CSIS - Studie : Warum die USA die GOLF REGION besetzen (sollen)! OEL! - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[M_B_S]

CSIS_______________________________
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
[phone]
[e-mail]
The Gulf and Transition
US Policy Ten Years
After the Gulf War
Working Draft
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Revised November 2, 2000
The Gulf and Transition 11/2/00 Page iii
Introduction
This transition study reflects the result of a long-standing project on Gulf net assessment,
funded in part by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This project has already produced some
eight books, including two major studies of Iranian and Iraqi military forces published in 1999 –
Iraq and the War of Sanctions and Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Praeger 1999).
Additional detailed briefings and supporting data on the military balance in the Gulf, energy
and economic trends. Iranian and Iraqi proliferation, and Gulf arms transfers can be found on
the CSIS web page at www.csis.org under the sections market as “Gulf in Transition” and
“Strategic Assessment.
This volume is intended to support US policy making and the reader should be aware that
the sources used are deliberately chosen to rely as heavily as possible on current official US
government documents and reports, unclassified intelligence reporting and estimates, and
official international institutions like the World Bank. The goal is to provide data that policy
makers are familiar with and can trust. The author, however, is solely responsible for the
conclusions and suggestions made in this analysis and no attempt was made to coordinate its
content with either any officials or experts in the US government or other policy analysts in the
CSIS.

http://csis.org/gulf/reports/mainfullreport.PDF
PDF Reader erforderlich ! 500 Seiten !

Wichtige Erkenntnis : WELT Oelversorgung ist in Gefahr !

Fazit: es wird immer US Truppen in der Golf Region geben solange der Westen vom Oel abhängig ist : oder es wird keinen Terrorismus mehr aus Nah Ost geben wenn der Westen sich vom OEL verabschiedet !

Jetzt in der Terror Krise haben die USA und England ihre Truppen in der Region noch einmal aufgestockt auf ca. 100000 Mann!

[M_B_S]

@ all schnell Kopieren !

Ist bald weg !

Verschwörung !

Gebt mal ein bei google.de

Ibn Ladin on horse picture

Und guckt was rauskommt !

Der vierte apokalyptische Reiter !

M_B_S der alles weiss

[Rainer6767]

@MBS: Keine Lust, 500 Seiten zu lesen, sorry.
Wenn das Fazit stimmt, wie von Dir dargestellt: Volle Zustimmung (dass ich das noch erleben darf).
So lange der Westen vom Öl abhängig ist, wird es immer westliche Truppen in der Golfregion geben.
Und das ist auch gut so. Irgend jemand muss schließlich die Versorgung mit diesem wichtigen Rohstoff sichern. Oder fährst Du kein Auto?

Wenn bspw. Länder wie Saudi-Arabien durch Fundamentalisten beherrscht würden, die uns den Ölhahn zudrehen, was sollten wir dann Deiner Meinung nach tun?
Meine Meinung ist klar: Militärisch intervenieren. Denn ein Stopp der Ölversorgung kommt einem kriegerischen Akt gleich.
Und die Moral ist mir dabei völlig gleichgültig.

Vom Öl völlig verabschieden können wir uns leider nicht. Auch wenn ich die Weiterentwicklung regenerativer Energien etc. ganz klar unterstütze.

[M_B_S]

Die Visionen der Apokalypse, aus der Offenbarung des Johannes, prägte massgeblich das Weltbild
des Mittelalters und schürte die Ängste und Sorgen der Menschen. Für die Menschen des Mittelalters,
besonders bei den Armen, waren die Vorboten der Apokalypse bereits allgegenwärtig, denn das Leben war
geprägt vom Hunger, vom Krieg, von der Pest und schließlich dem Tod, welche die Reiter der Apokalypse
symbolisierten. Die Angst und die Ehrfurcht vor Gott und seinem Zorn war allgegenwärtig. Die
Reichen versuchten ihr schlechtes Gewissen und ihre Sünden mit dem Ablasshandel zu mildern,
während den Armen nur das Hoffen und Beten blieb. Der folgende Auszug aus der Apokalypse
gehört mit zu den interessantesten Stellen der Heiligen Schrift.




Auszug aus Luther-Bibel in der revidierten Fassung von 1912:



Die Offenbarung des Johannes. (Apk 6, 1-17)


1. Und ich sah, daß das Lamm der Siegel eines auftat und hörte der vier Tiere eines
sagen wie mit einer Donnerstimme: Komm!

2. Und ich sah, und siehe, ein weißes Pferd. Und der daraufsaß, hatte einen Bogen
und ihm ward gegeben eine Krone, und er zog aus sieghaft, und das er siegte.

3. Und da es das andere Siegel auftat, hörte ich das andere Tier sagen: Komm!

4. Und es ging heraus ein anderes Pferd, das war rot. Und dem, der daraufsaß, ward
gegeben, den Frieden zu nehmen von der Erde und da§ sie sich untereinander erwŸrgten
und ward ihm ein gro§es Schwert gegeben.

5. Und da es das dritte Siegel auftat, hörte ich das dritte Tier sagen: Komm!
Und ich sah, und siehe, ein schwarzes Pferd. Und der daraufsaß, hatte eine Waage in seiner Hand.

6. Und ich hörte eine Stimme unter den vier Tieren sagen: Ein Maß Weizen um einen Groschen
und drei Maß Gerste um einen Groschen; und dem Öl und Wein tu kein Leid!

7. Und da es das vierte Siegel auftat, hörte ich die Stimme des vierten Tiers sagen: Komm!

8. Und ich sah, und siehe, ein fahles Pferd. Und der daraufsaß, dessen Name hieß Tod, und die
Hölle folgte ihm nach. Und ihnen ward Macht gegeben, zu töten das vierte Teil auf der Erde
mit dem Schwert und Hunger und mit dem Tod und durch die Tiere auf Erden.

9. Und da es das fünfte Siegel auftat, sah ich unter dem Altar die Seelen derer, die erwürgt
waren um des Wortes Gottes willen und um des Zeugnisses willen, das sie hatten.


10. Und sie schrieen mit großer Stimme und sprachen: HERR, du Heiliger und Wahrhaftiger,
wie lange richtest du nicht und rächest unser Blut an denen, die auf der Erde wohnen?


11. Und ihnen wurde gegeben einem jeglichen ein weißes Kleid, und ward zu ihnen gesagt,
da§ sie ruhten noch eine kleine Zeit, bis da§ vollends dazukämen ihre Mitknechte und Brüder,
die auch sollten noch getötet werden gleich wie sie.


12. Und ich sah, daß es das sechste Siegel auftat, und siehe, da ward ein großes Erdbeben,
und die Sonne ward schwarz wie ein härener Sack, und der Mond ward wie Blut.

13. Und die Sterne des Himmels fielen auf die Erde, gleichwie ein Feigenbaum seine Feigen
abwirft, wenn er von großem Wind bewegt wird.


14. Und der Himmel entwich wie ein zusammengerolltes Buch und alle Berge und Inseln
wurden bewegt aus ihren Örtern.


15. Und die Könige auf Erden und die Großen und die Reichen und die Hauptleute und die Gewaltigen
und alle Knechte und alle Freien verbargen sich in den Klüften und Felsen an den Bergen

16. und sprachen zu den Bergen und Felsen: Fallt über uns und verbergt uns vor dem Angesichte
des, der auf dem Stuhl sitzt, und vor dem Zorn des Lammes!


17. Denn es ist gekommen der große Tag seines Zorns, und wer kann bestehen?

[M_B_S]

Verschwörer M_B_S

Hält es mit

Theodor Fontane

Der Schnee leis stäubend vom Himmel fällt,
Ein Reiter vor Dschellalabad hält.
"Wer da!" - "Ein britischer Reitersmann,
Bringe Botschaft aus Afghanistan." >>



Man Beachte auch den 11.11.2001

[M_B_S]

Auszüge gefällig !

Growing Challenges for US Policy

At the same time, the Gulf is scarcely stable and the US faces major and growing
challenges that the next Administration must address:
· The US and the world economy are becoming steadily more dependent on imports of Gulf oil and gas.
This is not simply a matter of direct imports, but of imports of manufactured goods from Europe and Asia
that are dependent on Gulf oil for energy. Oil prices remain erratic, but they are rising. US oil production
is declining, and there are no near-term prospects that the US can reduce its growing dependence on
energy imports.
· This increased global dependence on Gulf oil exports presents a number of regional problems. Two key
Gulf oil producers – Iran and Iraq – face major problems in maintaining and increasing their oil and gas
production capacity because of UN and US sanctions. Other key oil producers – such as Saudi Arabia –
may lack the capital and incentives to increase production by the amounts needed to meet world demand
at moderate prices.
· There are significant political and ideological forces that can divide the US from its Gulf allies, and which
affect the challenge posed by Iran and Iraq. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains a source of tension, and the
search for a final settlement over issues like Jerusalem, raises issues of fundamental religious concern to
states like Saudi Arabia. Islamic extremism remains a problem, challenging both moderate regimes and
the US presence in the Gulf.
· Societal change involves a number of destabilizing forces. High levels of population growth and a lack of
economic diversification have cut real per capita income by more than 40% since the height of the oil
boom in the early 1980s. Hyper-urbanization is breaking down the traditional social structure. A lack of
relevant education, welfare and a weak work ethic, and dependence on foreign labor has left the Southern
Gulf without new jobs for many of its young men and women. Direct and disguised unemployment are
high, often in excess of 25%, in nations undergoing a youth explosion and where more than 60% of the
population is under 25 years of age. There are no immediate signs of major political and social unrest in
the Southern Gulf, but there are powerful structural problems.
· More than two decades have elapsed since the fall of the Shah of Iran. Much of the fervor of the Iranian
revolution has been lost, and Iran has now established good or correct relations with all of its Gulf
neighbors except Iraq. Democratic elections have brought a comparatively moderate president and Majlis
to power, and Iran has improved its relations with Europe as well as the Southern Gulf. US-Iranian
relations, however, remain tense over Iran’s proliferation, opposition to US ties to the Southern Gulf
states, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and support of violent anti-Israeli movements like the
Hizbollah and Hamas. Iran remains a potential military threat, and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons
and missiles with IRBM and ICBM-like ranges may allow it to pose a future threat to Europe and the
United States.
· Nearly a decade has elapsed since the Gulf War, and Iraq remains a hostile power. It is now contained by
UN sanctions, and a strong British and US military presence in the Southern Gulf and Turkey. There is no
practical prospect for normalized relations with Saddam Hussein and little near-term prospect that he can
be removed from power. The UN inspection regime has effectively collapsed and the economic sanctions
regime is eroding. In part because economic sanctions have helped cause hardship for the Iraqi people
and in part because of the need for Iraqi oil ensure moderate oil prices. Iraq almost certainly continues its
The Gulf and Transition 11/2/00 Page 3
Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. No reproduction without written permission. May be quoted or referenced with
proper attribution.
efforts to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles and has stocks of
some chemical and biological weapons.
· The improvement in US bilateral military relations with the Southern Gulf states has not been matched by
adequate improvements in either the individual national forces of the Southern Gulf countries, or in
regional cooperation. While many individual force elements have improved, no Southern Gulf ally has
established balanced, combat-capable forces focused on the necessary missions. Military progress within
bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council has been slow, and successes in areas like mine warfare have
been offset by delays in developing cooperative air defense systems and a failure to organize the effective
defense of the upper Gulf.
· The US advantage in conventional warfighting capability has led nations all over the world to examine
forms of asymmetric warfare that might counter the advantages the US has gained from new military
tactics, technology, and the “revolution in military affairs.” While Iran and Iraq, and various extremist
and terrorist movements have so far made only limited progress in this area, the US must increasingly
adapt its forces to deal with the threat posed by asymmetric warfare.
· Proliferation is a growing regional threat. Iranian and Iraqi efforts to create chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, coupled with their development of long-range missile forces have a potentially
destabilizing effect on the region. This confronts the US with the need to try to restrain any new
capabilities, find ways to encourage arms control, and develop counter-proliferation capabilities to deter
the use of weapons of mass destruction and defend its forces and allies against such attacks.
· The US faces internal problems in funding the level of military capability it needs to remain a global
superpower. Providing a forward presence in the Gulf and suitable power projection capabilities, are only
parts of this larger problem. The fact remains that the US has far smaller forces than it had at the time of
the Gulf War, and is still attempting to find the right level of defense spending and military capability to
meet its commitments in the Gulf.
· The cutbacks in European power projection capability have been substantially more severe compared to
those of the US. Britain, however, still maintains a significant presence in the Gulf. The European
Defense Initiative may change this situation, but the US faces the need to redefine coalition warfare in
ways that focus on real world power projection capabilities.
Key Issues the Next Administration Must Address
Some of these issues transcend US policy in the Gulf, and others must remain the
responsibility of its Southern Gulf allies. The Arab-Israeli peace process is important to Gulf
stability, and maintaining the US position in the Gulf, but it must be dealt with as a separate, issue
for US policy. The US needs to recognize the demographic, economic, and internal political
problems in the Southern Gulf, but the US cannot restructure the society and economies of its
allies. The United States can only encourage its allies’ own efforts towards internal reform.
The Gulf and Transition 11/2/00 Page 4
The Need for an Effective US Energy Policy
The remaining security issues, however, have a direct and focused impact on US policy in
the Gulf, and will force the US to make major changes in its policies over the next few years. One
key area is the need for a more effective energy policy. The US needs to reexamine its growing
dependence on Gulf energy and the security implications of that dependence. It needs to
understand the broad trends that can affect regional stability, and to determine what, if anything,
US policy can do to influence them.
There are four major issues US policy must address in order to develop an effective
energy policy:
· The strategic implications of the shifts taking place in world oil production, and in the shift in Gulf oil
exports from a US and European-oriented market to one focused on Asia. The increases that the US
projects in Gulf exports indicate that the volume of Gulf oil exports will more than double by 2020, and
that most of the increase in these exports must move by sea to Asia. The end result will be a far more
fragile infrastructure for making these exports that will be even more important to the US and global
economy.
· The ability of our Southern Gulf allies to finance the massive increase needed in Gulf oil production
capacity, while simultaneously addressing the growing economic problems they are encountering because
of a major increases in population, declines in per capita oil wealth, and the failure to diversify their
economies. The free market may be able to provide the capital that the Southern Gulf needs, but the US
may have to take a more proactive role in persuading the Southern Gulf states to make the required
investments, allow foreign and private investment, reform and diversify their economies, and consider
efforts to limit population growth.
· The future role of Iran in the world oil market and its role in shaping Caspian energy exports. The US
has failed to persuade any other nation of the merits of the sanctions enforced in the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act, and the Act has had no impact on Iran’s military expenditures and efforts to proliferate. The Act has
succeeded, however, in making foreign investment in Iran’s energy development slow and inefficient, and
in blocking US investment and involvement in the development of Iranian oil and gas exports. The end
result is a US policy that fails to achieve its military security objectives while limiting US ability to
achieve its energy and economic objectives.
· The future role of an Iraq in which Saddam Hussein or some similar figure may remain in power, and
where major modifications may be needed to UN sanctions to allow major outside investment in Iraqi
energy development. This will present major problems for US policy because in may mean accepting the
failure of UN efforts to force Iraq to cease proliferating, and finding new approaches to containing Iraq.

Wer will jetzt immer noch nicht war haben, dass es um Oel geht und sonst gar nichts !

India, Pakistan, and the Indian Ocean area are strategically important to the Gulf for three
reasons.


First, the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race is affecting proliferation in Iran and the Gulf.
Second, Pakistan and Afghanistan are emerging as a far more important regional threat in terms of
terrorism and Islamic extremism than Iran.

Third, India and Pakistan are a major source of foreign
labor in the Gulf. In fact there are more Indian and Pakistani workers in Qatar and the UAE than
native Arabs. The US must continue to fight proliferation in India and Pakistan and the Pakistani
and Afghan role in terrorism and Islamic extremism. At the same time, US naval and power
projection forces must be sized so that it is clear that the US can ensure the smooth, secure flow
of energy exports to Asia through the Indian Ocean.

*****************************************
Central Asia and the Caspian:
Putting an End to the “New Great Game”
*********************************************
As has been discussed in Chapter V, the US has become over-engaged in the Caspian and
Central Asia, largely because of mistaken policies in dealing with Iran. The Clinton Administration
involved the US in this “new Great Game” to obtain access to what were perceived as massive oil
The Gulf and Transition 11/2/00 Page 479
reserves, limit Russian influence, and prevent Iran from profiting from Caspian oil. In practice,
Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves seem to be the size of a new North Sea at most, and
will develop slowly. There is no reason to challenge Russia in its own backyard, particularly since
Chechnya has shown Russia that it has little reason to reabsorb Islamic and non-Russian
minorities.
“Pipeline politics” seem unlikely to seriously affect Iran’s future military efforts in any
way, but they already interfere with the operations of US companies in the Caspian and Central
Asia, create pointless political antagonism in Iran and Russia, and attempt to legislate energy
development in Turkey. US interests in the Caspian and Central Asia at most require the US to
seek a level playing field for US companies in developing the region’s energy resources. Once
again, the best way for the US and the world to win this particular “new great game” in terms of
globalism is not to play it.


M_B_S

[puhvogel]

Und nun streich mir mal bitte die Stelle an, wo die Amis die gesamte Golfregion besetzen sollen.

[M_B_S]

Ist im übertragenen Sinne gemeint ! Feste strategische Punkte kontrollieren !

Wieso haben sie doch schon


Entweder selber oder durch Vasallen !

Studie lesen !

[puhvogel]

ah ja. Also wolltest du einen reisserischen Titel entwickeln, um die Leser zum Lesen anzuregen?

Das die amerikanische Außenpolitik sich mehr an der Stabilität des Ölpreises als an Menschenrechten orientiert, ist eine Binsenweisheit. Das ist aber auch im Geheimen der Wunsch selbst von 85 % der PDS-Wähler (keine Angst ich kenne mehr als genug), vom Average US-joe möchte ich gar nicht anfangen.
Sprich: Du müsstest den mainstream ändern. Ganz schlecht kommen übrigens Kriegseinsätze aus rein "humanitären" Gründen an. Und hätten die Amis im Genozid von Ruanda eingegriffen, dann wäre dort sicher irgendein Rohstoff dort vorhanden gewesen, der den Ami-Hassern als Vorwand für das Eingreifen gedient hätte.

Zum Thema "Vasallen": Vielleicht fällt in 5 Jahren ein König besoffen vom Thron, und dann könnte die Stromversorgung durch off-shore Windkrafträder tatsächlich ziemlich aktuell werden.

[WKY]

Wollt ihr M_B_S nicht verstehen, dürft ihr nicht oder könnt ihr nicht. Wer alles mit Skulls, Bones and Bush kombiniert, der sollte es eigentlich begreifen.

(Quelle www.heise.detp
Suchbegriff WTC und schön lesen (insbesondere IX)

Totenkopf und Knochenloge, super Leute ...

Es erscheint mir alles wie ein Drehbuch ...

[M_B_S]

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

The Honorable Robert W. Gee, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Energy
Professor S. Frederick Starr, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. John J. Maresca, Unocal Corporation

APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Robert W. Gee
Professor S. Frederick Starr
Mr. John J. Maresca
Additional material submitted for the record:
Opening statement for the record by The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and chairman, Committee on International Relations
Opening statement submitted for the record by The Honorable Alcee Hastings, a Representative in Congress from Florida
HEARING ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1998
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on International Relations,

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Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. BEREUTER. [presiding] The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will come to order. Before we begin today`s hearing, the Chair would ask our witnesses` indulgence to take care of a small matter of Subcommittee business, H. Res. 350.
[Whereupon, at 2:13 p.m., the Subcommittee proceeded to other business.]
[Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the Subcommittee resumed this hearing.]
Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to proceed to the subject of the hearing for today, U.S. interests in the Central Asian Republics. I do have a statement. One hundred years ago, Central Asia was the arena for a great game played by Czarist Russia, Colonial Britain, Napoleon`s France, and the Persian and the Ottoman Empires. Allegiances meant little during this struggle for empire building, where no single empire could gain the upper hand. One hundred years later, the collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new great game, where the interests of the East India Trading Company have been replaced by those of Unocal and Total, and many other organizations and firms.
Today the Subcommittee examines the interests of a new contestant in this new great game, the United States. The five countries which make up Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, attained their independence in 1991, and have once again captured worldwide attention due to the phenomenal reserves of oil and natural gas located in the region. In their desire for political stability as well as economic independence and prosperity, these nations are anxious to establish relations with the United States. In response, last November, Secretary of Energy Frederico Pena led a Presidential mission to the Caspian-Central Asian region for discussions. The area`s energy resources were also discussed during November visits to Washington of Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev and Uzbek Prime Minister Sultanov.

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Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess large reserves of oil and natural gas, both on-shore and off-shore in the Caspian Sea, which they urgently seek to exploit. Uzbekistan has oil and gas reserves that may permit it to be self-sufficient in energy and gain revenue through exports. Estimates of Central Asian oil reserves vary widely, but are usually said to rival those of the North Sea or Alaska. More accurate estimates of oil and gas resources await wider exploration and the drilling of test wells.
Stated U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in this region include fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia`s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes; promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers; encouraging the construction of east-west pipelines that do not transit Iran; and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the Central Asian economies.
In addition, as has been noted by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the United States seeks to discourage any one country from gaining control over the region, but rather urges all responsible States to cooperate in the exploitation of regional oil and other resources.
Central Asia would seem to offer significant new investment opportunities for a broad range of American companies which, in turn, will serve as a valuable stimulus to the economic development of the region. Japan, Turkey, Iran, Western Europe, and China are all pursuing economic development opportunities and challenging Russian dominance in the region. It is essential that U.S. policymakers understand the stakes involved in Central Asia as we seek to craft a policy that serves the interests of the United States and U.S. business.
On the other hand, some question the importance of the region to U.S. interests, and dispute the significance of its resources to U.S. national security interests. Others caution that it will take a great deal of time and money to bring these resources to world markets. Still others point to civil and ethnic conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan as a reason to avoid involvement beyond a minimal diplomatic presence in the area.

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The Subcommittee is fortunate to have an outstanding panel of witnesses today. Testifying for the Administration will be Mr. Robert Gee, Assistant Secretary of Policy for the Department of Energy. As Assistant Secretary, he is a principal advisor to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of DOE on all domestic and international energy matters.
In our distinguished panel of private witnesses, we are privileged to welcome Professor Frederick Starr, founder and current chairman of Johns Hopkins Central Asian-Caspian Institute. Professor Starr, former president of Oberlin College, and founder of the Kennan Institute of Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center, is a recognized authority on Russian and Central Asian affairs, and has authored recent articles which outline the emerging geopolitical relations in the Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
Mr. John Maresca is vice president of international relations for Unocal Corporation, one of the world`s largest energy resource development companies. Prior to his Unocal service, Mr. Maresca enjoyed a successful diplomatic career, having served as U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as minister in our U.S. embassy in France. It is also good to have him before our Subcommittee.
Mr. Berman, I moved through the process of taking up the Sri Lanka amendment, deferred any action, and would open to you now any comments you might like to make on that resolution before we proceed.
[Whereupon, the hearing recessed and proceeded to the markup.]
Mr. BEREUTER. Returning now to the subject of this hearing, I would just conclude my opening remarks by saying consistent with the policy of the Subcommittee, I would tell our witnesses that their entire statement will be made a part of the record. But I would ask them to summarize their testimony, approximately in 10 minutes if they can, 10 minutes each, and thus allowing time for the Members` questions.
Mr. Berman, I recognize you now as the Ranking Democrat Member for any comments you might like to make on the hearing today.

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Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The Subcommittee has only been given jurisdiction over this region in this session of Congress. Many of us are just learning about this area. But all of us are quickly understanding the vital importance of the Caucasus to our future. The fact that the Subcommittee is holding a hearing on the region when at the time so much of the world`s attention is diverted to events in the Middle East I think should be considered a signal that the United States is not solely focused on the Iraqi situation.
I know that some analysts believe that the recent assassination attempt at Georgian President Edward Shevardnadze and the forced resignation of Armenia`s President Ter-Petrossian are not unrelated. Some believe that forces with differing agendas think that the diversion of world attention toward Iraq provides a chance to destabilize Central Asia, playing the traditional great game of espionage, deceit, and treachery in an effort to dominate the region. American interests in the region are simply to ensure its progressive political and economic development and to prevent it from being under the thumb of any outside power, be it Iran or Russia.
This hearing is an opportunity to draw attention to that objective and to signal to everyone that we remain focused on it, even as crises develop elsewhere. The region`s geographical placement, its tremendous energy resources, are of major concern to us. We will do all we can to assist in the exploitation of that resource in a manner that benefits the people of the region.
I look forward to the hearing, and hearing from the witnesses. I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing today.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Hastings, the gentleman from Florida, could not be with us because of a conflict. He is a Member of the Subcommittee, and asked that his statement be made a part of the record. Without objection, that will be the order.

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[The prepared statement of Mr. Hastings appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have your attendance today. We look forward to your testimony. Proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. GEE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. GEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Robert Gee, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy and International Affairs at the Department of Energy. I am pleased and honored to appear before this Committee today to report on the U.S. energy policy in the Caspian region. I welcome the opportunity to discuss our government`s strategic and economic interests in this important region, our policy to advance those interests, and how we can achieve our goals.
I also appreciate the opportunity to appear before you as you begin consideration of H.R. 2867, the House version of the Silk Road Strategy Act. While the Administration does not yet have a formal position on the bill, the underlying theme of the proposed legislation is consistent with our policy objectives and strategic goals in the region.
To begin, you may ask why is the United States active in the region? The United States has energy security, strategic, and commercial interests in promoting Caspian region energy development. We have an interest in strengthening global energy security through diversification, and the development of these new sources of supply. Caspian export routes would diversify rather than concentrate world energy supplies, while avoiding over-reliance on the Persian Gulf.
We have strategic interests in supporting the independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the Newly Independent States of the Caspian Basin. We want to assist the development of these States into democratic, sovereign members of the world community of nations, enjoying unfettered access to world markets without pressure or undue influence from regional powers.

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We also have an interest in maximizing commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and for U.S. and other foreign investment in the region`s energy development. In short, our interests are rooted in achieving multiple objectives. Rapid development of the region`s energy resources and trade linkages are critical to the independence, prosperity, democracy, and stability of all of the countries of that region.
Four factors frame our policy. First, promoting multiple export routes. The Administration`s policy is centered on rapid development of the region`s resources and the transportation and sale of those resources to hard-currency markets to secure the independence of these new countries. Accordingly, our government has promoted the development of multiple pipelines and diversified infrastructure networks to open and integrate these countries into the global market and to foster regional cooperation.
We have given priority to supporting efforts by the regional governments themselves and the private sector to develop and improve east-west trade linkages and infrastructure networks through Central Asia and the Caucasus. A Eurasian energy transport corridor incorporating a trans-Caspian segment with a route from Baku, Azerbaijan, through the Caucasus and Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is inclusive, providing benefits to transit as well as energy-producing countries.
Second, emphasizing commerciality. While we recognize the influence regional politics will play on the development of export routes, we have always maintained that commercial considerations will principally determine the outcome. These massive infrastructure projects must be commercially competitive before the private sector and the international financial community can move forward. Our support of specific pipelines, such as the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and trans-Caspian oil and gas lines, is not driven by any desire to intervene in private commercial decisions. Rather, it derives from our conclusion that it is not in the commercial interest of companies operating in the Caspian States, nor in the strategic interests of those host States, to rely on a major competitor for transit rights.

Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In general, we support those transportation solutions that are commercially viable and address our environmental concerns and policy objectives. Based on discussions with the companies involved, a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline appears to be the most viable option. We have urged the Turks to take steps to make Baku-Ceyhan a commercially attractive option. For our part, we are also looking at steps the United States can take to provide political risk guarantees and to foster cooperation among the regional States on an approach that can lead to a regional solution for the longer term.
Third, cooperating with Russia. Our Caspian policy is not intended to bypass or to thwart Russia. In fact, two key projects closest to fruition go through Russia, those of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company northern early pipeline, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium from Kazakhstan through Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. We have also financed a major study to look at ways to export more volumes through the existing Russian pipeline system.
Russia is in the midst of tremendous change in its energy policy, moving toward privatization and embracing market reform. Russian energy companies are deeply involved in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. We support continued Russian participation in Caspian production and transportation. We would also welcome their participation in the Eurasian corridor. U.S. companies are working in partnership with Russian firms in the Caspian, and there will be future opportunities to expand that commercial cooperation.
Development of the region`s energy resources creates opportunities for these countries to cooperate in new ways for the benefit of all. The pace and extent of that regional cooperation will have a direct effect upon the future economic prosperity of the individual States.
The United States supports regional approaches to Caspian energy development. The Eurasian corridor will enhance Turkey`s energy security through diversification, and will ensure that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have reliable and diversified outlets for their resources.

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This corridor also addresses squarely the environmental issues associated with the Bosporus. We share Turkey`s environmental concerns about the potential increase in traffic through the straits. Further, we seek to avoid having the Bosporus become a chokepoint for a significant share of the world`s oil supplies, heightening environmental concerns and possibly impeding the development of Caspian energy.
Fourth, isolating Iran. Our policy on Iran is unchanged. The U.S. Government opposes pipelines through Iran. Development of Iran`s oil and gas industry and pipelines from the Caspian Basin south through Iran will seriously undercut the development of east-west infrastructure, and give Iran improper leverage over the economies of the Caucasus and Central Asian States. Moreover, from an energy security standpoint, it makes no sense to move yet more energy resources through the Persian Gulf, a potential major hot spot or chokepoint. From an economic standpoint, Iran competes with Turkmenistan for the lucrative Turkish gas market. Turkmenistan could provide the gas to build the pipeline, only to see itself displaced ultimately by Iran`s own gas exports.
How are we implementing U.S. policy? First, we have stepped up our engagement with the regional governments through Cabinet level and senior level visits to the region, and have established formal government-to-government dialogs. We also have invited regional leaders to Washington. Our Cabinet officers also are deeply engaged. Last fall Secretary Pena led a very successful Presidential mission to Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan. Secretary Daly recently returned from a trade mission to Turkey. I had the privilege of leading an inter-agency delegation to Turkey in mid-January to discuss Turkey`s strategy for moving forward with development of its energy sector, meeting the growing demand for electricity, diversifying its gas supplies, and identifying further steps for the developing and constructing of oil and gas pipelines through Turkey.
Second, we are pursuing an aggressive strategy with the regional governments. The Eurasian energy transport corridor, spanning at least six countries and disputed regions, presents complicated problems for even the most efficient governments. The number of potential players ensures that negotiations and equity structures will be enormously complicated. The United States has stressed the importance of achieving agreement on concrete project proposals among the relevant countries as early as possible. Along these lines, we have encouraged the regional governments to accelerate multilateral discussions with their neighboring States and with the private sector shippers through the establishment of national working groups. These groups have a critical role in resolving regulatory, legal, tariff, and other issues that will make the Eurasian corridor most commercially attractive.

Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In sum, we enthusiastically support an ongoing dialog with Congress on Caspian and Central Asian issues. We also support and encourage the positive contribution of the numerous congressional delegations that have traveled to the Caspian region. We must maintain the momentum behind our support for these governments and for our private sector. Developments this year will be critical in advancing regional energy development and export. We look forward to working with you in meeting the upcoming challenges.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I stand available to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gee appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your concise testimony, very significant information presented to us. On page two, you talk about the Baku into Turkey route. You indicate that this should take—likely to take tax and tariff regime changes that are attractive and ensuring ways for acquisition and development, and that our government is looking at ways that we can provide some political risk guarantees. Obviously one of them would be the traditional route through OPIC. But also, we have the World Bank`s similar institution. What did you learn in your recent visit to Turkey beyond what you have told us here, about Turkey`s interest, the actions that Turkey is likely to take to facilitate the total implementation of that proposal?
Mr. GEE. Turkey is keenly interested. They are interested in building infrastructure that not only would allow their country to be a transit route for the export of oil that would be taken from the Caspian Sea, but also they are keenly interested in providing a consumption market for the natural gas that would be developed in that region. They strongly favor a pipeline that would carry the volumes of oil and gas from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and ultimately through Turkey, ending in Ceyhan, a port on the Mediterranean.
They recognize that they need to take proper steps to reform some of their governmental infrastructure in order to make the environment much more commercially viable. Among other things, they are experiencing some difficulties in reforming some of their legal requirements relative to the privatization of the power generation market in order to allow private investment to come in, with the necessary guarantees of securing investment, to provide the gas market that would facilitate the transport of gas into Turkey.

Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We have worked with them, have given them some technical advice on some of the aspects of private sector expectations that are necessary to make a pipeline commercially viable through that region. They have indicated to us that they are willing to take a leadership role, both in securing a consensus within their own government to try to make the governmental reforms occur on a timely basis. They have also offered to assert a leadership role within the entire region in talking with all of the neighboring States through which that pipeline would be routed.
Mr. BEREUTER. What, if any, major impediments do you see on the ability of the Turkish Government to take those steps? What impediments or significant hurdles do they see and discuss with you? What is the progress of their visitation with their neighbors as we can best determine it?
Mr. GEE. Let me take your questions one by one. They have within their own government obviously different individuals and different ministries that work under the leadership of their Prime Minister. We have been talking separately both with their Foreign Ministry and with their Energy Ministry to ensure that their decision making process internally within their government can be expedited. So I guess it would be fair to say that one of the subjects that we did discuss with them is how best to facilitate decision making within their own government, to give the private sector the necessary measures of expectations that are needed, such as the necessary tariff regime that`s required to be adopted by law, the rights of way that are explicit, the environmental policies that need to be made explicit. We are working with them. They are obviously interested in making sure that they can make their decision making more expeditious so that the private sector can make their own decisions timely.
Another matter that we discussed was engaging them with their neighboring States to talk about developing a consensus on some of the issues I have just described relative to the proper tax and tariff regime and rights of way. Since this pipeline would traverse multiple governments, it`s very important for each of those affected transit governments to be working in close cooperation so that they can coordinate their policies together. They realize that talking to other neighboring States is not an easy process because this is the first time they have been required to work in such close collaboration on a project of this magnitude. But they have made commitments to us that they are willing to advance the ball in that direction.

Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I do understand that they are sending representatives to our country at the end of this month so that we can continue to get a progress report on how well those discussions have ensued between themselves and the governments of their neighboring States. They have committed to us that they will be working with the Foreign Ministry of each of those neighboring States through which the pipeline would be routed. We are looking forward to getting a progress report from them later this month.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. We would very much of course like to have an opportunity to also have that information from the department.
I did mention, without asking a question, the role of OPIC and of course the multilateral organization, MEGA. OPIC would facilitate American firms` participation. We would expect to see other countries do something similar in a worthy project. Is it essential to the Turkish Government that there be a multilateral investment guarantee agency or are they satisfied with simply the various developed countries that have such loan guarantee programs like OPIC, to provide them one by one under a competitive kind of environment?
Mr. GEE. I think that they are holding their options open. They expressed interest in whatever level of U.S. Government support could be provided, whether it`s in the form of loan guarantees, underwriting insurance. We indicated to them that we are in discussions with OPIC, Eximbank, to see at what level of participation they could be involved. They have indicated to us that they are looking at the proper steps that need to be taken for their involvement. In fact, we did take an OPIC consultant with us on our visit to Turkey to give them advice on the fundamentals of pipeline finance so that they could begin to understand better exactly what the private sector requires and so that OPIC itself could be in a position to become a more active player.
I think that the government of Turkey is willing to entertain any opportunities for the U.S. agencies to be involved. I think that they would also welcome other international agency participation as well.

Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEREUTER. Are there any impediments in American law to our cooperation and assistance to Turkey and to the countries of this region? Are there any, for example, sanctions in place that would have a negative effect?
Mr. GEE. I think the only obstacle that we see, and I think it`s indicated in my testimony, is section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. It has hindered our ability in working closer with the government of Azerbaijan, which is obviously an affected government through which oil and gas would be transported. In helping facilitate that government`s development toward a transparent reliable legal regime, we have worked with the neighboring States of that region to build new legal institutions through the democratization process. Unfortunately, section 907 has been a barrier in our efforts to bring along similar improvements in Azerbaijan. That would be the only existing obstacle that I could relay to you today, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER. Switching geography slightly, what is the status of proposals by Unocal and others to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan?
Mr. GEE. Perhaps the Unocal witness can give you more detail. I do understand that they do have an agreement with the government of Turkmenistan. They have also been in discussions with the various factions within Afghanistan through which that proposed pipeline would be routed.
The U.S. Government`s position is that we support multiple pipelines with the exception of the southern pipeline that would transit Iran. The Unocal pipeline is among those pipelines that would receive our support under that policy.
I would caution that while we do support the project, the U.S. Government has not at this point recognized any governing regime of the transit country, one of the transit countries, Afghanistan, through which that pipeline would be routed. But we do support the project.
Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Gee, could you briefly tell us what the formal Chinese involvement in the region is at this moment with respect to energy resources?


Mehr :http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hf…

Wer will mir jetzt noch weiss machen , das es nicht um Oel geht !

[M_B_S]

@ gholzbauer

Hier noch mehr Beweise !

WARUM??

OEL heisst die Antwort

Bin Laden ist "nur" die "Giftnuss" für die Presse !

Hier geht es um zig Milliarden Dollar und Bush will das die US Boys das Rennen ums Kaspi Oel machen !

Thats it !

[ballsofsteel]

wartet mal ab bis die amis ein paar clusterbombs und bunkerbuster über mekka ausklincken.

[M_B_S]

USA warnen vor neuen Anschlägen in den nächsten sieben
Tagen

Die amerikanische Regierung rechnet in Kürze mit neuen
Attacken von Osama Bin Ladens Terrororganisation al-Qaida.
Die Ziele könnten in den USA oder US-Einrichtungen in Übersee
sein, warnte Justizminister John Ashcroft.

Washington - Ashcroft und FBI-Direktor Robert
Mueller beriefen sich während einer
Pressekonferenz auf angeblich
vertrauenswürdige Geheimdienstinformationen.
Die Sicherheitsbehörden in den USA wurden in
erhöhte Alarmbereitschaft versetzt. Es gebe
zwar keine Hinweise auf die etwaigen Ziele
oder die mögliche Anschlagsmethode, sagte
Ashcroft. Die US-Regierung nehme die
Informationen aber sehr ernst und betrachte es
als ihre Verantwortung, die Öffentlichkeit zu
warnen und sie zu erhöhter Wachsamkeit
aufzurufen.

Es war die zweite offizielle Warnung der
US-Regierung nach den Anschlägen vom 11.
September. Die erste hatte es am 11. Oktober
gegeben.

Das Ausbleiben weiterer Anschläge nach dem 11. September sollte
die Amerikaner nicht verleiten, in eine "falsche Gleichgültigkeit" zu
verfallen, sagte Ashcroft. "Es ist wichtig für das amerikanische Volk,
dass diese Warnungen ernst genommen werden."

Der Justizminister rief die US-Bürger auf, dennoch ihr normales Leben
weiterzuführen. Er selbst sagte allerdings eine Reise zu einer
Polizeikonferenz in Toronto ab.

Mein Tip : 11.11.2001

M_B_S

[GjT]

Ca. 14 Beiträge,ca. 14 davon überflüssig.
Über 330 mal gelesen, etwa 330 mal zuviel.

[DER WAHRE CHEF]

@ geklaut aus dem Optionsscheine-Thread

Iraqi paper expects western attack in Ramadan
10/30

BAGHDAD, Oct 30 (Reuters) - Iraq`s most influential newspaper said on Tuesday it feared the United States and Britain would attack the country in November.

Babel newspaper said the two western countries might attack at the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan which starts in mid-November after suspending attacks on Afghanistan.

Babel, owned by President Saddam Hussein`s eldest son Uday, said the attack could begin after Washington and London suspended their bombing of Afghanistan until the end of winter.

"Perhaps they may suspend their operation in Afghanistan because of winter and they may commit new aggression against Iraq starting with the beginning of Ramadan," Babel said in a rare frontpage editorial.

The attack would start around northern and southern areas of Iraq rich with oil in order to occupy them and weaken the central government in Baghdad, the newspaper said.

"If they fail in Iraq, they will resume their attacks on Afghanistan once again and their operation in Iraq will be limited. But if they achieve progress in Iraq, they will expand their operations," it added.

"They may fire 1,000 missiles against 300 targets in Iraq as announced by Mr Tareq Aziz," it added in a reference to a statement last week by the Deputy Prime Minister.

Aziz said in an interview with Britain`s Sunday Telegraph newspaper at the weekend that he expected the United States and Britain to attack Iraq. He said they wanted to use the U.S.-led "war against terrorism" as an excuse to oust Saddam.

Aziz said an attack on Iraq was just a matter of time.

U.S. and British officials have said operations may not be restricted to Afghanistan in future but have avoided saying that Iraq or any other specific countries could become targets.

Babel said the expected attacks would begin against Iraqi troops around the oil rich city of Kirkuk in the north and against troops near Mosul 450 km (270 miles) north of Baghdad.

It said preparations for an attack on Iraq had already started, saying the United States had ordered Turkey last month to send 60 tanks into northern Iraq.

Baghdad accused Turkey last month of stationing troops in a Kurdish-controlled enclave in northern Iraq and asked U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan to press Turkey to withdraw.

Babel said that in southern Iraq the United States would try to occupy Basra 550 km (330 miles) south of Baghdad with troops massed in Kuwait. ((Baghdad Newsroom [phone]))

Damit wird klarer worum es eigentlich geht-bestimmt nicht um Afghanistan.

[M_B_S]

Das dritte Siegel :



Wer glaubt.......

[M_B_S]

Nach Saudi Arabien + Kuwait setzen die Amis nun alles daran die Stars and Stripes in Bagdad zu hissen !

Damit kontrollieren die US GIs über 1/3 der Welt Oel Reserven !

Yeah !

[sharky007]

#18

na dann bleibt ja immer noch genug zu tun für die restlichen 2/3. Wozu eigentlich die Aufregung ?

[M_B_S]

ORIENT-EXPERTE STEINBACH

"Erste Bombe auf Irak würde Anti-Terror-Allianz zerstören"

Der Direktor des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, Udo Steinbach, warnt vor einem Angriff des Westens auf den Irak. Im SPIEGEL-ONLINE -Interview sagt Steinbach, die USA seien dabei, Feinde zu benennen, um sie unter dem Deckmäntelchen der Terrorbekämpfung fertig zu machen.


DPA

Steinbach: "Nicht mit abgehalfterten Politikern kungeln"


SPIEGEL ONLINE: Herr Steinbach, haben die Amerikaner Recht, dem Irak mit einem Angriff zu drohen?
Steinbach: Zu verkünden, das nächste Angriffsziel sei der Irak, ist völlig daneben. In der Wahrnehmung der arabischen Welt geben die Amerikaner den Israelis völlig freie Hand, die Palästinenser zu bekämpfen - und nehmen sich selbst die Freiheit, Saddam Hussein zu bekämpfen, ohne deutlich zu machen, in welchem Zusammenhang dies mit dem Kampf gegen den Terror steht. Beweise dafür, dass Saddam in die Terroranschläge vom 11. September involviert ist, gibt es bisher nicht.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Hätten die Amerikaner Saddam Hussein im Golfkrieg 1991 stürzen müssen?

Steinbach: Hätten die Amerikaner ein neues Regime etabliert, hätten sie in dieser Region sicher an Glaubwürdigkeit gewonnen. Eine neue machtpolitische Ordnung hätte einen umfassenden Friedensprozess in der ganzen Region ermöglichen können.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wieso also Saddam Hussein aus ordnungspolitischen Gründen nicht jetzt stürzen?

Steinbach: Jetzt gibt es keinen Grund mehr. Außerdem lässt sich der Sturz Husseins nicht ähnlich locker machen wie die Vertreibung der Taliban. Es müsste ein Feldzug von enormer Dimension werden. Die so genannten Collateral Damages wären unabsehbar. Außerdem: Je öfter die USA einseitig neue Feinde in der Region benennen - Iran, Irak, Somalia, Jemen - verstärkt sich der Eindruck, dass Amerika nicht auf die Bekämpfung des Terrors aus ist, sondern eine Politik verfolgt, die dem eigenen Interesse am Öl dient. Das bestärkt die Bevölkerung in der Ansicht, dass auch der Afghanistan-Feldzug amerikanische Interessenpolitik gewesen sein könnte. Es besteht ein tiefes Misstrauen in der Region zu allem, was mit dem 11. September zusammenhängt. Der Kreis derer, die zweifeln, dass die Attacken vom 11. September von einem Muslim angezettelt worden sind, ist nicht klein.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Diese Verschwörungstheorien sind doch absurd.

Steinbach: Natürlich. Doch sie zeigen, dass eine Aversion gegen Amerika zu Grunde liegt, die dadurch gestärkt wird, dass die USA jetzt nach reinem Eigeninteresse Feinde benennen, um sie unter dem Deckmäntelchen der Terrorbekämpfung fertig zu machen.


SPIEGEL ONLINE: Was müssten die USA denn tun?


REUTERS

Saddam Hussein: Wer füllt das Machtvakuum nach seinem Sturz?


Steinbach: Die Amerikaner müssten den Terror kooperativ bekämpfen und nicht nach einer einseitigen amerikanischen Agenda. Iran zur "Achse des Bösen" zu zählen, ist die völlig falsche Politik. Iran hatte deutlich signalisiert, sich den Amerikanern annähern zu wollen. Im Jemen werden al-Qaida-Leute vermutet. Doch es ist die schlechteste Methode, CIA-Agenten in diverse Institutionen im Jemen zu schicken, um die Arbeit der Regierung dort zu kontrollieren. Und wenn sie Saddam Hussein weg haben wollen, ist es besser, die gesamte Region zu darüber zu konsultieren, wie das Regime wegzubringen ist, als dies durch eine einseitige amerikanische Militäraktion zu machen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Die CIA versucht bereits eine Allianz mit Schiiten und Kurden im Irak zu schmieden.

Steinbach: Ob das eine gute Idee ist, ist mehr als fraglich. Insbesondere eine kurdische Opposition aufzubauen, taugt langfristig überhaupt nicht, eine Stabilisierung des Irak zu erreichen. Diese Aktion schürt Ängste, nicht nur im Irak selbst, sondern auch in der Türkei. Die Türken fürchten nichts mehr als die Entstehung eines neuen Staates. Wenn man eine stabile Ordnung nach Saddam Hussein anstrebt, muss man sich etwas anderes einfallen lassen als mit abgehalfterten Politikern zu kungeln.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Welche Folgen hätte ein amerikanischer Angriff auf den Irak?

Steinbach: In dem Augenblick, in dem die erste Bombe auf Bagdad fällt, wird die Anti-Terror-Allianz zerbrechen. Die Saudis legen bereits einen immer schmerzlicher werdenden Spagat hin. Auf der einen Seite können sie nicht anders als Amerika die Treue zu halten, auf der anderen rücken sie von Amerika ab. Die Saudis überprüfen bereits, ob sie weiter amerikanische Stützpunkte in ihrem Land haben wollen. Die Öffentlichkeit in der arabischen Welt würde einen erhöhten Druck auf ihre Regierungen ausüben, mit dem Ergebnis, dass etwa das Regime in Jordanien in große Bedrängnis geraten könnte. Der Nachbar Türkei fürchtet, dass mit dem Fall Husseins ein kurdischer Staat entstehen könnte. Mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit würde die Türkei in die Auseinandersetzungen im Irak hineingezogen werden.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Und im Irak selbst?

Steinbach: Keiner weiß, wie das Machtvakuum nach Saddam gefüllt werden könnte. Die Auslandsopposition wäre dazu nicht in der Lage. Möglicherweise bräuchte man einen anderen Militär, um das Land zusammenzuhalten.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wie muss der Terror-Feldzug fortgesetzt werden?

Steinbach: Man muss beim palästinensisch-amerikanischen Verhältnis beginnen. Wenn es dort zu einem wirklichen Friedensprozess käme durch die politische Perspektive "Land für Frieden" mit der Gründung eines palästinensischen Staates, dann wäre das ein erheblicher Erfolg mit Blick auf islamistische Militanz. Zweitens: Der Uno muss es gelingen, den Irak wieder in die internationalen Gemeinschaft zurückzuholen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Der Irak verweigert der Uno nach wie vor, Inspektoren ins Land zu lassen, die prüfen sollen, ob das Land Massenvernichtungsmittel herstellt.

Steinbach: Der Irak verweigert sich, weil das Land bisher keine Zusage hat, dass es im Falle von Inspektionen die Sanktionen los sein wird. Die amerikanische Politik ließ es immer offen, an welchem Punkt man den Irak wieder in die internationale Gemeinschaft aufnehmen würde. Hussein wird eher einlenken, wenn er einen Lohn in Aussicht gestellt bekommt. Und man darf nicht vergessen, dass es die unsinnigen und unmenschlichen britischen und amerikanischen Bombardements vom Dezember 1998 gewesen sind, die Hussein dazu gebracht haben, auch den letzten Inspektor der Uno des Landes zu verweisen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Den USA wird vorgeworfen, sie verfolgten eine simplifizierende und isolationistische Politik. Trifft diese Haltung nicht auf ähnliche Denkstrukturen in der arabischen Welt? Hier die rechtgläubige islamische Welt, dort der gottlose, feindliche Westen.

Steinbach: Absolut. Das kann man nicht übersehen. Besonders die Verschwörungstheoretiker leiden an einem Realitätsverlust. Alles, was für die islamische Welt negativ ist, wird beim Westen abgeladen. Vor diesem Hintergrund brauchen wir dringend einen Dialog der Kulturen. Die kriminelle Kapazität des Terrorismus muss bekämpft werden, zugleich müssen wir aber sehen, dass er in tief greifenden Fehlentwicklungen wurzelt.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Was soll ein Dialog der Kulturen bringen?

Steinbach: Dieser Dialog muss selbstkritischer Natur sein. Die islamische Welt muss sich eingestehen, dass es eine westliche Moderne gibt, dass man nicht ständig die Flucht in die Tradition suchen kann. Und der Westen muss zurückfinden zu einer Haltung des Respekts vor anderen Kulturen, als Voraussetzung dafür, dass wir viel stärker kooperativ verfahren als früher. Bisher war amerikanische und europäische Politik eine Politik der Dominanz, ausgerichtet an wirtschafts- und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen.

Das Interview führte Alexander Schwabe

Mit Bush als Präsident wird es immer Machtpolitik geben :Kampf ums OEL!

[M_B_S]

Warum der Irak ?

Hier die Anworten

[M_B_S]

Nur noch einmal für ALLE der SPASS FRAKTION !

Die Gründe für BUSH jr. im IRAK / IRAN zuzuschlagen ist OEL !

Und die USA brauchen immer mehr davon zumindest wenn Bushs Oelmafia weiter regiert !

Ex CIA Direktor empfiehlt Europa seine strategischen Reserven schnellstens aufzufüllen !

[M_B_S]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[M_B_S]

US wants to control Iraqi oil, dominate region: Khamenei

TEHRAN: Iran`s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused the United States on Thursday of wanting to control the Middle Eastern oil resources and dominate the region through its military build-up against Iraq in the Gulf.

"The US war against Iraq is for oil wells, for domination in the region, defending Israel and exerting control over the Islamic republic," Khamenei said in remarks quoted on state television.

"The Americans think they can easily swallow Iraq and its oil wells, but they are mistaken. Even if they deploy their forces in the region, the Islamic nations will not give them the least comfort", he added, addressing thousands of people in the religious city of Qom.

The US has some 64,000 US troops already stationed in the Gulf region, with about 15,000 in Kuwait bordering Iraq, while another 25,000 troops have been ordered to the Gulf. Additional deployments are under consideration.

Khamenei accused the "arrogant powers, including the US" of "looking for opportunities to infiltrate our key institutions and fan the flames of domestic issues to take revenge on the Islamic system and nation." "But our nation will not surrender to this psychological war," he said.

Another top Iranian official, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also hit out at the "US military presence in the region" saying it would "intensify the tensions and increase the insecurity in the Middle East".

"US interference in the affairs of the region will benefit the Zionist regime (Israel)," by allowing it to "use the Iraqi crisis to deviate world opinion from the killing and suppression of Palestinians," he said, quoted on state television.

Rafsanjani made the remarks in talks with Kurdish-Iraqi opposition leader Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who arrived in Iran on Monday on a five-day visit. Iranian officials have voiced concern that if a US-led war against Iraq is launched, the presence of US troops there will leave the Islamic republic encircled, since US troops are also stationed in neighbouring Afghanistan to the east, and Arab Gulf states to the south. Despite general loathing in Iran of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and government support for Iraqi opposition groups, Iran has consistently opposed a US attack on Baghdad.

[M_B_S]

Blut für OEL

TV Tip Heute 22:15 VOX Spiegel TV

[M_B_S]

!

Dieser Beitrag wurde vom System automatisch gesperrt. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an [e-mail]

[M_B_S]

BRITISCHER ÖL-EXPERTE

"Die Falken sind kurzsichtig"

Welche Rolle spielt das Öl bei einem Feldzug gegen Saddam Hussein? Der britische Energieexperte und Weltbank-Berater Mamdouh Salameh warnt im SPIEGEL-ONLINE-Interview vor den hohen Risiken einer amerikanisch-britischen Invasion im Irak.


Öl-Experte Salameh: "Die wichtigsten Ölfelder liegen im Kurdengebiet und im Süden bei den Schiiten"


SPIEGEL ONLINE: Dr. Salameh, wie sind die irakischen Ölreserven beschaffen und welche Bedeutung haben sie für die USA?
Mamdouh Salameh: Die nachgewiesenen irakischen Ölreserven belaufen sich auf 150 Milliarden Barrel, das sind rund 15 Prozent der weltweit nachgewiesenen Reserven. Darüber hinaus verfügt der Irak noch über geschätzte Reserven von 215 Milliarden Barrel. Damit hat der Irak insgesamt rund 50 Prozent mehr Öl als Saudi-Arabien.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Gleichwohl sprechen Vertreter der US-Regierung, wenn es um die Irak-Krise geht, nicht über Öl.






Salameh: Nein, sie sprechen natürlich viel lieber von Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Massenvernichtungswaffen, obwohl die irakischen Ölreserven ganz ohne Frage für die Strategie und die Sicherheit der USA eine sehr große Rolle spielen, und die derzeitige Irak-Krise ohne die Dimension des Öls gar nicht zu verstehen ist.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Das müssen Sie genauer erklären.

Salameh: Die USA importieren nahezu 60 Prozent des Öls, das sie verbrauchen, ungefähr die Hälfte davon aus dem Nahen Osten. Aber die Importe werden steigen, und langfristig kann nur der Nahe Osten den gewaltigen Öldurst der Amerikaner stillen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sie gehen davon aus, dass die Abhängigkeit der US-Wirtschaft vom Öl ungebrochen bleibt?

Salameh: Es wird inzwischen intensiv in Sachen erneuerbare Energien geforscht. Dennoch kam ich in einer Studie, die ich für die Weltbank gemacht habe, zu dem Ergebnis, dass - wenn es nicht zu einer schnellen und radikalen Wende in der Energiepolitik kommt, was sehr unwahrscheinlich ist - im Jahr 2050 nur zwölf Prozent des weltweiten Primärenergiebedarfs mit erneuerbaren Energiequellen gedeckt werden können, in den USA nur weniger als sechs Prozent.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Der Zugang zu großen Mengen bezahlbaren Öls ist demnach besonders für die USA eine Überlebensfrage.

Salameh: In der Tat. Und das strategische Ziel der US-Regierung muss es aus diesem Grund sein, die Länder, die über entscheidende Ölreserven verfügen, zu kontrollieren. In Saudi-Arabien sind schon amerikanische Soldaten stationiert, aber die dortigen Reserven reichen nicht aus. Die Amerikaner brauchen Kuweit, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate - und den Irak.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Die Amerikaner können sich ja nicht einmal auf die Saudis verlassen.


DER SPIEGEL

Verteilung der Ölreserven: "Der Irak hat 50 Prozent mehr Öl als Saudi-Arabien"


Salameh: Saudi-Arabien ist ein stabiles Land, allerdings existiert eine tiefe Abneigung im Volk gegen die Stationierung von US-Truppen im Land, die wiederum einen fruchtbaren Boden für al-Qaida bereitet. Deshalb hat die Regierung in Riad auch erklärt, dass sie ihren Luftraum nicht für einen Angriff auf den Irak freigeben wird, und deshalb sind die Beziehungen zurzeit so angespannt.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wird angesichts dieser Spannungen der Irak für die US-Regierung nicht noch wichtiger und die Einsetzung eines von Washington kontrollierten Regimes in Bagdad nicht noch verlockender?

Salameh: Ja, statt eine friedliche Lösung mit dem Irak zu suchen, in deren Rahmen amerikanische Ölkonzerne neue Ölfelder erschließen könnten, wollen die Amerikaner sich das irakische Öl offenbar mit Gewalt unter den Nagel reißen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sehen Sie die Debatte über die Massenvernichtungswaffen des Irak nur als einen Vorwand für einen Öl-Krieg?

Salameh: Schauen wir uns doch einfach mal die so genannten "Schurkenstaaten" und ihre Massenvernichtungswaffen an. Nordkorea hat eingeräumt, dass seine Nuklearwissenschaftler Atomwaffen entwickeln, dennoch redet George W. Bush nicht von einem Regimewechsel in Pjöngjang. Der Grund dafür ist natürlich, dass Nordkorea kein Öl hat, ebenso wie etwa die Atommächte Indien oder Pakistan keines haben. Und der Irak stellt im Gegensatz zu diesen Nuklearmächten eine Bedrohung für Israel dar, das bekanntermaßen seit den sechziger Jahren über die nukleare Trumpfkarte verfügt.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Israel mal ausgeklammert, welche Auswirkungen auf die Ölmärkte könnte eine Invasion des Irak haben?

Salameh: Wenn die USA in Bagdad eine Marionettenregierung installieren, würde diese so schnell als möglich so viel Öl als möglich auf den Markt werfen, um die Opec zu unterminieren.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Indem der Ölpreise nach unten gebracht wird ...

Salameh: ...und die Opec-Länder die Produktion steigern müssen, um zumindest ihre Einkünfte stabil zu halten.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wie schnell könnten die Märkte mit irakischem Öl überschwemmt werden?


DPA

Raffinerie im Irak: "Nur der Nahe Osten kann den Öldurst der Amerikaner stillen"


Salameh: Die irakische Ölindustrie ist auf Grund von Ersatzteilmangel und unterlassenen Investitionen in einem ziemlich jämmerlichen Zustand. Sollten die Amerikaner den Irak erobern, dürfte es mindestens ein Jahr dauern und massiver Investitionen bedürfen, bis die Produktion wieder auf dem Stand von 1990, von vor dem Golfkrieg, angelangt ist. Für eine Verdopplung der Produktion innerhalb von zehn Jahren müssten die großen Ölkonzerne rund 30 Milliarden US-Dollar investieren.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Dieses Szenario setzt allerdings eine reibungslose Besetzung des Irak voraus.

Salameh: Woran ich erhebliche Zweifel habe. Ich befürchte, dass die Amerikaner bei einer Invasion nicht alle denkbaren Konsequenzen kontrollieren können. Der Irak könnte aufgeteilt werden, auch wenn die Bush-Administration jetzt stets die Wahrung seiner territorialen Integrität beschwört. Man muss in diesem Zusammenhang wissen, dass die wichtigsten Ölfelder des Irak im Kurdengebiet im Norden liegen und vor allem in dem von Schiiten bewohnten Süden an der Grenze zum Iran.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wie könnte sich ein Krieg im Irak auf die ölproduzierenden Nachbarstaaten auswirken?

Salameh: Eine Invasion könnte die Königliche Familie und ihre Regierung in Saudi-Arabien in Gefahr bringen, Kuweit und mein Heimatland Jordanien destabilisieren. Und das würde dann den Ölnachschub für die ganze Welt gefährden.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wird das in Washington nicht bedacht?

Salameh: Die Falken in Washington, die unbedingt einen militärischen Erfolg gegen Saddam erzielen wollen, den sie ohne Zweifel erreichen würden, sind meiner Meinung nach kurzsichtig. Auch wenn sie dies nicht beabsichtigen, sie könnten mit einer Invasion den gesamten Nahen Osten in Instabilität stürzen und zu einem perfekten Rekrutierungsgebiet für al-Qaida und ähnliche Terrorgruppen machen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sie meinen, ein sicherer, langfristiger Ölnachschub ließe sich am besten mit friedlichen Mitteln erreichen?

Salameh: Ja. Statt irakisches und amerikanisches Blut zu vergießen, sollte Präsident Bush eine friedliche Lösung mit dem Irak suchen. Davon würden alle profitieren, die Ölfirmen, die Menschen im Nahen Osten, die ganze Welt. Letztlich bedürfte es natürlich auch einer Lösung des Palästina-Problems und Friedensverträgen zwischen Israel und allen arabischen Ländern. Aber schon eine Entwicklung in diese Richtung würde der amerikanischen Wirtschaft und der Weltwirtschaft nützen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wie würden die Ölmärkte auf eine Invasion des Irak reagieren?

Salameh: Wenn der Krieg nicht ganz schnell gewonnen wird, könnte der Ölpreis bis auf über 60 Dollar pro Barrel in die Höhe schießen. Das wäre fatal für die Weltwirtschaft und die US-Wirtschaft. Präsident Bush könnte, wie es schon seit Vater vorgemacht hat, einen Krieg gegen Saddam Hussein gewinnen, aber das Vertrauen seiner Landsleute und die nächsten Wahlen verlieren.

Das Interview führte SPIEGEL-ONLINE-Korrespondent Michael Sontheimer in London

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