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Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 48.380.978 von semiferrum am 21.11.14 14:41:51Russia
A wounded economy
It is closer to crisis than the West or Vladimir Putin realise
Nov 22nd 2014 | From the print edition
VLADIMIR PUTIN is not short of problems, many of his own creation. There is the carnage in eastern Ukraine, where he is continuing to stir things up. There are his fraught relations with the West, with even Germany turning against him now. There is an Islamist insurgency on his borders and at home there is grumbling among the growing numbers who doubt the wisdom of his Ukraine policy. But one problem could yet eclipse all these: Russia’s wounded economy could fall into a crisis (see article).
Some of Russia’s ailments are well known. Its oil-fired economy surged upward on rising energy prices; now that oil has tumbled, from an average of almost $110 a barrel in the first half of the year to below $80, Russia is hurting. More than two-thirds of exports come from energy. The rouble has fallen by 23% in three months. Western sanctions have also caused pain, as bankers have applied the restrictions not just to Mr Putin’s cronies, but to a much longer tally of Russian businesses. More generally, years of kleptocracy have had a corrosive effect on the place. Much of the country’s wealth has been divided among Mr Putin’s friends.
Everybody expects continued stagnation, but the conventional wisdom is that Mr Putin is strong enough to withstand this. The falling rouble has made some export industries like farming more competitive. These exports combined with Mr Putin’s import-blocking counter-sanctions mean Russia still has a small trade surplus. It has a stash of foreign-exchange reserves, some $370 billion according to the central bank’s figures. Add in the resilience of the Russian people, who are also inclined to blame deprivation on foreigners, and the view from Moscow is that Mr Putin has time to manoeuvre. People talk loosely about two years or so.
In fact, a crisis could happen a lot sooner. Russia’s defences are weaker than they first appear and they could be tested by any one of a succession of possibilities—another dip in the oil price, a bungled debt rescheduling by Russian firms, further Western sanctions. When economies are on an unsustainable course, international finance often acts as a fast-forward button, pushing countries over the edge more quickly than politicians or investors expect.
Putin a good man down
The immediate worry is the oil price. Mr Putin is confident it will recover. But supply seems set to increase, with OPEC keen to defend its market share. American government agencies predict oil prices could average $83 a barrel in 2015, well below the $90 level Russia needs to avoid recession (and to keep its budget in balance). If global demand weakens—Japan has slipped into recession since the latest round of forecasts—the oil price could fall further. That would immediately prompt investors to reassess Russia’s prospects.
Then there are the debt repayments. Russia’s firms have over $500 billion in external debt outstanding, with $130 billion of it payable before the end of 2015, at a time when few Western banks want to increase their exposure to Russia. Even firms that earn dollar revenues may struggle to pay their debts. Rosneft, an oil giant, recently asked the Kremlin to lend it $44 billion. Mr Putin has so far resisted, but he cannot let a company that is 70% state-owned and employs 160,000 people fail. There is a lengthening queue of troubled Russian firms. Non-performing loans were rising even before interest rates were raised to 9.5% to defend the rouble. Meanwhile Russian banks are reliant on the central bank to replace deposits that their customers are understandably spiriting into dollars.
Directly or indirectly, many of these bills will end up with the Kremlin, which is why its reserves will be vital. They are evaporating: down $100 billion in the past year, following failed attempts to defend the rouble. And the book-keeping is dodgy. Of the reported $370 billion reserve pile, more than $170 billion sits in the country’s two wealth funds. Some of their assets are iffy, including various stakes in Russia’s state-owned banks and debt issued by Ukraine that Mr Putin’s own aggression is fast rendering worthless. One of the funds is earmarked for pensions. In reality, Russia’s government has perhaps $270 billion of hard cash that is accessible and usable without massive cuts elsewhere—less than its external obligations due over the next two years (see article).
All this spells trouble for Russia, but Mr Putin’s marauding foreign policy could accelerate things. This after all is a man who has invaded other countries and lied about it. A deeper foray into Ukraine would lead to stronger sanctions by Western countries. Some of them, such as barring Russia’s banks from the SWIFT international payments system (see article), could halt Russian trade altogether. A partial block on oil exports would fell the economy, as it did Iran’s. And the more trouble he faces, the more likely Mr Putin is to play the nationalist card—and that means more foreign forays, and yet more sanctions.
From Russia to Rio, without much love
Russia’s biggest recent economic crisis, in 1998, led to a government default. This time a string of bank failures, corporate defaults and a deep recession look likelier. Even so the pain from these could spread abroad quickly, both to countries that rely on Russian trade (exports to Russia account for fully 5% of GDP in the Baltics and Belarus) and through financial ripple effects. Banks in both Austria and Sweden are exposed. And if firms in one badly run commodity-driven country start to default on their dollar debts, then investors will worry about others—such as Brazil.
If Russia’s economy looks likely to collapse, there will be inevitable calls in the West for sanctions to be cut back. This week Mr Putin pointed out that 300,000 German jobs depend on trade with his country. But Angela Merkel rightly stood firm. Actions, Mr Putin must finally learn, have consequences. Invade another country, and the world will act against you. And the same goes for the economy, too. Had Mr Putin spent more of his time strengthening Russia’s economy than enriching his friends, he would not find himself so vulnerable now.
A wounded economy
It is closer to crisis than the West or Vladimir Putin realise
Nov 22nd 2014 | From the print edition
VLADIMIR PUTIN is not short of problems, many of his own creation. There is the carnage in eastern Ukraine, where he is continuing to stir things up. There are his fraught relations with the West, with even Germany turning against him now. There is an Islamist insurgency on his borders and at home there is grumbling among the growing numbers who doubt the wisdom of his Ukraine policy. But one problem could yet eclipse all these: Russia’s wounded economy could fall into a crisis (see article).
Some of Russia’s ailments are well known. Its oil-fired economy surged upward on rising energy prices; now that oil has tumbled, from an average of almost $110 a barrel in the first half of the year to below $80, Russia is hurting. More than two-thirds of exports come from energy. The rouble has fallen by 23% in three months. Western sanctions have also caused pain, as bankers have applied the restrictions not just to Mr Putin’s cronies, but to a much longer tally of Russian businesses. More generally, years of kleptocracy have had a corrosive effect on the place. Much of the country’s wealth has been divided among Mr Putin’s friends.
Everybody expects continued stagnation, but the conventional wisdom is that Mr Putin is strong enough to withstand this. The falling rouble has made some export industries like farming more competitive. These exports combined with Mr Putin’s import-blocking counter-sanctions mean Russia still has a small trade surplus. It has a stash of foreign-exchange reserves, some $370 billion according to the central bank’s figures. Add in the resilience of the Russian people, who are also inclined to blame deprivation on foreigners, and the view from Moscow is that Mr Putin has time to manoeuvre. People talk loosely about two years or so.
In fact, a crisis could happen a lot sooner. Russia’s defences are weaker than they first appear and they could be tested by any one of a succession of possibilities—another dip in the oil price, a bungled debt rescheduling by Russian firms, further Western sanctions. When economies are on an unsustainable course, international finance often acts as a fast-forward button, pushing countries over the edge more quickly than politicians or investors expect.
Putin a good man down
The immediate worry is the oil price. Mr Putin is confident it will recover. But supply seems set to increase, with OPEC keen to defend its market share. American government agencies predict oil prices could average $83 a barrel in 2015, well below the $90 level Russia needs to avoid recession (and to keep its budget in balance). If global demand weakens—Japan has slipped into recession since the latest round of forecasts—the oil price could fall further. That would immediately prompt investors to reassess Russia’s prospects.
Then there are the debt repayments. Russia’s firms have over $500 billion in external debt outstanding, with $130 billion of it payable before the end of 2015, at a time when few Western banks want to increase their exposure to Russia. Even firms that earn dollar revenues may struggle to pay their debts. Rosneft, an oil giant, recently asked the Kremlin to lend it $44 billion. Mr Putin has so far resisted, but he cannot let a company that is 70% state-owned and employs 160,000 people fail. There is a lengthening queue of troubled Russian firms. Non-performing loans were rising even before interest rates were raised to 9.5% to defend the rouble. Meanwhile Russian banks are reliant on the central bank to replace deposits that their customers are understandably spiriting into dollars.
Directly or indirectly, many of these bills will end up with the Kremlin, which is why its reserves will be vital. They are evaporating: down $100 billion in the past year, following failed attempts to defend the rouble. And the book-keeping is dodgy. Of the reported $370 billion reserve pile, more than $170 billion sits in the country’s two wealth funds. Some of their assets are iffy, including various stakes in Russia’s state-owned banks and debt issued by Ukraine that Mr Putin’s own aggression is fast rendering worthless. One of the funds is earmarked for pensions. In reality, Russia’s government has perhaps $270 billion of hard cash that is accessible and usable without massive cuts elsewhere—less than its external obligations due over the next two years (see article).
All this spells trouble for Russia, but Mr Putin’s marauding foreign policy could accelerate things. This after all is a man who has invaded other countries and lied about it. A deeper foray into Ukraine would lead to stronger sanctions by Western countries. Some of them, such as barring Russia’s banks from the SWIFT international payments system (see article), could halt Russian trade altogether. A partial block on oil exports would fell the economy, as it did Iran’s. And the more trouble he faces, the more likely Mr Putin is to play the nationalist card—and that means more foreign forays, and yet more sanctions.
From Russia to Rio, without much love
Russia’s biggest recent economic crisis, in 1998, led to a government default. This time a string of bank failures, corporate defaults and a deep recession look likelier. Even so the pain from these could spread abroad quickly, both to countries that rely on Russian trade (exports to Russia account for fully 5% of GDP in the Baltics and Belarus) and through financial ripple effects. Banks in both Austria and Sweden are exposed. And if firms in one badly run commodity-driven country start to default on their dollar debts, then investors will worry about others—such as Brazil.
If Russia’s economy looks likely to collapse, there will be inevitable calls in the West for sanctions to be cut back. This week Mr Putin pointed out that 300,000 German jobs depend on trade with his country. But Angela Merkel rightly stood firm. Actions, Mr Putin must finally learn, have consequences. Invade another country, and the world will act against you. And the same goes for the economy, too. Had Mr Putin spent more of his time strengthening Russia’s economy than enriching his friends, he would not find himself so vulnerable now.
Es wird in diesem Forum immer wieder von Unterstützern des Parasiten Putin
und diesem selber, behauptet, Russland habe hohe Goldreserven, hier die tatsächlichen Zahlen:
Angaben Stand 9/14 in Tonnen:
USA 8134
Deutschland 3384
IWF 2814
Italien 2452
Frankreich 2435
Russland 1150
Quelle:FAZ v.21.11.14 S.23
Jetzt haben die Donetzker Verbrecher auch zugegeben, daß sie von Russland nicht nur Waffen und Truppen und "Freiwliige" sondern auch viel Geld bekommen, da wird dann bald kein Gold mehr in der russischen Staatsbank sein....
und diesem selber, behauptet, Russland habe hohe Goldreserven, hier die tatsächlichen Zahlen:
Angaben Stand 9/14 in Tonnen:
USA 8134
Deutschland 3384
IWF 2814
Italien 2452
Frankreich 2435
Russland 1150
Quelle:FAZ v.21.11.14 S.23
Jetzt haben die Donetzker Verbrecher auch zugegeben, daß sie von Russland nicht nur Waffen und Truppen und "Freiwliige" sondern auch viel Geld bekommen, da wird dann bald kein Gold mehr in der russischen Staatsbank sein....
Aufbäumen am Verfallstag...
Noch eine Kurze Anmerkung zur Dividende:
Für die Zaglung der Dividende ist der Quartalsgewinn eigentlich von untergeordneter Bedeutung.
Die Wichtige Größe ist der free Cashflow = Operative Cashflow - Investment in operating Capital
Bei Gazprom handelt es sich beim "Investment in operating Capital" im wesentlichen um die "Capital expenditure" (CapEx).
Bis zum Zeiten Quartal gab es diesbezüglich keine Sorge.
Nach dem Dritten Quartal kann man aber folgeren, dass sich diese Bilanz gedreht hat. Nach der Bilanz und der GuV Rechnung kann man schießen, dass diese Zahl von fast + 300 Mrd Rubel auf etwa - 200 Mrd Rubel gedreht hat (gabz grobe Abschätzung) es (Leider habe ich in dem mehr als 500 Seiten langen russischen Bericht keine brauchbare Cashflowrechnung gefunden)
Da das dritte Quartal auch im normalfall das schwächste Quartal für Gazprom ist und der Cashbestand zum Ende des 2. Quartals sehr hoch war, ist das allerdings noch nicht bedenklich.
Das 4. Quartal wird auch bei offensichtlich anhaltender Problemen sowohl witterungabedingt als auch durch Sonderefekte (Zahlungen aud der Ukraine) sicherlich besser aussehen.
Rein aus betriebswirschaftlicher Sicht würde man aber die Dividende reduzienen um eine nachhaltige Bilanz zu erreichen. Da sehr große Projekte in Zukunft gestemmt werden müssen, wäre es jetzt sinvoll ein möglichst großes Cashpolster aufzubauen.
Daber natürlich sind die Argumente deren nicht falsch, die es für möglich halten, dass die Devidende unter Umständen nicht drastisch gekürzt wird um z.B. Aktionäre bei der Stange zu halten, damit gegebenenfalls leichter eine Eigenkapitalerhöhung durchgeführt werden kann.
Im Allgemeinen kann man annehmen, dass Gazprom dann auf Zahlung einer hohen Dividende verzichten sollte, wenn zukünftige Erschließungen vorwiegend durch Fremdkapital gestemmt werden sollen. Fall die Eigenkapitalerhöhung als primäres Mittel angesehen wird, macht jedoch die Zahlung einer relativ stabilen Dividende Sinn.
Für die Zaglung der Dividende ist der Quartalsgewinn eigentlich von untergeordneter Bedeutung.
Die Wichtige Größe ist der free Cashflow = Operative Cashflow - Investment in operating Capital
Bei Gazprom handelt es sich beim "Investment in operating Capital" im wesentlichen um die "Capital expenditure" (CapEx).
Bis zum Zeiten Quartal gab es diesbezüglich keine Sorge.
Nach dem Dritten Quartal kann man aber folgeren, dass sich diese Bilanz gedreht hat. Nach der Bilanz und der GuV Rechnung kann man schießen, dass diese Zahl von fast + 300 Mrd Rubel auf etwa - 200 Mrd Rubel gedreht hat (gabz grobe Abschätzung) es (Leider habe ich in dem mehr als 500 Seiten langen russischen Bericht keine brauchbare Cashflowrechnung gefunden)
Da das dritte Quartal auch im normalfall das schwächste Quartal für Gazprom ist und der Cashbestand zum Ende des 2. Quartals sehr hoch war, ist das allerdings noch nicht bedenklich.
Das 4. Quartal wird auch bei offensichtlich anhaltender Problemen sowohl witterungabedingt als auch durch Sonderefekte (Zahlungen aud der Ukraine) sicherlich besser aussehen.
Rein aus betriebswirschaftlicher Sicht würde man aber die Dividende reduzienen um eine nachhaltige Bilanz zu erreichen. Da sehr große Projekte in Zukunft gestemmt werden müssen, wäre es jetzt sinvoll ein möglichst großes Cashpolster aufzubauen.
Daber natürlich sind die Argumente deren nicht falsch, die es für möglich halten, dass die Devidende unter Umständen nicht drastisch gekürzt wird um z.B. Aktionäre bei der Stange zu halten, damit gegebenenfalls leichter eine Eigenkapitalerhöhung durchgeführt werden kann.
Im Allgemeinen kann man annehmen, dass Gazprom dann auf Zahlung einer hohen Dividende verzichten sollte, wenn zukünftige Erschließungen vorwiegend durch Fremdkapital gestemmt werden sollen. Fall die Eigenkapitalerhöhung als primäres Mittel angesehen wird, macht jedoch die Zahlung einer relativ stabilen Dividende Sinn.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 48.373.277 von Shaki am 20.11.14 19:03:22Immer wieder das gleiche Drama in Deutschland. Und die D.... tappen
in die gleichen Fallen wie ihre Groß u. Urgroßeltern.
in die gleichen Fallen wie ihre Groß u. Urgroßeltern.
Trading Spotlight
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 48.373.133 von jojo6666 am 20.11.14 18:46:35
Nur durch ständiges wiederholen deiner Weisheiten aus der BLÖD-Zeitung werden diese auch nicht wahrer.
Die Scharfmacher der Ukraine-Krise sitzen doch nicht in Russland.
Ausschnitte aus Monitor Sendungen der ARD (also wohl kaum Extremistenpropaganda):
Zitat von jojo6666: Das ist ein Witz - Putin hat doch das Vertrauen von Russland komplett zerschlagen. Mehr geht doch kaum noch.
Nur durch ständiges wiederholen deiner Weisheiten aus der BLÖD-Zeitung werden diese auch nicht wahrer.
Die Scharfmacher der Ukraine-Krise sitzen doch nicht in Russland.
Ausschnitte aus Monitor Sendungen der ARD (also wohl kaum Extremistenpropaganda):
Und dann wird das Kapital zu einem erbärmlichen Grenz-RoE investiert. Gratulation.
Dazu sinkt die Dividende wohl primär, weil der Jahresüberschuss sinkt und die Dividende daran gekoppelt ist. Also bleibt unterm Strich auch weniger zusätzliches Kapital im Unternehmen.
Rundherum negativ.
Dazu sinkt die Dividende wohl primär, weil der Jahresüberschuss sinkt und die Dividende daran gekoppelt ist. Also bleibt unterm Strich auch weniger zusätzliches Kapital im Unternehmen.
Rundherum negativ.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 48.370.679 von guensing am 20.11.14 15:27:04
Image Russland
Das ist ein Witz - Putin hat doch das Vertrauen von Russland komplett zerschlagen. Mehr geht doch kaum noch.
Stimmt schon, es hat seine Vorteile, wenn die Dividende sinkt oder wegfällt,
dann bleibt das Geld im Unternehmen und es geht weniger Quellensteuer oder
Abgeltungssteuer an den Staat. Nur schadet die Dividendenkürzung dem Image
Russlands. Das weiß Putin sehr genau.
dann bleibt das Geld im Unternehmen und es geht weniger Quellensteuer oder
Abgeltungssteuer an den Staat. Nur schadet die Dividendenkürzung dem Image
Russlands. Das weiß Putin sehr genau.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 48.367.763 von ralf-peinemann am 20.11.14 10:44:06Da gibt's für Russland bestimmt noch andere Wege um an das gute Tafelsilber von Gazprom ran zu kommen. Wird die Divi gekürzt, bleibt mehr Geld im Konzern.
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