Berkshire Hathaway (Seite 96)

[soleil1504]

The Best Stocks for 2010: Berkshire Hathaway
by Morgan Housel - December 31, 2009
It's true: We talk about Warren Buffett a lot.
Probably too much. We treat him like he walks on water. We pretend he makes Mother Teresa look like a jerk, Einstein like a dimwit, Soros like a lout. I'll be the first to admit the investment community can go overboard when it comes to worshiping the dear Oracle.
But what doesn't get talked about enough is Buffet's creation, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A) (NYSE: BRK-B). So rather than shoving a million Buffettisms down your throat (or pointing out that the old man can't stop talking about sex), I'll give you three reasons why you might want to consider investing in Berkshire Hathaway.
1. It's cheap
Berkshire's a big, rambling conglomerate made up of both investment securities and wholly owned businesses. Some of the largest are insurance subsidiaries where net income can be quite sporadic, so valuing this beast can be daunting.
Since Berkshire's a long-term oriented acquirer of assets where the goal is often price appreciation, not necessarily income, the most common valuation metric used is the price-to-book-ratio. This yields a more meaningful measure of value than, say, the P/E ratio.
The good news is that Berkshire trades at one of the lowest price-to-book values in years. Have a look:
Year Average Price-to-Book Value
1994 2.06
1995 2.60
1996 2.50
1997 2.18
1998 2.47
1999 1.99
2000 1.53
2001 1.78
2002 1.84
2003 1.68
2004 1.74
2005 1.54
2006 1.53
2007 1.61
2008 1.58
Current 1.29*
Average 1.87
Source: Capital IQ, a division of Standard & Poor's.
*As of Dec. 24, 2009.
That alone convinces me shares are a buy today.
Some might scoff, wondering why an insurance conglomerate deserves any premium to book value. That brings me to point number two.
2. Diversification
It's true that your average insurance company doesn't deserve much, if any, premium to book value. Berkshire's different. Though it's heavy in insurance -- particularly reinsurance -- the diversification of its business lines
are immense. Some of its wholly owned subsidiaries include:
· Ben Bridge Jeweler
· NetJets
· The Pampered Chef
· See's Candies
· Business Wire
· Iscar (metal cutting tools)
· Clayton Homes
· Benjamin Moore (paint)
· Fruit of the Loom
· MidAmerican Energy (utilities)
· Burlington Northern Santa Fe (railroad, acquisition pending)
Plus, there's the $57 billion (as of Sept. 30) common stock portfolio that holds names like Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO), Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG), Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC), and Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ) among others. Other hard-to-value assets like the Goldman Sachs warrants Berkshire scored (for free) last fall are worth billions, too.
All of these are great businesses with real potential to grow above an average market return over the long haul. This is a quality franchise. Berkshire absolutely deserves a premium to book value, even without the "Buffett premium."
3. Panic overblown
Berkshire shares are down 30% since the end of 2007, probably because it was overvalued to begin with. But two other areas of concern have made investors anxious lately: derivatives that could cost the company billions, and Buffett's mortality.
In years past, Berkshire sold equity puts on global stock market indices. After markets crashed last year, it looked like the company could be on the hook for tens of billions of dollars in losses over the next decade or so. Scary, chilling, daunting ... I know.
But those threats have been nearly eliminated now that a) Buffett renegotiated the contracts at lower strike prices in exchange for nearer expiration dates, and b) global stock indices have rebounded 50%-60%. Even if
markets crash anew, the renegotiated terms of the contracts mean the odds Berkshire will actually end up in the green are quite good.
Now on to Buffett's mortality. Yes, he's an old man and could very well pass in the coming years. Sad, but true. But how much will this impact Berkshire's long-term value? Far less than most think.
Berkshire is entirely decentralized, with managers of individual subsidiaries in charge of their own businesses. Buffett simply uses their profits to buy more stuff. True, he's the best at buying "stuff," and Berkshire sans Buffett won't have the growth potential it had in the past. But it won't destroy the earnings machine he's already
created. This is an enduring engine that doesn't need Buffett, just as Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT) didn't need Sam Walton after he died. As co-chairman Charlie Munger recently noted, "The best days of Berkshire are ahead. This company will make a big contribution to its surrounding civilization."
http://www.themoneytimes.com/featured/20091231/best-stocks-2…

[jerobeam]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.645.853 von Schürger am 30.12.09 10:34:09

und ?
MCO steht tiefer als Mai. BRK verkauft weiter. Buchwert ist nur ein bischen weniger negativ. Klagen sind immer noch anhängig. Ratings braucht kein (intelligenter) Mensch.
Das Verschuldungsproblem der Staaten kann durch Firmen wie MCO nur verschlimmert werden. Vielleicht sollten die USA Moody's in die Pleite schicken solange sie noch ein AAA-Rating haben. Griechenland hätte es sich schon früher gewünscht (Auch wenn das Interest Premium dort schon lange hunderte von Basispunkten über Bunds lag - bei Ratings geht es schliesslich nur um PR).

[soleil1504]

Buffett's Hits and Misses in 2009
By Don Dion - 12/30/09 – thestreet.com
2009 was a year of big moves for Warren Buffett.
As we wrap up this year and set our sights on 2010, it is a good time to look back at some of the biggest plays and best lessons to take away from the Oracle of Omaha. By internalizing these actions, investors can look forward to a financially prosperous new year.
Patience Is Key
This year, Buffett proved once again that successful investing requires a strong stomach and plenty of patience. The Oracle has famously been quoted as saying that his favorite holding period is forever.
The financier's all-in bet on Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI Quote) is a shining example of his persistence.
Unlike many of his other investments, the financier has made it clear on a number of occasions that his investment in BNI is not expected to ever see rocketing performance.
Rather, as the United States and other nations around the world regain strength, the railroad industry will see slow, albeit steady returns. Instead of the looking forward to the next few months or years, Buffett believes that this BNI is well suited to benefit Berkshire Hathaway long after Buffett is gone and even into the next century.
As moments of weakness present themselves in this recovering market, having the patience to weather market volatility will prove crucial to successful investing in 2010.
Know When to Fold
Buffett has stated that his two most important rules when it comes to investing: Don't lose money, and don't forget that rule. In 2009, the investor has shown just how dire the consequences are when his investments fail to live up to these two rules.
Professor Buffett's most noteworthy dud in 2009 was Moody's. Since July of this year, the investor has cut Berkshire's stake in this damaged credit ratings agency on six different occasions.
The most recent share cut occurred on Dec. 23, when the investor dumped nearly 88,000 shares. Berkshire's stake in Moody's has been cut 34% from the 48 million shares it owned at the end of June. It is likely that, by the end of 2010, Buffett's portfolio will be nearly, if not completely free of Moody's exposure.
Another big loser in Buffett's portfolio this year has been NetJets. Not only has Buffett slashed 800 employees from the struggling firm, but he replaced the company's CEO in August in hopes of turning the firm around.
Thanks to the broad market reversal in 2009, the returns have been plentiful. However, looking to 2010, investors need to remain vigilant in their search for not only strong buys but also safe windows to exit underperforming holdings.
Take Intelligent Risks
This year, the Buffett saying, "Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful" was perhaps the most important . In 2009, this single lesson netted the Oracle billions.
Goldman Sachs is Buffett's biggest success story of 2009. In September, the Oracle of Omaha invested $5 billion into the firm, essentially saving it from collapse. Buffett's blessing has paid off beautifully as Goldman Sachs' shares have rocketed through the second half of 2009, earning the investor billions in profit.
The company has risen from the ashes to currently hold the throne as king of Wall Street. Because Buffett had faith in the U.S.'s financial system when others were fearful, the investor has earned over $3 billion in profits. Heading into 2010, expect Buffett to rake in even more from this play.
It is important to remember that Goldman Sachs was not the only financial firm that sought the help of the Oracle. On the contrary, when the sector as a whole was faltering, a number of other big names looked to Buffett for assistance.
However, through doing a significant amount of research and homework, he found many of these firms to be inherently damaged and lacking attractive upside potential. While risky, Goldman proved to be the safest play for a rebound in the U.S. financial system.
As Buffett has shown, taking risks is essential to earning big returns. However, doing your homework is even more important. In 2010, investors will have even more opportunities for big profits. However, only by following Buffett's example and doing your homework, will you be able to weed out the winners from the losers.
-- Written by Don Dion in Williamstown, Mass.
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10653689/1/buffetts-hits-and-…

[Schürger]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.634.369 von jerobeam am 28.12.09 00:13:24

Das war am 27. Mai 2009.

[tonisoprano]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.634.314 von jerobeam am 27.12.09 23:12:39

Sehr gut geantwortet Danke für die Infos

[jerobeam]

David Einhorn, the curse of the triple-A

http://www.newdeal20.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/einhorn-…

Come to think of it, many of the spectacular failures during this crisis bore AAA ratings. The Government Sponsored Enterprises, the monoline insurers, AIG and General Electric, whose slow moving train-wreck is ongoing, suffered the Curse of the Triple A and damaged their companies with sizable harm to the economy at large. The only AAA rated (or at least until recently AAA) financial institution I can think of that didn’t abuse its status is Berkshire Hathaway.

Investors who bought AAA rated structured products thought they were buying safety, but instead bought disaster. They can forgive themselves by blaming the rating agencies. But if the credit markets improve to the point where newly issued AAA rated bonds price with tight spreads only to later widen or ultimately fail, investors will have no one but themselves to blame. Fool me once...

Investors have figured this out and many deny that they buy bonds based on ratings unless they are forced to by law. Even Moody’s largest shareholder, Warren Buffett, has said that he doesn’t believe in using ratings.

We are short Moody’s Investor Service. If your product is a stamp of approval where your highest rating is a curse to those that receive it, and is shunned by those who are supposed to use it, you have problems. Moody’s says that it has enormous incentive to do a good job with the ratings because the ratings are the brand. Imagine yourself the head of Moody’s a decade ago. If your goal was to destroy the brand, would you have done anything differently?

The truth is that nobody I know buys or uses Moody’s credit ratings because they believe in the brand. They use it because it is part of a government created oligopoly and, often, because they are required to by law. As a classic oligopolist, Moody’s earns exceedingly high margins while paying only the needed lip service to product quality. The real value of Moody’s lies in its ability to cow the authorities into preserving its status.

The rating agencies’ lobby is pushing “reform” through modest changes to the ratings process. Why reform them when we can get rid of them? Are we waiting for them to blow up the Lunar economy as well? Some wonder what would happen without government sanctioned ratings. It is hard to imagine how things would be any worse.

Even if the ratings were free of conflict, the unfixable issue is that the rating system is inherently pro-cyclical and economically destabilizing. When times are good, rating upgrades reduce borrowing costs and contribute to credit bubbles. The more debt they rate, the more profit they earn. When times are bad, rating downgrades accelerate a negative feedback loop and can be catastrophic for entities that rely so much on their credit rating that a rating downgrade jeopardizes their existence. The monoline insurers and AIG suffered this fate.

This empowers the rating agencies to decide whether a company lives or dies. The rating agencies are sensitive to this responsibility. As a result, they fail to use the downgrade as a warning signal to investors, and when they do finally act, it is often the coup de grace.

Regulators can improve the stability of the financial markets by eliminating the formal credit rating system.

Credit analysts don’t believe in credit ratings; equity analysts do. Moody’s shares trade at 19x estimated earnings that, wink-wink, they are supposed to beat. Ironically, for a firm that evaluates credit, its balance sheet is upside down, with a negative net worth of $900 million.

That is a lot to pay for a franchise with a socially undesirable product and a shattered brand that exists at a time when the government is considering broad reform in its mission to fix some of the systemic regulatory issues that got our economy into trouble in the first place.


Ich denke damit ist zu Moody's alles gesagt. Buffett wird sich über jeden 'sucker' freuen, der ihm die Aktien über $25 abnimmt.

[jerobeam]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.634.314 von jerobeam am 27.12.09 23:12:39

der Käufer, nicht mehr der Käufer zahlt das Rating

Sollte natürlich "der Käufer, nicht mehr der Verkäufer zahlt das Rating" heissen.

[jerobeam]

folgende Dinge sollte man auch noch bedenken:

1) Es kommen enorme Schadensersatzforderungen und andere Klagen auf die Ratingagenturen zu.
2) Werden Institutionen weiterhin "Kunde" bei einem Institut sein wollen, dass ihnen zum einen "AAA" Produkte gerated hat die sich als Desaster erwiesen, und zum anderen ihnen nach den durch diese Produkte verursachten Desastern dann selbst das Rating massiv gesenkt hat ?
3) "Kunde" wollten die meisten ohnehin nie sein (Moody's und S&P haben de facto jahrelang "Schutzgelder" erpresst). Nun sind die Ratingagenturen definitiv in einer Schwächesituation. Die Legislative könnte sich gegen Sie wenden. Die Ratingkosten werden wahscheinlich umgepolt (der Käufer, nicht mehr der Käufer zahlt das Rating) - damit ist das Zeitalter der Erpressungen und Wunschratings vorbei. Not good for 'business'.

MCO hat noch ca. $500 millionen cash in der Bilanz. Ein negatives Urteil bzgl. fahrlässige Ratings von CDOs, MBS usw und die können zum Insolvenzrichter marschieren.

[jerobeam]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.634.006 von tonisoprano am 27.12.09 20:14:18

Aus dem letzten Quartalsbericht:

During the third quarter of 2009, Berkshire sold shares of Moody’s common stock, which reduced its ownership interest to about 16.6% as of September 30

Laut dem letzten 13-F filing
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/00009501230906302…

waren das 39.219.312 Aktien. Moody's hat ca. 245 Mio Aktien (verwässert). Die 16.6% beziehen sich auf die tatsächlich ausstehenden Aktien (235.2 Mio).

Nach Quartalsende kamen weitere Verkäufe von BRK dazu:

28.10.2009 Verkauf 1,133,027 Aktien zu $24.86
29.10.2009 Verkauf 19,600 Aktien zu $25.27
07.12.2009 Verkauf 2,004,946 Aktien zu $25.04
08.12.2009 Verkauf 704,346 Aktien zu $24.81
10.12.2009 Verkauf 1,325,374 Aktien zu $25.20
11.12.2009 Verkauf 2,054,798 Aktien zu $26.67
14.12.2009 Verkauf 74,619 Aktien zu $26.66
18.12.2009 Verkauf 87,992 Aktien zu $26.77

macht unter dem Strich über 7.4 Millionen verkaufte Aktien, wenn also nichts weiter verkauft wurde verbleiben nun bei BRK 31.814.610 Aktien, was ein ca 13.5% Anteil ist. Es waren lange mal 48 Millionen Aktien.

[jerobeam]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 38.634.006 von tonisoprano am 27.12.09 20:14:18

Berkshire reduziert schon seit einiger Zeit den Anteil an Moody's. Das kann man auch durchaus nachvollziehen, der Ruf der Ratingagenturen ist ja nun seit letztem Jahr gründlich ruiniert. Wenn man bedenkt, wieviele Feinde sich die Ratingagenturen in letzter Zeit gemacht haben, und dass ihr Geschäft in Zukunft aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach stark reguliert, überwacht und beschnitten wird, spricht nicht vieles für die Firma. Letztendlich ist es aber wahrscheinlich eine Frage der Kapitalallokation. Warum soll man an Moody's festkleben (mit all den angehefteten Risiken) wenn man 10% preferred von GS bekommt + kostenlose Warrants.
Vielleicht ist aber auch hinter den Kulissen was los. Nachdem BRK Moody's immer weiter verkauft hat, hat Moody's plötzlich BRK "herabgestuft" (was IMHO völlig lächerlich ist).
Dass Moody's Konzerne erpresst, scheint nicht neu zu sein, siehe:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8032-2004Nov2….
Wenn man nun bedenkt, dass dieser Artikel in der Washington Post erschienen ist (dessen grösster Aktionär Berkshire ist) und Berkshire genauso wie Hannover RE eine Größe im Rückversicherungsgeschäft ist, wo Vertrauen in die Kapitalbasis EXTREM wichtig (Überlebenswichtig, siehe AIG) ist ... dann fragt man sich doch, was da wirklich gelaufen ist (oder noch läuft).