► BAYER AG ■ Auf neuen Wegen ◄ (Seite 928)

[-Kapitalvernichter-]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 69.431.572 von Invest-Trading am 27.09.21 09:20:15

Meine Güte: Hier im Forum geht es aktuell zu wie auf einem Kindergeburtstag, wo der Kuchen ausgegangen ist!
Was erwartet ihr denn von der Bayer-Aktie oder von Aktien im Allgemeinen? Eine Aktie geht doch nicht jeden Tag um 10 % durch die Decke, egal was der Gesamtmarkt oder auch die bisherigen Kursverläufe so machten.
Und auch solch schweren Unternehmensklagen lassen sich doch nicht von heute auf morgen abschütteln. Diese werden das Unternehmen noch einige Jahre beschäftigen. Auch ein Wechsel in der Führungsspitze würde nicht zwangsläufig eine Wende bringen.
Soeben hat Bayer nun die 47er Marke überschritten. Aktuell 47,23 € = + 1,48 %. Der "starke" Gesamtmarkt steigt ca. 1 %.
Aber was ändert das nun? Kann gleich auch schon wieder ganz anders aussehen!

[Invest-Trading]

zumindest ist Bayer weiter steigungsresistent bei starkem Gesamtmarkt. Da kann der DAX noch so weit rennen, Bayer stagniert weiter unter 47 EUR.

Ein Armutszeugnis für CEO und Aufsichtsrat diese Performance.
Vermutlich hat das bald ein Ende und der Laden wird aufgespalten...

[Jlivermore999]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 69.430.096 von 007coolinvestor am 26.09.21 22:40:42

Eben …

… und einmal mehr gilt: wer lesen kann, ist klar im Vorteil - mit oder ohne Halbwissen.

[007coolinvestor]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 69.429.919 von Jlivermore999 am 26.09.21 21:42:08

Zitat von Jlivermore999: Leute, prüft es besser. Ich habe keine Shortinteressen. Nur bitte nicht naiv durch die Finanzwelt marschieren.

Bayer ist eine oder DIE Top-verschuldete und mit einem Mühlstein behängte AG. Das geht schief, sobald die Politik des billigen Gekdes vorbei ist. Bald ?

Oder der Cashflow wächst schneller, als die Politik des billigen Geldes endet. Sehe ich nicht.

Evergrande wird die Welt in den Kollaps oder wenigstens nah daran führen. Die Asiaten wissen das längst. Siehe
Seekriegs Alpha von heute:

The bankruptcy of the Chinese real estate company Evergrande (OTCPK:EGRNF)(OTCPK:EGRNY) is much more than a “Chinese Lehman.” Lehman Brothers was much more diversified than Evergrande and better capitalized. In fact, the total assets of Evergrande that are on the brink of bankruptcy outnumber the entire subprime bubble of the United States.

The problem with Evergrande is that it is not an anecdote, but a symptom of a model based on leveraged growth and seeking to inflate GDP at any cost with ghost cities, unused infrastructure, and wild construction. The indebtedness chain model of Evergrande is not uncommon in China. Many Chinese companies follow the “running to stand still” strategy of piling on ever-increasing debt to compensate for poor cash flow generation and weak margins. Many promoters get into massive debt to build a promotion that either is not sold or is left with many unsold units, then refinance that debt by adding more credit for new projects using unsaleable or already leveraged assets as collateral.

The total liabilities of Evergrande account for more than double its official debt figure (more than 2 trillion yuan). Evergrande’s financial hole is equivalent to almost a third of Russia’s GDP. Its annual revenues do not reach $70 billion, and it is more than debatable whether those revenues are real, since a relevant part comes from payment commitments whose collection is doubtful. Even if they were real, these revenues are not enough to address the bond maturities, which exceed $250 billion in the short term.

Evergrande is much more dangerous than it seems:

All the “Keynesian” solutions that you are hearing these days have already been implemented. Massive liquidity injections, low interest rates, full implicit and explicit support from the Chinese government … Let’s not forget that Evergrande was the largest issuer of commercial paper in China, $32 billion issued in 2020, a 390 percent increase from 2015, according to Reuters.

Evergrande represents less than 4 percent of the overall Chinese market but its model has been used by many Chinese promoters. The ten biggest real estate developers account for 34 percent of the market and aggressive leverage practices are widespread.

The real estate sector is huge in China. Its direct and indirect weight, according to JPMorgan, is 25 percent of GDP, more than double the size of the real estate bubble in Japan or Spain. The sector has been growing with an indebted model at 15 percent per year in the last three years. The Chinese government has introduced regulations to reduce the excess, but because it benefits from the increase in GDP and job creation, it has maintained a complacent position regarding the corporate debt model.

Chinese real estate companies, according to JPMorgan, have “reduced” their indebtedness to 92 percent of total assets from a monster 140 percent in 2018, with a profit margin of 9–13 percent. But those figures still show a larger and more concerning problem than what headlines imply. Most Chinese real estate developers have total liabilities of 50 percent to total assets, according to JPMorgan. The problem is that the value of those assets and the capacity to sell them is more than questionable.

The implications of an Evergrande collapse are far greater than what investment banks tell us.

The first risk is a domino effect in a very aggressively indebted sector. There is also a significant impact on all those banks exposed to China and emerging markets, where China has financed ruinous projects in recent years. And there is also impact on global growth and countries that export to China, because the slowdown was already more than evident. Additionally, we cannot ignore the impact on the solvency of the financial system despite billions of dollars injected by the People's Bank of China.

A Solvency Problem Cannot Be Solved with Liquidity.

The hope that the government will fix everything contrasts with the magnitude of the financial hole. Be that as it may, we cannot overlook the negative effect on those sectors highly exposed to real estate growth, infrastructure, electricity, services, and in the hundreds of thousands of citizens who have paid an upfront fee for flats that are not going to be built.

The problem with China is that the entire economy is a huge indebted model that needs almost ten units of debt to generate one unit of GDP, three times more than a decade ago, and all this catastrophe was already more than evident months ago. With total debt of 300 percent debt to GDP according to the Institute of International Finance, China is not the strong economy swimming in with cash that it was a couple of decades ago.

The market assumed that because it is China, the government was going to hide these risks. Even worse, the Evergrande collapse only shows a dangerous reality in several Chinese sectors: excessive indebtedness without real income or assets to support it.

This episode comes at the worst possible time after the government has launched a massive crackdown on large companies. International investors are already concerned about corporate governance and intervention in China and now the fears of credit contagion make the risk even worse.

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4457154-evergrande-is-much-…

Man muss keine Shortinteressen haben. Man kann schlicht auch sich mit Halbwissen (im besten Fall) aufblasen. Entscheidend ist die Schuldentragfähigkeit und nicht die absolute Höhe der Schulden eines Unternehmens. Und dabei spiel auch die Rolle eines stabilen Geschäftsmodells. Bayer gehört nach einer Auswertung eine internationale Unternehmensberatung zu den 50 international führenden innovativen Unternehmen ... (link wurde von Proflux gepostet).

[Jlivermore999]

Crash voraus

Leute, prüft es besser. Ich habe keine Shortinteressen. Nur bitte nicht naiv durch die Finanzwelt marschieren.

Bayer ist eine oder DIE Top-verschuldete und mit einem Mühlstein behängte AG. Das geht schief, sobald die Politik des billigen Gekdes vorbei ist. Bald ?

Oder der Cashflow wächst schneller, als die Politik des billigen Geldes endet. Sehe ich nicht.

Evergrande wird die Welt in den Kollaps oder wenigstens nah daran führen. Die Asiaten wissen das längst. Siehe
Seekriegs Alpha von heute:

The bankruptcy of the Chinese real estate company Evergrande (OTCPK:EGRNF)(OTCPK:EGRNY) is much more than a “Chinese Lehman.” Lehman Brothers was much more diversified than Evergrande and better capitalized. In fact, the total assets of Evergrande that are on the brink of bankruptcy outnumber the entire subprime bubble of the United States.

The problem with Evergrande is that it is not an anecdote, but a symptom of a model based on leveraged growth and seeking to inflate GDP at any cost with ghost cities, unused infrastructure, and wild construction. The indebtedness chain model of Evergrande is not uncommon in China. Many Chinese companies follow the “running to stand still” strategy of piling on ever-increasing debt to compensate for poor cash flow generation and weak margins. Many promoters get into massive debt to build a promotion that either is not sold or is left with many unsold units, then refinance that debt by adding more credit for new projects using unsaleable or already leveraged assets as collateral.

The total liabilities of Evergrande account for more than double its official debt figure (more than 2 trillion yuan). Evergrande’s financial hole is equivalent to almost a third of Russia’s GDP. Its annual revenues do not reach $70 billion, and it is more than debatable whether those revenues are real, since a relevant part comes from payment commitments whose collection is doubtful. Even if they were real, these revenues are not enough to address the bond maturities, which exceed $250 billion in the short term.

Evergrande is much more dangerous than it seems:

All the “Keynesian” solutions that you are hearing these days have already been implemented. Massive liquidity injections, low interest rates, full implicit and explicit support from the Chinese government … Let’s not forget that Evergrande was the largest issuer of commercial paper in China, $32 billion issued in 2020, a 390 percent increase from 2015, according to Reuters.

Evergrande represents less than 4 percent of the overall Chinese market but its model has been used by many Chinese promoters. The ten biggest real estate developers account for 34 percent of the market and aggressive leverage practices are widespread.

The real estate sector is huge in China. Its direct and indirect weight, according to JPMorgan, is 25 percent of GDP, more than double the size of the real estate bubble in Japan or Spain. The sector has been growing with an indebted model at 15 percent per year in the last three years. The Chinese government has introduced regulations to reduce the excess, but because it benefits from the increase in GDP and job creation, it has maintained a complacent position regarding the corporate debt model.

Chinese real estate companies, according to JPMorgan, have “reduced” their indebtedness to 92 percent of total assets from a monster 140 percent in 2018, with a profit margin of 9–13 percent. But those figures still show a larger and more concerning problem than what headlines imply. Most Chinese real estate developers have total liabilities of 50 percent to total assets, according to JPMorgan. The problem is that the value of those assets and the capacity to sell them is more than questionable.

The implications of an Evergrande collapse are far greater than what investment banks tell us.

The first risk is a domino effect in a very aggressively indebted sector. There is also a significant impact on all those banks exposed to China and emerging markets, where China has financed ruinous projects in recent years. And there is also impact on global growth and countries that export to China, because the slowdown was already more than evident. Additionally, we cannot ignore the impact on the solvency of the financial system despite billions of dollars injected by the People's Bank of China.

A Solvency Problem Cannot Be Solved with Liquidity.

The hope that the government will fix everything contrasts with the magnitude of the financial hole. Be that as it may, we cannot overlook the negative effect on those sectors highly exposed to real estate growth, infrastructure, electricity, services, and in the hundreds of thousands of citizens who have paid an upfront fee for flats that are not going to be built.

The problem with China is that the entire economy is a huge indebted model that needs almost ten units of debt to generate one unit of GDP, three times more than a decade ago, and all this catastrophe was already more than evident months ago. With total debt of 300 percent debt to GDP according to the Institute of International Finance, China is not the strong economy swimming in with cash that it was a couple of decades ago.

The market assumed that because it is China, the government was going to hide these risks. Even worse, the Evergrande collapse only shows a dangerous reality in several Chinese sectors: excessive indebtedness without real income or assets to support it.

This episode comes at the worst possible time after the government has launched a massive crackdown on large companies. International investors are already concerned about corporate governance and intervention in China and now the fears of credit contagion make the risk even worse.

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4457154-evergrande-is-much-…

[Guru-Neu]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 69.428.605 von 007coolinvestor am 26.09.21 16:58:18

Warum kauft man keiner Bayer?

[007coolinvestor]

[Guru-Neu]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 69.428.074 von clownfisch am 26.09.21 14:46:24

In 20 Jahre gibt's kein Monsanto mehr.

[clownfisch]

in gewisser weise hat der user jlivermore 999 recht!

durch die monsanto-übernahme hängt die bilanz von bayer eigentlich schief......

die analysten reden immer noch von hohem gewinn, hohem cash-flow und schöner dividende...bemerken aber gar nicht wie hoch bayer inzwischen verschuldet ist......

es wird 20 jahre (!!!) dauern, bis sich der monsanto-deal rechnet..
20 jahre! hat ein unabhängiger finanz-analyst ausgerechnet...

dann ist der sch...-vorstand in seinem chalet in der schweiz und die meisten bayer-aktionäre tot.........

merde!

[EliasB]

Zitat von strolch_100:

Zitat von Jlivermore999: Bayer wird der Evergrandekollaps voll treffen, klar meine Meinung. Evergrande kollabiert, und es ist doch wohl ein Pyramideneffekt siehe

https://qz.com/2062541/this-researcher-foresaw-chinas-evergr…

Reuters schreibt schon, es gäbe den credit/ cash crunch quer durch China . https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-evergrande-bondhol…

Heißt das nicht auch quer durch die Ganze Welt. Bayers Frenü,verschuldung ist apokalyptisch hoch! So wie niemand den Evergrande Kollaps sah, so wie niemand den credit/cash crunch sieht, so sehen die auch nich den Bayer Crash. - Das Ding geht bald steil bergab ….

God bless you, allen Investierten

Dann all in short. Danach hast du ausgesorgt. Feuer frei. Muss dann aber auch wirklich steil bergab gehen, das weißt du schon?

Was hat dann dieses Posting von Substanz? Wenn evergrande den Bach runtergeht, dann geht alles runter - außer Shorts versteht sich-
Damit muss jeder Invertierter leben. Ob er/sie Bayer im Depot hat oder Daimler oder Tesla oder sonst was, spielt keine Rolle.
Ich würde eher vermuten, dass es Bayer zwar trifft, aber nicht so hart wie andere Werte, denn Bayer ist in geräumter Zeit bereits genug ausgepeitscht worden. Meine Meinung, wie du schön schreibst.