die Datenpflege für ein computergestütztes Einkaufsinstrument, so dass der Zeitaufwand und die Fehlerkosten gesenkt werden konnten. Die Kosteneinsparung seiner Idee liegt bei rund 74.000 Euro jährlich. Den dritten Platz erreichte ein Mitarbeiter der ABB Calor Emag Hochspannung GmbH am Standort Hanau-Großauheim. Sein Vorschlag verbessert die Fertigung und die Qualität von Pumpengehäusen und spart im Jahr etwa 40.000 Euro.
ABB in Deutschland erzielt mit rund 14.300 Beschäftigten einen Umsatz von drei Milliarden Euro. ABB ist führend in der Energie- und Automationstechnik. Das Unternehmen ermöglicht seinen Kunden in der Energieversorgung und der Industrie, ihre Leistung zu verbessern und die Umweltbelastung zu reduzieren. ABB beschäftigt etwa 102.000 Mitarbeiter in rund 100 Ländern.
Goldman bestätigt "In-Line" für ABB nach Vergleich
Einstufung: Bestätigt "In-Line"
Goldman Sachs bestätigt die Einstufung für ABB infolge der Einigung im Asbest-Streit.
Die Aktien dürften von der Beseitigung der Unsicherheit profitieren.
Im Kurs seien aber immer noch nicht alle guten Nachrichten eingepreist.
Die am 28. April 2005 anstehenden Ergebnisse für das erste Quartal 2005
dürften sowohl von dem schwächer als gewöhnlich ausgefallenen Schlussquartal für 2004
als auch von der derzeit starken Nachfrage aus China profitieren.
Einstufung: Bestätigt "In-Line"
Goldman Sachs bestätigt die Einstufung für ABB infolge der Einigung im Asbest-Streit.
Die Aktien dürften von der Beseitigung der Unsicherheit profitieren.
Im Kurs seien aber immer noch nicht alle guten Nachrichten eingepreist.
Die am 28. April 2005 anstehenden Ergebnisse für das erste Quartal 2005
dürften sowohl von dem schwächer als gewöhnlich ausgefallenen Schlussquartal für 2004
als auch von der derzeit starken Nachfrage aus China profitieren.
Was man über Abb hört .....
Name: ABB
Gattung: Aktien
WKN: 919730
Symbol: ABJ
ISIN: CH0012221716
Branche: --
Land: Deutschland
Währung: EUR
Jahreschart 08.04.2005
ChartTool
Kursdaten Frankfurt
Kurs:
16:25:05 4,98 +0,81%
+0,04
Taxe Stück
Bid: 16:46:46 4,97 50.000
Ask: 16:46:46 4,99 50.000
Tief Hoch
Jahr: 4,15 4,95
52 Wochen: 3,94 5,29
Unternehmensmeldungen
04.04. CSFB erhöht ABB-Kursziel auf 9 (7,70) CHF
24.03. Goldman bestätigt "In-Line" für ABB nach Vergleich
22.03. ABB: Overweight
22.03. ABB: Accumulate
22.03. JPM erhöht ABB-Ziel auf 8,30 (7,70) CHF - "Overweight"
21.03. ABB: Neutral
21.03. Bank Sarasin erhöht ABB-Kursziel auf 7,75 (7,00) CHF
21.03. Cheuvreux erhöht ABB-Ziel auf 8,40 CHF - "Outperform"
21.03. ABB hofft 2005 auf endgültige Einigung im Asbest-Vergleich
21.03. ABB zahlt zusätzlich 232 Mio USD im Asbest-Vergleich
Finanztreff entnommen
Name: ABB
Gattung: Aktien
WKN: 919730
Symbol: ABJ
ISIN: CH0012221716
Branche: --
Land: Deutschland
Währung: EUR
Jahreschart 08.04.2005
ChartTool
Kursdaten Frankfurt
Kurs:
16:25:05 4,98 +0,81%
+0,04
Taxe Stück
Bid: 16:46:46 4,97 50.000
Ask: 16:46:46 4,99 50.000
Tief Hoch
Jahr: 4,15 4,95
52 Wochen: 3,94 5,29
Unternehmensmeldungen
04.04. CSFB erhöht ABB-Kursziel auf 9 (7,70) CHF
24.03. Goldman bestätigt "In-Line" für ABB nach Vergleich
22.03. ABB: Overweight
22.03. ABB: Accumulate
22.03. JPM erhöht ABB-Ziel auf 8,30 (7,70) CHF - "Overweight"
21.03. ABB: Neutral
21.03. Bank Sarasin erhöht ABB-Kursziel auf 7,75 (7,00) CHF
21.03. Cheuvreux erhöht ABB-Ziel auf 8,40 CHF - "Outperform"
21.03. ABB hofft 2005 auf endgültige Einigung im Asbest-Vergleich
21.03. ABB zahlt zusätzlich 232 Mio USD im Asbest-Vergleich
Finanztreff entnommen
News vom 14.04.2005 09:00 (Tiscali.finanzen entnommen)
Lehman:
ABB-US-Sparte peilt zweistelliges Wachstum an
=== Einstufung: Bestätigt "Overweight"
Kursziel: Bestätigt 8 CHF ===
Die US-Sparte von ABB strebt ein Ergebniswachstum im zweistelligen Prozentbereich an, wie Lehman Brothers nach einem Treffen mit dem Management sagt.
Zudem sei bei dem Treffen hervorgehoben worden, dass der wenig bekannte Interstate Transmission Act eine bedeutende Nachfrage nach ABB-Produkten implizieren könnte.
Das Auftragsumfeld der Gruppe bleibe 2005 robust.
(ENDE) Dow Jones Newswires/14.4.2005/swz/alfap/kfm/ake/ros
Lehman:
ABB-US-Sparte peilt zweistelliges Wachstum an
=== Einstufung: Bestätigt "Overweight"
Kursziel: Bestätigt 8 CHF ===
Die US-Sparte von ABB strebt ein Ergebniswachstum im zweistelligen Prozentbereich an, wie Lehman Brothers nach einem Treffen mit dem Management sagt.
Zudem sei bei dem Treffen hervorgehoben worden, dass der wenig bekannte Interstate Transmission Act eine bedeutende Nachfrage nach ABB-Produkten implizieren könnte.
Das Auftragsumfeld der Gruppe bleibe 2005 robust.
(ENDE) Dow Jones Newswires/14.4.2005/swz/alfap/kfm/ake/ros
Trading Spotlight
WAS IST DER "INTERSTATE TRANSMISSIONS ACT"?
Feedback
109th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 498
To provide for expansion of electricity transmission networks in order to support competitive electricity markets, to ensure reliability of electric service, to modernize regulation and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 2, 2005
Mr. BURR (for himself, Ms. LANDRIEU, and Mr. LOTT) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
A BILL
To provide for expansion of electricity transmission networks in order to support competitive electricity markets, to ensure reliability of electric service, to modernize regulation and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Interstate Transmission Act of 2005`.
(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents of this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--RELIABLE AND ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE
Sec. 101. Transmission infrastructure investment.
Sec. 102. Open nondiscriminatory access.
Sec. 103. Electric transmission property treated as 15-year property.
Sec. 104. Disposition of property.
Sec. 105. Electric reliability standards.
TITLE II--PROTECTING RETAIL CONSUMERS
Sec. 201. Native load service obligation.
Sec. 202. Voluntary transmission pricing plans.
TITLE III--VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 301. Promotion of voluntary development of regional transmission organizations, independent transmission providers, and similar organizations.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
(1) transmission networks are the backbone of reliable delivery of electric energy and competitive wholesale power markets;
(2) the expansion, enhancement, and improvement of transmission facilities, and rules of the road for using the facilities, are necessary to maintain and improve the reliability of electric service and to enhance competitive wholesale markets across the United States and competitive retail markets that have been adopted by nearly the States;
(3) to ensure reliable and efficient expansion, enhancement, and improvement of transmission facilities, the economics of the business of electric transmission and the Federal regulatory structures applicable to the facilities must be improved;
(4) Federal electricity regulatory policy should benefit consumers by providing incentives for infrastructure improvement and by removing barriers to efficient competition, and not be dictated by the imposition of market structures or costly mandates;
(5) slow, burdensome, or duplicative reviews of utility mergers are a disincentive to the efficient disposition of utility assets needed to ensure a reliable and efficient infrastructure;
(6) since efficient competition requires accurate price signals that reflect cost causation, parties that benefit from transmission upgrades should be required to pay for the upgrades;
(7) Federal regulation should not override the interests of local consumers or State laws that ensure reliable service and adequate transmission capacity to serve consumers;
(8) in regions where the formation of regional transmission organizations or similar entities have been formed voluntarily with oversight or approval by States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should have clear authority to approve applications for the organizations that are consistent with the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.);
(9) the States and electricity consumers in each region of the United States, and not the Federal Government, are in the best position to determine how the electric power systems serving their regions should be structured, including whether Regional Transmission Organization formation, traditional vertical integration, or other structures are cost effective for their region; and
(10) mandatory reliability rules, developed and enforced by a self-regulating electric reliability organization, are a vital component of a comprehensive policy to ensure a robust and reliable electricity grid.
TITLE I--RELIABLE AND ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC. 101. TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 215. TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT.
`(a) Rulemaking Requirement- Within 1 year after the enactment of this section, the Commission shall establish, by rule, incentive-based (including, but not limited to performance-based) rate treatments for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce by any public utility for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion. Such rule shall--
`(1) promote reliable and economically efficient transmission and generation of electricity by promoting capital investment in the enlargement, improvement, maintenance and operation of facilities for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce;
`(2) provide a return on equity, determined using a variety of reasonable valuation methodologies, that attracts new investment in transmission facilities (including related transmission technologies);
`(3) encourage deployment of transmission technologies and other measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing transmission facilities and improve the operation of such facilities;
`(4) allow recovery of all prudently incurred costs necessary to comply with mandatory reliability standards issued pursuant to section 216 of this Act;
`(5) allow a current return in rates for construction work in progress for transmission facilities and full recovery of prudently incurred costs for constructing transmission facilities;
`(6) allow the use of formula transmission rates;
`(7) allow rates of return that do not vary with capital structure; and
`(8) allow a maximum 15-year accelerated depreciation on new transmission facilities for rate treatment purposes.
`(b) Additional Incentives for RTO Participation- In the rule issued under this section, the Commission shall, to the extent within its jurisdiction, provide for incentives to each transmitting utility or electric utility that joins a Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator. Incentives provided by the Commission pursuant to such rule shall include--
`(1) recovery of all prudently incurred costs to develop and participate in any proposed or approved RTO, ISO, or independent transmission company;
`(2) recovery of all costs previously approved by a State commission which exercised jurisdiction over the transmission facilities prior to the utility`s participation in the RTO or ISO, including costs necessary to honor preexisting transmission service contracts, in a manner which does not reduce the revenues the utility receives for transmission services for a reasonable transition period after the utility joins the RTO or ISO; and
`(3) recovery as an expense in rates of the costs prudently incurred to conduct transmission planning and reliability activities, including the costs of participating in RTO, ISO and other regional planning activities and design, study and other precertification costs involved in seeking permits and approvals for proposed transmission facilities.
The Commission shall ensure that any costs recoverable pursuant to this subsection may be recovered by such utility through the transmission rates charged by such utility or through the transmission rates charged by the RTO or ISO that provides transmission service to such utility.
`(c) Just and Reasonable Rates- All rates approved under the rules adopted pursuant to this section, including any revisions to such rules, are subject to the requirement of sections 205 and 206 that all rates, charges, terms, and conditions be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.`.
SEC. 102. OPEN NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 211 the following new section:
`SEC. 211A. OPEN ACCESS BY UNREGULATED TRANSMITTING UTILITIES.
`(a) Transmission Services- Subject to section 212(h), the Commission may, by rule or order, require an unregulated transmitting utility to provide transmission services--
`(1) at rates that are comparable to those that the unregulated transmitting utility charges itself; and
`(2) on terms and conditions (not relating to rates) that are comparable to those under which such unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission services to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
`(b) Exemption- The Commission shall exempt from any rule or order under this section any unregulated transmitting utility that--
`(1) sells no more than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year; or
`(2) does not own or operate any transmission facilities that are necessary for operating an interconnected transmission system (or any portion thereof); or
`(3) meets other criteria the Commission determines to be in the public interest.
`(c) Local Distribution Facilities- The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply to facilities used in local distribution.
`(d) Exemption Termination- Whenever the Commission, after an evidentiary hearing held upon a complaint and after giving consideration to reliability standards established under section 216, finds on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence that any exemption granted pursuant to subsection (b) unreasonably impairs the continued reliability of an interconnected transmission system, it shall revoke the exemption granted to that transmitting utility.
`(e) Application to Unregulated Transmitting Utilities- The rate changing procedures applicable to public utilities under subsections (c) and (d) of section 205 are applicable to unregulated transmitting utilities for purposes of this section.
`(f) Remand- In exercising its authority under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the Commission may remand transmission rates to an unregulated transmitting utility for review and revision where necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (a).
`(g) Other Requests- The provision of transmission services under subsection (a) does not preclude a request for transmission services under section 211.
`(h) Limitation- The Commission may not require a State or municipality to take action under this section that would violate a private activity bond rule for purposes of section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 141).
`(i) Transfer of Control of Transmitting Facilities- Nothing in this section authorizes the Commission to require an unregulated transmitting utility to transfer control or operational control of its transmitting facilities to an RTO or any other Commission-approved independent transmission organization designated to provide nondiscriminatory transmission access.
`(j) Definition- For purposes of this section, the term `unregulated transmitting utility` means an entity that--
`(1) owns or operates facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce; and
`(2) is an entity described in section 201(f).`.
SEC. 103. ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PROPERTY TREATED AS 15-YEAR PROPERTY.
(a) In General- Subparagraph (E) of section 168(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to classification of certain property) is amended by striking `and` at the end of clause (v), by striking the period at the end of clause (vi) and by inserting `, and`, and by adding at the end the following new clause:
`(vii) any section 1245 property (as defined in section 1245(a)(3)) used in the transmission at 69 or more kilovolts of electricity for sale the original use of which commences with the taxpayer after the date of the enactment of this clause.`.
(b) Alternative System- The table contained in section 168(g)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rule for certain property assigned to classes) is amended by inserting after the item relating to subparagraph (E)(vi) the following:
`(E)(vii)
--30`.
(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of this Act, in taxable years ending after such date.
SEC. 104. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY.
Section 203 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b) is repealed.
SEC. 105. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY STANDARDS.
(a) In General- Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 101) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 216. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY.
`(a) Definitions- For purposes of this section:
`(1) The term `bulk-power system` means--
`(A) facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and
`(B) electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability.
The term does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.
`(2) The terms `Electric Reliability Organization` and `ERO` mean the organization certified by the Commission under subsection (c) the purpose of which is to establish and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system, subject to Commission review.
`(3) The term `reliability standard` means a requirement, approved by the Commission under this section, to provide for reliable operation of the bulk-power system. The term includes requirements for the operation of existing bulk-power system facilities and the design of planned additions or modifications to such facilities to the extent necessary to provide for reliable operation of the bulk-power system, but the term does not include any requirement to enlarge such facilities or to construct new transmission capacity or generation capacity.
`(4) The term `reliable operation` means operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance or unanticipated failure of system elements.
`(5) The term `Interconnection` means a geographic area in which the operation of bulk-power system components is synchronized such that the failure of 1 or more of such components may adversely affect the ability of the operators of other components within the system to maintain reliable operation of the facilities within their control.
`(6) The term `transmission organization` means a Regional Transmission Organization, Independent System Operator, independent transmission provider, or other transmission organization finally approved by the Commission for the operation of transmission facilities.
`(7) The term `regional entity` means an entity having enforcement authority pursuant to subsection (e)(4).
`(b) Jurisdiction and Applicability- (1) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, within the United States, over the ERO certified by the Commission under subsection (c), any regional entities, and all users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system, including but not limited to the entities described in section 201(f), for purposes of approving reliability standards established under this section and enforcing compliance with this section. All users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system shall comply with reliability standards that take effect under this section.
`(2) The Commission shall issue a final rule to implement the requirements of this section not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section.
`(c) Certification- Following the issuance of a Commission rule under subsection (b)(2), any person may submit an application to the Commission for certification as the Electric Reliability Organization. The Commission may certify 1 such ERO if the Commission determines that such ERO--
`(1) has the ability to develop and enforce, subject to subsection (e)(2), reliability standards that provide for an adequate level of reliability of the bulk-power system; and
`(2) has established rules that--
`(A) assure its independence of the users and owners and operators of the bulk-power system, while assuring fair stakeholder representation in the selection of its directors and balanced decisionmaking in any ERO committee or subordinate organizational structure;
`(B) allocate equitably reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among end users for all activities under this section;
`(C) provide fair and impartial procedures for enforcement of reliability standards through the imposition of penalties in accordance with subsection (e) (including limitations on activities, functions, or operations, or other appropriate sanctions);
`(D) provide for reasonable notice and opportunity for public comment, due process, openness, and balance of interests in developing reliability standards and otherwise exercising its duties; and
`(E) provide for taking, after certification, appropriate steps to gain recognition in Canada and Mexico.
`(d) Reliability Standards- (1) The Electric Reliability Organization shall file each reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard that it proposes to be made effective under this section with the Commission.
`(2) The Commission may approve, by rule or order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it determines that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The Commission shall give due weight to the technical expertise of the Electric Reliability Organization with respect to the content of a proposed standard or modification to a reliability standard and to the technical expertise of a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis with respect to a reliability standard to be applicable within that Interconnection, but shall not defer with respect to the effect of a standard on competition. A proposed standard or modification shall take effect upon approval by the Commission.
`(3) The Electric Reliability Organization shall rebuttably presume that a proposal from a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis for a reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard to be applicable on an Interconnection-wide basis is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
`(4) The Commission shall remand to the Electric Reliability Organization for further consideration a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that the Commission disapproves in whole or in part.
`(5) The Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint, may order the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that addresses a specific matter if the Commission considers such a new or modified reliability standard appropriate to carry out this section.
`(6) The final rule adopted under subsection (b)(2) shall include fair processes for the identification and timely resolution of any conflict between a reliability standard and any function, rule, order, tariff, rate schedule, or agreement accepted, approved, or ordered by the Commission applicable to a transmission organization. Such transmission organization shall continue to comply with such function, rule, order, tariff, rate schedule or agreement accepted approved, or ordered by the Commission until--
`(A) the Commission finds a conflict exists between a reliability standard and any such provision;
`(B) the Commission orders a change to such provision pursuant to section 206 of this part; and
`(C) the ordered change becomes effective under this part.
If the Commission determines that a reliability standard needs to be changed as a result of such a conflict, it shall order the ERO to develop and file with the Commission a modified reliability standard under paragraph (4) or (5) of this subsection.
`(e) Enforcement- (1) The ERO may impose, subject to paragraph (2), a penalty on a user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system for a violation of a reliability standard approved by the Commission under subsection (d) if the ERO, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing--
`(A) finds that the user or owner or operator has violated a reliability standard approved by the Commission under subsection (d); and
`(B) files notice and the record of the proceeding with the Commission.
`(2) A penalty imposed under paragraph (1) may take effect not earlier than the 31st day after the ERO files with the Commission notice of the penalty and the record of proceedings. Such penalty shall be subject to review by the Commission, on its own motion or upon application by the user, owner or operator that is the subject of the penalty filed within 30 days after the date such notice is filed with the Commission. Application to the Commission for review, or the initiation of review by the Commission on its own motion, shall not operate as a stay of such penalty unless the Commission otherwise orders upon its own motion or upon application by the user, owner or operator that is the subject of such penalty. In any proceeding to review a penalty imposed under paragraph (1), the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing (which hearing may consist solely of the record before the ERO and opportunity for the presentation of supporting reasons to affirm, modify, or set aside the penalty), shall by order affirm, set aside, reinstate, or modify the penalty, and, if appropriate, remand to the ERO for further proceedings. The Commission shall implement expedited procedures for such hearings.
`(3) On its own motion or upon complaint, the Commission may order compliance with a reliability standard and may impose a penalty against a user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system if the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices that constitute or will constitute a violation of a reliability standard.
`(4) The Commission shall issue regulations authorizing the ERO to enter into an agreement to delegate authority to a regional entity for the purpose of proposing reliability standards to the ERO and enforcing reliability standards under paragraph (1) if--
`(A) the regional entity is governed by--
`(i) an independent board;
`(ii) a balanced stakeholder board; or
`(iii) a combination independent and balanced stakeholder board.
`(B) the regional entity otherwise satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(1) and (2); and
`(C) the agreement promotes effective and efficient administration of bulk-power system reliability.
The Commission may modify such delegation. The ERO and the Commission shall rebuttably presume that a proposal for delegation to a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis promotes effective and efficient administration of bulk-power system reliability and should be approved. Such regulation may provide that the Commission may assign the ERO`s authority to enforce reliability standards under paragraph (1) directly to a regional entity consistent with the requirements of this paragraph.
`(5) The Commission may take such action as is necessary or appropriate against the ERO or a regional entity to ensure compliance with a reliability standard or any Commission order affecting the ERO or a regional entity.
`(6) Any penalty imposed under this section shall bear a reasonable relation to the seriousness of the violation and shall take into consideration the efforts of such user, owner, or operator to remedy the violation in a timely manner.
`(f) Changes in Electric Reliability Organization Rules- The Electric Reliability Organization shall file with the Commission for approval any proposed rule or proposed rule change, accompanied by an explanation of its basis and purpose. The Commission, upon its own motion or complaint, may propose a change to the rules of the ERO. A proposed rule or proposed rule change shall take effect upon a finding by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for comment, that the change is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, is in the public interest, and satisfies the requirements of subsection (c).
`(g) Reliability Reports- The ERO shall conduct periodic assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the bulk-power system in North America.
`(h) Coordination With Canada and Mexico- The President is urged to negotiate international agreements with the governments of Canada and Mexico to provide for effective compliance with reliability standards and the effectiveness of the ERO in the United States and Canada or Mexico.
`(i) Savings Provisions- (1) The ERO shall have authority to develop and enforce compliance with reliability standards for only the bulk-power system.
`(2) This section does not authorize the ERO or the Commission to order the construction of additional generation or transmission capacity or to set and enforce compliance with standards for adequacy or safety of electric facilities or services.
`(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any authority of any State to take action to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with any reliability standard.
`(4) Within 90 days of the application of the Electric Reliability Organization or other affected party, and after notice and opportunity for comment, the Commission shall issue a final order determining whether a State action is inconsistent with a reliability standard, taking into consideration any recommendation of the ERO.
`(5) The Commission, after consultation with the ERO and the State taking action, may stay the effectiveness of any State action, pending the Commission`s issuance of a final order.
`(j) Regional Advisory Bodies- The Commission shall establish a regional advisory body on the petition of at least 2/3 of the States within a region that have more than 1/2 of their electric load served within the region. A regional advisory body shall be composed of 1 member from each participating State in the region, appointed by the Governor of each State, and may include representatives of agencies, States, and provinces outside the United States. A regional advisory body may provide advice to the Electric Reliability Organization, a regional entity, or the Commission regarding the governance of an existing or proposed regional entity within the same region, whether a standard proposed to apply within the region is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest, whether fees proposed to be assessed within the region are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest and any other responsibilities requested by the Commission. The Commission may give deference to the advice of any such regional advisory body if that body is organized on an Interconnection-wide basis.
`(k) Alaska and Hawaii- The provisions of this section do not apply to Alaska or Hawaii.`.
(b) Status of ERO- The Electric Reliability Organization certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under section 216(c) of the Federal Power Act and any regional entity delegated enforcement authority pursuant to section 216(e)(4) of that Act are not departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the United States Government.
TITLE II--PROTECTING RETAIL CONSUMERS
SEC. 201. NATIVE LOAD SERVICE OBLIGATION.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 105(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 217. NATIVE LOAD SERVICE OBLIGATION.
`(a) Meeting Service Obligations- (1) Any load-serving entity that, as of the date of enactment of this section--
`(A) owns generation facilities, markets the output of Federal generation facilities, or holds rights under 1 or more wholesale contracts to purchase electric energy, for the purpose of meeting a service obligation, and
`(B) by reason of ownership of transmission facilities, or 1 or more contracts or service agreements for firm transmission service, holds firm transmission rights for delivery of the output of such generation facilities or such purchased energy to meet such service obligation, is entitled to use such firm transmission rights, or, equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights, in order to deliver such output or purchased energy, or the output of other generating facilities or purchased energy to the extent deliverable using such rights, to the extent required to meet its service obligation.
`(2) To the extent that all or a portion of the service obligation covered by such firm transmission rights or equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights is transferred to another load-serving entity, the successor load-serving entity shall be entitled to use the firm transmission rights or equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights associated with the transferred service obligation. Subsequent transfers to another load-serving entity, or back to the original load-serving entity, shall be entitled to the same rights.
`(3) The Commission shall exercise its authority under this Act in a manner that facilitates the planning and expansion of transmission facilities to meet the reasonable needs of load-serving entities to satisfy their service obligations.
`(b) Allocation of Transmission Rights- Nothing in this section shall affect any methodology approved by the Commission prior to September 15, 2003, for the allocation of transmission rights by an RTO or ISO that has been authorized by the Commission to allocate transmission rights.
`(c) Certain Transmission Rights- The Commission may exercise authority under this Act to make transmission rights not used to meet an obligation covered by subsection (a) available to other entities in a manner determined by the Commission to be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
`(d) Obligation to Build- Nothing in this Act shall relieve a load-serving entity from any obligation under State or local law to build transmission or distribution facilities adequate to meet its service obligations.
`(e) Contracts- Nothing in this section shall provide a basis for abrogating any contract or service agreement for firm transmission service or rights in effect as of the date of the enactment of this subsection.
`(f) Water Pumping Facilities- The Commission shall ensure that any entity described in section 201(f) that owns transmission facilities used predominately to support its own water pumping facilities shall have, with respect to such facilities, protections for transmission service comparable to those provided to load-serving entities pursuant to this section.
`(g) ERCOT- This section shall not apply within the area referred to in section 212(k)(2)(A).
`(h) Jurisdiction- This section does not authorize the Commission to take any action not otherwise within its jurisdiction.
`(i) Effect of Exercising Rights- An entity that lawfully exercises rights granted under subsection (a) shall not be considered by such action as engaging in undue discrimination or preference under this Act.
`(j) Definitions- For purposes of this section:
`(1) The term `distribution utility` means an electric utility that has a service obligation to end-users or to a State utility or electric cooperative that, directly or indirectly, through 1 or more additional State utilities or electric cooperatives, provides electric service to end-users.
`(2) The term `load-serving entity` means a distribution utility or an electric utility that has a service obligation.
`(3) The term `service obligation` means a requirement applicable to, or the exercise of authority granted to, an electric utility under Federal, State or local law or under long-term contracts to provide electric service to end-users or to a distribution utility.
`(4) The term `State utility` means a State or any political subdivision of a State, or any agency, authority, or instrumentality of any 1 or more of the foregoing, or a corporation which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any 1 or more of the foregoing, competent to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing or distributing power.`.
SEC. 202. VOLUNTARY TRANSMISSION PRICING PLANS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 201) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 218. VOLUNTARY TRANSMISSION PRICING PLANS.
`(a) In General- Any transmission provider, including an RTO or ISO, may submit to the Commission a plan or plans under section 205 containing the criteria for determining the person or persons that will be required to pay for any construction of new transmission facilities or expansion, modification or upgrade of transmission facilities (in this section referred to as `transmission service related expansion`) or new generator interconnection.
`(b) Voluntary Transmission Pricing Plans- (1) Any plan or plans submitted under subsection (a) shall specify the method or methods by which costs may be allocated or assigned. Such methods may include, but are not limited to:
`(A) directly assigned;
`(B) participant funded; or
`(C) rolled into regional or sub-regional rates.-
`(2) FERC shall approve a plan or plans submitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) if such plan or plans--
`(A) result in rates that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential consistent with section 205; and
`(B) ensure that the costs of any transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection not required to meet applicable reliability standards established under section 216 are assigned in a fair manner, meaning that those who benefit from the transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection pay an appropriate share of the associated costs, provided that--
`(i) costs may not be assigned or allocated to an electric utility if the native load customers of that utility would not have required such transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection absent the request for transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection that necessitated the investment;
`(ii) the party requesting such transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection shall not be required to pay for both--
`(I) the assigned cost of the upgrade; and
`(II) the difference between--
`(aa) the embedded cost paid for transmission services (including the cost of the requested upgrade); and
`(bb) the embedded cost that would have been paid absent the upgrade; and
`(iii) the party or parties who pay for facilities necessary for the transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection receives full compensation for its costs for the participant funded facilities in the form of--
`(I) monetary credit equal to the cost of the participant funded facilities (accounting for the time value of money at the Gross Domestic Product deflator), which credit shall be pro-rated in equal installments over a period of not more than 30 years and shall not exceed in total the amount of the initial investment, against the transmission charges that the funding entity or its assignee is otherwise assessed by the transmission provider;
`(II) appropriate financial or physical rights; or
`(III) any other method of cost recovery or compensation approved by the Commission.
`(3) A plan submitted under this section shall apply only to--
`(A) a contract or interconnection agreement executed or filed with the Commission after the date of enactment of this section; or
`(B) an interconnection agreement pending rehearing as of November 1, 2003.
`(4) Nothing in this section diminishes or alters the rights of individual members of an RTO or ISO under this Act.
`(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the allocation of costs or the cost methodology employed by an RTO or ISO authorized by the Commission to allocate costs (including costs for transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection) prior to the date of enactment of this section.
`(6) This section shall not apply within the area referred to in section 212(k)(2)(A).
`(7) The term `transmission provider` means a public utility that owns or operates facilities that provide interconnection or transmission service in interstate commerce.`.
TITLE III--VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
SEC. 301. PROMOTION OF VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS, INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION PROVIDERS, AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 202) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`SEC. 219. PROMOTION OF VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS, INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION PROVIDERS, AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS.
`(a) In General- The Commission may approve and may encourage the formation of regional transmission organizations, independent transmission providers, and similar organizations (referred to in this section as `transmission organizations`) for the purpose of enhancing the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. Among options for the formation of a transmission organization, the Commission shall prefer those in which--
`(1) participation in the organization by transmitting utilities is voluntary;
`(2) the form, structure, and operating entity of the organization are approved of by participating transmitting utilities; and
`(3) market incentives exist to promote investment for expansion of transmission facilities and for the introduction of new transmission technologies within the territory of the organization.
`(b) Conditions- No order issued under this Act shall be conditioned upon or require a transmitting utility to transfer operational control of jurisdictional facilities to an independent system operator or other transmission organization.
`(c) Complaint- In addition to any other rights or remedies it may have under this Act, any entity serving electric load that is denied services by a transmission organization that the transmission organization makes available to other load serving entities shall be entitled to file a complaint with the Commission concerning the denial of such services. If the Commission shall find, after an evidentiary hearing on the record, that the denial of services complained of was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, or contrary to the public interest, the Commission may order the provision of such services at rates and on terms and conditions that shall be in accordance with this Act.`.
END
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109th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 498
To provide for expansion of electricity transmission networks in order to support competitive electricity markets, to ensure reliability of electric service, to modernize regulation and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 2, 2005
Mr. BURR (for himself, Ms. LANDRIEU, and Mr. LOTT) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
A BILL
To provide for expansion of electricity transmission networks in order to support competitive electricity markets, to ensure reliability of electric service, to modernize regulation and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Interstate Transmission Act of 2005`.
(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents of this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--RELIABLE AND ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE
Sec. 101. Transmission infrastructure investment.
Sec. 102. Open nondiscriminatory access.
Sec. 103. Electric transmission property treated as 15-year property.
Sec. 104. Disposition of property.
Sec. 105. Electric reliability standards.
TITLE II--PROTECTING RETAIL CONSUMERS
Sec. 201. Native load service obligation.
Sec. 202. Voluntary transmission pricing plans.
TITLE III--VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 301. Promotion of voluntary development of regional transmission organizations, independent transmission providers, and similar organizations.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
(1) transmission networks are the backbone of reliable delivery of electric energy and competitive wholesale power markets;
(2) the expansion, enhancement, and improvement of transmission facilities, and rules of the road for using the facilities, are necessary to maintain and improve the reliability of electric service and to enhance competitive wholesale markets across the United States and competitive retail markets that have been adopted by nearly the States;
(3) to ensure reliable and efficient expansion, enhancement, and improvement of transmission facilities, the economics of the business of electric transmission and the Federal regulatory structures applicable to the facilities must be improved;
(4) Federal electricity regulatory policy should benefit consumers by providing incentives for infrastructure improvement and by removing barriers to efficient competition, and not be dictated by the imposition of market structures or costly mandates;
(5) slow, burdensome, or duplicative reviews of utility mergers are a disincentive to the efficient disposition of utility assets needed to ensure a reliable and efficient infrastructure;
(6) since efficient competition requires accurate price signals that reflect cost causation, parties that benefit from transmission upgrades should be required to pay for the upgrades;
(7) Federal regulation should not override the interests of local consumers or State laws that ensure reliable service and adequate transmission capacity to serve consumers;
(8) in regions where the formation of regional transmission organizations or similar entities have been formed voluntarily with oversight or approval by States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should have clear authority to approve applications for the organizations that are consistent with the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.);
(9) the States and electricity consumers in each region of the United States, and not the Federal Government, are in the best position to determine how the electric power systems serving their regions should be structured, including whether Regional Transmission Organization formation, traditional vertical integration, or other structures are cost effective for their region; and
(10) mandatory reliability rules, developed and enforced by a self-regulating electric reliability organization, are a vital component of a comprehensive policy to ensure a robust and reliable electricity grid.
TITLE I--RELIABLE AND ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC. 101. TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 215. TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT.
`(a) Rulemaking Requirement- Within 1 year after the enactment of this section, the Commission shall establish, by rule, incentive-based (including, but not limited to performance-based) rate treatments for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce by any public utility for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion. Such rule shall--
`(1) promote reliable and economically efficient transmission and generation of electricity by promoting capital investment in the enlargement, improvement, maintenance and operation of facilities for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce;
`(2) provide a return on equity, determined using a variety of reasonable valuation methodologies, that attracts new investment in transmission facilities (including related transmission technologies);
`(3) encourage deployment of transmission technologies and other measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing transmission facilities and improve the operation of such facilities;
`(4) allow recovery of all prudently incurred costs necessary to comply with mandatory reliability standards issued pursuant to section 216 of this Act;
`(5) allow a current return in rates for construction work in progress for transmission facilities and full recovery of prudently incurred costs for constructing transmission facilities;
`(6) allow the use of formula transmission rates;
`(7) allow rates of return that do not vary with capital structure; and
`(8) allow a maximum 15-year accelerated depreciation on new transmission facilities for rate treatment purposes.
`(b) Additional Incentives for RTO Participation- In the rule issued under this section, the Commission shall, to the extent within its jurisdiction, provide for incentives to each transmitting utility or electric utility that joins a Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator. Incentives provided by the Commission pursuant to such rule shall include--
`(1) recovery of all prudently incurred costs to develop and participate in any proposed or approved RTO, ISO, or independent transmission company;
`(2) recovery of all costs previously approved by a State commission which exercised jurisdiction over the transmission facilities prior to the utility`s participation in the RTO or ISO, including costs necessary to honor preexisting transmission service contracts, in a manner which does not reduce the revenues the utility receives for transmission services for a reasonable transition period after the utility joins the RTO or ISO; and
`(3) recovery as an expense in rates of the costs prudently incurred to conduct transmission planning and reliability activities, including the costs of participating in RTO, ISO and other regional planning activities and design, study and other precertification costs involved in seeking permits and approvals for proposed transmission facilities.
The Commission shall ensure that any costs recoverable pursuant to this subsection may be recovered by such utility through the transmission rates charged by such utility or through the transmission rates charged by the RTO or ISO that provides transmission service to such utility.
`(c) Just and Reasonable Rates- All rates approved under the rules adopted pursuant to this section, including any revisions to such rules, are subject to the requirement of sections 205 and 206 that all rates, charges, terms, and conditions be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.`.
SEC. 102. OPEN NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 211 the following new section:
`SEC. 211A. OPEN ACCESS BY UNREGULATED TRANSMITTING UTILITIES.
`(a) Transmission Services- Subject to section 212(h), the Commission may, by rule or order, require an unregulated transmitting utility to provide transmission services--
`(1) at rates that are comparable to those that the unregulated transmitting utility charges itself; and
`(2) on terms and conditions (not relating to rates) that are comparable to those under which such unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission services to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
`(b) Exemption- The Commission shall exempt from any rule or order under this section any unregulated transmitting utility that--
`(1) sells no more than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year; or
`(2) does not own or operate any transmission facilities that are necessary for operating an interconnected transmission system (or any portion thereof); or
`(3) meets other criteria the Commission determines to be in the public interest.
`(c) Local Distribution Facilities- The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply to facilities used in local distribution.
`(d) Exemption Termination- Whenever the Commission, after an evidentiary hearing held upon a complaint and after giving consideration to reliability standards established under section 216, finds on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence that any exemption granted pursuant to subsection (b) unreasonably impairs the continued reliability of an interconnected transmission system, it shall revoke the exemption granted to that transmitting utility.
`(e) Application to Unregulated Transmitting Utilities- The rate changing procedures applicable to public utilities under subsections (c) and (d) of section 205 are applicable to unregulated transmitting utilities for purposes of this section.
`(f) Remand- In exercising its authority under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the Commission may remand transmission rates to an unregulated transmitting utility for review and revision where necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (a).
`(g) Other Requests- The provision of transmission services under subsection (a) does not preclude a request for transmission services under section 211.
`(h) Limitation- The Commission may not require a State or municipality to take action under this section that would violate a private activity bond rule for purposes of section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 141).
`(i) Transfer of Control of Transmitting Facilities- Nothing in this section authorizes the Commission to require an unregulated transmitting utility to transfer control or operational control of its transmitting facilities to an RTO or any other Commission-approved independent transmission organization designated to provide nondiscriminatory transmission access.
`(j) Definition- For purposes of this section, the term `unregulated transmitting utility` means an entity that--
`(1) owns or operates facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce; and
`(2) is an entity described in section 201(f).`.
SEC. 103. ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PROPERTY TREATED AS 15-YEAR PROPERTY.
(a) In General- Subparagraph (E) of section 168(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to classification of certain property) is amended by striking `and` at the end of clause (v), by striking the period at the end of clause (vi) and by inserting `, and`, and by adding at the end the following new clause:
`(vii) any section 1245 property (as defined in section 1245(a)(3)) used in the transmission at 69 or more kilovolts of electricity for sale the original use of which commences with the taxpayer after the date of the enactment of this clause.`.
(b) Alternative System- The table contained in section 168(g)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rule for certain property assigned to classes) is amended by inserting after the item relating to subparagraph (E)(vi) the following:
`(E)(vii)
--30`.
(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of this Act, in taxable years ending after such date.
SEC. 104. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY.
Section 203 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b) is repealed.
SEC. 105. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY STANDARDS.
(a) In General- Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 101) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 216. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY.
`(a) Definitions- For purposes of this section:
`(1) The term `bulk-power system` means--
`(A) facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and
`(B) electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability.
The term does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.
`(2) The terms `Electric Reliability Organization` and `ERO` mean the organization certified by the Commission under subsection (c) the purpose of which is to establish and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system, subject to Commission review.
`(3) The term `reliability standard` means a requirement, approved by the Commission under this section, to provide for reliable operation of the bulk-power system. The term includes requirements for the operation of existing bulk-power system facilities and the design of planned additions or modifications to such facilities to the extent necessary to provide for reliable operation of the bulk-power system, but the term does not include any requirement to enlarge such facilities or to construct new transmission capacity or generation capacity.
`(4) The term `reliable operation` means operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance or unanticipated failure of system elements.
`(5) The term `Interconnection` means a geographic area in which the operation of bulk-power system components is synchronized such that the failure of 1 or more of such components may adversely affect the ability of the operators of other components within the system to maintain reliable operation of the facilities within their control.
`(6) The term `transmission organization` means a Regional Transmission Organization, Independent System Operator, independent transmission provider, or other transmission organization finally approved by the Commission for the operation of transmission facilities.
`(7) The term `regional entity` means an entity having enforcement authority pursuant to subsection (e)(4).
`(b) Jurisdiction and Applicability- (1) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, within the United States, over the ERO certified by the Commission under subsection (c), any regional entities, and all users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system, including but not limited to the entities described in section 201(f), for purposes of approving reliability standards established under this section and enforcing compliance with this section. All users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system shall comply with reliability standards that take effect under this section.
`(2) The Commission shall issue a final rule to implement the requirements of this section not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section.
`(c) Certification- Following the issuance of a Commission rule under subsection (b)(2), any person may submit an application to the Commission for certification as the Electric Reliability Organization. The Commission may certify 1 such ERO if the Commission determines that such ERO--
`(1) has the ability to develop and enforce, subject to subsection (e)(2), reliability standards that provide for an adequate level of reliability of the bulk-power system; and
`(2) has established rules that--
`(A) assure its independence of the users and owners and operators of the bulk-power system, while assuring fair stakeholder representation in the selection of its directors and balanced decisionmaking in any ERO committee or subordinate organizational structure;
`(B) allocate equitably reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among end users for all activities under this section;
`(C) provide fair and impartial procedures for enforcement of reliability standards through the imposition of penalties in accordance with subsection (e) (including limitations on activities, functions, or operations, or other appropriate sanctions);
`(D) provide for reasonable notice and opportunity for public comment, due process, openness, and balance of interests in developing reliability standards and otherwise exercising its duties; and
`(E) provide for taking, after certification, appropriate steps to gain recognition in Canada and Mexico.
`(d) Reliability Standards- (1) The Electric Reliability Organization shall file each reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard that it proposes to be made effective under this section with the Commission.
`(2) The Commission may approve, by rule or order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it determines that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The Commission shall give due weight to the technical expertise of the Electric Reliability Organization with respect to the content of a proposed standard or modification to a reliability standard and to the technical expertise of a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis with respect to a reliability standard to be applicable within that Interconnection, but shall not defer with respect to the effect of a standard on competition. A proposed standard or modification shall take effect upon approval by the Commission.
`(3) The Electric Reliability Organization shall rebuttably presume that a proposal from a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis for a reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard to be applicable on an Interconnection-wide basis is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
`(4) The Commission shall remand to the Electric Reliability Organization for further consideration a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that the Commission disapproves in whole or in part.
`(5) The Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint, may order the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that addresses a specific matter if the Commission considers such a new or modified reliability standard appropriate to carry out this section.
`(6) The final rule adopted under subsection (b)(2) shall include fair processes for the identification and timely resolution of any conflict between a reliability standard and any function, rule, order, tariff, rate schedule, or agreement accepted, approved, or ordered by the Commission applicable to a transmission organization. Such transmission organization shall continue to comply with such function, rule, order, tariff, rate schedule or agreement accepted approved, or ordered by the Commission until--
`(A) the Commission finds a conflict exists between a reliability standard and any such provision;
`(B) the Commission orders a change to such provision pursuant to section 206 of this part; and
`(C) the ordered change becomes effective under this part.
If the Commission determines that a reliability standard needs to be changed as a result of such a conflict, it shall order the ERO to develop and file with the Commission a modified reliability standard under paragraph (4) or (5) of this subsection.
`(e) Enforcement- (1) The ERO may impose, subject to paragraph (2), a penalty on a user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system for a violation of a reliability standard approved by the Commission under subsection (d) if the ERO, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing--
`(A) finds that the user or owner or operator has violated a reliability standard approved by the Commission under subsection (d); and
`(B) files notice and the record of the proceeding with the Commission.
`(2) A penalty imposed under paragraph (1) may take effect not earlier than the 31st day after the ERO files with the Commission notice of the penalty and the record of proceedings. Such penalty shall be subject to review by the Commission, on its own motion or upon application by the user, owner or operator that is the subject of the penalty filed within 30 days after the date such notice is filed with the Commission. Application to the Commission for review, or the initiation of review by the Commission on its own motion, shall not operate as a stay of such penalty unless the Commission otherwise orders upon its own motion or upon application by the user, owner or operator that is the subject of such penalty. In any proceeding to review a penalty imposed under paragraph (1), the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing (which hearing may consist solely of the record before the ERO and opportunity for the presentation of supporting reasons to affirm, modify, or set aside the penalty), shall by order affirm, set aside, reinstate, or modify the penalty, and, if appropriate, remand to the ERO for further proceedings. The Commission shall implement expedited procedures for such hearings.
`(3) On its own motion or upon complaint, the Commission may order compliance with a reliability standard and may impose a penalty against a user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system if the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the user or owner or operator of the bulk-power system has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices that constitute or will constitute a violation of a reliability standard.
`(4) The Commission shall issue regulations authorizing the ERO to enter into an agreement to delegate authority to a regional entity for the purpose of proposing reliability standards to the ERO and enforcing reliability standards under paragraph (1) if--
`(A) the regional entity is governed by--
`(i) an independent board;
`(ii) a balanced stakeholder board; or
`(iii) a combination independent and balanced stakeholder board.
`(B) the regional entity otherwise satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(1) and (2); and
`(C) the agreement promotes effective and efficient administration of bulk-power system reliability.
The Commission may modify such delegation. The ERO and the Commission shall rebuttably presume that a proposal for delegation to a regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis promotes effective and efficient administration of bulk-power system reliability and should be approved. Such regulation may provide that the Commission may assign the ERO`s authority to enforce reliability standards under paragraph (1) directly to a regional entity consistent with the requirements of this paragraph.
`(5) The Commission may take such action as is necessary or appropriate against the ERO or a regional entity to ensure compliance with a reliability standard or any Commission order affecting the ERO or a regional entity.
`(6) Any penalty imposed under this section shall bear a reasonable relation to the seriousness of the violation and shall take into consideration the efforts of such user, owner, or operator to remedy the violation in a timely manner.
`(f) Changes in Electric Reliability Organization Rules- The Electric Reliability Organization shall file with the Commission for approval any proposed rule or proposed rule change, accompanied by an explanation of its basis and purpose. The Commission, upon its own motion or complaint, may propose a change to the rules of the ERO. A proposed rule or proposed rule change shall take effect upon a finding by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for comment, that the change is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, is in the public interest, and satisfies the requirements of subsection (c).
`(g) Reliability Reports- The ERO shall conduct periodic assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the bulk-power system in North America.
`(h) Coordination With Canada and Mexico- The President is urged to negotiate international agreements with the governments of Canada and Mexico to provide for effective compliance with reliability standards and the effectiveness of the ERO in the United States and Canada or Mexico.
`(i) Savings Provisions- (1) The ERO shall have authority to develop and enforce compliance with reliability standards for only the bulk-power system.
`(2) This section does not authorize the ERO or the Commission to order the construction of additional generation or transmission capacity or to set and enforce compliance with standards for adequacy or safety of electric facilities or services.
`(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any authority of any State to take action to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with any reliability standard.
`(4) Within 90 days of the application of the Electric Reliability Organization or other affected party, and after notice and opportunity for comment, the Commission shall issue a final order determining whether a State action is inconsistent with a reliability standard, taking into consideration any recommendation of the ERO.
`(5) The Commission, after consultation with the ERO and the State taking action, may stay the effectiveness of any State action, pending the Commission`s issuance of a final order.
`(j) Regional Advisory Bodies- The Commission shall establish a regional advisory body on the petition of at least 2/3 of the States within a region that have more than 1/2 of their electric load served within the region. A regional advisory body shall be composed of 1 member from each participating State in the region, appointed by the Governor of each State, and may include representatives of agencies, States, and provinces outside the United States. A regional advisory body may provide advice to the Electric Reliability Organization, a regional entity, or the Commission regarding the governance of an existing or proposed regional entity within the same region, whether a standard proposed to apply within the region is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest, whether fees proposed to be assessed within the region are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest and any other responsibilities requested by the Commission. The Commission may give deference to the advice of any such regional advisory body if that body is organized on an Interconnection-wide basis.
`(k) Alaska and Hawaii- The provisions of this section do not apply to Alaska or Hawaii.`.
(b) Status of ERO- The Electric Reliability Organization certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under section 216(c) of the Federal Power Act and any regional entity delegated enforcement authority pursuant to section 216(e)(4) of that Act are not departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the United States Government.
TITLE II--PROTECTING RETAIL CONSUMERS
SEC. 201. NATIVE LOAD SERVICE OBLIGATION.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 105(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 217. NATIVE LOAD SERVICE OBLIGATION.
`(a) Meeting Service Obligations- (1) Any load-serving entity that, as of the date of enactment of this section--
`(A) owns generation facilities, markets the output of Federal generation facilities, or holds rights under 1 or more wholesale contracts to purchase electric energy, for the purpose of meeting a service obligation, and
`(B) by reason of ownership of transmission facilities, or 1 or more contracts or service agreements for firm transmission service, holds firm transmission rights for delivery of the output of such generation facilities or such purchased energy to meet such service obligation, is entitled to use such firm transmission rights, or, equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights, in order to deliver such output or purchased energy, or the output of other generating facilities or purchased energy to the extent deliverable using such rights, to the extent required to meet its service obligation.
`(2) To the extent that all or a portion of the service obligation covered by such firm transmission rights or equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights is transferred to another load-serving entity, the successor load-serving entity shall be entitled to use the firm transmission rights or equivalent tradable or financial transmission rights associated with the transferred service obligation. Subsequent transfers to another load-serving entity, or back to the original load-serving entity, shall be entitled to the same rights.
`(3) The Commission shall exercise its authority under this Act in a manner that facilitates the planning and expansion of transmission facilities to meet the reasonable needs of load-serving entities to satisfy their service obligations.
`(b) Allocation of Transmission Rights- Nothing in this section shall affect any methodology approved by the Commission prior to September 15, 2003, for the allocation of transmission rights by an RTO or ISO that has been authorized by the Commission to allocate transmission rights.
`(c) Certain Transmission Rights- The Commission may exercise authority under this Act to make transmission rights not used to meet an obligation covered by subsection (a) available to other entities in a manner determined by the Commission to be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
`(d) Obligation to Build- Nothing in this Act shall relieve a load-serving entity from any obligation under State or local law to build transmission or distribution facilities adequate to meet its service obligations.
`(e) Contracts- Nothing in this section shall provide a basis for abrogating any contract or service agreement for firm transmission service or rights in effect as of the date of the enactment of this subsection.
`(f) Water Pumping Facilities- The Commission shall ensure that any entity described in section 201(f) that owns transmission facilities used predominately to support its own water pumping facilities shall have, with respect to such facilities, protections for transmission service comparable to those provided to load-serving entities pursuant to this section.
`(g) ERCOT- This section shall not apply within the area referred to in section 212(k)(2)(A).
`(h) Jurisdiction- This section does not authorize the Commission to take any action not otherwise within its jurisdiction.
`(i) Effect of Exercising Rights- An entity that lawfully exercises rights granted under subsection (a) shall not be considered by such action as engaging in undue discrimination or preference under this Act.
`(j) Definitions- For purposes of this section:
`(1) The term `distribution utility` means an electric utility that has a service obligation to end-users or to a State utility or electric cooperative that, directly or indirectly, through 1 or more additional State utilities or electric cooperatives, provides electric service to end-users.
`(2) The term `load-serving entity` means a distribution utility or an electric utility that has a service obligation.
`(3) The term `service obligation` means a requirement applicable to, or the exercise of authority granted to, an electric utility under Federal, State or local law or under long-term contracts to provide electric service to end-users or to a distribution utility.
`(4) The term `State utility` means a State or any political subdivision of a State, or any agency, authority, or instrumentality of any 1 or more of the foregoing, or a corporation which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any 1 or more of the foregoing, competent to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing or distributing power.`.
SEC. 202. VOLUNTARY TRANSMISSION PRICING PLANS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 201) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`SEC. 218. VOLUNTARY TRANSMISSION PRICING PLANS.
`(a) In General- Any transmission provider, including an RTO or ISO, may submit to the Commission a plan or plans under section 205 containing the criteria for determining the person or persons that will be required to pay for any construction of new transmission facilities or expansion, modification or upgrade of transmission facilities (in this section referred to as `transmission service related expansion`) or new generator interconnection.
`(b) Voluntary Transmission Pricing Plans- (1) Any plan or plans submitted under subsection (a) shall specify the method or methods by which costs may be allocated or assigned. Such methods may include, but are not limited to:
`(A) directly assigned;
`(B) participant funded; or
`(C) rolled into regional or sub-regional rates.-
`(2) FERC shall approve a plan or plans submitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) if such plan or plans--
`(A) result in rates that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential consistent with section 205; and
`(B) ensure that the costs of any transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection not required to meet applicable reliability standards established under section 216 are assigned in a fair manner, meaning that those who benefit from the transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection pay an appropriate share of the associated costs, provided that--
`(i) costs may not be assigned or allocated to an electric utility if the native load customers of that utility would not have required such transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection absent the request for transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection that necessitated the investment;
`(ii) the party requesting such transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection shall not be required to pay for both--
`(I) the assigned cost of the upgrade; and
`(II) the difference between--
`(aa) the embedded cost paid for transmission services (including the cost of the requested upgrade); and
`(bb) the embedded cost that would have been paid absent the upgrade; and
`(iii) the party or parties who pay for facilities necessary for the transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection receives full compensation for its costs for the participant funded facilities in the form of--
`(I) monetary credit equal to the cost of the participant funded facilities (accounting for the time value of money at the Gross Domestic Product deflator), which credit shall be pro-rated in equal installments over a period of not more than 30 years and shall not exceed in total the amount of the initial investment, against the transmission charges that the funding entity or its assignee is otherwise assessed by the transmission provider;
`(II) appropriate financial or physical rights; or
`(III) any other method of cost recovery or compensation approved by the Commission.
`(3) A plan submitted under this section shall apply only to--
`(A) a contract or interconnection agreement executed or filed with the Commission after the date of enactment of this section; or
`(B) an interconnection agreement pending rehearing as of November 1, 2003.
`(4) Nothing in this section diminishes or alters the rights of individual members of an RTO or ISO under this Act.
`(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the allocation of costs or the cost methodology employed by an RTO or ISO authorized by the Commission to allocate costs (including costs for transmission service related expansion or new generator interconnection) prior to the date of enactment of this section.
`(6) This section shall not apply within the area referred to in section 212(k)(2)(A).
`(7) The term `transmission provider` means a public utility that owns or operates facilities that provide interconnection or transmission service in interstate commerce.`.
TITLE III--VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
SEC. 301. PROMOTION OF VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS, INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION PROVIDERS, AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS.
Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) (as amended by section 202) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`SEC. 219. PROMOTION OF VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS, INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION PROVIDERS, AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS.
`(a) In General- The Commission may approve and may encourage the formation of regional transmission organizations, independent transmission providers, and similar organizations (referred to in this section as `transmission organizations`) for the purpose of enhancing the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. Among options for the formation of a transmission organization, the Commission shall prefer those in which--
`(1) participation in the organization by transmitting utilities is voluntary;
`(2) the form, structure, and operating entity of the organization are approved of by participating transmitting utilities; and
`(3) market incentives exist to promote investment for expansion of transmission facilities and for the introduction of new transmission technologies within the territory of the organization.
`(b) Conditions- No order issued under this Act shall be conditioned upon or require a transmitting utility to transfer operational control of jurisdictional facilities to an independent system operator or other transmission organization.
`(c) Complaint- In addition to any other rights or remedies it may have under this Act, any entity serving electric load that is denied services by a transmission organization that the transmission organization makes available to other load serving entities shall be entitled to file a complaint with the Commission concerning the denial of such services. If the Commission shall find, after an evidentiary hearing on the record, that the denial of services complained of was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, or contrary to the public interest, the Commission may order the provision of such services at rates and on terms and conditions that shall be in accordance with this Act.`.
END
Wer wagt es ... rittersmann oder knapp ...
diesen text in`s deutsche zu übersetzen ?
Analyse:ABB Ltd. (Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.) (N)
Kurzzusammenfassung:
Analyst: JP Morgan
Rating: Overweight Kurs: 7.37 CHF
KGV: Kursziel: n/A
Update: n/A WKN: 919730
ABB: Overweight
19.04.2005 13:18:16
JP Morgan bewertet die Aktie des Schweizer Anlagen- und Maschinenbauers ABB Ltd. am 19. April mit "Overweight".
Die Analysten rechnen bei der Bekanntgabe der Zahlen zum ersten Quartal am 28. April mit Aufträgen in Höhe von 6,1 Mrd. Dollar,
einem Umsatz von 5,0 Mrd. Dollar und einem EBIT von 280 Mio. Dollar, welche 28 Mio. Dollar an Restrukturierungsaufwendungen beinhalten würden.
Der Nettogewinn aus fortgeführten Aktivitäten werde mit 129 Mio. Dollar und der berichtete Nettogewinn mit 109 Mio. Dollar erwartet.
Ein Hauptfokus werde auf dem Bereich Power Technology liegen.
Die Analysten gehen hier von einem flächenbereinigten Auftragswachstum von 10 Prozent auf 2,65 Mrd. Dollar
und einer EBIT-Marge von 8,8 Prozent vor Restrukturierungen aus.
In der Sparte Automation Technology rechnen sie mit einem 5-prozentigen Auftragswachstum auf 3,2 Mrd. Dollar
und einer EBIT-Marge von 9,7 Prozent.
Weitere Analysen zu ABB Ltd. (Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.) (N):
19.04.05 13:18 ABB: Overweight
14.04.05 13:30 ABB: Overweight
22.03.05 11:49 ABB: Overweight
22.03.05 10:01 ABB: Accumulate
21.03.05 16:15 ABB: Neutral
weiter...
Für die aufgeführten Inhalte kann keine Gewährleistung für die Vollständigkeit, Richtigkeit und Genauigkeit übernommen werden (Disclaimer).
finanzen.net
Kurzzusammenfassung:
Analyst: JP Morgan
Rating: Overweight Kurs: 7.37 CHF
KGV: Kursziel: n/A
Update: n/A WKN: 919730
ABB: Overweight
19.04.2005 13:18:16
JP Morgan bewertet die Aktie des Schweizer Anlagen- und Maschinenbauers ABB Ltd. am 19. April mit "Overweight".
Die Analysten rechnen bei der Bekanntgabe der Zahlen zum ersten Quartal am 28. April mit Aufträgen in Höhe von 6,1 Mrd. Dollar,
einem Umsatz von 5,0 Mrd. Dollar und einem EBIT von 280 Mio. Dollar, welche 28 Mio. Dollar an Restrukturierungsaufwendungen beinhalten würden.
Der Nettogewinn aus fortgeführten Aktivitäten werde mit 129 Mio. Dollar und der berichtete Nettogewinn mit 109 Mio. Dollar erwartet.
Ein Hauptfokus werde auf dem Bereich Power Technology liegen.
Die Analysten gehen hier von einem flächenbereinigten Auftragswachstum von 10 Prozent auf 2,65 Mrd. Dollar
und einer EBIT-Marge von 8,8 Prozent vor Restrukturierungen aus.
In der Sparte Automation Technology rechnen sie mit einem 5-prozentigen Auftragswachstum auf 3,2 Mrd. Dollar
und einer EBIT-Marge von 9,7 Prozent.
Weitere Analysen zu ABB Ltd. (Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.) (N):
19.04.05 13:18 ABB: Overweight
14.04.05 13:30 ABB: Overweight
22.03.05 11:49 ABB: Overweight
22.03.05 10:01 ABB: Accumulate
21.03.05 16:15 ABB: Neutral
weiter...
Für die aufgeführten Inhalte kann keine Gewährleistung für die Vollständigkeit, Richtigkeit und Genauigkeit übernommen werden (Disclaimer).
finanzen.net
Wenn man/frau ein paar Aktien bei einer Gesellschaft hat,ist es - meiner Ansicht nach - wichtig zu wissen,
wer die Geschicke dieser Gesellschaft in Händen hält; denn davon hängt wohl und wehe massgeblich ab.
Deshalb erlaube ich mir einen - zwar älteren - Bericht über den Verwaltungspräsidenten von ABB Jürgen Dormann hier reinzustellen.
Dem HANDELSBLATT. entnommen
KARRIERE KÖPFE
Der 62-Jährige wird neuer Chef von ABB
Jürgen Dormann: Der Tempomacher
Von BERT FRÖNDHOFF, MARKUS HENNES, Handelsblatt
Manager des Jahres war er bereits 1995, Hoechst und Rhône Poulenc hat er mit Erfolg zu Aventis fusioniert.
Jetzt übernimmt Dormann den Chefposten bei ABB.
Wem will er was beweisen?
Eigentlich hat er alles erreicht.
Bereits 1995 war er Deutschlands Manager des Jahres.
Er hat den Frankfurter Chemiekonzern Hoechst radikal umgebaut, ihn mit der französischen Rhône-Poulenc fusioniert
und daraus Aventis, das sechstgrößte Pharmaunternehmen der Welt, geformt.
Vor drei Monaten ist er von der Aventis-Spitze zurückgetreten.
Und mit 62 ist er in einem Alter, in dem er allmählich kürzer treten und sich mehr um seine Enkelkinder kümmern könnte.
Doch Jürgen Dormann will es noch einmal wissen:
Er hat den Chefposten beim schwer angeschlagenen schwedisch-schweizerischen Anlagenbaukonzern ABB übernommen.
Womöglich ein Himmelfahrtskommando, gewiss aber ein klarer Abstieg, verglichen mit dem Posten,
den er noch vor zwei Monaten hätte haben können.
Anfang Juli war Dormann noch als Vorstandsvorsitzender der Deutschen Telekom im Gespräch.
Es könnte das Pflichtbewusstsein sein, das ihn antreibt.
Im November 2001 trat Dormann die Nachfolge von Percy Barnevik als Präsident des Verwaltungsrates bei ABB an.
Bei der Auswahl des bisherigen Konzernchefs Jörgen Centerman spielte er eine mitentscheidende Rolle.
Zugleich könnte es aber die Ungeduld sein, die Dormann dann zeigt,
wenn sich notwendige Änderungen nicht schnell genug vollziehen.
Dann packt er lieber selber an
– seinen Drang zur Neugestaltung von Konzernen hat er oft genug bewiesen.
Völlig überraschend ist Dormanns Rückkehr ins operative Geschäft zumindest für diejenigen nicht,
die ihn schon lange kennen.
Er selbst lässt sich allerdings nicht in die Karten gucken – zumindest nicht,
wenn es um sein Innenleben geht und um das, was ihn auch als Manager persönlich bewegt.
Das Lamentieren über Gefühle ist dem gebürtigen Heidelberger mit dem kühlen, hanseatischen Einschlag eher zuwider.
Schließlich hält ein Zuviel an Emotionen Unternehmen und seine Mitarbeiter nur von unangenehmen,
aber nicht aufschiebbaren Entscheidungen ab, wie er glaubt.
Vor solchen Entscheidungen hat sich der analytisch denkende Dormann nie gescheut.
Das Paradebeispiel dafür ist die Zerschlagung des Chemie- und Pharmakonzerns Hoechst,
den er gegen alle Widerstände zerlegte und zu einem neuen Firmengebilde zusammensetzte.
Wenn Dormann heute über diese Entscheidung spricht, dann bereut er nichts – im Gegenteil:
Er fragt sich, ob er während der Fusion zum neuen Aventis-Konzern manchen Schritt nicht schnell genug gemacht habe.
Ein zu zögerliches Vorgehen nervt ihn.
Aber natürlich drückt Dormann so etwas in seiner sehr intellektuellen Denkweise ganz anders aus:
„Wenn die Kraft zur rechtzeitigen Gestaltung nicht da ist, kann ein Unternehmen in Phasen hineingeraten, in denen dann schier Unzumutbares durchgezogen werden muss“,
sagte er im vergangenen Jahr mit Blick auf die Zerschlagung von Hoechst.
Er könnte diesen Satz zur Charakterisierung der momentanen Situation von ABB genau so wiederholen.
Gesellschaftlicher Glanz und Prominenz, die das Amt eines Konzernchefs selbst in der Schweiz mit sich bringen,
dürften für Dormann kaum Motive gewesen sein, den Chefsessel bei ABB zu besteigen.
Der hagere, asketisch wirkende Manager meidet öffentliche Auftritte.
Für einen Mann in seiner Funktion ist er ungewöhnlich scheu.
Dormann ist kein begnadeter Redner, sondern, wie er selbst sagt, eher ein guter Zuhörer.
Wenn er spricht, dann leise, oft nicht griffig und leicht, sondern seine komplexen Gedanken dozierend.
Zuhörer können oft nur schwer folgen.
Seinen Führungsstil beschreibt Dormann selbst als konsensorientiert.
Das freilich sehen seine ehemaligen Mitarbeiter anders:
Als Vorstandschef von Hoechst wandelt sich Dormann zum „bestgehassten“ Konzernchef Deutschlands.
Der Vater von vier Kindern überrumpelt Mitte der neunziger Jahre die Belegschaft mit seinem radikalen Vorgehen.
Nachdem er das traditionelle Firmenlogo mit Turm und Brücke eliminiert
und den Stellenabbau in der Pharmaforschung angekündigt hat,
kommt es zur größten Demonstration der Hoechst-Geschichte:
8 000 Beschäftigte protestieren gegen den Kurs ihres Chefs.
Doch eines wusste Dormann immer:
Viele, die ihn vorher angreifen, klopfen ihm nachher auf die Schulter.
Vor allem die Aktionäre, die von der Fusion zu Aventis kräftig profitiert haben.
Dormann agiert sachlich, er denkt langfristig und entscheidet hart und schnell.
Für den neuen Chef von ABB, der viel Vertrauen an der Börse zurückgewinnen muss, sind dies nicht die schlechtesten Eigenschaften.
HANDELSBLATT, Montag, 09. September 2002, 12:01 Uhr
Resümmée:
- Bericht datiert zwar aus dem Jahre 2002 zeigt aber sehr deutlich, WELCHES JUWEL
( und ABB hat in der Führungsetage noch eine Handvoll weiterer Spitzenleute - so liest man! )
BEI ABB DIE FÄDEN IN DER HAND HAT !!!!
wer die Geschicke dieser Gesellschaft in Händen hält; denn davon hängt wohl und wehe massgeblich ab.
Deshalb erlaube ich mir einen - zwar älteren - Bericht über den Verwaltungspräsidenten von ABB Jürgen Dormann hier reinzustellen.
Dem HANDELSBLATT. entnommen
KARRIERE KÖPFE
Der 62-Jährige wird neuer Chef von ABB
Jürgen Dormann: Der Tempomacher
Von BERT FRÖNDHOFF, MARKUS HENNES, Handelsblatt
Manager des Jahres war er bereits 1995, Hoechst und Rhône Poulenc hat er mit Erfolg zu Aventis fusioniert.
Jetzt übernimmt Dormann den Chefposten bei ABB.
Wem will er was beweisen?
Eigentlich hat er alles erreicht.
Bereits 1995 war er Deutschlands Manager des Jahres.
Er hat den Frankfurter Chemiekonzern Hoechst radikal umgebaut, ihn mit der französischen Rhône-Poulenc fusioniert
und daraus Aventis, das sechstgrößte Pharmaunternehmen der Welt, geformt.
Vor drei Monaten ist er von der Aventis-Spitze zurückgetreten.
Und mit 62 ist er in einem Alter, in dem er allmählich kürzer treten und sich mehr um seine Enkelkinder kümmern könnte.
Doch Jürgen Dormann will es noch einmal wissen:
Er hat den Chefposten beim schwer angeschlagenen schwedisch-schweizerischen Anlagenbaukonzern ABB übernommen.
Womöglich ein Himmelfahrtskommando, gewiss aber ein klarer Abstieg, verglichen mit dem Posten,
den er noch vor zwei Monaten hätte haben können.
Anfang Juli war Dormann noch als Vorstandsvorsitzender der Deutschen Telekom im Gespräch.
Es könnte das Pflichtbewusstsein sein, das ihn antreibt.
Im November 2001 trat Dormann die Nachfolge von Percy Barnevik als Präsident des Verwaltungsrates bei ABB an.
Bei der Auswahl des bisherigen Konzernchefs Jörgen Centerman spielte er eine mitentscheidende Rolle.
Zugleich könnte es aber die Ungeduld sein, die Dormann dann zeigt,
wenn sich notwendige Änderungen nicht schnell genug vollziehen.
Dann packt er lieber selber an
– seinen Drang zur Neugestaltung von Konzernen hat er oft genug bewiesen.
Völlig überraschend ist Dormanns Rückkehr ins operative Geschäft zumindest für diejenigen nicht,
die ihn schon lange kennen.
Er selbst lässt sich allerdings nicht in die Karten gucken – zumindest nicht,
wenn es um sein Innenleben geht und um das, was ihn auch als Manager persönlich bewegt.
Das Lamentieren über Gefühle ist dem gebürtigen Heidelberger mit dem kühlen, hanseatischen Einschlag eher zuwider.
Schließlich hält ein Zuviel an Emotionen Unternehmen und seine Mitarbeiter nur von unangenehmen,
aber nicht aufschiebbaren Entscheidungen ab, wie er glaubt.
Vor solchen Entscheidungen hat sich der analytisch denkende Dormann nie gescheut.
Das Paradebeispiel dafür ist die Zerschlagung des Chemie- und Pharmakonzerns Hoechst,
den er gegen alle Widerstände zerlegte und zu einem neuen Firmengebilde zusammensetzte.
Wenn Dormann heute über diese Entscheidung spricht, dann bereut er nichts – im Gegenteil:
Er fragt sich, ob er während der Fusion zum neuen Aventis-Konzern manchen Schritt nicht schnell genug gemacht habe.
Ein zu zögerliches Vorgehen nervt ihn.
Aber natürlich drückt Dormann so etwas in seiner sehr intellektuellen Denkweise ganz anders aus:
„Wenn die Kraft zur rechtzeitigen Gestaltung nicht da ist, kann ein Unternehmen in Phasen hineingeraten, in denen dann schier Unzumutbares durchgezogen werden muss“,
sagte er im vergangenen Jahr mit Blick auf die Zerschlagung von Hoechst.
Er könnte diesen Satz zur Charakterisierung der momentanen Situation von ABB genau so wiederholen.
Gesellschaftlicher Glanz und Prominenz, die das Amt eines Konzernchefs selbst in der Schweiz mit sich bringen,
dürften für Dormann kaum Motive gewesen sein, den Chefsessel bei ABB zu besteigen.
Der hagere, asketisch wirkende Manager meidet öffentliche Auftritte.
Für einen Mann in seiner Funktion ist er ungewöhnlich scheu.
Dormann ist kein begnadeter Redner, sondern, wie er selbst sagt, eher ein guter Zuhörer.
Wenn er spricht, dann leise, oft nicht griffig und leicht, sondern seine komplexen Gedanken dozierend.
Zuhörer können oft nur schwer folgen.
Seinen Führungsstil beschreibt Dormann selbst als konsensorientiert.
Das freilich sehen seine ehemaligen Mitarbeiter anders:
Als Vorstandschef von Hoechst wandelt sich Dormann zum „bestgehassten“ Konzernchef Deutschlands.
Der Vater von vier Kindern überrumpelt Mitte der neunziger Jahre die Belegschaft mit seinem radikalen Vorgehen.
Nachdem er das traditionelle Firmenlogo mit Turm und Brücke eliminiert
und den Stellenabbau in der Pharmaforschung angekündigt hat,
kommt es zur größten Demonstration der Hoechst-Geschichte:
8 000 Beschäftigte protestieren gegen den Kurs ihres Chefs.
Doch eines wusste Dormann immer:
Viele, die ihn vorher angreifen, klopfen ihm nachher auf die Schulter.
Vor allem die Aktionäre, die von der Fusion zu Aventis kräftig profitiert haben.
Dormann agiert sachlich, er denkt langfristig und entscheidet hart und schnell.
Für den neuen Chef von ABB, der viel Vertrauen an der Börse zurückgewinnen muss, sind dies nicht die schlechtesten Eigenschaften.
HANDELSBLATT, Montag, 09. September 2002, 12:01 Uhr
Resümmée:
- Bericht datiert zwar aus dem Jahre 2002 zeigt aber sehr deutlich, WELCHES JUWEL
( und ABB hat in der Führungsetage noch eine Handvoll weiterer Spitzenleute - so liest man! )
BEI ABB DIE FÄDEN IN DER HAND HAT !!!!
Jepp, ich bin auch der Meinung: STRONG BUY! Wer ABB jetzt nicht hat, ist selber schuld und lässt sich tolle Gewinne entgehen.
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Lehman Brothers: ABB Kaufen!!!!!!
