Diskussion zu Silver Elephant Mining Corp, ehemals Prophecy Development Corp. (Seite 2923)
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ISIN: CA82770L3074 · WKN: A3DWAL · Symbol: ELEF
0,3800
CAD
+2,70 %
+0,0100 CAD
Letzter Kurs 10.05.24 Toronto
Werte aus der Branche Rohstoffe
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 1,0000 | +809,09 | |
| 8,0000 | +45,45 | |
| 11,000 | +19,57 | |
| 1,2000 | +18,05 | |
| 1,6640 | +16,04 |
| Wertpapier | Kurs | Perf. % |
|---|---|---|
| 324,70 | -10,30 | |
| 9,8500 | -10,54 | |
| 0,6166 | -19,12 | |
| 0,6601 | -26,22 | |
| 47,07 | -97,97 |
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Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.842.515 von Ahorne am 02.03.12 17:54:40guckst du A0CAKZ.
News von PP wird vermutlich nach Börsenschuss kommen... Schaun wir ob in den letzten Minuten noch einige in PC reingehen werden...
erwartungsgemäß wieder eingebremst auf 0,50 CAD (meine Kauforder)! wie letzte Woche auch schon von 0,54 am nächsten Tag sofort auf 0,50 CAD.
Müssen auf den 7 März wohl warten, dann hoffe ich das man den Kurs nicht mehr so reguliert. Also ist noch etwas Sitzfleisch angesagt.
Müssen auf den 7 März wohl warten, dann hoffe ich das man den Kurs nicht mehr so reguliert. Also ist noch etwas Sitzfleisch angesagt.
Habe ich das Interview richtig verstanden, für den Export von Strom an China müßen sich erst die Mongolei und China vertraglich vereinbaren.
Warum ?
Zudem soll das mindestens 10 Jahre dauern laut dem Mitarbeiter von Steag..
Ich dachte der Export von Strom kann schon etwas früher beginnen.
Was meint Ihr?
Warum ?
Zudem soll das mindestens 10 Jahre dauern laut dem Mitarbeiter von Steag..
Ich dachte der Export von Strom kann schon etwas früher beginnen.
Was meint Ihr?
thx russo
Trading Spotlight
damit die Warterei nicht zu langweilig wird, hier ein aktueller Makrobericht zur Mongolei (leider ohne Link, da es direkt von Investmentbank per e-mail geschickt wird)
MACRO
According to World Bank on February 28,2011 GDP growth in Mongolia accelerated to an unprecedented 17.3 percent in 2011 from 6.4 percent in 2010 and the unemployment rate fell from 13 percent in 2010 to 9 percent in 2011. However, real wages for unskilled workers in the urban informal sector are starting to fall as the inflation rate reached 11.1 percent yoy in December. Sharply rising government spending is the root cause of overheating: government spending rose by 56 percent in 2011 and is budgeted to rise by a further 32 percent this year, fueled by sharply rising resource revenues. This pro-cyclical fiscal policy could result in another “boom-and-bust” cycle Mongolia experienced before, particularly as the global economy could face a substantial slowdown in growth due to the continuing European sovereign debt crisis, and which could result in a sharp drop in mineral prices and subsequently government revenues.
According to Bank of Mongolia on February 7,2012 IMF Representative to Mongolia Steven Barnett commented on Mongolian economy’s key short-term challenges and risks
Overheating. The economy is overheating or, put more simply, is growing too fast. It may sound funny to say an economy is growing too fast, but more is not always better when it comes to growth. Growing too fast in the short run leads to significant problems, such as high inflation, exchange rate volatility, wage pressures, Dutch disease, and the list goes on. These could also heighten fears about “hard landing” especially if external shocks hit the economy. This macroeconomic instability, in turn, has substantial long
run costs that include making it more expensive to do business in Mongolia, discouraging investment, and making Mongolian firms less competitive globally. The inflation,
moreover, has a particularly hard impact on the poor.
So in sum, the overheating today leads to higher poverty and lower growth in the future. This is a bad tradeoff.
Inflation. Inflation has been stubbornly high in Mongolia, which is not surprising given the phenomenal growth in government spending. Headline inflation is often volatile in Mongolia, due mainly to food price shocks. It is helpful, therefore, to look at a measure of underlying inflation that removes the impact of changes in food and administered prices. This measure has been much more steady and has hovered around 15 percent most of last year and was running at over 16 percent in December. This is also too high and, moreover, is above the policy interest rate. So while the nominal level of the interest rate may seem high—12 ¼ percent—it is actually extraordinarily low in an economic sense. Specifically, adjusted for inflation, the policy interest rate has been negative for much of last year and is still negative today—on the order of -4 percent. A further hike in the policy rate, therefore, is warranted and would help contain inflation. It does so through two complementary channels. First, it slows credit growth by making it more expensive for firms to borrow, thereby reducing demand as a partial offset to the demand impact of surging government spending. Second, it will also help ease the depreciation pressure on the togrog by making it more attractive to hold togrog deposits. And, clearly depreciation of the currency is contributing to inflation by raising the price of imports. Although raising interest rates to contain inflation works, in part, by strengthening the currency, this is fundamentally different and should not be confused with targeting the exchange rate. The exchange rate would remain flexible and evolve in line with market conditions, it is just that the interest rate hike itself alters the market conditions.
............................
............................
FISCAL
Further, according to World Bank, government spending in 2011 was almost double that in 2009 in real terms, and mainly reflects pre-election year pressures, efforts to make good on earlier political promises for large cash transfers and large increases in capital expenditures. Because of high revenues, the government budget deficit is still modest: the 2011 deficit amounted to 3.6 percent. However, the structural deficit (based on long run commodity prices as defined under the Fiscal Stability Law) is much higher at 8.5 per cent
..........................
..........................
The Social Welfare Law was passed in early January. This mandates the provision of a targeted poverty benefit replacing the existing system of universal cash transfers. This represents a major step towards setting up a fiscally sustainable social protection system while supporting Mongolia’s poor- it is expected to reach about 130,000 poorest households, or one-fifth of all households in Mongolia.
MONETARY
Further according to World Bank, on the monetary front, the Bank of Mongolia (BoM) took significant action to curb inflation and lending growth in 2011. But with inflation still high, the real policy interest rate negative and bank lending expanding at a staggering pace (73 percent yoy), more tightening is needed. Liquidity risks are also rising and a large amount of NPLs remains on the loan books. Given the easy convertibility between dollar and local currency accounts the banking system remains vulnerable to capital flight, if macro-prudential action is not taken to strengthen it. Such action could include, in addition to the recently introduced additional capital buffers for systematically important banks, the use of additional provisioning requirements for highly volatile sectors such as construction, mortgage and consumer loans.
....................
.....................
EXHANGE RATE
Further, according to World Bank, the togrog depreciated by 11 percent during 2011 reflecting high domestic inflation and declining commodity prices towards the end of last year, factors that similarly impacted the currencies of other emerging mineral-rich economies. Going forward, exchange rate flexibility remains crucial. It will reduce the risk of one-way speculative bets on the currency and allow the economy to better absorb external shocks such as commodity price shocks without transmitting these directly to budgetary and export revenues as in the previous bust in 2008. More significantly, it will help the economy adjust through movements in the nominal exchange rate rather than through sharp cuts in domestic wages, employment and prices that hurt the real incomes and profits of workers and businesses. Finally, exchange rate flexibility is desirable in that it will reduce incentives for the private sector or banks for taking on unhedged risk.
................
...............
EXTERNAL
Further according to World Bank, the trade deficit reached record levels (US$ 1.7 bn in December 2011) as imports of mining-related equipment and fuel imports have surged. But exports also grew strongly, reaching US$ 4.8 bn in December from US$ 2.9 bn a year ago supported almost entirely by coal shipments to China. The current account deficit widened to 35 percent of GDP from 14 percent in 2010, but was fully funded by record FDI inflows of US$ 5.3 bn or almost 62 percent of GDP on a four-quarter rolling sum basis.
OUTLOOK
Further, according to World Bank , to ensure macroeconomic stability and to prevent a hard landing for the economy in case of an adverse external shock, Mongolia needs to adhere strictly to prudent fiscal policies as set out in the FSL and IBL and tightening both fiscal and monetary policy to reduce inflation, take macro-prudential action to reduce systemic risks in the banking sector and maintain a flexible exchange rate that will act as the first buffer in any external shock materializes
These are uncertain times for Mongolia. The economy faces growing headwinds from the global economic environment, while the looming elections increase domestic uncertainty. Until a substantial amount of savings has accumulated in the stabilization fund, Mongolia remains strongly exposed to volatility in commodity prices. With global economic prospects diminishing, and with any potential stimulus package from China unlikely to be focused on infrastructure as during the last global financial crisis in 2008-09, extra caution is warranted.
“Be prepared” sums up the appropriate policy advice at this point in time. Mongolia’s policy-makers realized the importance of “being prepared” when they passed the landmark FSL in June 2010. It is now critical to adhere to the principles contained in this law, in order to ensure that the country’s vast coal and copper resources are converted into sustainable growth that improves the welfare of all current and future Mongolian citizens.
The IMF Representative commented on global risks
· The global economy is at a particularly dangerous point, and there is a real risk of a substantial slowdown in world growth similar to what happened in 2008. While the biggest concern is the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, no part of the world would be immune from the fallout. For Mongolia, the biggest implication would be from a significant drop in copper and coal prices, just like 2008, which would hit the economy extremely hard. In fact, Mongolian policymakers are repeating the very same mistakes that led to the 2008-9 economic crisis at the worst possible time. The return of boom-bust policies at this dangerous juncture in the global economy makes the Mongolian economy vulnerable to another crisis. The upcoming elections in Mongolia are another source of uncertainty and could lead to a political accident that triggers an abrupt loss of confidence. Fortunately, the economy is not at that point yet but urgent policy action is needed to put the economy on safer footing.
The Governor of Bank of Mongolia has said
• World economic uncertainty is prolonging. IMF and World Bank are warning that world economy is going to next economic crisis
• Growth has stagnated in developed economies , depression has started and growth in China might decline
• As a negative result of this, there is a risk of decline our exports revenues especially copper, increase in foreign trade deficit and loss in budget revenues in a short time
• Therefore probability is rising of repeat of economic crisis of 2008-2009
• That’s why measures to overcome possible external shocks should be installed in the budget and monetary policy as wide as possible
• Our country that has high capital inflow and rapid economic expansion has no choice but to urgently implement proper countercyclical macro policy of reducing vulnerability to economic difficulties and capacity to overcome challenges
• main criteria of proper macro policy is not fixing negative effects of wrong policy with another policy but in having integrated policy aimed at creating condition for sustainable and stable development
Conclusion:
It appears that there is multilateral consensus on Mongolian economy’s key short-term challenges and risks as communications from World Bank and IMF echo each other and the keyword is prudence.
Mongolia has no shortage of prudent fiscal policies framework as set out in the FSL and IBL. The question is implementation.
Non-implementation of FSL and IBL , not sticking to promise of ending cash handouts and failure to control inflation would be early indicators of resource curse and Dutch Disease further spreading in Mongolia.
russo
MACRO
According to World Bank on February 28,2011 GDP growth in Mongolia accelerated to an unprecedented 17.3 percent in 2011 from 6.4 percent in 2010 and the unemployment rate fell from 13 percent in 2010 to 9 percent in 2011. However, real wages for unskilled workers in the urban informal sector are starting to fall as the inflation rate reached 11.1 percent yoy in December. Sharply rising government spending is the root cause of overheating: government spending rose by 56 percent in 2011 and is budgeted to rise by a further 32 percent this year, fueled by sharply rising resource revenues. This pro-cyclical fiscal policy could result in another “boom-and-bust” cycle Mongolia experienced before, particularly as the global economy could face a substantial slowdown in growth due to the continuing European sovereign debt crisis, and which could result in a sharp drop in mineral prices and subsequently government revenues.
According to Bank of Mongolia on February 7,2012 IMF Representative to Mongolia Steven Barnett commented on Mongolian economy’s key short-term challenges and risks
Overheating. The economy is overheating or, put more simply, is growing too fast. It may sound funny to say an economy is growing too fast, but more is not always better when it comes to growth. Growing too fast in the short run leads to significant problems, such as high inflation, exchange rate volatility, wage pressures, Dutch disease, and the list goes on. These could also heighten fears about “hard landing” especially if external shocks hit the economy. This macroeconomic instability, in turn, has substantial long
run costs that include making it more expensive to do business in Mongolia, discouraging investment, and making Mongolian firms less competitive globally. The inflation,
moreover, has a particularly hard impact on the poor.
So in sum, the overheating today leads to higher poverty and lower growth in the future. This is a bad tradeoff.
Inflation. Inflation has been stubbornly high in Mongolia, which is not surprising given the phenomenal growth in government spending. Headline inflation is often volatile in Mongolia, due mainly to food price shocks. It is helpful, therefore, to look at a measure of underlying inflation that removes the impact of changes in food and administered prices. This measure has been much more steady and has hovered around 15 percent most of last year and was running at over 16 percent in December. This is also too high and, moreover, is above the policy interest rate. So while the nominal level of the interest rate may seem high—12 ¼ percent—it is actually extraordinarily low in an economic sense. Specifically, adjusted for inflation, the policy interest rate has been negative for much of last year and is still negative today—on the order of -4 percent. A further hike in the policy rate, therefore, is warranted and would help contain inflation. It does so through two complementary channels. First, it slows credit growth by making it more expensive for firms to borrow, thereby reducing demand as a partial offset to the demand impact of surging government spending. Second, it will also help ease the depreciation pressure on the togrog by making it more attractive to hold togrog deposits. And, clearly depreciation of the currency is contributing to inflation by raising the price of imports. Although raising interest rates to contain inflation works, in part, by strengthening the currency, this is fundamentally different and should not be confused with targeting the exchange rate. The exchange rate would remain flexible and evolve in line with market conditions, it is just that the interest rate hike itself alters the market conditions.
............................
............................
FISCAL
Further, according to World Bank, government spending in 2011 was almost double that in 2009 in real terms, and mainly reflects pre-election year pressures, efforts to make good on earlier political promises for large cash transfers and large increases in capital expenditures. Because of high revenues, the government budget deficit is still modest: the 2011 deficit amounted to 3.6 percent. However, the structural deficit (based on long run commodity prices as defined under the Fiscal Stability Law) is much higher at 8.5 per cent
..........................
..........................
The Social Welfare Law was passed in early January. This mandates the provision of a targeted poverty benefit replacing the existing system of universal cash transfers. This represents a major step towards setting up a fiscally sustainable social protection system while supporting Mongolia’s poor- it is expected to reach about 130,000 poorest households, or one-fifth of all households in Mongolia.
MONETARY
Further according to World Bank, on the monetary front, the Bank of Mongolia (BoM) took significant action to curb inflation and lending growth in 2011. But with inflation still high, the real policy interest rate negative and bank lending expanding at a staggering pace (73 percent yoy), more tightening is needed. Liquidity risks are also rising and a large amount of NPLs remains on the loan books. Given the easy convertibility between dollar and local currency accounts the banking system remains vulnerable to capital flight, if macro-prudential action is not taken to strengthen it. Such action could include, in addition to the recently introduced additional capital buffers for systematically important banks, the use of additional provisioning requirements for highly volatile sectors such as construction, mortgage and consumer loans.
....................
.....................
EXHANGE RATE
Further, according to World Bank, the togrog depreciated by 11 percent during 2011 reflecting high domestic inflation and declining commodity prices towards the end of last year, factors that similarly impacted the currencies of other emerging mineral-rich economies. Going forward, exchange rate flexibility remains crucial. It will reduce the risk of one-way speculative bets on the currency and allow the economy to better absorb external shocks such as commodity price shocks without transmitting these directly to budgetary and export revenues as in the previous bust in 2008. More significantly, it will help the economy adjust through movements in the nominal exchange rate rather than through sharp cuts in domestic wages, employment and prices that hurt the real incomes and profits of workers and businesses. Finally, exchange rate flexibility is desirable in that it will reduce incentives for the private sector or banks for taking on unhedged risk.
................
...............
EXTERNAL
Further according to World Bank, the trade deficit reached record levels (US$ 1.7 bn in December 2011) as imports of mining-related equipment and fuel imports have surged. But exports also grew strongly, reaching US$ 4.8 bn in December from US$ 2.9 bn a year ago supported almost entirely by coal shipments to China. The current account deficit widened to 35 percent of GDP from 14 percent in 2010, but was fully funded by record FDI inflows of US$ 5.3 bn or almost 62 percent of GDP on a four-quarter rolling sum basis.
OUTLOOK
Further, according to World Bank , to ensure macroeconomic stability and to prevent a hard landing for the economy in case of an adverse external shock, Mongolia needs to adhere strictly to prudent fiscal policies as set out in the FSL and IBL and tightening both fiscal and monetary policy to reduce inflation, take macro-prudential action to reduce systemic risks in the banking sector and maintain a flexible exchange rate that will act as the first buffer in any external shock materializes
These are uncertain times for Mongolia. The economy faces growing headwinds from the global economic environment, while the looming elections increase domestic uncertainty. Until a substantial amount of savings has accumulated in the stabilization fund, Mongolia remains strongly exposed to volatility in commodity prices. With global economic prospects diminishing, and with any potential stimulus package from China unlikely to be focused on infrastructure as during the last global financial crisis in 2008-09, extra caution is warranted.
“Be prepared” sums up the appropriate policy advice at this point in time. Mongolia’s policy-makers realized the importance of “being prepared” when they passed the landmark FSL in June 2010. It is now critical to adhere to the principles contained in this law, in order to ensure that the country’s vast coal and copper resources are converted into sustainable growth that improves the welfare of all current and future Mongolian citizens.
The IMF Representative commented on global risks
· The global economy is at a particularly dangerous point, and there is a real risk of a substantial slowdown in world growth similar to what happened in 2008. While the biggest concern is the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, no part of the world would be immune from the fallout. For Mongolia, the biggest implication would be from a significant drop in copper and coal prices, just like 2008, which would hit the economy extremely hard. In fact, Mongolian policymakers are repeating the very same mistakes that led to the 2008-9 economic crisis at the worst possible time. The return of boom-bust policies at this dangerous juncture in the global economy makes the Mongolian economy vulnerable to another crisis. The upcoming elections in Mongolia are another source of uncertainty and could lead to a political accident that triggers an abrupt loss of confidence. Fortunately, the economy is not at that point yet but urgent policy action is needed to put the economy on safer footing.
The Governor of Bank of Mongolia has said
• World economic uncertainty is prolonging. IMF and World Bank are warning that world economy is going to next economic crisis
• Growth has stagnated in developed economies , depression has started and growth in China might decline
• As a negative result of this, there is a risk of decline our exports revenues especially copper, increase in foreign trade deficit and loss in budget revenues in a short time
• Therefore probability is rising of repeat of economic crisis of 2008-2009
• That’s why measures to overcome possible external shocks should be installed in the budget and monetary policy as wide as possible
• Our country that has high capital inflow and rapid economic expansion has no choice but to urgently implement proper countercyclical macro policy of reducing vulnerability to economic difficulties and capacity to overcome challenges
• main criteria of proper macro policy is not fixing negative effects of wrong policy with another policy but in having integrated policy aimed at creating condition for sustainable and stable development
Conclusion:
It appears that there is multilateral consensus on Mongolian economy’s key short-term challenges and risks as communications from World Bank and IMF echo each other and the keyword is prudence.
Mongolia has no shortage of prudent fiscal policies framework as set out in the FSL and IBL. The question is implementation.
Non-implementation of FSL and IBL , not sticking to promise of ending cash handouts and failure to control inflation would be early indicators of resource curse and Dutch Disease further spreading in Mongolia.
russo
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 42.838.663 von aaahhh am 02.03.12 09:39:24
Nicht alles ernst nehmen, was hier so verzapft wird.
Nicht alles ernst nehmen, was hier so verzapft wird.
Hallo möcht auch mal wieder was los werden,
bezüglich des Private Placement möcht ich sagen, zumindest ist aufgefallen dass eine Mini Kapitalerhöhung durchgeführt wurde, dass ein PP mit einem kleinen Abschlag von ein paar % gemacht wird ist auch bekannt, 20% werdens wohl nicht gewesensein mit hinblick auf den durchschnittspreis der letzten tage bzw woche(n).
Auf den ersten Blick mag das für einen Aktionär vielleicht nicht so positiv erscheinen, aus der Sicht des Unternehmens und als teilhaber an dem Unternehmen muss ich sagen ist es wohl die bessere Lösung gewesen als die 7 mio dept zu hohen zinsen, inkl fee, 1 mio pcy aktien und 300% nkl aktien. Nun hat das Unternehmen anstelle von 7 mio zu schlechten konditionen und schulden nämlich 9 mio cash und keine Schulden mit geringen 20 mio aktien mehr (verwässerung auf Fully Diluted wurde sowieso erwartet) in hoffe ich, festen händen.
So schlecht finde ich dass nicht...
bezüglich des Private Placement möcht ich sagen, zumindest ist aufgefallen dass eine Mini Kapitalerhöhung durchgeführt wurde, dass ein PP mit einem kleinen Abschlag von ein paar % gemacht wird ist auch bekannt, 20% werdens wohl nicht gewesensein mit hinblick auf den durchschnittspreis der letzten tage bzw woche(n).
Auf den ersten Blick mag das für einen Aktionär vielleicht nicht so positiv erscheinen, aus der Sicht des Unternehmens und als teilhaber an dem Unternehmen muss ich sagen ist es wohl die bessere Lösung gewesen als die 7 mio dept zu hohen zinsen, inkl fee, 1 mio pcy aktien und 300% nkl aktien. Nun hat das Unternehmen anstelle von 7 mio zu schlechten konditionen und schulden nämlich 9 mio cash und keine Schulden mit geringen 20 mio aktien mehr (verwässerung auf Fully Diluted wurde sowieso erwartet) in hoffe ich, festen händen.
So schlecht finde ich dass nicht...
ups falscher thread mods bitte löschen
0,45 sind sind 0,34 € cent 50% aufschlag, also wer jetzt verkauft, muss mit m hammer gepudert sein.
also her mit den shares
also her mit den shares
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