Amatech jetzt mit Philips-Mann als Vorstand - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

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Der Anbieter von kontaktlosen SmartCards Amatech meldet die Abberufung des Alleinvorstands David Finn. Mit sofortiger Wirkung wird Willem Haverkamp das in Schwierigkeiten befindliche Unternehmen führen. Der 55-jährige Haverkamp war bis Ende 2001 als Executive Vice President bei einer Tochter der Philips tätig. Er gehört dem Philips-Konzern seit 1977 an.

Amatech hatte zuletzt Anfang Februar gemeldet , dass die Umsatzziele für das Geschäftsjahr 2001 voraussichtlich nicht erreicht werden. Die Messlatte hatte bei 36 Mio. Euro gelegen. Als Gründe für die voraussichtliche Korrektur wurden Umsatzeinbußen in den USA im vierten Quartal, sowie Altlasten der AmaTech Automation GmbH angegeben.

Durchaus denkbar, dass im Zuge der Aufarbeitung der endgültigen 2001-er Zahlen, die am 28. März bekannt gegeben werden sollen, Hinweise darauf gefunden wurden, dass Finn als Vorstand nicht länger akzeptabel ist. Dass ein treuer Philips-Streiter einspringt, dürfte Anlass zu weitreichenden Spekulationen bieten. Amatech nutzt Produkte von Philips. Beide Unternehmen hatten vor einiger Zeit einen Kooperationsvertrag geschlossen.

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Mit einer Privaten Krankenversicherung können Sie Monat für Monat bis 200 Euro sparen. Wir ermitteln aus über 35 Gesellschaften und über 1000 Tarifkombinatsmöglichkeiten den für Sie günstigsten Versicherer. Fordern Sie jetzt ihren persönlichen Preis- Leistungsvergleich an.

Autor: Klaus Singer (© wallstreet:online AG),09:24 13.03.2002

[Pettssonw]

In 1995, Philips wanted to sell one of its businesses. Based in Paris, the unit had been in trouble for a few
years and was facing an uncertain future. A quick sale seemed the only option until, in one of those happy
coincidences, Willem Haverkamp, after successful spells as a Philips country and region manager, decided
to move to the French capital. As he was there, senior Philips figures asked him to cast his eye over the
floundering business. They gave him the freedom to make the unit a more attractive proposition for potential
buyers.
Haverkamp instituted dramatic changes across the business. He fired the boss and gave the unit a focus it
previously lacked. When he first arrived it had just been offered to De La Rue for one symbolic French Franc.
They rejected the offer. A year later, Philips sold it to them for FF 600 million.

Construction
The story could have ended there because the very success of this project put Haverkamp out of a job. But
every ironic twist has a silver lining, and what Haverkamp had done once he could do again: “From what I’d
just learned, and from what I’d just been through, it occurred to me that this redesign process could be
applied to many other units in Philips.” And so Redesign was born, almost by accident.
Before it could grow legs and run, however, a more systematic plan was needed. Over the following months,
Haverkamp set about developing a highly procedural approach that distinguished clear steps in the process
(see box). This had the benefit of making redesign an extremely flexible tool that could be applied to different
units with different problems, no matter where they were. A second, successful project then followed. Boosted
by this, Haverkamp continued to draw together a small team of specialists from across Philips, and set about
making them as responsive as possible to the tasks ahead.
But even though the process had been developed and proven, Redesign still had to overcome opposition to
its very existence. Managers questioned why Philips needed a team of specialists when they could revive
flagging fortunes themselves. Haverkamp’s argument then, as now, was precisely that managers could not
do it themselves, particularly when it came to breaking through their established networks: “If they try, how
likely are they to fire a good friend, for example, if that is what’s required?”

Emotions
Redesign team members can face problems when they need to make tough decisions. There is always
opposition from a few people, and Haverkamp makes no secret of the fact they can play hardball when
required: “Redesign has the power, we are in charge. Because of our experience we know what to expect.
We’re always ready to take instantaneous action when someone challenges us by deviating from the agreed
strategy. They’re removed the next day. That’s the power we exercise to make sure this works. We don’t let
one thing pass.”
It is this willingness to act that is crucial in transforming strategy into reality. The Redesign team is adept at
holding its nerve, and also at knowing how far to take the process. Sometimes they are accused of driving too
hard, but this is precisely where extra value can be squeezed out of a business on the bounce. As Haverkamp
puts it: “We pile on the pressure, pushing and pushing to add more and more value.”

Value
Until recently, this uncompromising stance had an unexpected side effect. There was a growing reluctance to
send projects Redesign’s way, to admit failure so that Redesign might succeed. The equation is simple.
“Some people think a unit is worthless and want to close it,” says Haverkamp. “But we come in and make
millions. Then others say ‘Why did nobody else see that?’ That’s the difficult part of it. It’s an emotional thing –
a question of pride.”
The Philips Board takes a different view. It recently decided that all units sent to the company’s M&A
specialists for possible divestment would first be offered to Redesign, to see if the team could take them on
as new projects.
This news signified top-level recognition of Redesign’s success. “What we are doing,” explains Haverkamp,
“is creating value for Philips.” Traditional divestment practice usually means disposing of a unit as quickly as
possible, with the buyer then trying to make something of it. In contrast, Redesign creates value before the
sale. This adds significant numbers to the balance sheet, money that without Redesign would have been lost.
Haverkamp cautions that these are troublesome units. Their profits are down, as is their morale. They’re not
market leaders, they’re not essential to Philips’ core activities and they are problems for their product
divisions. With Redesign, division managers do not have to spend valuable time on non-strategic issues or
worry anymore about the unit’s draining effect.
Once Redesign takes over, it goes to work finding some under-exploited capability. Team members gather
information from the business to use as vital resource material for a strategic study by outside consultants,
who are employed to ensure the most objective analysis of potential strategies. They then utilize the results of
this study to choose a strategy for the road to renewal.
The next step is for Redesign to assume complete control of the business, becoming its de facto owners and
treating it as a company separate from Philips. The business is then refocused and centered around its new
advantage, something that is done by encouraging senior figures in the organization to draw up a new
business plan in line with the chosen strategy. It’s Redesign’s job to make sure the plan is fully implemented,
because once this is done and the balance sheet looks healthier, there are a range of divestment options for
the transformed business.
The team may look to merge with a faster-growing competitor. But usually Redesign makes the unit the
fastest-growing, so there is no need for an immediate sale. “Now”, says Haverkamp “it becomes a money
machine. Not necessarily on cash flow, but on value. It’s worth more every day. That alone gives you a
stronger negotiating position. Then, when you need money, you can sell it, IPO it, whatever.”


Change
Today the Redesign team has grown to eight members. They choose not to have a permanent office, just a
secretary in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. They live in different European countries, and remain in close
contact while travelling constantly between assignments.
So far they have successfully completed four projects, and are working on four others. The total value in cash
and shares created by their activities is estimated to be over Euro 3,500 million.
People are finally starting to take notice. “When people find out that a unit is going to Redesign,” Haverkamp
explains, “they know what it involves to an extent. Sometimes they even start making changes themselves
before we get there. Things are less surprising for them now.”
Does this signify changes in the way Philips works? “People are naturally resistant to change, but I think that
we’ve definitely had an impact on the rest of the company. We do things differently and put tremendous
pressure and responsibility on people. But Redesign gets excellent results, and that’s what matters.”

The Redesign Process

Identify and prioritize businesses for Redesign
Business units with problems, and which are not strategic to Philips’ core activities, are candidates for
Redesign.As are potential divestments routed to the company’s M&A department.
Redesign screens units for potential added value – something unique with high entry barriers, in most
cases proprietary technology. Option to redesign focuses on high growth markets and creation of high
multiples on revenue, plus insertion of unit in optimal value chain.

Develop Redesign strategy
Downside risk analysis, examining worst-case scenarios and deciding whether risk is too high to justify
potential rewards. If not, then full-scale objective third-party research to identify highest possible value
creation, optimal value chain, partner identification and development of strategic plan.

Turn Redesign strategy into reality
Change management. Operating for maximum value creation instead of IFO/cash flow. Create paradigm
shift in management process. Carve business out into a separate unit. Strategic plan translated into
business plan. Implement operational changes. Get right people in, wrong people out.

Prepare/execute high value divestment
Negotiate with preferred merger candidate. Simulate business plan from viewpoint candidate. Prepare for
due diligence. Factors for successful negotiation include decision power and detailed knowledge of
playing field.

Post-transaction involvement
Philips keeps financial interest in value creation period.Takes board representation in new company when
stake is more than 10%.





In September 1998, Philips Broadband Wireless Systems (BWS) was in serious trouble. For years it had
been passed around the company’s product divisions, never finding a home. It was not central to Philips’ core
strategy, and the lack of attention had deprived it of significant investment. There was no leadership, no real
earnings and no direction. In the words of Chief Scientist Keith Williams: “We had no future.”
For the Redesign team, called in to see what they could do, it was exactly the kind of situation that has its
members salivating. “We go in to shake things up,” says Rein Couperus, the unit’s Marketing, Technology and
Communications specialist. “And this was a great opportunity, because they were all over the place.”
After completing a downside risk analysis, Redesign decided it was worth trying to revive the fortunes of the
flagging business. This meant first of all embarking on a full scale strategic study, begun in October of the
same year, to examine every aspect of BWS’s operations, markets and the industries in which it operated.
Once the study was finished, Redesign chose a strategy that would create the most value with the minimum
risk. And on January 1 1999, the team assumed complete control of every facet of BWS. This meant they were
free, as they are with every project, to make whatever changes they liked. They could fire people if they wanted,
or reassign them to new tasks. They could terminate product lines, discard technologies, and take the
company in completely new directions. Which is exactly what they did.

Fear
“People are scared of us,” says Couperus. “We haven’t been around that long, we’re relatively unknown, and
we have total control over the units we work with. That naturally creates a lot of anxiety.”
Such concern is readily admitted to in Manchester, where a justifiable skepticism underlined the view of this
as yet another doomed-to-failure rescue attempt. According to Stewart Jones, executive vice president (evp)
Operations: “Redesign was an unknown concept, and when they first came on board there was a degree of
apprehension. We’d never been subject to such a process before, and I don’t think any of us knew what to
expect.”
This changed quickly. One of the central tenets of Redesign’s standard operating procedure is a constant
stream of communication that from day one lets people know exactly what will happen. “Communication is
vital,” says Couperus, “a very important part of the process. There are no secrets and no hidden agendas. We
tell people what we will do and why, and this method, along with demonstrated success, ends up convincing
people Redesign is the right way to go.”

Strategy
The strategy Redesign chose for BWS represented a dramatic change in direction. Like many dying
companies, BWS had been diversifying and diversifying, making anything it could to survive the desperate
times. For the Redesign team this was tantamount to suicide – they had to stop the noose from tightening.
Radical overhaul was required. “They really needed focus, and that’s what we gave them,” Couperus bluntly
states.
In this case, focus entailed creating a Business Plan that dispensed with the 150 products BWS made to
concentrate on just one. The Business Plan was guided by Redesign’s strategy, but written by BWS
themselves. In a few short months the company went from being a system integrator in the video distribution
business, making everything from semiconductors to radios to radar detectors, to becoming a specialized
manufacturer of microwave radios for Internet data communication. In short, BWS moved from established
markets to an emerging one. It became a start-up.
But it was not only a question of picking the right business strategy. A psychological campaign began to
change people’s attitudes. This started with ditching the BWS name, so closely associated with past failures,
and calling the unit MMRadiolink. It continued with an expansion of the premises and interior redecoration.
And most importantly, it was sealed with substantial investment in new equipment.
Inevitably, personnel changes were also necessary, especially at the top. A significant proportion of higher
management was axed, including the Managing Director. Redesign had a stroke of luck in finding a
replacement. Ed Thomas, an American big-hitter with vast experience in the telecoms sector, had spurned
several lucrative executive-level offers with large US conglomerates and was looking around for something
different. He found the opportunity to turn MMRadiolink around irresistible, and joined the company in February
2000.
“My job is to help rebuild the company,” he says. “The old regime was a recipe for disaster, and I’m part of the
injection of new blood. I like the flavor of this place. MMRadiolink is the startup and Redesign the investment
banker.” Having Thomas in place enables Redesign to focus on the broad picture while leaving him making
ground-level decisions. “Redesign are not micromanagers,” he states. “They put the general direction in place
and leave the rest up to me.”


Setback
Just as it was winning the struggle to get back on its feet, MMRadiolink’s first and only customer was taken
over and the contract lost. This was a huge blow. As Thomas puts it: “July looked bleak. There was zero
revenue on our radar.”
After the immense amount of work that had been put in, this seemed like the cruelest twist of fate. Once again,
the company was staring into the abyss. The whole Business Plan would have to be rethought and rewritten.
But in typical fashion, the Redesign team showed it wasn’t giving up.
Willem Haverkamp, the team’s leader, told Thomas he had to “scramble for customers.” He also told the
Philips Board that if none had been found by the last day of 2000, they could sell MMRadiolink and take
whatever they could for it. “It’s a nice site with 22 RF Engineers; you’ll get your money back,” he said. It was a
simple equation, and the race was now on.
But even during this uncertain time, investment continued. “Part of the Redesign process is material
demonstrations of the will to succeed,” says Thomas. “Look at the new building – construction didn’t start until
after we lost the contract. Other people said we were crazy, but we’re not. This sends a signal that our
business is not just about one customer.”
MMRadiolink’s scientific brigade got on with expanding their project range, and fine-tuning what they already
had to fit the needs of potential customers. At the same time, Thomas and his senior team searched for new
contracts. For the first time in years, their Manchester site played host to a stream of visitors from around the
world. They were impressed by what they saw, both in terms of the technical capabilities on display and the
commitment of employees.
And in November, the company had the success it deserved. It signed an important contract with a new
customer. Several others are on the way, and suddenly the future is looking a lot brighter. As a direct effect of
this, staff levels are also rising. From a relatively stable low of 75-80 people over the past few years,
MMRadiolink has grown to just over 100, and should climb to around 130 in 2001. There is also continuing
investment across the board and, perhaps more importantly, a renewal of confidence and self-belief.

Reflection
It has been a long road to get this far, and only now are people at MMRadiolink taking stock of what’s
happened over the past two years. “In a way,” says Finance vice president Chris Andrew, “what Redesign did
was remove all possible reasons for failure. We can’t say that we don’t have the right strategy, the right people
or the right resources. Things here are staggeringly different now.” According to Evan Evangelinos,
Commercial evp: “What was crucial is that Redesign set up an organization that would allow us to compete in
the real commercial world.”
But what of the process itself? “It’s painful,” admits Chief Scientist Keith Williams, “but liberating also.” evp
Operations Stewart Jones agrees: “It’s been a ride, and there were black days. It was difficult to tell people that
we couldn’t make our traditional products anymore. There’s a certain pain in your heart when you know they’re
going away. Then again, dealing with this is a demonstration of your commitment to the future.”
Redesign’s Rein Couperus, one of those most closely involved in the turnaround, sums it up like this: “We
came in and we took drastic action. It was badly needed. We explained our strategy to people. They accepted
it, and now they’ve followed through with it. We’ve made a real change here, and we had to invest a lot of
money to give them a future. But we wouldn’t spend it if we didn’t believe in it.”


Original-Artikel: http://www.news.philips.com/mondial/archive/2001/february/ar…

[tupper]

Das isses!
Den Boss hat man ja schon gefeúert und Potential hat Amatech mehr als genug!

[exlex]

HAt hier keiner mehr eine Meinung zu Amatech?

Immerhin kommen am Donnerstag Zahlen auf den Tisch.

[spekulativ]

@exlex
und ? dann heißt es erneut Umsatzziel nicht erreicht.

Gruß spekulativ

[exlex]

@spekulativ:

Entscheidend wird der Ausblick sein.

Dennnoch hoffe ich, daß das Umsatzziel erreicht wird.

Grüße

Exlex