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Feedback
Hat sich hier jemand mit Schweden befasst?
Eventuell lohnt es sich hier zu investieren um vom Euro wegzudiversifizieren.
Kann jemand einen Fonds empfehlen - Renten oder Aktien?
Ich bin auf diesen Artikel bei research.gavekal.com
(Anmeldung erforderlich) gestossen:
The Swedish Krona, An Odd Victim - by Pierre Gave
Published on May 22nd, 2012
It is puzzling that the Swedish krona should be so directly in the firing line as investors flee the chaos in southern Europe. The SEK has fallen for 15 of the last 16 days against the US$ (the longest losing streak since 1971) and is trading at a two-year low. It also has the dubious distinction of being the worst major OECD currency against the euro so far this month, losing nearly 3%.
One can hardly attribute the fallout to knock-on economic effects, as a deeper downturn in southern Europe is unlikely to have a significant impact. Swedish exports to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece only amount to 4.5% of total exports; if one includes France the total is 9.9% of exports , down from 15% in the late 1990s. Swedens export industry is far more dependent on northern EuropeScandinavia plus Germany and the Netherlands represent 38% of total exports. In other words Swedish industry is exposed to the right part of Europe. And while Swedish GDP growth is set to slow from the torrid pace of the past two years (5.8% YoY in 2010 and 4.0% in 2011), this should come as no surprise. Private sector analysts, the Riksbank and the Ministry of Finance have all been pretty clear in telegraphing this years GDP growth rate (current official projections are around 1-1.5% YoY for 2012). Moreover, there has been very little change in the Swedish growth outlook in the past couple of weeks to trigger such a violent correction in the SEK.
So could the kronas weakness be explained by vulnerability in the Swedish financial system? The Swedish banking sector is quite large relative to GDP, so naturally the underlying economy would be subject to significant volatility if a serious accident was incurred. But most of Swedish banks foreign exposure has been geared to the Baltic region and these losses have already been accounted for.
Swedish exposure to southern European debt is very small compared to the other major European banking sectors and all Swedish banks passed last years European Union bank stress tests with a "good margin.
After a recent inspection tour, the IMF duly noted that Swedish growth was likely to slow, but saw no serious systemic risks and noted that Swedens good economic performance is the result of robust policy frameworks and sustained reform initiatives. Indeed, it is precisely these supply side reforms that have allowed Sweden to weather the crisis with a very modest rise in unemployment to 7.3% from 6% pre-Lehman. More impressively, Sweden is the only OECD country that has managed to lower its government debt to GDP ratio during this whole ordeal.
If anything, Swedens fundamentals make the country more of a safe haven than a Greek contagion victim. The bond markets agree with this assessment as yields on the Swedish 10-year government bonds have fallen to near record lows of 1.47%, at par with the mighty German bund. Meanwhile, the 5-year CDS on Sweden is currently quoted at 64bps, the third lowest in Europe (only Switzerland and Norway are lower). This illustrates an interesting dichotomy: how can a countrys bond market be perceived as a safe haven, while its currency is not?
The answer, we believe, lies in Swedish equities. Swedens stock market has come to be treated as a kind of leveraged risk-on play, especially in the last couple of years (see chart overleaf). Meanwhile, foreign ownership of Swedish stocks has risen from around 25% in the mid-1990s to an all-time high of 40%. This implies that recent selling pressure in the krona has resulted from repatriation of fickle foreign capital out of the Swedish stock market, and not because of worsening economic fundamentals.
As long as the current malaise in Europe remains, we should probably not expect the SEK to recovery markedly, especially against the US$. However, we believe the current weakness should be bought. And as far as Swedish assets go, the equity market probably offers more value than the bond markets at this stage. Indeed, if we do get a turnaround in market sentiment, buying into the Swedish stock market will in all likelihood give investors a lucrative double-play of a rallying equity prices and a recovering currency. This is especially true since the SEK remains significantly undervalued on a purchasing parity basis (almost a 30% undervaluation against the Euro and 12% against the US$).
Eventuell lohnt es sich hier zu investieren um vom Euro wegzudiversifizieren.
Kann jemand einen Fonds empfehlen - Renten oder Aktien?
Ich bin auf diesen Artikel bei research.gavekal.com
(Anmeldung erforderlich) gestossen:
The Swedish Krona, An Odd Victim - by Pierre Gave
Published on May 22nd, 2012
It is puzzling that the Swedish krona should be so directly in the firing line as investors flee the chaos in southern Europe. The SEK has fallen for 15 of the last 16 days against the US$ (the longest losing streak since 1971) and is trading at a two-year low. It also has the dubious distinction of being the worst major OECD currency against the euro so far this month, losing nearly 3%.
One can hardly attribute the fallout to knock-on economic effects, as a deeper downturn in southern Europe is unlikely to have a significant impact. Swedish exports to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece only amount to 4.5% of total exports; if one includes France the total is 9.9% of exports , down from 15% in the late 1990s. Swedens export industry is far more dependent on northern EuropeScandinavia plus Germany and the Netherlands represent 38% of total exports. In other words Swedish industry is exposed to the right part of Europe. And while Swedish GDP growth is set to slow from the torrid pace of the past two years (5.8% YoY in 2010 and 4.0% in 2011), this should come as no surprise. Private sector analysts, the Riksbank and the Ministry of Finance have all been pretty clear in telegraphing this years GDP growth rate (current official projections are around 1-1.5% YoY for 2012). Moreover, there has been very little change in the Swedish growth outlook in the past couple of weeks to trigger such a violent correction in the SEK.
So could the kronas weakness be explained by vulnerability in the Swedish financial system? The Swedish banking sector is quite large relative to GDP, so naturally the underlying economy would be subject to significant volatility if a serious accident was incurred. But most of Swedish banks foreign exposure has been geared to the Baltic region and these losses have already been accounted for.
Swedish exposure to southern European debt is very small compared to the other major European banking sectors and all Swedish banks passed last years European Union bank stress tests with a "good margin.
After a recent inspection tour, the IMF duly noted that Swedish growth was likely to slow, but saw no serious systemic risks and noted that Swedens good economic performance is the result of robust policy frameworks and sustained reform initiatives. Indeed, it is precisely these supply side reforms that have allowed Sweden to weather the crisis with a very modest rise in unemployment to 7.3% from 6% pre-Lehman. More impressively, Sweden is the only OECD country that has managed to lower its government debt to GDP ratio during this whole ordeal.
If anything, Swedens fundamentals make the country more of a safe haven than a Greek contagion victim. The bond markets agree with this assessment as yields on the Swedish 10-year government bonds have fallen to near record lows of 1.47%, at par with the mighty German bund. Meanwhile, the 5-year CDS on Sweden is currently quoted at 64bps, the third lowest in Europe (only Switzerland and Norway are lower). This illustrates an interesting dichotomy: how can a countrys bond market be perceived as a safe haven, while its currency is not?
The answer, we believe, lies in Swedish equities. Swedens stock market has come to be treated as a kind of leveraged risk-on play, especially in the last couple of years (see chart overleaf). Meanwhile, foreign ownership of Swedish stocks has risen from around 25% in the mid-1990s to an all-time high of 40%. This implies that recent selling pressure in the krona has resulted from repatriation of fickle foreign capital out of the Swedish stock market, and not because of worsening economic fundamentals.
As long as the current malaise in Europe remains, we should probably not expect the SEK to recovery markedly, especially against the US$. However, we believe the current weakness should be bought. And as far as Swedish assets go, the equity market probably offers more value than the bond markets at this stage. Indeed, if we do get a turnaround in market sentiment, buying into the Swedish stock market will in all likelihood give investors a lucrative double-play of a rallying equity prices and a recovering currency. This is especially true since the SEK remains significantly undervalued on a purchasing parity basis (almost a 30% undervaluation against the Euro and 12% against the US$).
iShares Symbol EWD - ein Indexfonds aus Schweden
http://us.ishares.com/product_info/fund/overview/EWD.htm
52 W Hoch war bei 35 US$ - aktuell um die 25 US $
http://us.ishares.com/product_info/fund/overview/EWD.htm
52 W Hoch war bei 35 US$ - aktuell um die 25 US $
Heute schreibt research.gavekal.com
Sweden Moves Against Repression - by Pierre Gave
Published on June 12th, 2012
On Thursday last week, the Swedish OMX jumped by +3.2%, the biggest gain in six months, while bond markets sold off heavily. Yields on the Swedish 10y leapt by +33bps to 1.47%, or a shocking 25% move, the biggest daily change on record. What prompted this violent reaction?
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) is proposing a one-year floor to the rate at which Swedish life insurance companies and pension funds discount their liabilities in solvency calculations. What this means is that institutions will be protected from yield declines - it thereby removes a key incentive for the forced buying of Swedish government bonds by domestic institutions.
This is a big move, which takes on “mark-to-market” type requirements that are damaging to portfolio management (see Regulation Without Ruination). The most telling part of this regulatory change was the FSA’s assertion that: “The companies’ actions would otherwise risk creating a negative spiral of falling stock market prices and interest rates which could further worsen the situation. In the long run, policyholders risk getting lower pensions”. In other words, enough with the financial repression!
It is widely recognized fact that the financial repression that we have been seeing for the past few years is significantly distorting the markets. In the US, the Fed is buying up most of the US Treasury’s new bond issuances and the same is true for the BoE on Gilts and for the BoJ on JGBs. In Europe, the LTRO operations are effectively the same thing and aim to artificially suppress bond yields (although it must be said with diminishing results in some markets).
What this all means is that the world economy is forced to operate in an environment where the signals from all major bond markets are heavily manipulated. Needless to say, it is hardly surprising that the preference for cash is so high among investors.
On top of that, we also have to contend with financial repression on the regulatory side. Among other things, the proposed Basel III regulations force banks to raise their capital base. Because today’s financial conditions make it very difficult to raise capital on the markets, the simplest way to comply with the regulations is to cut back on the lending book. In others words, these new wonderful regulations effectively lead to a contraction in global money supply at time when this is the exact opposite of what we need (see On Basel 3 And Solvency 2).
As far as Solvency 2 goes, it implicitly forces the big insurance companies and pension funds to pile into the long-end of the bond market, while cutting their equity exposure. Again, this is the exact opposite of what the world needs right now. In the past, long-term institutional investors would come in and start buying equities at the end of a big bear market, when equities were deemed sufficiently cheap to be worth the short-term risk.
Today, regulatory repression is instead forcing them to increase their holdings of the most overvalued assets in the financial world (sovereign bond markets) and move out of the best valued assets (good quality equities). As a result, most of the big insurance companies in Europe are running equity exposure in the low single digits. And they are doing this against their will and better judgment. Some of these institutions are our clients and every time we have meeting they bemoan the hopelessness of their situation (one even called Solvency 2 “the biggest regulatory mistake of our generation”).
In this context, we were very encouraged by the Swedish actions. Granted, perhaps we are guilty of getting overly excited about a small positive move from a non-core economy. But as far as we can tell, this is the first time an official regulatory body has acknowledged the havoc that these new regulations have brought. If this sentiment spreads to other markets, then the potential implications are huge.
For someone who grew up in Sweden when it was a one-party state, a sclerotic and union dominated economy suffering from high inflation and high unemployment, the changes that we keep seeing from policymakers is truly breathtaking. Some 15 years ago, nobody would touch a Swedish bond with a barge pole and everybody complained that us Swedes were addicted to social welfare and would never change. Today, Swedish bonds yields are among the lowest in the world, even after last week’s epic sell-off and the government debt to GDP is at a very palatable 38%. I never thought I would see the day when Swedish regulation would lead the way in a positive direction. Yet here we are.
Three weeks ago, we argued that the odd sell-off on the SEK was due to foreign repatriation of capital out of the Swedish stock markets (see The Swedish Krona, An Odd Victim). Recently the tide has turned and so far this month the SEK has been the best performing major currency in the world, gaining +2.4% against the USD and +1.4% against the euro. In view of the recent positive policymaking and the fact that the SEK remains significantly undervalued on a PPP basis, we still believe the krona is a very good bet.
Sweden Moves Against Repression - by Pierre Gave
Published on June 12th, 2012
On Thursday last week, the Swedish OMX jumped by +3.2%, the biggest gain in six months, while bond markets sold off heavily. Yields on the Swedish 10y leapt by +33bps to 1.47%, or a shocking 25% move, the biggest daily change on record. What prompted this violent reaction?
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) is proposing a one-year floor to the rate at which Swedish life insurance companies and pension funds discount their liabilities in solvency calculations. What this means is that institutions will be protected from yield declines - it thereby removes a key incentive for the forced buying of Swedish government bonds by domestic institutions.
This is a big move, which takes on “mark-to-market” type requirements that are damaging to portfolio management (see Regulation Without Ruination). The most telling part of this regulatory change was the FSA’s assertion that: “The companies’ actions would otherwise risk creating a negative spiral of falling stock market prices and interest rates which could further worsen the situation. In the long run, policyholders risk getting lower pensions”. In other words, enough with the financial repression!
It is widely recognized fact that the financial repression that we have been seeing for the past few years is significantly distorting the markets. In the US, the Fed is buying up most of the US Treasury’s new bond issuances and the same is true for the BoE on Gilts and for the BoJ on JGBs. In Europe, the LTRO operations are effectively the same thing and aim to artificially suppress bond yields (although it must be said with diminishing results in some markets).
What this all means is that the world economy is forced to operate in an environment where the signals from all major bond markets are heavily manipulated. Needless to say, it is hardly surprising that the preference for cash is so high among investors.
On top of that, we also have to contend with financial repression on the regulatory side. Among other things, the proposed Basel III regulations force banks to raise their capital base. Because today’s financial conditions make it very difficult to raise capital on the markets, the simplest way to comply with the regulations is to cut back on the lending book. In others words, these new wonderful regulations effectively lead to a contraction in global money supply at time when this is the exact opposite of what we need (see On Basel 3 And Solvency 2).
As far as Solvency 2 goes, it implicitly forces the big insurance companies and pension funds to pile into the long-end of the bond market, while cutting their equity exposure. Again, this is the exact opposite of what the world needs right now. In the past, long-term institutional investors would come in and start buying equities at the end of a big bear market, when equities were deemed sufficiently cheap to be worth the short-term risk.
Today, regulatory repression is instead forcing them to increase their holdings of the most overvalued assets in the financial world (sovereign bond markets) and move out of the best valued assets (good quality equities). As a result, most of the big insurance companies in Europe are running equity exposure in the low single digits. And they are doing this against their will and better judgment. Some of these institutions are our clients and every time we have meeting they bemoan the hopelessness of their situation (one even called Solvency 2 “the biggest regulatory mistake of our generation”).
In this context, we were very encouraged by the Swedish actions. Granted, perhaps we are guilty of getting overly excited about a small positive move from a non-core economy. But as far as we can tell, this is the first time an official regulatory body has acknowledged the havoc that these new regulations have brought. If this sentiment spreads to other markets, then the potential implications are huge.
For someone who grew up in Sweden when it was a one-party state, a sclerotic and union dominated economy suffering from high inflation and high unemployment, the changes that we keep seeing from policymakers is truly breathtaking. Some 15 years ago, nobody would touch a Swedish bond with a barge pole and everybody complained that us Swedes were addicted to social welfare and would never change. Today, Swedish bonds yields are among the lowest in the world, even after last week’s epic sell-off and the government debt to GDP is at a very palatable 38%. I never thought I would see the day when Swedish regulation would lead the way in a positive direction. Yet here we are.
Three weeks ago, we argued that the odd sell-off on the SEK was due to foreign repatriation of capital out of the Swedish stock markets (see The Swedish Krona, An Odd Victim). Recently the tide has turned and so far this month the SEK has been the best performing major currency in the world, gaining +2.4% against the USD and +1.4% against the euro. In view of the recent positive policymaking and the fact that the SEK remains significantly undervalued on a PPP basis, we still believe the krona is a very good bet.
Hi,
ich selbst war schon häufiger in schwedischen Aktien investiert
und habe aktuell eine mittelgroße Position an folgendem Unternehmen:
http://www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1172377-1-10/auto…
und ein Rest-Engagement in folgendem Unternehmen:
http://www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1174493-1-10/elek…
Wenn du über schwedische Aktienfonds nachdenkst, dann solltest du dir im klaren
darüber sein, dass die Unternehmen in den Fonds durch eine starke Krone i.d.R.
benachteiligt sind. D.h. die Firmen müssen entweder so konkurrenzfähig sein, dass sie
trotz einer starken Krone noch nach Europa und in die USA exportieren können oder sie müssen den Schwerpunkt ihres Absatzmarktes in Schweden selbst haben.
Ich habe deshalb in diesem Währungsraum immer nur Einzelaktien gekauft, von denen ich aus fundamentalen Gründen überzeugt war (s.o.). Gehst du generell von einer steigenden Krone aus, so kannst du dir überlegen, ob du nicht eine
Mischung schwedischer Anleihen kaufen möchtest oder ähnliches. Vermutlich kann man auch als Deutscher direkt dort Geld auf einem Sparbuch anlegen, ob sich das aber lohnt kann ich dir nicht sagen, da ich die dortigen Zinsen nicht kenne.
Viele Grüße
-Shrew
ich selbst war schon häufiger in schwedischen Aktien investiert
und habe aktuell eine mittelgroße Position an folgendem Unternehmen:
http://www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1172377-1-10/auto…
und ein Rest-Engagement in folgendem Unternehmen:
http://www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1174493-1-10/elek…
Wenn du über schwedische Aktienfonds nachdenkst, dann solltest du dir im klaren
darüber sein, dass die Unternehmen in den Fonds durch eine starke Krone i.d.R.
benachteiligt sind. D.h. die Firmen müssen entweder so konkurrenzfähig sein, dass sie
trotz einer starken Krone noch nach Europa und in die USA exportieren können oder sie müssen den Schwerpunkt ihres Absatzmarktes in Schweden selbst haben.
Ich habe deshalb in diesem Währungsraum immer nur Einzelaktien gekauft, von denen ich aus fundamentalen Gründen überzeugt war (s.o.). Gehst du generell von einer steigenden Krone aus, so kannst du dir überlegen, ob du nicht eine
Mischung schwedischer Anleihen kaufen möchtest oder ähnliches. Vermutlich kann man auch als Deutscher direkt dort Geld auf einem Sparbuch anlegen, ob sich das aber lohnt kann ich dir nicht sagen, da ich die dortigen Zinsen nicht kenne.
Viele Grüße
-Shrew
Es bietet sich da auch Investor AB an...ein Konglomerat, das bei diversen vornehmlich schwedischen Unternehmen beteiligt ist. Ist die Vermögensverwaltung der Wallenbergs, die aber auch dem Publikum zugänglich ist. Ist sowas wie ein geschlossener schwedischer Aktienfonds.
WKNs sind 855904 und 869202. Erstere ist illiquider, hat aber volle Stimmrechte.
Die Papiere notieren sehr deutlich unter ihrem NAV.
WKNs sind 855904 und 869202. Erstere ist illiquider, hat aber volle Stimmrechte.
Die Papiere notieren sehr deutlich unter ihrem NAV.
Trading Spotlight
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.274.999 von Pfandbrief am 12.06.12 15:15:52Bei Investor gefaellt mir dass es in 2012 einige Insiderkaeufe gab.
http://www.investorab.com/en/Investors_media/Share+Informati…
Wie kriege ich den NAV raus.?
Bei anderen Konglomeraten wie Pargesa wird der von der Firma veroeffentlicht.
http://www.investorab.com/en/Investors_media/Share+Informati…
Wie kriege ich den NAV raus.?
Bei anderen Konglomeraten wie Pargesa wird der von der Firma veroeffentlicht.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.275.292 von derivatus am 12.06.12 16:11:06Tun sie auch, allerdings nur mit jedem Quartalsbericht. Ich glaube häufiger wäre auch nicht seriös.
http://www.investorab.com/investors-media/investor-in-figure…
Mithilfe der Aufstellung der Werte im Quartalsbericht sowie der Börsenkurse der Beteiligungen (insofern notiert) kann man ihn auch näherungsweise börsetäglich selbst errechnen. Nicht dass ich mir bisher die Mühe gemacht hätte.
http://www.investorab.com/investors-media/investor-in-figure…
Mithilfe der Aufstellung der Werte im Quartalsbericht sowie der Börsenkurse der Beteiligungen (insofern notiert) kann man ihn auch näherungsweise börsetäglich selbst errechnen. Nicht dass ich mir bisher die Mühe gemacht hätte.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.275.543 von Pfandbrief am 12.06.12 17:05:07Mercy
Per 31.3.2012 waren das 208 SEK
Boersenkurs war etwa 145 SEK
macht etwa 30 % Discount/
Per 31.3.2012 waren das 208 SEK
Boersenkurs war etwa 145 SEK
macht etwa 30 % Discount/
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