CALPINE CORP (902918) - eine zweite Delphi ?? - 500 Beiträge pro Seite (Seite 11)

[Charly_2]

**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG**WICHTIG

noch CEO MAY will durch die Hintertüre abhauen. Ich bin sicher, dass er den Fellus Appeal gelesen hat und sieht, daß seine betrügerischen Manipulationen endlich völlig aufgedeckt werden.

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.520.600 von Charly_2 am 29.02.08 20:10:28

Mit 12 Mio in der Tasche

see
e. Success Fee.

http://www.secinfo.com/dRuv6.z32.htm

[Charly_2]

Fellus kann man sich etwa so vorstellen

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02…

[Charly_2]

Ohhhh Shit

NYC Meeting
I listened to the meeting. It was mostly uneventful. They of course stressed how well positioned they are to be successful in the future. Same old stuff they were saying prior to BK.

Only one question at the end of Q&A dealt with treatment of prior equity holders. One person (maybe whose?) tried to put them on the spot and get them to answer 'why they wouldn't list the warrants on a respectable exchange and make a liquid, fair market for their most loyal investors.' Of course they had no comment.

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.520.365 von Charly_2 am 29.02.08 19:55:00

Entsprechend jenem
http://www.centredaily.com/business/story/435726.html

haben wir also


GAAP Net Income/(loss) (millions) (a)
2007 -> $ 2,693
2006 -> $(1,765)

Adjusted EBITDA (millions) (c,d)
2007 -> $ 1,412
2006 -> $ 1,029 37%

Einen Gewinn von 1,4 Mrd $

An Verlustvorträgen müßte die Firma doch genug haben oder wurde das auch alles "abgegeben"?

Ist das KGV nun wirklich schon wieder 10

fragend
mac

[Charly_2]

Update_PM February 29, 2008......Stinson called....
Just got off the phone with Albert from Stinson, Morrison and Hecker.

After careful review of the facts in this case they have determined we have a very strong appeal in the due process infractions and we should be confident in winning.

While nothing is certain, their op-inion is the shareholders were screwed by the judge and possibly the SHC....

As i am in commute from having covered the CALPINE aNALYST MEETING i COULDN'T TALK VERY LONG.

wHEN i RETURN TO MY OFFICE (kitchen) I will have a more extensive conversation and see what can be done about a settlement with the company as well as other issues, namely reviewing the many comments we have collected over the last few years and seeing if that adds any fuel to the fire.

AS Stinson is principally concerned with matters for appeal, they may say that these comments from shareholders are irrelevant...but I will pass it by them NYWAY.

Discussion around fees indicated that $40K was a number they felt they could turn THIS APPEAL IN ON....I will talk to him in greater detail and have some questions for him....

Any suggestions from our group is welcome ahead of my conversation.

after my questions, I will ask them for a written report.....

I said hello to Doody at the meeting and he recognized me.......

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.524.356 von Charly_2 am 01.03.08 15:16:13

Appeal von Felluss ist unterwex

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.524.360 von Charly_2 am 01.03.08 15:16:59

Hi Charly,

ich muß Dich noch ma fragen:
Was erwartest Du Dir hieraus?
Wie könnte ein Kompromiß aussehen?

Längere Laufzeit des Warrants?
Geringerer Kaufkurs?

Eine neue Lösung dürfte ja negative Auswirkungen auf den Kurs des derzeitigen Warrants haben, da es die Aktie ja belastet, wenn nun die "Altschulden" eskalieren.

Gut für uns, schlecht für potentielle Neuaktionäre / Investmentfonds, die Calpine auf der Watchlist haben.
Wenn ich nicht schon drin wäre, würde ich hier erst ma abwarten, ob sich noch was ändert.
D.h Unsicherheit, die auch dem Warrant schadet, vor allem, wenn sich nix ändert und im August alles abläuft.

Insofern:
a) Welche Lösungen kann es geben
-> individuell / für alle Altaktionäre
b) Welche Auswirkungen haben die dann wohl auf den Kurs

Klar ist mir, daß bei einer Verlängerung der Laufzeit oder Senkung des Basispreises der Warrant natürlich geheblt in die Höhe geht, während die Aktie absackt.

Dies wäre dann der Moment zu schmeißen und die Aktie normal zu kaufen.
Aber will das dann nicht jeder?

fragend
mac

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.521.643 von Charly_2 am 29.02.08 21:51:28

300 Analysten mussten sich das Geschafel von May&Co anhören, von wegen greenest Cpy und so :O

[Charly_2]

...Appeal: ministerial errors hat noch eine gute Chance, man muss aber eine gute Anwaltskanzlei finden - Stinson scheint eine zu sein

....Shareholder notes...appeal grounds
the lawyers say grounds for an appeal are very narrow, and among others, I am sure:

The judge must have:

1 Made a mistake
2.Errored in the law
3.Denied due process.
4.Violated constitutional rights

It really has nothing to do with the facts in the case other than ministerial errors....i think.

This is why I personally thought the other shareholder appeal was a waste of resources.

You see the appeals court is concerned wwith the Judge and how the judgement violated your rights during the course of the trial. If you weren't in the trial, you have nothing to complain about....i think....-

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.524.514 von Charly_2 am 01.03.08 15:53:33

Altaktionäre wurde geschraubt durch irreführende, falsche Berechnungen und durch unfähigen Richter der diese Irreführung nicht durchschaut hat, sondern den Fall einfach abschliessen wollte, zu Lasten der Shareholder

Diese Tatsache wurde nun aufgearbeitet und wird mittels dem Felluss Appeal demnext vor Gericht angeprangert!!

> Recs: 0 Re: My Appeal Items
> I am not wrong. I think Calpine was successful in misleading people and the
> Court. Exhibit 21 and its attachment is the smoking gun. There are 3 numbers
> wrong in the attachment "Strike Price" calculation. The very title is meant
> to mislead because what is calculated is not "Equity Strike Price" as
> previously explained in a previous post.
>
> If you go to the attachment "Claims Analysis" You come up with another set
> of misleading calculations which ring up another 2 TEVs. Let me explain. If
> You go to the "Updated Valuation Analysis for Calpine Corporation et al",
> page 6, top of page you get the following:
>
> Updated TEV Midpoint $19,350
> Plus: Available Cash and other Assets 1,533 note (1030 + 494 = 1533 se
> below)
> Updated Reorganization Value $20,883
>
> Now comparing this to what is in the Exhibit 21 attachment you get the
> following as inverted to match format:
>
> Total Net Claims $19,552
> Other Non-Operating Asset Value 494
> Distributable cash 1,039
> MB Estimated Claims Midpoint $21,085
>
> The MB Estimated Claims Midpoint is mislabeled. The waterfall methodology
> uses the label as shown above "Updated Reorganization Value" which means the
> same. It is the value as can be seen on page 6 that is used to subtract
> secured claims and unsecured claims to the yield equity for shareholders of
> $0.41/share.
>
> So the only thing that doesn't match in the two comparisons above is "Total
> Net Claims" and Updated "TEV Midpoint". So "Total Net Claims is wrong, pure
> and simple. This calculation on the surface appears good but is certainly
> intended to mislead others and the Court. So Calpine introduces a new TEV -
> $19,552 in addition to the new $18.95 TEV that was wrongly determined by
> "compromise settlement".
>
> Now for the % Appreciation 15%, multiplying the $19,552 new TEV mislabeled
> "Total Net Claims" you get a new TEV of $22,485. Wow, now we have 3 new
> TEVs. What a cobled up mess Calpine has put together again by Calpine,
> Creditors Committee, Equity Committee, and Bridge. Now we can see a
> deliberate manipulation of numbers and labels to mislead others and the
> Court in order to defraud shareholders of any equity by using these
> calculations to jack up the strike price far out of the money so that there
> would be no way to exercise warrants in 6 months.
>
> Noy "

[macsoja]

Der Chef geht nach getaner "Arbeit"

Meldung: Calpine Corporation: Robert P. May Announces Intent to Leave Calpine after Orderly Transition

http://www.ecoreporter.de/index.php?action=,,159_n24025__

[federico29]

die warrants gehen rauf wie nix (aktuell 1,32, waren kurz schon bei 1,70), obwohl die aktie leicht fällt. das könnte doch ein gutes zeichen sein, oder?!

[savenm]

bitte wenn jemand realtime chart der cpncw hat, hier einfügen. Charli machte das öfters mit cpnlq.

[Dostojewski]

Guten Morgen,

hier ist ja gar nichts mehr los - schade.


Gruß - Dosto

[Ayrton1]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.603.622 von Dostojewski am 11.03.08 00:50:42

Hallo zusammen, ja leider hat mir meine Bank mitgeteilt dass die Warrents in Deutschland nicht gehandelt werden könne. Das heisst, dass ich mein ganzes Geld verloren habe oder die Warrents mit einem neuen Schuß Money an Calpine in neue Aktien umtauschen kann.
Ich denke dies wird sich nicht realisieren lassen.
Schade für uns alle.....!

Wenn man Erfolg an der Börse haben will, muss man zuerst Geld verlieren! So sagt es ein Sprichwort glaube ich..

Also macht es alle gut und weiterhin viel Erfolg.

Aryton

[Tripower]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.613.038 von Ayrton1 am 11.03.08 20:06:04

Hallo Ayrton1, weisst du auch wieviel geld man nachschieben muss um die warrants in aktien zutauschen? Habe 404 St. Warrants.

tripower

[voltago01]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.613.038 von Ayrton1 am 11.03.08 20:06:04

Kannst die Dinger doch in USA verkaufen. Wird aber möglicherweise einen gewissen Mindestwert Deiner Warrant-Position erfordern, damit Deine Bank das macht.

[voltago01]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.603.622 von Dostojewski am 11.03.08 00:50:42

Muttu halt mehr posten - faule Socke!

[Dostojewski]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.614.606 von voltago01 am 11.03.08 22:31:51

Hallo voltago01 ,

schön wieder von Dir zu lesen.
Ich habe gerade sehr viel um die Ohren - sonst gerne.

Der Dienstag ist geschafft

Trotz der letzten zweieinhalb Horrormonate...

Grüße durch die verregnete und windige Nacht bis an die Grenzen Europas und darüber hinaus - Dosto

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.615.031 von Dostojewski am 11.03.08 23:45:16

Also bei der DAB kommt:

Fehler:
Wertpapier vom Handel ausgeschlossen

Ich komme gar nicht zur Stelle, wo ich den Handelsplatz und damit evtl. die USA auswählen könnte.

Wie ich die Warrents überhaupt dann für einen Aktienkauf wandeln könnte, ist mir auch schleierhaft.
D.h. ich sehe auch keine Möglichkeit für mich, das Zeug loszuwerden

Hoffe nur, daß es wenigstens als realisierter Verlust in der Spekulationsfrist irgendwie ausgewiesen wird, wenn die im August ausgebucht werden

[federico29]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.621.255 von macsoja am 12.03.08 16:19:32

so siehts bei mir auch aus, will aber noch nicht locker lassen und hab bei der bank einen nachfrage gestartet, jedoch ohne große hoffnung.

nachdem sich die aktie gen süden neigt, scheinen sich die warrants sowieso in luft aufzulösen. alles einfach eine riesensauerei.

[Charly_2]

Da tut sich noch was

Appeal
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

David Flair, Avram Ninyo and Merle Root (collectively, the “Individual Appellants”), holders collectively of nearly 3,000,000 shares of common stock of the Debtor, Calpine Corporation (“Calpine” or the “Debtors”) , hereby appeal from five orders, relating to the confirmation of the Debtors’ Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Lifland, U.S.B.J.) in the Debtors’ jointly administered bankruptcy proceeding (05-60200). The Individual Appellants seek review of:
• Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Sixth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, entered on December 19, 2007 (the “Confirmation Order”) (Bankr. Docket No. 7256; Appellants’ Designation of Items Comprising Record on Appeal No. 157 in 08-cv01286).
• Order Approving Motion Seeking Approval of Immaterial Modifications to the Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Without Need for Further Solicitation of Votes, entered on December 19, 2007 (the “Modification Order”) (Bankr. Docket No. 7253; Appellants’ Designation of Items Comprising Record on Appeal No. 156 in 08-cv01286.
• Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of the Confirmation Order and Modification Order entered on January 15, 2008 (the “Reconsideration Order”) (Bankr. Docket No. 7404; Appellants’ Designation of Items Comprising Record on Appeal No. 186 in 08-cv01286);
• Bench Order Denying Application for Limited Production of Documents, issued by the Court on January 8, 2008; and
• Order Striking Analysts’ Reports entered on the record at the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration (Bankr. Docket No. 7519, Appellants’ Designation of Items Comprising Record on Appeal No. 198 in 08-cv01286).
This appeal arises from the secretive and hasty proceedings, conducted over the span of 48 hours, which culminated with the entry of the Confirmation Order and the Second Modification Order on December 19, 2007. The Confirmation Order confirmed the Debtors’ Sixth Amended Joint Plan for Reorganization, which the Debtors proposed on the date of the Reorganization Hearing without any notice to claimants or shareholders, including the Individual Appellants, in transparent violation of their constitutional right to due process.
The Bankruptcy Court immediately confirmed this Sixth Amended Plan, literally only minutes old, along with an Order approving “immaterial” modifications to the previously proposed plan -- without providing any of the affected shareholders with a genuine opportunity to be heard. Within a short span of hours, the value of nearly 500,000,000 million shares of Calpine common stock was wiped out. The Individual Appellants, lacking the means and commercial stature of the other interest parties, were summarily deprived of property rights without any effort to notify them, or similarly situated parties, of what was transpiring.
As if this were not enough, the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders (the “Equity Committee”), which was appointed by the United States Trustee to represent the interests of the Debtors’ shareholders, and which repeatedly advised all shareholders that it would protect their interests, sat silently back and allowed all this to happen without once raising an objection to the obviously infirm procedures.
A review of the docket proves just how swiftly “justice” was meted out in these proceedings. On the morning of December 19, 2008, the Debtors filed their Sixth Amended Joint Plan for Reorganization, which “noticed” an objection deadline for nine o’clock on that very day, along with a hearing for an hour later (See Bankruptcy Docket ##7235-7241). Needless to say the Individual Appellants, and numerous other similarly situated persons and entities, remained completely unaware of what was transpiring while being led to believe that the Equity Committee was actually advancing and protecting their interests. The Bankruptcy Court signed and entered the Confirmation and Second Modification Orders (Bankruptcy Docket Entries ##1253 and 1256) immediately after the hearing on December 19, 2007. Unfortunately, the Individual Appellants gained their first inkling of what had transpired two days later, when the Confirmation and Second Modifications Orders arrived in their holiday mail.
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This Court possesses appellate jurisdiction over “final judgments, orders, and decrees … of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of [Title 28 of the United States Code].” 11 U.S.C. §158(a). Bankruptcy court orders which confirm a debtor’s plan, and related orders, are appealable as a matter of right under Section 158(a). See Bourne v. Northwood Properties, LLC (In re Northwood Properties, LLC), 509 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Individual Appellants join in the Statement of Issues on Appeal as set fort by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. As stated by their brief, these issues are:
1. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in confirming the Debtors’ Sixth Amended Plan without requiring or affording Appellants reasonable notice and an opportunity to object thereto.
2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in entering the Modification Order without requiring or affording Appellants reasonable notice and an opportunity to object thereto.
3. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the changes to the Sixth Amended Plan were immaterial.
4. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in confirming the Debtors’ Sixth Amended Plan, when the Sixth Amended Plan violated Sections 1129(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Code in that the Plan failed to meet the (a) solicitation and compliance requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2); (b) good faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3); (c) best interest test codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); or (d) absolute priority rule codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
5. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in confirming the Sixth Amended Plan without sufficient evidence on the record that the Plan met the confirmation standards and with all evidence of the Debtors’ valuation filed under seal.
6. Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in denying the Appellants’ Motion to Reconsider the Confirmation Order and the Modification Order.
7. Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in denying the Appellants’ limited request for production of documents from the Debtors in connection with the Motion to Reconsider.
8. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in striking the Dahlman Rose & Co. and Lehman Brothers’ analyst reports from the Appellants’ reply memorandum of law in support of their Motion to Reconsider.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to avoid duplicative briefing which would address substantially the same points already addressed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal, the Individual Appellants adopt the statement of the Standard of Review set forth by those Appellants in at pages three through five of their Opening Brief. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that statement is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here so as to avoid what would be substantially the same statement as to the appropriate standards of review to be applied by this Court to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
For the purpose of avoiding duplication of efforts by the parties and the Court by setting forth a statement of the Nature of the Case which would be substantially similar to the Nature of the Case set forth by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal, the Individual Appellants adopt the Nature of the Case as set forth by those Appellants at pages five through ten of their Opening Brief. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that statement is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here so as to avoid what would be substantially the same statement as to the Nature of the Case pertaining to this appeal.
B. Course of Proceedings
For the purpose of avoiding duplication of efforts by the parties and the Court by setting forth a statement of the Course of Proceedings which would be substantially similar to the Course of Proceedings set forth by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal, the Individual Appellants adopt the Course of Proceedings as set forth by those Appellants at pages ten through thirteen of their Opening Brief. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that statement is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here so as to avoid what would be substantially the same statement of the course of the proceedings pertaining to this appeal.
C. Statement of Facts
For the purpose of avoiding duplication of efforts by the parties and the Court by setting forth a statement of the Statement of Facts which would be substantially similar to the Statement of Facts set forth by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal, the Individual Appellants adopt the Statement of Facts set forth by those Appellants at pages thirteen through thirty of their Opening Brief. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that statement is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same statement of the facts which pertain to this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE INDIVIDUAL APPELLANTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS
BY THE APPROVAL OF THE MODIFICATION AND
CONFIRMATION ORDERS WITHOUT NOTICE

A. Due Process and the Bankruptcy Code Require That The Individual Appellants Receive Notice of Material Modifications to the Plan of Reorganization

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages thirty through thirty-two of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.
B. The Modifications That Resulted in the Sixth Amended Plan Were Material and Adversely Changed the Treatment of the Individual Appellants’ Interests

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages thirty-three through thirty-six of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.
C. The Individual Appellants’ Due Process Rights Override the Finality of the Confirmation Order

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages thirty-six through thirty-seven of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.
POINT II
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DENIED THE INDIVIDUAL APPELLANTS
A FULL AND FAIR VALUATION HEARING THROUGH THE
IMPROPER USE OF ITS EXPERT AS A MEDIATOR AND FAILED
TO INDEPENDENTLY EXAMINE WHETHER THE DEBTORS
SATISFIED THE CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages thirty-seven through thirty-nine of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.
POINT III
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED BY DENYING REQUESTS
FOR DISCOVERY IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages forty through forty-one of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.
POINT IV
THE DHALMAN AND LEHMAN REPORTS ARE ADMISSIBLE
PURSUANT TO THE MARKET REPORTS EXCEPTION TO
THE HEARSAY RULE

The Individual Appellants adopt the legal argument set forth on pages forty-one through forty-three of the brief filed by the Appellants in the Consolidated Appeal. For the convenience of the Court and the parties, that argument is hereby adopted as if set forth at length here, so as to avoid what would be substantially the same argument which pertains to this appeal.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the Appellants respectfully request that the Court order:
(i) the issuance and reservation of an additional three hundred million shares from the one billion five hundred million shares authorized under the Sixth Amended Plan pending a full and fair valuation hearing on remand;
(ii) that the modifications resulting in the Sixth Amended Plan were material and remand to the Bankruptcy Court for a hearing on reasonable notice for the Individual Appellants to present their objections to the Sixth Amended Plan;
(iii) that reasonable discovery in connection with the Individual Appellants’ plan objections is permissible;
(iv) that the Dahlman Rose & Co. and Lehman Brothers market reports are admissible; and
(v) that to the extent the court on remand determines that the value of the New Calpine Common Stock distributed to the creditors under the Sixth Amended Plan exceeds the amount of their debt, the excess value, in the form of New Calpine Common Stock, be distributed to former shareholders.
Dated: March 7, 2008
New York, New York
Respectfully submitted,

FORMAN HOLT ELIADES & RAVIN LLC


By:
Joseph M. Cerra (JMC-0903)
888 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10106
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

80 Route 4 East, Suite 290
Paramus, NJ 07652
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Attorneys for David Flair,
Avram Ninyo and Merle Root

[Charly_2]

Author: goldgrl (Merle Root)

Re: appeal
Honorable Victor Marrero

United States District Court Judge

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse

500 Pearl St., Room 660

New York, New York 10007

Re: Compania Internacional Financiera, S.A., et al. v.
Calpine Corporation, et al. (In re Calpine Corporation),
No. 1:08-cv-01286-VM (consolidated appeals)

Dear Judge Marrero:

This letter is submitted in response to the Court’s March 5, 2008 order requiring the parties to confer and submit, by March 14, an agreed-upon schedule for briefing these three consolidated appeals. The parties conferred by telephone conference on March 11, and have agreed on the following schedule.

Appellants’ Opening Briefs Shall Be Filed On Or Before March 14. Appellants Compania Internacional Financiera, S.A., Coudree Global Equities Fund, Standard Bank of London, and Leonardo Capital Fund SPC filed their opening brief on February 25, 2008. Appellants David Flair, Avram Ninyo, and Merle Root filed their opening brief on March 10, 2008. Appellant Mr. Elias A. Felluss will file his opening brief on March 14, 2008.

Appellees’ Response Briefs Shall Be Filed On Or Before March 28. The parties have agreed that, for the convenience of the Court and in order to streamline briefing, the appellees — the reorganized debtors and debtors-in-possession (collectively "Calpine") and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Calpine Corporation, et al. (the "Creditors Committee") — shall each file a consolidated response to the appellants’ three opening briefs. Calpine’s response brief and the Creditors Committee’s response brief shall both be due on or before March 28, 2007, fourteen days after the filing and service of Mr. Felluss’s opening brief.

The parties have further agreed that, although Calpine and the Creditors Committee do not require the 150 pages of briefing permitted under the rules if they were to file separate responses to each of the appellants’ three opening briefs, a modest increase in pages above the usual limit for a single brief is warranted. Accordingly, the parties have agreed that neither of the appellees’ consolidated response briefs shall exceed 65 pages.

Appellants’ Reply Briefs Will Be Filed Within 10 Days After Service Of Appellees’ Response Briefs. Each of the appellants will be entitled to file a reply brief within 10 days after the filing and service of the appellees’ response briefs.

report abuse

[Charly_2]

Author: whosegow (E. Felluss)

In response to msg 1357 by the grouper

Re: Court Activity
Projected tentative hearing schedule......

Honorable Victor Marrero

United States District Court Judge

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse

500 Pearl St., Room 660

New York, New York 10007

Re: Compania Internacional Financiera, S.A., et al. v.
Calpine Corporation, et al. (In re Calpine Corporation),
No. 1:08-cv-01286-VM (consolidated appeals)

Dear Judge Marrero:

This letter is submitted in response to the Court’s March 5, 2008 order requiring the parties to confer and submit, by March 14, an agreed-upon schedule for briefing these three consolidated appeals. The parties conferred by telephone conference on March 11, and have agreed on the following schedule.

Appellants’ Opening Briefs Shall Be Filed On Or Before March 14. Appellants Compania Internacional Financiera, S.A., Coudree Global Equities Fund, Standard Bank of London, and Leonardo Capital Fund SPC filed their opening brief on February 25, 2008. Appellants David Flair, Avram Ninyo, and Merle Root filed their opening brief on March 10, 2008. Appellant Mr. Elias A. Felluss will file his opening brief on March 14, 2008.

Appellees’ Response Briefs Shall Be Filed On Or Before March 28. The parties have agreed that, for the convenience of the Court and in order to streamline briefing, the appellees — the reorganized debtors and debtors-in-possession (collectively "Calpine") and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Calpine Corporation, et al. (the "Creditors Committee") — shall each file a consolidated response to the appellants’ three opening briefs. Calpine’s response brief and the Creditors Committee’s response brief shall both be due on or before March 28, 2007, fourteen days after the filing and service of Mr. Felluss’s opening brief.

The parties have further agreed that, although Calpine and the Creditors Committee do not require the 150 pages of briefing permitted under the rules if they were to file separate responses to each of the appellants’ three opening briefs, a modest increase in pages above the usual limit for a single brief is warranted. Accordingly, the parties have agreed that neither of the appellees’ consolidated response briefs shall exceed 65 pages.

Appellants’ Reply Briefs Will Be Filed Within 10 Days After Service Of Appellees’ Response Briefs. Each of the appellants will be entitled to file a reply brief within 10 days after the filing and service of the appellees’ response briefs.

[Charly_2]

..die grösste Frechheit fand ich übrigens, dass der Rentner Richter Lifland in einer der letzten Anhörung vor Gericht die Argumente der Appellanten verbal angriff, und sie anweisen wollte sich bei den Kongressmitgliedern zu beschweren....über die Bankruptcy-Gesetzgebung...

...dabei hätte dieser Greis nur seines Amtes walten müssen und den Grips anzustrengen um das Pack auszuhebeln das sich alles unter den Nagel gerissen hat - Harbinger & Co :O

[Charly_2]

CEO May haut ab mit $29 Mio, modernes Raubrittertum à la American

A Rat Abandoning Ship, hopefully will still face justice

Calpine's turnaround specialist to leave with $29 million bonus
BONUS FOR EXEC WHO LED DURING BANKRUPTCY
By Matt Nauman
Mercury News
Article Launched: 03/01/2008 01:53:53 AM PST

[voltago01]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.621.255 von macsoja am 12.03.08 16:19:32

Sowas macht man auch nicht übers Internet, sondern telefonisch! Jede klassische Geschäftsbank handelt auch in den USA.

Beispiel Dresdner: Muß man anrufen, dann geben die Order an ihre internationale Handelsabteilung. Muß aber ca. 3000 € Wert haben, die Position, jedenfalls bei einem Kauf.

Meiner Meinung nach muß die Bank aber einen Verkaufsauftrag in jedem Fall ausführen, wenn es keinen anderen möglichen Handelsplatz gibt.

Ist man bei einer Direktbank, die evtl. nicht selbst in den USA handelt, haben diese aber meist Korrespondenzbanken, die für sie so einen Auftrag abwickeln.

Ich würde jedenfalls nicht vor meinem Bildschirm sitzen bleiben und sagen "Ich kann ja hier gar nicht handeln", wenn ich eigentlich verkaufen will. Vielleicht mal bei der Bank anrufen und ggf. auch nicht von der Auszubildenden abwimmeln lassen, sondern jemand Kompetentes verlangen.

[maikelmaikel]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.613.038 von Ayrton1 am 11.03.08 20:06:04

Hmm. Ich hatte früher mal - bei Consors - das Problem, in D gekaufte Aktien nicht direkt in USA verkaufen zu können. Nach Anruf bei Consors und gebührenplichtiger Umbuchung konnte ich sie dort Minuten später problemlos verkaufen. Vielleicht ist das bei Deinen Warrants auch die Lösung?

maikelmaikel

[Charly_2]

The "Appellant's Opening Brief"

http://www.randpatent.com/Felluss_Brief_03_14_08.pdf

[Dostojewski]

Seid gegrüßt!
Gibt es Neuigkeiten?
Schade das es so aussgehen musste.

Einen Gruß durch die Nacht - Dosto

[Dostojewski]

Guten Abend,
ist hier noch jemand?

Gruß in die angehende Nacht hinaus - Dosto

[Dostojewski]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.781.908 von Dostojewski am 01.04.08 20:04:46

http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=cpn

Wenn jemand einen besseren/informativeren Link kennt bitte posten.

Gruß durch die Nacht - Dosto

[Charly_2]

..ist etwas lang

Info
CASE NO. 08-CV-01286-VM
(consolidated with Case Nos. 08-CV-01815 and 08-CV-01286)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________
COMPANIA INTERNACIONAL FINANCIERA, S.A,
COUDREE GLOBAL EQUITIES FUND,
STANDARD BANK OF LONDON, AND
LEONARDO CAPITAL FUND SPC, ET AL.,
Appellants,
V.
CALPINE CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Debtors-Appellees.
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
For the Southern District of New York
In re Calpine Corporation, et al.,
Case No. 05-60200 (BRL) (Jointly Administered)
__________________________________
OPENING BRIEF OF DEBTORS-APPELLEES
IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEFS
__________________________________
Richard M. Cieri (RC 6062)
Marc Kieselstein (admitted pro hac vice)
David R. Seligman (admitted pro hac vice)
Peter Asplund (PA 0603)
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4611
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Jeffrey S. Powell (admitted pro hac vice)
Ashley C. Parrish (admitted pro hac vice)
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Ste. 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Counsel for Debtors-Appellees Calpine Corporation, et al.
DATED: March 28, 2008
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 1 of 60
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................6
A. The Disclosure Statement And Solicitation Process....................................6
B. Discovery And Litigation Over Valuation...................................................7
C. The Negotiated Settlement And Confirmation Order................................10
D. The Objecting Shareholders’ Belated Requests To Re-Litigate ................12
E. This Court’s Denial Of The Compania Appellants’ Stay Request ............14
F. The Plan Of Reorganization Is Substantially Consummated.....................15
STANDARD OF REVIEW...........................................................................................................16
ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................18
I. The Consolidated Appeals Are Equitably Moot And Should Be Dismissed.........18
A. The Objecting Shareholders Have Failed To Address The
Threshold Mootness Question. ..................................................................18
B. The Plan Of Reorganization Is Substantially Consummated.....................21
C. The Objecting Shareholders Cannot Overcome The Strong
Presumption That Their Appeals Are Moot...............................................23
1. The Relief Sought By The Objecting Shareholders Is
Infeasible And Not Permitted Under Federal Law. .......................23
2. The Court Cannot Grant Relief Without Imperiling The
Debtors’ Successful Reorganization And Unraveling
Numerous, Intricate, Integrated Transactions................................26
3. Adversely Affected Parties Have Not Received Notice Or
A Reasonable Opportunity To Participate In These
Appeals. .........................................................................................29
4. The Objecting Shareholders Did Not Diligently Pursue Or
Obtain A Stay Pending Appeal. .....................................................30
II. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Made The Threshold Showing
Required To Pursue Their Appeals........................................................................32
A. The Objecting Shareholders Lack Standing To Appeal Rulings
And Orders Not Challenged In The Proceedings Below. ..........................33
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 2 of 60
iii
1. The Flair Appellants Lack Standing To Participate In These
Appeals. .........................................................................................34
2. The Objecting Shareholders Have No Standing To
Challenge The Bankruptcy Court’s Discovery And
Scheduling Orders..........................................................................34
3. The Objecting Shareholders Have No Standing To
Challenge The Bankruptcy Court’s Confirmation Order...............35
B. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Addressed The Critical
Findings On Which The Bankruptcy Court Grounded Its Denial Of
Reconsideration..........................................................................................36
C. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Come Forward With Any
Evidence Supporting Their Positions On Appeal. .....................................37
III. The Objecting Shareholders’ Arguments Fail On Their Merits. ...........................41
A. The Objecting Shareholders’ Due Process Rights Were Not
Violated......................................................................................................41
1. The Objecting Shareholders Had A Fair And Adequate
Opportunity To Participate In The Confirmation Process. ............41
2. The Minor Plan Modifications Were Not Material........................43
B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Retaining
A Court-Appointed Expert.........................................................................44
C. The Bankruptcy Court Examined And Determined All Elements
Required Under Section 1129 Of The Bankruptcy Code. .........................46
D. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying
Additional Discovery. ................................................................................48
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................50
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 3 of 60
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes,
174 B.R. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).................................................................................... 18, 29
Associated Press v. U.S. Dept. of Def.,
395 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)................................................................................. 37
Baker v. Dorfman,
239 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2000).............................................................................................. 35
Bartel v. Bar Harbor Airways, Inc.,
196 B.R. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).......................................................................................... 26
Brady v. Andrew (In re Commercial W. Fin. Corp.),
761 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) .......................................................................................... 33
Carney v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
19 F.3d 807 (2d Cir. 1994)................................................................................................ 49
Castleman v. Liquidating Tr.,
No. 6:06-CV-1077, 2007 WL 2492792 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2007) ................................. 35
Cedar Crest Health Center, Inc. v. Bowen,
129 F.R.D. 519 (S.D. Ind. 1989)....................................................................................... 19
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States,
506 U.S. 9 (1992).............................................................................................................. 18
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust,
756 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1985).............................................................................................. 32
Cruden v. Bank of N.Y.,
957 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1992).............................................................................................. 48
D.A. Elia Constr. Corp. v. Damon and Morey, LLP,
No. 04-CV-975A, 2006 WL 1720361 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) ................................................. 33
Devine v. American Benefit Corp.,
27 F. Supp. 2d 669 (S.D. W.Va. 1998)............................................................................. 19
Devlin v. Transportation Commc’ns Int’l. Union,
175 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1999)........................................................................................ 17, 36
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 4 of 60
v
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).............................................................................................. 49
Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc.,
164 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1999).............................................................................................. 50
Goldy v. Beal,
91 F.R.D. 451 (D.C. Pa. 1981).......................................................................................... 49
Griffin Indus. v. Petrojam, Ltd.,
72 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)................................................................................. 36
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner,
343 B.R. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)............................................................................................ 17
H. K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
536 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1976) .......................................................................................... 48
In re Adelphia Commnc’s Corp.,
367 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).................................................. 19, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32
In re Adelphia,
No. 06-1738, 2006 WL 3826700 (2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2006).......................................... 25, 30
In re Advocate,
140 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1944).............................................................................................. 33
In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
366 B.R. 278 (D. Del. 2007)............................................................................................. 44
In re Blumer,
66 B.R. 109, (9th Cir. BAP 1986),
aff’d, 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1987)................................................................................. 26
In re Box Bros. Holding Co.,
194 B.R. 32 (D. Del. 1996)............................................................................................... 30
In re Chase,
No. 06 Civ. 13743, 2008 WL 203622 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008)...................................... 17
In re Chateaugay Corp., (“Chateaugay I”)
988 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1993).............................................................................................. 18
In re Chateaugay Corp., (“Chateaugay II”)
10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993).................................................................................... 23, 26, 30
In re Chateaugay Corp., (“Chateaugay III”)
94 F.3d 772 (2d Cir. 1996)................................................................................................ 19
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 5 of 60
vi
In re Cinderella Clothing Indus., Inc.,
93 B.R. 373 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ................................................................................. 24
In re Concrete Designers, Inc.,
173 B.R. 354 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994)............................................................................. 43
In re Croton River Club, Inc.,
52 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) ........................................................................................... 17, 39
In re Delta,
374 B.R. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)........................................................................ 22, 25, 27, 29
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.,
138 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).............................................................................. 42
In re East 44th Realty, LLC,
07-8799, 2008 WL 217103 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008) ...................................................... 29
In re Edwards,
62 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................................. 20
In re Enron Corp.,
326 B.R. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).................................................................................... 22, 29
In re Flanagan,
503 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2007).............................................................................................. 17
In re Gucci,
126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997)............................................................................................. 33
In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Secs. Litig.,
113 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)............................................................................... 36
In re Home Holdings, Inc.,
No. 98-cv-5690, 2001 WL 262750 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001)............................. 21, 22, 23
In re Horne,
99 B.R. 132 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989)................................................................................ 24
In re Integrated Res., Inc.,
147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).................................................................................... 17, 48
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,
184 B.R. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).................................................................................... 23, 25
In re Johns Manville Corp.,
68 B.R. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)............................................................................................ 42
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 6 of 60
vii
In re Kenwin Shops, Inc.,
No. 99-10485, 2000 WL 351404 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2000) ........................................ 23, 28
In re King,
No. 05-51441, 2005 WL 4030049 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 15, 2005).............................. 37
In re Loral Space & Communications, Ltd.,
342 B.R. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).......................................... 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 38
In re McKenna,
238 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2001).............................................................................................. 44
In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.,
416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005)...................................................................... 18, 22, 28, 29, 31
In re Miner,
229 B.R. 561 (2d Cir. BAP 1999)..................................................................................... 34
In re Orlick,
No. 01-civ1606, 2002 WL 432006 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2002)........................................... 48
In re Peterson,
253 U.S. 300 (1920).......................................................................................................... 45
In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.,
78 B.R. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)........................................................................................ 30, 32
In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.,
836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................ 37
In re Schick,
No. 97 Civ. 9300, 1998 WL 397849 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1998) ................................. 35, 39
In re Sharp,
361 B.R. 559 (10th Cir. 2007) .......................................................................................... 40
In re Specialty Equip. Cos.,
3 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 1993) .............................................................................................. 28
In re Texaco Inc.,
92 B.R. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).................................................................................. 23, 29, 31
In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc.,
337 B.R. 811 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).............................................................................. 30
In re UAL Corp.,
408 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................ 31
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 7 of 60
viii
In re UNR Indus., Inc.,
20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1994) .............................................................................................. 32
In re Urban Broad. Corp.,
304 B.R. 263 (E.D. Va. 2004)........................................................................................... 37
In re US Airways Group,
369 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................ 24
In re USA Commercial Mortgage Co.,
Nos. 2:07-CV-00072, 2007 WL 2571947 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2007) ................................ 20
In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig.,
798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986)................................................................................................ 25
In re Weston,
18 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................................ 33
In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2007 WL 2994395 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2007) ..................................... 17
In re Wyatt, Inc.,
168 B.R. 520 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) .............................................................................. 48
In re Zahn Farms,
206 B.R. 643 (2d Cir. BAP 1997)..................................................................................... 31
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).............................................................................................. 33
Kothe v. Smith,
771 F.2d 667 (2d. Cir. 1985)............................................................................................. 46
MAC Panel Co. v. Virginia Panel Corp.,
283 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................ 18
Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co.,
762 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................. 32
Mannheim Video, Inc. v. County of Cook,
884 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1989) .......................................................................................... 19
Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc.,
466 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2006)................................................................................................ 40
Martin v. O’Conner,
225 B.R. 283 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) ......................................................................................... 49
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 8 of 60
ix
Matter of Levensaler,
13 B.R. 140 (Bankr. Conn. 1981) ..................................................................................... 49
Matter of Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co.,
956 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................ 33
Norton v. Sam’s Club,
145 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998).............................................................................................. 47
Ozyagcilar v. Davis,
701 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................................ 25
Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA,
489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................ 34
Sandra Cotton, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y.,
87 B.R. 272 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) .......................................................................................... 33
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................ 37
Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc.,
298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962).............................................................................................. 45
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1995)................................................................................................ 36
Troy Savings Bank v. Travelers Motor Inn, Inc.,
215 B.R. 485 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ......................................................................................... 35
U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters,
826 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ................................................................................... 49
United States v. Ballard,
779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1986) ............................................................................................ 47
United States v. Pugliese,
712 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983)............................................................................................ 39
Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005).............................................................................................. 47
Statutes
11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) ...................................................................................................................... 21
11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) ...................................................................................................................... 24
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 9 of 60
x
Rules and Regulations
17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(2) ......................................................................................................... 11
17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b)(3) ......................................................................................................... 11
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019(a) ............................................................................................................. 11
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005.................................................................................................................. 31
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.................................................................................................................. 17
Fed. R. Evid. 402 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Fed. R. Evid. 403 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Fed. R. Evid. 802 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Fed. R. Evid. 901 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 10 of 60
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellants in these three consolidated appeals (collectively, the “Objecting
Shareholders”) are investors who purchased millions of shares of Calpine Corporation common
stock after Calpine filed its chapter 11 petitions. Despite the size of their collective holdings, the
Objecting Shareholders did not retain counsel to monitor the chapter 11 cases. Although they
received notice, they did not appear at the disclosure statement hearing, object to the discovery
procedures established by the Bankruptcy Court, file an objection to the plan of reorganization,
participate in discovery or litigate confirmation, or appear at either the confirmation hearing on
December 17 or the continued confirmation hearing on December 19. Nor did they file a notice
of appearance so as to receive automatic and immediate electronic mail service of all documents
filed with the Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the Objecting Shareholders admit they relied entirely
on the Equity Committee to protect their interests.
The Objecting Shareholders are now dissatisfied with the Equity Committee’s decision to
support the plan of reorganization and with the careful determinations made by the Bankruptcy
Court. They want to blow up the plan of reorganization and re-litigate valuation issues that were
litigated over the course of months of proceedings in which they declined to participate. In an
attempt to justify this extraordinary request, the Objecting Shareholders complain they did not
receive adequate notice of supposedly “material” changes made to the plan before it was
confirmed, and that the confirmation process was “rushed” and discovery “severely limited.”
But it is undisputed that six months ago, on September 26, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court
approved the Debtors’ disclosure statement, established a schedule for litigating the value of
reorganized Calpine, and gave all interested parties an opportunity to participate in the plan
confirmation process. The Debtors disclosed to all stakeholders that, based on the Debtors’
valuation estimates, equity holders were not guaranteed distributions under the plan, and that the
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 11 of 60
2
Bankruptcy Court would ultimately determine the value of reorganized Calpine. It also is
undisputed that the Objecting Shareholders received adequate notice of the disclosure statement,
the proposed plan, the court-ordered discovery and pre-trial schedule, the confirmation objection
deadline, and the date of the confirmation hearing. The Objecting Shareholders nonetheless
chose to stay on the sidelines and made no formal appearance in the proceedings until the last
week of December 2007 — more than a week after the Bankruptcy Court entered a final order
confirming the plan of reorganization.
For reasons stated on the record, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the Objecting
Shareholders’ late-breaking objections as meritless and, in a thorough written opinion, denied
their request for a stay pending appeal. See 2008-01-24 Order at 4, 11-2 [Dkt No. 7478]; 2008-
01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 48-53. The Objecting Shareholders then sought emergency relief from this
Court in the form of a “limited stay.” While that request remained pending, and because the
Objecting Shareholders did not seek expedited consideration of their stay request, the Debtors’
plan went effective, bringing about myriad transactions and events, including distributions to
shareholders. On February 1, after a lengthy hearing, the Court denied the request for a “limited
stay.” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 65-72; 2008-02-01 Order.
Undeterred, the Objecting Shareholders now urge this Court to unwind Calpine’s
consummated plan and modify the plan to require the reorganized Debtors to issue and reserve
300 million additional shares. In addition, they want the Court to force reorganized Calpine back
into chapter 11 by directing the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the confirmation process and require
re-litigation of Calpine’s value. As explained below, the Court should deny these unfounded
requests and dismiss the consolidated appeals.
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 12 of 60
3
First, the appeals are moot because Calpine’s plan of reorganization has been
substantially consummated. The reorganized Debtors have implemented the plan of
reorganization, transferred property, and made distributions to former creditors and shareholders.
Millions of shares and warrants to purchase shares of reorganized Calpine have been distributed
and traded on open markets to third party investors. At this late date, the Court cannot grant
effective relief and, even if it could fashion some relief, it should decline to do so because
interfering with the consummated plan would imperil Calpine’s successful reorganization,
unravel numerous intricate and integrated transactions, and create an unmanageable mess for the
Bankruptcy Court. Furthermore, granting relief would be grossly inequitable to parties who,
unlike the Objecting Shareholders, diligently participated in the bankruptcy proceedings, as well
as innocent investors who purchased new Calpine common stock and warrants in reliance on the
terms of the confirmed plan. The proverbial eggs in this case not only have been beaten to a
faretheewell, they have been seasoned, cooked up, and served to thousands of interested
stakeholders. At this late, late juncture, unscrambling them simply is not an option. (See Section
I, below.)
Second, the appeals should be dismissed because the Objecting Shareholders have not
carried their heavy burden to prove that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in denying
their requests for reconsideration. They argue that discovery was “rushed” and “severely
limited,” but they lack standing to raise these (unfounded) objections because they did not timely
challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s discovery and scheduling orders in the proceedings below.
More fundamentally, the Objecting Shareholders never address the Bankruptcy Court’s
dispositive findings that, because the Objecting Shareholders “failed to appear and participate in”
the “detailed scheduled discovery and confirmation process,” and failed to come forward with
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 13 of 60
4
concrete evidence supporting their position, they did not justify their request to reopen the
confirmation proceedings. Parties may not use motions for reconsideration to raise arguments
that could have and should have been raised before final judgment. (See Section II, below.)
Third, the appeals should be dismissed because the arguments raised in the Objecting
Shareholders’ opening briefs are meritless. The Objecting Shareholders have made no showing
that the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings were clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust, and they have
identified no substantial grounds for reversing the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order. The
Objecting Shareholders argue that minor modifications to the plan were material, but they cannot
overcome the Bankruptcy Court’s findings to the contrary. Among other things, the Bankruptcy
Court found that, because reorganized Calpine was worth $18.95 billion, equity holders were
entitled to no distributions under the plan and, therefore, the plan modifications inured to the
benefit of equity holders by granting them warrants to which they otherwise would not have been
entitled. See 2008-01-24 Order at 4, 11-12 [Dkt No. 7478]; 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 52. The
Objecting Shareholders’ scattershot arguments do not come close to carrying their heavy burden
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The orders challenged on appeal are the culmination of more than two years of
proceedings, beginning on December 20, 2005, when the Debtors filed voluntary petitions for
relief under chapter 11. Those proceedings, involving one of the largest reorganizations in
history, concluded in December, when the Bankruptcy Court confirmed a plan of reorganization
permitting Calpine to emerge from chapter 11 as a revitalized entity.
Three groups of appellants are participating in these consolidated appeals. The lead
appellants — Compania Internacional Finaciera, S.A., Coudree Global Equities Fund, Standard
Bank of London, and Leonardo Capital Fund SPC (the “Compania Appellants”) — are
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 14 of 60
5
sophisticated hedge funds who purchased nearly 28 million shares of Calpine old common stock
after the Debtors filed their chapter 11 petitions. See Compania Br. 1. The second group —
David Flair, Avram Ninyo, and Merle Root (the “Flair Appellants”) — are individual investors
who owned over 3 million shares of Calpine old common stock. See Flair Br. 1. The third has
one member — Elias Fellus — who is proceeding pro se and who owned 44,000 shares of
Calpine old common stock, including shares he purchased after the Debtors filed their chapter 11
petitions. See Felluss Br. 5.
None of the appellants participated in the extensive proceedings that resulted in the
global settlement and confirmation of the Debtors’ (sixth amended) joint plan of reorganization.
In fact, none of the appellants appeared on the scene until days after the Bankruptcy Court
confirmed the plan on December 19, 2007. Over a week later, the Compania Appellants (on
December 31) and Mr. Felluss (on December 26) moved for reconsideration of the confirmation
order and associated rulings, arguing that reorganized Calpine is worth more than the $18.95
billion value determined by the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motions for
reconsideration on January 15, 2008.
The Compania Appellants (but neither Mr. Fellus nor the Flair Appellants) sought a
“limited stay” from the Bankruptcy Court. After their request was denied, the Compania
Appellants filed an emergency motion in this Court for an expedited appeal and a “limited stay.”
Although they were on notice that the plan would become effective by the end of the month, see
2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 54, the appellants did not seek an immediate hearing or move for
expedited briefing.
The plan of reorganization became effective on January 31, 2008. At that time,
reorganized Calpine assumed control of the business, property was transferred, and distributions
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commenced under the plan. See Decl. of B. Folse ¶¶ 10-20 (Ex. A). The next day, on February
1, 2008, this Court denied the Compania Appellants’ stay request and motion to expedite.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following provides an overview of the chapter 11 cases, the Bankruptcy Court’s
rulings below, and this Court’s order denying the request for a stay pending appeal.
A. The Disclosure Statement And Solicitation Process
On June 20, 2007, the Debtors filed their plan of reorganization and an accompanying
disclosure statement. The plan was a “waterfall” plan under which Calpine’s reorganized equity
would be distributed to unsecured creditors until they were paid in full, with the balance, if any,
cascading to old shareholder interest holders in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute
priority rule. The proposed plan and disclosure statement made clear the value of reorganized
Calpine — which would determine whether creditors would be paid in full — would be
determined by the Bankruptcy Court. See 2007-10-04 Order at 2 [Dkt No. 6192]; see also
Fourth Am. Discl. Statement, at 177 [Dkt No. 6140].
In the disclosure statement, the Debtors provided their views regarding the value of
reorganized Calpine, and emphasized that, depending on the “total enterprise value” determined
by the Bankruptcy Court, equity holders might not receive any recovery under the proposed plan.
Not surprisingly, the Creditors Committee complained the Debtors’ initial total enterprise value
was too high, while the Equity Committee complained that it was too low — a point of
contention flagged seven different times in the disclosure statement. See Fourth Am. Discl.
Statement, at 4, 10, 13, 105, 109, 177, 184 [Dkt No. 6140].
The Bankruptcy Court approved the Debtors’ disclosure statement on September 26. The
following week, on October 5, the Debtors began mailing solicitation materials and soliciting
votes to accept or reject the proposed plan. The solicitation materials reiterated that equity
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holders were not guaranteed any distribution under the plan, that they had a right to contest the
total enterprise value, and that valuation ultimately would be determined by the Bankruptcy
Court. The Objecting Shareholders received these materials.
B. Discovery And Litigation Over Valuation
In connection with the approval of the disclosure statement, the Bankruptcy Court issued
orders establishing the ground rules for interested parties to engage in discovery and participate
in the total enterprise valuation trial and confirmation proceedings. See 2007-09-26 Order [Dkt
No. 6136]; 2007-10-24 Order [Dkt No. 6422]. These orders set forth a structured, organized
process to facilitate discovery focused on valuation and other aspects of confirmation, while
protecting sensitive confidential information concerning the Debtors’ businesses. Among other
things, the orders provided that discovery would close on December 10, established a
confirmation objection deadline, and scheduled the confirmation hearing for December 17.
As the Bankruptcy Court recognized, it was vital that the confirmation hearing occur in
December because the Debtors’ valuable exit financing commitment was scheduled to expire in
January 2008. See 2008-01-24 Order at 10-11 [Dkt No. 7478]. It was therefore in all
stakeholders’ interests that the confirmation process remain on track. Because of dramatic and
well-documented changes in the capital markets, if the financing commitment expired before the
Debtors emerged from chapter 11, forcing the Debtors to shop for a new exit financing package,
the Debtors would have faced potentially $800 million in additional interest expense, which
could have upended the plan and prolonged the bankruptcy proceedings. See Aff. of Morgan P.
Suckow ¶ 7 (Ex. A, Debtors’ Resp. to Mot. for Recons.) [Dkt No. 6189]; Aff. of Samuel M.
Greene ¶ 9 (Ex. A, Debtors’ Resp. to Mot. for Limited Stay) [Dkt No. 7456].
Although they did not object to the confirmation schedule when it was entered, the
Objecting Shareholders now contend that proceedings were rushed and discovery “severely
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limited.” Compania Br. 14; Flair Br. 9. In fact, for over ten weeks the parties engaged in
extensive discovery, centered primarily around valuation. Thirteen different parties promulgated
441 requests for production of documents. See 2008-01-24 Order at 3 [Dkt No. 7478]. As the
Bankruptcy Court found, the Debtors produced over 2 million pages of documents, and other
respondents produced nearly 157,000 additional pages. See id. Five different parties
promulgated 105 interrogatories, and three different parties promulgated 157 requests to admit.
See id. Over 20 depositions were taken. See id. Sixteen parties requested and were given access
to confirmation discovery. The Debtors, the Creditors Committee, and the Equity Committee
prepared eight expert reports, along with six rebuttal reports. See id. The discovery process was
anything but limited.
All stakeholders, including the appellants, had ample access to the fruits of this
discovery. Under the process established in September, any stakeholder could access discovery
by contacting the Debtors and agreeing to be bound by a protective order. Indeed, parties were
granted access to documents, even if they opted not to participate in the initial rounds of
discovery. For example, although counsel for the Indenture Trustee for ULC1 bonds did not
seek to participate in the discovery process until November, they were given access to
confirmation discovery at their request and attended numerous depositions.
Moreover, even without agreeing to the court-approved protective order, stakeholders had
access to non-confidential information that was not filed under seal, including the Debtors’
earnings forecasts, income statement forecasts, indirect cash flow forecasts, estimated 12/31/07
balance sheet, and monthly operating reports. See Plan, Ex. 12 [Dkt No. 5858]. Stakeholders
also were given access to the Debtors’ and the Equity Committee’s respective valuation report
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summaries, as well as the Creditors Committee’s statement on the Debtors’ plan and valuation,
and a summary report prepared by the court-appointed expert.
It is undisputed the Objecting Shareholders received adequate notice of the court-ordered
discovery and pre-trial schedules, the confirmation objection deadline, and information about the
confirmation hearing. It is also undisputed they did not object to the discovery process or the
safeguards erected by the Bankruptcy Court to protect confidential business information. The
Objecting Shareholders elected not to promulgate any discovery requests, hire any experts,
attend any depositions, or participate in any phase of either discovery or the valuation litigation.
On November 1 and 2, the Debtors released updated business plan projections and, on
November 19, filed an updated total enterprise valuation analysis, estimating that reorganized
Calpine’s total enterprise value was $19.35 billion. Based on the $19.35 billion figure and a
litigation risk-adjusted claims estimate, the Debtors projected that shareholders would receive no
distributions under the plan. See Updated Valuation, at 9 [Dkt No. 6642]. At the same time, the
Equity Committee and the Creditors Committee each released their own expert valuation reports
and, shortly thereafter, publicly released their valuation estimates in statements filed with the
Bankruptcy Court. Experts retained by the Creditors Committee estimated the mid-point
“distributable value” of reorganized Calpine at $17.78 billion, and projected shareholders would
receive no distributions. Experts retained by the Equity Committee estimated a mid-point total
distributable value at $25.8 billion, projecting significant distributions to shareholders. See
2008-01-24 Order at 3 [Dkt No. 7478].
On November 30, the deadline for objecting to the plan, the Debtors received fifty-one
objections raising confirmation-related issues. See Status Chart of Resp. to Debtors’ Fifth Am.
Joint Plan [Dkt No. 7239]. Although they were on notice that they would receive no
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distributions under several valuation projections, the Objecting Shareholders filed no objections
to the process for determining valuation or the manner in which that process was managed by the
Bankruptcy Court.
C. The Negotiated Settlement And Confirmation Order
Through the course of discovery, the room for reasonable disagreement over valuation
substantially narrowed. Perhaps most significantly, the Equity Committee’s expert reports
collapsed under the glare of cross examination. Its valuation estimates, which were based on a
non-standard replacement cost approach and generic cost estimates, were shown to be unreliable
and greatly inflated. See 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 53 (finding the Equity Committee expert’s
valuation theory “coherently disputed”); Compania Br. 20 (acknowledging that Debtors filed a
motion in limine).
The parties negotiated a resolution on December 16, 2007, and agreed to present the
Bankruptcy Court with a settlement valuing reorganized Calpine at $18.95 billion. At that
valuation amount, shareholders were entitled to no distributions under the plan. To provide
shareholders with the possibility of some recovery, however, the parties agreed to modify the
plan to provide shareholders — including the Objecting Shareholders — with “New Calpine
Warrants.” See Plan Supp., Ex. 21, Warrant Term Sheet [Dkt No. 7228]. Had the plan not been
modified in this fashion, shareholders would have received nothing under the plan.
Although the Bankruptcy Court had scheduled the December 17 confirmation hearing
months in advance, the Objecting Shareholders did not attend or monitor the hearing. If they
had, they would have heard the Debtors outline the terms of the proposed settlement in open
court. See 2008-12-17 Hrg. Tr. at 8–10. The Debtors reported the parties had agreed to adjourn
the confirmation hearing until December 19, providing time to document the settlement and
modify the plan documents. News of the settlement was immediately “picked up” by Debtwire
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(“Calpine cuts deal with equity; reduces enterprise value and exit financing by USD 400m”), and
Bloomberg (“Calpine, Creditors, Shareholders Agree on Value”), and later that day appeared on
the Associated Press wire (“Calpine to reduce bankruptcy exit financing by $400M”).
Over the next two days, the Debtors filed a motion seeking approval to make minor plan
modifications for the benefit of equity holders, a redlined version of the plan incorporating the
terms of the agreed-on settlement, and an amended hearing agenda for the December 19 hearing.
As required by Bankruptcy Rule 3019(a), the Debtors served the modification motion on both
the Creditors Committee and the Equity Committee, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019(a), and by
electronic mail, facsimile, and overnight mail on the entire Rule 2002 Service List — that is, on
every person who had asked to receive notice in the chapter 11 cases. See [Dkt No. 7285]. The
Debtors did not serve individual shareholders who had not requested notice because the Debtors
did not have their addresses. Under SEC rules governing the duties of securities intermediaries
to forward notices, contact information for shareholders is held by the shareholders’ nominees,
whose addresses the Debtors do not have, because they are stored in the records of securities
services organizations such as the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14b-1(b)(2), 240.14b-2(b)(3). It is clear that had the Objecting Shareholders requested
notice, or signed up to receive notice through the Bankruptcy Court’s system, they would have
received copies of the modification motion.
At the confirmation hearing on December 19, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Debtors’
motion to modify the plan, and determined that the total enterprise value of $18.95 billion was
appropriate. See 2007-12-19 Hrg. Tr. at 56-57. The Bankruptcy Court held that “the construct
of the settlement stipulations and the modifications of the plan are not material and do not
adversely affect the treatment of claims or interests.” 2008-12-19 Hrg. Tr. at 30. In addition, the
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Bankruptcy Court overruled remaining unresolved objections to confirmation. A colloquy
among counsel and the Bankruptcy Court regarding telephone calls the Equity Committee had
received from shareholders prompted the Bankruptcy Court to ask if any shareholder wanted to
object to the plan. No one came forward. See id. 55-56.
The Bankruptcy Court then entered a final order confirming the plan. See 2007-12-19
Confirmation Order [Dkt No. 7256]. The Bankruptcy Court found that “the New Calpine Total
Enterprise Value is equal to $18.95 billion.” Id. ¶ 76. It also found that the settlement resolving
the parties’ valuation dispute was reasonable, in good faith, and fair and equitable to all interest
holders. See id. ¶ 64.
D. The Objecting Shareholders’ Belated Requests To Re-Litigate
The Objecting Shareholders did not appear at, or in any manner participate in, the
confirmation hearings. The Compania Appellants retained counsel for the first time on
December 24, and then on December 31 — twelve days after confirmation — filed a motion for
reconsideration and a motion to reopen discovery. See 2019 Statement ¶ 2 (Dec. 31, 2008) [Dkt
No. 7316]. On December 28, Mr. Felluss also filed a motion for reconsideration. See Notice of
Appeal [Dkt No. 7322]. The Flair Appellants did not move for reconsideration or seek any other
relief before the Bankruptcy Court.
On January 8, at an in-chambers discovery conference, the Bankruptcy Court denied the
Compania Appellants’ request to reopen discovery and offered to hear argument and rule on their
reconsideration motion at that time. The Compania Appellants declined the offer, delaying
consideration of their motion until the scheduled hearing, a week later, on January 15.
At the January 15 hearing, in a comprehensive bench ruling, the Bankruptcy Court denied
the Compania Appellants’ motion to reconsider, and Mr. Felluss’s “motion to reargue,” which
the Court found was “grounded in conjecture.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 53. The Bankruptcy
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Court held that the Compania Appellants “are sophisticated investors,” who “[d]espite the size of
their investments, the risk involved, the existence of notice of the Confirmation Hearing and all
other applicable deadlines,” did not “request electronic notice,” did not “closely monitor” the
chapter 11 cases, and decided “as a matter of volition” not to “participate in the confirmation
process.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 50-51. The Bankruptcy Court also held that, “[h]aving failed
to appear and participate in a detailed scheduled discovery and confirmation process and pursue
their objections, there is no basis to now reopen the proceedings to allow them to retry the issues
they now seek to raise.” Id. at 51. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed its findings that “the Plan
Modification Motion did not materially and adversely affect the treatment of Equity Security
Holders,” because “at no time was Equity guaranteed to receive any distribution on account of
their Interests pursuant to the Plan.” Id. at 51-52. The Bankruptcy Court held that the total
enterprise value of $18.95 billion was “justified and reasonable” and, under the “terms of [the]
Plan,” equity holders at that value “would receive no distribution on account of their interests.”
Id. The settlement, which “granted” equity holders “the right to receive warrants rather than no
distribution at all,” improved their position. Id.
At the January 15 hearing, the Compania Appellants stated they would file a stay
“application promptly.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 48-54. Although the Debtors announced on the
record that the plan would become effective by month’s end, the Compania Appellants waited
another three days before filing their notice of appeal and motion for a “limited stay” on January
18, and setting the motion for hearing on January 24.
On January 24, the Bankruptcy Court denied the Compania Appellants’ request for a
“limited stay.” See 2008-01-24 Order at 7 [Dkt No. 7478]. In a written opinion, the Bankruptcy
Court noted the Compania Appellants had “made no showing” and “submitted no affidavits,
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declarations, or other appropriate evidence” supporting their stay request. Id. at 9. It also found
that “any harm” the Compania Appellants “may now face is a result of their own dilatory
conduct.” Id. And it held the relief sought by the Compania Appellants would jeopardize the
Debtors’ favorable exit financing and threaten potentially significant harm on the Debtors and
other stakeholders by delaying Calpine’s emergence from bankruptcy. Id. at 10-11.
E. This Court’s Denial Of The Compania Appellants’ Stay Request
On January 25, 2008, the Compania Appellants filed an emergency motion with this
Court for an expedited appeal and a “limited stay” pending appeal. The Flair Appellants moved
to join this motion on January 31, 2008. Although the affidavit submitted by the Compania
Appellants recognized the plan would become effective before the end of the month, see 2008-
02-25 Wolfson Aff. ¶ 4, the appellants did not request expedited briefing or seek an immediate
hearing. The Court scheduled a hearing for February 1, 2007 — one day after the plan became
effective. See 2008-01-31 Notice of Effective Date [Dkt No. 7551].
On February 1, 2008, after a lengthy oral argument, this Court rejected the stay request,
noting it had “been mooted by the closing of the exit financing and the issuance of the common
stock as contemplated by the confirmed plan.” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 65. The Court held the
Compania Appellants had not satisfied the statutory standards for a stay, because their “core due
process arguments substantially constitute efforts to attack the results of judicial proceedings of
which [they] were aware, in which they could have participated directly but chose not to, and as
to which they made the strategic decision to rely on a representative body that ultimately
determined to settle rather than litigate the valuation issues it had raised” earlier in the litigation.
Id. at 68. None of the appellants “took advantage of the opportunity to receive automatic
notification of court events.” Id. at 69. The Court further held that this “willful distancing” in
“high stakes proceedings as to which” they were “given initial notice … and in which the
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bankruptcy court made” key determinations regarding “enterprise valuation” and the materiality
of plan modifications “undermines significantly the possibility” the Compania Appellants could
prevail on appeal. Id.
F. The Plan Of Reorganization Is Substantially Consummated
On January 31, 2008, the Debtors’ plan went effective and “[e]ach of the conditions
precedent to consummation” set forth in the plan were “satisfied or waived.” 2008-01-31 Notice
of Effective Date [Dkt No. 7551]. Upon becoming effective, a series of transactions occurred to
implement the plan. Immediately, the plan discharged more than $12 billion of debt — held by
more than 2,600 creditors — and permanently enjoined those creditors from asserting claims
against Calpine; cancelled all the outstanding shares of old common stock; cancelled certificates
evidencing Calpine’s pre-petition bond debt; and established certain governance procedures for
reorganized Calpine, including a new board of directors and a restatement of the company’s
charters and bylaws. See Folse Decl. ¶ 12.
After the plan went effective, Calpine closed on its $7.3 billion exit financing facility,
and used $3.88 billion of those funds to pay off its debtor-in-possession financing facility. See
id. ¶ 13. Calpine also made wire transfers of billions of dollars to satisfy various secured and
administrative claims, including: (1) approximately $66 million to the holders of first lien
secured debt; (2) approximately $3.9 billion to holders of second lien secured debt;
(3) approximately $16 million to holders of other secured claims; (4) approximately $15 million
to holders of administrative claims; and (5) approximately $20 million to holders of unsecured
convenience class claims. See id. ¶ 14. As of March 25, 2008, Calpine had issued
approximately 417 million shares (more than 86% of the 485 million shares of new common
stock available to Calpine’s creditors) to thousands of creditors. Id. ¶ 15. Calpine also
distributed 9.7 million shares to an escrow account for the benefit of certain holders of unsecured
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bonds pending resolution of an intercreditor dispute. Id. ¶ 16. And on February 28, 2008,
Calpine issued approximately 48.5 million in warrants to purchase shares of new Calpine
common stock to holders of old Calpine common stock, including all of the Objecting
Shareholders. Id. ¶ 18.
On February 7, 2008, shares of new Calpine common stock began “regular way” trading
on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “CPN.” Id. ¶ 17. Between February
7 and March 25, myriad members of the investing public — including employees, individuals,
and institutional investors — have bought and sold more than 107 million shares of new Calpine
common stock. See id. In addition, approximately 4 million warrants, which are trading on open
markets under the ticker symbol “CPNCW.PK,” have exchanged hands. Id. ¶ 18.
Moreover, confirmation and implementation of the plan served as a catalyst for
completing distributions by Calpine’s Canadian subsidiaries, which had filed for relief under the
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act in the Court of Queen’s Bench in Calgary, Alberta,
Canada. On January 15, 2008, the Canadian Debtors obtained specific approval of certain
distributions to creditors that were dependent upon implementation of the confirmed plan. On
February 8, 2008 the Canadian Debtors, relying on the fact that those distributions had been
made, applied for and obtained an order terminating the Canadian proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 27-29.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Objecting Shareholders urge the Court to apply a de novo standard of review because
their appeals purportedly turn “on matters of statutory construction” and “the notice requirements
sufficient to satisfy due process.” Compania Br. 3. In fact, a far more deferential standard is
required.
The Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings — including its finding that reorganized Calpine
was appropriately valued at $18.95 billion — is reviewed for “clear error.” See Fed. R. Bankr. P.
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8013; In re Flanagan, 503 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (“bankruptcy court’s factual findings
will be upheld unless clearly erroneous”). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if this
Court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake” was committed. In re Chase,
No. 06 Civ. 13743, 2008 WL 203622, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008). If the Bankruptcy Court’s
findings are “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” this Court “may not reverse”
even if it “would have weighed the evidence differently.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 343 B.R.
47, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotations omitted).
Although a Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations are generally reviewed de novo, see
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013, those determinations here are being challenged in the context of a
motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The denial of a Rule 59
motion is committed to the sound discretion of the Bankruptcy Court and will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion. Devlin v. Transportation Commc’ns Int’l. Union, 175 F.3d 121,
132 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2007 WL 2994395, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2007).
The Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the Compania Appellants’ request to reopen discovery
“may be reversed only for abuse of discretion.” In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). Its decision not to consider certain analyst reports is reviewed under the same
deferential standard. See In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 45 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995)
(bankruptcy court “has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence”).
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ARGUMENT
I. The Consolidated Appeals Are Equitably Moot And Should Be Dismissed.
The Court should dismiss these consolidated appeals because Calpine’s plan of
reorganization went effective more than a month ago and has been substantially consummated.
There is thus a “strong presumption” that these appeals are moot. The Objecting Shareholders
have not and cannot overcome this presumption.
A. The Objecting Shareholders Have Failed To Address The Threshold
Mootness Question.
An appeal “must be dismissed” as moot when it is not possible “to grant ‘any effectual
relief whatever’ to a prevailing party.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S.
9, 12 (1992). An appeal also should be dismissed when although “effective relief could
conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable.” In re Chateaugay
Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Chateaugay I”). This pragmatic rule is “grounded in
the notion that, with the passage of time … effective relief on appeal becomes impractical,
imprudent, and therefore inequitable.” MAC Panel Co. v. Virginia Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622,
625 (4th Cir. 2002).
The doctrine of “equitable mootness” is “especially pertinent in bankruptcy proceedings,
where the ability to achieve finality is essential to the fashioning of effective remedies.”
Chateaugay I, 988 F.2d at 325; In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d
Cir. 2005) (doctrine applies to “avoid disturbing a reorganization plan once implemented”).
Courts in this Circuit have held that if a reorganization plan is substantially consummated, or an
unstayed order results in a “comprehensive change in circumstances” while an appeal is pending,
the appeal is presumptively moot. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 174 B.R. 884, 889 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (“strong presumption” that an appeal of an unstayed confirmation order is moot);; In re
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Chateaugay Corp., 94 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Chateaugay III”) (“courts presume that it
will be inequitable or impractical to grant relief after substantial consummation of a plan of
reorganization”); In re Adelphia, 367 B.R. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
The Objecting Shareholders have acknowledged that, absent a stay, their appeal could be
subject to dismissal. See 2008-01-18 Mot. For Limited Stay, at 14 (“the Debtors and the
Creditors Committee are likely to argue that any further prosecution of the appeal would be
equitably moot”) [Dkt No. 7446]; 2008-01-25 Mot. For Limited Stay, at 4, 34 & n.18. Indeed,
this Court noted that it was “largely persuaded that the stay application has been mooted by the
closing of the exit financing and the issuance of the common stock as contemplated by the
confirmed plan.” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 65 (emphasis added). Yet the Objecting Shareholders
fail even to mention mootness in their opening briefs, let alone refute it, a tactic that courts have
firmly rebuked. See Mannheim Video, Inc. v. County of Cook, 884 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.
1989) (criticizing “ostrich-like tactic” of ignoring potentially dispositive authorities); Devine v.
American Benefit Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675 n.5 (S.D. W.Va. 1998); Cedar Crest Health
Center, Inc. v. Bowen, 129 F.R.D. 519, 525 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
Instead of addressing this threshold issue, the Objecting Shareholders assert that their
“due process rights override the finality of the” Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order.
Compania Br. 36. In their view, even when a sophisticated shareholder “willful[ly] distanc[es]”
itself from “high-stakes proceedings,” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 68, that shareholder’s alleged
rights trump not only the rights of the many stakeholders who diligently participated in the
proceedings, but also the potentially tens of thousands of innocent third parties who relied on the
Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order.
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That view is unfounded. This Court faced a similar situation in In re Loral Space &
Communications, Ltd., 342 B.R. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Marrero, J.). There, as here, a group of
shareholders appealed a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order, seeking to reopen confirmation
proceedings, obtain additional discovery, and revalue the debtors’ assets. Id. at 138-39.
Although the appealing shareholders argued the bankruptcy court’s orders violated their “due
process and equal protection rights,” this Court dismissed the appeal as equitably moot. Id.. In a
telling passage that could have been written with these appeals in mind, the Court held that,
because the plan of reorganization had been substantially consummated, it could not grant relief
without disturbing the “numerous consummated transactions and further transactions taken in
reliance thereon.” Loral, 342 B.R. at 139, 140. Even though the appealing shareholders put
forth “several hypothetical calculations as to what the valuation” of the debtors’ assets “should or
could have been,” and although they argued they needed further discovery to prove their case,
this Court held that the appellants’ rights had to give way to those of other parties who were
entitled to rely on the finality of the Bankruptcy Court’s underlying orders. Id. at 138-39.
That holding is consistent with Judge Posner’s decision in In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641,
645 (7th Cir. 1992), which considered due process challenges to a bankruptcy court order
confirming the sale of property allegedly made without adequate notice. Judge Posner
recognized that taking “away a person’s property … without compensation or even notice is
pretty shocking.” Id. at 645. But he also recognized that because the sale was consummated
there were “property rights on both sides of the equation.” Id. Emphasizing the Bankruptcy
Code’s “strong policy of finality,” the Seventh Circuit denied the appeal notwithstanding the
constitutional nature of the claims asserted. Id.; see also In re USA Commercial Mortgage Co.,
Nos. 2:07-CV-00072, et al., 2007 WL 2571947, at *10 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2007) (dismissing
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appeal as equitably moot even though appellants raised serious due process violations); In re
Home Holdings, Inc., No. 98-cv-5690, 2001 WL 262750, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001) (courts
apply mootness doctrines notwithstanding alleged jurisdictional defects).
As these authorities underscore, preserving the finality of a bankruptcy court’s
confirmation order is necessary to safeguard the rights of all interested parties. Invoking due
process does not exempt an appeal from the proper application of doctrines of constitutional and
equitable mootness.
B. The Plan Of Reorganization Is Substantially Consummated.
Calpine’s plan of reorganization has been substantially consummated. Under section
1101 of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan is “substantially consummated” upon (i) the transfer of
substantially all of the property proposed to be transferred under the plan; (ii) the reorganized
debtor’s assumption of the debtor’s business; and (iii) the commencement of distributions under
the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2).
Like most plans in large-scale reorganizations, Calpine’s plan contemplated myriad
interrelated transactions affecting the reorganized Debtors, old equity holders, new equity
holders, creditors, employees, and other third parties. For example, the plan permitted
reorganized Calpine to access a $7.3 billion new credit facility; provided for the issuance of 500
million shares of new Calpine common stock; provided for the issuance of 48.5 million new
Calpine warrants, vested assets, property, and claims in the reorganized Debtors free from
encumbrances; canceled debt and equity securities and related obligations, permitted the Debtors
to assume and reject numerous contracts and leases; and discharged claims and terminated
interests. See Plan, Art. IV § B.1-B.3, H, I; Art. V §§ A, A.1-A.7, B, C; Art. VIII § A. [Dkt No.
7237]. Pursuant to the plan of reorganization, Calpine selected a new board of Directors,
authorized the adoption of a new charter and bylaws, and awarded grants of stock options and
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22
restricted stock to management. All of these contemplated transactions are substantially
complete. See Folse Decl. ¶¶ 19-20.
After the plan went effective, the reorganized Debtors accessed the new credit facility,
utilized billions of dollars to repay their debtor-in-possession financing and other secured debt,
and assumed control of business operations. Id. ¶ 13-14, 20. Hundreds of millions of new shares
were distributed to creditors through financial intermediaries and, more than 107 million shares
of new Calpine stock have been traded over the New York Stock Exchange as of March 25. Id.
¶¶ 15, 17; see Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 144 (plan substantially consummated because
reorganized entity issued substantially all of its reorganized stock and cash distributions); In re
Delta, 374 B.R. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (settlement substantially consummated because debtor
“distributed millions of dollars in freely tradeable stock through financial intermediaries”).
Calpine has issued more than 48 million warrants to old shareholders, which also have been
publicly traded. See Folse Decl. ¶ 18. It also has entered numerous new agreements and courtapproved
stipulations, paid taxes, and paid millions of dollars to settle various claims and liens.
See In re Enron Corp., 326 B.R. 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (plan substantially consummated in
part because “myriad … complicated and interrelated transactions have gone forward, including
the settlement and dismissal of litigation”). Since consummation, Calpine has spent millions of
dollars on various transactions that could only be entered into by a reorganized entity. See Folse
Decl. ¶¶ 22-23, 26; Home Holdings, 2001 WL 262750, at *5 (plan substantially consummated
because “many of the transactions provided for in the plan have been implemented and
completed”).
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C. The Objecting Shareholders Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption
That Their Appeals Are Moot.
Because the plan is substantially consummated, there is a “strong presumption that
appellants’ challenges have been rendered moot.” In re Texaco Inc., 92 B.R. 38, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 184 B.R. 648, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (substantial
consummation is a strong indication of mootness). To rebut this presumption, the Objecting
Shareholders must demonstrate (i) that the Court can order some form of “effective relief,” and
(ii) that the requested relief will not “affect the re-emergence of the debtor as a revitalized
corporate entity,” and (iii) that the requested relief will not “unravel intricate transactions so as to
knock the props out from under the authorization for every transaction that has taken place and
create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court,” and (iv) that the
parties “adversely affected by the modification have notice of the appeal and an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings,” and (v) that the appellants diligently sought a stay. In re
Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Chateaugay II”).
To pass this “stringent test,” Home Holdings, 2001 WL 262750, at *6, the Objecting
Shareholders must satisfy each and every one of these five factors. See Loral, 346 B.R. at 72; In
re Kenwin Shops, Inc., No. 99-10485, 2000 WL 351404, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2000). Here,
none of the factors are satisfied; the presumption of mootness is insurmountable.
1. The Relief Sought By The Objecting Shareholders Is Infeasible And
Not Permitted Under Federal Law.
The Objecting Shareholders request that the Court order “the issuance and reservation of
an additional three hundred million shares,” require the parties to re-litigate the value of
reorganized Calpine, and, if the re-litigated value is greater than $18.95 billion, distribute
additional stock to former shareholders. Compania Br. 44. The Objecting Shareholders thus ask
this Court to set aside five of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders, reopen the confirmation
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24
proceedings, and require the parties to redo the extensive discovery, expert report review, and
contested litigation that occurred from last September through December. In essence, the
Objecting Shareholders are asking for a whole new chapter 11 case.
Granting this relief would require this Court to blue pencil dozens of essential plan
provisions. See Plan, Art. IV [Dkt No. 7237] (provisions for implementation of the plan); id.,
Art. VII (provisions governing distributions). It also would effectively “unsatisfy” a necessary
condition of the debtors’ valuable exit financing and require numerous parts of the plan to be
reconfigured. See In re US Airways Group, 369 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting request
for piecemeal modification of a substantially consummated plan); see Mot. for Order Auth. Am.
to Exit Fin. Facility, Ex. B, Annex C (Dec. 14, 2007) [Dkt. No. 7116] (as a condition of closing,
confirmation order must be “in full force and effect” and “shall not have been stayed …,
amended, or modified”). And it would have potentially serious consequences for Calpine’s
Canadian subsidiaries, which have made distributions predicated on the value of reorganized
Calpine’s equity having a particular value. See Folse Decl. ¶¶ 28-29.
Such modifications and reconfigurations are not permitted. Section 1127(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that no modifications may be made to a plan after “substantial
consummation,” and that only a plan proponent may seek modifications after confirmation. 11
U.S.C. § 1127(b). As the Bankruptcy Court found, the Objecting Shareholders are not plan
proponents under 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b). See 2008-01-24 Order at 12-13 [Dkt No. 7478] (because
“the Objecting Shareholders were not [Plan] proponents,” they are “not authorized under Section
1127(b) … to modify the confirmed Plan”); see also In re Cinderella Clothing Indus., Inc., 93
B.R. 373, 378 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (“creditors are precluded from seeking a plan
modification”); In re Horne, 99 B.R. 132, 134 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989).
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Moreover, as the Second Circuit has recognized, reviewing courts lack authority to
modify the terms of a settlement reflected in a confirmed plan. In re Adelphia, No. 06-1738,
2006 WL 3826700, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2006); Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 97 (court has no
authority to “rewrite the terms of the bargain” reflected in a confirmed plan). A district court
judge “should approve or disapprove a proposed [settlement] agreement as it is placed before
him and should not take it upon himself to modify its terms.” In re Warner Commc’ns Sec.
Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986); Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1983)
(authority to enforce settlement applies to the agreement in its entirety, not to selected parts).
Even if modifications were permitted, they cannot be accomplished here without a
wholesale gutting of Calpine’s plan of reorganization. See Ionosphere, 184 B.R. at 652
(effective relief not available where appellants challenged the plan in its entirety). The plan
contains a non-severability provision, which states that none of the terms of the plan can be
modified, and that all of the plan’s provisions are “nonseverable and mutually dependent.” Plan,
Art. XII, § L [Dkt No. 7237]; see Delta, 374 B.R. at 523 (refusing to “treat a non-severable
provision of the Settlement Agreement as dispensable,” contrary to “the tradeoff that allowed the
parties to settle in the first instance”).
In light of the plan’s non-severability provision, the only relief this Court can order
would be to overturn the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order and require the parties to start
over and negotiate a new plan. But such relief would effectively force Calpine back into
bankruptcy and inevitably “disturb the numerous consummated transactions and further
transactions taken in reliance” on the consummated plan. Loral, 342 B.R. at 139. Billions of
dollars of distributions called for under the plan have already occurred, and numerous contracts
and leases have been terminated and new agreements executed in reliance on the Bankruptcy
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Court’s underlying valuation determination. In such circumstances, courts have repeatedly held
that no effective relief can be granted. Id. at 138-39; Bartel v. Bar Harbor Airways, Inc., 196
B.R. 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court unable to grant effective relief because “asset sales are
completed and the proceeds already distributed”); Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 96 & n.50 (“far from
evident” how effective relief can be granted when a “multi-billion dollar plan of reorganization”
includes “a global settlement, and distributions of cash, stock, and interests in a litigation
vehicle”); In re Blumer, 66 B.R. 109, 113 (9th Cir. BAP 1986), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir.
1987) (“effective relief is impossible if funds have been disbursed to persons who are not parties
to the appeal”).
2. The Court Cannot Grant Relief Without Imperiling The Debtors’
Successful Reorganization And Unraveling Numerous, Intricate,
Integrated Transactions.
Even if conducting a new valuation hearing were possible, granting such relief would be
inequitable because it would imperil the Debtors’ successful reorganization and “unravel
intricate transactions so as to knock the props out from under” the plan and “create an
unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court.” Chateaugay II, 10 F.3d at
953; Loral, 342 B.R. at 139 (reopening proceedings “so that the Bankruptcy Court can revalue
the debtors assets and redistribute accordingly … would clearly ‘knock the props out from under
the authorization for every transaction that has taken place’”).
The consummated plan here embodies a carefully negotiated global settlement approved
by the Bankruptcy Court. An incalculable number of interrelated transactions have taken place
since confirmation. Folse Decl. ¶ 22. As noted above, when the plan became effective, billions
of dollars were distributed in cash and stock. See id. ¶¶ 13-15. More than one hundred million
shares of stock have been bought and sold. And, perhaps most significantly, “[t]housands of
creditors have undoubtedly entered into countless transactions with their distributions since the
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plan went effective.” Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 96; Delta, 374 B.R. at 524 (appeal equitably moot
where, among other things, “the securities distributed” had “likely been traded … and those
distributions cannot reasonably be undone”). In addition, Calpine’s Canadian subsidiaries have
completed distributions to creditors in related proceedings in reliance on the value of Calpine’s
equity. See Folse Decl. ¶¶ 27-29. None of these transactions can “be unraveled, nor would it be
equitable to unravel them.” Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 97.
Because Calpine’s common stock is already trading on open public markets, it is hard to
fathom how the Bankruptcy Court could even begin to manage the severe disruptions and
irreparable harm that would occur to creditors, equity holders, and third party investors if this
Court were to require the parties to re-litigate the value of reorganized Calpine. See Loral, 342
B.R. at 140; Folse Decl. ¶ 24. When it denied the stay request, this Court acknowledged the
Bankruptcy Court’s unrefuted finding that “the issuance of an additional 300 million shares
would dilute the share value of the common [stock] issued under the plan by $6 a share, or some
$3 billion in market value, and that there would be similar injury to non-objecting shareholders
who do not object to the issuance of the warrants in that the warrants would suffer a similar
drop.” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 71; Folse Decl. ¶ 25. The Objecting Shareholders do not even
challenge this finding, let alone refute it, or offer any explanation how this irreparable harm
might be avoided.
Equally significant, the Objecting Shareholders have not explained how the Bankruptcy
Court could avoid the certain chaos that would ensue if the value of reorganized Calpine were
changed. See Compania Br. 5 (admitting that “[t]he key issue relating to the … plan of
reorganization was the value of the reorganized Debtors”). Even if Calpine were ultimately
valued at more than $18.95 billion, as the Objecting Shareholders contend, the Bankruptcy Court
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could not distribute additional stock to former shareholders without first recalling the warrants
received by former shareholders. Because approximately 4 million warrants have been traded to
parties over which this Court may have no jurisdiction, such relief is wholly impracticable. See
Folse Decl. ¶ 18, 24. Moreover, although the Objecting Shareholders speculate they might prove
a value greater than $18.95 billion, it is also possible the Bankruptcy Court would value
reorganized Calpine at a lower figure, adopting the Creditors Committee’s pre-settlement
position. If that occurred, not only would former shareholders be out of the money, but certain
classes of subordinated creditors also would be entitled to smaller (or no) recoveries. It would be
impracticable to order the return of warrants and stocks already distributed and, in many
instances, traded to third party investors. See Kenwin, 2000 WL 351404, at *2 (refusing to revise
plan where “property transfers ... could be undone” and value of company “substantially
dissipated”).
Nor could the Court grant relief without fundamentally changing the “bargain struck”
between the debtors and interested stakeholders on which the consummated plan is premised.
See Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 145 (appeal moot because “none of the completed transactions can
be undone without violence to the overall arrangements”); In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d
1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing to nullify non-debtor releases because it “would amount to
imposing a different plan of reorganization on the parties”). Under the terms of the
consummated plan, for example, the debtors and holders of claims and interests mutually
discharged and released one another and other parties from claims, interests, liabilities, liens, and
other actions arising before the instigation of chapter 11 proceedings. See Plan, Art. VIII, §§ AG,
K [Dkt No. 7237]. As the Bankruptcy Court found, these provisions are “an essential means
of implementing the Plan,” an “integral element of the transactions incorporated” into the plan,
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and are “important” to the plan’s “overall objectives.” 2007-12-19 Confirmation Order ¶ 34
[Dkt No. 7256]. The various releases were premised on the confirmed plan, not on some
alternative plan the Objecting Shareholders might prefer. See Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 145
(refusing to void plan releases because “the bargain struck by the debtor and the released parties
might have been different without the releases”); Delta, 374 B.R. at 524 (because “releases were
an integral part of the entire Settlement,” appeal could not go forward); In re Texaco Inc., 92
B.R. 38, 45-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (releases were part of an “integrated settlement” and rescission
would “undermine the entire reorganization”).
In short, granting any relief sought by the Objecting Shareholders would “unravel the
entire fabric” of the plan. Enron, 326 B.R. at 503; Folse Decl. ¶ 23. This extraordinary step
would “disrupt the equipoise that produced” the settlement “in the first place” and cast doubt on
the legitimacy of the entire reorganization. In re East 44th Realty, LLC, 07-8799, 2008 WL
217103, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008) (courts should not alter a “painstakingly-negotiated
bargain”). And it would be grossly “inequitable to all those who,” unlike the Objecting
Shareholders, “participated in good faith to bring it to fruition.” Enron, 326 B.R. at 503.
3. Adversely Affected Parties Have Not Received Notice Or A
Reasonable Opportunity To Participate In These Appeals.
The Objecting Shareholders also have failed to demonstrate that adversely affected
parties have received adequate notice of this appeal. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 174 B.R.
884, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Although the appellants have filed “Notices of Appeal,” those filings
are insufficient to satisfy their obligations. See Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 97-98. Innocent third
parties who were not involved in the reorganization but purchased stock after the plan went
effective may have no understanding that these appeals, if successful, could result in diluting the
value of their shares. See 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 4 (noting potential for significant share
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dilution). There is no record evidence “that these parties have been notified” or given “an
opportunity to participate in these proceedings.” Loral, 342 B.R. at 140.
This Court faced analogous situations in both the Adelphia and Trico cases. In both
cases, appellants sought relief that would have diluted the value of distributions received under a
consummated plan. And in both cases, the Court held that, because not all of the interested
stakeholders were before the Court, the appeal could not go forward. See Adelphia, 367 B.R. at
98; In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc., 337 B.R. 811, 815-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 78 B.R. 17, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (appeal moot because relief would
have a “harmful or prejudicial effect on creditors not party to the appeal” and affect “the
activities of the debtor in its reorganized form”). Because unwinding the plans would
“retroactively alter” the investing public’s “financial assumptions” and potentially diminish the
stock value, the Court held it would be “impossible to protect innocent third parties.” Trico, 337
B.R. at 815-16; see also In re Box Bros. Holding Co., 194 B.R. 32, 41-42 (D. Del. 1996) (appeal
moot though only three creditors altered their position in reliance on the reorganization plan).
So too here. Because distributions have been made and Calpine’s common stock publicly
traded, it is impossible for the Court to protect the “investing public,” including the “innocent
third parties” who purchased Calpine common stock “based on available public information”
when the plan went effective. Trico, 337 B.R. at 815. Relitigating valuation issues would
“cause substantial uncertainty” that this Court could not “even begin to predict.” Id.
4. The Objecting Shareholders Did Not Diligently Pursue Or Obtain A
Stay Pending Appeal.
Finally, the consolidated appeals should be dismissed because the Objecting Shareholders
did not diligently pursue all available remedies to obtain a stay. See Chateaugay II, 10 F.3d at
952-53. As courts have emphasized, “[a]s a practical matter review of a confirmed plan is
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possible only if it has been stayed pending appeal.” In re UAL Corp., 408 F.3d 847, 850 (7th
Cir. 2005). Diligently seeking a stay is therefore “of the utmost importance to an appellant
desiring to preserve an appeal of a confirmation order.” Loral, 342 B.R. at 141.
Neither the Flair Appellants nor Mr. Felluss sought a stay before the Bankruptcy Court.
Although the Flair Appellants (but not Mr. Fellus) joined in the Compania Appellants’ request
for a stay before this Court, the law is settled that a failure to seek relief from the Bankruptcy
Court precludes obtaining a stay on appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005; In re Zahn Farms, 206
B.R. 643, 644 (2d Cir. BAP 1997) (failure to first seek relief in Bankruptcy Court bars issuance
of stay on appeal). Because both the Flair Appellants and Mr. Felluss have failed to pursue all
available remedies, they cannot overcome the strong presumption that their appeals are moot.
See Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 144 (party must “seek a stay even if it may seem highly unlikely”
that one will be granted); Texaco, 92 B.R. at 46, 51, 54.
Unlike the Flair and Felluss Appellants, the Compania Appellants did seek a stay. But
they did not act “with diligence.” See Loral, 342 B.R. at 141 n.6 (emphasizing that even if
appellants sought a stay, their appeal was moot because they did not pursue “all available
remedies” with “diligence”).
The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan on December 19, 2007 — forty-three days
before the plan went effective on January 31, 2008, leaving the Objecting Shareholders almost a
month and half to prosecute their appeal. Cf. In re DJK Residential, M-47(GEL) (obtaining an
immediate hearing in this Court on March 5, the same day the bankruptcy court denied the stay
request); Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 88 (obtaining stay within 21 days of confirmation order). But the
Compania Appellants did not take the ordinary steps necessary to place their appeal in a posture
that would have allowed it to be promptly resolved. Instead, they waited twelve days after
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confirmation to file a reconsideration motion; waited weeks before filing their initial stay request
in the Bankruptcy Court; and after that request was denied, filed an emergency motion for a stay
pending appeal, but did not seek expedited briefing or an immediate hearing. This “[l]ack of
diligence, standing alone” is grounds for denying relief. Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762
F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (lack of diligence may preclude injunctive relief); Citibank, N.A. v.
Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985); see also In re Revere Copper & Brass Inc., 78 B.R.
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (because appellants failed “diligently to pursue the available remedies to
obtain a stay” it is “inequitable to hear the merits of their case”).
The rule that parties must “diligently” pursue a stay pending appeal is not a formalistic,
procedural obligation akin to checking a box; it is a pragmatic requirement intended to encourage
the aggressive pursuit of remedies before a plan goes forward to ensure that innocent parties do
not suffer. See Loral, 342 B.R. at 141 (upsetting “intricate transactions and numerous reliance
interests in the absence of an attempt to seek a stay would be inequitable”). As the Seventh
Circuit has recognized, “a stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the
implementation of the plan of reorganization.” In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th
Cir. 1994). Permitting the Compania Appellants to avoid mootness by half-heartedly pursuing a
stay “would be grossly inequitable” and subvert the requirement that a party act with all due
diligence. Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 98-99.
II. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Made The Threshold Showing Required To
Pursue Their Appeals.
Even if these consolidated appeals were not moot, they should be dismissed because the
Objecting Shareholders have failed to make the threshold showing required to pursue their
appeals. They have failed to establish standing to challenge many of the Bankruptcy Court
rulings to which they object; they have failed to address the Bankruptcy Court’s stated reasons
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for denying the motions for reconsideration; and they have produced no evidence on which this
Court could reasonably rely to grant the relief they seek.
A. The Objecting Shareholders Lack Standing To Appeal Rulings And Orders
Not Challenged In The Proceedings Below.
To have standing to appeal “an appellant must be an ‘aggrieved person,’ a person
‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily’ by the challenged order of the bankruptcy court.”
In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1997). This test is stricter than Article III’s “injury in
fact” requirement, see Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988), and
“rooted in a concern that freely granting open-ended appeals to those persons affected by
bankruptcy court orders will sound the death knell of the orderly disposition of bankruptcy
matters.” Gucci, 126 F.3d at 388.
To be an “aggrieved person,” a party must appear in the bankruptcy court and object to
the orders it seeks to challenge on appeal. Matter of Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686,
690 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[p]rerequisites for being a ‘person aggrieved’ are attendance and objection
at a bankruptcy court proceeding”); Brady v. Andrew (In re Commercial W. Fin. Corp.), 761
F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. Sandra
Cotton, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 87 B.R. 272, 274 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (where shareholder failed to
intervene before bankruptcy court, he has no standing to appeal the order at issue); D.A. Elia
Constr. Corp. v. Damon and Morey, LLP, No. 04-CV-975A, 2006 WL 1720361, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. 2006). As the Second Circuit recognized long ago, “t is too elementary to require
the citation of authorities that a person not a party to an action may not appeal from the judgment
entered.” In re Advocate, 140 F.2d 783, 784 (2d Cir. 1944).
Here, because they did not participate or raise objections in the proceedings below, none
of the Objecting Shareholders have standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s discovery,
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scheduling, and confirmation orders. The Compania Appellants and Mr. Felluss have standing
only to the limited extent they seek review of the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of their requests for
reconsideration.
1. The Flair Appellants Lack Standing To Participate In These Appeals.
The Flair Appellants have no standing to participate in these appeals. They did not
appear or object to any scheduling, discovery, evidentiary, or other order or ruling at any stage in
the bankruptcy proceedings. Nor did they seek reconsideration in the Bankruptcy Court. Their
first and only act of participation in the proceedings below was filing a notice of appeal.
Accordingly, because the Flair Appellants failed to participate in the proceedings below, and
because they have not established standing in their opening brief, their appeal should be
dismissed. See In re Miner, 229 B.R. 561, 565 (2d Cir. BAP 1999) (appellants “bear the burden
to demonstrate standing”); Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 489 F.3d 1279, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(appealing party must establish standing in its opening brief).
2. The Objecting Shareholders Have No Standing To Challenge The
Bankruptcy Court’s Discovery And Scheduling Orders.
The Objecting Shareholders spend pages and pages arguing that discovery was “rushed,
selective, and severely limited.” Compania Br. 14-24. They accuse the Debtors of improperly
“cut[ting] off” discovery, id. at 22, blame the Bankruptcy Court for mishandling proceedings, see
id. at 30, and criticize experienced attorneys representing the Equity Committee for purportedly
failing to protect their interests. See Compania Br. 15, 20, 22.
The Court should pay no heed to these unfounded accusations because none of the
Objecting Shareholders have standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s discovery or
scheduling orders, attack its decision permitting documents to be filed under seal, or resurrect
objections that were initially raised but are no longer being pressed by other parties. See 2007-
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12-19 Confirmation Order, § II.B [Dkt No. 7256] (remaining objections to the confirmation
order “hereby overruled on the merits”); see also 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 69 (questioning whether
Compania Appellants have standing to seek appellate review of “bankruptcy court’s
determinations with respect to discovery applications and plan objections to which they were not
parties”). No Objecting Shareholder challenged or sought timely reconsideration of the
Bankruptcy Court’s rulings on any of these issues and, accordingly, their belated objections to
the Bankruptcy Court’s litigation and discovery schedule cannot be raised on appeal. See Baker
v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000) (appellate courts do not consider issues that were
not raised at the trial level); Castleman v. Liquidating Tr., No. 6:06-CV-1077, 2007 WL
2492792, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2007) (failure to object in the Bankruptcy Court waives the
issue on appeal); In re Schick, No. 97 Civ. 9300, 1998 WL 397849, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1998).
3. The Objecting Shareholders Have No Standing To Challenge The
Bankruptcy Court’s Confirmation Order.
The Objecting Shareholders also have no standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s
confirmation order. See 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 51. Although they argue at length that their due
process rights were violated, that they were purportedly denied the right to a full and fair
valuation hearing, that the court-appointed expert exceeded its proper role, and that the
Bankruptcy Court failed to determine whether the requirements for confirmation were satisfied,
see Compania Br. 30-39, none of these arguments are properly before this Court. The Objecting
Shareholders did not participate in the confirmation proceedings and did not appear at the
confirmation hearing. See Troy Savings Bank v. Travelers Motor Inn, Inc., 215 B.R. 485, 491
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (“objections to confirmation may not be raised for the first time on appeal”).
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The Objecting Shareholders have framed their arguments as if this Court were reviewing
the issues on a clean slate. But this Court’s authority on appeal is limited to reviewing the
Bankruptcy Court’s order denying reconsideration — the only order for which the Compania
Appellants and Mr. Fellus qualify as “aggrieved” parties with standing to appeal.
B. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Addressed The Critical Findings On
Which The Bankruptcy Court Grounded Its Denial Of Reconsideration.
Although the Objecting Shareholders’ standing on appeal is limited to challenging the
Bankruptcy Court’s order denying reconsideration, they have not come close to making the
threshold showing required to demonstrate that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion. See
Devlin v. Transportation Commc’ns Int’l. Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (rulings
under Rule 59 reviewed for abuse of discretion).
The standard for granting reconsideration “is strict” and a motion to reconsider is rarely
granted “unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions” or factual data overlooked
by the court, Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995), or demonstrate “the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Griffin Indus. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” In
re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Secs. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
On reconsideration, the Compania Appellants and Mr. Felluss did not assert an
“intervening change in law” or come forward with “newly-discovered evidence.” Accordingly,
the burden was (and remains) on them to show that reconsideration was required to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 50 (holding appellants
“failed to establish either alternative criteria” for reconsideration).
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 46 of 60
37
The Objecting Shareholders have not satisfied their heavy burden. Most critically, the
Objecting Shareholders do not address the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that they could have
participated in the confirmation and valuation proceedings, but “as a matter of volition” chose
not to. 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 51. That finding is dispositive because the law is clear that
“[m]anifest injustice does not exist” when a party “could have easily avoided the outcome, but
instead elected not to act until after a final order had been entered.” In re King, No. 05-51441,
2005 WL 4030049, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 15, 2005).
Parties may not use motions for reconsideration to “raise arguments” that “could, and
should, have been made before judgment issued.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998); Associated Press v. U.S. Dept. of Def., 395 F. Supp.
2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (a motion for reconsideration is not “an opportunity for making new
arguments that could have been previously advanced”). The failure “to object is not excused by
[a] motion to reconsider.” In re Urban Broad. Corp., 304 B.R. 263, 271 (E.D. Va. 2004). An
interested party may not “sit idly by, not participate in any manner in the formulation and
adoption of a plan in reorganization and thereafter … raise a challenge to the plan for the first
time” in a motion for reconsideration. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (10th
Cir. 1988).
C. The Objecting Shareholders Have Not Come Forward With Any Evidence
Supporting Their Positions On Appeal.
In the end, the Objecting Shareholders’ arguments on appeal rest on their underlying
assertion that reorganized Calpine is worth more than $18.95 billion and former equity holders
were entitled to a richer payout under the plan. See Compania Br. 26. But they have come
forward with no credible record evidence — no affidavits, expert reports, or other documentary
evidence — supporting this assertion. There is accordingly nothing in the record contradicting
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38
the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that reorganized Calpine is worth $18.95 billion. See 2008-01-
19 Confirmation Order ¶ 76 [Dkt No. 7256] (“the New Calpine Total Enterprise Value is equal
to $18.95 billion”); see also 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 70 (the Compania Appellants “did not make
an evidentiary record below as to their valuation contention and do not proffer one now”).
Instead, the Objecting Shareholders’ arguments rest largely on hope and conjecture — if
litigation were reopened and the Bankruptcy Court required to reconsider its valuation
determination, they speculate their newly-retained attorneys (and still unidentified experts) might
obtain a more favorable result for equity holders than the result obtained by the experienced
attorneys and experts representing the Equity Committee on which the Objecting Shareholders
chose to rely. Apart from speculation “as to what the valuation should or could have been,”
Loral, 342 B.R. at 138, the only “evidence” cited by the Objecting Shareholders is the enterprise
value initially estimated by the Equity Committee’s expert before that estimate was tested in the
crucible of contested discovery. That estimate was carefully considered by the Bankruptcy Court
when it confirmed the plan. See 2007-12-19 Hrg. Tr. at 57 (“the court’s examination of all the
reports puts me somewhere in” the “range” of $18.95 billion) (emphasis added). The
Bankruptcy Court specifically found that the Equity Committee’s expert reports were
“coherently disputed by the other experts.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 53. It also determined that
the Equity Committee’s settlement decision was made in “good faith” and the terms of the
settlement were a “fair and reasonable compromise” of the “Equity Committee’s objections to
Confirmation and the disputes regarding the value of the Debtors and provides a fair recovery to
Calpine’s shareholders.” 2007-12-19 Confirmation Order ¶ 64 [Dkt No. 7256]. The Objecting
Shareholders provide no reason why the Bankruptcy Court’s careful assessment of this evidence
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 48 of 60
39
should be second-guessed on appeal. See Schick, 1998 WL 397849, at *6 (“peculative and
conclusory allegations” are insufficient to resolve factual disputes).
With no evidence supporting their position, the Compania Appellants argue the
Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by failing to consider analyst reports, which even Mr.
Felluss characterizes as “speculative industry commentaries … gratuitously attached as exhibits”
to the Compania Appellant’s reconsideration request. Felluss Br. 9. The Compania Appellants
contend that these “speculative” commentaries “may be admissible under the ‘market reports,
commercial publications’ exception to the hearsay rule.” Compania Br. 41-42. But this line of
argument was never presented to the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance. See United States v.
Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1580 (2d Cir. 1983) (hearsay exception cannot be raised for first time
on appeal). To the contrary, the Compania Appellants’ merely argued that the reports were not
hearsay because they were “not being necessarily offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 14-15 [Dkt No. 7519]. That argument was appropriately
rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. See Croton River, 52 F.3d at 45 n.2. Moreover, even if
admissible under a hearsay exception, if the reports were not offered for the truth, it is unclear
why they are relevant.
The Compania Appellants also have made no showing that the analyst reports should
have been admitted. Establishing an exception to the hearsay rule is only the first step in
admitting questionable evidence; evidence also must be relevant, reliable, and authentic — issues
that fall within the trial court’s sound discretion. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403, 802, 901; Croton
River, 52 F.3d at 45 n.2 (the “bankruptcy court, as a trial court, has broad discretion regarding
the admissibility of evidence”). Here, the Bankruptcy Court not only found that the offered
reports “were hearsay,” but also that “they were rank speculation” and “inappropriate as part of
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40
the motion” because, as Calpine counsel argued, the reports “were generated after [the]
December 19” confirmation hearing and, therefore, “improper to use in connection with a
motion for reconsideration.” 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 14-15.
In any event, the Compania Appellants have not argued, much less proven, that the
Bankruptcy Court’s evidentiary ruling was “clearly prejudicial” or that it resulted in “manifest
injustice.” Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 466 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2006) (must show ruling was “clearly prejudicial”); In re
Sharp, 361 B.R. 559, 565 (10th Cir. 2007) (when a trial court excludes evidence, a reviewing
court should “reverse only if the exclusion is an abuse of discretion that results in ‘manifest
injustice to the parties’”). To make such a showing, the Compania Appellants would not only
have to prove that the reports fall within an exception to hearsay, but also that the reports would
have changed the Bankruptcy Court’s factual finding that reorganized Calpine was worth $18.95
billion. The Compania Appellants have not even attempted to make this affirmative
demonstration. Indeed, considering the record evidence as a whole, it is hard to fathom how a
few analyst reports that were neither authenticated nor backed-up by expert testimony could
outweigh the hundreds of pages of expert reports and rebuttal reports the Bankruptcy Court
carefully reviewed and considered.
In short, because the Compania Appellants and Mr. Felluss did not offer any credible
evidence below in support of their motions for reconsideration, there is no concrete evidence —
as opposed to bare legal argument — on which the Court could rely to overturn the Bankruptcy
Court. Without such evidence, the Objecting Shareholders cannot carry their burden and their
appeals should be dismissed.
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III. The Objecting Shareholders’ Arguments Fail On Their Merits.
Even if the appeals were not equitable moot, and even if Objecting Shareholders had
standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order, and even if they had attempted
to make the necessary threshold showing to pursue their appeals, the consolidated appeals still
should be dismissed. The Objecting Shareholders never bring into focus any arguments that
might supply grounds for overturning the Bankruptcy Court.
A. The Objecting Shareholders’ Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.
The Objecting Shareholders argue that their due process rights were violated because
they purportedly should have been given an opportunity to object to modifications made to the
plan. In particular, the Objecting Shareholders contend that they were not given an adequate
opportunity to participate in the confirmation process, and that changes made to the plan were
material. Both assertions disintegrate on examination.
1. The Objecting Shareholders Had A Fair And Adequate Opportunity
To Participate In The Confirmation Process.
The Objecting Shareholders do not deny they could have participated in the confirmation
process. They do not deny they received notice that, on September 26, 2007, the Bankruptcy
Court approved the Debtors’ disclosure statement, established a schedule for litigating the total
enterprise value of reorganized Calpine, and gave all interested parties an opportunity to
participate. They do not deny they could have attended and participated in the confirmation
hearings. They do not deny they could have signed up for immediate electronic notification of
all bankruptcy court filings and orders. Nor do they deny they received adequate notice of the
disclosure statement, the proposed plan, the court-ordered discovery and pre-trial schedule, the
confirmation objection deadline, and the date of the confirmation hearing, or that they could have
taken part in discovery.
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42
The Objecting Shareholders instead stake their appeal on the notion they possessed
something akin to a constitutional right to have the Equity Committee engage in a contested
valuation process on their behalf, and then to redo litigation when the Equity Committee decided
to settle on terms the Objecting Shareholders did not like. See Compania Br. 15 (“Appellants
had every reason to rely on” the Equity Committee); id. at 7, 19 (Appellants “rightfully relied”).
But they cite no authority that the Equity Committee owed them such a specific duty or that it
was prohibited from agreeing to a reasonable settlement. See In re Johns Manville Corp., 68
B.R. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (an “equity committee … cannot guarantee favorable treatment”
for equity holders’ interests); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717, 722
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (members of a committee have a duty “to the class as a whole, not to its
individual members”). The selective facts set forth in the Compania Appellants’ opening brief
confirm that, after hard-fought litigation, the Equity Committee agreed to a settlement that it
determined was in the best interests of all equity holders.
The Compania Appellants have no right to “attack the results of judicial proceedings of
which [they] were aware, in which they could have participated directly but chose not to, and as
to which they made the strategic decision to rely on a representative body that ultimately
determined to settle rather than litigate the valuation issues that it had raised in its timely
objection to the debtors’ plan.” 2008-02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 67. As Judge Swain recognized on
February 1, such “willful distancing of a party ... in fast-moving, high-stakes proceedings, as to
which the record demonstrates it was given initial notice ... and in which the bankruptcy court
made determinations that the parties agreed enterprise valuation was appropriate and that, in light
of that valuation, the further plan modifications that were noticed out pursuant to the Rule 3019
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43
procedure were not material,” undermines Objecting Shareholders due process arguments. 2008-
02-01 Hrg. Tr. at 68.
2. The Minor Plan Modifications Were Not Material.
Even putting aside the Objecting Shareholders’ willful failure to participate in the
confirmation proceedings, there is no merit to their contentions that changes to the plan were
material.
The Objecting Shareholders rely on cases suggesting that plan modifications are material
if they result in a dilution in equity ownership. See Compania Br. 35-36. As noted above,
however, there is no evidence on which this Court could rely showing that any dilution in equity
ownership occurred. To the contrary, the Fourth Amended Plan — of which the Objecting
Shareholders indisputably received notice — would have resulted in no distributions to equity
holders based on a total enterprise value of $18.95 billion. See 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 52. In
other words, had the plan not been modified and the total enterprise value set at $18.95 billion,
the Objecting Shareholders would have received no recovery. As the Bankruptcy Court found,
the modified plan, which granted equity holders the right to receive warrants, was more
favorable to equity holders, not less. See id. at 52; see also In re Concrete Designers, Inc., 173
B.R. 354, 356 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (changes not material if affected party’s position
improved). The Objecting Shareholders have made no showing that this finding was clearly
erroneous.
Apart from speculating that reorganized Calpine’s enterprise value might be greater than
the value determined by the Bankruptcy Court, the Objecting Shareholders complain that the
plan’s structure was changed because the Bankruptcy Court failed to conduct a “valuation
hearing” that supposedly “had been contemplated and widely advertised by all parties.”
Compania Br. 37. But the Compania Appellants cannot point to anything in the plan or in the
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44
Bankruptcy Court’s orders promising a fully litigated valuation hearing. The proposed plan and
the disclosure statement merely required the Bankruptcy Court to “determine” the value of
reorganized Calpine. See Plan, Art. XIII § N [Dkt No. 7237]; Debtors’ Fourth Amended
Disclosure Statement at 177 [Dkt No. 6140]. Nothing prevented the Bankruptcy Court from
approving a settlement and determining the fair value of reorganized Calpine based on its review
of the expert reports and assessment that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best
interests of all stakeholders.
In the end, the Objecting Shareholders cannot overcome the incontrovertible facts that
they were notified of the discovery schedule and valuation process, were well aware that the
Bankruptcy Court would ultimately determine the value of reorganized Calpine, and knew that
under the Debtors’ plan, equity holders were not guaranteed any recovery. The Bankruptcy
Court determined a valuation of $18.95 billion, which would not have entitled equity holders to
any distribution under the plan. The minor modifications made to provide equity holders more
than what they were otherwise due could not have been material.
B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Retaining A Court-
Appointed Expert.
The Objecting Shareholders complain that the Bankruptcy Court “facilitated and
promoted a settlement through its own experts.” But this objection is waived and cannot be
argued on appeal because it was not raised in the motion for reconsideration. See In re
McKenna, 238 F.3d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 2001). The objection is also baseless because there is
nothing improper about appointing an expert to aid the Bankruptcy Court in understanding the
complex valuation issues raised in this multi-billion dollar reorganization. See In re Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 366 B.R. 278, 280-81 (D. Del. 2007) (approving use of fee auditor to
scrutinize fee applications in bankruptcy case). The Objecting Shareholders concede that court-
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 54 of 60
45
appointed experts are permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, see Compania Br. 37, and
that the Second Circuit has expressly approved the practice. See Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298
F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1962) (“cases are recorded as early as the 14th Century … of the
summoning of experts by the judges to aid them in the determining of” complex issues); In re
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (Brandeis, J.) (approving Judge Augustus Hand’s
appointment of an expert auditor to preliminarily investigate claim).
Relying on a ten-year-old Illinois law review article, the Objecting Shareholders
nonetheless complain that the Bankruptcy Court’s use of an “expert to foster a settlement is
immediately questionable because of the likelihood of undue pressure.” Compania Br. 38. But
these unsavory allegations of “pressure tactics” are unsubstantiated. None of the parties that
participated in the confirmation process and settlement negotiations have complained about
undue pressure from the court-appointed expert. Nor have the Objecting Shareholders identified
any evidence establishing that the court-appointed expert exceeded its proper role.
The Objecting Shareholders instead rely on out-of-context quotations from the
confirmation hearing at which “[c]ounsel to the Bankruptcy Court’s appointed expert”
supposedly “confirmed the presence of pressure tactics and coercive settlement.” Id. at 38. The
transcript contradicts these outlandish accusations. At the confirmation hearing, the Bankruptcy
Court noted that all parties responded enthusiastically, without objection, to the idea of utilizing
a court-appointed expert. See 12-12-17 Hrg. Tr. at 15 [Dkt No. 7431]. As counsel for the courtappointed
expert explained, the process was a cooperative enterprise: “despite the broad
difference of opinion that existed among the parties when the expert was appointed, the parties in
good faith reacted very positively to what the expert tried to get done here and everyone, in the
most professional manner possible, worked with us and then ultimately with each other,” to
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46
reach a fair and reasonable resolution of the disputed valuation issues. Id. at 14. Significantly,
numerous parties took the opportunity to confirm the propriety of the process. Id. at 14-18.
Counsel for the Equity Committee, for example, rose “to confirm the statements” made by others
“to reiterate” the Equity Committee’s “thanks and appreciation” to the court-appointed expert,
whose participation in the process was “of great benefit to all of us.” Id. at 18.
Accusing a court-appointed expert and, by implication, the Bankruptcy Court of
misconduct is a serious matter. In the only case cited by the Objecting Shareholders, the Second
Circuit condemned a district court’s tactic of sanctioning counsel when they did not settle on
terms dictated by the judge. See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669-70 (2d. Cir. 1985). That is
not remotely close to what occurred in this case.
C. The Bankruptcy Court Examined And Determined All Elements Required
Under Section 1129 Of The Bankruptcy Code.
In two paragraphs, the Objecting Shareholders continue their assault on the Bankruptcy
Court, complaining that it failed “to determine whether the confirmation requirements in Section
1123 and 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code were satisfied.” Compania Br. 39. But these
unsupported accusations are also baseless.
The Bankruptcy Court went to great lengths to fulfill its responsibilities under the
Bankruptcy Code. Before entering its confirmation order and approving the settlement, it
“reviewed the Plan, Disclosure Statement, the Plan Confirmation Brief, the Valuation Brief, the
Doody Affidavit, the Greene Affidavit, the Donahue Affidavit, the Castellano Affidavit, the
Voting Certification, … the Warrant Term Sheet, the Supplemental Voting Certification, and all
filed pleadings, exhibits, statements, and comments regarding Confirmation, including all
objections, statements, and reservations of rights.” 2007-12-19 Confirmation Order at 3 [Dkt
No. 7256]. The Bankruptcy Court also “heard the statements, arguments, and objections made
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 56 of 60
47
by counsel in respect of Confirmation” and it “considered all oral representations, testimony,
documents, filings, and other evidence regarding Confirmation.” Id.
Far from shirking its responsibility to apply the requirements of section 1123 and 1129,
the Bankruptcy Court dedicated sixteen full paragraphs of its confirmation order to explaining
why section 1123’s requirements were satisfied, see id. ¶¶ 20-35, and thirty-nine full paragraphs
to addressing the requirements of section 1129, see id. ¶¶ 18-56, specifically finding the Debtors
had “met their burden of proving the elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code by a preponderance of the evidence” and by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 5.
Contrary to the Objecting Shareholders’ assertions, the Bankruptcy Court considered section
1129(a)(2)’s solicitation and compliance requirements, see id. ¶¶ 36-39, section 1129(a)(3)’s
good faith requirements, see id. ¶ 40, section 1129(a)(7)’s best interest test, see id. ¶ 44; and
section 1129(b)’s absolute priority rule. See id. at ¶¶ 52-54.
The Objecting Shareholders’ conclusory criticisms do not come close to satisfying their
heavy burden on appeal to show the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion or otherwise
committed clear error. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“issues not
sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on
appeal”); Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Ballard,
779 F.2d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
In contrast to the Compania Appellants, Mr. Felluss dedicates a significant portion of his
opening brief to arguing that the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis failed to satisfy the requirements of
section 1129. See Felluss Br. 20-23. But even a generous reading of Mr. Felluss’ submission
below, which was “grounded in conjecture,” demonstrates that these arguments are all raised for
the first time on appeal. See 2008-01-15 Hrg. Tr. at 53; Felluss Mot. to Reconsider [Dkt No.
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 57 of 60
48
7322]. Nor does Mr. Felluss identify any legal error made by the Bankruptcy Court in
conducting its section 1129 analysis. Although Mr. Felluss states “there is little doubt that the
Plan does not satisfy all the requirements of Section 1129(a),” he provides no legal or factual
basis to support this bare contention.
D. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Additional
Discovery.
Finally, the Objecting Shareholders have not shown that the Bankruptcy Court abused its
discretion in denying discovery in conjunction with the motion for reconsideration, or refusing to
consider analyst reports posted on the Internet. See In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[t]he bankruptcy court’s decision not to permit additional discovery may be
reversed only for abuse of discretion”); Cruden v. Bank of N.Y., 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir.
1992).
The Objecting Shareholders concede that they were required to make a prima facie
showing that the Bankruptcy Court committed manifest errors of law before being entitled to
discovery. See Compania Br. 40-41; see In re Orlick, No. 01-civ1606, 2002 WL 432006, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2002) (a party has no right to discovery on rehearing). But they never made
this prima facia showing and provide no basis on appeal for disturbing the Bankruptcy Court’s
discretionary decision.
Even the cases cited by Objecting Shareholders provide a firm basis for upholding the
Bankruptcy Court. In each case the court denied the request for additional discovery. See In re
Wyatt, Inc., 168 B.R. 520, 525 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (denying additional discovery because,
even if were it granted, the outcome would not change); H. K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1119-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (a request “for discovery for the purpose of
attacking a final judgment involves considerations not present in pursuing discovery in a pending
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 58 of 60
49
action,” including the “public interest of the judiciary in protecting the finality of judgments”);
U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters, 826 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying discovery); Matter
of Levensaler, 13 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr. Conn. 1981); Goldy v. Beal, 91 F.R.D. 451, 456 (D.C.
Pa. 1981). These cases, and those of courts in this Circuit, confirm that the Bankruptcy Court
properly denied the discovery requests. It is well within a court’s discretion to deny additional
discovery where, as here, the motion “is supported only by speculative claims that further
discovery will provide the requisite evidence to flesh out deficient claims.” Martin v. O’Conner,
225 B.R. 283, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Carney v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 813 (2d
Cir. 1994); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 251 (2d Cir. 1985).
* * * *
Because the Objecting Shareholders seek to explode a complex, multi-billion dollar plan
of reorganization for a company servicing an essential sector of the economy, they face a heavy
burden to justify their request that the Court turn back time, unwind the consummated plan, and
reopen confirmation proceedings. To have any hope of satisfying this heavy burden, it was
incumbent on the Objecting Shareholders to develop concrete record evidence that might support
their position on appeal. It also was incumbent on the Objecting Shareholders in their opening
briefs to attend carefully to the proper standards of review, address forthrightly the obvious
mootness questions that infect these appeals, and respond directly to the Bankruptcy Court’s
stated reasons for denying their reconsideration requests, including justifying their dilatory
conduct and failure to participate in the proceedings below.
Instead of satisfying these obligations, the Objecting Shareholders’ opening briefs are
larded with unsupported accusations that turn on speculative assumptions about whether
reorganized Calpine might be valued differently if confirmation proceedings were reopened.
The arguments presented in the opening briefs do not come close to what should be expected of
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 59 of 60
50
parties seeking to summon this Court’s powers of appellate review to overturn a confirmed plan.
See Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc., 164 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (“new
arguments may not be made in a reply brief”). Because they have failed to substantiate their
arguments, the Objecting Shareholders’ appeals should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss the consolidated appeals and affirm the Bankruptcy Court.
Dated: March 28, 2008
New York, New York
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Peter Asplund
Richard M. Cieri (RC 6062)
Marc Kieselstein (admitted pro hac vice)
David R. Seligman (admitted pro hac vice)
Peter Asplund (PA 0603)
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4611
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Jeffrey S. Powell (admitted pro hac vice)
Ashley C. Parrish (admitted pro hac vice)
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Counsel for the Debtors-Appellees
Calpine Corporation, et al.
Case 1:08-cv-01286-VM Document 21 Filed 03/28/2008 Page 60 of 60

[dren]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.783.690 von Charly_2 am 01.04.08 22:36:03

Hallo,
Habe versucht das alles zu lesen, aber geht nicht. Verstehe nicht viel von den Amis Schreiben, sowieso bin schön länger Zeit nicht Zufrieden mit dem Entwicklung und jetzt ist auch das Chart verschwunden. Selber bin immer noch der Inhaber von 2000 Stück.
Kann mir jemanden erklären was kann ich noch mit diese Aktien machen ???

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.818.093 von dren am 05.04.08 19:40:53

Hi dren,

die Aktien sind keine Aktien mehr, sondern Optionsscheine, die nicht mehr in DE gehandelt werden (darum auch kein Kurs = Chart).

Wonach sich derzeit der OS-Kurs richtet, ist mir völlig klar.

Die einzige Chance besteht darin, die OS über die USA zu verkaufen, denn eine Steigerung des Aktienkurses um mind. 40% wäre notwendig, damit der Schein überhaupt noch Wert hat.

Fazit:
Wie schon lang und breit diskutiert, wurde Calpine zu Lasten der Altaktionäre aus der Krise geführt und die Verantwortlichen wurden dafür auch noch belohnt

gruß
mac

[dren]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.821.688 von macsoja am 06.04.08 21:54:53

Stimmt, das CALPINE CORP. WTS08 ist nur noch das OS. Aber was ich nicht verstehe ist das Unterschied von das was ich lesen und das was ich rechnen kann. Nämlich die Calpine Berichtet gute Ergebnisse, und ich habe seit dem Kauf in April 2007 eine Vermögen verloren.
Wen ich jetzt das Papier in US verkaufe, werden die Gebühren teuere sein als das was ich bekommen kann.

[Charly_2]

..da läuft noch was - aus Ami-Board, Beitrag von E. Felluss

Here are the replies....
we were the only ones to address the warrants and are alone...as for sonnschein, we were on the correct path...as for "Fraud by Lawful Means"...we are alone...as for e/m we are on the same path as sonnencshein....

CALPINE CORPORATION - Felluss Consolidated in Compania Internacional Financiera, et al v. Calpine Corp., et al. - Civil Case No. 08-cv-01286 (VM)
Dear Counsel:

Attached for distribution in the above referenced case is the Reply Brief of Appellant Elias A Felluss, pro se.
http://www.randpatent.com/The_Felluss_Reply.doc" target="_blank" rel="nofollow ugc noopener">
http://www.randpatent.com/The_Felluss_Reply.doc

Sonnenschein Reply:
http://www.randpatent.com/Sonnenschein_Reply.pdf

Forman Reply:
http://www.randpatent.com/Forman_Reply.pdf

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.840.475 von Charly_2 am 08.04.08 21:26:33

Link 1: Calpine als der grösster Betrug in der US Bk Court History

The amount of monies to be gained by Calpine, through the fraudulent conduct of Calpine and others in this Bankruptcy is of such a magnitude it is almost inconceivable. Calpine through its own admission in its Appellees Brief, page 1 said: “This brought to a successful close one of the largest chapter 11 proceedings in history…” In fact Calpine’s fraudulent scheme may very well result in being the largest fraud ever perpetrated in the United States Bankruptcy Court in history. A fraudulent scheme that has thus far; netted Calpine BILLIONS of dollars!

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.840.533 von Charly_2 am 08.04.08 21:33:46

...kommt noch dazu, dass er diesem Calpine Pack noch vorrechnet wo sie überall die Shareholders betrogen haben durch Ministerial Errors

Ministerial Error No. 1
Notably the Debtor tells us $11.942 billion Reorganized Equity Value (waterfall format) is the balance of equity after total secured claims are subtracted and cash added back in and is based on the $22.485B recited in Exhibit 21 (Figure 1) which wrongly includes the 15% warrant premium in its gross calculation.
The Warrant Term Sheet states the premium for the warrants will be at 115% of the Equity....it didn't say Equity PLUS Debt (with emphasis) or 15% plus and additional 15% Premium.
Is this wrong headed? YES.
Put another way with the shoe on the other foot, if one were buying a house and was told to pay financing points on the loan plus the equity, not just the loan, I am sure there would be cries in protest.
The company is worth the sum of the assets valuation less liabilities, not the sum of the liabilities (claims).


Rest ab Seite 20ff

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.840.585 von Charly_2 am 08.04.08 21:40:30

...bis jetzt wurden diese Fakten von den Adressaten weder widerlegt noch beantwortet

Das hat noch ein Nachspiel - class action !

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.840.593 von Charly_2 am 08.04.08 21:42:35

In Summarizing Ministerial Errors
Under the basic principals of bankruptcy it cannot be the Court's intention to allow Creditors to receive more than the creditors are contractually owed, which is exactly what happened when these latter calculations were used.
Unfortunately, if that were the only thing gone awry here we could simply make the adjustments and move on, however we now must address the matters of concealing equity.
In conclusion, based upon Error Number 1......$19.55 Billion is not the confirmed $18.95 Billion; Error Number 2......$19.55 includes the Debt, and is not Net Equity before creditor claims and so does the correct confirmed number of $18.95 Billion include all Debt and upon which a premium was added making the effective out of the money warrants, not by 115% but by 142%; and Error Number 3.....Shares and equity do not balance, for all the reasons outlined herein this case should be remanded to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for review.

At a minimum, these ministerial errors must be addressed to give this entire process any credibility.

D. Appellants Appeal is Not Moot and Should Not Be Dismissed.
Appellant’s appeal is far from being “Equitably Moot” on its face. Appellant reasserts rebuttal argument “A” as if fully recited at length herein, so as to avoid duplication.
Appellant continues to stress in the alternative to revoking the confirmation, other relief is available as outlined in Appellant’s rebuttal argument “I.” Appellant reasserts rebuttal argument “I” as if fully recited at length herein, so as to avoid duplication.
The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness should not be applied when the Appellant does not seek to upset the plan of reorganization. In this case alternative relief does exist. If the confirmation were not revoked, the Court could fashion alternative relief as outlined in Appellant’s rebuttal argument “I” without upsetting the plan of reorganization. In re Continental Airlines, 117 S.Ct. 1098, 117 S.Ct. 686; See Also: Miami Center Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of New York, 838 F.2d 1547, 1554-57 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); In re Kaiser Group Int’l, Inc., 326 B.R. 265, 270 (D. Del. 2005).
An appeal is not moot if the Court can still order some effective relief which the Court could do in this case. In re Club Assoc. 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992); See Also: Miami Center Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of New York, 820 F.2d 376, 397 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988).
Equitable Mootness is not available in this case as the Court has the capability to provide meaningful and practical relief to the Appellant. In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
A balancing of the equities favors Appellant’s right to seek review. Courts consider several factors in determining whether effective judicial relief is available on appeal, ultimately a Court should not dismiss a case as moot if it can effectively grant relief. In re United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc., 138 B.R. 426, 428 (D.Del. 1992); See Also: In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 956 F.2d at 1069.
Failure to obtain a stay pending appeal does not compel a finding of equitable mootness. In re Club Assoc., 956 F.2d at 1070; Matter of Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992); See Also: In Re Adelphia Communications Corporation, 367 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
In re PWS Holding Corporation, 228 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit refused to dismiss an appeal of confirmation order on grounds of equitable mootness. Like this case, in PWS the creditor was unsuccessful in obtaining a stay pending appeal, the plan was thereafter substantially consummated. In that case the Court found that intermediate options exist like those contained in Appellants Rebuttal Argument “I” and as such certain items could be stricken from the plan without undoing other portions of it. That Court stated it drew instruction from In re Chateaugay Corp., 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952 (2nd Cir. 1993). See Also: In Re Zenith Electronics Corporation, 329 F.3d 338 (3rd Cir. 2002).

Substantial consummation of the plan by itself does not resolve the issue of mootness. In re Club Assoc., 956 F.2d at 1069. Substantial consummation does not justify dismissal for mootness in all circumstances. In re United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc. supra. See Also: In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148-1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1980).

E. Appellees Cannot Rely on The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness to Escape Their Fiduciary and Other Responsibilities For Profit.
Appellees cannot be rewarded by this Court, by allowing them to escape their responsibilities under the doctrine of equitable mootness for their successful design and implementation of the largest fraudulent scheme in the United States Bankruptcy Court history.
Appellant reasserts rebuttal argument “A” and “D” as if fully recited at length herein, so as to avoid duplication.
Calpine through its fraudulent scheme guided this bankruptcy into a position where it could assert the doctrine of equitable mootness. Calpine now asserts this doctrine in reliance that the Court will accept this assertion, thus allowing Calpine to walk-a-way with BILLIONS OF DOLLARS of ill-gotten gains.
Although Calpine created this situation, it is up to the Court to realize the fraudulent scheme and stop Calpine from receiving any additional benefits because of it. At that point the Court should consider in what manner it could begin to; make the damaged parties whole. Appellant beseeches the Court to do just that.

F. Appellant Was Denied Due Process.
Calpine argues that Appellant has received notice of all events leading up to and including the confirmation hearing. Although Appellant may or may not have received notice of events, it did not make any difference to have notice of any hearing when Appellant did not also have the accurate financial and other information to use at the hearing.
Calpine deprived Appellant from the opportunity to assert a timely objection, thus effectively denying due process to Appellant, when Calpine withheld certain information, provided false information and untimely releasing other information to the Court, the Trustee, the Creditors, Appellant and others.
G. The Bankruptcy Court Did Err In Entering The Confirmation Order.
Although duped by Calpine, the Court unknowingly erred in entering the confirmation order, because the Court justifiably relied upon misleading financial documents provided by Calpine for the confirmation. Had Calpine submitted accurate financial information as it was under a duty to do, the Plan would have been materially affected.
Calpine by hiding the BILLIONS OF DOLLARS of VALUE from the estate, not only committed a fraud against the Court, it cheated the creditors and stockholders from receiving the maximum amount they could have received in exchange for satisfaction of their debt.
At this point in the bankruptcy the creditors and stockholders were forced to take a small percentage on the dollar. A cram down, if you will. However had the additional hidden value been added to the estate, as it should have, the creditors and stockholders would have most likely not received dollar for dollar, but would have received a figure closer to 70-80 percent for dollar. This would have been a material change in the bankruptcy as a whole, effecting all parties.
Yes, the Court justifiably relied upon the misleading, out of date, financial information it received from Calpine all to its detriment, and the detriment to all parties involved.

H. Appellant’s Attacks Involving the Motion to Reconsider Are Meritorious.
Appellant in this reply brief carefully outlines each and every point of why Appellant’s reconsider request was meritorious. The Appellees in their brief at page 44 states: “Second, Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(3) requires that a plan be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). The Second Circuit defines good faith as requiring a showing that “the plan was proposed with ‘honesty and good intentions’ and with ‘a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected.’”
With all of the chicanery Calpine has done in this bankruptcy as it constantly implemented its fraudulent scheme, no reasonable and prudent person could consider the proposed plan as not being forbidden by law and in bad faith.
First, the law forbids the implementation of the plan because, the plan was devised using fraud and deceit as outlined herein. This in and of, itself makes the plan on its face unlawful. To allow the plan to continue in its current state only furthers the fraudulent scheme of Calpine all the while causing additional damages the parties and the public at large.
Second, the unlawful plan was never submitted in good faith. Had good faith appeared anywhere it would have caused the appropriate calculations of Calpine’s value to be shared with the estate long before the December 20, 2007 confirmation hearing. Instead the actual calculations of Calpine’s value at that time have not been submitted to the Court to this day. The fraudulent scheme continues.

I. Remedies That Could Be Applied Without Disturbing The Underlying.
As in Kaiser Group, supra, the relief Appellant seeks herein will not unravel the plan. The Creditors are owed $8.6 Billion of contractual debt, yet they are dividing amongst themselves not only some $8.6 Billion but in addition, they are about to accrue the remaining portion of $2.65 Billion in the form of 68 million undistributed shares which reverts to them unless there is a revelation that has yet to be disclosed, amounts which should be immediately awarded to the old shareholders.
If the latter is found to be unworkable, upon forensic review, adjustments to balance sheet valuations should be made adjusting the ineptness of the accounting that dominates.
In addition, the Warrant Strike price should be reduced to $19.34 from $23.88 and extended for the same period of time as the options and warrants awarded to management in the interest of fair play.
As for impact on the current Confirmation Plan, issuance of new warrants pricing in the money would have little or no impact, Remember, when warrants are exercised, CPN gets the strike price per share in cash, so it nets to no loss for the present new shareholders.
At the very least, a forensic review of the macro accounting numbers is warranted as so many people are being impacted by what seem to be simple elementary school arithmetic and Scribner errors
Solutions may cause some dislocations as the Respondents assert in their "Equitable Mootness" claims. However, a solution is mandated otherwise deceptions designed to conceal true value will prosper in Bankruptcy Court.
The challenge will be in identifying which solution would cause the least dislocation and keep the confirmation in tact.
While it is true, investors in the new company will have experienced some dilution, they really have only themselves to blame. These Motions to Reconsider, and pending Appeals are matters of public record and the new investors should have known these cases could have a material impact on their investment.

CONCLUSION
The Debtor, and the Bankruptcy Court, without any reference to fairness, decided which creditors get paid and how much those creditors get paid, is rejecting the historical foundation of equity receiverships and to read the § 1129(b) requirements out of the Code. . . . To accept that argument is simply a start down a slippery slope that does great violence to history and to positive law. Although under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code a bankruptcy court may exercise equitable power to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title,” this power is not unfettered. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). As the Third Circuit recently reminded us in In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004), “the equitable powers authorized by §105(a) are not without limitation, and courts have cautioned that this section does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” Id. at 236 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Bluntly put, no amount of legal creativity or counsel’s incantation to general notions of equity to any supposed policy favoring reorganizations over liquidation supports judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the approval of the Debtor’s Sixth Amended Plan Joint Plan of Reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code entered on December 19, 2007 violates the Federal Bankruptcy Rules under 11 U.S.C. § 1129. The Plan, therefore, cannot be confirmed.
Additionally, it was never the intention of the Debtor management to maximize the estate as they had a duty to do for the benefit of the shareholders, so they, the shareholders, might recover what was rightfully theirs. But instead, the management sought to keep the Calpine generation fleet in tact for the benefit of Creditors who shall remain nameless but now retain newly appointed seats on the newly emerged Calpine Board of Directors.
This was addressed in the Appellant's original Motion to Reconsideration, but largely fell on deaf ears.
While a transparent valuation was never conducted for the public record, a simple "back of the envelope" proof shows the Creditors benefit by billions in excess of their contractual debt as did the management with their incentive awards for concluding the bankruptcy and successful emergence provided.
The "Razor's Edge" here is not complicated, passing swiftly by lions at the gate.
Calpine states they acquired DIP financing from a consortium of lenders at the outset of these Calpine cases.

The Amount of the DIP was $4 Billion. This financing was secured by the Geysers, some 725 mw of geothermal generation capacity in the hills of California.
Calpine has stated innumerable times that it has 24,500 mega watts of generation capacity.

By subtracting 725mw from 24,500 mw, this leaves 23,775 mw of remaining generation assets that might be liquidated to satisfy creditors claims.
In today's market, and indeed, the market of December 2007, the cost to construct Combined Cycle Gas Generation is in excess of $1200 per mw. This would calculate to $28.53 Billion in excess of the $4 billion secured in the Geysers.
So what did Calpine represent to the Court when it valued "Plants and Equipment"? A paltry $12.00Billion inclusive of the Geyser facilities…less than half!
This is a compelling example why the entire accounting presented by Calpine to the Bankruptcy Court must be examined and how had Calpine dispose of some generating asserts would have found itself solvent and able to finance its debt without the need of an Exit financing package.
The "proof of the pudding," so to speak, comes in recent filings made by Calpine where they reported substantial gains over what they projected in bankruptcy in excess of $100 Millions on assets sales made after the "Exit". These gains rightfully should accrue to the old shareholders, instead they are awarded to the creditors and new shareholders.
So deep is this river.

For all the reasons stated herein, the Appellant requests that the Court deny all relief requested by the Debtor, revoke the confirmation plan or in the alternative order intermediary relief as outlined in rebuttal argument “I” that would not disturb the underlying plan, plus grant other relief as requested herein and grant Appellant such further relief as the Court deems just, either in equity or law, namely:
1. Adjust the Warrant Strike Price to accurately reflect the Net Equity predicate for establishing a premium of 15%.
2. Allow Warrants to have a live of 5 years rather than 6 months.
3. Order a forensic review of all the Debtors calculations leading up to the exit to determine if they were reasonable.
4. If equity remains after such a forensic review, then the Court can find an Order for the issuance of new shares to be provided to the holders of the warrants.
5. Failing all the above, remand to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for review of the numerology.

Dated: New York, New York
This 7th the day of April, 2008
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________
Elias A. Felluss, Pro Se Appellant

[xxt]

Hallo,

hat schon jemand seine Warrants verkaufen können? So wie es aussieht, besteht ja doch noch die Chance, dass die Warrants nochmal Im Geld landen.

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.017.678 von xxt am 02.05.08 17:25:13

..demnächst sollte ein Q-Report herausgegeben werden...

..und gekauft wird auch

http://www1.investorvillage.com/smbd.asp?mb=260&mn=20447&pt=…

[Charly_2]

..es gibt wirklich noch Leute die Zeit und Kohle haben

http://finance.yahoo.com/real-estate/article/104984/Inside-t…


...und unser Warrant läuft wohl noch ins Geld - Strike $23.88

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.023.389 von Charly_2 am 04.05.08 12:25:20

Earnings-Report: 12. Mai

[Charly_2]

Korrektur; Morgen !

Calpine Corp. (CPN)

Expected next earnings release:
Announcement date: 5/6/2008 - Before Market
Earnings Quarter: Q1

[Charly_2]

10-Q

http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=5…

[Charly_2]

Geschäft brummt

Calpine Reports First Quarter 2008 Financial and Operating Results Continued Improvement in Operations Demonstrated by a 15% Increase in Commodity Margin and an 18% Increase in Adjusted EBITDA

http://new.quote.com/news/story.action?id=BIZ133b9513

[Charly_2]

John Keeley glaubt daran - 1,26876 Mio shares
http://www.gurufocus.com/StockBuy.php?symbol=CPN

[paloma]

Calpine 21.33 $.

Nur weiter so bis mind. 23.88 $.

[xxt]

Unser Schein

[xxt]

Bzw. genaugenommen habe ich den A0SKRH im Depot. Kann aber nirgends sehen, wo das Ding gehandelt wird.

[savenm]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.841.053 von Charly_2 am 08.04.08 22:29:24

WEISS JEMAND WIE WEIT IST DIE SACHE MIT Elias A. Felluss, Pro Se Appellant?

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.115.632 von savenm am 17.05.08 09:37:30

District Court of N.Y. mit neuem Richter Marrero studiert noch den Fall

Der Strikepreis des Warrants muss viel tiefer (nicht $23.88) angesetzt werden, denn der Ausgabepreis der neuen Aktien war $17.50 - sogar zu $16 gab es Aktien

17.50 x 1,15 = 18.40 bis 20.125, nicht 23.88

Dies ist einer der grössten Appeal-Anträge

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.116.780 von Charly_2 am 17.05.08 14:56:20

..es sind insgesamt 3 Appeals offen - bleibt zu hoffen dass diese erfolgreich sind

[xxt]

Hat schon jemand hier seine Warrants verkaufen können?

[Don_Camillo]

22.05.2008 10:58
Mega-Übernahme im US-Energiesektor scheint wahrscheinlich
Princeton (BoerseGo.de) - Der zweitgrößte texanische Stromproduzent NRG Energy Inc. will den kalifornischen Branchenkollegen Calpine Corp. für 9,6 Milliarden Dollar übernehmen.

Das Angebot je Aktie repräsentiert gegenüber dem Schlusskurs der Calpine-Papiere vom Vortag einen Aufschlag von 6,7 Prozent. Die Calpine-Aktionäre sollen für jede ihrer Anteilsscheine 0,534 NRG-Papiere erhalten.

Im Falle eines Zusammenschlusses wird der größte unabhängige Stromproduzent in den USA geschaffen.

(© BörseGo AG 2007 - http://www.boerse-go.de, Autor: Huber Christoph, Redakteur)

http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2008-05/artikel-…

[xxt]

Es wird wohl nochmal spannend. Das Übernahmeangebot ist allerdings unter unserem Strike-Preis.. Leider konnte ich immernoch keinen Handelsplatz für unsere Warrants entdecken.

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.150.340 von xxt am 22.05.08 12:38:45

..was heisst unsere Warrants - es gibt nur einen Warrant der handelbar ist, das ist der in den USA - CPNCW

[Charly_2]

Firmenklau geht weiter...ich denke der Bieterkrieg müsste jetzt ausbrechenn, wenn nicht jetzt wann dann

Robbery Continues...

NRG Makes Unsolicited Offer for Calpine
Bid Values Combined Firm at $22 Billion,
Could Stir Other Power Producers to Merge
By REBECCA SMITH
May 22, 2008

Power generator Calpine Corp. confirmed that it received an unsolicited merger offer from NRG Energy Inc., which proposed a stock-for-stock transaction that would value the combined firm at $22 billion and create the largest independent power company in the U.S.
[Graphic]

The NRG offer represented a 16% premium to Calpine's closing price when the offer was made on May 14 and a 6.7% premium to Wednesday's price. Under the proposal, NRG would give 0.534 share for each share of Calpine.

In 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading Wednesday, Calpine was up eight cents to $21.28 and NRG was up 36 cents to $42.51.

Calpine is one of the largest independent generators of electricity in the U.S., selling the power it makes to utilities. It emerged from bankruptcy proceedings earlier this year. During the bankruptcy process, Chief Executive Bob May sold assets and pared debt.

If the two firms combine, it would begin to fulfill predictions of consolidation among independent power producers, which need to get bigger and more diverse to protect against regional downturns or price increases for particular fuels. An NRG-Calpine combination would have more than 45,000 megawatts of power plants.

Almost all of Calpine's plants are fueled by natural gas; NRG has a mix of gas, coal and nuclear units. The companies' assets would complement each other, resulting in a company that would be geographically diverse and have strong presence in important deregulated markets.

Calpine confirmed it had received the offer, but the board hasn't yet responded. News of the offer emerged late Wednesday when Calpine's largest investor, Harbinger Capital Partners Fund, made public a letter it sent to Calpine's board this week urging it to use the offer as a "starting point" from which to negotiate a transaction.

NRG, Princeton, N.J., is coming off a roll in which it gave its shareholders a 55% return last year. In an interview, NRG Chief Executive David Crane said he still thinks he is "offering up an undervalued stock" to Calpine. He added that he thinks Calpine would be a tremendous fit for NRG, putting together a company that would have the right power plants in important markets. He added that NRG would be well positioned to take advantage of more than $5 billion in net operating losses at Calpine that could be used to decrease future taxes.

Mr. Crane proposed the transaction a short time after Calpine's chairman contacted him to see if he was interested in becoming Calpine's CEO. People familiar with the matter said Mr. Crane said he didn't want the job but thought Calpine presented an attractive opportunity.

Calpine, which recently moved its headquarters to Houston from San Jose, Calif., was searching for a replacement for Mr. May, who was hired to get the firm through bankruptcy proceedings, which it entered in late 2005 and emerged from in February. Lately, it has been operating without the usual complement of executives or a full power-trading operation.

A personal familiar with the matter said Harbinger made the letter public because it felt that Calpine's board wasn't taking the NRG offer seriously enough and, in fact, was close to hiring a chief executive -- something Harbinger felt would doom a transaction that it said it thought would be in the interest of shareholders.

Calpine is a more attractive acquisition as a result of shedding about half of its debt in bankruptcy proceedings, and it appears to be benefiting from rising wholesale prices for electricity. Some analysts speculate it will do even better if Congress limits greenhouse-gas emissions, because Calpine's gas-fired power plants emit only half as much carbon dioxide as the typical coal-fired plants and therefore it would need to purchase fewer pollution allowances, giving it a competitive advantage in some markets.

http://www1.investorvillage.com/smbd.asp?mb=260&mn=20624&pt=…

[Charly_2]

16% Premium ist ein Witz

[Charly_2]

Calpine müsste mit konservativem PE aktuell bei $46 stehen - das Gebot ist also unanständig, zu tief

[xxt]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.153.128 von Charly_2 am 22.05.08 17:52:33

Ist unser A0SKRH den identisch mit dem CPNCW?

So wie ich es sehe sind das unterschiedliche Scheine.

[Don_Camillo]

Calpine's stock jumps on hopes for higher NRG bid

By Jessica Hall of Reuters

5:21 AM, 23 May 2008

=> http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/UPDATE-1-…

[Charly_2]

Old Shareholders wurden abgekocht und das Pack will den grossen Reibach machen, zum k...en

"We are confident a higher bid will be needed to consummate this deal," Calyon Securities analyst Gordon Howald said in a research report.

Hedge fund Harbinger Capital Partners, which owns more than 24 per cent of Calpine's shares, said the offer represents a good starting point and Calpine's board should immediately negotiate with NRG over terms.

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.149.745 von Don_Camillo am 22.05.08 11:34:23

zu


Das Angebot je Aktie repräsentiert gegenüber dem Schlusskurs der Calpine-Papiere vom Vortag einen Aufschlag von 6,7 Prozent. Die Calpine-Aktionäre sollen für jede ihrer Anteilsscheine 0,534 NRG-Papiere erhalten.

Wir reden in diesem Fall nicht von unserem Warrant, sondern von der richtigen Calpine-Aktie, die heute auf 23$ geklettert.

D.h. Wir müssen jetzt anfangen, den Wert unseres OS vom NRG-Papier herzuleiten

An eine Neubewertung glaube ich allerdings nicht, das wäre das pure Chaos, denn in den USA sind die Warrants inzwischen hin- und hergewandert und damit sinkt die Motivation immer mehr, irgendwelchen "Altaktionären" zu helfen.
Wozu denn?

Und wenn ein Merger ansteht, dann macht man sich allerdings hübsch. Da bin ich gespannt, wie sie sich aufblasen wollen, wo sie sich vorher sehr viel Mühe gegeben haben, möglichst klein zu erscheinen.

Ich spiele wirklich mit dem Gedanken, bei ca. 1$ zu verkaufen. Für 1$ müßte der Kurs auf ca. 34$ gehen, das wird bis August nicht passieren.
Eher wird der Kurs nach den Mergergesprächen wieder in sich zusammenfallen.

Bis denn
mac

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.153.930 von xxt am 22.05.08 19:36:44

...aus meiner Sicht ist der A0SKRH wertlos, da CPN-Warrants nur in den USA handelbar sind, von A0SKRH war nie die Rede in den Bankruptcy-Dokumenten.

Vielleicht kannst Du den A0SKRH an einen Broker verhökern

[Don_Camillo]

Ich habe US1313471146 eingebucht bekommen... konnte aber eben auch nicht verkaufen!

[xxt]

Unser Schein

[Dostojewski]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.155.652 von xxt am 23.05.08 00:25:41

Hallo zusammen, endlich habe ich diesen Thread gefunden

Diesen Schein habe ich auch in meinem Depot:
A0SKRH, CALPINE CORP. WTS08

Hatte gerade ein Gespräch mit dem Bankmenschen und dieser sagte mir, dass es keinen Handelsplatz gäbe. Weder in Deutschland noch in den USA !

Einzige Möglichkeit wäre eine Email an Calpine und zu hinterfragen was damit nun geschehen solle. Kann jemand so gut Englisch, oder hat sich jemand mal die Mühe gemacht und an Calpine geschrieben.

Was hier gelaufen ist, ist wirklich Abzockerei vom Feinsten.

Trotzdem alledem

Grüße in diesen Thread - Dosto

[Dostojewski]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.187.279 von Dostojewski am 28.05.08 14:22:17

Guten Morgen,

ich denke, dass so eine Ungleichbehandlung von Gesetzes wegen gar nicht sein darf. Sind Eigentümer/Aktionäre aus Europa/Deutschland nur Eigentümer zweiter Klasse? Ich denke - Nein!

Man hat uns von Anfang mit OS abgefunden, in dem Wissen, dass diese wertlos sind, weil nicht handelbar.

Hätte jemand Interesse an einer Sammelklage aus Deutschland heraus (wenn soetwas funktionieren würde) gegen Calpine und deren Machenschaften?

Mich hat der Spaß einen hohen fünstelligen Betrag gekostet!
Dementsprechend ist mein Interesse geweckt, dass nicht einfach so hinzunehmen.

Gruß - Dosto

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.187.279 von Dostojewski am 28.05.08 14:22:17

Das Problem ist dass man als nicht US-Bürger, der Aktien hält von einer US-Firma die unter Chapter 11 steht, keinerlei Handhabe hat um gegen die Firma vorzugehen, ausser eine Sammelklage einzureichen....

...und da wissen wir, dass US-Anwälte ebensolche Abzocker sind wie die Führungsklicke von Calpine

Somit bleibt nur die Abbuchung des Falls als Lehrgeld......

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.193.160 von Dostojewski am 29.05.08 09:28:08

Soviel ich weiss, kann man in den USA gar keine Sammelklage gegen eine US-Firma platzieren, wenn die Sammelkläger nicht US-Bürger sind...

[Charly_2]

Calpine scheint mit dem Angebot von NRG ein Problem zu haben:

sie können nicht argumentieren, dass die Bude mehr wert ist als das Angebot repräsentiert....

...denn gegenüber den Altaktionären wurde festgehalten dass die Firma nicht mehr wert sei als 18.95 Mrd. - und damit war das Aktienkapital futsch

...3 Court-Appeals sind noch pendent, da geht's genau um diesen Punkt - fairer Wert der Firma und geforderter Warrant-Strikepreis unter $20

[Charly_2]

Diese Calpinepfeifen meinen das Angebot

...has unanimously determined that NRG’s proposal is inadequate and materially undervalues the Company’s unique asset portfolio and future prospects.

http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/calpine-determines-t…

Unvorstellbar, die Altaktionäre wurden abgekocht und jetzt will die CPN-Klicke gross ansahnen

[Charly_2]

Jetzt liegen beim Aktienkurs noch +10% drin, dann liegt der US-Warrant im Geld

[Charly_2]

Damit muss wohl der alte Strikepreis neu ausgehandelt werden, das Gericht kriegt viel Arbeit

[Charly_2]

Letzter Satz!

Chokshi said he thinks Calpine is worth $36 to $40 a share.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aStf1K2H…

[Charly_2]

Die Warrants werden nicht wertlos verfallen!

Calpine Turns Down NRG Offer
By DONNA KARDOS
May 30, 2008 10:39 a.m.

Calpine Corp. said its board unanimously determined NRG Energy Inc.'s unsolicited takeover bid is "inadequate and materially undervalues the company's unique asset portfolio and future prospects."

But Calpine said the board's legal and financial advisers will contact their counterparts at NRG to see "whether there is a basis for discussions between the two companies to explore a business combination."

Calpine added that it has no intentions of revealing the developments of any such discussions.

The response comes two weeks after NRG made public its unsolicited stock-for-stock proposed offer of 0.534 share of its stock for each share of Calpine, in a deal currently valued at nearly $11 billion.

A merger of NRG and Calpine would create the nation's biggest independent power producer, with 45,000 megawatts of capacity, and could spur combinations among the remaining "independents" that sell electricity to utilities at market prices.

If the two firms were to combine, it also would begin to fulfill predictions of consolidation among independent power producers, which need to get bigger and more diverse to protect against regional downturns or price increases for particular fuels.

Calpine is one of the largest independent generators of electricity in the U.S., selling the power it makes to utilities. But it is surrounded in uncertainty, with its headquarters split between Houston and San Jose, and most of its top executive positions filled by interim executives.

NRG, which is based in Princeton, N.J., was the first major independent power producer to go into bankruptcy, and it emerged in late 2003. Calpine filed two years later and emerged in February.

Almost all of Calpine's plants are fueled by natural gas; NRG has a mix of gas, coal and nuclear units. The assets would complement each other, resulting in a company that would be geographically diverse and have strong presence in important deregulated markets.

The bid for Calpine by NRG had breathed renewed interest in 48.5 million Calpine warrants. The securities, given to pre-bankruptcy Calpine shareholders as part of the electric utility's exit plan, can be used to buy shares for $23.88 each. As part of that plan, the opportunity to exchange those warrants for shares expires Aug. 25. With Calpine's stock price sitting below $23.88 since it exited bankruptcy in February, those warrants have had no value.

But NRG's proposal has pushed Calpine's stock price up, and the possibility of a higher-priced deal has the warrant holders thinking their holdings will be worth something after all. Thursday, Calpine shares closed at $22.69. NRG shares closed at $40.81.

The NRG bid was made public by Harbinger, the $20 billion hedge fund that owns almost a quarter of post-bankruptcy Calpine's stock, and had said it believes it is the largest holder of Calpine's warrants.

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.193.160 von Dostojewski am 29.05.08 09:28:08

...die USA ist für Ausländer ein extrem riskanter Markt, letztendlich schaut Amerika nur für Amerika, wie dieses Beispiel zeigt!!

[Charly_2]

...übernimmt NRG Calpine, so scheinen sie gewillt zu sein die Warrants zu $23 zu übernehmen

Schaun wer mal was da noch kommt

[Charly_2]

Fitch Rating lässt sich sehen

http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINWNA328420080530

[Charly_2]

...und Empfehlung ist zumindest nicht mehr sell

http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=…

[voltago01]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.187.279 von Dostojewski am 28.05.08 14:22:17

CALPINE CORP 08A WTS
wird in den USA an der Nasdaq OTC gehandelt.

Wer den Schein verkaufen will, sollte seiner Bank mal kräftig auf die Zehen treten. M.E. handelt es sich um das gleiche Papier, das auch die amerikanischen Anteilseigner bekommen haben. Somit müsste Handel in USA möglich sein.

Bei der Dresdner kann man solche Geschäfte über die internationale Handelsabteilung abwickeln. Andere Banken sollten so etwas auch ermöglichen können...

Gruss
voltago01

[macsoja]

Sagt mal, welchen Grund hat NRG, Calpine vor dem September zu übernehmen?

Ist es nicht schlauer, einfach zu warten, bis die Optionen wertlos verfallen, anstatt jetzt irgendwelchen "frustrierten Altaktionären" irgendwelche neuen Aktien in den "gierigen Rachen" zu schmeißen.

Vor allem, wenn da noch einige "prozessgeile" Interessensgemeinschaften dranhängen, die noch mehr Aktien für ihren "alten Schrott" fordern.

Ich meine, neben dem fairen und sozialen Aspekt, der an der Börse keinen interessiert -> gibt es hierfür wirtschaftliche Gründe, warum ein NRG so handeln sollte?

fragend
mac

[Charly_2]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.273.263 von macsoja am 10.06.08 13:01:40

..jetzt kommen für CPN die gewinnträchtigen Sommermonate, im September ist demzufolge die Übernahme eher teurer !

[Ayrton1]

Hallo an alle die noch investiert sind
Was passiert in nächster Zeit? Hat jemand Infos?
Ich habe meine Warrents noch in Depot und die habe einen Wert von 0,428 USD.
Ich weiß nicht was ich machen soll

Hilfe.........
Gruß Arton an aledie mit leiden.

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.420.681 von Ayrton1 am 02.07.08 13:32:09

Meine Meinung habe ich oben geschrieben und am Chart siehst Du auch den Deckel sehr schön:



Ratet mal, wo der Ausübungspreis liegt

D.h. wir beobachten, was abzusehen war, der Optionsschein verfällt wertlos, weil es billiger ist, die Aktie so zu kaufen.

Danach werden die Verhandlungen wieder aufgenommen und der Kurs kommt vom Fleck.
Beste Strategie: in die neuen Aktien investieren, wobei man dann damit klar kommen muß, daß man es nicht längst schon gemacht hat...

Die Meinung von Charly siehste ja, er hofft/glaubt noch an einen größeren Sprung über die Barriere aufgrund des Kaufangebotes.

[macsoja]

Okay, also ich könnte meine theoretisch verkaufen, aber das lohnt sich nun wirklich nicht mehr.
Ist so kompliziert, weil man ausländische OS handeln will -> wer macht das schon normalerweise

1. Lagerstellenwechsel = 50€ inkl. 2 Tage Wartezeit
2. Telefonische Ausführung über institutionellen Händler ohne Garantie auf Ausführung = 50€

Beim jetzigen Wert der OS von ca. 0,2€ nicht mehr so richtig lohnend

Kurz, der Zug ist schon lange weg und wir haben viel gelernt

[mancede]

Hallo liebe Leidensgenossen.
Ich muss zugeben, dass ich vor längerer Zeit zum Spaß mit 100 EURO Einsatz auf Calpine eingelassen habe. Kurz danach ist der Aktienkurs explodiert und ich hatte auf einmal Aktien im Wert von 200 Euro.
100 % Steigerung.

Danach habe ich die Aktie etwas aus den Augen verloren, bis mich heute ein Brief von meiner ING Diba erreichte.

Optionsscheinausübung CALPINE CORP, 250808
ISIN: US1313471146

Sehr geehrter XYZ,

für die oben genannte Gattung liegen uns folgende Informationen vor:

Optionsscheinausübung

Verhältnis 1:1
Ausübungspreis: USD 23,88
Titel nach Umtausch: Calpine CORP ORD REG (ISIN: US1313473043)
Weisungsfrist: 19.8.08 22 Uhr

Nicht ausgeübte Optionsscheine können wertlos verfallen.
Anleger müssen sicherstellen, dass sie mit Abgabe ihrer Weisung nicht gegen geltendes Recht ihres Landes verstoßen.

Die Gesellschaft plant voraussichtlich eine Fusion im Verhältnis 1:0,534 mit der NRG Energy INC., ISIN: US6293771027. Die Daten müssen auf der Versammlung erst noch beschlossen werden.

Mit freundlichen BLABLABLA


Da ich vermutlich nicht der einzige bin, der jetzt vor einem großen Rätsel steht, bitte ich hier jemanden diese verwirrenden Zeilen etwas "mainstreamtauglich" zu entwirren. Was ist da bloß mit Calpine passiert?

[macsoja]

Du hast das Recht, die Calpine-Aktie zu 23,88 zu kaufen und sie fragen jetzt, wieviele Du kaufen willst.

An Deiner Stelle würde ich nix kaufen, denn der Kurs der Aktie steht bei 18,31 Dollar bzw. 11,38

Gleichzeit informiert man Dich, daß dann auch gleich eine Fusion ansteht (die aber nix mit dem Kaufrecht zu tun hat, aber Dich wohl vor weiterer Verwirrung schützen soll, weil die Aktien evtl. gleich in NRG getauscht bzw. ausgeliefert werden)

Bitter:
Wenn Du die Optionen nicht ausübst, kannst Du die Verluste nicht mal steuerlich geltend machen.

Kurz:
Der OS ist wertlos, es sei denn, die Aktie steigert sich noch um 30%

Wenn Du an Calpine bzw. dem evtl. fusionierten Konglomerat interessiert bist, kauf einfach die Aktie auf dem Markt, das ist billiger.

Glückwunsch, daß Du nur mit 100 EUR dabei warst

Gruß
mac

[mancede]

Danke für die nette Antwort.
Als ich damals die Calpine Aktie kaufe, wurde ich auch informiert, dass der Penny Market sehr risikoreich ist. Ich hab jedem gesagt, dass ich das weiß und dann hab ich auch noch 100 % Wertsteigerung erzielt.

Du bist wahrscheinlich besser über Calpine informiert als ich.
Könntest du so im groben Zügen sagen, wer mit wem fusioniert und wieso die neue Calpine Aktie jetzt zum Preis von 18 Dollar gehandelt wird.

[macsoja]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 34.528.231 von mancede am 17.07.08 12:49:23

Sorry, habe nur wenig Zeit,

eigentlich kannste hier rückwärts lesen (ist wenig Pushing/Bashing) dring und bekommst die Infos:

Ich habe mich mit der Fusion noch nicht richtig beschäftigt.

Folgender Hintergrund:
Um den Altaktionären nicht so viel übrig zu lassen bzw. (offiziell) einen konservativen Wertansatz zu wählen (gibt ja noch immer die Schulden) wurde Calpine sehr gering bewertet, als die neuen Aktien kamen.
Den Altaktionären wurde die alten Aktien gesplittet in die Optionen gewandelt mit Blick auf die "mögliche Wertsteigerung"

Die Phantasie entstand damals aus der Hoffnung, daß die Firma (aus unserer Sicht) bewußt schlechter bewertet wurde und sich dies schnell im Markt relativiert.

Ist nicht passiert.

D.h. die Aktie ist etwas unterm Durchschnitt bewertet (das kommt immer darauf an, wie die Vermögenswerte und Verbindlichkeiten einbezogen werden).
Dann damit hat sie sich bei ca. 23 eingependelt (damit knapp unter der Ausübung) und ist im Zuge der Krise des Marktes genauso abgeschmiert (gibt ja noch andere Aktien mit weniger Ballast, die aussichtsreich sind)

Und da sind wir nun.

In DE kaum Volumen, in USA auch nicht besser.
Ich erwarte nach Auslaufen der Frist für die verarschten Altaktionäre einen kleinen Sprung um ca. 20-30% und dann wird man sehen, wie sich die Ergebnisse entwickeln und ob aus der Fusion Synergien entstehen.

Ich bewerte eine Fusion positiv, da dann die noch immer vorhandene Schuldenlast noch mehr verteilt wird und das Risiko für einen Ausfall sinkt.
Außerdem birgt ein zunächst konservativer Ansatz Überraschungspotential für später.

Aber wie gesagt - momentan liegt der Fokus nicht so sehr auf der Firma und wenn die Konjunktur sinkt, wird weniger Strom gebraucht und dann sinkt auch der Gewinn.

Langfristig schreibt sich Calpine ein bissl "grüne Energie" auf die Fahnen, wegen der Geotherme-Kraftwerke (die wiederum auch ganz verschiedene Bewertungen bekommen können). Am Ende ist es aber ein Stromversorger (ich weiß jetzt nicht, der wievieltgrößte in den USA), wie die anderen auch.
-> evtl. nun etwas auf den Boden geholt aufgrund dem Ballastabwurf der Altaktionäre und der grundsätzlichen Überholung von Management und Bewertungsansätzen.

Kurz: Generalüberholt, aber dadurch noch lange nicht sofort erfolgreich

Aus meiner Sicht aber mit Potential, sich besser, als der Wettbewerb zu entwickeln.

Wer also auf die Branche schielt, kann sich Calpine anschauen, ansonsten gibt es interessantere Alternativen - wohl auch noch im Laufe des Jahres, auch wenn heute alle kaufen, als ob irgendwo einer die Ampel umgestellt hätte...

Wie gesagt, ich habe bissl Vorurlaubsstress und werde wohl auf weitere Fragen nicht präziser werden können, weil ich dann ne Woche nicht da bin.

Irgendwann sollte man diesen "Hoffnungsthread" dann auch schließen und evtl. in die richtige Aktie rüberwechseln.

Gruß
mac