EUR/USD Mittelfristig-Long - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[GERRIXX]

wir stehen m.e. kurz vor einem uptrend im euro auf sicht von 3-5 monaten ab 01/2002. zum einen verliert der $ so langsam an saft, zumal die zinssenkungen auch in diesem bereich nicht spurlos bleiben werden. zum anderen ist der € gegenüber dem $ zu tief bewertet. das allein muss ja nichts heissen, aber die technik bildete mittelfristig den finalen boden bei 0,84 USD und einen weiteren bei 0,88 USD. der markt will nach oben und initialzündung wird die euro-bargeldeinführung sein ! buchgeld wird greifbar und die hausgemachten probleme bzgl. vertrauen in die neue währung werden ein stück schwinden. ich jedenfalls werde auf sicht von 3-5 monaten auf einen steigenden euro setzen.

mfG, pe.

[Vinzenz69]

jo,dass mach ich mit 582573 auch

[LFGBroker]

Jou Man !

"Wir stehen m.e. kurz vor einem uptrend im euro ..."

Und wenn alle so schön bullish sind, dann gehts Ratz-Fatz abwärts auf 0.85

[Megamann]

Tja wohin geht die Reise ? wohin brichts aus, naja Elliott eher 0,85, aber irgendwie ist die Zählung nicht so genau durchschaubar und genauso 0,93 oder 0,96 drin

[gerri2001]

Bin seit gestern short 636680
Kurzfristig gehe ich von einem fallenden Euro aus (0,84)
Langfristig bin ich positiv gestimmt Parität in zwei bis drei Jahren.
Grüße gerri

[shiparamita]

Stephen Roach (from London) www.Morganstanley.comThe first thing I did when I arrived in Frankfurt this week was to get some euros. There¡¦s nothing like the look and feel of newly minted coins -- especially of a currency that heretofore existed only on our screens. When I emptied my pocket at the end of the day, it was not too difficult to separate the euros from my American currency. Shiny and sleek, they stood in sharp contrast to the worn and wrinkled greenbacks. My mind started racing. I have long felt the strong dollar is an accident waiting to happen. If anything, my conviction is deepening. The reason: America¡¦s external imbalance has plunged into the danger zone and is about to get worse. The current-account deficit -- the broadest measure of any nation¡¦s international financial position -- hit a record 4.6% of nominal GDP in late 2000. That was more than a full percentage point wider than the previous record deficit of 3.5% hit in late 1986. While the deficit narrowed a bit in 3Q01 (to 3.7%), that was an aberration traceable largely to foreign insurance payments associated with the destruction of the World Trade Center. The bad news is that the current-account deficit appears set to get a good deal worse in the years ahead. Our baseline scenario for the US economy has America¡¦s external shortfall rising to the astronomical 6.2% share of GDP by late 2003. Such a deficit would bear an eerie resemblance to those that plagued a pre-crisis Asia in the mid-1990s. This is a stunning and worrisome development for a US economy in recession. Normally, cyclical downturns are just what the doctor orders for current-account deficit economies. The resulting slowdown of domestic demand produces a concomitant reduction in imports, whereas resilience elsewhere in the world allows exports to keep on expanding. That¡¦s exactly the way it worked in the recessions of the mid-1970s, the early 1980s, and again in the early 1990s -- as the business cycle transformed external deficits into balance. Not so this time. The synchronicity of this world recession has prevented such an outcome. With the rest of the world marching quickly to the beat of the US economy, exports plunged by 11.5% (in real terms) over the four quarters of 2001. And with a relatively contained shortfall in domestic demand, imports were down an estimated 6% over the same period. With the dollar value of imports of goods and services fully one-third larger than exports, the normal cyclical math of the current-account adjustment simply doesn¡¦t add up; it would have taken a much larger reduction in imports -- or an even greater export offset -- to take the external gap toward balance. This same math -- a by-product of the so-called current-account legacy effect -- produces the even more dire outcome of our recovery scenario. The value of imports is simply too large to allow the likely rebound in exports to put a dent in the external imbalance. Nor does America¡¦s high import propensity help matters any. Our baseline case for 2003 calls for export growth (13.9%) to be more than 50% faster than import growth (9.0%). And yet because imports are so much larger than exports, the current-account gap is still projected to go from 4.9% of GDP in 2002 to 6.1% in 2003. This would leave America more dependent than ever on foreign capital to finance the ongoing operations of the US economy. The capital account is, of course, the flip side of the balance of payments. And if our baseline estimates come to pass, the United States will have to attract some $664 billion of foreign capital in 2003 in order to finance its current-account deficit. That¡¦s nearly $2 billion per day, close to double the daily financing requirements in 2001 (about $1.1 billion per day). Therein lies the great conundrum for the heretofore Teflon-like dollar. History is utterly devoid of examples when such a massive external financing requirement did not result in a sharp depreciation of the currency and/or a concession in the price of other assets -- namely stocks or bonds. There is, of course, another outcome to this sorry state of affairs -- a current-account adjustment that comes through the currency and/or the business cycle. A soft landing in the dollar -- a drop of some 10-15% per year -- would not do the trick, in my view. The lags are simply too long between trade flows and such muted shifts in foreign exchange rates. Even a hard landing in the dollar -- perhaps double the depreciation of the soft-landing -- would have a limited impact in a short and mild recession. By contrast, a deeper and longer cyclical downturn would take a much greater toll on domestic demand -- and the import content of such purchases. Needless to say, a double-dip recession would come in quite handy in that respect. In my opinion, however, only by putting the two outcomes together -- a harder landing in both the dollar and the real economy -- would it be possible for America to come to grips with its seemingly intractable current-account deficit. Such a scenario is dismissed out of hand by policy makers and investors alike. It¡¦s a nightmare that few want to face. There must be an easier way out. Since the dollar hasn¡¦t fallen yet, it seems most believe that the current account has simply lost its potency in shaping the relative prices set in foreign exchange markets. With the benefit of hindsight, we all know what has finessed the current-account-financing problem in recent years. It¡¦s capital flows, stupid. The world has been more than eager to buy a piece of America¡¦s New Economy prowess and its related ability to deliver superior returns on dollar-denominated assets. Nearly two years after the popping of the Nasdaq bubble, this legacy endures -- either out of hope or a seeming lack of investable alternatives elsewhere in the world. Whatever the reason, a dollar that has resisted the tine-honored pressures of an ever-widening current-account deficit is now thought to be perfectly capable of performing that high-wire act over and over again. Sadly, this is precisely the same logic that rationalized the Nasdaq bubble -- that is, until it popped. A new theory has been concocted to explain away a fundamental disconnect. My new euro coins are looking shinier by the minute.

[LFGBroker]

So, ich will jetzt den Uptrend sehen !

[btrend]

@LFG

Wie wärs mit einem langfristigen Call auf den €/$?

[btrend]

Ich habe mir mal einen längerfristigen Call auf den Euro/$ reingelegt.

Mir ist zur Zeit alles so negativ für den Euro.
Ausserdem wurde wieder mal die 10-T-DL nach oben geschnitten.
Ich sehe dies als kurzfristiger Zock: längstens bis April.

Kann ja sein, dass der Euro nochmals auf ,8490 geht, doch zur Zeit sehe ich dies als rel. unwahrscheinlich an.

Gruss Btrend