GEELY AUTOMOBILE - jetzt hat es einer bemerkt (Seite 1872)

[Matischack]

Doch Tinki, ich rede mit Dir. Denn was Du schreibst, wenngleich dem auch nicht immer so war, hat "Hand und Fuß". Und ist "kein Müll", wie ihn einer hier, der überhaupt nichts Konstruktives zur Sache beiträgt (bis auf ständig wiederkehrendes "Dummgeschwätz") und dessen Namen ich nicht mehr nennen will, von sich gibt.

Ich habe Dir ja gesagt, konstruktive Kritik - und das ist sie in diesem Falle definitiv - ist hier jederzeit und ich denke auch im Sinne der anderen, willkommen. Zu leicht nämlich gerät man in eine Spirale der Euphorie bei einem Unternehmen.

Zu lange und zu hart hat man für den geglaubten Erfolg an einem Unternehmen gekämpft und im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes, auch "bezahlt"! Das verleitet nur zu schnell dazu, dass man an einen Misserfolg gar nicht mehr denken mag. Schließlich hat man ja schon genug Federn für das Unternehmen, an das man ge(glaubt) hat, gelassen, also Miese gemacht. Und diese Tatsache lässt uns engstirnig werden. Mit "Scheuklappenblick" wollen wir nur noch das Positive sehen, wenn wir mal ehrlich sind und suchen uns zumeist nur noch solche Nachrichten heraus. Leider zähle ich mich selbst auch dazu.

Nur wenige scheinen hier den Überblick zu behalten. "Der Eine" ("gottgleich"), bei dem mittlerweile klar wird, was für ein Typ er tatsächlich ist (Arroganz und Hochmut) gehört aber ganz bestimmt nicht dazu. Dennoch möchte ich mich bei einigen Personen, wie zum Beispiel Fire bedanken, die durch unermüdliche Arbeit hier, uns an deren Akrebie teilhaben lassen. Ich glaube, dass Fire jemand ist, der es noch versteht, das "Für" und "Wider" herauszusuchen, abzuwägen und in seiner Bibliothek übersichtlich darzustellen.
Ich möchte vielen hier danken, nicht aber jeden explizit namentlich erwähnen müssen.

Und auch Dir Tinki danke ich. Mahnst Du doch ständig zur Vorsicht und gibst zu denken. Auch das ist ganz wichtig hier. Vielleicht nicht mehr für mich, der das Mahnende zwar hört, gern aber überhören will, da er schon (wie der Charlie) zu viele Verluste angehäuft hat und einfach nur noch hofft, dass es wohl "gut gehen wird". Wohl aber für die anderen, die hoffentlich den Blick für "das Klare" noch nicht verloren haben mögen.

Ich, lieber Tinki, hoffe also, dass Du unrecht behalten mögest. Weiß aber sehr wohl, wie groß die Gefahr ist, die Du beschreibst und das Du durchaus recht haben könntest.

Danke für Deinen Beitrag. :-)

[Tinkabay]

Aufrufe heute 425
davon bestimmt 200 doppelt-
Die Bude ist so etwas von Tot.
Kein Schwa..z interessiert sich
noch.

[Tinkabay]

Ich vermute mal das es hier eine Art von
Absprache gibt die über (evtl Bord Mail läuft)
es verbietet mir zu antworten.
Wie armselig.

[Tinkabay]

Darüber könnte/sollte man auch mal nachdenken.
Was hat Geely über die letzten Jahre nicht alles
angekündigt und was ist davon übrig geblieben.
Vieles was dieses Jahr angekündigt wird wurde
auch schon die Jahre davor angekündigt.

Ich meine mit ....wir haben vor und wollen demnächst
wurden wir fast tot geschlagen.

Davon sollte mal genug sein und DER Knaller gebracht werden.

Vertrauen schafft man so jedenfalls nicht.
Des weiteren sollte man die Verkaufszahlen von
Volvo als ALARMSIGNAL für Geely Mama im Auge behalten.
Es sieht nicht gut aus.Wie Der kleine Angsthase oder so
schon sagte 1000 Meldungen die allesamt fürs Klo sind.
Hört sich vielleicht gut an aber Geely ist nicht alleine
da sind andere Anbieter Meilen voraus.
Will sagen alles was hier als sagen wir mal als ..wat geil
angeboten wird ..sollte man mit der Konkurrenz mal abgleichen.
Die schlafen auch nicht.
Meine Meinung ist und bleibt..
Die goldenen Anleger Zeiten bei Geely sind vorbei
Geely wird ein Nischenplayer bleiben und den Euro
niemals sehen.
Da dürfte selbst ein Sparbuch über die Jahre mehr bringen.
Ich selber habe es schon erlebt wie schnell ein delisting
an der Börse geht weil ...der Onkel hat es nicht so gemeint.
China ist da ganz schnell bei der Sache.

[joap]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.625.222 von Fire72 am 20.09.12 11:37:12

Ja, dann wird in dem Bericht von 2 Marken gesprochen.

Gruß joap

[Fire72]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.623.889 von joap am 20.09.12 03:42:36

Grüatzi Geelianer,

@joap: Najo...GX7 u. GC7 = GLEagle, SC7=ENGLON ....

[joap]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 43.623.212 von Fire72 am 19.09.12 21:19:29

Hey Fire72,
denke daran das Geely die drei Markenstrategie fährt.

Muss also nichts bedeuten.

Gruß joap

[Fire72]

Nach diesem Bericht, sofern ich ihn richtig verstehe, stellt Geely seine verfügbaren Modelle mit den DSIH 6AT vor...GX7, SC7 und GC7...kein EC7 u. EC8 ...

http://roll.sohu.com/20120919/n353483022.shtml

[Fire72]

So,

liebe Leutz, der folgende Text ist in Englisch und seehr lang....das Lesen lohnt sich aber (die Zeit sollte man sich echt nehmen), da ein wirklicher Fachmann Stellung zu der Automobilentwicklung in China nimmt ....

"Interview with Asvin Chotai on the Chinese market, New Energy and Trends
Industry News | Ash | September 19, 2012 at 7:04 pm
ashvinchotai Interview with Asvin Chotai on the Chinese market, New Energy and Trends

Ashvin at the Global Automotive Forum

Ashvin Chotai is no newcomer to the Chinese market, the gentlemen has been offering commentary and opinion on the Chinese auto market for several years. Chotai is currently the managing director of Intelligence Automotive Asia, a London based consultancy focusing on research, analysis, consulting and other advisory services to automotive companies and financial institutions on developments in Asian economies and the global automotive industry. The below interview was carried out at the Global Automotive Forum in Chengdu in September 2012.

Q: At what stage of development is the Chinese auto market? What are some of the special characteristics and in what senses is it similar to and different from auto market in Europe and the U.S.?

A: Not long ago, it was common to compare China with other emerging markets such as Brazil and India and in many ways China is still an emerging market. For example, car ownership per thousand persons is still very low at national level, a large percentage of buyers are first time buyers and growth rates are high. New players are still entering the market, expanding their production scale and distribution presence and new customer and product segments are still forming. So in this respect, China is very different from Europe or North America where car ownership rates are very high while demand, segmentation and competitive dynamics are more stable. Of course, the financial crisis has created some instability and interesting changes in both regions.

After the incredible growth during the last decade, it can be said that many of China’s provinces (especially on the East coast) and cities now have more similarities with developed countries than with emerging markets. But many provinces and cities are still in “emerging market” phase.

Similarities with USA include the large land area, large number of cities and rapid construction of road network, in the same way that occured in the US in the 1950s. Medium and large sedans have traditionally dominated, helped by high level of institutional demand relatively low fuel prices. Diesel cars have not become popular. However, unlike the US, long distance car driving is not as common, demand is quickly shifting to smaller, fuel efficient cars. With the exception of Buick models, American design models, especially pick-up trucks have not gained significant market share.

Europe is not a single or homogenous market but generally speaking, smaller hatchbacks tend to dominate, especially in Southern European countries. European influence has in China has been strong, especially as European models from brands such as Volkswagen play a prominent role in China. Smaller car models and hatch back body styles have been becoming more popular, especially among younger buyers in big cities.

And we should not forget Japanese and Korean influence as well. There are some interesting parallels between Japanese/Korean presence in North America and in China.

In terms of structure of the market and industry, China is much more fragmented and complicated with presence of Chinese, US, European, Japanese and Korean brands with no one enjoying significant “home turf” advantage.

Overall, China has its own characteristics with mix of developed world, developing or emerging market features and strong influence from all the key brands which as know are from everywhere in the world. The government’s role and the JV structure is also very unique to China and this has a massive influence on industry structure.

Q: Since 2009, China has been the top ranked country, both in terms of domestic auto sales and auto production but demand growth has been moderating in the last two years. What is your assessment of the growth dynamics for auto demand and auto production in China?

A: In order to assess how demand will evolve in the future it is useful to briefly review the major demand drivers during the last decade, how they are now changing and how they will change during the next decade.

In 2000, vehicle production in China stood at just 2.1 million units. By 2011, production level had reached 18.42 million units. This is equivalent to compound annual growth rate of 21.8% during the last 11 years.

China’s entry into the WTO was the major catalyst for the boom during the early years of the last decade. A combination of very favorable factors, including, new models, increased capacity (owing to the government’s more liberal attitude towards approving new projects), intense price competition, improved affordability and greater consumer choice released pent-up demand and came at the time when “consumerism” was taking off in China. Major cities in the East Coast were the main growth engines but from 2005-2006, healthy support has also been coming from the spread of motorization in other provincial capitals and medium size cities.

The next major catalyst came in early 2009 when developments in global and Chinese macroeconomic environment and outlook for car demand were extremely worrying. Against this backdrop, China’s macroeconomic stimulus package and specific measures to stimulate auto consumption triggered an incredible boom, (much more powerful than policy makers may have intended). Attractive incentives and higher level of confidence pulled forward car purchasing decisions but after strong sales in 2009 and 2010 there was much less pent-up demand and hence growth in 2011 and 2012 has been sluggish by China’s standards.

Q: How much more growth potential is there in China? What can you say about provincial and city level trends?

A: Despite the impressive boom in vehicle sales since 2002, vehicle ownership levels at national level are still very low and hence there is still huge potential for growth, especially outside the mega-cities and in the inner provinces. However, there are clear signs that the market has reached at least the first stage of maturity. Growth from high base levels also becomes more challenging and there is now also much greater focus on traffic, infrastructure and environmental issues, especially in the large cities on the East coast. There is also impressive progress in the development of public transport infrastructure while the development of the used car market will also complement but check the growth in new car sales.

Whilst demand growth in many of the major cities will be constrained by congestion and infrastructure bottlenecks plus more stringent controls on vehicle registrations, there is still significant scope for growth in inner, Northern and some Southern provinces as well in the smaller cities in the more developed provinces such as Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu. However, controls on car registrations in Beijing and Guangzhou and negative developments in cities such as Wenzhou are a warning that car demand in many cities across China are in “bubble” and could see a sharp correction from the high levels of 2010.

Overall, however, I expect demand growth is expected to moderate but still remain healthy.

If we just focus on passenger cars, SUVs and MPV (no minibus or commercial vehicles), it can be said than in 2011 there were four provinces (Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Zhejiang) with sales of around 1 million units. If minibus and commercial vehicles are included demand was well over 1 million units in these provinces. So the auto market in many of China’s provinces is much bigger than many country markets. For example, the size of Thailand’s auto market in 2011 was less than 800,000 units in 2011. I estimate that there were five provinces in China with a bigger market than Thailand. Global companies need to recognize this in their planning and resource allocation processes.

It is now well accepted that growth in developed provinces and large cities is slowing down. In cities where there are controls on ownership, sales are of course falling. But demand in smaller cities (in China even smaller cities have very large population by international comparisons) still remains healthy.

Although growth rates in developed East Coast provinces are now moderating, the base is very large and these provinces will still remain very important for all automakers, even with low levels of growth. Demand in inner and less developed provinces is growing rapidly but from much lower base levels. Even at city level, we have a similar contrasting situation with high growth rates in smaller cities but from low base level and lower or negative growth in some of very large cities.

Overall, I expect around 80% of the growth in the next decade to come from outside the top 10 cities (as measured by current size of the car market). The role of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou is declining because of congestion and other ownership controls and also relatively high car ownership levels. Other large cities including several provincial capitals will have similar situation.

In terms of provinces, automakers are establishing a broader based presence across China to serve the existing core markets and future growth provinces. Purchasing power, segment profiles and hence product requirements do vary quite bit across provinces. Overall, I expect Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hebei, Sichuan and Henan to be the Top 7 most important provinces, as measured by current size of the market and future growth potential.

Q: Several big cities in China have imposed restriction on the purchase of cars. Will this affect the role of auto industry in China’s industry?

A: This is a major uncertainty when making demand assessment and of course has huge impact at local level, especially at dealer level.

Beijing demand in 2011 was less than half of the demand in 2010. In the next 12 months we can expect a similar slump in Guangzhou while Xi’an is also considering moves to impose some controls.

The impact of controls in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou has already been factored into most manufacturers plans. As other cities are smaller markets, the impact of controls will not be as severe as Beijing. My own estimates indicate that we could see a negative impact of around 1 million units in 2015, if say 15 significant cities impose similar controls between 2013 and 2015.

Of course, this will put further pressure on national level growth but I don’t believe it will change the role of auto industry in China’s industrial economy or its role in the global context.

Q: What about vehicle production ?

A: Unlike Japan or Korea or Germany, China domestic demand is the primary driver of vehicle production levels in China. Growth in exports by Chinese brands has been very healthy in recent years and I expect further healthy growth but export are likely to account for around less than 10% of production during the next decade. Imports are restricted to luxury and niche vehicles and this situation is also unlikely to change.

So, broadly speaking, vehicle production will remain highly dependent on domestic demand and the role of exports will increase slowly and gradually.

China’s expected production levels of around 19.5 million units in 2012 will be over twice Japan’s level and over 30% higher than combined production of USA, Canada and Mexico. However, with so many players and joint ventures, the industry structure is highly fragmented.

Q: Do you think the government should introduce stimulus measures to boost auto demand ?

A: As was seen in 2009, the abilities of national and provincial governments to prop up demand should never be underestimated. So it is always dangerous to predict a slowdown in China.

What happened in 2009 and 2010, while positive for the industry in the short term, was not necessarily healthy from a medium and long-term perspective. Incentive fuelled boom generally result in market distortions and over-optimism when it comes to future planning and there is generally always a “post-stimulus” hangover when demand growth either declines sharply or actually falls. It is unhealthy for automotive market and the industry to become addicted to government support measures.

So, I think the market should be allowed to determine its own level of natural level without much government support and intervention. In the medium and long term, the emphasis should be on sustainable growth, striking the balance between mobility, aspiration to won a car, congestion, environment, energy supplies and the health of the auto industry. Any government intervention to should ensure that it does not adversely impact balanced long term sustainable growth.

Q: With the rapid development of China’s auto industry, the conflict between vehicles, the environment, and traffic have become increasingly severe. So what kind of development do you think is sustainable? Do you think the “traffic regulation” taken by the government to slow the pace of urban traffic congestion is desirable? Are there any good examples overseas we can learn from?

A: It is quite interesting that on the one hand there is a lot of talk of further stimulus measures to boost demand and on the other hand many cities are facing chronic congestion and are considering measures to control car ownership and use.
In the short term and at national level, the market needs to find its natural level of demand without distortions from policy measures.

In the medium and long term, of course, individual cities will have to find their own solutions and this could be Beijing/Shanghai/Guangzhou style controls on ownership, either via lottery or license place auctions, congestion charges similar to London and Singapore to discourage driving in congested central areas, more emphasis on traffic and parking management. Preferential treatment for cars carrying multiple passengers (e.g. priority lanes on expressways) and to fuel efficient and environmentally friendly cars is also common in some countries. Public transport in many of the Chinese cities is improving rapidly and many of the cities are learning from the experience of cities such as Tokyo, which has managed to achieve a good balance between public transport, taxis and private cars and move large numbers of people everyday in fairly efficient manner.

Q: At present, inventory levels at many auto dealers in China have reached “a red line”. Does this mean the Chinese auto market is saturated and begins to slump down? What suggestions do you have for the manufacturers and auto dealers whose inventory has reached the red line?

A: After spectacular growth in 2009 and 2010, I am not surprised to see that demand has been sluggish in 2011 and 2012. Although growth rate is disappointing by China’s standards, the fact that demand has not shown major declines is a promising sign but mounting inventory levels is very destablising.

In simple terms, dealer inventory has reached high levels because demand growth has slowed and manufacturers have set ambitious growth targets and have been reluctant or slow to adjust their production and have been pushing sales to dealers too aggressively even when demand from end customer is weak.

Of course, the situation varies from brand to brand and from dealer to dealer but in general, excess inventory is intensifying price competition and discounting.

So, the first solution would be for manufactures to work more closely with dealers to set more realistic sales goals. This is a major challenge and learning exercise for both parties as they have got used to high level of demand growth, waiting lists, high margins and capacity constraints.

As I have stated above, the medium and long term outlook is still healthy and I don’t think that this signals a major slump in demand from a medium and long term perspective. However, it is a strong indication that growth rates are moderating because there are some macroeconomic headwinds and a lot of pent-up demand has been satisfied after strong buying in recent years.

All players need to acknowledge this and maintain flexibility in their growth plans and strategies. There will be pressure on margins and profits and this is bound to discourage aggressive investments at manufacturer and dealer levels.

Q: The spectacular growth of Chinese auto industry has meant that China features more prominently in their global strategies. Can you summarize how the strategies of foreign companies have evolved to take into account the importance of China? What key challenges do they face?

A: In 1990, China’s share of global auto sales was just 1.1%. Even in 2002, it stood at just 5.2%. But by 2011 this had risen to 22.7%. In the same period, the share of N. America, Europe and Japan (so called developed triad markets) dropped from 76% to 47% because the boom in China was accompanied by stagnation or declines in developed markets. Also, until the last decade, most automakers had been locked out of China due to the tight controls on entry and investment.

So, it has been not surprising that global automakers and component suppliers have been putting more and more emphasis on China to support their global growth objectives. Even with more moderate growth, China will continue to remain a key market for virtually all automakers and the main growth engine for their global sales, production, revenues and profits. China will also continue to be their main destination for investment. There is no other growth market like China. Other BRIC countries have not enjoyed such spectacular growth and there are few signs that they will do so consistently in the future.

Operating in China via a JV structure does make it much more complex for foreign automakers to properly integrate their China operations into their global strategies and supply chains. This is one of the major reasons why foreign brands are reluctant to even plan to use China as a significant export base …in the same way as they are using countries like India and Thailand. For example, Hyundai is a major exporter of cars made at its Indian factories while Toyota is major exporter from Thailand but neither of these companies are exporting from China. Of course, the spectacular growth in China has meant that most companies have had their hands full expanding their operations to satisfy domestic demand rather than consider exports from China.

The challenge for most manufacturers continues to be to build a competitive product portfolio, have high level of local content and cost competitiveness, establish an extensive and efficient distribution network and have sufficient products and production capacity to take advantage of the growth opportunities. It is fair to say foreign companies are becoming more “Chinese” while Chinese companies are learning from foreign players. In the current environment, they also need to exercise some caution when planning major investments. A slowdown in China and excess capacity could trigger a change in strategy and put more pressure on join ventures to step up export activity.

Q: Do you think it is time for the Chinese government to change its provisions regarding the 50:50 ratio for Sino-foreign auto joint ventures?

A: Foreign auto assembly cannot have a wholly owned assembly ventures and under the current regulations, foreign assemblers can have a maximum of 2 joint ventures per vehicle category and the maximum stake in restricted to 50%.

In a sense, I find it quite surprising that China has not faced more pressure from developed countries to relax these restrictions …especially as China has been in the WTO for nearly 10 years.

These types of restrictions were common across Asia until the 1990s. In India, these restrictions in the auto industry were removed in 1997. In countries like Thailand and Indonesia, most such restrictions were removed in the post Asian crisis period, in 1997/1998 when the IMF started putting pressure on the respective governments to deregulate and many of the local players were facing financial difficulties.

Today, large parts of the auto assembly sector in India, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico are wholly owned by global OEMs and fully integrated into the global strategy and operations.

Immediately after China joined WTO there was a lot of debate on this issue but it is interesting that this no longer seems to be a talking point. Part of the reason is that many of the foreign companies have already signed very long term JV agreements and accepted this situation and see this restriction as a small price to pay for participating in China’s booming market. China has not really been put under any international pressure on this issue and without significant external pressure the government is unlikely to change these rules.

In the meantime JVs have become bigger and bigger and quite mature. Now we have a situation that even if China relaxed the restrictions, the current JV structure will continue to dominate. Exiting or restructuring current JV agreements would be very complicated …and most foreign assemblers may not even be able to afford to buy out the Chinese partner’s stake even if this became possible in law.

So …in theory, wholly owned operations foreign companies could one day be possible but they would most likely face a whole new set of new obstacles.

So we have to assume that the current JV structure will remain as the only way in which foreign assemblers can participate in China’s auto industry.

From Chinese point of view, it can be said that Chinese government and SOEs have been able to maintain control over the industry and reap significant financial benefits from the current rules and industry structure but it can be argued that this structure has not helped in the development of independent technology and brands. Independent Chinese automakers such as Geely, Great Wall and Chery who have operated without JV partners have made more progress.

Q: How will the competitive dynamics Between JVs and Independent Brands Evolve ?

A: 13 major Chinese Groups plus their JV partners currently account for over 90% of the vehicle production.

Chinese brands are dominant in the commercial vehicle market but in the car sector (excluding minibus), more than two third of the production is accounted for by JVs.

Will JVs continue this type of dominance? In summary yes, mainly because of JVs continue to improve their competitiveness and will continue to be the main mechanism for bringing in the latest products and technologies into China and also for producing and marketing vehicles that modern Chinese customers want.

Initially, independent Chinese brands enjoyed success with low price strategies and focus on smaller cities but in recent years, most JVs have made very impressive progress in terms of having a broad product portfolio, becoming very price competitive and expanding their distribution to inner provinces and smaller cities. Meanwhile, operating performance of individual Chinese companies has also been erratic. In 2011 and 2012, most Chinese independent brand have been underperforming the market.

The most recent development is introduction of joint venture brands such as Baojun, Linian, Kaili etc. The product strategy is based on the use of old/outgoing platform from the foreign partner, carrying out some restyling and upgrades and then repositioning the model to appeal to price sensitive buyers, especially in smaller cities. This development will be putting even more pressure on Chinese independent brands.

So overall, the outlook for independent brands is becoming very challenging. I expect JVs to continue their dominance and account for at least 60% of China’s car production in the medium term.

Q: How rapidly can Chinese auto assemblers close the competitive gap? Is there scope for cooperation between different players?

A: The global auto industry is highly competitive. Barriers to entry in areas such as sophistication of technology, capital intensity and production scale, brand development and distribution presence are very high and it is rare to see new players emerge and succeed. So in this global context it has been amazing to see so many domestic brands emerge in China in the last decade.

Progress made by larger automotive SOEs in areas such as building their engineering and development capabilities, launching competitive models, building brands and eventually gaining market share has been slow. But, a small number of newer private Chinese companies have made more impressive progress.

Of course, we have to again mention China has a unique industry structure, shaped and tightly controlled by government policy. Without such controls, it is almost certain that China’s industry structure could have become similar to India or Brazil where foreign automakers dominate and only a very few globally competitive domestic automakers emerge and succeed over a longer period. In India, we have just Tata and Mahindra who can compete with global brands and even they face a lot of challenges.

In China’s unique situation, although there has been a fair bit of consolidation already, there are still too many players and the industry structure is too fragmented. While demand was growing strongly, the fragmented industry structure was not an issue but a prolonged period of slow growth will put pressure on several of smaller automakers to exit, consolidate or seek other ways of operating.

In an environment of slow growth and intense competition, it becomes even more important to have highly competitive products and strong branding. So, the main challenge is to continue to focus on product quality and technology and continue to improve brand image and customer acceptance.

There are currently no examples of meaningful cooperation between domestic players and the culture of deep cooperation in areas such as engineering, product development, joint purchasing and production, re-badging and sharing distribution channels will take time to evolve.

The government is expected to continue to persist with its support and encouragement to local players to enhance their capabilities and become more competitive. It has been acknowledging that the gap between Chinese companies and major global OEMs is still significant and it will soon have to decide how many companies it is viable to support. How rapidly this gap can close during the coming years will determine the type of progress that Chinese companies can make both in China and globally.

Q: We know you have done a lot of research on the development of South Korea’s auto industry. The auto industry of China and South Korea both started basically in the 1980s, but now Korean-brands have been well recognized by the global market, especially in China. What is the weakness associated with China’s auto industry by comparing the two countries, and what do you think China should learn from South Korea?

A: The situation in China is very different from Korea and so we have to be careful when making direct comparisons. But of course, these are some lessons China can learn from the experiences of the Korean automakers.

In 2011, Korean domestic vehicle sales were only 1.5 million units while vehicle production was 4.66 million units. So both sales and production levels are a lot lower than in China. There are also major differences in industry structure, number of players, export orientation and government policy. In 2011, South Korea exported 3.15m vehicles of exports accounted for over two thirds of the production.

Historically, high tariffs and tight control over foreign participation in the industry were crucial factors in the nurturing and development of strong national champion companies in the form of companies such as Hyundai, Kia and Daewoo. During the 1970s and 1980s the Korean automotive industry entered into numerous joint ventures and technology agreements with overseas manufacturers. Daewoo co-operated with GM through to 1992, Hyundai with Mitsubishi, and Kia with Mazda.

From the mid-1980s, the Korean industry started to transform itself from CKD assembly of foreign designed vehicles to fully fledged manufacture with a high level of domestic design, engineering and component production.

Initially, Korean brands also suffered from low quality image and they did not enjoy success immediately, Indeed, the industry went through a difficult period in the late 1990s, immediately after the Asian crisis and the collapse in the domestic market. Kia and Daewoo went into bankruptcy and were bought by Hyundai and GM respectively while Renault acquired Samsung. At Hyundai/Kia, there was a realization that without a significant presence outside Korea, the company could not survive. Strong leadership and a single-minded focus on quality and technology was crucial in turning around Hyundai’s performance in key export markets such as the USA. In the last decade, Hyundai and Kia have developed into sophisticated global companies with a broad and competitive product portfolio plus an extensive global sales and production footprint. While Daewoo and Samsung were acquired by GM and Renault respectively, they continue to play a critical role in the Korean auto industry and the economy.

The situation in China is a lot more complex with so many players, a large domestic market and low dependency on exports.

So far, Chinese penetration of export markets has been low and restricted to emerging markets such as Russia, South/Central America and Africa/Middle East. Moving up to the next level would require success in the major developed regions of North America and Europe. In this respect, it appears very unlikely that Chinese brands can emulate he success of Japanese brands in the 1970s and 1980s or the success of Koran brand in the last decade.

The main lessons individual Chinese companies can learn from Hyundai/Kia are:

• A strategy based on low prices and to other emerging markets should be regarded as only the first stage of international expansion focused on emerging markets.
• Significant volumes can only be built up by achieving presence in developed markets such as North America and Europe. Customers in these regions are brand loyal and winning them over requires a major leap in quality and technology level. New brands also need to make significant investment in marketing, brand building and distribution network.
• It will be much more challenging for new brands to build up sales momentum in the current environment than it was for Japanese and Korean brands when they first entered USA and Europe.

Q: Chinese government has introduced the “Energy-saving and new energy vehicle development plan” formally in July, and put forward the goal of sales in 2015 as 500 000 units. How do you see this? In last year’s car forum you highlighted some of the major obstacles in the way of more rapid development of new energy vehicles in China. What is your latest assessment of the future development of new energy vehicles in China? What are the key obstacles?

A: It is true that a key element of government policy has been to support the adoption and development of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs).

The broad rationale is obvious

1. NEVs will eventually reduce China’s dependence on oil and reduce its carbon footprint.
2. Developing the capability to develop and produce competitive NEVs (particularly Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) is a huge opportunity for China and Chinese companies to leap-frog global automakers and hence build up a significant global competitive advantage

There is very strong government commitment and financial resources to support developments in this sector including generous grants to the local industry and aggressive subsidies from national and municipal governments for buyers of NEVs. China also has a huge pool of engineering resources to support development of battery, motor and other related technologies and the financial resources and ability to rapidly establish of EV charging infrastructure. Compared to most developed countries, Chinese consumers also appear to be more “open” to buying EVs.

Government targets to have 500,000 NEVs on the road by 2015 (this is not an annual sales goal) and 5 million NEVs on the road by 2020 are very modest in relation to the overall vehicle population but ambitious in relation to the current population of NEVs and the nature of challenges ahead.

Actual progress and sales performance so far has been very disappointing. Key obstacles for more rapid adoption include high purchase price, the limited driving range of NEVs (particularly for BEVs) and inadequate charging infrastructure. Issues such as shortage of electric power, lack of common technical standards for EV charging interface and infrastructure and safety will also hinder progress. It is also highly debatable whether the carbon footprint will really drop as a large portion of China’s electricity is generated using coal.

Based on an assessment of progress in all the above areas, I do not expect demand, especially from private buyers, to accelerate until after 2015.

Even if government’s current goal of 5 million NEVs by 2020 is met, this will hardly make dent in demand for oil as total vehicle population in 2020 is set to rise to over 200 million.

In the near term, Chinese policy makers and the industry need to acknowledge the significant technical and infrastructure obstacles before battery vehicles become more competitive and acceptable to consumers. China’s policy roadmap has so far not been pragmatic and in 2011, even Prime Minister Hu Jintao has questioned the philosophy of putting so much emphasis on Battery Electric Vehicles.

There are currently more reasons to be optimistic about the outlook for hybrid cars, especially plug-in hybrids but the internal combustion engine is likely to remain as the dominant propulsion mode at least for the next decade and most likely a lot longer. There is still plenty of scope to make improvements through measures such as direct injection, turbo charging etc.

Q: The Toyota PRIUS is selling well in Japan and the U.S. but sales in China are very low. Sales of other hybrid vehicles are also low. How do you explain this? If relatively developed technologies such as hybrid are not accepted in China can we conclude that the outlook for pure electric vehicles is even more pessimistic?

A: It is very true that the success of the Prius in USA and Japan is so far not being replicated in China. Government policy currently does not provide any special benefit to hybrids relative to conventional gasoline powered cars. In fact, conventional hybrids are not even regarded as New Energy Vehicles in the national government policy. The subsidy level for hybrids is just 3000 yuan compared to maximum of 120,000 yuan (60,000 yuan from central government and upto 60,000 yuan from selected municipal governments) available for battery electric vehicles.

Until now, lack of broad policy support means high price premium over gasoline cars while the absence of some of the benefits (such as special lanes on expressways, easier parking and tax breaks) that are available in other countries does not make hybrids an attractive proposition at present.

Recently, however, there has been some news that the Guangzhou will offer subsidy of 10,000 yuan for conventional hybrids. This is sure to energize sales of the Toyota Prius and other hybrid models in Guangzhou. It is quite likely that the policy environment in other cities could become also become more favourable and it will not be surprising if hybrids also receive more support at national level in the future.

Plug In hybrids (PHEVs) and Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) are classified as NEVs and come with many incentives and benefits for consumers. The aim of government policy has been to encourage Chinese companies to develop BEVs and PHEVs as it believes that Chinese companies can have the potential to leapfrog foreign automakers in this technology. Such policy support is available for hybrids. Hence, the performance of Prius hybrid should not be regarded as an indication of sales of BEVs and PHEVs.
My comments on the previous question summarize the key obstacles in the way of more rapid acceptance of PHEVs and BEVs.

Toyota is believed to be considering sale of imported version of Prius Plug In version in China. It will be interesting to see if Toyota eventually produces the Prius PHEV in China and whether this model can qualify for the same level of incentives and policy support as PHEVs developed and produced by Chinese automakers.

Interviewed carried out by the Global Automotive Forum."

http://www.chinacartimes.com/2012/09/19/interview-asvin-chot…

[Fire72]

Geely bekommt Zuwachs von der Konkurrenz ....

"PSA China’s Brand Manager and Hawtai CEO Drop Into Geely
Industry News | Ash | September 19, 2012 at 9:28 pm

Geely has two new additions to its team, first PSA Asia’s former product planner and market strategy director Mr Sun Xiao Dong has joined Geely as brand director and Hawtai’s former CEO Mr Hou Qing Jing will join Geely as the General Manager of Geely’s Chengdu production facility.

Sun Xiao Dong has been in the car industry since 1997 when he joined Shanghai GM as Sales and Marketing Director before leaving to PSA as Asia Product Planning and Strategy Director."

http://www.chinacartimes.com/2012/09/19/psa-chinas-brand-man…