Private Equity und Hedge Fonds - Implikationen im Hinblick auf systematische Risiken - 500 Beiträge pro Seite
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Stellen Hedge Fonds und vor allem Private Equity Fonds (Leveraged buy Out) ein Risiko für die Finanzmarktstabilität dar?
Oder sind sie ein Wohltat und führen zu mehr Effizienz auf dem Finanzmarkt. Was mein ihr? Überwiegen die Vorteile die Nachteile?
The Times November 07, 2006
Collapse of leveraged buyout firm inevitable, FSA warns
By Caroline Merrell
The collapse of a large private equity-backed company is inevitable, the Financial Services Authority forecast yesterday.
The warning came as the City regulator blew a hole in the culture of secrecy of private equity by demanding that UK banks disclose their financial exposure to highly leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
Hector Sants, the managing director of wholesale markets at the FSA, said that such a default was inevitable but pointed out that small shocks were healthy for the private equity market, which has been accused of piling up too much debt on company balance sheets.
Mr Sants was launching the results of an eight-month inquiry into the private equity industry. The review demanded that the banks disclose the default rates on leveraged buyout deals on a six-monthly basis, as well as the total level of lending on LBOs.
The FSA said that the disclosure would give the regulator a better understanding of the credit cycle. The FSA found that lending on leveraged buyouts among the biggest banks had increased to £68 billion for the year to the end of June, a rise of 17 per cent on the previous year.
The review also highlighted the increased scope for insider-dealing in private equity deals, as well as pointing out the potential conflicts of interest at private equity firms that also run hedge funds investing in debt. The FSA is also demanding that firms give the regulator details of how much capital investors have put into private equity funds. The review comes as the credit agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, give warning over the increasing debt levels being used by private equity firms intent on buying the biggest companies. S&P said last month that the global default rate had fallen to its lowest level in almost 25 years, but forecast that it would rise between now and the end of next year.
Mr Sants highlighted the potential problems that a large collapse could create for creditors. “If we were to have a failure of a leveraged private-equity backed company it would be quite difficult to put a small number of owners of that risk around a table.” He said it would be up to the market participants to sort out any default. “The flipside of increased risk dispersion is increased difficulty in managing a failure.”
The industry welcomed the FSA paper, which requires responses within four months. Peter Linthwaithe, chief executive of the British Venture Capital Association, said: “The FSA has rightly understood that the more complex financing structures are mainly concentrated in relatively few, larger deals.”
John Cole, of Ernst & Young, said: “I am glad that the FSA has responded with a sensible and even-handed approach. As our report on exits across Western Europe revealed last week, private equity companies are consistently outperforming public companies in terms of creating value.”
Quelle: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9063-2440634,00…
Oder sind sie ein Wohltat und führen zu mehr Effizienz auf dem Finanzmarkt. Was mein ihr? Überwiegen die Vorteile die Nachteile?
The Times November 07, 2006
Collapse of leveraged buyout firm inevitable, FSA warns
By Caroline Merrell
The collapse of a large private equity-backed company is inevitable, the Financial Services Authority forecast yesterday.
The warning came as the City regulator blew a hole in the culture of secrecy of private equity by demanding that UK banks disclose their financial exposure to highly leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
Hector Sants, the managing director of wholesale markets at the FSA, said that such a default was inevitable but pointed out that small shocks were healthy for the private equity market, which has been accused of piling up too much debt on company balance sheets.
Mr Sants was launching the results of an eight-month inquiry into the private equity industry. The review demanded that the banks disclose the default rates on leveraged buyout deals on a six-monthly basis, as well as the total level of lending on LBOs.
The FSA said that the disclosure would give the regulator a better understanding of the credit cycle. The FSA found that lending on leveraged buyouts among the biggest banks had increased to £68 billion for the year to the end of June, a rise of 17 per cent on the previous year.
The review also highlighted the increased scope for insider-dealing in private equity deals, as well as pointing out the potential conflicts of interest at private equity firms that also run hedge funds investing in debt. The FSA is also demanding that firms give the regulator details of how much capital investors have put into private equity funds. The review comes as the credit agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, give warning over the increasing debt levels being used by private equity firms intent on buying the biggest companies. S&P said last month that the global default rate had fallen to its lowest level in almost 25 years, but forecast that it would rise between now and the end of next year.
Mr Sants highlighted the potential problems that a large collapse could create for creditors. “If we were to have a failure of a leveraged private-equity backed company it would be quite difficult to put a small number of owners of that risk around a table.” He said it would be up to the market participants to sort out any default. “The flipside of increased risk dispersion is increased difficulty in managing a failure.”
The industry welcomed the FSA paper, which requires responses within four months. Peter Linthwaithe, chief executive of the British Venture Capital Association, said: “The FSA has rightly understood that the more complex financing structures are mainly concentrated in relatively few, larger deals.”
John Cole, of Ernst & Young, said: “I am glad that the FSA has responded with a sensible and even-handed approach. As our report on exits across Western Europe revealed last week, private equity companies are consistently outperforming public companies in terms of creating value.”
Quelle: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9063-2440634,00…
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 25.762.341 von ottone am 28.11.06 03:46:07Europe simulates financial meltdown
By George Parker in Vienna
Published: April 9 2006 21:05 | Last updated: April 9 2006 21:05
Europe’s financial regulators have held a “war game” exercise, simulating a continent-wide financial crisis, amid fears they are ill- prepared to stop a problem in one country spreading across borders.
The exercise involved simulating the collapse of a big bank with operations in several large countries to see whether the European Central Bank, national central banks and finance ministries could work toget- her to contain the crisis.
It is understood the exercise took place at the headquarters of the ECB in Frankfurt at the end of last week. One person involved said: “It is like checking whether a nuclear power plant can survive a plane crashing into it.”
The exercise took place on the eve of a meeting of European Union finance ministers and central bank chiefs in Vienna, at which the bloc’s financial stability was high on the agenda. Officials at the meeting confirmed that ministers had discussed the ECB crisis management exercise.
The aim was to test the ability of national regulators to share information with other national bodies in a crisis and to overcome “differences in culture” and other practical obstacles. The results are being analysed and will be reported to the Ecofin council in June.
Europe’s vulnerability to a cross-border financial crisis was revealed in a confidential report prepared by officials for the Ecofin council. Regulators are particularly worried about the risks to financial stability posed by the growth in hedge funds and credit derivatives.
It said that “progress has been insufficient in most of the member states” in putting in place national structures for crisis management, and urged national regulators to stage their own crisis simulation exercises.
The EU has rejected the creation of a single European financial regulator to manage cross-border risks, and has instead placed its faith in national authorities working together.
Last year regulators signed an agreement that they would share information openly and speedily in the event of a crisis in a national financial institution, in an attempt to stop the contagion spreading across Europe’s single market.
The report submitted to the Ecofin council identified a possible housing market crash, a bird flu pandemic and high oil prices as potential sources of risk, but said that the situation in the banking sector was “solid”.
However, the report warned that hedge funds and credit derivatives were sources of concern “as related risks remain opaque and they have become extremely relevant in assessing financial stability both across borders and across all financial sectors”.
It said that, while hedge funds could contribute to market efficiency, they “can also be sources of systemic risks”.
Credit derivatives markets were said to have grown by 128 per cent in 2005 compared with the previous year, with a nominal value of €12,430bn ($14,900bn, £8,700bn) in June last year.
The report welcomed the efforts by regulators to alleviate risks “by encouraging the markets to develop back-office processes to overcome the problems of unconfirmed trades which could escalate into wider instabilities in the financial system”.
Additional reporting by Wolfgang Proissl in Vienna and Mark Schieritz in Frankfurt
Quelle:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/66c09a88-c802-11da-a377-0000779e2340…
By George Parker in Vienna
Published: April 9 2006 21:05 | Last updated: April 9 2006 21:05
Europe’s financial regulators have held a “war game” exercise, simulating a continent-wide financial crisis, amid fears they are ill- prepared to stop a problem in one country spreading across borders.
The exercise involved simulating the collapse of a big bank with operations in several large countries to see whether the European Central Bank, national central banks and finance ministries could work toget- her to contain the crisis.
It is understood the exercise took place at the headquarters of the ECB in Frankfurt at the end of last week. One person involved said: “It is like checking whether a nuclear power plant can survive a plane crashing into it.”
The exercise took place on the eve of a meeting of European Union finance ministers and central bank chiefs in Vienna, at which the bloc’s financial stability was high on the agenda. Officials at the meeting confirmed that ministers had discussed the ECB crisis management exercise.
The aim was to test the ability of national regulators to share information with other national bodies in a crisis and to overcome “differences in culture” and other practical obstacles. The results are being analysed and will be reported to the Ecofin council in June.
Europe’s vulnerability to a cross-border financial crisis was revealed in a confidential report prepared by officials for the Ecofin council. Regulators are particularly worried about the risks to financial stability posed by the growth in hedge funds and credit derivatives.
It said that “progress has been insufficient in most of the member states” in putting in place national structures for crisis management, and urged national regulators to stage their own crisis simulation exercises.
The EU has rejected the creation of a single European financial regulator to manage cross-border risks, and has instead placed its faith in national authorities working together.
Last year regulators signed an agreement that they would share information openly and speedily in the event of a crisis in a national financial institution, in an attempt to stop the contagion spreading across Europe’s single market.
The report submitted to the Ecofin council identified a possible housing market crash, a bird flu pandemic and high oil prices as potential sources of risk, but said that the situation in the banking sector was “solid”.
However, the report warned that hedge funds and credit derivatives were sources of concern “as related risks remain opaque and they have become extremely relevant in assessing financial stability both across borders and across all financial sectors”.
It said that, while hedge funds could contribute to market efficiency, they “can also be sources of systemic risks”.
Credit derivatives markets were said to have grown by 128 per cent in 2005 compared with the previous year, with a nominal value of €12,430bn ($14,900bn, £8,700bn) in June last year.
The report welcomed the efforts by regulators to alleviate risks “by encouraging the markets to develop back-office processes to overcome the problems of unconfirmed trades which could escalate into wider instabilities in the financial system”.
Additional reporting by Wolfgang Proissl in Vienna and Mark Schieritz in Frankfurt
Quelle:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/66c09a88-c802-11da-a377-0000779e2340…
Stellen Hedge Fonds und vor allem Private Equity Fonds (Leveraged buy Out) ein Risiko für die Finanzmarktstabilität dar?
Oder sind sie ein Wohltat und führen zu mehr Effizienz auf dem Finanzmarkt.
Was mein ihr? Überwiegen die Vorteile die Nachteile?
Zunächst wäre mal deine Meinung gefragt!
Nur mal ein kurzer Kommentar zum Anfang: Irgedwann wird es knallen, doch du weißt nicht wann.
Was ist das für eine Welt, wo du solide Firmen kaufen kannst und diese dann mit deinem FK für den Kauf zuladen kannst und viele dadurch in schlechteren konjunkturellen Zeiten in Schieflage geraten werden.
Viele PEs hatten einfach zuviel Zulauf an Geld und das mußte irgendwo investiert werden. Dadurch steigen die Preise und die Investionen werden immer unüberlegter.
Es ist vergleichbar mit der Situation der VCs im Jahr 2000, nur das das Geld in solideren Gesellschaften steckt.
Falls die Zinsen höher sind bei der Refinanzierung, dann kann es bitter werden.
Oder sind sie ein Wohltat und führen zu mehr Effizienz auf dem Finanzmarkt.
Was mein ihr? Überwiegen die Vorteile die Nachteile?
Zunächst wäre mal deine Meinung gefragt!
Nur mal ein kurzer Kommentar zum Anfang: Irgedwann wird es knallen, doch du weißt nicht wann.
Was ist das für eine Welt, wo du solide Firmen kaufen kannst und diese dann mit deinem FK für den Kauf zuladen kannst und viele dadurch in schlechteren konjunkturellen Zeiten in Schieflage geraten werden.
Viele PEs hatten einfach zuviel Zulauf an Geld und das mußte irgendwo investiert werden. Dadurch steigen die Preise und die Investionen werden immer unüberlegter.
Es ist vergleichbar mit der Situation der VCs im Jahr 2000, nur das das Geld in solideren Gesellschaften steckt.
Falls die Zinsen höher sind bei der Refinanzierung, dann kann es bitter werden.
Also meine Meinung. Das ist nicht so einfach.
Einerseits halte ich PE'S für etwas gutes. Vor allem wenn ich als Aktionär mit einer Firma konfrontiert bin,von der ich überzeugt bin, aber in der eine selbstgefällige Managerclicke sitzt. Und in der sich das Management und der Aufsichtsrat gegenseitig "den Rücken kratzt". In solch einem Fall kann ein engagement eines PE's eine Wohltat sein, sowohl für die Aktionäre als auch für die Volkswirtschaft.
Andererseits gefallen mir die Exzesse in der Branche nicht. Immer mehr PE'S wollen mitspielen. Da sich dadurch die Renditen schmälern, wird das "leverage" hochgefahren, mit dem Ziel das (wenige) eingesetzte Eigenkapital besser zu verzinsen. Einer übernommenen Firma Schuldzahlungen aufzuzwingen, die den gessamten Jahresüberschuss beinhalten ist schon ein ganz übles Ding. Und davon hat der (langfrist) Aktionär auch nichts.
Was mir wirklich Kopfzerbrechen macht, ist die Rolle der Banken dabei. Interessenkonfllikte bei der Finanzierung der Projekte. Finanzierung von Projekten, die früher niemals genehmigt worden wären. Der Anreiz der Banken mitzumachen, da man doppelt verdient. Sowohl bei der Kreditfinanzierung, als auch bei der Akquisition. Die Angst mitmachen zu müssen, da sonst die Konkurrenz den Deal macht.
Das scheint mir ein ganz unheilvolles Gemisch zu sein.
Ich frage mich, welche Deutschen Banken hier am agressivsten versuchen mitzuspielen. Aber wahrscheinlich die üblichen Verdächtigen.
Einerseits halte ich PE'S für etwas gutes. Vor allem wenn ich als Aktionär mit einer Firma konfrontiert bin,von der ich überzeugt bin, aber in der eine selbstgefällige Managerclicke sitzt. Und in der sich das Management und der Aufsichtsrat gegenseitig "den Rücken kratzt". In solch einem Fall kann ein engagement eines PE's eine Wohltat sein, sowohl für die Aktionäre als auch für die Volkswirtschaft.
Andererseits gefallen mir die Exzesse in der Branche nicht. Immer mehr PE'S wollen mitspielen. Da sich dadurch die Renditen schmälern, wird das "leverage" hochgefahren, mit dem Ziel das (wenige) eingesetzte Eigenkapital besser zu verzinsen. Einer übernommenen Firma Schuldzahlungen aufzuzwingen, die den gessamten Jahresüberschuss beinhalten ist schon ein ganz übles Ding. Und davon hat der (langfrist) Aktionär auch nichts.
Was mir wirklich Kopfzerbrechen macht, ist die Rolle der Banken dabei. Interessenkonfllikte bei der Finanzierung der Projekte. Finanzierung von Projekten, die früher niemals genehmigt worden wären. Der Anreiz der Banken mitzumachen, da man doppelt verdient. Sowohl bei der Kreditfinanzierung, als auch bei der Akquisition. Die Angst mitmachen zu müssen, da sonst die Konkurrenz den Deal macht.
Das scheint mir ein ganz unheilvolles Gemisch zu sein.
Ich frage mich, welche Deutschen Banken hier am agressivsten versuchen mitzuspielen. Aber wahrscheinlich die üblichen Verdächtigen.
Antwort auf Beitrag Nr.: 25.775.300 von ottone am 28.11.06 18:33:22
Wir haben hier in Europa bzw. USA die gleiche Situation wie im Jahr 1980/1981 in den USA.
Laut meiner Erinnerung - ohne Gewähr.
Auch damals gab es wahnsinnige Summen die den PEs zugegeflossen sind und die Renditen in den folgenden 10 Jahren waren eine Katastrophe.
Die Chancen das es dieses mal genauso ist, stehen nicht schlecht.
Es ist genauso wie bei den Hedge Fonds - wenn eine Branche läuft, dann gibt es viele Trittbrettfahrer die nicht das nötige langjährige Know How haben.
Die Profis agieren antizyklisch und haben einen langjährigen Track Record.
Wir haben hier in Europa bzw. USA die gleiche Situation wie im Jahr 1980/1981 in den USA.
Laut meiner Erinnerung - ohne Gewähr.
Auch damals gab es wahnsinnige Summen die den PEs zugegeflossen sind und die Renditen in den folgenden 10 Jahren waren eine Katastrophe.
Die Chancen das es dieses mal genauso ist, stehen nicht schlecht.
Es ist genauso wie bei den Hedge Fonds - wenn eine Branche läuft, dann gibt es viele Trittbrettfahrer die nicht das nötige langjährige Know How haben.
Die Profis agieren antizyklisch und haben einen langjährigen Track Record.
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