Wireless LAN statt UMTS ... Alvarion (ALVR) wird profitieren! - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[Freeclimber]

Hallo zusammen,

habt Ihr Euch mal Gedanken darüber gemacht, daß es fuer mobile Business-Anwendungenbesser und kostengünstiger ist, auf Wireless LAN zu setzen. Zukünftig werden sicher alle Bahnhöfe, ICEs, Flughäfen und andere zentrale Punkte mit Wireless LAN ausgestattet werden. Kostenintensive UMTS Lizenzen sind dafür nicht erforderlich!
M.E. werden dabei Komponentenanbieter überproportional verdienen. Lucent Tech. ist dabei viel zu breit aufgestellt ... aber was haltet Ihr von Alaviron (ALVR). Hier ist ledgilich eine Market Cap von 180 Mio $. Einige andere Analysten haben bereits ein Auge darauf geworfen. In den vergangen Monaten ist der Kurs bereits um 50% gestiegen.

Alvarion ist aus einem Merger zw. Floware und BreezeCom entstanden (Mitte diesen Jahres) ... sicher haben die noch einige Probleme, die neue Struktur in den Griff u bekommen, aber dann erwarte ich deutliche Verbesserungen der Ergebnissituation. Zudem sichert eine Kooperationsvereinbarung mit Siemens das Geschäft in Deutschland/Europa ab.

Gruß
FreeClimber

[mr007]

moin moin,
qz waren ganz ok, aussichten, marktstellung, cashpos. sprechen für ne solide kursentwicklung (kz $6), mark.cap liegt akt. bei $145 mio!
viel glück mr007

[flaminghomer]

Hier ein Kommentar zu dem Thema...Es ist nicht alles Gold was glänzt!

JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN, DOESN`T MEAN YOU SHOULD: Wireless Operators and WLAN Networks

There has been much speculation lately on the potential impact of low cost Wireless LAN networks on the 3G business case. WLANs (based primarily on the IEEE 802.11 standard) have matured to the point that their performance and the cost of building WLAN networks in public spaces (such as airports, hotels, and coffee shops) are looking somewhat interesting, at least compared to 3G.

From this, analysts and pundits have speculated that public space networks could erode the 3G business case by "stealing" those customers who use laptops and other devices . We agree. We have presented this concept, called "piranha networks" in our strategic seminars since July, 2000. Our view is that WLAN and Bluetooth networks in public spaces will eventually be a much better and more popular alternative for mobile customers using laptops, PDAs, digital cameras, and other devices in relatively confined public spaces.

However, those same analysts have taken this concept a step further, stating that network operators must begin to invest in public space networks in order to resist erosion of their business. With this, we emphatically do not agree.

Although in our seminars we have described the effect which piranha networks will have on 3G networks, we have repeatedly cautioned our clients that the piranha network business model is not yet ready for prime time. The key issue is lack of qualified users. The piranha network addresses the need of a niche market those with mobile devices equipped with WLAN or Bluetooth, who need Internet access in public spaces, and who are willing to pay significantly for the privilege ($20-40 per month is typical). This encompasses far fewer customers than most are willing to recognize - and this is the underlying reason behind the failures of Metricom and MobileStar. Those companies achieved only 30,000 to 40,000 paying subscribers each despite millions in marketing and (in the case of Metricom) over a billion dollars in overall expenditures. Others will follow as they inevitably run out of funding.

In short, there are too few wirelessly-equipped devices being asked to support too many public spaces. The number of wirelessly-equipped (non-phone) mobile devices sold each year needs to increase by an order of magnitude - at least - before the economics begin to make sense. This will eventually occur, but not soon enough for the "bleeding edge" companies trying to make a profit from piranha networks today. For power-constrained devices such as digital cameras, MP3 players, and PDAs (which will form the bulk of sales) the dominant technologies will be infrared and Bluetooth. For laptops, WLAN and its evolutionary descendants will continue strongly. We see sufficient quantities of devices in the market no earlier than 2005 - and possibly later - though some of those devices are emerging today.

Should network operators attempt to enter this market, they will waste money and gain little. In addition to lack of market demand, they are hardly equipped to succeed. Network operators don`t have the sales channels for such networks, they lack the billing and technical support capability, they strongly resist the "pipe" role (in favor of providing specific "services" which they can control, such as ringtones), and they would be unable to control the devices. Furthermore, there is a strong logical disconnect between phone-based services over 3G, and Internet access via broadband piranha networks. They involve different users, devices, markets, pricing models, applications, technologies, and locations. Today`s network operator is a terrible candidate to develop or run piranha networks.

Like it or not, 3G is the strategy on which the wireless industry has hung its future survival. Network operators building 3G networks must concentrate their efforts on finding ways to make 3G pay. A first step is to recognize the markets that don`t exist and focus energies on those which make sense. Network operators have two key weapons -- their ownership of spectrum and their ability to provide specific wide area mobility services. Focusing efforts on building a quality network to provide mobility services will serve network operators much better than thinking their worth will be in supplying an all-encompassing solution serving public and enterprise spaces.