Hypovereinsbank: BKN - Underperform! - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[VanessaM]

Habe mir heute von der IR-Abteilung von BKN die ersten Analysteneinschätzungen zuschicken lassen. Bis jetzt gibt es nur eine der Hypovereinsbank.

Die HVB stuft darin BKN auf underperform ein.

(Falls mir noch jemand erklärt, wie man hier eine pdf-Datei posten kann, stelle ich gerne die Studie der HVB ein)

Hier noch die Mail:

Sehr geehrte Frau XXXX,

es ist korrekt, dass wir am 15. und 16. Januar eine Analystenkonferenz
abgehalten haben. Inder tat erwarten wir Veröffentlichungen der Banken. Bis
dato kann ich Ihnen gerne eine Veröffentlichung der HypoVereinsbank zukommen
lassen, alle anderen lassen noch auf sich warten und auch ich weiß nicht,
wann diese kommen sollen. tut mir leid.
Teilnehmende Banken waren u.a. HypoVereinsbank, Gontard&Metall Bank, ABN
Amro, Sal. Oppenheim, DZ Bank (Frankfurt)
Merill Lynch, Schroders Salomon Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley, Bank
Labouchère, ABN Amro, Barclay`s Capital, Cazenove, Bear Sterns
etc...(London).

Sobald ich weitere Veröffentlichungen vorliegen habe kann ihc mich gerne
wieder bei Ihnen melden,


mit freundlichen Grüßen,
> Sabine Hengstmann


Für mich klingt das nun alles in allem nicht mehr all zu rosig;
ich denke die Zeit für Gewinnmitnahmen (nach dem schönen Anstieg) ist für mich nun gekommen...
Was denkt ihr?

MfG.
Vanessa

[hajoberg]

Halte derzeit 8 200 St. und gebe vor 6.00 Eu n i c h t s ab!!
Hajo

[VanessaM]

@hajo:
Respekt für diesen wahrlich konstruktiven Beitrag.

[User67]

Die Hypovereinsbank hat AMATECH bei 20 Euro dem Anleger ans Herz gelegt.AMATECH steht bei 1,72...Die Hypovereinsbank war Konsortialführer und hatte besten Einblick in die Geschäfte...

[markusJ]

Ich gebe gar nichts mehr auf irgend eine Analystenbewertung.
Ist höchstens für einen Kurspush gut.

[Nurbs]

Glaubst Du ich verkauft eine Aktie die ein KGV von 4 hat !!!

Ich bleibe long!


:-) Nurbs.

[RaymondJames]

>
mit denen bist du (am Neuen Markt) falsch verbunden, VanessaM!

HypoVereinsbank - FLOP Empfehlungen Neuer Markt

Empfehlungen:
Gesamt 79
Performance:
Plus 4
Minus 75

Untern./Empf.Kurs/akt.Kurs/Performance/Datum

Kabel New Media 11.6 0.0 -99.7% 01.02.01

H5B5 43.0 1.2 -97.2% 20.04.00

Intertainment 92.0 2.7 -97.0% 16.06.00

MWG Biotech 39.2 1.8 -95.5% 13.04.00

Mania 49.5 3.0 -93.8% 02.02.00

Pandatel 154.0 11.3 -92.7% 19.05.00

Helkon 31.0 2.3 -92.6% 20.04.00

Pandatel 152.0 11.3 -92.6% 16.05.00

AmaTech 24.3 1.9 -92.4% 10.11.00

WWL Internet 13.0 1.1 -91.8% 21.06.00

Parsytec 80.0 7.0 -91.2% 06.07.00

Parsytec 78.3 7.0 -91.1% 29.06.00

ADVA 54.6 5.1 -90.8% 16.01.01

Helkon 24.8 2.3 -90.7% 03.11.00

ce Consumer 74.3 7.4 -90.0% 21.03.00

Parsytec 69.0 7.0 -89.9% 19.04.00

Transtec 50.0 5.2 -89.6% 25.02.00

realTech 70.5 7.8 -89.0% 30.05.00

Transtec 45.0 5.2 -88.4% 03.05.00

CineMedia 27.0 3.2 -88.1% 01.08.00

Varetis 54.2 7.4 -86.3% 14.06.00

ce Consumer 53.2 7.4 -86.1% 27.04.00

ce Consumer 52.7 7.4 -85.9% 06.04.00

ce Consumer 52.5 7.4 -85.9% 08.09.00

Media! AG 19.9 2.8 -85.9% 30.01.01

Varetis 51.0 7.4 -85.5% 07.06.00

Lintec 41.9 6.2 -85.3% 24.08.00

Parsytec 47.4 7.0 -85.2% 10.11.00

ce Consumer 48.0 7.4 -84.6% 12.09.00

GFT 38.0 5.9 -84.6% 01.02.01

ce Consumer 47.6 7.4 -84.4% 30.06.00

ce Consumer 46.5 7.4 -84.1% 02.08.00

Augusta 47.3 8.0 -83.1% 01.03.00

Parsytec 41.2 7.0 -83.0% 29.01.01

Lintec 35.5 6.2 -82.6% 26.07.00

Lintec 34.5 6.2 -82.1% 11.04.00

Evotec 47.5 9.1 -80.9% 06.04.00

ce Consumer 37.0 7.4 -80.0% 30.10.00

Augusta 39.2 8.0 -79.6% 18.08.00

Plaut 14.0 2.8 -79.6% 09.02.01

Parsytec 31.5 7.0 -77.8% 15.05.01

Augusta 35.0 8.0 -77.1% 19.05.00

MorphoSys 228.0 55.8 -75.5% 12.09.00

Mobilcom 94.7 23.4 -75.3% 17.01.00

ADVA 19.9 5.1 -74.6% 01.03.01

PSI 29.0 7.7 -73.6% 05.09.00

United Internet 22.3 5.9 -73.5% 18.01.00

Plaut 9.7 2.8 -70.6% 03.04.01

Mühlbauer 90.5 31.2 -65.5% 18.01.01

Augusta 22.0 8.0 -63.7% 23.01.01

Jumptec 22.0 8.6 -61.0% 22.03.00

Mühlbauer 80.0 31.2 -60.9% 22.11.00

PSI 19.0 7.7 -59.7% 22.11.00

Jumptec 21.0 8.6 -59.2% 28.04.00

Jumptec 20.8 8.6 -58.8% 19.05.00

Aixtron 57.6 24.2 -58.0% 30.01.01

Software AG 93.0 39.5 -57.5% 25.10.00

ce Consumer 17.1 7.4 -56.7% 15.12.00

Jumptec 19.0 8.6 -54.8% 06.07.00

Jumptec 18.6 8.6 -53.9% 23.08.00

Medion 100.0 46.4 -53.6% 19.05.00

Jumptec 17.0 8.6 -49.4% 16.01.01

ce Consumer 14.0 7.4 -47.0% 16.02.01

Jumptec 16.0 8.6 -46.4% 22.11.00

Software AG 69.0 39.5 -42.8% 19.01.00

Jumptec 13.9 8.6 -38.3% 26.04.01

Fortec 47.5 31.7 -33.3% 28.09.00

Fortec 45.8 31.7 -30.9% 06.09.00

Fortec 40.5 31.7 -21.8% 22.11.00

Bertrandt 22.7 18.0 -20.5% 22.03.00

W.E.T. 41.0 37.2 -9.1% 29.02.00

Fortec 34.0 31.7 -6.8% 13.03.00

W.E.T. 38.5 37.2 -3.2% 14.07.00

Thiel Logistik 22.2 22.0 -1.1% 11.01.02

FJA 50.9 50.5 -0.9% 22.01.02

http://www.analystencheck.de/analystencheck/suchmaschinen/em…" target="_blank" rel="nofollow ugc noopener">
http://www.analystencheck.de/analystencheck/suchmaschinen/em…

[Gambletron]

Hi Vanessa,
Wäre nett, wenn Du Dir die Arbeit mit dem Reinstellen machen würdest. In der Button Zeile des Acrobat Readers ist ein Knopf mit n`em großen T - Textauswahl Werkzeug. Damit kannst Du wie in einer normalen Textverarbeitung den Text markieren und dann per paste & copy einfügen.

Habe mir übrigens die Präsentation mal zuschicken lassen und durchgeschaut. Da waren für jemanden, der den Jahresabschluss gelesen hat keine essentiellen neuen Fakten drin.

Für mich hätte die ABN Amro Bewertung den höchsten Stellenwert, diese wird jedoch sicher erst in einem Branchenreport veröffentlicht.

Grüße - Gambletron

P.S.: Denke ein Ausstieg ist z.Z. zu früh. Vergleiche den Chart mal mit einigen klassischen "Aufholern" nach dem 11.9. (z.B. Infineon). Da sieht man wieviel Luft noch ist. Die Berichte habe ich recht intensiv studiert und bin der Meinung, dass BKN keine besonders muffligen Leichen im Keller hat. Soll heißen die Bewertung des Filmvermögens passt m.E. und durch die Kap.-Erh. und Kreditaufnahme in Q1/02 von insgesamt 13 Mio € + 4 Mio € Kooperationsvertrag mit M6 (Legend) sind alle geplanten 2002er Produktionen gesichert.

[VanessaM]

@Gambletron: Danke für die "Anleitung".

Hier also die Studie:

January 16, 2002
HVB Equity Research
12345
© HypoVereinsbank Equity Research

See next page for disclaimer
A member of HVB Group
Company Update Media & Entertainment

Underperform

Price on 1/15/02 EUR 3.66
High/Low (12M) 32.50/2.45
STOCK DATA
Reuters BKQG.F
Bloomberg BKQ GR
WPK 529 070
Average daily volume (tds.) 21.6
Free float (%) 68.9
COMPANY DATA
Market capitalization (EUR bn) 0.031
No. of shares in issue (mn) 8.5
Capital subscribed (EUR mn) 8.5
Capital authorized (EUR mn) –
Shareholders Durham Cap. Partner
22.7%, A. Bohbot 5%, Sony
Pict.Fam.Entert. 3.4%,
remainder widely held
Next AGM 7-Mar-02
Quarterly report 26-Feb-02
Bal. sheet press conf. 27-Dec-02
PRICE CHART
1999 2000 2001 2002
2
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BKN INTERNATIONAL NM
NEMAX 50 IND.
Source: DATASTREAM
RELATIVE PERFORMANCE (% CHG.)
1M 3M 6M
NEMAX all share -10.4% -48.3% -68.1%
NEMAX 50 -10.2% -54.1% -76.2%
NM Media & Ent. -2.6% -20.5% -43.9%
Friedrich Schellmoser
[e-mail]
[phone]
Volker Bosse
[e-mail]
[phone]
Peter-Thilo Hasler
[e-mail]
[phone]
BKN International


THE RISKS CONTINUE TO DOMINATE

BKNI is currently passing through a vale of tears, the end
of which will not be reached before the second half of fiscal
2001/02. Company-specific problems might be solved by
then, but the sector’s structural problems will remain.
By extending the amortization periods in the last fiscal year from
three years to nine, BKNI is becoming more like its competitors.
Comparative valuations will be easier as a result.In the wake of a “spending spree” last year, BKNI has consumed
all the funds raised from the IPO. It now lacks the financial re-
sources that it needs for stronger growth in the immediate future.
Compared with that of its peers, BKNI stock is not valued at-
tractively enough to offset the below-average margins, the
much poorer financial condition and the risk of impairment
amortization on the portfolio.
1999/00 2000/01 2001/02e 2002/03e
Sales (EUR mn) 23 30 35 40
% change 69.1 32.3 15.8 14.7
Net Income (EUR mn) 3.9 0.9 2.5 2.7
% change 24.3 -75.7 161.0 9.9
EPS (EUR) 0.56 0.12 0.29 0.32
% change 5.8 -78.0 138.6 9.3
CFPS (EUR) 2.25 1.67 2.49 3.08
% change 18.8 -25.8 48.8 24.0
Dividend (EUR) 0 0 0 0
EBIT-Margin (%) 31.2 10.5 13.4 13.4
CAGR (Sales; 00-03) 20.7%
CAGR (EBIT; 00-03) -8.9%
EV/Sales 17.1 1.1 0.9 0.8
EV/EBITDA 20.7 2.2 1.5 1.2
EV/EBIT 54.8 10.4 7.1 6.1
PER 96.6 29.9 12.5 11.5
PEG-Ratio -1.8
PCF 23.9 2.2 1.5 1.2
Div. Yield (%) 0 0 0 0

This report is intended for clients of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG who are market counterparties or ordinary business investors (both as defined
by the Securities and Futures Authority Ltd.) and is not intended for use by any other person. This report does not constitute a solicitation to buy or an of-
fer to sell any securities. The information in this publication is based on carefully selected sources believed to be reliable but we do not make any repre-
sentation that it is accurate or complete. Any opinions herein reflect our judgement at this date and are subject to change without notice. We and/or
other members of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank Group may take a long or short position and buy or sell securities mentioned in this publication. We
and/or members of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank Group may act as investment bankers and/or commercial bankers for issuers of securities mentioned,
be represented on the board of such issuers and/or engage in "market making" of such securities. The Bank and its affiliates may also, from time to time,
have a consulting relationship with a company being reported upon. The investments discussed or recommended in this report may be unsuitable for in-
vestors depending on their specific investment objectives and financial position. Private investors should obtain the advice of their banker/broker about
the investments concerned prior to making them. Regulated by SFA for the conduct of investment business in the UK.
The information contained in this Report is intended solely for institutional clients of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, New York Branch (“HypoVereins-
bank”) and HVB Capital Markets, Inc. (“HVB Capital” and, together with HypoVereinsbank, “HVB”) in the United States, and may not be used or relied
upon by any other person for any purpose. It does not constitute a solicitation to buy or an offer to sell any securities under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended or under any other U.S. federal or state securities laws, rules or regulations. Investments in securities discussed herein may be unsuitable for in-
vestors, depending on their specific investment objectives, risk tolerance and financial position.
All information contained herein is based on carefully selected sources believed to be reliable, but HVB makes no representations as to its accuracy or
completeness. Any opinions contained herein reflect HVB’s judgment as of this date, and are subject to change without notice. HVB and any HVB affiliate
may, with respect to any securities discussed herein: (a) take a long or short position and buy or sell such securities; (b) act as investment and/or commercial
bankers for issuers of such securities; (c) engage in market-making for such securities; (d) serve on the board of any issuer of such securities; and (e) act as a
paid consultant or adviser to any issuer.
The information contained in this Report may include forward-looking statements within the meaning of U.S. federal securities laws that are subject to
risks and uncertainties. Factors that could cause a company’s actual results and financial condition to differ from its expectations include, without limita-
tion: political uncertainty, changes in economic conditions that adversely affect the level of demand for the company’s products or services, changes in
foreign exchange markets, changes in international and domestic financial markets, competitive environments and other factors relating to the foregoing.
All forward-looking statements contained in this Report are qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.






BKNI stock: cheap = attractive?

2001 financial statement much worse than expected
Many question marks hanging over 2002 – but
a footing seems to have been found
Segment Results
Consolidated Income Statement
HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002 3
BKNI stock: cheap = attractive?
BKNI stock has fallen out of favor with the market, as evidenced by the current
fairly attractive valuation on a peer-group comparison. The reason for the dis-
count is likely to lie in a series of profit warnings, as well as the far-below-average
EBIT margin and the company’s liquidity.
Investors’ expectations
since IPO have not
been met
So far, BKN International has continually disappointed the capital market. BKNI
itself has a tradition of not issuing exact forecasts about revenues and results.
However, since it went public in Spring 2000, hopes have been repeatedly raised
and always dashed. Even major purchases failed to bring the company closer
to hitting its targets. Aside from a deterioration in the sector environment, there
were in-house reasons for the company’s failure to deliver.
U.S. parent creamed
off liquidity and dis-
posed of BKNI stock
The company has lost credibility. Since BKNI went public, a limited number of
so-called strategic investors have played a major role. They successively and indi-
rectly acquired the stocks still held by the U.S. parent company (58.2%) after the
IPO. At the same time, the U.S. parent extracted the vast majority of the liquid
funds from the company by selling a production studio in Los Angeles and the
complete U.S. library to BKNI. The marked deterioration in results since early
Summer 2001 would indicate that this “love affair” is on the rocks and is reflected
in the stock’s performance. It is worth noting in this regard that the CEO and
former major stakeholder of the former US parent, Alan Bohbot, decided in
the interim to purchase 5% of outstanding BKNI stock personally from Durham
Capital Partners (previously the U.S. parent) at EUR 18 per share. On the same
day (December 5, 2001), the market price was only about one-fourth of that.
At the same time, Mr. Bohbot acquired a call option on the same number of
shares (425,000) under the same terms with the right to exercise that option
between January 2, 2002 and December 31, 2003. The company’s explanation
that these transactions were intended to keep Durham’s holding below the im-
portant 25% mark stipulated under the German Corporation Act is not very sound
in our opinion. Earlier reductions in holdings were explained away by other argu-
ments (requirement for receiving European movie funding; increase in free float).
Durham, whose largest stakeholder – aside from several wealthy private investors
– is News Corp., now only holds around 22% of BKNI. This essentially equates to
the number of outstanding call options (5% Mr. Bohbot; 12% Sony Picture Family
Entertainment).
4 HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002
Greater risk through
lower margin and
poorer financial
condition
Operating margin lagging far behind that of peers. In terms of liquidity, too,
BKNI is behind the competitors. BKNI’s EBIT margin lags far behind its peer-group
comparables. Based on the estimates for fiscal 2002 and 2003, the EBIT margin of
13.4% is only half that of its comparables. However, its EV/EBIT ratio (2002e)
of 7.1 is much more favorable than international comparables. Direct compari-
son with the much more profitable TV-Loonland (EBIT margin: 25.5%e; EV/EBIT
ratio 2002e: 3.7) shows BKNI to be second class here again. The picture is pretty
much similar when the EV/EBIT ratio is replaced by the PER. The following
diagrams illustrate this. Given the far-below-average operating margin, a sub-
stantial discount seems appropriate because the susceptibility of the results to
the weakening tendencies within the sector increases as the EBIT margin de-
clines. Another fact that reduces the value, even though this is not explicitly
backed up with figures, is that BKNI – unlike its peer group – has no liquidity
reserves and has more or less exhausted its credit lines.
Comparative data only
available for 2002
The following two scatter diagrams are each based on the forecast for the year
2002, as we have no other estimates for 2003 aside from those for TV-Loonland,
which we cover. The basic valuation advantages of TV-Loonland are not affected
however.
EV/EBIT AND EBIT MARGIN 2002E
BKN International
Gullane Entertainment
HIT Entertainment
RTV Family
Entertainment
TV-Loonland
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
EV/EBIT 2002e
EBIT margin 2002e
Sources: Thomson Financial Datastream, HypoVereinsbank Research
HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002 5
PER AND EBIT-MARGE 2002E
BKN International
Gullane Entertainment
HIT Entertainment
TV-Loonland
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
PER 2002e
EBIT margin 2002e
Sources: Thomson Financial Datastream, HypoVereinsbank Research
Looming impairment
amortization’s of up
to EUR 8 mn for 2002
In favor of BKNI stock is the fact that it has already been punished enough by
the market and that it appears to have more or less passed through the vale
of tears. A clear argument against it is the ongoing high risk of unscheduled
amortization on its rights library. BKNI is known to have purchased extensive
rights libraries in the past – a small package of about 200 episodes from Good-
Times Enterp. (September 2000/price EUR 15 mn) and a large package from its
former parent BKN, Inc. (January 2001; EUR 24 mn). We calculated the aver-
age purchase prices to be around EUR 75,000 and EUR 40,000 per episode.
Library transfers that occurred later within the sector and which roughly involved
the same scope of rights were concluded at a price of EUR 25,000 (April 2001)
and EUR 15,000 (October 2001), but these do not take account of the exact scope
of the rights and the quality of the productions. BKNI has so far been valuing
its rights portfolio by the individual film forecast method; the new SOP 00-2,
however, will be applied for the first time ever to the current fiscal year. We
are starting on the assumption that the price squeeze within the sector, espe-
cially in the library business, will force BKNI to make unscheduled amortization.
We estimate this cash-neutral expense to be as much as 20% of the acquired
rights portfolio, or EUR 7-8 mn. However, this expense has not been factored
into our forecasts. It should be noted that we also expect all other domestic anima-
tion producers (EM.TV, TV-Loonland and RTV) to take impairment amortization.
Is BKNI a possible
merger or takeover
candidate?
Another argument against long-term investment is the small size of the com-
pany, which is not conducive to survival as an independent on the market.
But that could actually present an opportunity for investors, since the BKNI portfo-
lio (after estimated impairment amortization and subtraction of finance debts
of EUR 52 mn) has a current market value of just EUR 30 mn. In our eyes, this
makes BKNI a potential merger candidate or takeover target.
6 HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002
2001 financial statement much worse than
expected
Under pressure from an increasingly adverse sector environment and due to
the delay in a series of major importance to BKNI, the company failed to meet
its own targets and the expectations of the capital market, some of which were
very high. By extending the amortization periods from three to nine years, BKNI
at least managed to avoid slipping into the red. It would also seem from the
capital increase rushed through in October 2001 that the company came under
financial pressure during the year.
Volume fell far short
of targets
Production and revenue targets were not met. While in-house production in
fiscal 2000/01 (to September 30) was greatly increased at 91 compared with
43 episodes, it fell far short of the envisaged target of 126 episodes for this year.
Even though revenue targets were lowered several times, the company was far
from able to meet the last revenue target that was announced. The revenues of
EUR 30.2 mn, were even more than 10% down on the target announced at the
time of the IPO, even though considerably more rights libraries and thus revenue
potential have been purchased in the meantime.
One-time income from
acquisitions cannot
be recorded on P&L
statement
Contrary to plans, one-time income of EUR 4.2 mn accruing from the acquisition
of the U.S. activities could not be put through the P&L statement, but instead
had to be recorded as a reduction of the purchase price on the consolidated
year-end balance sheet. In acquiring the U.S. library, the seller, BKN Inc., was
obliged to finish the series in production at that time. In the wake of the disposal,
the U.S. production studio, which was also acquired by BKNI, was commissioned
to do the finishing. The final completion costs were EUR 4.2 mn lower than origi-
nally planned overall, which meant that the purchase price for the rights library
was commensurately lower. Conversely, however, production revenues and the
margin which they generated could not be recorded on the P&L statement as
the company had initially hoped to do.
2001: Greater pressure
on costs and delayed
revenues
Revenue delays and the generally weaker sector squeeze results. The Group
annual deficit of EUR 1.534 mn in fiscal 2000/01 before one-time income was the
product of both in-house and sector factors. The most obvious one, albeit difficult
to quantify exactly, is the negative influence of the sector on the result. The
falling willingness on the part of free-TV broadcasters around the world to invest
(due to advertising market), combined with a simultaneous, accelerating tendency
within the TV industry to concentrate, has also substantially increased the pressure
on providers of animation content. In certain territories (Germany, USA, South
America), library business, especially, almost totally collapsed. The over-supply
of programs on the market has forced down the overall price level and has thus
mostly affected providers operating at below-average margins. The two in-house
reasons for failing to deliver the result were the delay of one series and the much-
increased fixed costs of the global infrastructure, which is now largely complete
(see next paragraph). The series “BKN’s The Lost Continent” suffered apparently
from quality problems that delayed delivery. Thus, instead of 26 episodes, only
13 were delivered toward the end of the last fiscal year. The final 13 episodes
will now likely not be delivered until June 2002. Contractual regulations meant
that only revenues of EUR 1.5 mn could be recorded in 2001, with the result
HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002 7
that, according to the company, the delay of this series caused sales to be down
EUR 3.5 mn and EBIT down EUR 1.5 mn. Only when the remaining 13 episodes
are delivered, probably in June 2002, will the preconditions have been met for
the remaining revenues to be recorded. In addition, BKNI had to bear the full
brunt of the global infrastructure costs for the first time. This increased cost item
was not offset by higher revenues, as planned, but instead by much lower revenues
(see next paragraph).
New business model
put additional squeeze
on margins
The purchase of the U.S. library on January 5, 2001, heralded a new business
model at BKNI. The marketing territory has extended since then to the missing
North America territory (up to then marketed by the U.S. parent). However, BKNI
had to take on board the full production costs in return. The preceding business
model provided for a budget split arrangement (50:50) between the U.S. entity
and BKNI. According to the new business model BKNI now has to bear the full
production costs. As the additional costs (100% as opposed to 50% previously)
are being weighed against lower additional revenues (100% as opposed to 70-75%;
we believe North America accounts for 25-30% of global revenues), the new busi-
ness model applied significant pressure on the above-average high margins that
were generated up to 1999/00.
Extraordinary influence
on result through
change of valuation
Beautifying the results by extending the amortization periods. Until 2000, the
company amortized all license rights over three years (and thus in the first ex-
ploitation cycle), with BKNI being clearly the most conservative valuer within
the sector. In the last fiscal year, 2001, BKNI extended the amortization period
to nine years. Most of the amortization (80%) still takes place in the first three
years. This change in valuation reduced the amortization on licenses by EUR
2.476 mn. Adjusted, obligatory comparable figures for the prior year are not
quoted.
Better comparability
with peer group
The advantage of this change in valuation from an analytical point of view is
that BKNI is now easier to compare with its peers, who apply similar amortization
periods.
Latest capital-raising
measure reveals fi-
nancing bottleneck
Should the latest capital increase be construed as an emergency measure? On
October 23, 2001, BKNI concluded a small-volume capital increase that led to
a net cash influx of EUR 4.74 mn for the company on balance. The execution
of this capital increase in a conceivably poor market phase at the risk of significant
incentive discounts suggests that the company would have been facing financial
collapse otherwise. Indeed, the financial report reveals that the credit lines are
extensively exhausted and the existing credit lines are contingent on the attainment
of target returns (EBITDA margin: >50%).
8 HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002
Many question marks hanging over 2002 –
but a footing seems to have been found
Even if the sector were to escape the advertising doldrums in 2002, we would
still classify it as negative. This means that the pressure on BKNI’s margins will
not remain a one-time effect. However, provided that the new series can be real-
ized according to plan, BKNI is likely to emerge from the vale of tears behind
in the second half of fiscal 2001/02.
Full-year costs from the
new business model for
the first time
For the first time, the current fiscal year will see the higher fixed costs arising
from the implementation of the new business model being borne for the full
year. In 2000/01, these costs had to be borne from January 2001 and thus propor-
tionately for around nine months. Amortization of the estimated annual costs of
around EUR 12 mn for the global infrastructure requires much higher revenues
(especially in the TV business segment). If there is a corresponding lack of presence
in TV, revenues in the Consumer Brands segment will also be affected as they are
highly dependent on it.
Adverse market climate
persists
We believe that the sector climate in which BKNI operates will continue to be
adverse beyond the year 2002. Television, especially, on which BKNI is heavily
dependent, will find it tough going again in 2002. First of all, there are the purely
advertising-revenue-financed free-TV broadcasters to consider, whose revenues
impose a continuing restrictive purchasing policy for licensing rights. Also nega-
tively affected by the advertising doldrums are the partially advertising-financed
pay-TV broadcasters. The advertising doldrums aside, free-TV and pay-TV broad-
casters are also experiencing a strong global tendency to concentration that is
aimed at economizing and does not bode well for content providers such as BKNI.
This mega-trend, in our opinion, will last far beyond 2002. Broadcasters are
only making direct purchases of what is up to date, of good quality and attrac-
tive to the target group. And even these projects are increasingly marked by
haggling over terms and the scope of rights. The resultant squeeze on returns
(despite major savings in production costs) is only rarely likely to be eased by
bundling current topics and library content. This is also the reason that all anima-
tion providers attach such importance to a so-called branded block with a reputa-
ble broadcaster as this generally leads to renewed sales of library content and
increases the reliability of long-term forecasts.
Co-production: the
model of the future?
Is BKNI heading more and more down the path of co-production? The realization
of the “Legend of the Dragon” series is the first time BKNI has banked on a genuine
co-production; the Chinese partner is not only co-financing the project, but is also
taking on some physical aspects of production. So far, it is unclear whether the
company wants to push this model in future or whether it is just a one-off. Al-
though co-productions make it easier to finance a project, they also lead to coordi-
nation problems and additional costs as well as to permanent loss of copyright in
the agreed territories.
HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002 9
HY1 2002 disappoint-
ing on account of
base line
Thanks to the high revenues and earnings base line from the prior year, the
first half-year of 2002/02 will once again be very disappointing. While major
new productions delivered in fiscal 2000/01, such as Capertown Cops (Q1) and
UBOS (Q2), brought in revenues and earnings, there are no new productions in
the current fiscal year. The following table illustrates the situation.
BKNI -PRODUCTIONS FROM 1999/00 TO 2001/02E
Production In-house production (E) Episodes Delivery in
External production (F)
1999/00
Monster Rancher F 26 –
Kong E 43 –
Total 69 –
2000/01
Capertown Cops E 26 Q1
UBOS Batches 1 + 2 E 52 Q1
The Lost Continent E 13 Q4
Total 91 91
2001/02
UBOS Batch 3 E 13 Q3
The Lost Continent E 13 Q3
Legend of the Dragon E 40 Q4
Goliath E 26 Q4
Total 92 92
Sources: BKN International AG, HypoVereinsbank Research
Double-digit growth
rates in revenues and
EBIT appear feasible
For the full year 2001/02, we expect revenue growth of around 15% to EUR
35.3 mn and EBIT growth of 47% to EUR 4.7 mn. This forecast can only be met
if there are no new delays of the kind which occurred last year in delivering new
products and if the current price level in the animation market can be maintained.
The growth over 2000/01 is largely explained by the delayed revenues that will
be made good in the current year and the associated degressive-costs effects.
For the following fiscal year 2002/03, we have been assuming that marketing
of four new series (26 episodes each) would commence, with the growth rate
maintained somewhat and the profitability further improved while cost struc-
tures remain largely unchanged. We are assuming here that the company can
secure the financing for the higher output, since credit lines are partly tied to
the attainment of profitability/cash-flow figures (EBITDA margin >50%), which
we consider feasible.
10 HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002
Segment Results
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02e 2002/03e
Group
Sales revenues EUR mn 13.5 22.9 30.2 35.0 40.2
Sales growth % 2.4 69.1 32.3 15.8 14.7
Operating profit EUR mn 0 5.4 4.1 4.7 5.4
Margin % 0 23.7 13.6 13.4 13.4
Television
Sales revenues EUR mn 10.6 15.5 17.9 24.9 28.7
Sales growth % 5.4 45.8 15.5 39.0 15.4
as a percentage of sales revenues % 78.6 67.8 59.2 71.0 71.5
Operating profit EUR mn 0 4.0 2.8 3.7 4.3
Margin % 0 26.1 15.4 15.0 15.0
Consumer Brands
Sales revenues EUR mn 2.9 6.2 11.4 9.2 10.5
Sales growth % -7.3 113.4 84.1 -19.5 14.3
as a percentage of sales revenues % 21.4 27.0 37.6 26.1 26.0
Operating profit EUR mn 0 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.0
Margin % 0 18.5 11.8 10.0 10.0
Others
Sales revenues EUR mn 0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
Sales growth % -17.4 1.4 0
as a percentage of sales revenues % 0 5.2 3.3 2.9 2.5
Operating profit EUR mn 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1
Margin % 19.8 2.3 5.0 5.0
HVB Equity Research – BKN International
January 16, 2002 11
Consolidated Income Statement
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02e 2002/03e
Sales revenues EUR mn 13.5 22.9 30.2 35.0 40.2
Cost of goods sold EUR mn -8.3 -12.5 -13.9 -17.3 -21.4
as a percentage of revenues % 61.1 54.9 46.1 49.5 53.2
Gross profit EUR mn 5.3 10.3 16.3 17.7 18.8
as a percentage of revenues % 38.9 45.1 53.9 50.5 46.8
Selling expenses EUR mn -0.6 -2.6 -6.4 -6.8 -7.0
as a percentage of revenues % 4.3 11.3 21.1 19.4 17.4
Research EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
as a percentage of revenues % 0 0 0 0 0
Administration EUR mn -0.6 -2.3 -5.8 -6.2 -6.4
as a percentage of revenues % 4.5 10.1 19.2 17.7 15.9
Other operating income EUR mn 0 1.7 -0.9 0 0
as a percentage of revenues % 0 7.5 -3.1 0 0
Other operating expenses EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
as a percentage of revenues % 0 0 0 0 0
Other taxes EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
as a percentage of revenues % 0 0 0 0 0
Operating result (EBIT) EUR mn 4.1 7.1 3.2 4.7 5.4
as a percentage of revenues % 30.0 31.2 10.5 13.4 13.4
Income from investments EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
Net interest income EUR mn 0 0.4 0.2 -0.6 -0.9
Other financial expenses and income EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
Financial result EUR mn 0 0.4 0.2 -0.6 -0.9
as a percentage of revenues % 0 1.7 0.6 -1.7 -2.2
Earnings from ordinary activities (EBT) EUR mn 4.1 7.5 3.4 4.1 4.5
as a percentage of revenues % 30.0 32.9 11.2 11.7 11.2
Reported non-recurrent result EUR mn 0.2 0 0 0 0
Earnings before income taxes EUR mn 4.2 7.5 3.4 4.1 4.5
as a percentage of revenues % 31.2 32.9 11.2 11.7 11.2
Income taxes EUR mn -1.1 -3.6 -2.4 -1.6 -1.8
Income tax rate % 26.1 48.5 72.2 40.0 40.0
Net annual income EUR mn 3.1 3.9 0.9 2.5 2.7
as a percentage of revenues % 23.1 17.0 3.1 7.0 6.7
DVFA/SG adjustment items EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
DVFA/SG earnings before minorities EUR mn 3.1 3.9 0.9 2.5 2.7
as a percentage of revenues % 23.1 17.0 3.1 7.0 6.7
Minority interests EUR mn 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings after minority interests EUR mn 3.1 3.9 0.9 2.5 2.7
EBITDA EUR mn 12.2 18.9 15.1 22.2 26.8
as a percentage of revenues % -90.1 -82.9 -50.0 -63.3 -66.7

[VanessaM]

@alle unsere Charttechniker (insbesondere daWinni):

Wie geht´s denn technisch weiter?

MfG.
Vanesssa

[whyso]

@ Raymond James ,

Ich finde daß die HypovereinsBank sehr konsequent ist ...die haben halt beschlossen immer neben der Kapp zu sein & das treibt der Anleger dazu, die eigene dd zu leisten .

Kein Analyst oder Wirtschaftsprüfer ist zu vertrauen(Enron lässt grüßen) z.b. am 17 Januar empf von Börseonline kauft Highlight (große Nemax Bericht ), alineheuute ein minus von 18% an die Spitze, basiert auf den gerücht das die UEFA Rechten morgen ein andere kriegt ...ein parade beispiel wie man verlüste mit Idioten heim fährt ...

Do your own research & make up your own Mind,
its your time and money,
BKN -Strong BUY(imho),
Whyso

[Jeeve]

.




Mir ist es inzwischen ziemlich egal ob die HypoVereinsbank bei BKN richtig liegt:
Wie ihr wißt war ich ja ein sehr starker Fan und Fürsprecher von BKN -und das auch zu Recht:
man konnte ja in letzter Zeit hervorragend mit BKN verdienen, aber ein Anstieg von über 70% in kürzester Zeit schreit nun auch einfach mal nach einer Konsolidierung, sprich: es sind jetzt einfach mal etwas stärkere Gewinnmitnahmen zu erwarten.

Deshalb hab ich meine Gewinne bei BKN inzwischen auch mal realisiert und das ganze Geld heute in einen anderen Wert gesteckt, von dem ich mir in den nächsten Tagen einiges verspreche:

UMWELTKONTOR ---> genaue Begründung und Analyse siehe dieser Link: Thread: Tradingchance: Umweltkontor seit heute charttechnisch + fundamental ein Kauf







.

[RaymondJames]

auch nicht schlecht, BKN als übernahmekandidat!
vielleicht ist es erlaubt, auch die positiven aspekte der sehr zurückhaltenden HVB-studie herauszustellen:
die schätzungen für 2001/02 und 2002/03 berauschen nicht, sind aber so schlecht nicht und im aktienkurs mehr als eingepreist:
BKNI-Group lt. HVB Equity Research (seite 10)
-----------------------1998/99--1999/00--2000/01--2001/02e--2002/03e
Sales revenues EUR mn---13.5---22.9---30.2---35.0---40.2
Sales growth %------------------2.4---69.1---32.3---15.8---14.7
Operating profit EUR mn--------0-----5.4-----4.1-----4.7----5.4
Margin %-----------------------------0---23.7---13.6---13.4---13.4
eine EBITDA margin >50% hält die studie auch zukünftig für feasible, also erreichbar (seite 9 unten)
BKNI wird eine recht attraktive bewertung gegenüber vergleichbaren companies zugestanden (fairly attractive valuation on a peer-group comparison, seite 3 oben)
gegen ein langzeitinvestment soll sprechen, dass die firma sehr klein ist, vielleicht zu klein, um nicht gefressen zu werden
"but that could actually present an opportunity for investors, since the BKNI portfolio (after estimated impairment amortization and subtraction of finance debts
of EUR 52 mn) has a current market value of just EUR 30 mn. In our eyes, this makes BKNI a potential merger candidate or takeover target. "

[murdog]

Hallo Leute.


Bin auch der Meinung, dass bei BKN momentan der Daumen nach unten zeigt - zumindest für die nächsten Tage -, da BKN 2 Mal bei 4,5E abgeprallt ist. Hiermit zeigt sich, dass der GD 60 ein größeres Hindernis ist. Hinzu kommt die extrem überkaufte Situation (Slow Stochastik, Momentum, RSI), welche nur danach lächzt abgebaut zu werden.

Deshalb bin ich auch vor zwei Tagen mit 44% Gewinn ausgestiegen und hab die Kohle in Cancom IT gepackt.

Es muss jetzt einfach eine Konsolidierung der erzielten Gewinne geben. BKN bleibt langfristig interessant. Wenn sie überverkauft sind, dann steig ich wieder ein. Viel Glück weiterhin

[RaymondJames]

@VanessaM
dass BKN keine wunderfirma ist, wissen wissen wir spätstens seit der kurs von über 70 auf unter 3 gefallen ist
dass TV-Loonland fundamental besser dasteht, wussten wir schon vor dem HVB Equity Research (seite 4: "Direct comparison with the much more profitable TV-Loonland (EBIT margin: 25.5%e; EV/EBIT ratio 2002e: 3.7) shows BKNI to be second class here again" )
was das Research naturgemäß nicht enthält:
TV-Loonland seit dem 21.9.2001 um 50% gestiegen, BKN aber um 50% gefallen
that makes the difference!
gestern sind
LETSBUYIT.COM +25,00%
CYBERNET INTERNET +21,28%
F.A.M.E. +16,67%
WWL INTERNET +13,21%
EM.TV +13,02% gestiegen!
ich weiß nicht warum, aber mit sicherheit lautete das HVB-Rating dieser non-valeurs: sell!

[User67]

Es gibt keinen Grund für eine (kurzfristige)negative Stimmung.Im Gegenteil,-die Charttechnischen Kaufsignale sind noch sehr jung,und der Aufwärtstrend in voller Blüte.Fundamental ist alles bekannt !!!- oder hat jemand Neuigkeiten ??? Ich habe festgestellt,das ich bei meinen besten Investments weder positive noch negative Analystenkommentare mit einbezogen habe.Natürlich ließt man gerne das, was einem zusagt.Kosto: Eigene Gedanken !

Jeder von uns hat ein Ziel.Und einen Plan.Unsere Kursziele für BKN sind breit gefächert.Die Kursziele der Käufer von Morgen und nächste Woche sind auch andere.Wir glauben,das unsere Einschätzung die Richtige ist.Jeder Widerstand gegen diese Einschätzung wird hart bekämpft.Im Hirn.Es gibt immer Pro und Kontra,-sonst würde ja der Handel nicht stattfinden !Es gibt Gewinner und Verlierer.

Ich bleibe dabei,Technik : O.K. Fundamental : O.K. sollte eines der beiden Punkte ins negative Abtriften überdenke ich in Ruhe und kühl das Investment.

N8

[Klaus39]

@murdog

Der GD60 liegt bei 3,99. Wieso sollte das ein größeres Hindernis sein??

Der RSI ist bei 60. Ist das etwa schon extrem überkauft?

Klaus

[Popschlager]

Ich weiß wirklich nicht, was so manche Anleger haben.
BKN ist ein klarer Kauf, dass bestätigt auch die Kaufempfehlung aus der USA -Morgan Stanley Dean Witter-
Sie sehen die BKN als Outperformer mit einem kurzfristigen Kursziel bei 7,10Euro.
Na, wenn das nichts ist.

[VanessaM]

Oh oh...
Vielleicht war es doch ganz gut gestern raus gegangen zu sein, denn technisch schaut es heute nicht mehr so toll aus.
Aktuell 3,91 €
Damit hat BKN den GD 38 wieder von oben nach unten geschnitten...jetzt könnte es erst mal abwärts gehen.

Eure Einschätzungen zu der m.E. veränderten Situation?!?

MfG.
Vanessa

[Gambletron]

Thx Vanessa.

Mir gefällt der HVB Bericht ziemlich gut. Man sollte die Verfassung des Marktes nicht ignorieren oder beschönigen.

Nicht übereinstimmen kann ich mit der Aussage die erworbenen Rechte seien bis zum 3fachen überteuert gewesen.

Die aktuell bilanzierten Filmrechte (inkl. M&L) betragen ca. 64 Mio €. Diese verteilen sich wie folgt (Gambletron Schätzung):

1) Neue Produktionen (UBOS, Kong...) ca. 170 Episoden bewertet mit 16 Mio € (25% der Rechte). Dies entspricht ca. 95.000 € und ist m.E. gerechtfertigt da sich UBOS, Lost Cont., und Capertown Cops im 1. Jahr und Kong erst im 2. Jahr befinden.

2) "Alte" Serien ca. 1180 Episoden Wert: ca. 32 Mio (50%).
Darunter fallen wertvolle wie Pocket Dragons, Roswell oder Monster Rancher. Die Sony HE Titel (Kinoadaptionen, Extreme ...) wo ich leider nicht weiß wie umfassend die Rechte bei BKN liegen, sowie mindestens 1/3 schwache Serien.
Im Schnitt liegt der Buchwert pro Episode bei ca. 30.000 €, also nur noch 10% - 15% der Produktionskosten. D.h. alle diese Serien sind im Schnitt bewertet als wären sie im 3 cycle und mindestens 6 Jahre alt.

3) Movies (Kong, 2 Rudolph...) Insgesamt 56 lange Filme die mit 16 Mio € zu Buche schlagen. Sicherlich ist Rudolph mit den Lizenzen mehr Wert als die restlichen 54 Filme zusammen. Von einer konkreten Einschätzung möchte ich allerdings absehen.


Alles in allem birgt der Katalog m.E. eher stille Reserven, die sich jedoch erst in ferner Zukunft wirklich positiv auswirken.


Ich möchte noch weitere Punkte der HVB Analysten aufgreifen: Der Nettobuchwert beträgt 52 Mio €, die Produktionen 2002 sind durch 4,7 Mio € Emissionserlös, ausschöpfen der Kreditlinie 8-9 Mio € sowie einen Kooperationsvertrag mit M6 4 Mio € gesichert. Die aktuelle Börsenbewertung beträgt ca. 30 Mio €. Für mich definitiv eine gute Chance.

[o_mar]

Wow, heute wird aber kräftig am Baum geschüttelt...

[VanessaM]

X99 sei gegrüsst!
Noch frohes Schaffen und zock nicht so viel!
Bis morgen.
Vanessa

[BruderK]

@hajoberg : na ganz schön ruhig geworden, ich hoffe du hast jetzt deine 9.800 stück noch, bestimmt aber noch ein paar mehr weil man kann ja jetzt noch billiger abstauben.
PS. kleiner tipp lieber nicht so weit aus dem fenster lehnen wenn man doch nix weis !