Caribische Piraten stützen den US Dollar + Gold wird "gemanagt" - 500 Beiträge pro Seite

[Siam2]

PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN

Rob Kirby

http://www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_05/rkirby031905.html




Review Of Gold From Frank Veneroso

Auszug:

I believe the most recent GFMS statistics are now distorted to the point of the ridiculous. Let me illustrate.

Below are the GFMS supply/demand data for 1995 and 1996 (published at a time when the gold price averaged approximately $390.00 an ounce) and the more recent data for 2003 and 2004 (when the dollar gold price has been somewhat higher). In the interim, there has been some global inflation and some dollar depreciation. Therefore, in real inflation adjusted terms in a relevant global basket of currencies, the gold price over the last two years is probably a little below the level that prevailed in 1995 and 1996.



We know that, in over 200 years of history, private demand for gold (excluding gold as a monetary metal in the hands of the public) has been positively correlated with income and negatively correlated with the real gold price. In the Gold Book, I showed that, for a constant real gold price, gold demand has tended to rise in line with global income. In the economic jargon, we say that gold has had an income elasticity slightly greater than unity. Many studies have shown that such demands for gold are also reasonably price elastic. That is, when the real price of gold falls, for the same amount of global income, demand tends to rise. (See the Gold Book for the supporting data and analysis.)

Let us apply these simple concepts to the last eight years. From 1995-1996 to 2003-2004, global real income has risen by a little more than 3% a year, or roughly 30%. Given gold demand’s past unitary price elasticity, this would suggest perhaps a 30% rise in gold demand. As I have said above, the real price of gold in a basket of currencies probably fell over this period. Given gold’s significant price elasticity, this would suggest that global gold demand rose by an even greater amount than 30%.

Has anything like this happened? If one listens to dealers and refiners, yes, something like this has happened. We hear reports of ever-rising gold demand in India and in the Middle East. And the big refineries in Switzerland are apparently running flat out, producing more gold for the market than they ever have.

John Brimelow has provided us with the following data on gold imports into Turkey. They averaged 100,000 tonnes a year in 1995-1996. They are running at a 300,000-tonne rate so far this year. Sure, Turkey — as a center for distribution into the Middle East — no doubt reflects a demand trend way above the global average. But how likely is it that gold demand in the rest of the world fell even more than GFMS reports in order for their global estimates to square with the huge demand growth in the Turkish regional market?



But what does GFMS tell us about gold demand? They tell us that, despite a rise in global incomes of almost a third and a likely small real price decline in the relevant basket of currencies, global gold demand, excluding Western investment demand, has actually fallen. Their estimate of gold demand for the year 2003 is particularly suspect. In that year, the real price of gold in the relevant basket of currencies was surely much below the comparable price of gold in 1995-1996. And yet, GFMS tells us that gold demand fell by almost 10% from the mid-1990s to 2003, amidst a large rise in real global income.

Why is GFMS giving us demand estimates that are so out of keeping with all historical demand trends, as well as the anecdotal evidence we get from refiners and from consuming regions like the Middle East and India? The answer once again lies in GFMS’s completely erroneous estimates of supply and their felt need to pull down their demand estimates so that it squares with these erroneous supply estimates.

In the 1990s, GFMS correctly recognized that producer hedging took physical gold out of central bank vaults by way of the lending process, and made it available for fabrication. Their basic error was that they did not admit the same for other types of gold borrowings. But now they have a very serious problem. Producers are now reducing their gold borrowings. As I have explained in many papers and the Gold Book, it is not possible for the gold that has been lent and then fabricated into jewelry to be returned to the central banks without blowing the lid off the gold market. We assume that, as with the covering of the large outstanding volumes of speculator shorts in 1998 and 1999, producer forward short positions have simply been transferred to the books of the official “manager” of the gold market.

But GFMS is assuming that repayments of producer gold loans does take physical gold out of the market, that it results in a negative supply flow. This greatly reduces their estimate of aggregate physical supply. They are trying to make up for this by now reporting record high official sector sales. They are also estimating record flows of gold scrap.

The latter makes no sense. They are now carrying scrap flows that are 40% higher than 1995-1996. At the same time, their estimate of fabrication demand is down. Yet, most scrap has been recycled jewelry and has tended to move with the trend in jewelry fabrication demand. In fact, scrap flows of all kinds have tended to move in tandem in percentage terms with fabrication demand flows. Because scrap flows are also price elastic, they have usually surged above trend when the real price of gold went to new highs. But in 2003, the real price of gold was below the level of 1995-1996. And yet GFMS has an estimate of scrap supply that is almost 50% greater than that of 1995-1996.

Despite these heroics on the part of GFMS to push up their estimates of official sector and scrap supplies, their treatment of the reductions in producer hedges as a negative supply flow results in an overall contraction of aggregate physical supply from 19951996 to 2003-2004. Nothing like that has happened. The refiners will tell you that. But that is where their faulty handling of the supply side for a decade and a half has now taken them.

Faced with this contraction in their estimate of supply, they must assume a contraction in demand to make their balances balance. That is why they estimate lower fabrication demand today than eight years ago, despite a very large increase in real income and something of a decline in the relevant measure of the real gold price. That is why they tell us that demand has fallen now over the last eight years, even though people in the marketplace tell us that Middle East and Indian demand is booming and that the refineries are humming like they have never hummed before.

The GFMS estimates of gold demand are so removed from historical trends and current market reports that they have become ludicrous. In a sense, with their recent statistical shenanigans, GFMS has now fully discredited itself.

We no longer have an anchor for estimating gold supply/demand. But we are not at all bothered by the fact that the official GFMS data goes in a direction that is diametrically opposed to our estimate of market trends. Abundant market reports support our overall assessment and we will go with them.

Note: Frank Veneroso is a Global Market Strategist advising Allianz Dresdner. He also manages two funds. Over more than three decades as a top-level market economist and fund manager, Mr. Veneroso has advised countless governments, as well as the World Bank, on economic policy, served as a senior partner in one of the world’s largest hedge funds, and is a confidant and private advisor to many of today’s most influential investors and economic leaders. In 1998, he authored the ground-breaking Gold Book, detailing how years of central bank gold loans and sales had artificially depressed the gold price, and positioned the metal for a powerful rebound. Mr. Veneroso graduated cum laude from Harvard University. VENEROSO’S VIEW — 7— MARCH 2005

Vollständiger Beitrag:

http://www.gata.org/VenerosoReport.html

[BarnyXXL]

Irgendwann werden alle merken, dass ihre US-Staatsanleihen wertlos sind.

Allem voran Japan.

Die werden es schon bemerkt haben, dass sie für ihre Anleihen keine realen Güter aus den USA bekommen,
sondern nur noch mehr wertlose Finanztitel.

Aber wenn die japanischen Banken alle ihre Positionen wertberichtigen würden,
wäre die nächste Finanzkrise schon da.

Selbst ein Umtausch in Euro würde schon eine Krise auslösen, nicht zuletzt durch einen weiter fallenden Dollar.

Was bei den karibischen Banken ist, dürfte im Wesentlichen Altersvorsorge
für einige US-Amerikaner sein.

[emulat]

Lieber Barny, das ist leider falsch.

Die Bonds sind nicht wertlos, Du kannst sie jeden Tag
kaufen oder verkaufen. Sind zwar seit Februar etwas gefallen sollten aber mit weiteren Zinserhöhungen wieder steigen.
Äußerst unwahrscheinlich auch, daß sie völlig wertlos werden, das würde Zahlungsunfähigkeit voraussetzen..

Nationen wie Japan und andere, die mit USA starken Handel treiben, werden jetzt auch nicht den Ast auf dem sie sitzen absägen. Da kooperiert man lieber, schließlich ist man ja voneinander abhängig. Also halten sie still und diversifizieren etwas. Bei den US Bonds ist daher ein Total Crash -auch empirisch betrachtet- nicht anzunehmen.

[BarnyXXL]

Natürlich kann ich Bonds jeden Tag kaufen und verkaufen.

Fakt ist nur, dass sich die Amis jährlich für ca. 250 Mrd. USD Güter aus Japan liefern lassen und diese quasi mit Staats-Anleihen bezahlen, die wiederum von Japan oder anderen Staaten oder Banken erworben werden.

Die Summe dieser Anleihen können die USA niemals in Güter
zurückzahlen, deshalb geschieht die Rückzahlung ja auch mit neuen Anleihen usw.

Das heisst nicht anderes, als dass die USA im Ausland Waren auf Kredit einkaufen (Haushaltsdefizit) und eventuell nicht mehr (in Gütern) bezahlen können.

Man könte auch sagen, der Wohlstand der USA basiert auf ungedeckten Wechseln.