China Crash (Seite 24)

[faultcode]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 63.411.554 von faultcode am 22.04.20 12:09:21

auf die chinesischen Banken kommen nun auch Ausfälle bei den Krediten im Ausland hinzu:



=> ist nur "announced", aber USD461Mrd. an Kreditvorhaben seit 2013 durch chines. Finanzinstitute (die aber sowieso meistens halbstaatlich sind, mehr oder weniger) klingt nach ziemlich viel

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1.5.
Trump Eyes Order to Block Savings Fund From Chinese Stocks
• Move comes after months of pressure from concerned lawmakers
• Action could come in the form of executive order, source says
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-01/trump-con…
...

=> das wird den Kursen der ganzen China-ADR-Buden, allen voran BABA, nicht gut tun:

• BABA -4%
• QQQ -2% (NASDAQ100)

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22.4.
China’s Banks Hit by Bad Loans Despite $212 Billion Relief
• Lenders delay $124 billion in loan repayments in quarter
• China’s banks brace for unprecedented decline in profits
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-22/china-s-b…
...

[faultcode]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 63.270.253 von faultcode am 08.04.20 01:03:58

bekannte und große China ADR's notierten zuletzt alle mit Abschlag (seit dem Luckin Coffee-Skandal):



"Werte":
• BABA
• BIDU
• GSX
• LK
• TAL
• TME

Benchmark: QQQ = Invesco QQQ Trust Series I ETF ("NASDAQ 100")

[faultcode]

der "China crash" als Mangel an frischen U.S. dollars

...
$TAL (TAL Education Group) soll der nächste China ADR Scam sein. Afterhours:



7.4.
TAL Education Group Discovered Employee Wrongdoing
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tal-education-group… (~)


=> es scheint ja so zu sein: je nach der relativen Anzahl der verpfändeten American depositary shares fällt auch der Crash aus

Sollte man sowas also noch im Depot haben, lohnt sich eventuell ein Blick ins IPO-Prospekt oder andere Finanzberichte.


$IQ (iQIYI) war heute auch kurz im Gespräch.

Man fängt schon an, den Überblick zu verlieren.


Mich würde nicht wundern, wenn eines Tages herauskommt, daß es hinter den Kulissen in den USA Druck auf die Big 4 gab (warum auch immer), bei den China ADR's nicht mehr wegzusehen:

(~)
TAL Education Group (NYSE: TAL) ("TAL" or the "Company"), a leading K-12 after-school tutoring services provider in China, today announced certain employee wrongdoing discovered in the Company's routine internal auditing process.
...
The employee has been taken into custody by the local police.

--> sieht mir schwer nach dem armen Schwein aus, was nun als Bauernopfer herhalten muss, um die politisch gut und richtig Vernetzten erstmal so davonkommen zu lassen


Bei $LK war es Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP in Shanghai.

Auch wenn die international alle nur lose miteinander verbunden sind und der Scam damit quasi nur Sache der jeweiligen Landesgesellschaft einer Big 4 ist (mMn).


Frage aller Fragen: warum macht (secondary offerings) und machte (IPO) man das in China (inklusive HK) überhaupt, v.a. in diesem großen Stil?
<die Bullen wiesen ja immer darauf hin, wie groß z.B. LK schon sei. Das muss also auch jemandem in Peking aufgefallen sein. Jemand mit Parteibuch meine ich.>

--> am Ende gibt es mMn (oft) einen einfachen Grund: um an dringend benötigte U.S. dollar (in China bzw. HK) zu kommen


--> "die Welt", und damit China, hat sich nach 200Y überproportional in U.S. dollar verschuldet:




Und die fehlen nun oftmals hinten und vorne bei einer sich in Wahrheit schon seit Längerem (also weit vor "Corona") abkühlenden Konjunktur (in China).

"Corona" wirkt hier nun wie ein Brandbeschleuniger.

Daher ist es mMn kein Zufall, daß "discovered in the Company's routine internal auditing process" gerade jetzt passiert, und das nicht nur bei TAL mMn.


In diesem Zusammenhang ist mMn auch interessant, daß z.B. Goldman Sachs einer der Banken war, die Wertpapierkredite für verpfändete Luckin Coffee-ADS's bereitstellten.

Underwrite waren sie aber nicht. Das waren:
• Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
• Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
• China International Capital Corporation Hong Kong Securities Limited (CICC) --> recht politiknah (Peking also)
• Haitong International Securities Company Limited --> "halbstaatlich", wie viele Banken in China:
-- Shanghai State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration: 20.0%
-- Government of China: 4.95%
usw.

Irgendwie ist es schon irritierend, daß auch dort die Gier offenbar großer war als das Hirn. Anders kann man sich das ja nicht mehr (seit 2009) erklären.

Denn sonst müsste ich annehmen, daß auch dort Dummköpfe das Sagen haben.

Als dritte Variante hätte ich noch was in Richtung Verschwörungstheorie:

Nehmen wir z.B. Hui Li. Der ist Direktor bei Luckin Coffee und über den heißt es:

Hui Li has served as our director since June 2018. Mr. Li is the founder and chief executive officer of Centurium Capital. Mr. Li has been a director of China Biologic Products, Inc. (Nasdaq: CBPO) since 2013 and served as the Chairman of the board of the company from 2018 to February 2019.

Mr. Li was an executive director and a managing director at Warburg Pincus Asia LLC from 2002 to 2016. Prior to joining Warburg Pincus, Mr. Li worked in the investment banking division of Goldman Sachs from 2001 to 2002 and Morgan Stanley from 1994 to 2001.

Mr. Li obtained a bachelor's degree majoring in economics from Renmin University of China in July 1990 and a master's degree majoring in business administration from Yale University School of
Management in May 1994.

Oder soll ich annehmen, daß Wall Street-Banken von China aus von innen quasi bereits gekapert wurden (im Auftrag der CCP), um so leichter an viele U.S. dollar zu kommen?


Irgendwie ist doch klar, daß es ohne CICC und Haitong nie einen Luckin Coffee-ADR-IPO (in dieser Form und Größe) gegeben hätte.

Ich glaube nun sogar, daß der Luckin Coffee-Betrug so gar nicht aufgeflogen wäre, wenn auch denen "Corona" nicht dazwischengekommen wäre.

Denn ursprünglich dementierte LK ja den Betrug sehr entschieden:

3.2.2020
Luckin Coffee categorically denies all allegations in the Report. The methodology of the Report is flawed, the evidence is unsubstantiated, and the allegations are unsupported speculations and malicious interpretations of events. The Report also attacks members of Luckin Coffee’s management team, shareholders, and business partners and its claims are either false, misleading or entirely irrelevant. Furthermore, Luckin Coffee believes that the Report demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the Company’s business model and operating environment. Luckin Coffee intends to take appropriate actions to defend itself against these malicious allegations and to protect the interests of its shareholders.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/luckin-coffee-responds-anonym…


=> mit anderen Worten: da muss es zuletzt einen Sinneswandel gegeben haben

Denn für so doof darf man die Macher dahinter auch nicht halten, auch wenn sie der CCP am Ende zu gehorchen haben.

[faultcode]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 63.120.943 von faultcode am 25.03.20 00:26:01

ob man den diversen China-PMI-Umfragen Glauben schenken darf, halte ich auch für fraglich:

[faultcode]

24.3.
No, China’s economy hasn’t gotten better. The implications could be more serious than investors realize
‘There’s going to be mixed signals sent to markets,’ says Leland Miller
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/no-chinas-economy-hasnt-go…

Just how bad is the economic situation in China?

In late February, MarketWatch interviewed Leland Miller, CEO of the China Beige Book, who warned that economic deterioration caused by the novel coronavirus was, as we put it, “worse than you think.” On Monday, Miller’s firm released a fresh report that confirms that earlier view.

His takeaway now: for investors, the notion of “worse than you think” only tells part of the story.

With more firms reporting in for the final first-quarter tally, Miller said, results are worse, even as parts of the country unwind government restrictions on movement and travel intended to contain the spread of the deadly pathogen. As CBB’s report puts it, “results continued to deteriorate even into mid-March when most firms were re-opening and supposedly ‘back to work’.”

Miller thinks it is critical that investors understand how bad the downturn in China is so that they can read official reports with some healthy skepticism. “There’s going to be mixed signals sent to markets,” he said. “Gloom in Europe and the U.S. but growth in China. That will be very alluring. But it will be wrong.”

Specifically, Miller expects the Chinese government will report a “March recovery” and then data from then on “will shoot to the moon.” That will help China appear to have met President Xi Jinping’s growth targets.


But investors need to understand that the Chinese economy hasn’t just fallen off a cliff because it was the epicenter of the blow from the coronavirus, Miller said. It is also because of the way the virus is now rippling around the world. “The China recovery story is no longer just about domestic resilience, but also factors beyond Beijing’s control,” the report explained.

“Chinese factories went down just when the world badly needed auto parts supplies,” Miller said in an interview. Wuhan, China, where COVID-19 was first identified in December, is an auto-manufacturing hub in Hubei province. “Now those factories are being cranked back online just as demand falls off a cliff. You’ll have an oversupply.”

Now, the rest of the world is undergoing the sorts of severe restrictions that China went through weeks ago, Miller noted, and global mitigation efforts from the biological threat are expected to throw much of the globe into recession.

What next? In the short term, that oversupply could lead not just to destabilized global markets but to more trade tensions. President Donald Trump’s administration made supply gluts a major pillar of its negotiations with China.

But in the long term, Miller thinks, global interconnectedness will be the biggest victim of the illness derived from the novel strain of coronavirus. Firms have spent years thinking about rerouting supply chains away from China. And between the trade war throughout 2019 and the coronavirus now, “this might finally be the point where people say, no mas. There are too many implications,” he said, suggesting that countries may adopt more isolationist policies and reroute supply chains.

Some industries may be able to decouple, but some players, like Apple Inc. may find themselves too dependent on China, Miller said. In fact, if the U.S. and China find themselves locked in a Cold War, there may be political implications for American companies that continue to rely on Chinese supply chains.

The question now may be: “How and to what degree are we going to unravel globalization?” Miller said.

[faultcode]

HNA Group

woanders nennt man so etwas eine Insolvenz:

4.3.
Coronavirus Claims Chinese Travel and Finance Conglomerate HNA
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/news/coronavirus-claims-chin…
...
On Feb. 29, the government of Hainan, the island province where HNA is based, began taking control of the company, appointing new leaders and assuming management of its debts. The move, the first step in what could be a slow-motion takeover, will see HNA’s remaining assets sold off, according to people familiar with the matter.

It paves the way for a humiliating end to one of China’s most remarkable corporate stories, one that saw a little-known conglomerate become the core of an international financial empire, all run from an out-of-the-way resort island in the South China Sea.

The proximate cause of HNA’s downfall is, of course, the new coronavirus outbreak that brought China’s economy to a virtual dead stop, taking an especially heavy toll on travel and tourism. Globally, about 80% of China flights have been halted, and the International Air Transport Association estimates the virus epidemic could cost the industry almost $30 billion in lost revenue.


But the seeds of HNA’s demise were sown long before the virus emerged in central China late last year. From the earliest days of HNA’s expansion, Chen and other top executives sought to collect a seemingly random assortment of trophy assets around the world with competing mandates and vastly different challenges.

The purchases ranged from blue-chip Manhattan real estate to an airport ground-handling company, a computer distributor, and even a hedge fund. HNA, which Chen started as an airline, would do all this by amassing one of the largest debt loads in the world—about $86 billion at the end of 2017—and spending more on interest that year than any other nonfinancial company in Asia. Perhaps most audaciously, it would acquire these assets—which included major stakes in companies such as Deutsche Bank AG, the most important lender in Europe’s largest economy—without disclosing much about HNA’s finances or the identities of its ultimate owners.
...

[faultcode]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 62.885.808 von faultcode am 05.03.20 01:43:33

..und Fake-Produktion:

4.3.
Lights Are On but No One’s Working: How Local Governments Are Faking Coronavirus Recovery
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-03-04/lights-are-on-but-no…

Local companies and officials are fraudulently boosting electricity consumption and other metrics in order to meet tough new back-to-work targets as the spread of Covid-19 in China wanes, a Caixin investigation has found.

As new coronavirus cases in China slowed in recent weeks, local governments in less-affected regions pushed companies and factories to return to work, typically by assigning concrete targets to district officials. Company insiders and local civil servants told Caixin that, under pressure to fulfill quotas they could not otherwise meet, they deftly cooked the books.

Leaving lights and air conditioners on all day long in empty offices, turning on manufacturing equipment, faking staff rosters and even coaching factory workers to lie to inspectors are just some of the ways they helped manufacture flashy statistics on the resumption of business for local governments to report up the chain.

Electricity consumption data has regularly been used as a proxy for the business resumption rate when reporting to Beijing, and to the public.

The East China province of Zhejiang has been lauded as a prime example of the nation’s industrial recovery from the coronavirus outbreak by China’s top economic planner, which reported on Feb. 24 that its work resumption rate was more than 90%.

Nevertheless, a civil servant in one district of the provincial capital, Hangzhou, told Caixin that from Saturday plants were instructed to leave their industrial equipment idling for the whole day, while offices were told to keep computers and air-conditioners running, when Beijing began checking the resumption rate by examining power consumption figures.
...

[faultcode]

Inflation..