UBS - Weltgrößter Vermögensverwalter // am besten geeigneter Emittent für Zertifikate ? - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[meinolf67]

Hallo zusammen,

heute mache ich mal einen für mich eher untypischen Thread auf. Wer mich kennt, weiß dass mich primär Solarwerte interessieren.

Da die Bewertungen dort doch sehr ambitioniert sind, habe ich den Sektor in den letzten beiden Jahren hauptsächlich über Zertifikate gespielt.

Womit wir bei UBS wären.

Denn das wesentliche Risiko ist, dass mal einer der Emittenten die Grätsche macht und dann ist das schöne Geld futsch.

Angesichts der Subprime/Leveraged Loan/\"und was kommt als nächtes?\"-Krise(n) ist es für mich durchaus denkbar -wenn auch zumindest heute noch nicht wahrscheinlich- dass es bei den Banken zu solchen Ausfällen kommen kann.

Siehe heutige Meldung von UBS zu deren dritten Quartal....

Trotzdem halte ich UBS für einen der solidesten Finanztitel überhaupt, da sie ein so großes Asset-Management haben.

Deshalb die Frage an Euch:

Für wie sicher haltet Ihr die großen Emittenten von Zertifikaten im Allgemeinen und UBS im Besonderen? Welche Faktoren beobachtet IHr, um Euch hierzu eine Meinung zu bilden? Oder seht Ihr sowas überhaupt nicht als Risiko?

Und zuletzt: Ist UBS vielleicht \"sogar\" als Investment geeignet (mir ist eine Bank zum 2,5-fachen Buchwert einfach zuviel bisher)?

Über Rückmeldungen würde ich mich sehr freuen


PS:
Die Emittenten meiner Zertifikate sind
UBS
Deutsche Bank
Commerzbank
BNP
Dresdner Bank

[meinolf67]

Das hier ist die Pressemeldung von heute (und ich bin mir sicher, dass es noch viele Banken mit ähnlichen Problemen gibt):

Zurich/Basel, October 1, 2007, 07:00 AM
UBS writes down positions, predicts an overall loss in third quarter, and reorganizes management

Following a write down of positions in fixed income, rates and currencies (FIRC), mainly related to deteriorating conditions in the US sub prime residential mortgage market, UBS is likely to record an overall Group pre-tax loss of between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million for third quarter, ended September 30. Pre-tax profits for the first nine months of 2007 will be in the order of CHF 10 billion. Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, will reorganize senior management, take over as Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, and accelerate structural improvements to the firm.

*

In third quarter 2007, expected pre-tax loss for the Group between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million, due mainly to write downs and losses in the FIRC business within the Investment Bank
*

For the first nine months of 2007 pre-tax profits for the Group in the order of CHF 10 billion, and expect to end the year with good level of profits and a strong capital position
*

All other businesses in the Investment Bank, as well as the Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management business groups, performing very well
*

Management changes:
o

Investment Bank Chairman and CEO Huw Jenkins to step down. Group CFO Clive Standish to retire
o

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, to become Group CFO
o

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), to become Chief Operating Officer (COO), Corporate Center
o

Joseph Scoby, Global Head Alternative & Quantitative Investments, UBS Global Asset Management, to become GCRO, UBS
*

Investment Bank changes:
o

Robert Wolf, COO, Investment Bank, additionally appointed President, Investment Bank
o

Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) to be integrated into Fixed Income
o

Initiation of cost reductions in Investment Bank

Commenting on these decisions, Marcel Rohner, Group CEO said:

“On August 14, I said that if turbulent conditions prevail throughout the quarter, we will probably see a very weak trading result in the Investment Bank, offset by predictable earnings from wealth and asset management. In fact, conditions remained turbulent, so we will make an overall pre-tax loss at Group level for the quarter.

Our first quarterly loss in nine years is an unsatisfactory result, especially after such a strong first half. I have therefore taken decisive action to be as transparent as possible. I have also made appropriate senior management changes, and will accelerate already-planned changes to the firm. Following these actions, UBS is in a strong position to continue to grow its client businesses.

Despite the unsatisfactory results for the third quarter, we still expect to end the year with a good level of profits and in a strong capital position. All other businesses in the Investment Bank, and our Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management businesses, continue to record good results. UBS remains a formidable competitor in financial services and is well positioned to deliver long-term profitable growth.“

Third quarter results

In the third quarter, UBS will recognize substantial losses in FIRC within the Investment Bank, mainly on its holdings of securities related to the US sub prime residential mortgage (RMBS) market. Overall, FIRC will record negative revenues in the order of CHF 4 billion.

These write downs are mainly of (a) legacy positions of the now closed Dillon Read Capital Management subsidiary and (b) positions entered into as part of the Investment Bank’s mortgage backed securities business.

There are other, smaller, losses in equities proprietary trading within an overall satisfactory result.

UBS has only limited exposure to leveraged lending with commitments of about USD 13 billion. These have also been written down appropriately, leading to a limited loss on these positions in third quarter.

UBS has no material exposure to conduits.

When most mortgage backed securities positions were set up there were offsetting positions in place, designed to mitigate risk in normal market conditions. However, the deterioration in the US sub prime residential mortgage backed securities market, especially in August, was more sudden and more severe than in recent history, and markets became illiquid. This led to substantial valuation losses, including in securities with high credit ratings. Management action has been taken to make certain these positions are appropriately valued and risk managed.

Where possible, holdings are marked at the quoted market price. For most sub prime holdings, this is not possible. Valuations therefore mostly use models with observable inputs, where possible, and level 3 valuation models otherwise.

The marks take a cautious view of future developments in the US mortgage market and UBS is content to hold these securities at this level of valuation.

The remaining relevant positions in direct sub prime RMBS have a current net value of USD 19 billion. These positions consist overwhelmingly of AAA-rated tranches, 80% with a weighted average life of less than three years. There is also a smaller position of below USD 4 billion net exposure to sub prime securities through warehouse lines and retained CDOs. These securities are either AAA-rated or High Grade, and have a short weighted average life.

In addition, UBS has taken significant write downs on positions in Super Senior AAA-rated tranches of CDOs, based on level 3 valuation models.

Management changes

With effect from today:

Marcel Rohner, in addition to his duties as Group CEO, will for the foreseeable future take over the role of Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank. Huw Jenkins, Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, will step down from his position and become a senior advisor to Marcel Rohner.

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, will leave the Board of Directors to become Group Chief Financial Officer, and join the Group Executive Board. His long experience and knowledge of UBS, including as Group Chief Credit Officer, make him extremely well qualified for this position. Clive Standish, Group Chief Financial Officer, will retire.

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), will become Chief Operating Officer, Corporate Center, and hand over the GCRO position to Joseph Scoby, currently Global Head Alternative and Quantitative Investments (A&Q), Global Asset Management. A&Q currently has over USD 60 billion in assets under management. Joseph Scoby's record both as head of A&Q and previously as Joint Head of US Equities within the Investment Bank makes him an ideal successor to Walter Stuerzinger. Joseph Scoby's first task as a member of the Group Executive Board will be to review and refine our risk processes. William Ferri, currently Head of Business Development and Logistics for A&Q, will be appointed as the new Global Head of Alternative and Quantitative Investments.

Robert Wolf, Chairman and CEO, UBS Group Americas and Chief Operating Officer Investment Bank, will additionally become President, Investment Bank. Prior to his appointment to his current position in 2004, Robert Wolf was Global Head of Fixed Income for over three years.

Within the Investment Bank, Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) will be integrated into Fixed Income under the leadership of Andre Esteves.

As a result of the planned changes within the Investment Bank, overall staff numbers will fall by about 1,500 by the end of this year.

Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, said: "UBS operates on the principle that management is accountable to shareholders. These events have led to the management changes announced today. The one firm approach requires a successful and profitable Investment Bank. During 2008 we will continue to focus on improving cost and balance sheet efficiency."

Continued strong performance in other business areas

All other UBS businesses remain strong. In Global Wealth Management & Business Banking, all geographical regions continue to attract net new money. Global Asset Management continues to perform well. Within the Investment Bank, IBD has gained market share, the capital markets business remains strong, and equities revenues – though a bit weaker this quarter than a year ago, and in the context of extremely difficult conditions – remain healthy.

While the third quarter loss means that pre tax results for the full year 2007 will most probably be below those for 2006, total earnings should still be at a high level and UBS will finish the year in a strong capital position.

Commenting on these changes Marcel Rohner said:

“I am confident that, with these changes and by properly absorbing the lessons of this quarter, we will become a stronger bank. We have a strong balance sheet, a strong franchise, and leading positions in all businesses in all regions. We have thousands of talented people throughout the organisation who, by working together, will deliver further value to our clients and additional growth to our shareholders.”

Results for third quarter 2007 will be announced on October 30, 2007 as planned.

A video containing an interview with Group CEO Marcel Rohner is available at www.ubs.com/media as well as at www.cantos.com. A glossary, containing definitions of some of the less-well known terms used in today's release, is also available at www.ubs.com/media.

[meinolf67]

Hier die PM:

Zurich/Basel, October 1, 2007, 07:00 AM
UBS writes down positions, predicts an overall loss in third quarter, and reorganizes management

Following a write down of positions in fixed income, rates and currencies (FIRC), mainly related to deteriorating conditions in the US sub prime residential mortgage market, UBS is likely to record an overall Group pre-tax loss of between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million for third quarter, ended September 30. Pre-tax profits for the first nine months of 2007 will be in the order of CHF 10 billion. Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, will reorganize senior management, take over as Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, and accelerate structural improvements to the firm.

*

In third quarter 2007, expected pre-tax loss for the Group between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million, due mainly to write downs and losses in the FIRC business within the Investment Bank
*

For the first nine months of 2007 pre-tax profits for the Group in the order of CHF 10 billion, and expect to end the year with good level of profits and a strong capital position
*

All other businesses in the Investment Bank, as well as the Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management business groups, performing very well
*

Management changes:
o

Investment Bank Chairman and CEO Huw Jenkins to step down. Group CFO Clive Standish to retire
o

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, to become Group CFO
o

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), to become Chief Operating Officer (COO), Corporate Center
o

Joseph Scoby, Global Head Alternative & Quantitative Investments, UBS Global Asset Management, to become GCRO, UBS
*

Investment Bank changes:
o

Robert Wolf, COO, Investment Bank, additionally appointed President, Investment Bank
o

Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) to be integrated into Fixed Income
o

Initiation of cost reductions in Investment Bank

Commenting on these decisions, Marcel Rohner, Group CEO said:

“On August 14, I said that if turbulent conditions prevail throughout the quarter, we will probably see a very weak trading result in the Investment Bank, offset by predictable earnings from wealth and asset management. In fact, conditions remained turbulent, so we will make an overall pre-tax loss at Group level for the quarter.

Our first quarterly loss in nine years is an unsatisfactory result, especially after such a strong first half. I have therefore taken decisive action to be as transparent as possible. I have also made appropriate senior management changes, and will accelerate already-planned changes to the firm. Following these actions, UBS is in a strong position to continue to grow its client businesses.

Despite the unsatisfactory results for the third quarter, we still expect to end the year with a good level of profits and in a strong capital position. All other businesses in the Investment Bank, and our Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management businesses, continue to record good results. UBS remains a formidable competitor in financial services and is well positioned to deliver long-term profitable growth.“

Third quarter results

In the third quarter, UBS will recognize substantial losses in FIRC within the Investment Bank, mainly on its holdings of securities related to the US sub prime residential mortgage (RMBS) market. Overall, FIRC will record negative revenues in the order of CHF 4 billion.

These write downs are mainly of (a) legacy positions of the now closed Dillon Read Capital Management subsidiary and (b) positions entered into as part of the Investment Bank’s mortgage backed securities business.

There are other, smaller, losses in equities proprietary trading within an overall satisfactory result.

UBS has only limited exposure to leveraged lending with commitments of about USD 13 billion. These have also been written down appropriately, leading to a limited loss on these positions in third quarter.

UBS has no material exposure to conduits.

When most mortgage backed securities positions were set up there were offsetting positions in place, designed to mitigate risk in normal market conditions. However, the deterioration in the US sub prime residential mortgage backed securities market, especially in August, was more sudden and more severe than in recent history, and markets became illiquid. This led to substantial valuation losses, including in securities with high credit ratings. Management action has been taken to make certain these positions are appropriately valued and risk managed.

Where possible, holdings are marked at the quoted market price. For most sub prime holdings, this is not possible. Valuations therefore mostly use models with observable inputs, where possible, and level 3 valuation models otherwise.

The marks take a cautious view of future developments in the US mortgage market and UBS is content to hold these securities at this level of valuation.

The remaining relevant positions in direct sub prime RMBS have a current net value of USD 19 billion. These positions consist overwhelmingly of AAA-rated tranches, 80% with a weighted average life of less than three years. There is also a smaller position of below USD 4 billion net exposure to sub prime securities through warehouse lines and retained CDOs. These securities are either AAA-rated or High Grade, and have a short weighted average life.

In addition, UBS has taken significant write downs on positions in Super Senior AAA-rated tranches of CDOs, based on level 3 valuation models.

Management changes

With effect from today:

Marcel Rohner, in addition to his duties as Group CEO, will for the foreseeable future take over the role of Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank. Huw Jenkins, Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, will step down from his position and become a senior advisor to Marcel Rohner.

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, will leave the Board of Directors to become Group Chief Financial Officer, and join the Group Executive Board. His long experience and knowledge of UBS, including as Group Chief Credit Officer, make him extremely well qualified for this position. Clive Standish, Group Chief Financial Officer, will retire.

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), will become Chief Operating Officer, Corporate Center, and hand over the GCRO position to Joseph Scoby, currently Global Head Alternative and Quantitative Investments (A&Q), Global Asset Management. A&Q currently has over USD 60 billion in assets under management. Joseph Scoby's record both as head of A&Q and previously as Joint Head of US Equities within the Investment Bank makes him an ideal successor to Walter Stuerzinger. Joseph Scoby's first task as a member of the Group Executive Board will be to review and refine our risk processes. William Ferri, currently Head of Business Development and Logistics for A&Q, will be appointed as the new Global Head of Alternative and Quantitative Investments.

Robert Wolf, Chairman and CEO, UBS Group Americas and Chief Operating Officer Investment Bank, will additionally become President, Investment Bank. Prior to his appointment to his current position in 2004, Robert Wolf was Global Head of Fixed Income for over three years.

Within the Investment Bank, Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) will be integrated into Fixed Income under the leadership of Andre Esteves.

As a result of the planned changes within the Investment Bank, overall staff numbers will fall by about 1,500 by the end of this year.

Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, said: "UBS operates on the principle that management is accountable to shareholders. These events have led to the management changes announced today. The one firm approach requires a successful and profitable Investment Bank. During 2008 we will continue to focus on improving cost and balance sheet efficiency."

Continued strong performance in other business areas

All other UBS businesses remain strong. In Global Wealth Management & Business Banking, all geographical regions continue to attract net new money. Global Asset Management continues to perform well. Within the Investment Bank, IBD has gained market share, the capital markets business remains strong, and equities revenues – though a bit weaker this quarter than a year ago, and in the context of extremely difficult conditions – remain healthy.

While the third quarter loss means that pre tax results for the full year 2007 will most probably be below those for 2006, total earnings should still be at a high level and UBS will finish the year in a strong capital position.

Commenting on these changes Marcel Rohner said:

“I am confident that, with these changes and by properly absorbing the lessons of this quarter, we will become a stronger bank. We have a strong balance sheet, a strong franchise, and leading positions in all businesses in all regions. We have thousands of talented people throughout the organisation who, by working together, will deliver further value to our clients and additional growth to our shareholders.”

Results for third quarter 2007 will be announced on October 30, 2007 as planned.

A video containing an interview with Group CEO Marcel Rohner is available at www.ubs.com/media as well as at www.cantos.com. A glossary, containing definitions of some of the less-well known terms used in today's release, is also available at www.ubs.com/media.

[meinolf67]

UBS Homepage > Analysts & Investors > Investor Releases
Investors Releases
Zurich/Basel, October 1, 2007, 07:00 AM
UBS writes down positions, predicts an overall loss in third quarter, and reorganizes management

Following a write down of positions in fixed income, rates and currencies (FIRC), mainly related to deteriorating conditions in the US sub prime residential mortgage market, UBS is likely to record an overall Group pre-tax loss of between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million for third quarter, ended September 30. Pre-tax profits for the first nine months of 2007 will be in the order of CHF 10 billion. Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, will reorganize senior management, take over as Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, and accelerate structural improvements to the firm.

*

In third quarter 2007, expected pre-tax loss for the Group between CHF 600 million and CHF 800 million, due mainly to write downs and losses in the FIRC business within the Investment Bank
*

For the first nine months of 2007 pre-tax profits for the Group in the order of CHF 10 billion, and expect to end the year with good level of profits and a strong capital position
*

All other businesses in the Investment Bank, as well as the Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management business groups, performing very well
*

Management changes:
o

Investment Bank Chairman and CEO Huw Jenkins to step down. Group CFO Clive Standish to retire
o

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, to become Group CFO
o

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), to become Chief Operating Officer (COO), Corporate Center
o

Joseph Scoby, Global Head Alternative & Quantitative Investments, UBS Global Asset Management, to become GCRO, UBS
*

Investment Bank changes:
o

Robert Wolf, COO, Investment Bank, additionally appointed President, Investment Bank
o

Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) to be integrated into Fixed Income
o

Initiation of cost reductions in Investment Bank

Commenting on these decisions, Marcel Rohner, Group CEO said:

“On August 14, I said that if turbulent conditions prevail throughout the quarter, we will probably see a very weak trading result in the Investment Bank, offset by predictable earnings from wealth and asset management. In fact, conditions remained turbulent, so we will make an overall pre-tax loss at Group level for the quarter.

Our first quarterly loss in nine years is an unsatisfactory result, especially after such a strong first half. I have therefore taken decisive action to be as transparent as possible. I have also made appropriate senior management changes, and will accelerate already-planned changes to the firm. Following these actions, UBS is in a strong position to continue to grow its client businesses.

Despite the unsatisfactory results for the third quarter, we still expect to end the year with a good level of profits and in a strong capital position. All other businesses in the Investment Bank, and our Global Wealth Management & Business Banking and Global Asset Management businesses, continue to record good results. UBS remains a formidable competitor in financial services and is well positioned to deliver long-term profitable growth.“

Third quarter results

In the third quarter, UBS will recognize substantial losses in FIRC within the Investment Bank, mainly on its holdings of securities related to the US sub prime residential mortgage (RMBS) market. Overall, FIRC will record negative revenues in the order of CHF 4 billion.

These write downs are mainly of (a) legacy positions of the now closed Dillon Read Capital Management subsidiary and (b) positions entered into as part of the Investment Bank’s mortgage backed securities business.

There are other, smaller, losses in equities proprietary trading within an overall satisfactory result.

UBS has only limited exposure to leveraged lending with commitments of about USD 13 billion. These have also been written down appropriately, leading to a limited loss on these positions in third quarter.

UBS has no material exposure to conduits.

When most mortgage backed securities positions were set up there were offsetting positions in place, designed to mitigate risk in normal market conditions. However, the deterioration in the US sub prime residential mortgage backed securities market, especially in August, was more sudden and more severe than in recent history, and markets became illiquid. This led to substantial valuation losses, including in securities with high credit ratings. Management action has been taken to make certain these positions are appropriately valued and risk managed.

Where possible, holdings are marked at the quoted market price. For most sub prime holdings, this is not possible. Valuations therefore mostly use models with observable inputs, where possible, and level 3 valuation models otherwise.

The marks take a cautious view of future developments in the US mortgage market and UBS is content to hold these securities at this level of valuation.

The remaining relevant positions in direct sub prime RMBS have a current net value of USD 19 billion. These positions consist overwhelmingly of AAA-rated tranches, 80% with a weighted average life of less than three years. There is also a smaller position of below USD 4 billion net exposure to sub prime securities through warehouse lines and retained CDOs. These securities are either AAA-rated or High Grade, and have a short weighted average life.

In addition, UBS has taken significant write downs on positions in Super Senior AAA-rated tranches of CDOs, based on level 3 valuation models.

Management changes

With effect from today:

Marcel Rohner, in addition to his duties as Group CEO, will for the foreseeable future take over the role of Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank. Huw Jenkins, Chairman and CEO of the Investment Bank, will step down from his position and become a senior advisor to Marcel Rohner.

Marco Suter, Executive Vice Chairman, UBS, will leave the Board of Directors to become Group Chief Financial Officer, and join the Group Executive Board. His long experience and knowledge of UBS, including as Group Chief Credit Officer, make him extremely well qualified for this position. Clive Standish, Group Chief Financial Officer, will retire.

Walter Stuerzinger, Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), will become Chief Operating Officer, Corporate Center, and hand over the GCRO position to Joseph Scoby, currently Global Head Alternative and Quantitative Investments (A&Q), Global Asset Management. A&Q currently has over USD 60 billion in assets under management. Joseph Scoby's record both as head of A&Q and previously as Joint Head of US Equities within the Investment Bank makes him an ideal successor to Walter Stuerzinger. Joseph Scoby's first task as a member of the Group Executive Board will be to review and refine our risk processes. William Ferri, currently Head of Business Development and Logistics for A&Q, will be appointed as the new Global Head of Alternative and Quantitative Investments.

Robert Wolf, Chairman and CEO, UBS Group Americas and Chief Operating Officer Investment Bank, will additionally become President, Investment Bank. Prior to his appointment to his current position in 2004, Robert Wolf was Global Head of Fixed Income for over three years.

Within the Investment Bank, Money Markets, Currencies and Commodities (MCC) will be integrated into Fixed Income under the leadership of Andre Esteves.

As a result of the planned changes within the Investment Bank, overall staff numbers will fall by about 1,500 by the end of this year.

Marcel Rohner, Group CEO, said: "UBS operates on the principle that management is accountable to shareholders. These events have led to the management changes announced today. The one firm approach requires a successful and profitable Investment Bank. During 2008 we will continue to focus on improving cost and balance sheet efficiency."

Continued strong performance in other business areas

All other UBS businesses remain strong. In Global Wealth Management & Business Banking, all geographical regions continue to attract net new money. Global Asset Management continues to perform well. Within the Investment Bank, IBD has gained market share, the capital markets business remains strong, and equities revenues – though a bit weaker this quarter than a year ago, and in the context of extremely difficult conditions – remain healthy.

While the third quarter loss means that pre tax results for the full year 2007 will most probably be below those for 2006, total earnings should still be at a high level and UBS will finish the year in a strong capital position.

Commenting on these changes Marcel Rohner said:

“I am confident that, with these changes and by properly absorbing the lessons of this quarter, we will become a stronger bank. We have a strong balance sheet, a strong franchise, and leading positions in all businesses in all regions. We have thousands of talented people throughout the organisation who, by working together, will deliver further value to our clients and additional growth to our shareholders.”

Results for third quarter 2007 will be announced on October 30, 2007 as planned.

A video containing an interview with Group CEO Marcel Rohner is available at www.ubs.com/investors as well as at www.cantos.com. A glossary, containing definitions of some of the less-well known terms used in today's release, is also available:

[meinolf67]

???

[meinolf67]

Tja, es sieht so aus, als ob es ein Warteschlangen-Problem gegeben hätte.

Sorry.

[meinolf67]

PRESSESTIMME BÖRSEN-ZEITUNG/UBS

DJ PRESSESTIMME BÖRSEN-ZEITUNG/UBS (Nachrichten/Aktienkurs)


Schlechte Eigenwerbung,

Kommentar zu den tiefroten Zahlen und Entlassungen bei UBS von Daniel Zulauf

"Der One-Firm-Ansatz erfordert eine Investmentbank, die erfolgreich und
profitabel ist", begründete UBS-Chef Marcel Rohner seine Entscheidung, in
diesem für den Milliardenverlust verantwortlichen Teil der Bank gleich 1500
Leute zu entlassen. Eine Investmentbank, die tiefrote Zahlen schreibt und
international negative Schlagzeilen liefert, bedeutet - so lässt sich der
Satz auch interpretieren - einen Imageverlust für die Marke UBS und ist
somit schlecht für das tragende Vermögensverwaltungsgeschäft des Konzerns.

Im Wissen um die Gefahr, Geschäfte mit stark unterschiedlichen
Risikoprofilen unter einer Dachmarke zu betreiben, sucht die UBS seit Jahren
nach Rezepten für ein risikoarmes Wachstum, das auch die hungrigen Aktionäre
zufrieden stellt. Amerikanische Hypotheken für zweitklassige Schuldner
galten lange Zeit als ideales Feld dafür. Gut gestreut über das ganze Land,
dachte man nicht nur in der UBS, ließen sich die Risken dieser Papiere
"wegdiversifizieren".

Mehr Rendite bei wenig Risiko: Die UBS, die nach der Erwartung ihrer
Aktionäre ein Eigenkapital von über 50 Mrd. sfr mit über 20% verzinsen muss,
hat diese Formel voll ausgespielt. In den vergangenen fünf Jahren hat der
Konzern die Bilanzsumme Jahr für Jahr um etwa 15% oder durchschnittlich 200
Mrd. sfr ausgeweitet. Auf jeden Franken Eigenkapital kam jährlich etwas mehr
Fremdkapital dazu. Mit dieser Hebelmechanik konnte die Bank jedes Jahr
größere Wetten eingehen und ein überproportionales Gewinnwachstum zeigen.

Jetzt zeigen sich schon beim ersten richtigen Gewitter die Grenzen dieser
Strategie. Die Bank war nicht in der Lage, die eingegangenen Risiken richtig
zu bewerten. Deshalb hat sie auch so viel Geld in Subprime-Produkte
investiert. Eine Bank, die Risiken nicht bewerten kann, macht als
Vermögensverwalterin keine gute Werbung in eigener Sache. Kein Alinghi-Sieg
kann diese Fehlleistung kompensieren.

Marcel Rohner sucht jetzt nach einem Ausweg aus dem Dilemma. Pessimismus ist
angebracht, denn die Vergangenheit zeigt, dass auch die ausgeklügeltste
Risikokontrolle immer wieder versagt. Das beste Rezept für mehr Sicherheit
ist vermutlich mehr Zurückhaltung. Eine solche Erkenntnis den Aktionären zu
vermitteln ist freilich ungleich schwieriger als die Bekanntgabe einer zwar
großen, aber "einmaligen" Wertberichtigung.

Dies ist eine Pressestimme der Börsen-Zeitung. Für Text und Inhalt ist
ausschließlich die Börsen-Zeitung verantwortlich. Die geäußerten Ansichten
reflektieren auch nicht die Ansichten von Dow Jones Newswires oder der Dow
Jones and Company Inc.

[meinolf67]

UBS’ Q3 Loss: The First of Many?
posted on: October 01, 2007 | about stocks: UBS

UBS (UBS) is reporting a loss for Q3 ‘07 after having to write down the value of its mortgage backed securities by about $3.4 billion. The Q3 loss will lead to approximately 1,500 employees getting the sack; additionally both the CFO and the head of UBS’ investment bank will be stepping down. As we head into Q3 earnings season, the UBS situation could be a preview of similar problems impacting banks on both sides of the pond. However, it is worth noting that UBS is the first major bank to report an overall loss due to the mortgage crisis.

UBS’ loss appears to stem from simply not being able to manage the mortgage crisis and the larger credit crunch as well as its peers, as although many banks have reported and/or warned of losses from debt securities, lending and the credit crisis, none have (so far) reported losses overall.

From Bloomberg:

UBS AG, Europe's biggest bank, had a third-quarter loss and plans to cut 1,500 jobs after writing down the value of its mortgage-backed securities by about 4 billion Swiss francs ($3.4 billion).

The pretax loss, the first reported by any of the world's largest banks, totaled 600 million francs to 800 million francs, the Zurich-based bank said in a statement today. Huw Jenkins, the head of the investment bank, and Chief Financial Officer Clive Standish are stepping down.

[...]

The quarterly loss "is an unsatisfactory result, especially after such a strong first half,'' Marcel Rohner, who replaced Wuffli as CEO, said in the statement. `"I have therefore taken decisive action to be as transparent as possible. I have also made appropriate senior management changes.''

Rohner will take on the role of chairman and CEO of the investment bank, replacing Jenkins. Marco Suter, the executive vice chairman of UBS, will become CFO. Walter Stuerzinger, the bank's chief risk officer, will become chief operating officer.

UBS is Europe’s largest bank and instead of generating the expected profit of 2.6 Billion Swiss Francs, the bank will lose 600-800 million instead, a differential of 3.2-3.4 Billion. This smells (to me) of a bank holding on to a group of illiquid securities, hoping the bad investment turns around somehow and only declaring the loss when it has no other choice. Which begs the question, how many other banks have similar problems that have yet to be revealed, will UBS be the only major bank to report a loss for Q3?

Furthermore, significantly overvalued mortgage securities contributed to the earnings that were part of UBS’ “strong first half”, so I have to wonder about past earnings quality for UBS and other banks for that matter.

Finally, I have to say that replacing your COO with your Chief risk officer who didn’t see the “risk coming” with the bad mortgage securities your bank invested in seems a bit strange to me, but perhaps that’s beside the point. Companies often change leadership when they get into trouble without confronting the fundamental issues that are keeping the company from being a success, such as corporate culture, how business strategy is developed and executed, how important decisions are made, etc. A lot of traders, managers, executives, etc, were all part of the current mess UBS finds itself in, replacing two managers and promoting two others, may be just be more of the same bad management.

Sources:

- Bloomberg: “UBS Has Loss, to Cut Jobs, After Subprime Writedowns”, Christine Harper, October 1, 2007

Disclosure: As of the writing of this article, the author doesn’t hold a position in any of the firms referenced in this or the source article.

[meinolf67]

UBS admits underestimating US subprime crisis


Agence France-Presse
Last updated 08:44pm (Mla time) 10/06/2007

ZURICH--The head of UBS publicly admitted Saturday that the giant Swiss bank had underestimated the crisis in the US subprime home loans credit market, and that several top executives paid for that mistake with their jobs.

Marcel Ospel, UBS president, told the Neue Zuercher Zeitung newspaper the bank had over-invested in subprime-related instruments, even though he stressed its size and other activities would help it pull through.

"We poorly evaluated the impact of changing interest rates" in the United States which triggered the problems in that country's mortgage sector, he said.

"The problems started with the last change in interest rates and were compounded by DRCM," UBS's Dillon Read Capital Management hedge fund that had been incorporated into the bank's investment arm and which was closed in May.

DRCM had racked up 380 million Swiss francs (230 million euros, 325 million dollars) in losses in the US high-risk, or subprime, mortgage market before then, making it one of the early victims of the ongoing meltdown.

UBS announced last Monday that it had taken a hit of 4.0 billion Swiss francs (3.4 billion dollars, 2.4 billion euros) from its worthless subprime investments.

Ospel said two executives linked to the losses, Huw Jenkins, the head of UBS's investment banking business, and Clive Standish, the bank's financial director, were removed from their posts.

"When such extraordinary events occur, that can result in personal consequences," he said.

[meinolf67]

Grossbanken nach UBS-Unfall unter scharfer Beobachtung der EBK
Zuberbühler will höhere Eigenmittelpuffer für Investmentbanking – Ospel räumt Fehler ein und erwartet Lohnkürzung
AP
06.10.2007 13:05

Bern/Zürich – Nach dem Debakel der UBS in der US-Hypothekenkrise geraten die Grossbanken unter schärfere Beobachtung der Aufsichtsbehörde. Noch etwas höhere Eigenmittelpuffer und verschärfte Stresstests will die EBK. UBS-Präsident Ospel räumte Fehler ein und rechnet mit einer Lohnkürzung.

Der Direktor der Eidgenössischen Bankenkommission (EBK), Daniel Zuberbühler, bezeichnete die Abschreibungen von vier Milliarden Franken bei der UBS in einem Quartal als „rechten Unfall mit einem Blechschaden“. In der „Samstagsrundschau“ von Schweizer Radio DRS bekräftigte er aber, dass die Bank die Verluste verkraften könne. Die Bank selber habe die Konsequenzen auf personeller und organisatorischer Ebene bereits gezogen. Die EBK werde die UBS aber sicher in nächster Zeit „intensiv beüben“.

Wegen der Risiken mit dem neuen Geschäftsmodell im Investmentbanking wolle die EBK zudem noch ein bisschen höhere Eigenmittelpolster bei den beiden Schweizer Grossbanken sehen, sagte Zuberbühler. Und zwar bei jenem Teil, der jetzt schon über die Minimalanforderungen hinausgeht.

Als weitere Massnahme kündigte Zuberbühler eine Verschärfung der Stresstests an. Denn im vorliegenden Fall habe die Realität alle Szenarien überholt. Die Risiken der global tätigen Banken mit dem neuen Modell im Investmentbanking seien den Aufsichtsbehörden zwar bekannt gewesen. Überrascht habe bei der aktuellen Krise aber das Ausmass und das Tempo sowie die Ecke, in der sie begonnen habe, nämlich auf dem US-Immobilienmarkt.

Zuberbühler zeigte sich auch erstaunt über einzelne Produkte, die bei der Verbriefung der Hypothekarkredite zur Anwendung kamen. Ihm seien die Haare zu Berge gestanden, als er gesehen habe, wie da zum Teil aus Alteisen Gold gemacht worden sei. Solche Produkte müssten verschwinden.

In Interviews der Zeitungen „Finanz und Wirtschaft“ und „Neue Zürcher Zeitung“ machte Marcel Ospel klar, dass eine Trennung von Investmentbanking und Private Banking für die UBS auch nach dem Debakel kein Thema ist. Der UBS-Verwaltungsratspräsident führte die Wertberichtigungen von vier Milliarden Franken auf eine Reihe von Faktoren zurück und räumte auch Fehler ein. „Wir haben die Auswirkungen der Zinsentwicklung falsch eingeschätzt“, sagte er. Die Konkurrenz habe da etwas besser gemacht, was er sehr bedaure.

Versäumnisse auf Stufe des Verwaltungsrats vermag der UBS-Präsident jedoch nicht zu erkennen. Die ersten Warnlampen hätten vor weit über einem Jahr aufgeleuchtet. Und zwar in Form von drei Problemkreisen, der Kostenentwicklung, der fehlenden Dynamik im Zinsgeschäft und des Bilanzwachstums. „Wir haben keineswegs blind gehandelt und haben Änderungen angemahnt“, sagte Ospel. Er ist überzeigt, dass die Bank gestärkt aus der Krise hervorgehen wird.

Konsequenzen erwartet der UBS-Präsident bei seinem Lohn: „Ich gehe davon aus, dass der Kompensationsausschuss des Verwaltungsrats meinen Lohn zurücknimmt“, sagte er. Er wies auch darauf hin, dass die Vertreter der obersten Führungsgremien gezwungen seien, gemessen an ihrem erarbeiteten Vermögen grosse Positionen an UBS-Aktien und -Optionen zu halten. „Wenn der Aktienpreis sinkt, spüren wir das direkt am eigenen Leib“, sagte der vollamtliche UBS-Präsident. Er hatte für letztes Jahr eine Entschädigung von insgesamt 26,6 Millionen Franken erhalten. (AP)

[meinolf67]

Top-Banker Hummler kritisiert die UBS scharf
10.10 00:30

Top-Banker Hummler kritisiert die UBS scharfDer Druck auf die UBS steigt: Konrad Hummler fordert die Abspaltung des Investmentbanking und spricht von «Machtgelüsten» der UBS-Führung.

Es ist ein beispielloser Vorgang in der Schweizer Bankenszene: Konrad Hummler, Teilhaber der Bank Wegelin, greift den Verwaltungsrat (VR) der UBS frontal an und verlangt eine Abspaltung des Investmentbankings (IB).

Dies hatten Investoren bereits nach Bekanntwerden des UBS-Milliardenabschreibers im CASH daily vom letzten Dienstag gefordert. Auch Hummlers Wort hat Gewicht: Er ist einer der mächtigsten Strippenzieher in der Schweizer Wirtschaft. Ab 2008 sitzt er im VR der Deutschen Börse. Das IB «vergifte» die Bewertung der UBS-Aktie im Vergleich zu einem reinen Vermögensverwalter, so Hummler in seinem jüngsten Anlagebericht. «Der UBS-Verwaltungsrat geht fälschlicherweise von Synergien zwischen Private- und Investmentbanking aus», sagt Hummler zu CASH daily. Er wirft die Frage von «Machtgelüsten» und «Eigeninteressen» der UBS-Manager und des VR auf. Dank der grosszügigen Boni wandere ein wesentlicher Teil des Profits aus dem IB in die Taschen der Banker. Hummler will mit seinem Angriff die Interessen seiner Kunden und der UBS-Aktionäre wahren. Deren Rendite leide unter den Risiken des UBS-Konstrukts, sagt er.

Das «Riesenkonglomerat» Credit Suisse stört den Privatbankier ebenso. Ein Zusammenlegen der IB-Bereiche von UBS und CS wäre laut Hummler «sehr interessant». Die UBS äusserte sich nicht zu Hummlers Kommentaren. (hy)

[meinolf67]

Krise, UBS, Ospel und das Lehrbuch
Die Analyse zum Debakel im US-Hypothekenmarkt und deren weitreichende Folgen
Der Taucher am US-Immobilienmarkt hatte weltweite Folgen. Der Fall liefert in mancher Hinsicht Musterbeispiele für das Lehrbuch. Eine Einordnung der Geschehnisse.


Die amerikanische Hypothekenkrise ist ein Fall für das Lehrbuch. Sie zeigt zunächst, wie verschlungen die Wege in den modernen Volkswirtschaften sein können: Vieles hängt mit vielem zusammen – und kleine Anstösse an einem Ort können weit weg davon tiefe Spuren hinterlassen.

Dass viele US-Hauspreise dieses Jahr nach langem Boom zu sinken begannen und Hypothekarschuldner gleichzeitig steigende Zinsen zahlen mussten, war aus globaler Optik ein «kleiner» und lokaler Anstoss. Doch die Folgen reichten weit darüber hinaus. Dies vor allem aus drei Gründen: (1) Spezialisierte Finanzhäuser hatten viele der wackligen Hypotheken gebündelt, in Wertpapiere verpackt und weltweit an Banken, Anlagefonds, Versicherer und andere Investoren verkauft – die nun auf diesen Papieren herbe Verluste einstecken müssen. (2) Die Verluste im US-Hypothekengeschäft haben die Psychologie an den Finanzmärkten schlagartig verändert: Die Investoren sind plötzlich wieder risikoscheuer geworden – weshalb stark risikoträchtige Papiere zum Teil deutlich getaucht sind. (3)Die Bremsung im Bausektor und im Haushaltskonsum belastet auch die Gesamtkonjunktur der USA.

Die Banken hat es erwischt

Die US-Konjunktur muss nun mit einem erheblichen Dämpfer rechnen. Der Einfluss auf die Weltkonjunktur scheint dagegen vorderhand beschränkt. Doch dies kann sich noch ändern – weil vieles von den schwankungsanfälligen Bauchgefühlen der Wirtschaftsakteure abhängt. Was schon heute klar ist: Die Bankbranche hat es schwer erwischt. Einige Institute müssen besonders stark bluten. Dazu zählen die US-Banken Citigroup, Merrill Lynch und Morgan Stanley sowie die Schweizer UBS. Diese vier Institute haben bisher Abschreiber und Verluste im Zusammenhang mit dem US-Hypothekengeschäft von total 30 bis 35Milliarden Dollar getätigt bzw. angekündigt – und das letzte Wort dürfte noch nicht gesprochen sein.

Finanzanalysten überbieten sich derzeit gegenseitig mit Mutmassungen über weitere Milliardenabschreiber. Auch dies ist wie aus dem Lehrbuch: Wo konkrete Informationen fehlen, füllen Spekulationen das Vakuum. Da viele der nun mit «Müll» bezeichneten Papiere derzeit kaum mehr Käufer finden, sind die Banken auf interne Bewertungsmodelle angewiesen – die oft nur wenig aussagekräftiger sind als Blicke in die Glaskugel. Die «Marktpreise» sind bei Papieren ohne Käufer derzeit null. Grossflächige Abschreiber auf null würden diverse US-Banken per sofort zu Sanierungsfällen machen und auch der UBS ans Eingemachte gehen. Doch dieses von einzelnen Analysten gezeichnete Szenario scheint aus heutiger Sicht immer noch stark übertrieben: Die betroffenen Wertpapiere sind zwar nur durch wacklige Hypotheken «gesichert» – doch man muss nicht annehmen, dass von keinem dieser Schuldner auch nur ein Rappen zurückfliessen wird.

Gewisse Einblicke geben Marktindizes die auf Kursen wackliger Hypothekenpapiere beruhen. Solche Indizes sind seit Anfang Jahr – je nach Qualität der Papiere – um 20bis 80 Prozent getaucht. Selbst die mutmasslich höchste Qualitätsstufe (mit der Note «AAA» der Rating-Agenturen) hat demnach etwa 20 Prozent verloren. Fachleute zweifeln allerdings zum Teil an der Aussagekraft solcher Indizes – doch welche Alternative besser ist, bleibt eine offene Frage.

Rechenspiele

Aus Schweizer Sicht interessiert zunächst das Schicksal der beiden hiesigen Grossbanken. Die Credit Suisse hat nur von einer «minimalen» Exponierung im Geschäft mit zweitklassigen US-Hypotheken gesprochen, aber aus unerfindlichen Gründen keine Zahl genannt – was wieder Raum für Mutmassungen öffnet. Die UBS nannte Zahlen, hinterliess aber ebenfalls einigen Nebel. Die Nominalwerte der betroffenen Papiere im Besitz der UBS summierten sich laut der Bank per Ende September auf knapp 40 Milliarden Franken – doch die Risikoposition sei wegen Absicherungsgeschäften geringer. Wie gross netto die Risikoposition ist, liess die UBS offen. Mit einer Schätzung von 30 bis 35 Milliarden Franken liegt man vielleicht nicht allzu weit daneben.

Nimmt man nun gemäss UBS-Hinweisen an, dass der Grossteil dieser Papiere das angeblich bestgeschützte Segment (AAA) betrifft, und unterstellt auf Basis der erwähnten Indizes einen Wertverlust seit Anfang Jahr von durchschnittlich 25 Prozent, gäbe dies für die Bankposition von Ende September einen Abschreibungsbedarf von total etwa 8 bis 9 Milliarden Franken.

Wie viel die UBS bisher schon abgeschrieben hat, ist unklar. Für das dritte Quartal publizierte sie nur das Total von 5,3 Milliarden Franken aus realisierten Verlusten (auf verkauften Papieren) und aus Abschreibern (auf noch gehaltenen Papieren) – und nicht die beiden Posten einzeln. Der Nebel ist damit noch dichter, als er es sonst schon wäre. Mutmassen lässt sich derzeit nur, dass die UBS ohne eine Markterholung bis zum Jahresende wohl noch die eine oder andere Milliarde zusätzlich abschreiben muss. Gemessen am Aktienkurs, scheint die Börse mit einigen Milliarden Zusatzkosten zu rechnen. Seit Mitte Jahr ist der Börsenwert der UBS um rund 50 Milliarden Franken getaucht – um über 30 Prozent.

Kann es noch schlimmer kommen? Die Kurzantwort: Ja – die Hypothekenpapiere können noch weiter tauchen. Irgendwann wird der Markt wieder kehren. Doch niemand weiss, wann es so weit ist und wie stark die Werte bis dann noch sinken werden.

Die grosse Unsicherheit öffnet das Feld auch für ganz schlimme Szenarien. Hier ein solches für die UBS. Man nehme an, dass ihre Risikopositionen von 30 bis 35 Milliarden Franken einen Verlust von durchschnittlich 50 Prozent bringen. Selbst dieses unwahrscheinliche Szenario könnte die Bank überleben. Über 2007 und 2008 verteilt, würde dies etwa den Gesamtgewinn des Restkonzerns wegputzen. Die Aktionäre müssten für zwei Jahre die Dividende vergessen, aber das Eigenkapital von rund 48 Milliarden Franken könnte unangetastet bleiben.

Die Zutaten des Debakels

Unabhängig vom Szenario bleibt die Grundfrage dieselbe: Was ist bei der UBS und andern Banken schief gelaufen? Zunächst hat nur das Lehrbuch nach seinem Recht verlangt. Die meisten grossen Banken haben an den boomenden Finanzmärkten der letzten Jahre mit ihrem Wertpapiergeschäft viele Milliarden verdient. Wo hohe Gewinne winken, lauern meist auch hohe Risiken: Gelegentliche Taucher mit Milliardenverlusten gehören deshalb zum Geschäft wie der Kater zum Tag nach dem rauschenden Fest. Daneben hat das Debakel noch eine Reihe von Zutaten:

Die Kette. Die «Nahrungskette» im US-Hypothekengeschäft ist lang – vom Vermittler über den Hypothekenverleiher sowie Wertpapierbanken bis zu Anlagefonds und anderen Investoren. Weil der Verleiher die Risiken zum grossen Teil weitergibt, fehlt ihm der Anreiz, die Risiken genau anzuschauen – und die Käufer weiter «hinten» in der Kette kennen die Details nicht.

Gedächtnisschwund. Der lange Boom am Immobilienmarkt und an den Finanzmärkten hat die Erinnerung an frühere Krisen verblassen lassen. Risikoscheu war ausser Mode gefallen. Das wird im nächsten Boom wohl wieder so sein.

Risikosysteme. Die Risikosysteme bei einigen Banken waren offenbar ungenügend. Die UBS stellte zum Teil ähnliche Mängel fest wie 1998 nach dem Debakel mit dem Hedge-Fonds LTCM – nämlich dass die konzernweite Zusammenfassung der Gesamtrisiken ungenügend gewesen sei.

Boni. Die Investment-Banker kassieren grosse Boni bei Gewinnen, zahlen aber nichts zurück bei Milliardenverlusten. Das schafft Risikoanreize. Mögliche Lehren hier: Man zahle Boni nicht auf Basis der nackten Gewinne, sondern berücksichtige immer auch die Risiken – und man zahle Boni vermehrt in langfristig gesperrten Aktien statt in bar.

Macht ohne Verantwortung

Eine Kernzutat des Debakels sind zudem die Rating-Agenturen. Sie berieten zum Teil ihre Kunden im Design von Wertpapieren, lieferten dann ihr Rating ab und kassierten dafür happige Gebühren. Selbst Papiere, die nur durch sehr wacklige Hypotheken «gesichert» sind, erhielten unter Umständen die Spitzennote AAA. Das betrifft in der Regel Papiere, die erst dann bluten müssen, wenn die Verlustquote der zugrunde liegenden Hypotheken ein gewisses Mass (zum Beispiel 15Prozent) überschritten hat.

Die wenigen grossen Rating-Agenturen – vor allem Standard & Poor’s und Moody’s – bilden so etwas wie ein globales Oligopol. Ihre Noten haben enormen Einfluss (viele Investoren richten sich danach), doch Existenzangst im Fall des Versagens müssen sie kaum haben. Denn keiner will, dass eine der grossen Rating-Agenturen verschwindet – der «Wettbewerb» in diesem Sektor würde noch mehr zu einer Farce. Krisen sind aufgrund der Ratings kaum je voraussehbar – aber wenn eine Krise ausgebrochen ist, springen die Rating-Agenturen in der Regel hinterher, senken ihre Noten und verschlimmern dadurch die Lage noch. Gute Lösungen sind nicht in Sicht. Man würde dennoch hoffen, dass die nun in den USA anlaufende Klage- und Untersuchungswelle nicht nur die Banken ins Visier nimmt, sondern auch die Rating-Agenturen.

Die Ospel-Frage

Im Visier steht auch UBS-Präsident Marcel Ospel. Mit jeder Milliarde Zusatzabschreibung dürfte der Ruf nach seinem Abgang etwas lauter werden. Der Chef der verantwortlichen Sparte Investment-Banking, der Finanzchef und der Konzernchef der UBS mussten bereits gehen. Ob auch Ospel gehen muss, hängt von diversen Faktoren ab: Wie gross war seine persönliche Rolle direkt oder indirekt (via Vorgabe der Risikopolitik) beim Eingehen der besagten Wackelpositionen? Wie stark ist das Vertrauen von Kunden und Investoren angeknackst? Welches wären die Alternativen als Präsident? (Im vergangenen Jahr fand der Verwaltungsrat keine bessere Alternative, als Ospel seinen Rücktritt angeboten hatte.) Wie gross werden am Ende die Verluste sein? Und wie weit würde der Abgang des Präsidenten als PR-Massnahme gegenüber der breiten Öffentlichkeit («der Chef übernimmt Verantwortung und geht») etwas bringen? Die Antworten zu diesen Fragen sind alles andere als offensichtlich.

Die Problemsparte

Längerfristig wichtiger für die Bank als die «Ospel-Frage» ist jene nach der Zukunft der Problemsparte Investment-Banking. Diese Sparte liefert Finanzdienstleistungen für grössere Firmenkunden. Sie umfasst Wertpapieremissionen, Handel, Fusionsberatung und Grosskredite. Die Sparte bringt bei beiden Schweizer Grossbanken oft hohe Gewinne, sorgt dazwischen aber immer wieder für Milliardenverluste, Skandale, Pannen, Kulturkonflikte und Imageeinbussen.

UBS und CS sagen, dass die Zusammenarbeit von Investment-Banking und Vermögensverwaltung jährliche Kostenersparnisse und Zusatzerträge in Milliardenhöhe generiere. Doch es gibt auch Argumente für eine Abspaltung des Investment-Bankings:

?

Imageschäden: Wie viele (potenzielle) Vermögensverwaltungskunden haben die Grossbanken schon abgeschreckt, weil das Investment-Banking gerade wieder in einen Skandal oder einen Milliardenverlust verwickelt war und das Image der Gesamtbank besudelt hat?

?

Bisher hat das Investment-Banking vor allem von der Vermögensverwaltung profitiert – und weit weniger umgekehrt. So ist etwa die «Platzierungskraft» oft ein starkes Argument im Emissionsgeschäft: Wenn eine Firma Aktien oder Obligationen an den Markt bringen will, kann das Investment-Banking sagen, man werde viele dieser Papiere bei den Vermögensverwaltungskunden der UBS platzieren.

?

Das obige Beispiel zeigt grosse Interessenkonflikte – zulasten gewisser Kunden. Der Vermögensverwaltungskunde will die besten Anlagemöglichkeiten – unabhängig davon, welche Bank die Papiere an den Markt gebracht hat.

?

Das Investment-Banking zieht wegen seiner Risiken den Börsenwert der beiden Schweizer Grossbanken hinunter. Nach Rechnung einzelner Analysten für die UBS wären die Vermögensverwaltung und das Schweizer Massengeschäft ohne das Investment-Banking an der Börse so viel wert wie zurzeit die Gesamtbank. Die «Problemsparte» wäre demnach zurzeit mit null bewertet.

Die laufende Krise gibt den Argumenten für die Abspaltung neuen Rückenwind. Der Ausgang der Debatte bleibt allerdings ungewiss. Gewiss ist dagegen: Die Hypothekenkrise ist für die hauptbetroffenen Banken noch lange nicht ausgestanden.

[meinolf67]

LONDON (MarketWatch) --


Swiss bank UBS AG is expected to post more than $5 billion of debt-related write-downs in the fourth quarter, the Sunday Express said, quoting insiders at the bank.
CreditSights earlier this month said the bank had taken a $9 billion hit on collateralized debt obligations, but the bank has said it will write down the value of the debts only gradually.
UBS couldn't immediately be reached for comment.

[meinolf67]

Montag, 31. Dezember 2007 08:56 | Finance News
Zürich - Der Staatsfonds Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd (GIC), der 9% an der UBS AG hält, sieht die Schweizer Grossbank vom Verwaltungsrat und Management bestens geführt.

UBS: GIC hat volles Vertrauen in Ospel und Rohner



42156-img
GIC: Group Managing Director Lim Siong Guan.


Er habe volles Vertrauen in UBS-Verwaltungsratspräsident Marcel Ospel und CEO Marcel Rohner, erklärte GIC-Group Managing Director Lim Siong Guan in einem Interview mit dem `SonntagsBlick`.

Fonds von der UBS-Aktie überzeugt
Der GIC investiere schon seit längerem in UBS-Aktien, bestätigte Lim. Auch deshalb unterstütze der Staatsfonds die UBS im Bestreben, das Aktienkapital auf `einem komfortablen` Niveau zu halten. Ein Mitglied in den Verwaltungsrat zu stellen habe der GIC nicht zur Bedingung für seine Beteiligung im Umfang von 11 Mrd CHF gemacht. "Wir verlangen keine Kontrolle über die Geschäftstätigkeit der Bank", wird Lim weiter zitiert. GIC sei ein langfristig denkender Investor, der sich "nur von kommerziellen Überlegungen leiten lässt". Der Fonds sei überzeugt, dass der Kurs der UBS-Aktie in Zukunft stark steigen und dem Staatsfonds hohe Gewinne bringen werde, heisst es weiter.

Keine Sonderbehandlung
Die UBS ist gemäss Lim seit vielen Jahren als Vermögensverwalter für GIC tätigt. Weder der GIC noch der Staat Singapur würden nun nach der Beteiligung eine Sonderbehandlung als Kunde erwarten. "Die UBS darf auch keine Sonderbehandlung von uns erwarten."

Schwerpunkt der Weltwirtschaft Richtung Asien
Lim erwartet im Weiteren nicht, dass die Schweizer Bank Singapur als Businesszentrum gegenüber anderen Standorten, beispielsweise der Schweiz, bevorzugt. Doch Lim betont auch, dass die UBS nicht ohne Grund mit über 2`000 Mitarbeitern im asiatischen Stadtstaat präsent ist, den ohne starkes Verwaltungsvermögensgeschäft in Asien würde die Konkurrenzfähigkeit der UBS und mit der Zeit auch das Kerngeschäft in der Schweiz geschwächt. Angesichts des grossen Wachstumspotenzials geht Lim davon aus, dass sich der Schwerpunkt der Weltwirtschaft Richtung Asien verschieben wird. (awp/mc/ab)

[meinolf67]

G. S. Davos, 25. Januar

Als 1981 die Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) geschaffen wurde, war dies bei weitem nicht der erste Staatsfonds der jüngeren Geschichte. Kuwaits Reservefonds für künftige Generationen etwa geht auf das Jahr 1953 zurück, und die Abu Dhabi Investment Authority oder die Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation wurden 1976 geschaffen. Gleichwohl gab es zu Beginn der achtziger Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts noch wenige solche Fonds, und die Mittel, die sie zur Verfügung hatten, waren beschränkt. Für Tony Tan, den stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden und geschäftsführenden Direktor der GIC , ist es daher nachvollziehbar, dass sich damals niemand für die Staatsfonds interessierte. Genauso kann er verstehen, dass heute einige besorgte Aufgeregtheit herrscht. Er selbst lässt sich davon aber ganz offensichtlich nicht anstecken.
Anzeige
.
.
Ja zu einem Verhaltenskodex

Der 68-Jährige hält es für völlig legitim, wenn Staaten bestimmte Bereiche der Wirtschaft als strategisch ansehen und entsprechend regulieren. Jedes Land sei diesbezüglich frei. Allerdings wolle wohl niemand einen veritablen finanziellen Protektionismus. Gerade die Schweiz profitiere von den vielen Investitionen ihrer Firmen im Ausland. Auf den Unterschied zwischen privaten und staatlichen Firmen angesprochen, reagiert Tan gelassen. Auch das müsse jedes Land selbst wissen, es müsse also entscheiden, ob es Geld von einem Staatsfonds zulassen oder lieber andere Lösungen suchen wolle. Staatsfonds könnten diesen Entscheid den alten Industriestaaten nicht abnehmen, sie könnten sich nur gut aufführen; das habe die GIC getan und werde sie weiterhin tun.

Im Gespräch zeigt sich Tan offen gegenüber einem Verhaltenskodex, der den Ängsten in den USA und Europa etwas begegnen könnte. Ein solcher Kodex ist vom amerikanischen Schatzsekretär Henry Paulson vorgeschlagen worden und soll nun unter der Ägide des IMF und der OECD ausgearbeitet werden. Tan ist, wie er sagt, gerne bereit, daran mitzuarbeiten. Allerdings müsse der Kodex freiwillig sein sowie allgemein und flexibel genug, um den grossen Unterschieden der Staatsfonds, aber auch der Länder, in denen sie investieren, gerecht zu werden. Aus seiner Sicht sollten das Motiv für eine Investition sowie die Governance des Fonds transparent gemacht werden. Eine völlige Offenlegung aller Investitionen würde er dagegen als Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber allen privaten Fonds empfinden, die nicht der gleichen Verhaltensnorm unterliegen. Hingegen sei es klar, dass sich die GIC an die Offenlegungspflicht der jeweiligen Börsenreglemente halte. So lasse sich eine unerwünschte Konzentration und Kontrolle abwehren.
Vertrauen in Ospel und Rohner

Immer wieder betont Tan, der in seinem Heimatland als Minister für Gesundheit, Finanzen, Handel, Erziehung und Verteidigung sowie als stellvertretender Premierminister gedient hatte, bevor er 2005 seine heutige Funktion übernahm, dass die GIC ausschliesslich langfristig investiere und weder ein Händler noch ein Hedge-Fund sei. Ausserdem erwerbe sie vorzugsweise kleine Anteile. Der Einstieg bei der UBS (an der die GIC schon vorher – mit weniger als 0,5% – beteiligt gewesen sei), aber auch bei der Citigroup scheint diesem letzten Punkt der Investitionsstrategie zu widersprechen. Hier seien jedoch viele unglückliche Entwicklungen zusammengekommen, die es nahegelegt hätten, zu helfen. In einem schwierigen Moment Geld mittels einer Kapitalerhöhung zu besorgen, sei nämlich für eine Bank sehr, sehr problematisch. Die Aktion dürfe nicht fehlschlagen, und es müsse alles sehr schnell gehen, sonst sei das Vertrauen endgültig ruiniert.

Die UBS kenne man schon lange, und man sei überzeugt von ihren Qualitäten. Sie sei der weltweit beste Vermögensverwalter, sie sei auch im Investment-Banking stark, und in der ausgesprochen langfristigen Perspektive der GIC seien die momentanen Turbulenzen letztlich nicht so wichtig. Die GIC sei bereit, geduldig zu sein. Die jüngsten Kursverluste der UBS scheinen Tan völlig kalt zu lassen, denn mit dieser Möglichkeit habe man gerechnet; für die lange Frist sei dies indessen kaum relevant. Es bestehe auch kein Anlass, die Preisbedingungen der Wandelanleihe zu überprüfen. Auch in das Team Ospel-Rohner habe er vollstes Vertrauen; sie seien in der Lage, die Probleme wieder zu lösen, ganz abgesehen davon, dass jetzt wohl nicht der beste Moment sei, die Führung auszuwechseln. Im Übrigen seien aber personelle Entscheide Aufgabe des Verwaltungsrates, die man nicht beeinflussen wolle.
Passiv, aber nicht lethargisch

Gemäss Tan will sich die GIC zwar passiv verhalten, aber keineswegs lethargisch. Eine briefliche Einladung Marcel Ospels, Einsitz im Verwaltungsrat zu nehmen, habe man zwar nach genauer Überlegung abgelehnt, aber man werde mit dem Management regelmässig Gespräche führen. Man gehe auch davon aus, dass die Führung des Unternehmens die Meinung der GIC einholen werde. Tan zeigt sich überzeugt, dass diese Halb-Distanz letztlich die bessere Kontrolle erlaubt. Wenn man im Verwaltungsrat mitmache, gehöre man nämlich viel mehr dazu, man sei nicht mehr so objektiv und leidenschaftslos

((info-box))

[MattJohn]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 31.801.921 von meinolf67 am 01.10.07 10:56:47

Hallo meinolf,

mir ist gerade dein Thread ins Auge gesprungen.
Ich hoffe du bist bei Solarwerten geblieben und hast keine Aktien oder ähnliches von UBS gekauft.

Der Kurs wäre jetzt erst wieder für einen spekulativen Einstieg interessant, aber mit viel Risiko verbunden.

Zu deiner Frage ob ein Emittent pleite gehen kann: Das ist fast ausgeschlossen!!

Denn eine wirkliche Pleite einer Bank würde sich zu schnell auf denn gesamten Konjunkturzyklus auswirken.

Die Bank kann ihre Verbindlichkeiten nicht bedienen -> Firmen warten auf Geld -> diese können ihre Verbindlichkeiten nicht bedienen oder neu investieren -> starke Konjunkturabkühlung bis hin zur Konjunkturkrise!!

Das wollen alle (Staat und Banken) vermeiden, weshalb diese oft in die Presche springen (siehe IKB). Du brauchst also relativ wenig Angst haben das die UBS oder einer deiner anderen Emittenten bankrott gehen könnte. Vorher würde ein Konkurent die Bank kaufen, um die Kunden und ihr Asset übernehmen zu können.

Falls noch Fragen sind, einfach Fragen.

MfG Matt

[meinolf67]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.482.022 von MattJohn am 26.02.08 19:12:43

Halte 1 Stück und grinse viel...

[koki555]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.490.107 von meinolf67 am 27.02.08 13:13:30

Scheisse UBS Aktien, die gehen sicher unter 10 EURO!! nur warten kleine Aktionär.

[koki555]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.501.549 von koki555 am 28.02.08 12:03:05

Die UBS hat viel Geld verloren darum jetzt erholt sich die kapital und verkauft viele neue Aktien, aber die sind nicht Wert!! arme kleine Aktionär!! Marcel Ospel= Grosse Mafia Boss.

[MattJohn]

Ich halte es für unwahrscheinlich das UBS bis auf 10 € fällt. Das entspräche einer Marktkapitalisierung von nur 25 Milliarden €. Spätestens bei 30 MRD. € dürfte der Boden erreicht sein. Die UBS wäre damit ein interessanter Kandidat für eine Übernahme. vgl. Marktkapitalisierung der Deutschen Bank liegt momentan bei 40 mrd. €.

[grosserwagen]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 33.501.549 von koki555 am 28.02.08 12:03:05

Die gehen wahrscheinlich unter 6 €. Dort werden die Aktien für mich interessant.

Gruss
GW

[Fasu]

Leute, macht es doch nicht so kompliziert:

Die UBS wird nach der Swiss Air der nächste Kandidat sein, den es im Alpenländle putzt. Ich sag nur Grossbank Singapur...

Das die deutsche Lufthansa die Vorzeige Swiss Air schluckt, haben viele Schweizer bis heute noch nicht verkraftet....

[stauffenberg]

http://www.markit.com/information/products/category/indices/…
Die Abschreibungen der UBS für Q1 werden brutal. Die UBS fügt mit ihrem US-Subprime-Spiel ihrem Vermögensverwaltungsgeschäft katastrophalen Schaden zu.

[meinolf67]

Sehr interessanter Artikel:

Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
by Michael Lewis March 2008 Issue
For years, investors have relied on a complex formula to manage risk. But what happens if the Black-Scholes model is wrong—and we're in bigger trouble than ever?

The striking thing about the seemingly endless collapse of the subprime-mortgage market is how egalitarian it has been. It's nearly impossible to draw a demographic line between the victims and the perps. Millions of ordinary people ignorant of high finance have lost billions of dollars, but so have the biggest names on Wall Street, and both groups made exactly the same bet: that real estate values would never fall. Stan O'Neal, the former C.E.O. of Merrill Lynch, was fired for the same reason the lower-middle-class family in the suburban wasteland between Los Angeles and San Diego may have lost its surprisingly nice home. Both underestimated the likelihood of an unlikely event: a financial panic. In retrospect, the small army of Wall Street traders who lost tens of billions of dollars in subprime-mortgage investments looks as naive and foolish as the man on the street. But there's another way of viewing this crisis. The man on the street, for the first time, acted on the same foolish principles that have guided the behavior of sophisticated Wall Street traders for the past few decades.

If you had to pick a moment when those principles first appeared a bit shaky, you could do worse than the 1987 stock market crash. Black Monday was the first of a breed: a panic that suggested disastrous economic and social consequences but in the end had no serious effects at all. The bursting of the internet bubble, the Asian currency crisis, the Russian government bond default that triggered the failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management—all of these extreme events seemed, in the heat of the moment, to have the power to change the world as we know it. None of them, it turned out, was that big of a deal for the U.S. economy or for ordinary citizens. But the 1987 crash marked the beginning of something else too—a collapse brought about not by real or even perceived economic problems but by the new complexity of financial markets.

A new strategy known as portfolio insurance, invented by a pair of finance professors at the University of California at Berkeley, had been taken up in a big way by supposedly savvy investors. Portfolio insurance evolved from the most influential idea on Wall Street, an options-pricing model called Black-Scholes. The model is based on the assumption that a trader can suck all the risk out of the market by taking a short position and increasing that position as the market falls, thus protecting against losses, no matter how steep. Nearly every employee stock-ownership plan uses Black-Scholes as its guiding principle. A pension-fund manager sitting on billions of U.S. equities and fearful of a crash needn't call a Wall Street broker and buy a put option—an option to sell at a set price, limiting potential losses—on the S&P 500. Managers can create put options for themselves, cheaply, by shorting the S&P as it falls, and thus, in theory, be free of all market risk.

Good theory. The glitch was discovered only after the fact: When a market is crashing and no one is willing to buy, it's impossible to sell short. If too many investors are trying to unload stocks as a market falls, they create the very disaster they are seeking to avoid. Their desire to sell drives the market lower, triggering an even greater desire to sell and, ultimately, sending the market into a bottomless free fall. That's what happened on October 19, 1987, when the sweet logic of Black-Scholes was shown to be irrelevant in the real world of crashes and panics. Even the biggest portfolio insurance firm, Leland O'Brien Rubinstein Associates (co-founded and run by the same finance professors who invented portfolio insurance), tried to sell as the market crashed and couldn't.

Oddly, this failure of financial theory didn't lead Wall Street to question Black-Scholes in general. "If you try to attack it," says one longtime trader of abstruse financial options, "you're making a case for your own unintelligence." The math was too advanced, the theorists too smart; the debate, for anyone without a degree in mathematics, was bound to end badly. But after the crash of 1987, individual traders at big Wall Street firms who sold financial-disaster insurance must have smelled a rat. Across markets—in stocks, currencies, and bonds—the price of insuring yourself against financial disaster rose. This rise in prices and the break with Black-Scholes reflected two new beliefs: one, that huge price jumps were more probable and likely to be more extreme than the Black-Scholes model assumed; and two, that you can't manufacture an option on the stock market by selling and buying the market itself, because that market will never allow it. When you most need to sell—or to buy—is exactly when everyone else is selling or buying, in effect canceling out any advantage you once might have had.

"No one believes the original assumptions anymore," says John Seo, who co-manages Fermat Capital, a $2 billion-plus hedge fund that invests in catastrophe bonds—essentially bonds with put options that are triggered by such natural catastrophes as hurricanes and earthquakes. "It's hard to believe that anyone—yes, including me—ever believed it. It's like trying to replicate a fire-insurance policy by dynamically increasing or decreasing your coverage as fire conditions wax and wane. One day, bam, your house is on fire, and you call for more coverage?"

THE PROBLEM

 This is interesting: The very theory underlying all insurance against financial panic falls apart in the face of an actual panic. A few smart traders may have abandoned the theory, but the market itself hasn't; in fact, its influence has mushroomed in the most fantastic ways. At the end of 2006, according to the Bank for International Settlements, there were $415 trillion in derivatives—that is, $415 trillion in securities for which there is no completely satisfactory pricing model. Added to this are trillions more in exchange-traded options, employee stock options, mortgage bonds, and God knows what else—most of which, presumably, are still priced using some version of Black-Scholes. Investors need to believe that there's a rational price for what they buy, even if it requires a leap of faith. "The model created markets," Seo says. "Markets follow models. So these markets spring up, and the people in them figure out that, at least for some of it, Black-Scholes doesn't work. For certain kinds of risk—the risk of rare, extreme events—the model is not just wrong. It's very wrong. But the only reason these markets sprang up in the first place was the supposition that Black-Scholes could price these things fairly."

Black-Scholes didn't work; trillions of dollars' worth of securities may have been priced without regard to the possibility of crashes and panics. But until very recently, no one has bitched and moaned about this problem too loudly. Lay folk might harbor private misgivings about the clergy, but as lay folk, they are reluctant to express them. Now, however, as the subprime market unravels, the beginnings of a revolt against the church seem to be taking shape.

One of the revolt's leaders is Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the bestselling author of The Black Swan and Fooled by Randomness and a former trader of currency options for a big French bank. Taleb can precisely date the origin of his own personal gripe with Black-Scholes: September 22, 1985. On that day, central bankers from Japan, France, Germany, Britain, and the United States announced their intention to torpedo the U.S. dollar—to reduce its value in relation to the other countries' currencies. Every day, Taleb received a list of his trading positions from his firm and a matrix describing his risks. The matrix told him how much money he stood to make or lose, given various currency fluctuations. That September 22, when the central bankers announced their plan to lower the dollar's value, he made money but didn't know it. "I didn't know what my position was," he says, "because the movement was outside the matrix they'd given me." The French bank's risk-analysis program assumed that a currency crash of this magnitude would occur once in several million years and therefore wasn't worth considering.

Taleb made a killing that day, but it wasn't thanks to a grand plan and it wasn't happy money. "People in dark suits started coming from Paris," he says. "They said that the only way I could have made that much was to have taken far too much risk." But he hadn't. They had simply failed to account for the true nature of risk in financial markets. "Then I started looking at the history of markets," he says. "And I saw that these sorts of things happened all the time." Taleb became obsessed with the way prices in the options market, based on the famous Black-Scholes model, underestimated the risk of extreme and rare events. He set up his trading to profit from such events by buying up disaster insurance that would, according to Black-Scholes, be considered overpriced. When October 19, 1987, arrived, he was prepared. "Ninety-seven percent of all the returns I ever made as a trader, I made on that day," he says.

THE SOLUTION

 In the past two years, Taleb has co-authored a pair of papers that have appeared in the sort of academic journals that originally published the Black-Scholes model. He and his co-author attack the model head-on in its own language (math), and as much as call for a retraction of the Nobel Prize awarded to Myron Scholes and Robert Merton for their work in creating the model. "This is what I'm saying to Merton and Scholes," Taleb says. "You guys are just parasites. You're not bringing anything useful to the market. You are lecturing birds on how to fly. You're watching them fly. And then you're taking credit for it."

He's saying more than that, actually. He's saying that the academics, in lecturing the birds, have made flying more difficult. Like John Seo—like a lot of traders who both understand the math of Black-Scholes and the reality of the marketplace—Taleb believes that the model has a pernicious effect: By leading investors to think they understand complicated financial risk when they actually do not, and by mispricing that risk, Black-Scholes encourages them to take more chances than they rationally should. The big Wall Street firms, oddly enough, are the most foolish in this regard. In a post-Black-Scholes world, these companies, more than anyone else, would be compelled to reduce their exposure to financial catastrophe and to raise the prices at which they sell financial insurance to others. Indeed, if no one has made too much of a stink about mispriced risk until now, it may be because the chief victims have been the big Wall Street firms that typically wind up with it. "The main reason there isn't a fundamental public outcry against Black-Scholes," says Seo, "is that the main losers from its mispricing are broker-dealers." The crashes happened, yet only Wall Street traders—rather than living and breathing human beings with whom the world could empathize—suffered.

The collapse of the subprime-mortgage bond market is different from the general run of modern financial panics in this respect: It involves millions of blissfully oblivious people who have never heard of the Black-Scholes options-pricing model. Nevertheless, it was Black-Scholes that gave them—and the rest of the financial system—the excuse to risk the roof over their head. They were followed by the mortgage brokers who lent them money and the banks that funded the brokers. Black-Scholes is no longer just a model; it has evolved into a climate of opinion about a certain kind of financial risk. It wasn't only big Wall Street firms, but a lot of small real estate speculators—otherwise known as homeowners—who, in effect, sold put options too cheaply against the risk of extreme, rare events. That many of these people literally live inside the investment that they've speculated on sharpens the pain but fails to drive home the point. Financial panics have become almost commonplace; events that are meant to occur once in a millennium now seem to occur every few years. Could this be because the financial system was built on an idea that badly underestimates the risk of catastrophes—and so conspires with human nature to create them?

Good theory. The glitch was discovered only after the fact: When a market is crashing and no one is willing to buy, it's impossible to sell short. If too many investors are trying to unload stocks as a market falls, they create the very disaster they are seeking to avoid. Their desire to sell drives the market lower, triggering an even greater desire to sell and, ultimately, sending the market into a bottomless free fall. That's what happened on October 19, 1987, when the sweet logic of Black-Scholes was shown to be irrelevant in the real world of crashes and panics. Even the biggest portfolio insurance firm, Leland O'Brien Rubinstein Associates (co-founded and run by the same finance professors who invented portfolio insurance), tried to sell as the market crashed and couldn't.

Oddly, this failure of financial theory didn't lead Wall Street to question Black-Scholes in general. "If you try to attack it," says one longtime trader of abstruse financial options, "you're making a case for your own unintelligence." The math was too advanced, the theorists too smart; the debate, for anyone without a degree in mathematics, was bound to end badly. But after the crash of 1987, individual traders at big Wall Street firms who sold financial-disaster insurance must have smelled a rat. Across markets—in stocks, currencies, and bonds—the price of insuring yourself against financial disaster rose. This rise in prices and the break with Black-Scholes reflected two new beliefs: one, that huge price jumps were more probable and likely to be more extreme than the Black-Scholes model assumed; and two, that you can't manufacture an option on the stock market by selling and buying the market itself, because that market will never allow it. When you most need to sell—or to buy—is exactly when everyone else is selling or buying, in effect canceling out any advantage you once might have had.

"No one believes the original assumptions anymore," says John Seo, who co-manages Fermat Capital, a $2 billion-plus hedge fund that invests in catastrophe bonds—essentially bonds with put options that are triggered by such natural catastrophes as hurricanes and earthquakes. "It's hard to believe that anyone—yes, including me—ever believed it. It's like trying to replicate a fire-insurance policy by dynamically increasing or decreasing your coverage as fire conditions wax and wane. One day, bam, your house is on fire, and you call for more coverage?"

THE PROBLEM

 This is interesting: The very theory underlying all insurance against financial panic falls apart in the face of an actual panic. A few smart traders may have abandoned the theory, but the market itself hasn't; in fact, its influence has mushroomed in the most fantastic ways. At the end of 2006, according to the Bank for International Settlements, there were $415 trillion in derivatives—that is, $415 trillion in securities for which there is no completely satisfactory pricing model. Added to this are trillions more in exchange-traded options, employee stock options, mortgage bonds, and God knows what else—most of which, presumably, are still priced using some version of Black-Scholes. Investors need to believe that there's a rational price for what they buy, even if it requires a leap of faith. "The model created markets," Seo says. "Markets follow models. So these markets spring up, and the people in them figure out that, at least for some of it, Black-Scholes doesn't work. For certain kinds of risk—the risk of rare, extreme events—the model is not just wrong. It's very wrong. But the only reason these markets sprang up in the first place was the supposition that Black-Scholes could price these things fairly."

Black-Scholes didn't work; trillions of dollars' worth of securities may have been priced without regard to the possibility of crashes and panics. But until very recently, no one has bitched and moaned about this problem too loudly. Lay folk might harbor private misgivings about the clergy, but as lay folk, they are reluctant to express them. Now, however, as the subprime market unravels, the beginnings of a revolt against the church seem to be taking shape.

One of the revolt's leaders is Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the bestselling author of The Black Swan and Fooled by Randomness and a former trader of currency options for a big French bank. Taleb can precisely date the origin of his own personal gripe with Black-Scholes: September 22, 1985. On that day, central bankers from Japan, France, Germany, Britain, and the United States announced their intention to torpedo the U.S. dollar—to reduce its value in relation to the other countries' currencies. Every day, Taleb received a list of his trading positions from his firm and a matrix describing his risks. The matrix told him how much money he stood to make or lose, given various currency fluctuations. That September 22, when the central bankers announced their plan to lower the dollar's value, he made money but didn't know it. "I didn't know what my position was," he says, "because the movement was outside the matrix they'd given me." The French bank's risk-analysis program assumed that a currency crash of this magnitude would occur once in several million years and therefore wasn't worth considering.

Taleb made a killing that day, but it wasn't thanks to a grand plan and it wasn't happy money. "People in dark suits started coming from Paris," he says. "They said that the only way I could have made that much was to have taken far too much risk." But he hadn't. They had simply failed to account for the true nature of risk in financial markets. "Then I started looking at the history of markets," he says. "And I saw that these sorts of things happened all the time." Taleb became obsessed with the way prices in the options market, based on the famous Black-Scholes model, underestimated the risk of extreme and rare events. He set up his trading to profit from such events by buying up disaster insurance that would, according to Black-Scholes, be considered overpriced. When October 19, 1987, arrived, he was prepared. "Ninety-seven percent of all the returns I ever made as a trader, I made on that day," he says.

THE SOLUTION

 In the past two years, Taleb has co-authored a pair of papers that have appeared in the sort of academic journals that originally published the Black-Scholes model. He and his co-author attack the model head-on in its own language (math), and as much as call for a retraction of the Nobel Prize awarded to Myron Scholes and Robert Merton for their work in creating the model. "This is what I'm saying to Merton and Scholes," Taleb says. "You guys are just parasites. You're not bringing anything useful to the market. You are lecturing birds on how to fly. You're watching them fly. And then you're taking credit for it."

He's saying more than that, actually. He's saying that the academics, in lecturing the birds, have made flying more difficult. Like John Seo—like a lot of traders who both understand the math of Black-Scholes and the reality of the marketplace—Taleb believes that the model has a pernicious effect: By leading investors to think they understand complicated financial risk when they actually do not, and by mispricing that risk, Black-Scholes encourages them to take more chances than they rationally should. The big Wall Street firms, oddly enough, are the most foolish in this regard. In a post-Black-Scholes world, these companies, more than anyone else, would be compelled to reduce their exposure to financial catastrophe and to raise the prices at which they sell financial insurance to others. Indeed, if no one has made too much of a stink about mispriced risk until now, it may be because the chief victims have been the big Wall Street firms that typically wind up with it. "The main reason there isn't a fundamental public outcry against Black-Scholes," says Seo, "is that the main losers from its mispricing are broker-dealers." The crashes happened, yet only Wall Street traders—rather than living and breathing human beings with whom the world could empathize—suffered.

The collapse of the subprime-mortgage bond market is different from the general run of modern financial panics in this respect: It involves millions of blissfully oblivious people who have never heard of the Black-Scholes options-pricing model. Nevertheless, it was Black-Scholes that gave them—and the rest of the financial system—the excuse to risk the roof over their head. They were followed by the mortgage brokers who lent them money and the banks that funded the brokers. Black-Scholes is no longer just a model; it has evolved into a climate of opinion about a certain kind of financial risk. It wasn't only big Wall Street firms, but a lot of small real estate speculators—otherwise known as homeowners—who, in effect, sold put options too cheaply against the risk of extreme, rare events. That many of these people literally live inside the investment that they've speculated on sharpens the pain but fails to drive home the point. Financial panics have become almost commonplace; events that are meant to occur once in a millennium now seem to occur every few years. Could this be because the financial system was built on an idea that badly underestimates the risk of catastrophes—and so conspires with human nature to create them?

[meinolf67]

31.03.2008 11:19
UBS holds $5.9 bln auction-rate securities; news on capital hike by Wednesday

ZURICH (Thomson Financial) - UBS AG (News/Aktienkurs) said it held auction-rate securities of $5.9 billion as of December, 31, 2007 but declined to comment on whether the bank's own positions are also subject to reevaluation.

'The reevaluation of auction-rate securities of clients do not allow any conclusion on our own holdings,' a spokeswoman said.

Over the weekend, the Swiss bank confirmed that it is cutting the value of auction-rate securities in its brokerage customers' accounts adding to speculation of further write-downs and a fresh capital hike.

The group declined to disclose the total value of auction-rate securities held for clients.

Any news of a capital hike is expected to come in by Wednesday, the legal deadline for the bank to send out the AGM invitation along with the order of business for the day.

[meinolf67]

SPIEGEL online am 20.4.08:

Finanzsystem stand haarscharf vor dem Kollaps

Das internationale Finanzsystem stand offensichtlich viel näher am Abgrund, als selbst Experten wahrhaben wollten. Nach Überzeugung des ehemaligen Konzernchefs der Credit Suisse, Oswald Grübel, ist sie sogar nur denkbar knapp dem Kollaps entgangen.

Zürich - Als bisher kritischsten Moment bezeichnete Grübel in einem Interview mit dem Schweizer "SonntagsBlick" die Phase im März, als die US-Investmentbank Bear Stearns Chart zeigen durch eine konzertierte Aktion von US-Notenbank und der Investmentbank J.P.Morgan vor dem Konkurs bewahrt wurde.

Wäre diese vergleichsweise kleine Bank zusammengebrochen, hätten weltweit Millionen von Bankkunden ihre Einlagen zurückverlangt, und die Situation wäre außer Kontrolle geraten, erklärte der Banker. Das Bankgeschäft wäre über einen unabsehbaren Zeitraum hinweg gelähmt gewesen.

Zum Glück hätten die Zentralbanken erkannt, dass sie den Interbankmarkt faktisch hätten übernehmen müssen, sagte Grübel: "In der jetzigen Finanzkrise sind wir haarscharf an einem System-Kollaps vorbeigeschlittert. Das hat es noch nie gegeben."

Der ehemalige Spitzenbanker rechnet aber auch so mit nachhaltigen Konsequenzen der Finanzkrise. Die Banken würden künftig noch weniger Kredit gewähren. Dabei gehe es um Billionen. "Das wird das Wirtschaftswachstum in den nächsten Jahren überall gewaltig bremsen", sagte Grübel.

Mit der Einschätzung über das Ausmaß der Krise steht der Ex-Banker im Übrigen nicht allein. Auch US-Notenbankchef Ben Bernanke hatte Anfang April indirekt auf die existenzielle Bedrohung des Finanzsystems hingewiesen, als er die Rettung von Bear Sterns vor dem Bankenausschuss des US-Senats verteidigte. "Angesichts des außergewöhnlichen Drucks auf die Weltwirtschaft und das Finanzsystem, wäre der Schaden durch einen Zusammenbruch von Bear Stearns schwer und schwierig zu begrenzen gewesen", sagte Bernanke.

Die Federal Reserve hatte bei dem Verkauf des Investmenthauses an die US-Großbank J.P. Morgan rund 30 Milliarden Dollar an hochriskanten Wertbeständen bei Bear Stearns garantiert. Kritiker hatten bemängelt, dass für die Rettung eines Unternehmens letztendlich Steuergelder zum Einsatz kamen.

Schlimmste Wirtschaftskrise aller Zeiten?

"Die Probleme, um die es sich hier handelte, gingen weit über das Schicksal eines einzigen Unternehmens hinaus", betonte Bernanke. "Die negativen Folgen eines Zusammenbruchs wären nicht auf das Finanzsystem begrenzt gewesen, sondern wären in der Realwirtschaft durch Auswirkungen auf Vermögenswerte und die Verfügbarkeit von Krediten zu spüren gewesen".

Die US-Zentralbank hatte Anfang April die Übernahme von Bear Stearns durch die J.P. Morgan Chase Bank gebilligt. Mit Blick auf die Wettbewerbslage hieß es in einer Erklärung, es gebe auch nach der Vereinigung "zahlreiche Konkurrenten auf dem Markt".

[meinolf67]

The Crisis, Information and the Market

By Xavier Vives
14 May 2008 at 01:50 PM GMT-04:00

LONDON (VoxEU.org) -- The current financial crisis, as other previous crisis, raises voices about the irrationality of traders and other decision makers. How can it be that a modern interbank market blocks in gridlock? Why do sound banks suffer for the sins that other banks have committed? What explains contagion from a risky to a supposedly safe market? How can the oscillations of markets be much more pronounced than the oscillations of fundamental values of assets?

An easy answer is that traders and other market operators overreact and tend to follow the crowd as in Keynes’s beauty contest metaphor, where investors try to guess what other investors will do instead of looking at the fundamental values. This view of the market, at the mercy of fads and fashion and short-term speculation, contrasts with the view of Hayek of the market as a marvel that aggregates the dispersed information of the actors in the economy. Indeed, when Lange argued in the 1930s that socialism was viable, Hayek responded that a centrally planned economy would never manage to replicate the collective knowledge of the market. The superiority of the market was informational. The price system provides the right guide to economic actors who only need to have local knowledge of the part of the economy in which they operate. This does not mean that the market can avoid trouble always, and the root causes are precisely information problems compounded with coordination failures. In fact, without dismissing the potential contribution of irrationality to market outcomes, crises and crashes are natural outcomes of trade by rational actors if information in the market is dispersed enough.

In the present financial crisis, liquidity in the interbank market has dried out and central banks are having trouble normalising the situation. At the base of the crisis are the sophisticated packages of securitised loans, including subprime tranches, for which the market has collapsed. The reason for the related collapse of the interbank market is informational, with banks not trusting the positions of each other because of lack of common information. The problem has been aggravated by the lack of control of who was monitoring the subprime loans. In the old-fashioned banking system institutions would monitor loans, in the world of securitised packages the market failed to provide the monitoring because rating agencies did not do their job properly and fund managers took the risk knowing that the upside was to be cashed in bonus form and the downside protected by limited liability. This has lead to a lemons problem like in the market for used cars: if you want to sell it to me I do not want to buy from you.

The implications for policy are far-reaching. It means that the only solution to the current crisis is the revelation of the losses of the different entities eliminating this source of differential information in the market. Pumping more liquidity will soften the crisis temporarily but not eliminate the cause.

First of all, the massive liquidity interventions of central banks may have a pessimistic reading: what does the central bank know that the market does not to intervene in such a massive way? The central bank has to take into account that market actors will try to read into its actions because both central bank and actors do not share the same information. For example, the central bank has access to supervisory information not in the hands of the market. In fact, the central bank has to worry about the fact that the information it conveys, either by actions or words, does not destabilise the market. This is so because market actors may use the information released by the central bank to coordinate expectations on a pessimistic outcome, making it self-fulfilling. The central banker has to maintain a delicate balance between providing information and making sure that expectations are under control. This is an art at which Alan Greenspan was grand master.

A second aspect of the question, made evident in the present crisis, is that, if the central bank intervenes to help institutions that are not under its supervision, it may lack the necessary information to assess whether the origin of the need is a liquidity or a solvency problem. How does the Federal Reserve know when mounting the rescue operation of a non-bank financial firm, for example, that the institution is solvent? By helping an insolvent institution taxpayers’ money is put at risk and the disciplining effect of failure eliminated. The consequence is that the moral hazard problem is exacerbated and bank managers will feel more secure in the future to take excessive risks.

Still a third aspect of the crisis relates to the dynamics of information revelation. Participants in the interbank market may have incentives to defer disclosure of their losses to delay the punishment of the market and hopefully profit from an eventual improvement in the general situation. This waiting strategy may find support in the liquidity injections of central banks that try to stabilise markets but lead to a collectively bad outcome.

The conclusion is that without understanding the informational underpinnings of the current crisis we cannot start to propose measures that will help to resolve it in the medium run. Or, even worse, we may get the policy measures wrong and put the seeds of a future crisis.

[harosher]

AWP PRESSE/Deutsche Bank-Chef Ackermann sieht Finanzkrise bald ausgestanden
19.05.08 06:52:00- AWGB

Bern (AWP/sda) - Die Finanzkrise nähert sich nach Einschätzung von
Deutsche Bank-Chef Josef Ackermann ihrem Ende. Es sei noch nicht ganz
ausgestanden, "aber die Signale aus den USA sind ermutigend."

Der Immobilienmarkt in den USA dürfte sich bereits im zweiten Halbjahr
stark erholen, sagte der St. Galler im Interview mit dem "SonntagsBlick"
(Ausgabe 18.5.).

Aus der Finanzkrise müssten die Banken nun Lehren ziehen und handeln.
Wenn dies nicht geschehe, befürchte er, dass die öffentliche Hand
ihre Regulierung verstärke, "und zwar in einer Art und Weise, die unserer
Branche schadet".

Der internationale Bankenverband (IIF), welcher Ackermann präsidiert,
wird Empfehlungen vorlegen, wie eine solche Krise künftig vermieden werden
kann. Der Bericht werde voraussichtlich Ende Juni veröffentlicht, sagte
Ackermann.

Angesprochen, ob man ihn nach Auslaufen seines Vertrages mit der Deutschen
Bank im Jahr 2010 an der Spitze einer grossen Schweizer Bank wiedersehen werde,
winkte Ackermann ab. "Ich denke nicht. Ich bin sehr zufrieden in Deutschland
und ich bin jetzt doch schon 60". Es gebe zudem andere Aktivitäten, die
ihm sehr viel Freude machten, so etwa die Professur an der London School of
Economics, erklärte der Deutsche Bank Chef weiter.

[hasi22]

Kapitalaufnahme je 20 Akt. gibts neue zu Fr. 21.-
ergibt neues Kapital von ca 16 mrd chf.

Wird sich künftig positiv auswirken (EK Stärkung).


hier wieder ein Hinweis auf die "Verbrecher" in den US !

Falsche «Aaa»-Ratings bei Moody's Investor Service
Um vier Stufen zu hoch bewertete CPDO

feb. Der Rating-Agentur Moody's sind bei der Bewertung von Kreditderivaten schwere Fehler unterlaufen, weshalb sie Produkten mit einem Volumen in Höhe von mehreren Milliarden Dollar fälschlicherweise Ratings mit der Höchstnote «Aaa» erteilt hat. Gemäss der «Financial Times» haben Mitarbeiter der Agentur Anfang 2007 festgestellt, dass sogenannte «Constant Proportion Debt Obligations» – dies sind vereinfacht gesagt Anleihen auf Indizes für Kreditderivate – vier Stufen tiefer als mit der Bonitätsbestnote hätten bewertet werden sollen.

Vertuschung eines Computerfehlers?
Anzeige

In ihrer Berichterstattung beruft sich die Zeitung auf interne Dokumente von Moody's. Der Fehlbewertung sei ein Computerfehler vorausgegangen. Nach der Korrektur desselben im Frühjahr 2007 habe die Agentur die Bewertungsmethodik geändert, um die Titel nicht sofort um mehrere Stufen deklassieren zu müssen. Die Produkte hätten in der Folge ihr «Aaa»-Rating bis zum Januar 2008 behalten. Im schwierigen Marktumfeld nach dem Jahreswechsel habe Moody's die Bewertung dann um mehrere Stufen herabgesetzt.

Gemäss einem Moody's-Sprecher ändert die Rating-Agentur ihre Analysemodelle regelmässig aus einer Vielzahl an Gründen. Dies zu tun, um Fehler zu vertuschen, vertrage sich nicht mit der Firmenpolitik von Moody's. Die Agentur habe eine gründliche Untersuchung der Angelegenheit eingeleitet. Die Rating-Agenturen sind seit Ausbruch der Finanzkrise im Sommer 2007 bereits stark in der Kritik. Ihnen wurde wiederholt vorgeworfen, zu spät auf die Krise am Markt für zweitklassige Hypotheken («Subprime Mortgages») reagiert und auch Papiere zu gut bewertet zu haben.

NZZ 22.5.08

[hasi22]

die Amis decken sich schon wieder ein (ev. die Shorties)

Last Trade: 29.84
Trade Time: 3:10PM ET
Change: 0.50 (1.70%)
Volume: 4,067,465

[hasi22]

gestern war Tag X (Abschluss des Emissionshandels) da haben sich die armen Anrechtsbesitzer - welche keine Weisung an ihre Banken gaben - richtiggehend ausgekotzt :O

Nun heute ssieht es schon viel besser aus

erstmals mehr Käufer als Verkäufer an der SWX

Verkäufer 2434 / Käufer 2629

ich bin heute Morgen rein in

WKN / Symbol CB18Y6 QRJ6
ISIN DE000CB18Y64
Wertpapierart Knock-out-Produkte
Produktgattung Knock-out mit Stop-Loss
Produktname Unlimited Turbo Bull
Emittent Commerzbank
Handelssegment
Optionsart Call
Basiswert (-kurs) UBS (15,09)
Basispreis in [Währung] 20,6476 [CHF]
Knock-out-Barriere 21,6800
Hebel 6,85

Achtung auf KO (nicht das ganze Vermögen rein)

[meinolf67]

so richtig gut geht es Ihnen wohl noch nicht wieder...

[meinolf67]

habe meine Zertifikate inzwischen alle verkauft und gehe kein Risiko mehr ein;

damit ist der thread für mich erledigt...

Tschüs.