Rohstoff-Explorer: Research oder Neuvorstellung (Seite 1612)

[Popeye82]

das Schreiben doppele ich auch nochmal.
Thema: China scheint die Sonne aus dem

China’s New Bad Debt Companies: Red Herrings?, They may be a short-term positive, but they won’t solve the underlying cause of local government indebtedness
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinas-new-bad-debt-companies…

"Recently, the China Banking Regulation Commission embarked on a pilot program to set up five local asset management companies in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui provinces, as well as in the city of Shanghai. The companies will buy up bad debt from banks, trust companies, financial corporations, and financial leasing companies, in an attempt to clean up the banking and shadow banking systems in these areas. This action will help to make some important financial entities whole after they took part in over-exuberant investment in recent years, but it does not correct the fiscal imbalances between central and local governments that helped generate the problem in the first place.

First, some background. Currently, there are four national asset management companies, set up in the late 1990s to remove nonperforming loans from banks’ balance sheets. These are China Huarong Asset Management Company, China Cinda Asset Management Company, Orient Asset Management Company, and China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation. At the time, China was undergoing a massive privatization of its economy, and attempting to make banks more competitive and less involved in unprofitable policy lending. These national asset management companies were criticized as being ineffective in selling the bad debt, but they were successful in improving the status of banks’ balance sheets.

Fast forward to today. Local asset management companies are to be created, since the recent splurge in lending for fixed asset investment has resulted in some loan defaults in financial institutions starting at the beginning of this year. Because many local government financing vehicles and property developers have taken part in excessive borrowing to build up real estate and infrastructure, asset price declines, and the constant threat of a liquidity crunch have impacted these loans that are tied to local markets. Creating “bad banks,” or asset management companies, then, for regions with the heaviest amount of borrowing makes sense.

At the same time, as was the case with the national asset management companies, establishing “bad banks” does not change the fundamental incentives for financial institutions to take on such bad loans in the first place. In the case of the national asset management companies, the policy lending relationship between banks and state-owned enterprises remained to a significant degree intact, crowding out investment in smaller and privately owned firms. Similarly today, establishing local asset management companies does not change the problem of the revenue shortage from which local governments suffer, maintaining their incentives to spur growth through borrowing and short-run economic activities.

The problem that local governments face is not just a balance sheet crisis, but a fiscal crisis. Local governments obtain revenues through a fraction of the value added and corporate taxes collected in their jurisdiction, and all personal income taxes and business taxes. Extra-budgetary revenue has come mainly from land sales. All sources of income are insufficient, however, to cover expenditures, and not high enough to spur implicitly necessary growth.

The lack of sufficient local government revenue led governments to borrow to finance projects through local government financing vehicles, entities set up as corporations that, unlike local governments themselves, can borrow on the market. The 2008-09 fiscal stimulus package operated largely by pressuring local governments to spend on infrastructure, and in order to fund these projects, local government financing vehicles had to borrow big. Local government debt grew so large, that the central government announced that local governments would be able to issue bonds in order to cover the debt. Ten local governments, in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Qingdao, Ningxia and Jiangxi, were permitted to issue bonds in May 2014. The yields of these municipal bonds must be higher than the yield on central government bonds, which continues to pressure local governments to achieve sustained growth, setting up local governments for yet another round of debt-fueled growth.

To conclude, the basic central-local government fiscal relationship must be changed to reduce incentives for local officials to take on bad debt. This has been stated before but cannot be stressed enough. Allowing some over-indebted local governments to set up asset management companies has positive short-term implications, but in the long run, the fiscal shortfall will bring local governments back to a position of excessive debt once again. The solution would be for the central government to allot more local revenue to local governments, require a system of checks and balances to ensure the money is spent wisely, and reduce pressure to generate growth at all costs. Only then can local government debt become qualitatively and quantitatively healthier. "

[Boersiback]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 47.428.963 von Popeye82 am 04.08.14 22:46:39

...und alles wird gut...
oder auch nicht...

http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2014/07/12/forget…

[Popeye82]

Gov't expects to borrow $192.000.000.000 in Q3, $187.000.000.000 in Q4
www.stockhouse.com/news/bulletins/2014/08/04/gov-t-expects-t…

"WASHINGTON - The U.S. Treasury Department has raised by $22 billion its estimate of what it needs to borrow in the third quarter to keep the government operating.

Treasury said Monday that it expects to borrow $192 billion in the July-September period, up from an estimate of $170 billion announced in April. The borrowing increase is mainly due to the government taking in less in revenue than previously expected.

Treasury also said it expects to borrow $187 billion in the fourth quarter of the year.

To meet borrowing needs, the government sells Treasury securities such as 10-year notes and 30-year bonds at quarterly refunding auctions.

The government ran a budget surplus of $71 billion in June, putting it on course to record the lowest annual deficit since 2008. "

[Boersiback]

ok wir sind bei "kennt die jemand ?"

ich gehe mit und erhöhe um 2


DuSolo Fertilizer (ehemals Eagle Minerals) (phosphat)

http://investorintel.com/potash-phosphate-intel/dusolos-rock…
http://dusolo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/DSA_Factsheet.p…

scheint mir interessant, sehr spärlich alles.. erinnert mich an tribune (manche wollen keine doofen kleinaktionäre und schweigen lieber soweit es möglich ist)

Mediterranean Resources (Türkei)

die PEA ist steinalt, von september 2011 (erwähns mal nur weil die bude nur ~4,5 mios cad wert ist derzeit

- Mediterranean acquires properties from Teck Resources in 2006
- Excellent cost of discovery - less than $7.00 per oz
- Initial Capital Expenditure of $125 M (including a 25% contingency)
- Projected mine life of 7.2 years and average annual production over mine
life of 94,500 oz Au.
- Cash costs of US$538 per Gold equivalent ounce
- In-pit, contained resources of 14.4 Mt, 905,000 oz gold, 104 Mlb of zinc,
and 32 Mlb of copper and 40 Mlb of lead

insgesamt mit weiterem projekt
- NI 43-101 compliant resource of 1.87 Million ounces of gold indicated and
inferred and 2.5 Million ounces of gold equivalent indicated and inferred

[donnerpower]

Kennt die jemand ?

TD Reduces target to $3.00 maintains Spec Buy rating
August 1, 2014 TD Securities maintains Spec Buy rating. 12-month target reduces to $3.00 from $3.25 BNK Petroleum Inc. (BKX-T) C$1.16 Operations Update and New Credit Facility Event BNK Petroleum (BKX-T) has announced a new senior credit facility and an update on its operations in Poland and Oklahoma. Impact: SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE • We believe the key news investors were waiting for was test results from the Gapowo B-1 shale test well in Poland. We believe the preliminary results are slightly negative. However, we believe the market was expecting very negative news (after the company had failed to provide an update in early July as it had previously indicated it would). • We also believe the other updates (including a new credit facility and drilling operations having restarted in Oklahoma) represent positive progress (roughly as expected). • Our long-term enthusiasm for the geological potential of BNK Petroleum's shale play in Poland is unchanged (but still balanced with a recognition of significant risks and uncertainties). After considering the mechanical issues and testing constraints encountered so far, we are actually slightly encouraged by indications of production potential during early flowback (with gas rates currently averaging 200-400 mcf/d and having spiked to around 1 mmcf/d). • However, results obtained so far have not provided anything close to a clear indication of commercial potential. Further testing will be required as a result, and multiple issues mean that Gapowo B-1 is now relatively unlikely to provide such an indication, in our view. We are increasing our assumed timelines and costs required to fully evaluate the Polish shale play and (potentially) move it to commercial development. Our Fully- risked (post-tax PV10) valuation for the company's Polish assets has decreased by ~20% as a result (to ~$260 million). We also recognize that financing another science well in Poland could either significantly stretch the company's balance sheet or require dilution of upside potential through industry or other funding. TD Investment Conclusion We believe that BNK Petroleum has a highly commercial early–stage oil shale play in the Caney in Oklahoma, and we also note the potential for indicative economic inputs (flow rates, decline rates, and costs) to improve with further optimization of drilling and completions. We expect production growth to resume following a recent restart to drilling activities. Exploration in Poland’s Baltic Basin shale plays is still very much in its infancy, but we believe that upside potential is large. We continue to believe that the market has underestimated the technical merits of BNK’s lands in Europe (but the plays remain very early stage and high risk). Given what we view as significant additional upside potential from planned near-term drilling and testing in Oklahoma and Poland, as well as relatively attractive valuation on all key metrics, we maintain our SPECULATIVE BUY rating.

Read more at http://www.stockhouse.com/companies/bullboard/t.bkx/bnk-petr…

[donnerpower]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 47.427.124 von IllePille am 04.08.14 19:15:40

Da haben wir beide recht...ohne ein neuen Investor sind die aktuellen Verbindlichkeiten nicht zu bewältigen , aber ein positiver EBIT vereinfacht einiges.

Schaun wa mal , Nevada Copper mit 15 % größter Aktionär dürfte kein Geld über haben..aber wiederum Nevadas größter Aktionär "Pala Investments" könnte hier in den Verhandlungen mit einsteigen

[IllePille]

Erst mal abwarten was der Q2 bringt am 14,08 wo erstmals wieder ein positiver EBIT erscheinen veröffentlicht wird....auch im Q3 wird Geld verdient.

das wäre nur dann von Bedeutung, wenn massig Cashflow erwirtschaftet würde. Das EBIT selbst ist im Moment ziemlich unerheblich. Das zentrale Problem ist die immense - kurzfristige - Verschuldung. Die lässt sich aus dem operativen Geschäft nicht bewältigen. Ergo: Schuldenschnitt oder Pleite

[donnerpower]

Erst mal abwarten was der Q2 bringt am 14,08 wo erstmals wieder ein positiver EBIT erscheinen veröffentlicht wird....auch im Q3 wird Geld verdient.

Pleite ? Hmm würde eher sagen das man sich eventuell von einer Mine trennen wird was ich aber auch nicht glaube..., denke ein Neuer Investor sollte nun nach der Erholung des Rohstoff Marktes einfacher als 2013 zu finden sein ,Die Russen haben über das WE schon ungewollt ordentlich Werbung gemacht

Spannend spannend ...Nervenkitzel wie immer

[Boersiback]

Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 47.426.521 von IllePille am 04.08.14 18:20:06

jo, warum sollte die jemand übernehmen... pleite abwarten ist da noch billiger

[IllePille]

Produzent Mercator Minerals stehen nun wahrscheinlich vor einer Übernahme

Mercator steht entweder vor einem massiven debr-to-equity swap oder vor der Pleite.