GM - gewaltiges Loch in der Pensionskasse - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[danatbank]

Das aktuelle Defizit des Pensionsfonds beträgt 12,7 Mrd.$.
Dazu werden in den kommenden Jahren Defizite, die daraus
resultieren, daß eine Verzinsung der Rücklagen des Fonds
von 10% unterstellt wird, während seriöserweise mit max.
5% kalkuliert werden kann. Bei 7 Mrd.$ Buchwert ist das
Unternehmen damit faktisch um über 20 Mrd.$ überschuldet.
Auch operativ sieht es zunehmend düster aus: In Zukunft
werden aufgrund der 0%-Finanzierung Gewinne aus der
Finanzsparte dünner werden, viele Käufe werden vorgezogen
und bei 18 Mio. verkauften PKWs und leichten Nutzfahrzeugen
droht mittelfristig ein Übersättigung des US-Marktes, was
um so schlimmer wirkt, als erstens GM-Fahrzeuge eine
niedrigen Wiederverkaufswert haben und zweitens die starke
Stellung der UAW in der GM-Arbeitnehmerschaft Anpassungen
im Personalbestand nahezu unmöglich macht (Aktuell steht
wieder ein breitangelegter Streik vor der Tür.).
International sind gleich mehrere Fehlgriffe zu verzeichnen:
-Hughes Electronics, die hochdefizitäre Satellitenfernsehtochter,
die vergessen wurde, im TMT-Boom zu verkaufen,
-die stark verschuldete und qualitativ schlecht produzierende
Isuzu, der GM vor kurzem erst eine halbe Milliarde
Finanazspritze zugesagt hat,
-die rapide an Marktanteil verlierende Fiat Auto, die
GM gezwungen sein wird, 2004 zu einem überzogenen Preis zu kaufen,
-die Dauerverlustbringer Opel und Vauxhall,
-Daewoo, Suzuki usw.usw.
seien erwähnt. Ein Einbruch in den USA, von wo aus bislang
alle anderen Löcher gestopft werden, wird für dieses
Unternehmen nur schwer zu schultern sein. Er wird aufgrund
der Übersättigung des US-Marktes (mehr Autos als Führerscheine,
Drittautos weitverbreitet) aber kommen. Dann könnte mit
einem Mega-Crash zu rechnen sein, der nur von Staatsseite
noch zuverndern wäre (siehe Chrysler-bail-out in de 80ern.).

http://www.detnews.com/2002/autosinsider/0207/19/b01-538811.…
http://biz.yahoo.com/fin/l/g/gm_qb.html

[keinschweinweissbescheid]

geht mir am Arsch vorbei.
Meine Kasse ist voll.

[danatbank]

The decline in EDs will amount in a 1 billion dollar reduction in GMs pension fund. That equals 2 points of the stock. Here is the proof that GMs pension fund is holding a ton of EDS stock directly from the 1999 10-K
"Pension plan assets are primarily invested in U.S. Government obligations, equity and fixed income securities, commingled pension trust funds, insurance contracts, the Corporation`s $1-2/3 par value common stock (valued as of the1999 measurement date at $4.2 million), and EDS common stock (valued as of the 1999 measurement date at $4.7 billion). In March 1995, under the terms of an agreement between the Corporation and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), the Corporation contributed to the GM Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan(Hourly Plan) 173.2 million shares of Class E common stock valued at $6.3 billion on such date. Subsequent to the split-off of EDS, the Class E stock held by the Hourly Plan was exchanged for EDS common stock. The trustees for the Hourly Plan have, from time-to-time, sold shares of former Class E common stock and EDS common stock, with the effect of reducing the number of shares of EDS"

[danatbank]

EDS aktuell unter 18. Ergibt 2$/share zusätzlichen Verlusts:

[danatbank]

http://www.trendmacro.com/a/luskin/20020227luskin.asp

[danatbank]

http://www.trendmacro.com/a/luskin/20020327luskin.asp

[danatbank]

Accounting tricks can`t hide the big squeeze on pensions

Published: October 2 2002 5:00 | Last Updated: October 2 2002 5:00

Three years of fallingequity prices have finally taken their toll on the US pensions industry. According to UBS Warburg, the Swiss banking giant, companies in the S&P 500 index are now in cumulative deficit on their pension funds for the first time since 1993. This means that S&P 500 companies will report aggregate pension costs - rather than income - for 2002: a swing that will adversely affect earnings by an average $0.95 per share.

It is only in the past year or so that analysts have woken up to the effect of pension funds on corporate earnings.

During the long bull market in equities, pension promises made by the corporate sector seemed trivial - the funding burden was assumed by the market itself. To the extent that the pension fund mattered at all, it was a useful addition to reported earnings per share.

But, in its own way, the decision to back pension promises with a high equity weighting acted as a pyramid scheme: the US corporate sector was investing in itself.

The sharp decline in equity markets since March 2000 has taken its time to show up in profit and loss accounts and balance sheets because of the peculiar way in which pension promises are accounted for.

As UBS points out, US accounting techniques "delay and only partially recognise changes in asset market values and smooth or amortise these changes over a long period. The by-product of these adjustments and associated assumptions is balance sheet values of net pension liabilities or assets that are often completely meaningless."

The investment bank estimates that, of 355 S&P companies with defined benefit pension plans, 118 show a surplus on their balance sheet when the fund is really in deficit.

One common ruse is to assume a very high future return on pension assets. The average assumed return on pension assets by S&P 500 companies is 9.5 per cent, a very aggressive forecast given low inflation and a typical bond weighting of 30 per cent. Indeed, since the early 1990s, the spread between the assumed return on assets and the discount rate used to value liabilities has nearly tripled.

When, as in the last three years, returns have fallen far short of those forecasts, the shortfall is not recognised straight away but amortised over the average service of the employees. The hope is that the markets will recover sufficiently to make up any shortfall.

But each successive year when market returns fall short of the assumption makes such wishful thinking seem less plausible.

Just last week a Morgan Stanley analyst cautioned that IBM may need to contribute up to $2.3bn to its pension plan in 2004, prompting a decline in the computer giant`s stock.

One could argue that falling stock markets should prompt companies to raise their expected future return, on the grounds that returns tend to revert to the mean. Alas, there was little evidence that pension funds lowered their future return assumptions during the boom years of the late 1990s.

It is also fair to point out that the aggregate deficit is quite small. While UBS estimates the shortfall is 11 per cent of pension obligations, it is only 1.5 per cent of market capitalisation. But this figure is just an average; companies such as Delta Air Lines and General Motors have huge shortfalls.

The key issue is the extent to which the cost of meeting this shortfall is shared between shareholders and pension fund members. Some companies are already switching from defined benefit to defined contribution plans to reduce their costs. However, the benefits of this switch, which normally apply only to new members, are very slow to take effect.

Some companies also promised to provide health benefits for retirees. One reason why the US government put tariffs on imported steel was the crippling cost of pension and health business faced by the steel companies, which have vast armies of ex-employees. Those scheme members most at risk are those who work at ailing companies, where the pension promise may turn out to be an empty one. In such cases, the shareholders will lose out as well.

More generally, however, healthy companies will discover that all the accounting tricks in the world cannot protect them from their basic problem; that they have made an expensive promise to employees and that their own cash, rather than market gains, will be needed to fund it.

[danatbank]

FT.com
GM`s healthcare treatment costs could spiral
Thursday October 3, 4:05 pm ET

By James Mackintosh


If General Motors has a black hole in its pension fund, its healthcare obligations look like a bottomless pit.
The company paid out $3.2bn last year for the medical and life insurance costs of its pensioners, and estimates the cost in today`s money of its future obligations at $52.5bn - more than double its market capitalisation.

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Virtually none of this is backed by funds, either.

The company had only $5bn put aside at the start of this year.

If the company did not have to pay healthcare to its 459,000 US pensioners, its profits would be more than half as big again.

Most Wall Street concern about GM`s healthcare is focused on the rising cost of treatment, with US medical inflation spiralling.

GM is working hard to put a cap on the rise.

Last year it began an education programme to reduce its drugs bill - a quarter of the total cost - by promoting generic drugs over more expensive branded alternatives.

This saved $14m, and another $67m has been saved in the past four years by putting pressure on lower-quality providers to improve.

As a result the carmaker expects healthcare costs per person to rise only 6 per cent this year, down from 8.6 per cent last year, although the rate is forecast to rise again in 2003 b efore tailing off.

The big savings would come from more radical action.

Analysts expect the company next year to try to negotiate with the United Auto Workers union to include "co-pays" for pensioners, which would see them contribute towards the cost of ca re.

But the UAW will not be happy with such a move, and Rick Wagoner, chief executive of GM, is not building up hopes.

"I would not expect any silver bullet solution, for example by significantly changing the terms of our UAW agreement," he said. "The expense side can be managed and we are going to pursue every effort to do that.

[danatbank]

12/30 00:02
Earnings `Time Bomb` Looms in U.S. as Pension Fund Losses Mount
By David Evans

http://quote.bloomberg.com/fgcgi.cgi?T=marketsquote99_relnew…