Navios Maritime Partners - gute Kaufgelegenheit? (Seite 21)
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ISIN: MHY622674098 · WKN: A2PJPH · Symbol: NMM
44,71
USD
+1,73 %
+0,76 USD
Letzter Kurs 02:04:01 NYSE
Werte aus der Branche Verkehr
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 1,0100 | +304,00 | |
| 0,7200 | +56,42 | |
| 45,84 | +39,37 | |
| 0,5643 | +30,75 | |
| 0,7620 | +27,00 |
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 1,2600 | -11,89 | |
| 0,7350 | -14,53 | |
| 1,7901 | -16,35 | |
| 400,00 | -21,57 | |
| 8,2702 | -49,26 |
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Hat einer von Euch Ahnung wie man hier Verluste geltend machen kann? Habe mit Verlust verkauft weil mir die Frangou irgendwie suspekt ist...
Die Verluste der Units werden im Verlusttopf weder bei Aktien noch Sonstiges verrechnet.
Ich vermute das muss man in der Steuer Erklärung machen.Nur wie?!
Kann jemand helfen?!
Viele Grüsse
A.
Die Verluste der Units werden im Verlusttopf weder bei Aktien noch Sonstiges verrechnet.
Ich vermute das muss man in der Steuer Erklärung machen.Nur wie?!
Kann jemand helfen?!
Viele Grüsse
A.
Ob gut oder schlecht?
https://seekingalpha.com/pr/18027277-navios-maritime-partner…
Die Finanzierungskosten liegen nach meiner Rechnung bei ca. 9,5k$ pro Tag. Da hoffen wir mal auf noormale bis gute Raten 😎
https://seekingalpha.com/pr/18027277-navios-maritime-partner…
Die Finanzierungskosten liegen nach meiner Rechnung bei ca. 9,5k$ pro Tag. Da hoffen wir mal auf noormale bis gute Raten 😎
Dividendenkürzung auf 5 US Cent!
http://navios-mlp.irwebpage.com/files/nmm072920.pdf
Bin mit einem größeren Teil raus aus der Aktie.
Stopp-Kurse leider erreicht. Und als Dividenden-Papier durch diese überraschende massive Kürzung auch eher unbrauchbar.
http://navios-mlp.irwebpage.com/files/nmm072920.pdf
Bin mit einem größeren Teil raus aus der Aktie.
Stopp-Kurse leider erreicht. Und als Dividenden-Papier durch diese überraschende massive Kürzung auch eher unbrauchbar.
Kaufen wenn die Kanonen donnern - hat zumindest früher funktioniert
BDI ca. 1900 Punkte
Als wir etwas schlechtere Charterpreise hatte; z.B Anfang 2018, war der Kurs der Aktie bei 35 Dollar. Jetzt knapp 10 Dllar. Damals war die Fremdfinanzierungsquote der Firma noch schlechter.
Als wir im Herbst letzten Jahres die gleichen Charterpreise hatten, war der Kurs der Aktie doppelt so hoch.
Als 2016 / 2017 gar keine Dividende Dividende ausgeschüttet wurde (jetzt 1,20 Dollar p.a), es noch keine langlaufenden gute Verträge für die Conatinerschiffe gab, kein Aktienrückkaufprogramm etc., war der Aktienkurs Pi mal Daumen im Schnitt knapp bei 30 Dollar. - Jetzt bei knapp 10 Dollar. Also 300% höher
..
🤔
Es scheint so: je besser die Fundamentaldaten werden, desto mehr schmiert die Aktie ab!
Als wir etwas schlechtere Charterpreise hatte; z.B Anfang 2018, war der Kurs der Aktie bei 35 Dollar. Jetzt knapp 10 Dllar. Damals war die Fremdfinanzierungsquote der Firma noch schlechter.
Als wir im Herbst letzten Jahres die gleichen Charterpreise hatten, war der Kurs der Aktie doppelt so hoch.
Als 2016 / 2017 gar keine Dividende Dividende ausgeschüttet wurde (jetzt 1,20 Dollar p.a), es noch keine langlaufenden gute Verträge für die Conatinerschiffe gab, kein Aktienrückkaufprogramm etc., war der Aktienkurs Pi mal Daumen im Schnitt knapp bei 30 Dollar. - Jetzt bei knapp 10 Dollar. Also 300% höher
..
🤔
Es scheint so: je besser die Fundamentaldaten werden, desto mehr schmiert die Aktie ab!
Trading Spotlight
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 64.234.729 von wallstreetmarc am 30.06.20 12:54:14aber eine Dividendenrendite von ca. 12,5 Prozent, die fast ca. 8-fach dedeckt ist
das ist natürlich nur eine Annahme / Spekulation.
das ist natürlich nur eine Annahme / Spekulation.
Baltic Dry Index um die 1800 Punkte.
Das sind jetzt etwa die Frachtraten, die wir in Q4 2019 hatten und bei dem die Dividende ca. 8-fach gedeckt war. In Q1 2020 war sie dann noch ca. 4-fach gedeckt vom ausschüttungsfähigen Cash Flow. (siehe Quratalsberichte)
Ich hab wirklich fundamental noch nie eine unterbewertetere Aktie gesehen, als dieser Laden zur Zeit..
Mir ist schon klar, dass die Schifffahrtsbranche sehr volatil ist.. aber eine Dividendenrendite von ca. 12,5 Prozent, die fast ca. 8-fach dedeckt ist.. das kenn ich nicht..
Und dazu kommt noch die Sicherheit der langlaufenden Containerschiffs-Frachtraten, die zusätzlich Streuung bietet. Eine immer bessere Bilanz (Fremdkapitalquote) und die gute Aussicht, in den nächsten Jahren kein Überangebot an neuen Schiffen zu bekommen.
Und das Wachstum weltweit dürfte in 2021 wieder massiv anziehen. (siehe Prognosen von ca. 4-7 Prozent PLUS der Wirtshaftsinstitute).
Anlagen streuen!
Das sind jetzt etwa die Frachtraten, die wir in Q4 2019 hatten und bei dem die Dividende ca. 8-fach gedeckt war. In Q1 2020 war sie dann noch ca. 4-fach gedeckt vom ausschüttungsfähigen Cash Flow. (siehe Quratalsberichte)
Ich hab wirklich fundamental noch nie eine unterbewertetere Aktie gesehen, als dieser Laden zur Zeit..
Mir ist schon klar, dass die Schifffahrtsbranche sehr volatil ist.. aber eine Dividendenrendite von ca. 12,5 Prozent, die fast ca. 8-fach dedeckt ist.. das kenn ich nicht..
Und dazu kommt noch die Sicherheit der langlaufenden Containerschiffs-Frachtraten, die zusätzlich Streuung bietet. Eine immer bessere Bilanz (Fremdkapitalquote) und die gute Aussicht, in den nächsten Jahren kein Überangebot an neuen Schiffen zu bekommen.
Und das Wachstum weltweit dürfte in 2021 wieder massiv anziehen. (siehe Prognosen von ca. 4-7 Prozent PLUS der Wirtshaftsinstitute).
Anlagen streuen!
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 64.101.177 von wallstreetmarc am 20.06.20 11:37:41oder um die These des Artikels kurz zu machen: selbst bei einem Aktienkurs von 30 Dollar (aktuell 8,63 Dollar) wäre die Firma fundamental noch nicht zu hoch bewertet, da sie dann auch noch UNTER NAV liegen würde!
Des weiteren hat sie gute langlaufende Kontrakte im Containerbereich und massiv in den letzten Jahren Schulden abgebaut.
long NMM. - Keine Empfehlung; Anlagen streuen!
Des weiteren hat sie gute langlaufende Kontrakte im Containerbereich und massiv in den letzten Jahren Schulden abgebaut.
long NMM. - Keine Empfehlung; Anlagen streuen!
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 64.083.300 von wallstreetmarc am 19.06.20 10:59:59Navios Partners To Benefit From Surging Market And Navios Europe II Liquidation
On Wednesday 17 June, the BDI recorded its biggest ever daily percentage jump (29%), with average capesize rates climbing to $19,036.
On Thursday18 June, capesize rates increased by another 31% to $25,280, as a result of the continued spike in iron-ore shipments.
Following the liquidation of Navios Europe II, Navios Maritime Partners will receive ~$17.3M, namely ~$4M in cash and five dry bulk vessels (two Ultra-Handymaxes and three Panamaxes).
NMM has a large fleet of 53 vessels (highest number in its history). Debt is close to the lowest point in its history (37.4% net debt to book capitalization). Yet, the unit price is hovering at much lower levels compared to the shipping crash of 2015/16 (back then, things were arguably much worse for NMM).
If the unit price increases to $30 (almost 4 times increase), this equates to a market cap of ~$330M, which is still below NAV (charter-free fleet value plus contracted cash flow).
...
To be fair, NMM still pays a dividend while most peers don't (ultimately what matters is total return). The current dividend distribution yield is in excess of 15%; however, the distribution is well covered on a normalized basis. The quarterly distribution of $0.30 per unit "costs" $3.4M versus adjusted EBITDA of $19.1M for Q1 2020.
What brings tremendous stability to NMM's cash flow is the five containerships chartered out to HMM on lucrative long-term fixed contracts (expiring December 2023). Note, charter rates surged in December 2019, increasing from $24,095 per day to $30,119 per day
This is the key differentiating factor compared to its pure-play dry bulk peers. To put things into perspective, these lucrative contracts allow NMM to be cash flow positive in virtually any dry bulk rate environment. Not only that, but also the additional daily increase of ~$6,000 per vessel equates to a total ~$30,000 per day cash flow boost, which equates to ~$11M in annualized cash flow. This is almost the entire amount NMM pays in annual distributions (currently $13.6M per year).
All of the aforementioned positives (Navios Europe II liquidation, dry bulk market improving, containerships chartered out to HMM producing additional cash flow) will eventually result in a much higher unit price. In my view, it's a matter of time, but when it happens it will happen really fast.
It is important to highlight that based on pre-reverse split figures (one-for-fifteen reverse split), NMM is trading at just ~$0.5 per unit. For those who followed NMM on a pre-reverse split figures, anything under $2 (equivalent to $30 post-split) was considered quite cheap. We have a long way to go until those levels ($30+), but they are realistic. For example, a unit price of $30 (almost 4 times increase) equates to a market cap of ~$330M, which is arguably still below NAV (charter-free fleet value plus contracted cash flow).
I have been following NMM for more than a decade. In my view, this is perhaps one of the most interesting and promising moments in the company's history, which has suffered ever since eliminating the legacy distribution in 2015/16. Since then, the company has been trying to delever as well as grow the fleet with a low distribution payout model. NMM is currently well positioned to generate strong free cash flow as the dry bulk and containership markets pick up. Following the Navios Europe II liquidation, NMM will operate 53 vessels. If the dry bulk market plummets again, the five containerships chartered out to HMM provide much-needed stability, ensuring that NMM remains cash flow positive in virtually any dry bulk rate environment. NMM has a diversified debt maturity schedule, with no material debt maturities until Q3 2021 and no significant committed growth capex. We finally have clarity on both Navios Europe I and Navios Europe II. Let's hope NMM can find a way to take advantage of its stake in Navios Maritime Containers (NASDAQ:NMCI) as well.
In closing, NMM has a large fleet of 53 vessels (highest number in its history). Debt is close to the lowest point in its history (37.4% net debt to book capitalization). Yet, the unit price is hovering at much lower levels compared to the shipping crash of 2015/16 (back then, things were arguably much worse for NMM). The market will eventually come to its senses, as the discount to NAV is unprecedented, especially with all the additional equity value realized from Navios Europe I and Navios Europe II. Yet, the market cap is still just ~$85M. It is also important to note that the company's general partner (GP) interests were sold by Navios Maritime Holdings (NYSE:NM), the previous parent, to N Shipmanagement Acquisition Corp., an entity controlled by NMM's CEO. This is a net positive, as the market perceived the relationship with struggling NM as toxic. NM is now just a large unitholder, owning 18.5% limited partner interests in NMM. Despite this, the massive discount to NAV persists.
Disclosure: I am/we are long NMM. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4354781-navios-partners-to-…
On Wednesday 17 June, the BDI recorded its biggest ever daily percentage jump (29%), with average capesize rates climbing to $19,036.
On Thursday18 June, capesize rates increased by another 31% to $25,280, as a result of the continued spike in iron-ore shipments.
Following the liquidation of Navios Europe II, Navios Maritime Partners will receive ~$17.3M, namely ~$4M in cash and five dry bulk vessels (two Ultra-Handymaxes and three Panamaxes).
NMM has a large fleet of 53 vessels (highest number in its history). Debt is close to the lowest point in its history (37.4% net debt to book capitalization). Yet, the unit price is hovering at much lower levels compared to the shipping crash of 2015/16 (back then, things were arguably much worse for NMM).
If the unit price increases to $30 (almost 4 times increase), this equates to a market cap of ~$330M, which is still below NAV (charter-free fleet value plus contracted cash flow).
...
To be fair, NMM still pays a dividend while most peers don't (ultimately what matters is total return). The current dividend distribution yield is in excess of 15%; however, the distribution is well covered on a normalized basis. The quarterly distribution of $0.30 per unit "costs" $3.4M versus adjusted EBITDA of $19.1M for Q1 2020.
What brings tremendous stability to NMM's cash flow is the five containerships chartered out to HMM on lucrative long-term fixed contracts (expiring December 2023). Note, charter rates surged in December 2019, increasing from $24,095 per day to $30,119 per day
This is the key differentiating factor compared to its pure-play dry bulk peers. To put things into perspective, these lucrative contracts allow NMM to be cash flow positive in virtually any dry bulk rate environment. Not only that, but also the additional daily increase of ~$6,000 per vessel equates to a total ~$30,000 per day cash flow boost, which equates to ~$11M in annualized cash flow. This is almost the entire amount NMM pays in annual distributions (currently $13.6M per year).
All of the aforementioned positives (Navios Europe II liquidation, dry bulk market improving, containerships chartered out to HMM producing additional cash flow) will eventually result in a much higher unit price. In my view, it's a matter of time, but when it happens it will happen really fast.
It is important to highlight that based on pre-reverse split figures (one-for-fifteen reverse split), NMM is trading at just ~$0.5 per unit. For those who followed NMM on a pre-reverse split figures, anything under $2 (equivalent to $30 post-split) was considered quite cheap. We have a long way to go until those levels ($30+), but they are realistic. For example, a unit price of $30 (almost 4 times increase) equates to a market cap of ~$330M, which is arguably still below NAV (charter-free fleet value plus contracted cash flow).
I have been following NMM for more than a decade. In my view, this is perhaps one of the most interesting and promising moments in the company's history, which has suffered ever since eliminating the legacy distribution in 2015/16. Since then, the company has been trying to delever as well as grow the fleet with a low distribution payout model. NMM is currently well positioned to generate strong free cash flow as the dry bulk and containership markets pick up. Following the Navios Europe II liquidation, NMM will operate 53 vessels. If the dry bulk market plummets again, the five containerships chartered out to HMM provide much-needed stability, ensuring that NMM remains cash flow positive in virtually any dry bulk rate environment. NMM has a diversified debt maturity schedule, with no material debt maturities until Q3 2021 and no significant committed growth capex. We finally have clarity on both Navios Europe I and Navios Europe II. Let's hope NMM can find a way to take advantage of its stake in Navios Maritime Containers (NASDAQ:NMCI) as well.
In closing, NMM has a large fleet of 53 vessels (highest number in its history). Debt is close to the lowest point in its history (37.4% net debt to book capitalization). Yet, the unit price is hovering at much lower levels compared to the shipping crash of 2015/16 (back then, things were arguably much worse for NMM). The market will eventually come to its senses, as the discount to NAV is unprecedented, especially with all the additional equity value realized from Navios Europe I and Navios Europe II. Yet, the market cap is still just ~$85M. It is also important to note that the company's general partner (GP) interests were sold by Navios Maritime Holdings (NYSE:NM), the previous parent, to N Shipmanagement Acquisition Corp., an entity controlled by NMM's CEO. This is a net positive, as the market perceived the relationship with struggling NM as toxic. NM is now just a large unitholder, owning 18.5% limited partner interests in NMM. Despite this, the massive discount to NAV persists.
Disclosure: I am/we are long NMM. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4354781-navios-partners-to-…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 64.058.538 von wallstreetmarc am 18.06.20 09:45:10Wieder um die 20 Prozent hoch!
Another Record Day for the Baltic Dry Index as Capesizes Surge
https://gcaptain.com/another-record-day-for-the-baltic-dry-i…
Another Record Day for the Baltic Dry Index as Capesizes Surge
https://gcaptain.com/another-record-day-for-the-baltic-dry-i…
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